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Devoted centrally to an exposition of a kind of logical empiricim, which
includes re-instatement of the analytic/synthetic dichotomy, some kind of
moderation of metaphysics (?) but avoids the principle of verification and
phenomenal reductionism.
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Chapter One: WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE
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Chapter Two: THE CLAIMS OF RATIONALISM
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Chapter Four: PROPERTIES AND CONCEPTS
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Chapter Five: OBSERVATIONAL KNOWLEDGE
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Chapter Six: MEMORY AND A POSTERIORI KNOWLEDGE
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APPENDICES
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When Aune began his philosophical career empiricism was received wisdom.
It has since been repudiated, with the rejection of the analytic/synthetic
distinction, and the emergence of a new kind of metaphysics.
Aune regards this as a backward step, and it is the purpose of this book to put
forward and defend his own empiricist position.
Rudolf Carnap's philosophy is widely known primarily in its earliest
manifestations.
His mature philosophy is not well known but answers many of the criticisms
which have been levelled at Logical Positivism, including those of Quine
against the concept of analyticity.
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The other principle factor in the eclipse of logical empiricism was the rise of
"epistemological rationalism".
In this context Aune mentions Kripke and Chisholm.
The book responds generically to certain positions more or less close to that
of Chisholm.
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Quine's Criticism of Analyticity
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Quine's Later View of Analytic Truth
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Analyticity, Logic, and Everyday Language
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Analyticity Extended
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Some Examples and Arguments by Kripke
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Beliefs, Propositions and Analyticity
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