Aristotle - index for METAPHYSICA Book 3 Part 1

14 problems to be discussed

Paragraph 1 We must, with a view to the science which we are seeking, first recount the subjects that should be first discussed.

Paragraph 2 The first problem concerns the subject which we discussed in our prefatory remarks.

Paragraph 3 (1) whether the investigation of the causes belongs to one or to more sciences, and

Paragraph 4 (2) whether such a science should survey only the first principles of substance, or also the principles on which all men base their proofs, e.g. whether it is possible at the same time to assert and deny one and the same thing or not, and all other such questions;

Paragraph 5 (3) if the science in question deals with substance, whether one science deals with all substances, or more than one, and if more, whether all are akin, or some of them must be called forms of Wisdom and the others something else.

Paragraph 6 (4) this itself is also one of the things that must be discussed - whether sensible substances alone should be said to exist or others also besides them, and whether these others are of one kind or there are several classes of substances, as is supposed by those who believe both in Forms and in mathematical objects intermediate between these and sensible things.

Paragraph 7 (5) whether our investigation is concerned only with substances or also with the essential attributes of substances.

Paragraph 8 (6), are the principles and elements of things the genera, or the parts present in each thing, into which it is divided;

Paragraph 9 (7) if they are the genera, are they the genera that are predicated proximately of the individuals, or the highest genera, e.g. is animal or man the first principle and the more independent of the individual instance?

Paragraph 10 (8) we must inquire and discuss especially whether there is, besides the matter, any thing that is a cause in itself or not, and whether this can exist apart or not, and whether it is one or more in number, and whether there is something apart from the concrete thing (by the concrete thing I mean the matter with something already predicated of it), or there is nothing apart, or there is something in some cases though not in others, and what sort of cases these are.

Paragraph 11 (9) we ask whether the principles are limited in number or in kind, both those in the definitions and those in the substratum;

Paragraph 12 (10) whether the principles of perishable and of imperishable things are the same or different;

Paragraph 13 (11) there is the question which is hardest of all and most perplexing, whether unity and being, as the Pythagoreans and Plato said, are not attributes of something else but the substance of existing things, or this is not the case, but the substratum is something else, - as Empedocles says, love;

Paragraph 14 (12) we ask whether the principles are universal or like individual things, and

Paragraph 15 (13) whether they exist potentially or actually, and further, whether they are potential or actual in any other sense than in reference to movement;

Paragraph 16 (14), are numbers and lines and figures and points a kind of substance or not, and if they are substances are they separate from sensible things or present in them?

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created 1996/11/25 modified 2009/04/26


Paragraph 1	We must, with a view to the science which we are seeking, first recount the subjects that should be first discussed.
Paragraph 2	The first problem concerns the subject which we discussed in our prefatory remarks.
Paragraph 3	(1) whether the investigation of the causes belongs to one or to more sciences, and
Paragraph 4	(2) whether such a science should survey only the first principles of substance, or also the principles on which all men base their proofs, e.g. whether it is possible at the same time to assert and deny one and the same thing or not, and all other such questions;
Paragraph 5	(3) if the science in question deals with substance, whether one science deals with all substances, or more than one, and if more, whether all are akin, or some of them must be called forms of Wisdom and the others something else.
Paragraph 6	(4) this itself is also one of the things that must be discussed - whether sensible substances alone should be said to exist or others also besides them, and whether these others are of one kind or there are several classes of substances, as is supposed by those who believe both in Forms and in mathematical objects intermediate between these and sensible things.
Paragraph 7	(5) whether our investigation is concerned only with substances or also with the essential attributes of substances.
Paragraph 8	(6), are the principles and elements of things the genera, or the parts present in each thing, into which it is divided;
Paragraph 9	(7) if they are the genera, are they the genera that are predicated proximately of the individuals, or the highest genera, e.g. is animal or man the first principle and the more independent of the individual instance?
Paragraph 10	(8) we must inquire and discuss especially whether there is, besides the matter, any thing that is a cause in itself or not, and whether this can exist apart or not, and whether it is one or more in number, and whether there is something apart from the concrete thing (by the concrete thing I mean the matter with something already predicated of it), or there is nothing apart, or there is something in some cases though not in others, and what sort of cases these are.
Paragraph 11	(9) we ask whether the principles are limited in number or in kind, both those in the definitions and those in the substratum;
Paragraph 12	(10) whether the principles of perishable and of imperishable things are the same or different;
Paragraph 13	(11) there is the question which is hardest of all and most perplexing, whether unity and being, as the Pythagoreans and Plato said, are not attributes of something else but the substance of existing things, or this is not the case, but the substratum is something else, - as Empedocles says, love;
Paragraph 14	(12) we ask whether the principles are universal or like individual things, and
Paragraph 15	(13) whether they exist potentially or actually, and further, whether they are potential or actual in any other sense than in reference to movement;
Paragraph 16	(14), are numbers and lines and figures and points a kind of substance or not, and if they are substances are they separate from sensible things or present in them?