<table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0" ><tr><td valign="top" style="font: inherit;">It is useful, perhaps, to compare<br><br>'the cause of b caused b'<br><br>with<br><br>'the number of planets is greater than eight'<br><br>As long as 'the number of planets' is purely referential then if there is<br>analyticity, it could be argued that this is an example, since it "means"<br><br>'9>8',<br><br>but a lot depends on whether 'the number of planets' is, purely, referential.<br>Similarly, we need to know if in the first sentence 'the cause of b' is, purely,<br>referential. If it is, then it looks like it might be analytic; but the existence of<br>a cause, unlike, the number nine is not a matter of necessity, waving <br>endless debate on 'necessary''; There is, however, another perspective.<br>Isn't Donnellans referential employment of definite descriptions a use of<br>a purely referential expression, even though they are not proper names?
<br>Suppose, just suppose, that we say that it is. Still, it is a contingent fact, <br>I believe, that what caused b, the cause of b, might not have been the<br>cause of b - imagine other world cases of preemption (Lewis) for example.<br>In other words, I believe there is a reading of 'the cause of b caused b' which<br>is not such as to make it a necessary truth. Here we connect descriptions<br>logically, without connecting events. This tug of war between descriptions<br>and events is at the heart of Davidson's support of Hume. Another neglected<br>consideration: How are we to interpret sentences such as 'the cause of b<br>caused b' where we are talking about not events of a kind but particulars.<br>I have grown vey skeptical of the regularity theories of causation; I don't <br>think the debate will revolve around the semantics but, rather, the ontology<br>of events causes, etc.<br><br>Regards<br><br>Steve<br><br><br><br>--- On <b>Mon, 5/25/09, Roger
Bishop Jones <i><rbj@rbjones.com></i></b> wrote:<br><blockquote style="border-left: 2px solid rgb(16, 16, 255); margin-left: 5px; padding-left: 5px;"><br>From: Roger Bishop Jones <rbj@rbjones.com><br>Subject: Re: Davidson's Hume<br>To: hist-analytic@simplelists.co.uk<br>Date: Monday, May 25, 2009, 11:41 AM<br><br><div class="plainMail">On Sunday 24 May 2009 18:23:08 <a ymailto="mailto:Jlsperanza@aol.com" href="/mc/compose?to=Jlsperanza@aol.com">Jlsperanza@aol.com</a> wrote:<br>>In a message dated 5/23/2009 8:43:11 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,<br>><br>><a ymailto="mailto:rbj@rbjones.com" href="/mc/compose?to=rbj@rbjones.com">rbj@rbjones.com</a> quotes from S. Bayne:<br>>>>But does the fact that this means that it is logically necessary that the<br>>>>cause of b caused b is not so obvious. Let's take a look.<br>><br>>and comments:<br>>>The bit you quote from Davidson, after the correction
offered<br>>>by Aune seems OK,<br>>>It's not clear from your message what Davidson concluded from this,<br>>>e.g. did he make the inference you question above?<br>><br>>I wonder, too.<br>><br>>I find that in the relevant page in "Reasons, Causes...", he uses<br>><br>> 'the cause of b caused b'<br>><br>>as _analytic_, which I'd take as 'logically necessary'.<br><br>Well that seems to contradict Aune and support Steve's qualms.<br><br>On that basis, I should (more definitely than Steve) say<br>that Davidson is wrong, unless it were logically necessary<br>that every event has a unique cause (which I can't swallow).<br><br>However, if the sentence is read in plain English, rather<br>than as a surrogate for something one might say in<br>predicate logic, then its possible that it might<br>have been intended to express a conditional.<br><br> the cause of b (if it
has one) caused b<br><br>and I would concede the analyticity if that were the<br>intention (and hence the speakers meaning).<br><br>However, if the claim is attenuated enough for it<br>to be analytic, then it will have insufficient<br>force to be a problem for Hume.<br>So the only hope for Davidson is equivocation<br>(I don't think this is the same as gerrymandering).<br>He must use the weak interpretation subtly in<br>establishing the claim, and then glide effortlessly<br>into the stronger one when it comes to using<br>it against Hume.<br><br>Roger Jones<br></div></blockquote></td></tr></table><tt><br>
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