<table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0" ><tr><td valign="top" style="font: inherit;"><BR><BR><P>Prof. Aune may be right, but I need a little more from him, I </P><P>think. Let me restate my view.</P><P></P><P>Davidson wants to argue that for Hume something more like<BR></P>descriptions than events are to be regarded as causes. This view,<BR>he remarks, is "fortified by Hume's claim that causal statements<BR>are never necessary." So the question becomes: how does the<BR>description interpretation of cause get "fortified" by denying<BR>the necessary connection, some allege, between cause and<BR>effect. Davidson's claim is that this is because taking events as<BR><P>causes, not descriptions, leads to the necessity of causation, </P><P>whereas the description need not affirm it. So how does the <BR></P>event approach lead to the necessity of causation? Davidson<BR>says "For if events wee causes, then a true description of of<BR>some event would
be 'the cause of b', and, given that such<BR>an event exists, it follows logically that the cause of b<BR>caused b. (Notice the lack of quotes; we are in the extensional<BR>mode). But Aune overlooks a second modal element that<BR>gives credence to his claim that the descriptive approach<BR>"fortifies" the Hume's position. That second modality is<BR>the one that describes 'the cause of b caused b'. Look at it this<BR>way: suppose we deny this. Suppose we say<BR><BR>"It is not the case that the cause of b caused b."<BR><BR><P>This would be a contradiction, or close. True, what <EM>follows</EM> </P><P>"logically" is something like what Aune proposes,(the </P><P>business about 'If an event of causing b...etc. though I'm not </P><P>so sure Davidson is errs. Central to our disagreement, perhaps, </P><P>is that on the event view causation must be necessary, but if<BR></P>Hume is right it can't be, and therefore a descriptive approach<BR>is more acceptable. It
is in THIS sense that Hume is 'fortified'. <BR>Now I might be pursuaded by Prof. Aune; it would not be the<BR>first time. But one thing he must do for me to budge is explain<BR>how on his view Hume's position is fortified by a descriptive<BR>approach. Notice Davidson's use of 'fortified', a tricky word,<BR>deliberately placed with an intended nuance. We need to know<BR>from Prof. Aune what that nuance is, if I'm wrong - which I <BR>may very well be.<BR><BR>On my interpretation Davidson wants to show that if we take<BR>events as not being necessary, then the claim that causation<BR>relates necessarily can be shown to be , in this case the absurdity that<BR>if a causes b it must necessarily cause b. Here's why. If the <BR>relata are events, then there is a description for any caused event,<BR>b, such that this description entails this logical connection; but,<BR>since the causal relation is not a logical one, this must be
ruled<BR>out.<BR><P></P><P>Regards<BR></P><P></P><P></P><P>STeve</P>--- On <B>Sat, 5/23/09, Bruce Aune <I><aune@philos.umass.edu></I></B> wrote:<BR><BLOCKQUOTE style="border-left: 2px solid rgb(16, 16, 255); margin-left: 5px; padding-left: 5px;"><BR>From: Bruce Aune <aune@philos.umass.edu><BR>Subject: Re: Davidson's Hume<BR>To: "steve bayne" <baynesrb@yahoo.com><BR>Cc: hist-analytic@simplelists.com<BR>Date: Saturday, May 23, 2009, 1:49 PM<BR><BR><DIV class="plainMail">I think Steve has misunderstood Davidson. Davidson says, "Given that an event of causing b exists, it follows logically that the cause of b caused b." This assertion does NOT imply that it is logically necessary that the cause of b caused b." What is logically necessary according to Davidson's claim is the conditional, "If an event of causing b exists, then the cause of b caused b." But Davidson does make an error here. The relevant necessary conditional needs a
stronger antecedent, "If there is one and only one cause of b." This antecedent allows us to infer that the cause of b caused b.<BR><BR>Bruce<BR><BR></DIV></BLOCKQUOTE></td></tr></table><tt><br>
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