Aristotle - index for METAPHYSICA Book 10 Part 1

The one

Paragraph 1 We have said previously, in our distinction of the various meanings of words, that 'one' has several meanings;

Paragraph 2 (1) There is the continuous, either in general, or especially that which is continuous by nature and not by contact nor by being together;

Paragraph 3 (2) That which is a whole and has a certain shape and form is one in a still higher degree;

Paragraph 4 (3) In number, then, the individual is indivisible, and

Paragraph 5 (4) in kind, that which in intelligibility and in knowledge is indivisible, so that that which causes substances to be one must be one in the primary sense.

Paragraph 6 But it must be observed that the questions, what sort of things are said to be one, and what it is to be one and what is the definition of it, should not be assumed to be the same.

Paragraph 7 In all these, then, the measure and starting-point is something one and indivisible, since even in lines we treat as indivisible the line a foot long.

Paragraph 8 But the measure is not always one in number -- sometimes there are several;

Paragraph 9 The measure is always homogeneous with the thing measured;

Paragraph 10 Knowledge, also, and perception, we call the measure of things for the same reason, because we come to know something by them - while as a matter of fact they are measured rather than measure other things.

Paragraph 11 Evidently, then, unity in the strictest sense, if we define it according to the meaning of the word, is a measure, and most properly of quantity, and secondly of quality.

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Paragraph 1	We have said previously, in our distinction of the various meanings of words, that 'one' has several meanings;
Paragraph 2	(1) There is the continuous, either in general, or especially that which is continuous by nature and not by contact nor by being together;
Paragraph 3	(2) That which is a whole and has a certain shape and form is one in a still higher degree;
Paragraph 4	(3) In number, then, the individual is indivisible, and
Paragraph 5	(4) in kind, that which in intelligibility and in knowledge is indivisible, so that that which causes substances to be one must be one in the primary sense.
Paragraph 6	But it must be observed that the questions, what sort of things are said to be one, and what it is to be one and what is the definition of it, should not be assumed to be the same.
Paragraph 7	In all these, then, the measure and starting-point is something one and indivisible, since even in lines we treat as indivisible the line a foot long.
Paragraph 8	But the measure is not always one in number -- sometimes there are several;
Paragraph 9	The measure is always homogeneous with the thing measured;
Paragraph 10	Knowledge, also, and perception, we call the measure of things for the same reason, because we come to know something by them - while as a matter of fact they are measured rather than measure other things.
Paragraph 11	Evidently, then, unity in the strictest sense, if we define it according to the meaning of the word, is a measure, and most properly of quantity, and secondly of quality.