<table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0" ><tr><td valign="top" style="font: inherit;">JL,<br><br>What is the info on Chapman. I'd like to include reference to the<br>quote you made to the effect that Anscombe's intention was<br>the best Gricean idea yet. That would be interesting. Also,<br>I'm curious about Chapman. <br><br>I think Grice did a pretty terrible job in editing WoW. He <br>"cleaned it up." Too much missing; too much edited out;<br>not enough included. Don't get me wrong it is worth having<br>and reading but it has limitations.<br><br>On dispositions: I think this card has been played too <br>often. I think the issue of dispositions because it goes<br>back to the need to add operational definitions to <br>extensional accounts of scientific explanation etc and<br>because of its link to the verificationist position has an<br>unchallenged respectability. To be sure "finkish dipsostions"<br>do raise interesting questions about the
semantics of<br>counterfactuals in relation to these "theory terms" but<br>I think concentrating on them as a way of either formulating<br>or solving problems is far overdone.<br><br>By the way, if you'd like to write up a ten page pdf on <br>Grice's work and career etc. I'd be pleased to put it on<br>HIst-Analytic when I make my next addition. I've already<br>made the selection, a book. I think people will be surprised.<br>It's one of H. H. Price's works. Price was superb; never agreed<br>with him on much but he was a terrific philosopher.<br><br>Regards<br><br>STeve<br><br>--- On <b>Sat, 7/11/09, Jlsperanza@aol.com <i><Jlsperanza@aol.com></i></b> wrote:<br><blockquote style="border-left: 2px solid rgb(16, 16, 255); margin-left: 5px; padding-left: 5px;"><br>From: Jlsperanza@aol.com <Jlsperanza@aol.com><br>Subject: Grice, "Disposition and Intention"<br>To: hist-analytic@simplelists.co.uk<br>Date: Saturday, July 11, 2009, 1:41 PM<br><br><div
class="plainMail">Among the many unpublications by H. P. Grice that S. R. Chapman has <br>unburied for posterity is this "Disposition and Intention" which is discussed in <br>her biography of the man, and some excerpts of which I transcribe vis a vis <br>our continuing interest in the history of analytic philosophy (-- inspired <br>by S. R. Bayne's enthusiasm in the area and his seminal work on Anscombe).<br><br>Chapman writes:<br><br>"Grice circulated "Disposition and Intentions" among his colleagues just a <br>few years after he had written 'Meaning'"<br><br>That would be 1950.<br>I note that it has to be at least after Ryle 1949.<br><br>And I added a marginal note, J. C. D'Alession, "Intentions and <br>Dispositions" Crititica. The Argentine philosopher J. C. D'Alessio was a student of <br>Pears at All Souls and we would discuss Grice together.<br><br>---<br><br>""Disposition and
Intention" has survived only in manuscript".<br><br>He writes that "his purpose is to consider the best analysis of <br>'PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS'. He considers the 'dispositional' account, and the <br>alternative, to consider 'intention' statements as describing "SPECIAL EPISODES". <br><br>"Grice is dismissive of a third possibility: behaviourism" -- as 'silly' <br>(a word I came to overused, too, :) -- it means etymologically, 'blissful').<br><br>Grice argues that the dispositional account runs into difficulties <br>specially with "I intend."<br><br>But surely it is not appropriate, Chapman notes, to switch to the 'special <br>episode' account."<br><br>The 'how do you know' is trick.<br><br>"People," Chapman writes, "are not expected to be judging intention from <br>OBSERVATION."<br><br>In Grice's METAPHOR:<br><br>"I am not in the audience, not even in <br>the front row of
the stalls. I am on<br>the stage."<br>(cited by Chapman, p. 67).<br><br>-- brilliant, I'd expect you'd agree!<br><br>For (3), Grice singles Ryle for criticism. <br><br>----<br><br>"Grice argues that the difference between speech and other forms of <br>behavioiur is much greater than Ryle allows."<br><br>"A man does not need to wait," Chapman notes, "to observe HIMSELF heading <br>for the plate of fruit on the table before is in a position to KNOW that he <br>wants pineapple".<br><br>"Grice suggested solution to the failure ... of a, b, and c -- rests on <br>intention."<br><br>HYPOTHETICAL INTENTION.<br><br>If so and so were the case<br>I would behave in such and such a way<br><br>"cannot be understood as a statement of hypothetical fact," Chapman <br>writes, but "as a statement of hypothetical intention"<br><br>but cfr. Dummett on 'hypothetical promises.'<br><br>"just as
long as the behaviour in question can be seen as VOLUNTARY."<br><br>Furthermore,<br><br>"It is not possible to say, "I am not sure whether I intend..." in the way <br>it IS possible to doubt other psychological states." (Chapman notes).<br><br>Grice's own positive theory in that paper relies on Stout and the ideas<br><br>i. of FREEDOM FROM DOUBT that the intended action will take place as NOT <br>dependent on any empirical evidence.<br><br>---<br><br>Grice's "second observation is that the utterer must be prepared to take <br>"the necessary steps", Chapman writes, "to bring about the fulfillment of <br>the intention."<br><br>-- <br><br>Chapman observes:<br><br>Grice has "JUSTIFIED the inclusion of psychological concepts in analyses; <br>they do not need to be 'translated' away into behavioral tendencies or <br>observable phenomena"<br><br>--- although I'd nitpick about EMPIRICAL meaning
'inner experience'?<br><br>---<br><br>"Second, he has established the concept of intention as PRIMARY".<br><br>And no, I've checked in the index to Chapman's _Grice_ and there's no <br>'Anscombe'!<br><br>I have made a few marginal notes to my Chapman. INCORRIGIBILITY, <br>privileged access, are notions that Grice will come back to in "Method in <br>philosophical psychology", and while 'intend' may figure as PRIMARY, I would think he <br>ends up analysing it in terms of willing/judging and these two concepts <br>themselves if not behaviouristically at least "functionalistically".<br><br>Two footnotes:<br><br>* Philosophers can be _wicked_. Chapman notes that the manuscript copy of <br>"Disposition and Intention" contains, in a different hand, very wicked <br>comments, which I won't transcribe (right now) but which Chapman suggest that <br>could have been enough of a reason not for
Grice to consider this or that. <br>He could be sensitive.<br><br>* Philosophers and 'absurdity'. Chapman quotes from the last passage in <br>"Disposition and Intention" which may relate to Bayne's comments on <br>'absurdity' and grammar.<br><br>Chapman writes: "Having established that a doubt over one's own intention <br>is something of an ABSURDITY, he offers a characteristically tantalsing <br>suggestion that,<br><br>'we hope that this may help to explain<br>the ABSURDITY of analogous expressions<br>mentioning some OTHER psychological<br>concepts, though I wouldn't for a moment<br>claim that it will help to explain ALL such<br>absurdities.'<br>(cited by Chapman, p. 69)<br><br>For, indeed, 'what a piece of work is a pirot"!<br><br>Cheers,<br><br>J. L. Speranza <br><br>**************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy <br>steps!
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