Ch	Authors	Title
		Introduction
1	Warren S. McCulloch Walter H.Pitts	A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity
2	Alan M. Turing	Computing Machinery and Intelligence
3	John R. Searle	Minds, Brains and Programs
4	Margaret A. Boden	Escaping from the Chinese Room
5	Allen Newell Herbert A Simon	Computer Science as Empirical Enquiry
6	David C. Marr	Artificial Intelligence: A Personal View
7	Daniel C. Dennett	Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem of AI
8	Patrick J. Hayes	The Naive Physics Manifesto
9	Drew McDermott	A Critique of Pure Reason
10	Aaron Sloman	Motives, Mechanisms and Emotions
11	Geoffrey E. Hinton James L.McClelland David E. Rumelhart	Distributed Representations
12	Andy Clark	Connectionism, Competence and Explanation
13	Hubert L. Dreyfus Stuart E. Dreyfus	Making a Mind Versus Modellng the Brain: Artificial Intelligence at a Branch Point
14	Paul M.Churchland	Some Reductive strategies in Cognitive Neurobiology
15	Adrian Cussins	The Connectionist Construction of Concepts

1. the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sort of things that minds can do
2. making computers do things that would require intelligence if done by people
3. the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes
4. the science of intelligence in general
5. the intellectual core of cognitive science

She considers the main division in AI to be between "GOFAI" (Good Old Fashioned AI) and Connectionism, claiming that both have a common ancestry in the paper by McCulloch and Pitts in Chapter 1. This reflects Boden's perception of AI as a part of cognitive science concerned with the modelling of mental phenomena, rather than (say) as an engineering enterprise attaching no special significance to the structure of the brain.

Having discussed the significance of the McCulloch and Pitt paper Margaret moves on (or rather back) to Turing's paper (chapter 2), briefly describing the "Turing Test".

Three kinds of objection to Turings position are mentioned:

1. That it does not provide a good definition of intelligence
2. That computers could not be intelligent (however well they might perform in a Turing Test). A 1979 paper by Dreyfus is included under this heading, along with the paper by Searle in Chapter 3 of this volume. Margaret Boden's own response to this attack is also included as Chapter 4 of the volume.
3. That computers never will pass the Turing Test.

Moving on from the criticisms of Turing, we come to the paper by Newell and Simon, in Chapter 4, where the concept of a Physical-Symbol System is introduced. In this paper computer science is characterised as empirical enquiry.

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© created 1996/4/10 modified 1997/9/4