Aristotle - index for METAPHYSICA Book 8 Part 3 - Whether a name means the composite substance, or the actuality or form

Aristotle - index for METAPHYSICA Book 8 Part 3

Whether a name means the composite substance, or the actuality or form

Paragraph 1 We must not fail to notice that sometimes it is not clear whether a name means the composite substance, or the actuality or form, e.g. whether 'house' is a sign for the composite thing, 'a covering consisting of bricks and stones laid thus and thus', or for the actuality or form, 'a covering', and whether a line is 'twoness in length' or 'twoness', and whether an animal is 'soul in a body' or 'a soul';

Paragraph 2 If we examine we find that the syllable does not consist of the letters + juxtaposition, nor is the house bricks + juxtaposition.

Paragraph 3 (This, then, must either be eternal or it must be destructible without being ever in course of being destroyed, and must have come to be without ever being in course of coming to be.

Paragraph 4 Therefore the difficulty which used to be raised by the school of Antisthenes and other such uneducated people has a certain timeliness.

Paragraph 5 It is also obvious that, if substances are in a sense numbers, they are so in this sense and not, as some say, as numbers of units.

Paragraph 6 (1) it is divisible, and into indivisible parts (for definitory formulae are not infinite), and number also is of this nature.

Paragraph 7 And (2) as, when one of the parts of which a number consists has been taken from or added to the number, it is no longer the same number, but a different one, even if it is the very smallest part that has been taken away or added, so the definition and the essence will no longer remain when anything has been taken away or added.

Paragraph 8 And (3) the number must be something in virtue of which it is one, and this these thinkers cannot state, what makes it one, if it is one (for either it is not one but a sort of heap, or if it is, we ought to say what it is that makes one out of many);

Paragraph 9 And (4) as number does not admit of the more and the less, neither does substance, in the sense of form, but if any substance does, it is only the substance which involves matter.

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Paragraph 1	We must not fail to notice that sometimes it is not clear whether a name means the composite substance, or the actuality or form, e.g. whether 'house' is a sign for the composite thing, 'a covering consisting of bricks and stones laid thus and thus', or for the actuality or form, 'a covering', and whether a line is 'twoness in length' or 'twoness', and whether an animal is 'soul in a body' or 'a soul';
Paragraph 2	If we examine we find that the syllable does not consist of the letters + juxtaposition, nor is the house bricks + juxtaposition.
Paragraph 3	(This, then, must either be eternal or it must be destructible without being ever in course of being destroyed, and must have come to be without ever being in course of coming to be.
Paragraph 4	Therefore the difficulty which used to be raised by the school of Antisthenes and other such uneducated people has a certain timeliness.
Paragraph 5	It is also obvious that, if substances are in a sense numbers, they are so in this sense and not, as some say, as numbers of units.
Paragraph 6	(1) it is divisible, and into indivisible parts (for definitory formulae are not infinite), and number also is of this nature.
Paragraph 7	And (2) as, when one of the parts of which a number consists has been taken from or added to the number, it is no longer the same number, but a different one, even if it is the very smallest part that has been taken away or added, so the definition and the essence will no longer remain when anything has been taken away or added.
Paragraph 8	And (3) the number must be something in virtue of which it is one, and this these thinkers cannot state, what makes it one, if it is one (for either it is not one but a sort of heap, or if it is, we ought to say what it is that makes one out of many);
Paragraph 9	And (4) as number does not admit of the more and the less, neither does substance, in the sense of form, but if any substance does, it is only the substance which involves matter.