From Baynesr at comcast.net Mon Oct 5 14:22:10 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2009 18:22:10 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Small Talk: Castaneda, Indiana, and the Gov. Message-ID: <1615887137.2150691254766930975.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I am composing a response to the first chapter of Bruce's An Empiricist Theory of Knowledge which is now available on Amazon. I'm going to finishe all my comments before submitting them for discussion. It has been a busy week, but I'll now have time to get back to some serious work. The other day, when no one was looking, I took a glance at some stuff by Hector-Neri Castaneda, _Thinking, Language, and Experience_, in particular. It is very difficult to read, but its intensity and well-thought-outedness makes it an impressive document, even if few, if any, can understand all of it. I put the book down and went about my "vacation." I had met Castaneda twice; the second time I was smart enough to be in awe of his superior skill and knowledge of philosophy. I, lately,?thought about how unfortunate it is that the difficulty in understanding his work would, likely, submerge his influence on young philosophers. I have long believed that Prof. Castaneda would be a great role model for young Hispanic and Latino philosophers. While I lived in the Somerville/Cambridge area of Boston for 16 years, I got very close to the Brazilian, Columbian, etc. community, mainly through my being on the Board of Directors of the Somerville Boxing Club, where for a time I enjoyed a sport that possessed within these communities a different dimensioin of respect than that with which I was accustomed. I once asked a Latino kid, good fighter but inconsistent, why the "biz" was controlled by the Irish and Italian trainors. I knew Johnny Ruiz's (the first Hispanic Heavyweight Champ) father, a bit, and knew he could train anybody as well as anybody else. So I asked this, exceptionally, bright kid this question, and he replied that the main problem was that in his community people felt lucky to have what they could earn working for others. "They don't take the initiative." I thought about this a lot. It occurred to me that for incoming students of S. American origins Hector-Neri Castaneda was a model of taking the initiative and was a colorful interesting guy with the power to inspire. So I thought that maybe he should be honored in a public way. I didn't think much about it for a while and, then, while on my "vacation" I had a chance (this last week) to have a brief chat with the Governor of Indiana, Mtich Daniels, something I've never done before or probably ever will, again. I mentioned to the Gov. that U of Indiana was an exeptional school and that they had been lucky to have a guy like Castanada. I suggested that, perhaps, a chair or something could be named after him and that giving him a higher profile would benefit incoming Latino and minority students who I KNOW are, often, intimidated by the "culture of academia." I am too! At first, I thought he was annoyed, suspecting, maybe, that I was a "plant" from U of Indiana. So I said something like: "Ok, Ok, can we talk a bit about credit and insurance in the farm sector and its relation to TALP?" Somewhat to my surprise what I thought was annoyance was his trying to reach for his little black book. I think I saw him writing down Hector's name. He seemed more annoyed by my second question, it being a priori that I annoy about everybody whenever I open my mouth. In conclusion, some recognition of Castaneda should extend beyond U of Indiana, but it should start there. I've seen a very nice picture of the guy at Indiana (Bloomington) and I don't foresee any resistance. Just a thought. Please reply to this offlist, as I don't want to get into politics in the bad sense of the word, etc. Regards Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Oct 5 18:47:28 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2009 18:47:28 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Hector Neri Castaneda and Guatemalan analytic philosophy of language Message-ID: In a message dated 10/5/2009 2:29:57 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, Baynesr at comcast.net writes: for incoming students of S. American origins Hector-Neri Castaneda was a model of taking the initiative and was a colorful interesting guy with the power to inspire. ----- Good, but recall the brain drain. How good is it that a Guatemalan, or Nicaraguan or whatever, philosopher, makes it to the North (North of the Rio Grande, of course) and forgets his roots? How much of his influence is felt in GUATEMALA? As an Argentine, I get the feeling. I distinguish between two types of Argentine analytic philosophers: 1. Myself 2. Others I'll start with others. They lack originality! Just joking! But seriously, it's good to compare myself with others. Consider my interest in Grice. "Yankees go home", I was told, ignoring that Grice was from Harborne, in Warwickshire. Okay, 'gringo' by South of the Rio Grande standards! My mentors I regard as OTHERS. Take Rabossi. He was Argentine educated (as a lawyer!), then became student of Strawson at, of all places, Duke. He failed (Rabossi did) to get his DPhil Oxon, but that's life. Or consider Marcelo Sabates, a student of Rabossi. He got his first degree from the Univ of Buenos Aires, and his PhD under Wang at Brown. Does he qualify (Sabates), as an Argentine philosopher? I find, and not out of envy, that those philosophers -- of Argentine origin -- who get their 'maximal degree' in a furrin institution should NOT count as Argies! (It is as if Gaugin, the painter, had graduated from the Slade!) Or consider Rodrigo Pereyra (author of a book with OUP). Fresh with his first degree from the hills of Cordoba, where he hails from, he gets a Brit Council sponsored stay in Cambridge (under Mellor) and becomes an "Anglo" philosopher. I'm less sure about Castaneda. Maximal degrees is what count. My friend Larry Tapper says, "Maximal degrees are granted by St. Peter, upon entering Heaven, so what are you talking about?" I'm talking about agnosticism, that's what I'm talking about J. L. Speranza Argentine Society for Philosophical Analysis Calle Bulnes, Buenos Aires. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Tue Oct 6 06:38:24 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2009 06:38:24 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Hector Neri Castaneda and Guatemalan analytic philosophy of language In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I enjoyed your remarks on Argentine/Anglo philosophers, J.L.: I write this only to inform anyone who is interested that Castaneda got his Ph.D. under Sellars at the University of Minnesota--now, U of M Twin Cities. Castaneda was the TA in the first course I took in philosophy. Bruce Aune From rbj at rbjones.com Wed Oct 7 12:00:07 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2009 17:00:07 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism In-Reply-To: <2093429319.4740251253980556026.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <2093429319.4740251253980556026.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <200910071700.08727.rbj@rbjones.com> The lengthy delay in this response was caused by my hoping to rewrite my page on "positive science" to provide a better explanation of my reasons for thinking little of the idea that we should be talking about the probability of scientific theories rather than their truth. However, though I have done things to the page which might help to make my position clear, I have not yet succeeded in getting anything which I like. (the current muddle can be found at: http:/www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/x022.html) On Saturday 26 September 2009 16:55:56 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: [RBJ] >"As soon as you attempt to describe the sense data you will >introduce the possibility of error," [SB] >So I can be in error in describing them, say thinking the hen sense datum > has five instead of its in fact four speckles? How about being in error in > believing there is a datum? If you can have one sort of error, why not the > existential? I can't credit the idea of a hen sense datum. It would have to be data. In a scientific theory of perception I think you would have to deny that the data which passes from our sense organs to the brain have any very close correspondence with any conscious mental process. A sense datum would be something like the firing of a neuron, but consciousness, of however elementary a nature, is a macroscopic phenomenon involving very many neurons, perhaps millions. I think this has some connection with the way memory works and the intimate connection of consciousness and memory. (memory is holistic, and the things we thing we have been conscious of are of necessity only things of which we have memory). The upshot is that a philosophical theory of perception in which our knowledge of the world is mediated by sense data which correspond closely to conscious events is in my opinion untenable. So the problem with dubitability of our sense data is not just with descriptions of them, it is with consciousness. By the time you have a conscious awareness of anything your brain has already done a massive amount of processing (inference) on the real data. >"(this is like the skeptics "appearances appear")" > >Some would hold, following Plato in the Sophist, that there are no > appearances because there is no reality; there is just the way we describe > our experiences; "reality" need not apply. Is that what he says there? I thought he held that there was a "real world" (that of Platonic forms) and that we do have opinion of the world of appearances if not actual knowledge. >There are a number of places where you, rightly, point out I haven't said > enough; but these posts as you can see are very long. I think you should > take a look at some of this stuff, time permitting. > > >"I am generally not in favour of resort to talk about probability >as a remedy for uncertainty, or the various other similar >stratagems (such as confirmation theory)." > >Some deny there IS truth, only that there are degrees of likelihood of being > true; or something close to this. Well, let me explain the "Metaphysical Positivist" take on this. It seems to me, that most scientific laws, if we are to take them as literal claims about the universe, are false. Typically they provide idealised models of some aspect of reality. and like the relationship between Platonic forms and the world of shadows, nothing in this latter corresponds precisely to the forms. Elementary schoolboy illustrations of this are: 1. Boyles law. 2. Hooks law. But the phenomenon is pervasive. I don't know any "scientific laws" which are actually literally true. We agree that Newtonian mechanics is false but it is much more useful than relativistic mechanics. It is agreed that relativity theory and quantum theory present incompatible pictures of the universe, that they cannot both be true and are probably both false. Einstein spent most of his life working on a unified field theory, and now a huge amount of effort goes in to string theory, which is the same kind of thing. So it seems to me that physicists agree that none of their theories is actually true. Talking about the probability of a theory being true is not a remedy for this "problem", because an honest assessment of this will yield the answer -0.999 (i.e. almost certainly false) for all scientific theories. This problem also blights confirmation theory. What I recommend is that we simply accept that scientific theories provide models of aspects of reality, and should not be expected to be literally "true". We should then consider what information about these models is worth having (instead of the judgement about whether they are true). This is probably information about the scope of applicability of the model. its accuracy and reliability (in various areas of application). In a positivistic vein, I believe that scientists should evaluate theories in such terms and simply publish in details the results of their analysis and the details of the observations on which their assessments are based. I believe Popper recognised an issue for falsificationism here (presumably that scientific theories are too easily falsifiable). He distinguished between falsification and rejection (so the scientist is supposed to be focused on falsifying his theories but if he succeeds that does mean he abandons the theory!) Popper, I understand. tried to work out some notion of "verisimilitude" which is a measure of how close a theory comes to truth, but I think his efforts in this are not highly regarded, and deductivists continue to seek some numerical measure along these lines (David Miller has put one forward recently). There does seem to be a lot of interest in finding numbers which we can attach to theories which tell us how good they are, and they all seem unconvincing to me. So, metaphysical positivism is pragmatic in this area. I advocate asking the question, "what is this theory good for" and providing long and complicated answers supported by experimental data showing accuracy and reliability of the theory in different circumstances. [SB} >A cynical comment on my part on Hume: If Hume is right, there are a few > conventions having to do with arithemetic or vacuous tautologies at best, > and then there is the psychology of belief. There is no real need for > philosophy, unless we think of it as a way of describing psychological > facts of experience. An overstatement? Just a little, perhaps. This was not Hume's view. Hume did not consider mathematics to be trivial. Hume did think of philosophy as a branch of empirical science. That's why his grand opus was "A Treatise of Human Nature". His manner of reconciling this with his scepticism is not impressive. [SB] >> This will effect >> the logic of science. Truth values will be infinite between 0 and 1. There >> won't be two truth values. Much of this was supported by the Heisenberg >> business. Hume was quite explicit in rejecting the idea that scepticism about matters of fact can be fixed by talk about probabilities. He not only claimed that we do not have certain knowledge of matters of fact, but also that we do not have certain knowledge of the probability of any factual proposition. >What I mean by a "theory of ontology" is a theory as to how to answer the > question "What is there?" in the sense that epistemology answers the > question: "How do I know?" (in a broad sense of 'how', including what is > knowledge etc > >In the Aufbau, Carnap is pretty much a phenomenalist. I think you are > relying too much on Schilpp, but I may be wrong. I invariably talk about Carnap's mature view unless I explicitly talk about earlier ones. I don't doubt that the Aufbau is phenomenalistic, but I do doubt that Carnap was a dogmatic phenomenalist even at that time. In fact, if we are to believe Carnap's own words in the Schilpp volume, he was not a dogmatic phenomenalist even at the time he wrote the Aufbau. His section on pseudo-problems (I.II.5 p44) opens as follows: "During the time I was writing the Logischer Aufbau, I arrived more and more at a neutral attitude with respect to the language forms used by the various philosophical schools, e.g the phenomenalistic language about sense data and the realistic language about perceptible things and events in the so-called external world." >If mathematics is a bunch of tautologies and explanations are of the sort > Carnap accepts (the sort of thing Hempel had in mind, i.e. deductive > nomological explanations etc) then the question is what is the basis for > thinking these empty sentences relate to the world? Reichenbach's answer is > that this is owing to their use in making predictions. Otherwise they say > nothing of value. I'm not sure what you mean by a possible world. I never > been to one. That's a rather anti-metaphysical view you seem to be taking there. However, I think you are broadly correct in saying that scientific explanations relate to the world through their utility in enabling predictions to be made. However, I have lost your point here. >"Someone is surely a materialist only if he asserts that only matter > exists," > >Yes, and a physicalist who believes what is physical is material is a > physicalist just the same, and conversely a materialist who believes that > matter is physical is a materialist just the same. No problem here. > Language has little to do with it. But Carnap was neither a phenomenalist, nor a physicalist, nor a theoreticist, he was a pragmatist in accepting the legitimacy of linguistic forms, and in took a pragmatic stance on the "external" metaphysical questions which might be thought presupposed by use of these languages. So I would not myself call him a materialist and suspect that he would not call himself a materialist. >A language containing theoretical terms is "reducible" through operational > definition to the physicalist language, so physical language and > theoretical language differ only in the descriptive constants being in the > one case terms that refer to unobservables. So there is no difference in > languages, especially once the protocol language, via Neurath, is reduced > to a physical language. I don't recognise this as Carnap's position. Carnap's principle of tolerance was not predicated on reducibility of languages to phenomenalistic language. It is true that he was interested in the relationship between non phenomenalistic and phenomenalistic language, but that does not mean that he affirmed the possibility of a reduction (his conception of the kind of relationship he was looking for evolved, but I don't think it was ever part of a criterion of acceptability, on which he was pragmatic). As for the "unified language" stuff, that was more an attack on the idea that there are fundamental differences between the physical sciences and the social sciences than a program for phenomenalistic reduction. Roger Jones From Baynesr at comcast.net Wed Oct 7 14:29:40 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2009 18:29:40 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Chapter 1 of Aune's An Empiricist Theory of Knowledge Message-ID: <921781440.3007711254940180332.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I've been dealing with a lot of idiots, lately, which makes it more difficult to deal with Aune. Still, here is my best effort, at this point, all things considered. Russell held, along with others, that there is a difference between knowledge by achquaintance and knowledge by description. Aune notes that philosophers used to think that "knowledge that" had its source in "knowledge of." There is a very complex story to be told, here, one that I cannot tell in full. Still, the "plot" should be outlined. For Russell knowldege by acquaintance is not "knowledge of" in Aune's sense. In Aune's sense we have knowledge of such things as buildings, streets and parks. However, for the early positivists acquaintance was not knowledge of objects, it was knowledge of sense-data. Knowledge of buildings etc. was "knowledge that" certain sensa (for short) belong together in a construct. Thus, what Bruce is calling "knowledge of" would be characterized as "knowledge of," thus the distinction which was actually operant is just a bit obscured. Recall, the point of acquaintance was to supply the empirical basis of knowledge in the sense that the propositions we know must reduce to predicates with which we have acquaintance in the form of sense data. Later, the positivists would divide over what the objects of acquaintance are, but this move took place concurrently with a rejection of Kant, whose views were being addressed by people like Russell. So my first concern is that knowledge required for meaning must be distinguished from knowledge of truth if sense is to be made of the historical antecedents that concern Bruce. Bruce is right about the historical impact of Wittgenstein's private language argument, despite the fact that many rejected the argument. I reject it as well, but that is another story. Aune's own position is, however, interesting and worth examining, but let's get clearer on what it is. I would add as an aside that the notion of a sense-datum is not the idea of a sensation, but more like the idea of a Kantian intuition. The relation of sensation to intuition is Kant is an interesting story few think worth the telling these days, but I think it is fundamental to philosophy and in particular philosophy of science. More on that later, perhaps. Bruce says (p. 7) that his is a "dual account": "...one in which a concept of knowing for certain is distinguished from a minimal concept that does not require rational certainty." This will make certainty a big issue. This is a huge topic! We will pursue within the confines of his discussion but it is a vast topic that when traced historically will be found to lead to the very entrance of any good discussion of what motivated belief in analyticity and a number of other theses. The idea of 'certainty' as, merely, psychological must be made distinct from the philosophically relevant sense. Bruce's Humeanism may militate against making this a clear distinction. I'm not sure. The next point which I think is absolutel fundamental is one with which I agree. Bruce says that when it comes to deciding between two of the most important positions, contextualism and invariantists, there is no fact of the matter. Now here I agree completely. Take the idea of being a 'paper weight'; there is no fact of the matter whether something is a paper weight. One looks at use. Similarly, there may be no real definition of 'knowledge'. What knowledge is may depend on use, but this is seem pretty close to contextualism. Contextualism is the view that 'S knows that p' is subject to stronger or weaker standards, depending on context. A quick word from me on contextualism. I am always suspect of 'context'; it has been used to justify just about every crazy idea that has ever come down the pike. We need a much clearer idea of exactly what it is etc. But Aune's point is well taken; whether we accept this position or its antithesis is not a matter of fact. (p. 9); but if not fact, then what? Pragmatic considerations? If so, then Aune is an epistemological pragmatist or so it would seem. How far does this go, and when is it merely convenient and when does it obscure a difficult problem a solution to which we flee in the seach in favor of the "easy" pragmatic answer of 'context'. But there is the fact of the matter that the original problem seems undecidable, but if it is, then how important can the question be? Not sure. Next there is a discussion of D. Lewis's paper. I'm not sure, but as far as I can tell, Lewis simply takes Kripke's notion of epistemic counterparts, the ones he discusses in his paper related to issues of the necessary a priori, and he (Lewis) says that knowledge of p is when my evidence rules out any such counterparts inconsistent with the p. On the face of it, this seems to be palpably ridiculous when applied to scientific knowledge; it is to forget the main lessons of Duhem and others. I can't go into this here and now, but there are a number of considerations in this regard. I'll mention one. Knowledge by my lights is knowledge of facts, but on the proferred definition we don't need ANY facts of the matter; all we need is some reliable mechanism for ruling out certain epistemic alternatives. But is the remaining alternative one that corresponds to a fact of the matter? And if there are many then, surely, we aren't entitled to speak of facts of the matter. So for Lewis there can be knowledge not only without belief but without facts of the matter. Like some other of Lewis's views, this is "cute" but not convincing, assuming I understand him right. What is wrong with being "cute"? An answer may be forthcoming in looking at the torment that Gettier unleashed on epistemologists. The strongest point Bruce makes in this chapter on Gettier is this: "?the truth of the proposition embodying the information ust not be ?accidental? so far as that evidence is concerned." (p. 27) Bruce cites a couple of recent papers by Steup and Heller, but I think the most careful examination of such a proposal is to be found in a much older work, a work that in my opinion is striking in its care and precision. Here I am referring to Brian Skyrm?s marvelous (but long) paper "The Explication of ?X Knows that p?." (JP June, 1967, pp. 373-389) Skyrms, it will be recalled, remarked that "evidential warrant and belief must be connected," and "By parity of reasoning, we deny that there is knowledge when the evidentially warranted belief flows from one disjunct and the truth from the other" (p. 100) (here my page references are from _Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowing_ edited by M. Roth and Leon Galis, Random House. 1970). Now as I recall (I haven?t read this paper in about 25 years), Skyrms adds at some point that there are cases where a causal connection is *required* of the evidential connection. I let this pass. I, also, like Aune?s use of "truth maker." The issue of facts brings in a lot of ontological baggage. Moore, circa 1914, suggested facts as truth makers. This has stuck, more or less, despite the popularity of coherence in some pragmatic circles. Indeed, there are philosophers ? recall the "sling-shot" arguments ? who, actually deny facts. This is a symbol of troubled times in my opinion. There are facts. I cannot know something to be true unless I know it to be a fact. There is more to the dispute, including the ontological status of "connections." But here we are "doing" epistemology." I would raise one question, and I do not have an opinion on the answer: "Is there a sense of "ought" that is not ethical etc which is such that I can say ?I ought to believe this but I know it is not true?. Behind my question is a concern as to how distant, or ? to use Aune?s expression ? "indirect" evidence can be in relation to truth maker? A couple of small points. Bruce?s example (p. 32) of the Gettier example of the clock which is right once a day comes from Russell. I believe from the Problems of Philosophy. So Russell had an idea along Gettier?s lines but didn?t put it to use as far back as about 1910. Certainly, one of the best things in the chapter is Aune?s distinction bweteen two sorts of knowledge. I won?t rehearse the contents. But there is a loose and strict sense of knowledge that must be distinguished. One minor correction. Bruce mentions that Chisholm introduced the difference between a loose and strict sense of terms in his 1976 _Person and Object_. Actually, Chisholm introduces the idea, first, in his paper "The Loose and Popular and the Strict and Philosophical Senses of Identity" in Care and Grimm?s 1969 anthology _Perception and Personal Identity_. I might add that the paper by Hintikka in this volume "On the Logic of Perception" is one of Hintikka?s best works. One other detail of little importance is that he cites Moore?s paper ?Certainty? correctly as 1959 (although it was written much earlier) but in the bibliography it comes out 1969. And, before I forget, he references "Klempke" in the bibliography when it ought to be "Klemke." No big deal. Now a concluding remark with a little more substance. At one point, (p. 34), Bruce says that with respect to the loose sense of ?know? I may be said to ?know? p without believing p. Now I?m inclined to have my doubts about this. While I agree on the loose and strict distinction, I?m not sure where the looseness ends and the strictness, really, begins. There are it seems two sense of ?believe?. Suppose I see that my wallet is missing and I see it hanging out of Mojita?s pocket (?Mojita? is in fact the name of a dearly departed friend). It has a unique design which I carved into it and a distinctive color and I had only shortly before handed it to her to prove I?m broke. I say ?Mojita I do believe you have my wallet?. This is one use of ?believe?. Now another. I am at an air show. I see a plane. I see a plane coming in our direction. I say ?I believe that is a DC3?. Now I often have confused DC3s and DC9s at a distance, otherwise I would have said ?Hey, here comes my favorite plane, a DC3!? But in this case I?m not sure. In the first case I have the sense of ?believe? that I most often associate with knowledge; in the second case, I have what I would call a "hedging" sense of ?believe?. Now the difference between loose and strict sense of ?know? may very well be tied to this. After all, the evidence we have is evidence for believing not knowing. I do not say ?Why do you know that? I say ?Why do you believe that?. This question may arise when I say ?I know such and such? not ?I believe such and such?. Anyway, this is my first impression of the first chapter of Bruce?s book. Were I to give it the real justice it deserves I would spend a week thinking about counterexamples to his definitions ?certain? knowledge and ?imperfect? knowledge. I haven?t discussed his discussion of Kripke. While I think there may be some value in the theory of rigid designation (surely there is), I?m unconvinced by Kripke?s attack on Wittgenstein and its implications for Kant. I?ll devote a separate post to this unfortunately widely accepted gambit. Whoops! I see that is in the next chapter. Regards Steve Bayne -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Thu Oct 8 10:10:47 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2009 10:10:47 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Chapter 1 of Aune's An Empiricist Theory of Knowledge In-Reply-To: <921781440.3007711254940180332.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <921781440.3007711254940180332.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <0E24AA93-605D-4AE3-9C70-646EEDC86B69@philos.umass.edu> I I want to thank Steve for taking the time to read through my chapter and prepare comments. I really appreciate what he has done, but I think my remarks in the chapter were much more carefully considered than his comments suggest, and I therefore offer the following responses. 1. Steve says, ?For Russell knowldege by acquaintance is not "knowledge of" in Aune's sense. In Aune's sense we have knowledge of such things as buildings, streets and parks. However, for the early positivists acquaintance was not knowledge of objects, it was knowledge of sense-data.? I think Steve misunderstands me here. Knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge of an object, even though the objects we would recognize today as objects of our aquaintance are not the objects Russell recognized as objects of his acquaintance. Also, knowledge of sense data is clearly knowledge of objects, objects being distinct from anything propositional. I have a lot to say about objects so understood in my book, Metaphysics: the Elements. But my remarks about them in my first chapter should be clear enough. 2. Steve says my account of knowledge is a "dual account," one in which a concept of knowing for certain is distinguished from a minimal concept that does not require rational certainty." This is right. But Steve adds, ?The idea of 'certainty' as, merely, psychological must be made distinct from the philosophically relevant sense. Bruce's Humeanism may militate against making this a clear distinction. I'm not sure.? But I make the distinction quite clearly, I think. S is rationally certain that P when S?s confidence that P ?is owing to S?s awareness of evidence E that is conclusive for P: the evidential probability of P on E is maximal, or 1.? My alternative explanation of conclusive evidence is that E is conclusive for P just when E insures P, or E and not-P is impossible. 3. Steve says, ?The strongest point Bruce makes in this chapter on Gettier is this: "the truth of the proposition embodying the information must not be ?accidental? so far as that evidence is concerned" (p. 27). This was a rough, intuitive statement, which I immediately proceed to improve upon. My claim was that S has (imperfect) knowledge that P only when S has evidential access to the truth-maker for P. I explain what I mean by ?evidential access? and I give a recursive characterization of a truth-maker for a variable formula P. Steve implies that my explanation is less ?careful? that that given by Skyrms in paper published in 1967. Skyrm?s paper was important in its day (40 years ago!), but mine is more explicit in view of my recursive characterization, it is equally careful and, all things considered, it is much more satisfactory (see my next paragraph). I wouldn?t have written it if I didn?t think it marked an advance in the subject. 4. ?Bruce?s example (p. 32) of the Gettier example of the clock which is right once a day comes from Russell. I believe from the Problems of Philosophy. So Russell had an idea along Gettier?s lines but didn?t put it to use as far back as about 1910.? As I explain toward the end of my chapter, Russell?s example does not actually conform to the pattern of a Gettier example, though it is often thought to do so. In Gettier?s examples, the subject has adequate evidence for what he thinks he knows, but he lacks evidence for the fact that makes what he believes true. In Russell?s example, as in Ginet?s example of the phony barns, the subject?s evidence is not adequate for what he believes because it is undermined by evidence he is unaware of. As I emphasize in my chapter, these two classes of examples require different treatment, which I supply. Skyrms, in his 1967 paper, did not recognize the difference between these examples, and his ?solution? did not accommodate examples of both kinds. 5. Steve raises some questions about how there could be no "fact of the matter" to adjudicate between various versions of conventionalism and alternatives to it. I discuss this matter quite thoroughly in the chapter. My main point, perhaps, is that there can be different knowledge concepts, but although one concept may have various advantages over some alternative, concepts themselves are not themselves correct or incorrect if they are internally consistent. Everyday speech contains a lot of indeterminacy, and it can be "rationally reconsructed" in more than one way. Again, many thanks to Steve, Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Oct 8 12:13:33 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2009 12:13:33 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Before You Know It Message-ID: Being an analytic reassessment of 'healthy' scepticism in the history of philosophy. I'm enjoying B. Aune's comments, and I think his reply to Bayne's magisterial summing up of chapter 1 was magisterial, too. I would like to focus on this post on the 'logic' of the predicate "know" on two counts: (i) implicatural issues -- misguided? Some of the comments by Bayne on Aune's 'you can know without believing' seem apt for an implicatural approach. This is however tricky. For decades (at least since Grice coined 'implicature' -- I'm weary of using 'coined' seeing that Short and Lewis Oxford Latin dictionary has an entry, implicatura, borrowed from Sidonius --) it was felt that the inadequacy of "I don't just believe it; I _know_ it" (said smugly by non-philosophers) is an unintended implicature. The problem with unintended implicatures is that they don't exist. As R. Reichman notes: "An unwanted baby is still a baby, but an unwanted implicature is a contradictio in terminis". We do have a feeling, with Aune, that 'know' is what I call, a 'hocus pocus' verb. E.g, my aunt Matilda spent YEARS believing that The River Plate was so-called because its silvery reflections. And then all her illusions were shattered when she KNEW it couldn't be, since, well, it's muddy on closer inspection. (It is true that since then, she's been KNOWING that, and sharing it with anyone who cares). --- (ii) argumentative. Here I refer to 'argument' (why?) as used by some logicians to refer to the operators. I recall a lecture I gave at Salta (of all places) and a philosopher blatantly ignoring Quine's Word and Object and his reflections on 'know' (and 'believe') for that matter, as a monadic predicate: Pegasus knows. K(P) Pegasus knows his elbow from his tail: K(p) Most philosophers who won't quine take 'know' as somewhat dyadic. Bayne is right in emphasising the 'know of'. I know that the cat is on the mat. I know of a cat who is on the mat (and won't be elsewhere). "I know the cat is on the mat" is a trick of a thing to say, for we are never sure WHAT we know. I follow Peacocke (and Grice) that the role of a proposition as a CONTENT of a propositional attitude is enough to credit its existence (qua entity, the proposition) -- Grice, "Life and opinions of Paul Grice, being his prejudices and predilections". He credits here the Russian philosopher George Myro (Ukranian if you must). For Peacocke, 'the cat is on the mat' resolves perceptually (sensum-datum, as Bayne would prefer) into, "the cat" being "on the mat" i.e. we need to inspect the logical form, intrapropositionally. If the Universe were so simple as Witters thought it was, we wouldn't have burdened civilisations, philosophers wouldn't, with QUANTIFICATIONAL logic (predicate logic). We need iota operators ('the' cat, 'the' mat), and a subject-predicate consideration of what it is for THE cat to be on THE mat. Further, Peacocke argues (Content), we need an expansion in terms of qualia or sense reports of what it is to be a cat, a mat, and on it. ---- So: I know (the cat, is, on the mat) can very well connect with I know OF a cat that she is on the mat. (c) It may do to retranscribe the 'know of' in terms of its alleged antecessor, 'believe of'. I believe of the cat to be on the mat. Issues of factivity. When people say that 'belief', unlike 'know', is 'opaque' (thanks Willard Van Orman for that) and not transparent, some don't know what we are talking about. Opaque is, to me, transparent enough. Those glasses are 'opaque'. Does it mean that no refraction is allowed. Is a SOLID opaque only? Or do we distinguish between degrees of transparency with opaqueness also allowing for degrees? In the end it seems the justification or rationale is evolutionary. Why would people (or pirots, as Grice would prefer) care to KNOW things if it were an attitude that derives from a totally opaque attitude like belief? Where does 'know' get its factivity? Gettier leaves us cold here: A knows that p iff A believes that p, p is true, A has good reasons AND (THE GETTIER EXTRA FACTOR missing link). Grice (Logic and Conversation iii) considers, 'p' plays a good causal role in the history of why A came to know that p, is what we may need. And before you know it, you get an empiricist theory of knowledge that properly acknowledges the health of scepticism. Grice played with platonic superlunary forms. "Know", as people use it, is sublunary. "You should use a condom for safe sex" "I know". This is sublunary. We are aware that it's a LOOSE disimplicatural use of 'know'. The use of 'loose' is a good one, but the technical one is disimplicatural. Grice did coin disimplicature, but failed it was an otiose term. I disagree. For the contexts where a concept (like 'know') gains extra implicatures which are NOT part of its content, there is a similar loosening of things where the concept gets disimplicated of PART of its content. It is THIS we call loose use. His example is the factive, 'see'. Surely we can agree that to see is like know. (I always found seeing is believing as too guarded; seeing is KNOWING). If Banquo saw Macbeth, we do no need to postulate a use of "see" that LACKS the entailment that what is seen is there to be seen. (Grice, WoW, iii). Sticklers for good use (as Austin and Grice were) need to tolerate disimplicatures, even if they hated them at heart. Grice was concerned with Austin's considerations on belief versus know, in Other Minds: They were discussing the maxim of trustworthiness: "Look at that nice little goldfinch" For Austin, the implicature is that the utterer KNOWS it's a goldfinch (and a nice little one at that). For Grice it is merely that he BELIEVES it. ("An honest chap won't utter, "That's a blue heron" unless he KNOWS it's blue heron, but not all of us are honest chaps, and if we get too demanding and strict, before you know it, you leave the healthy scepticism and become an irresolute solipsist." Cheers, J. L. Speranza -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Fri Oct 9 07:44:23 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2009 11:44:23 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Brief Reply on Chpt. 1 Review of Aune's Book Message-ID: <1836754249.3672671255088663211.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> My reply to Bruce must be brief. In addition, I must apologize for not replying to posts. I will get to RBJ's long one, at some point. Speranza writes on conversational implicature, which I haven't looked at for a while, although I think there is a lot here. In fact, one thing I wanted to talk to Speranza about a phenomenon that qualifies a certain class of verbs as a category of its own, based on implicature. I call them "post factums." A "post factum" is an expression that can be applied only to past events under certain conversational circumstances. In some cases 'try' is such a verb (auxillary). More on this later, hopefully. I want to push on with my read of Bruce's book, so it will not be uncommon for me to give him the last word. I would defend Skyrms's paper a bit, but not at Aune's expense. It is a 40 year old paper, but Quine's is about 56 years old. So age doesn't count. That is the general point I want to raise. I think it is important for a philosopher to be driven by issues and the logical structure of an argument rather than the scholarship promoted by the journal editors. There is a lot of fad in philosophy and the journals are definitely unsympathetic to philosophers who are not cow towing to a few U.S. and British institutions that dominate the field. I find this deplorable. Here I am looking at a 60 year old paper by E. W. Beth and I got another over here I haven't read by Hermann Weyl and if I were a "pro" I'd be reading "Ben Heck" or "Tweety Hildefarb" on their latest take on the latest puzzle on the prisoner's dilemma. Not that the dilemma is not important, but one simply must make up one's mind whether one wants to keep up with a lot of crap in the journals edited by the students of the people writing the crap or read guys like Weyl, Reichenbach, and Poincare, all now very old papers. Why do I pass up the journals and read a lot of old stuff? Because a lot of the "new" stuff is actually old stuff detached from the mainstream of Kant, Aristotle, Russell, etc. I can't do both, and I don't think anyone else can either. The problems of philosophy are largely institutional. We will know we are beginning to fix these problems when U.S. and UK philosophers start talking about something besides the last article published by their friends. So I think there is hope once we get some people into the 'biz' who aren't clones out of Stanford, talking about rigid designators etc. The reply of course is that this is where it is all at. The disagreement here is fundamental. There is more truth to the sense datum theory in my opinion than came out of the entire 25 year disaster of trying to be clever enough to engineer some "phony" solution to the Gettier problem. Gettier got something right, but I don't know, exactly, what. Kant got something right, and I think it has to do with the realtion of sensation and intuition. How do I want to spend the rest of my life? Doing Kant, Reichenbach etc. Time does not allow throwing the old stuff just because a young editor recognizes a submission etc. If we can get these S. Americans, Romanians, Bosnians to break the headlock these guy have on the 'biz' we'll be talking about the history of analytical philosophy and the structure of the issues raised by the tradition, which is what we ought to be doing instead of being "scholars" familiar with the latest essay by X on Y who wrote on X etc. I've done it myself a little bit. At the end of the day, there is more satisfaction to be had reading old papers by E. W. Beth and papers by Parsons on Kant than the new kids on the block. But be careful, some of them have great promise outside the "establishment." So we have to keep an open mind and not just retreat into the past. Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Mon Oct 12 09:08:02 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2009 13:08:02 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism In-Reply-To: <200910071700.08727.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <2091369274.4446611255352882683.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> "The upshot is that a philosophical theory of perception in which our knowledge of the world is mediated by sense data which correspond closely to conscious events is in my opinion untenable." On the theory we are talking about the idea is not that sense data mediate anything. Sense data ARE the world. That is, given a strict empiricist methodology on this theory, or one version of it (say Russell in Mysticism and Logic), there are only sense data. It is the world. That is the theory. Now I could play devil's advocate and, I think, present a good case for this view. It is, basically, Hume's view as well. There are impressions and ideas. Impressions can be thought of as sense-data (on one "traditional" construal of sense data); and ideas are only less vivacious reminders of those impressions. If you are a strict Humean the closest thing to substance you will ever get are impressions. "I thought he held that there was a "real world" (that of Platonic forms) and that we do have opinion of the world of appearances if not actual knowledge." You've misunderstood. It may be my fault. Let me clarify. The sophist, as opposed to the philosopher who can view the Forms, denies the existence of images, because he uses images in his craft of persuasion. If he admits to them, he admits being a deceiver. That is Plato's theory throughout his entire career. No exceptions. "What I recommend is that we simply accept that scientific theories provide models of aspects of reality" But now how do we distinguish "models" and "theories" and "laws"? Typically "laws" in a collective can be identified with a theory. I'm not keen on this, but this is a popular view. But then how does a model differ from a theory? Of course they differ, but on your view how? "Popper, I understand. tried to work out some notion of "verisimilitude" which is a measure of how close a theory comes to truth," Not sure if this, rightly, characterizes Popper. I haven't done much with his theory of probability. I think there are problems with it, but I haven't take a close look. But just one question: How can I know how close to truth I am if I don't know where the truth is? Is it like hide the thimble, a game I played in early youth. The thing is hidden and the hidder can tell you when you are getting close by saying 'hot' or 'you're getting cold'. But the hidder has to know where it is; so, someone has to know. Elaborate, if you care to, on how I can know how close a theory comes to truth without knowing what the truth is. Sorry for the incompleteness and brevity. I told Bruce I'd review his book. It is a lot of fun, actually. I'll be posting the second installment soon. I think Kripke has the meter stick example totally balled up! That he does doesn't impact the value of his theory of rigid designation but it does affect what I shall, respectfully, call Bruce's "family pet": the theory of necessary a posteriori. Oh, he'll love that. ? Regards ? Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: Baynesr at comcast.net Cc: "hist-analytic" Sent: Wednesday, October 7, 2009 12:00:07 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism The lengthy delay in this response was caused by my hoping to rewrite my page on "positive science" to provide a better explanation of my reasons for thinking little of the idea that we should be talking about the probability of scientific theories rather than their truth. However, though I have done things to the page which might help to make my position clear, I have not yet succeeded in getting anything which I like. (the current muddle can be found at: http:/www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/x022.html) On Saturday 26 September 2009 16:55:56 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: [RBJ] >"As soon as you attempt to describe the sense data you will >introduce the possibility of error," [SB] >So I can be in error in describing them, say thinking the hen sense datum > has five instead of its in fact four speckles? How about being in error in > believing there is a datum? If you can have one sort of error, why not the > existential? I can't credit the idea of a hen sense datum. It would have to be data. In a scientific theory of perception I think you would have to deny that the data which passes from our sense organs to the brain have any very close correspondence with any conscious mental process. A sense datum would be something like the firing of a neuron, but consciousness, of however elementary a nature, is a macroscopic phenomenon involving very many neurons, perhaps millions. I think this has some connection with the way memory works and the intimate connection of consciousness and memory. (memory is holistic, and the things we thing we have been conscious of are of necessity only things of which we have memory). The upshot is that a philosophical theory of perception in which our knowledge of the world is mediated by sense data which correspond closely to conscious events is in my opinion untenable. So the problem with dubitability of our sense data is not just with descriptions of them, it is with consciousness. By the time you have a conscious awareness of anything your brain has already done a massive amount of processing (inference) on the real data. >"(this is like the skeptics "appearances appear")" > >Some would hold, following Plato in the Sophist, that there are no > appearances because there is no reality; there is just the way we describe > our experiences; "reality" need not apply. Is that what he says there? I thought he held that there was a "real world" (that of Platonic forms) and that we do have opinion of the world of appearances if not actual knowledge. >There are a number of places where you, rightly, point out I haven't said > enough; but these posts as you can see are very long. I think you should > take a look at some of this stuff, time permitting. > > >"I am generally not in favour of resort to talk about probability >as a remedy for uncertainty, or the various other similar >stratagems (such as confirmation theory)." > >Some deny there IS truth, only that there are degrees of likelihood of being > true; or something close to this. Well, let me explain the "Metaphysical Positivist" take on this. It seems to me, that most scientific laws, if we are to take them as literal claims about the universe, are false. Typically they provide idealised models of some aspect of reality. and like the relationship between Platonic forms and the world of shadows, nothing in this latter corresponds precisely to the forms. Elementary schoolboy illustrations of this are: 1. Boyles law. 2. Hooks law. But the phenomenon is pervasive. I don't know any "scientific laws" which are actually literally true. We agree that Newtonian mechanics is false but it is much more useful than relativistic mechanics. It is agreed that relativity theory and quantum theory present incompatible pictures of the universe, that they cannot both be true and are probably both false. Einstein spent most of his life working on a unified field theory, and now a huge amount of effort goes in to string theory, which is the same kind of thing. So it seems to me that physicists agree that none of their theories is actually true. Talking about the probability of a theory being true is not a remedy for this "problem", because an honest assessment of this will yield the answer -0.999 (i.e. almost certainly false) for all scientific theories. This problem also blights confirmation theory. What I recommend is that we simply accept that scientific theories provide models of aspects of reality, and should not be expected to be literally "true". We should then consider what information about these models is worth having (instead of the judgement about whether they are true). This is probably information about the scope of applicability of the model. its accuracy and reliability (in various areas of application). In a positivistic vein, I believe that scientists should evaluate theories in such terms and simply publish in details the results of their analysis and the details of the observations on which their assessments are based. I believe Popper recognised an issue for falsificationism here (presumably that scientific theories are too easily falsifiable). He distinguished between falsification and rejection (so the scientist is supposed to be focused on falsifying his theories but if he succeeds that does mean he abandons the theory!) Popper, I understand. tried to work out some notion of "verisimilitude" which is a measure of how close a theory comes to truth, but I think his efforts in this are not highly regarded, and deductivists continue to seek some numerical measure along these lines (David Miller has put one forward recently). There does seem to be a lot of interest in finding numbers which we can attach to theories which tell us how good they are, and they all seem unconvincing to me. So, metaphysical positivism is pragmatic in this area. I advocate asking the question, ??"what is this theory good for" and providing long and complicated answers supported by experimental data showing accuracy and reliability of the theory in different circumstances. [SB} >A cynical comment on my part on Hume: If Hume is right, there are a few > conventions having to do with arithemetic or vacuous tautologies at best, > and then there is the psychology of belief. There is no real need for > philosophy, unless we think of it as a way of describing psychological > facts of experience. An overstatement? Just a little, perhaps. This was not Hume's view. Hume did not consider mathematics to be trivial. Hume did think of philosophy as a branch of empirical science. That's why his grand opus was "A Treatise of Human Nature". His manner of reconciling this with his scepticism is not impressive. [SB] >> This will effect >> the logic of science. Truth values will be infinite between 0 and 1. There >> won't be two truth values. Much of this was supported by the Heisenberg >> business. Hume was quite explicit in rejecting the idea that scepticism about matters of fact can be fixed by talk about probabilities. He not only claimed that we do not have certain knowledge of matters of fact, but also that we do not have certain knowledge of the probability of any factual proposition. >What I mean by a "theory of ontology" is a theory as to how to answer the > question "What is there?" in the sense that epistemology answers the > question: "How do I know?" (in a broad sense of 'how', including what is > knowledge etc > >In the Aufbau, Carnap is pretty much a phenomenalist. I think you are > relying too much on Schilpp, but I may be wrong. I invariably talk about Carnap's mature view unless I explicitly talk about earlier ones. I don't doubt that the Aufbau is phenomenalistic, but I do doubt that Carnap was a dogmatic phenomenalist even at that time. In fact, if we are to believe Carnap's own words in the Schilpp volume, he was not a dogmatic phenomenalist even at the time he wrote the Aufbau. His section on pseudo-problems (I.II.5 p44) opens as follows: ?? "During the time I was writing the Logischer Aufbau, ?? I arrived more and more at a neutral attitude with respect ?? to the language forms used by the various philosophical ?? schools, e.g ?the phenomenalistic language about sense data ?? and the realistic language about perceptible things and events ?? in the so-called external world." >If mathematics is a bunch of tautologies and explanations are of the sort > Carnap accepts (the sort of thing Hempel had in mind, i.e. deductive > nomological explanations etc) then the question is what is the basis for > thinking these empty sentences relate to the world? Reichenbach's answer is > that this is owing to their use in making predictions. Otherwise they say > nothing of value. I'm not sure what you mean by a possible world. I never > been to one. That's a rather anti-metaphysical view you seem to be taking there. However, I think you are broadly correct in saying that scientific explanations relate to the world through their utility in enabling predictions to be made. ?However, I have lost your point here. >"Someone is surely a materialist only if he asserts that only matter > exists," > >Yes, and a physicalist who believes what is physical is material is a > physicalist just the same, and conversely a materialist who believes that > matter is physical is a materialist just the same. No problem here. > Language has little to do with it. But Carnap was neither a phenomenalist, nor a physicalist, nor a theoreticist, he was a pragmatist in accepting the legitimacy of linguistic forms, and in took a pragmatic stance on the "external" metaphysical questions which might be thought presupposed by use of these languages. So I would not myself call him a materialist and suspect that he would not call himself a materialist. >A language containing theoretical terms is "reducible" through operational > definition to the physicalist language, so physical language and > theoretical language differ only in the descriptive constants being in the > one case terms that refer to unobservables. So there is no difference in > languages, especially once the protocol language, via Neurath, is reduced > to a physical language. I don't recognise this as Carnap's position. Carnap's principle of tolerance was not predicated on reducibility of languages to phenomenalistic language. It is true that he was interested in the relationship between non phenomenalistic and phenomenalistic language, but that does not mean that he affirmed the possibility of a reduction (his conception of the kind of relationship he was looking for evolved, but I don't think it was ever part of a criterion of acceptability, on which he was pragmatic). As for the "unified language" stuff, that was more an attack on the idea that there are fundamental differences between the physical sciences and the social sciences than a program for phenomenalistic reduction. Roger Jones -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Tue Oct 13 07:17:32 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2009 04:17:32 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Upcoming History of analytic Philosophy Event Message-ID: <847540.90315.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> ? Here is a small conference that looks better than the, typical, APA meeting From baynesrb at yahoo.com Tue Oct 13 07:50:53 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2009 04:50:53 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Correction on Analytic Conference Message-ID: <336011.66976.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> ? I forgot to include the URL for the upcoming event. Sorry for having to add to your mail. But I think it is worth it. This looks to be one of the most interesting of its kind in a while. ? http://www.thebalticyearbook.org/ ? Regards ? STeve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Wed Oct 14 09:43:46 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2009 13:43:46 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Kripke and the Meter Stick Message-ID: <870956977.767341255527826816.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I am skeptical of Kripke's conclusions, on the?meter stick as discussed by Wittgenstein (PI 50).??The focus of my remarks is, Naming and Necessity pp. 54-56). I sometimes type out stuff as I think, since I am my only audience "in lecture." But I thought that since I will be discussing this issue in the book, I would post a couple of things I've thought about but not, as yet, included in the book, because I need to work them out a bit more. So I thought I'd throw this at the list. Run it up the flag pole so to speak and see what the crowd does if anything. These are not conclusions; they are attempts at probing an issue before laying out my real conclusions, probably, elsewhere (the book). This is all getting set up to discuss Aune on related topics. This may substitute for discussion of his treatment of the meter stick example. We can't treat the identity 'The length of this stick = 39.37 inches' like just any other identity, especially if we take ?the length of this stick? as rigidly designating the length of this stick, now, here, etc. If we did, then 'The length of this stick = 39.37 inches' would be a necessary truth. Now there is the appearance of contingency; the stick it seems might have been a different length. But if this is the case, then I must account for the appearance of contingency. Keep in mind that the situation is one where I have two edges, clearly, in sight; two bodies that are rigid, at least relative to one another. I confess that I cannot imagine two such edges being congruent without the length of this stick being 39.37 inches, unless I am mistaken as to how many inches the foot-rule is from which we get the figure 39.37 inches. Part of the problem is that 'the length of this stick' refers to what Russell called a 'magnitude' and not a 'quantity'. But, now, let's ask: with respect to the necessity of identity does the requirement of explaining the appearance of contingency apply to both quantities and magnitudes or do we restrict this to quantities only? But in this case, the relevant identity is not between quantities (the two sticks) but, rather, magnitudes. Thus 'this stick is a meter long' is not an identity statement. When we say 'This stick is one meter long', we appear to be talking about a quantity, not a magnitude. This is not an identity but a predication. If we should say 'One meter is the length of this stick' then we seem to be talking about magnitudes. The relevant identity is an identity between two magnitudes, not two quantities, as in the case say of the identity ?Pain = C-fibers firing?: a quantity cannot be identical with a magnitude. So if we are comparing magnitudes how can we possibly imagine this magnitude being 39.37 inches not being a meter? I can no more say that there is an epistemic counterpart of ?the length of this stick? which is not 39.37 inches than I can say there is an epistemic counterpart of being the length of this stick, the one I?ve set beside the foot-rule, which is not 39.37 inches. By contrast, I can imagine an epistemic counterpart of water which is not H2O! There is no contingent property available to me that I can use to pick out the length of this stick unless it is the contingent property or some other stick having the same length. But then our dilemma is recreated with this other stick. If we take ?meter? to be a magnitude, then on Kripke?s view it cannot be 39.37 inches long, since I cannot explain the appearance of contingency of this identity. Essential is the idea of congruence. If two bodies are rigid, relative to one another, and they are congruent, then I cannot imagine an epistemic counterpart where congruency does not obtain. Therefore, I cannot explain the appearance of contingency; therefore the identity fails. Let?s consider the problem from a, slightly, different angle. Suppose someone lays down the foot-rule and comes up with 39.37 inches and declares: "Witgenstein is wrong! Kant is wrong! As anyone can plainly see, this stick measures 39.37 inches and, so, we can attribute being a meter to this stick in Paris. Wittgenstein rises from the grave, saying "Just wait one moment young man! How can you say that this other stick is 39.37 inches long? Without pause the answer is: "Well I measured it against the standard foot-rule in Kookamonga and that what it shows." The ghost of Wittgenstein continues: "What justifies me in saying that that stick in Kookamonga is a foot long, and besides, you?ve been moving that stick around an awful lot; so, how can you say it is the length you say it is?" Answer: "I dunno." If ?the length of the meter stick in Paris? designates a particular length, a magnitude, we still have a problem: length is relative to the operation of measurement using a standard rigid body. Length is conceptually dependent on measurement, even conceptually. Fixing reference to one length seems to be a hold over from pre-Relativity days. I can hear the groans; but that, I?m afraid, was what Wittgenstein was talking about, viz. whether we can assert of something that it is such and such, absolutely. In the case of the meter stick?s being a meter we cannot make the attribution, let alone that it is absolute; the same holds for any elements which we take to be ultimate constituents of the world. We can no more attribute existence to these fundamental entities than we can attribute length to the meter stick in Paris. Kripke ignores the point. It?s old fashioned. Take another illustration. Suppose someone draws a line and calls it "the standard straight line." Someone says I can neither say that it is straight, nor that it is not. Someone runs up with a stick and lays it alongside what up to now is the standard stick. He declares, "Yes, this stick is straight. It is congruent with this stick, so I can say it is straight. You see I compared it to this other standard. Now here we are not speaking of metric properties, but the principle holds. If you don?t believe it, think of how one would in fact deal with the case of the standard straight line. There are no standard straight lines; there are no standard rigid bodies. It make no sense, and I wish to emphasize this, to say this body, the one I?m using as a metric in defining ?length?, is rigid. There is no length "out there" waiting to be designated. Steve Bayne -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Wed Oct 14 11:13:59 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2009 11:13:59 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Kripke and the Meter Stick In-Reply-To: <870956977.767341255527826816.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <870956977.767341255527826816.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: I have to leave my house in a few minutes to complete a necessary task, so I can't respond at length today to Steve's remarks about Kripke and the meter stick. But I would like to sat to Steve, why didn't you consider the argument I actually gave, the argument by Kripke that I set forth clearly in way in two paragraphs? The argument I gave is clearly deductively valid; the thing to attend to if one is going to criticize it is whether one of the premises is false or doubtful. But Steve, somehow getting Wittgenstein involved in the discussion, didn't address the argument I outlined, or Kripke originally gave. Steve's reference to Wittgensein is very curious. Not only was Kripke not responding to Wittgenstein, but the passage Steve cites as containing Witt's argument does not even contain an argument about the standard meter. Witt says dogmatically that the standard meter is not a meter long, but he has nothing to say--certainly no argument to present--regarding the identity Kripke and I were concerned with. Steve's remarks did not, in fact, concern the identity statement that K and I were concerned with in our respective arguments. He was concerned with an argument we did not defend. Bruce On Oct 14, 2009, at 9:43 AM, Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: > I am skeptical of Kripke's conclusions, on the meter stick as > discussed by Wittgenstein (PI 50). The focus of my remarks is, > Naming and Necessity pp. 54-56). I sometimes type out stuff as I > think, since I am my only audience "in lecture." But I thought that > since I will be discussing this issue in the book, I would post a > couple of things I've thought about but not, as yet, included in the > book, because I need to work them out a bit more. So I thought I'd > throw this at the list. Run it up the flag pole so to speak and see > what the crowd does if anything. These are not conclusions; they are > attempts at probing an issue before laying out my real conclusions, > probably, elsewhere (the book). > > This is all getting set up to discuss Aune on related topics. This > may substitute for discussion of his treatment of the meter stick > example. > > We can't treat the identity 'The length of this stick = 39.37 > inches' like just any other identity, especially if we take ?the > length of this stick? as rigidly designating the length of this > stick, now, here, etc. If we did, then 'The length of this stick = > 39.37 inches' would be a necessary truth. Now there is the > appearance of contingency; the stick it seems might have been a > different length. But if this is the case, then I must account for > the appearance of contingency. Keep in mind that the situation is > one where I have two edges, clearly, in sight; two bodies that are > rigid, at least relative to one another. I confess that I cannot > imagine two such edges being congruent without the length of this > stick being 39.37 inches, unless I am mistaken as to how many inches > the foot-rule is from which we get the figure 39.37 inches. Part of > the problem is that 'the length of this stick' refers to what > Russell called a 'magnitude' and not a 'quantity'. But, now, let's > ask: with respect to the necessity of identity does the requirement > of explaining the appearance of contingency apply to both quantities > and magnitudes or do we restrict this to quantities only? But in > this case, the relevant identity is not between quantities (the two > sticks) but, rather, magnitudes. Thus 'this stick is a meter long' > is not an identity statement. > > When we say 'This stick is one meter long', we appear to be talking > about a quantity, not a magnitude. This is not an identity but a > predication. If we should say 'One meter is the length of this > stick' then we seem to be talking about magnitudes. The relevant > identity is an identity between two magnitudes, not two quantities, > as in the case say of the identity ?Pain = C-fibers firing?: a > quantity cannot be identical with a magnitude. So if we are > comparing magnitudes how can we possibly imagine this magnitude > being 39.37 inches not being a meter? I can no more say that there > is an epistemic counterpart of ?the length of this stick? which is > not 39.37 inches than I can say there is an epistemic counterpart of > being the length of this stick, the one I?ve set beside the foot- > rule, which is not 39.37 inches. By contrast, I can imagine an > epistemic counterpart of water which is not H2O! > > There is no contingent property available to me that I can use to > pick out the length of this stick unless it is the contingent > property or some other stick having the same length. But then our > dilemma is recreated with this other stick. If we take ?meter? to be > a magnitude, then on Kripke?s view it cannot be 39.37 inches long, > since I cannot explain the appearance of contingency of this > identity. Essential is the idea of congruence. If two bodies are > rigid, relative to one another, and they are congruent, then I > cannot imagine an epistemic counterpart where congruency does not > obtain. Therefore, I cannot explain the appearance of contingency; > therefore the identity fails. Let?s consider the problem from a, > slightly, different angle. > > Suppose someone lays down the foot-rule and comes up with 39.37 > inches and declares: "Witgenstein is wrong! Kant is wrong! As anyone > can plainly see, this stick measures 39.37 inches and, so, we can > attribute being a meter to this stick in Paris. Wittgenstein rises > from the grave, saying "Just wait one moment young man! How can you > say that this other stick is 39.37 inches long? Without pause the > answer is: "Well I measured it against the standard foot-rule in > Kookamonga and that what it shows." The ghost of Wittgenstein > continues: "What justifies me in saying that that stick in > Kookamonga is a foot long, and besides, you?ve been moving that > stick around an awful lot; so, how can you say it is the length you > say it is?" Answer: "I dunno." If ?the length of the meter stick in > Paris? designates a particular length, a magnitude, we still have a > problem: length is relative to the operation of measurement using a > standard rigid body. Length is conceptually dependent on > measurement, even conceptually. Fixing reference to one length seems > to be a hold over from pre-Relativity days. I can hear the groans; > but that, I?m afraid, was what Wittgenstein was talking about, viz. > whether we can assert of something that it is such and such, > absolutely. In the case of the meter stick?s being a meter we cannot > make the attribution, let alone that it is absolute; the same holds > for any elements which we take to be ultimate constituents of the > world. We can no more attribute existence to these fundamental > entities than we can attribute length to the meter stick in Paris. > Kripke ignores the point. It?s old fashioned. Take another > illustration. > > Suppose someone draws a line and calls it "the standard straight > line." Someone says I can neither say that it is straight, nor that > it is not. Someone runs up with a stick and lays it alongside what > up to now is the standard stick. He declares, "Yes, this stick is > straight. It is congruent with this stick, so I can say it is > straight. You see I compared it to this other standard. Now here we > are not speaking of metric properties, but the principle holds. If > you don?t believe it, think of how one would in fact deal with the > case of the standard straight line. There are no standard straight > lines; there are no standard rigid bodies. It make no sense, and I > wish to emphasize this, to say this body, the one I?m using as a > metric in defining ?length?, is rigid. There is no length "out > there" waiting to be designated. > > Steve Bayne > > > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Wed Oct 14 11:16:13 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2009 15:16:13 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Kripke and the Meter Stick In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <829673553.809001255533373215.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> "Not only was Kripke not responding to Wittgenstein..." Here is what Kripke says. Like Bruce I'm out the door, but I'll be back to fill in the spaces. Here are the "brackets" between those spaces. Kripke says: "Wittgenstein says something very puzzling about this...I think he must be wrong." Now I'm only interested in Kripke's arguments. If he is not arguing against Wittgenstein, then he has no reason to believe "he must be wrong." Bruce needs to tell us why Kripke didn't give an argument for believing in talking about Wittgenstein: "I think he must be wrong." Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: Baynesr at comcast.net Cc: "hist-analytic" Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2009 11:13:59 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Kripke and the Meter Stick I have to leave my house in a few minutes to complete a necessary task, so I can't respond at length today to Steve's remarks about Kripke and the meter stick. ?But I would like to sat to Steve, why didn't you consider the argument I actually gave, the argument by Kripke that I set forth clearly in way in two paragraphs? ?The argument I gave is clearly deductively valid; the thing to attend to if one is going to criticize it is whether one of the premises is false or doubtful. ?But Steve, somehow getting Wittgenstein involved in the discussion, didn't address the argument I outlined, or Kripke originally gave. Steve's reference to Wittgensein is very curious. ?Not only was Kripke not responding to Wittgenstein, but the passage Steve cites as containing Witt's?argument?does not even contain an argument ?about the standard meter. ?Witt says dogmatically that the standard meter is not a meter long, but he has nothing to say--certainly no argument to present--regarding the identity Kripke and I were concerned with. Steve's remarks did not, in fact, concern the identity statement that K and I were concerned with in our respective arguments. ?He was concerned with an argument we did not defend. Bruce On Oct 14, 2009, at 9:43 AM, Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: I am skeptical of Kripke's conclusions, on the?meter stick as discussed by Wittgenstein (PI 50).??The focus of my remarks is, Naming and Necessity pp. 54-56). I sometimes type out stuff as I think, since I am my only audience "in lecture." But I thought that since I will be discussing this issue in the book, I would post a couple of things I've thought about but not, as yet, included in the book, because I need to work them out a bit more. So I thought I'd throw this at the list. Run it up the flag pole so to speak and see what the crowd does if anything. These are not conclusions; they are attempts at probing an issue before laying out my real conclusions, probably, elsewhere (the book). This is all getting set up to discuss Aune on related topics. This may substitute for discussion of his treatment of the meter stick example. We can't treat the identity 'The length of this stick = 39.37 inches' like just any other identity, especially if we take ?the length of this stick? as rigidly designating the length of this stick, now, here, etc. If we did, then 'The length of this stick = 39.37 inches' would be a necessary truth. Now there is the appearance of contingency; the stick it seems might have been a different length. But if this is the case, then I must account for the appearance of contingency. Keep in mind that the situation is one where I have two edges, clearly, in sight; two bodies that are rigid, at least relative to one another. I confess that I cannot imagine two such edges being congruent without the length of this stick being 39.37 inches, unless I am mistaken as to how many inches the foot-rule is from which we get the figure 39.37 inches. Part of the problem is that 'the length of this stick' refers to what Russell called a 'magnitude' and not a 'quantity'. But, now, let's ask: with respect to the necessity of identity does the requirement of explaining the appearance of contingency apply to both quantities and magnitudes or do we restrict this to quantities only? But in this case, the relevant identity is not between quantities (the two sticks) but, rather, magnitudes. Thus 'this stick is a meter long' is not an identity statement. When we say 'This stick is one meter long', we appear to be talking about a quantity, not a magnitude. This is not an identity but a predication. If we should say 'One meter is the length of this stick' then we seem to be talking about magnitudes. The relevant identity is an identity between two magnitudes, not two quantities, as in the case say of the identity ?Pain = C-fibers firing?: a quantity cannot be identical with a magnitude. So if we are comparing magnitudes how can we possibly imagine this magnitude being 39.37 inches not being a meter? I can no more say that there is an epistemic counterpart of ?the length of this stick? which is not 39.37 inches than I can say there is an epistemic counterpart of being the length of ? this ? stick, the one I?ve set beside the foot-rule, which is not 39.37 inches. By contrast, I ? can ? imagine an epistemic counterpart of ? water ? which is not H2O! There is no contingent property available to me that I can use to pick out the length of this stick unless it is the contingent property or some other stick having the same length. But then our dilemma is recreated with this other stick. If we take ?meter? to be a magnitude, then on Kripke?s view it cannot be 39.37 inches long, since I cannot explain the appearance of contingency of this identity. Essential is the idea of congruence. If two bodies are rigid, relative to one another, and they are congruent, then I cannot imagine an epistemic counterpart where congruency does not obtain. Therefore, I cannot explain the appearance of contingency; therefore the identity fails. Let?s consider the problem from a, slightly, different angle. Suppose someone lays down the foot-rule and comes up with 39.37 inches and declares: "Witgenstein is wrong! Kant is wrong! As anyone can plainly see, this stick measures 39.37 inches and, so, we can attribute being a meter to this stick in Paris. Wittgenstein rises from the grave, saying "Just wait one moment young man! How can you say that this other stick is 39.37 inches long? Without pause the answer is: "Well I measured it against the standard foot-rule in Kookamonga and that what it shows." The ghost of Wittgenstein continues: "What justifies me in saying that that stick in Kookamonga is a foot long, and besides, you?ve been moving that stick around an awful lot; so, how can you say it is the length you say it is?" Answer: "I dunno." If ?the length of the meter stick in Paris? designates a particular length, a magnitude, we still have a problem: length is relative to the operation of measurement using a standard rigid body. Length is conceptually dependent on measurement, even conceptually. Fixing reference to one length seems to be a hold over from pre-Relativity days. I can hear the groans; but that, I?m afraid, was what Wittgenstein was talking about, viz. whether we can assert of something that it is such and such, absolutely. In the case of the meter stick?s being a meter we cannot make the attribution, let alone that it is absolute; the same holds for any elements which we take to be ultimate constituents of the world. We can no more attribute existence to these fundamental entities than we can attribute length to the meter stick in Paris. Kripke ignores the point. It?s old fashioned. Take another illustration. Suppose someone draws a line and calls it "the standard straight line." Someone says I can neither say that it is straight, nor that it is not. Someone runs up with a stick and lays it alongside what up to now is the standard stick. He declares, "Yes, this stick is straight. It is congruent with this stick, so I can say it is straight. You see I compared it to this other standard. Now here we are not speaking of metric properties, but the principle holds. If you don?t believe it, think of how one would in fact deal with the case of the standard straight line. There are no standard straight lines; there are no standard rigid bodies. It make no sense, and I wish to emphasize this, to say this body, the one I?m using as a metric in defining ?length?, is rigid. There is no length "out there" waiting to be designated. Steve Bayne -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Wed Oct 14 12:28:19 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2009 16:28:19 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Kripke and the Meter Stick In-Reply-To: <829673553.809001255533373215.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <947830598.845051255537699479.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Before I go on with this particular thread (which I like, actually). I think I've identified a point of disagreement that may go to the source. Bruce says: "Witt says dogmatically that the standard meter is not a meter long..." In my opinion, this completely misstates what Wittgenstein says. "There is one thing of which can say NEITHER that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long and that is the standard metre in Paris." (PI 50) Not only is Wittgenstein NOT being dogmatic, he is NOT even denying that the meter stick?IS one meter long. If you can NOT say that it is NOT one meter long, then how in tarnation can you DENY that it is one meter long, let alone dogmatically? Wittgenstein is talking about the "language game" of attribution. He' showing us a case where neither affirming or denying an attribute is possible because it violates the rules of THIS game. To think otherwise is to think that Wittgenstein is a fool who couldn't figure out how to use a ruler. I'm sometimes critical of Wittgenstein but he was certainly no?more a fool than Kripke, who is no fool at all (as we all know). If this text is not clear, how are we ever going to refute Kant?! Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: Baynesr @comcast.net To: "Bruce Aune " < aune @ philos . umass . edu > Cc: "hist-analytic" Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2009 11:16:13 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Kripke and the Meter Stick "Not only was Kripke not responding to Wittgenstein..." Here is what Kripke says. Like Bruce I'm out the door, but I'll be back to fill in the spaces. Here are the "brackets" between those spaces. Kripke says: "Wittgenstein says something very puzzling about this...I think he must be wrong." Now I'm only interested in Kripke's arguments. If he is not arguing against Wittgenstein, then he has no reason to believe "he must be wrong." Bruce needs to tell us why Kripke didn't give an argument for believing in talking about Wittgenstein: "I think he must be wrong." Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune " < aune @ philos . umass . edu > To: Baynesr @comcast.net Cc: "hist-analytic" Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2009 11:13:59 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Kripke and the Meter Stick I have to leave my house in a few minutes to complete a necessary task, so I can't respond at length today to Steve's remarks about Kripke and the meter stick. ?But I would like to sat to Steve, why didn't you consider the argument I actually gave, the argument by Kripke that I set forth clearly in way in two paragraphs? ?The argument I gave is clearly deductively valid; the thing to attend to if one is going to criticize it is whether one of the premises is false or doubtful. ?But Steve, somehow getting Wittgenstein involved in the discussion, didn't address the argument I outlined, or Kripke originally gave. Steve's reference to Wittgensein is very curious. ?Not only was Kripke not responding to Wittgenstein, but the passage Steve cites as containing Witt's?argument?does not even contain an argument ?about the standard meter. ?Witt says dogmatically that the standard meter is not a meter long, but he has nothing to say--certainly no argument to present--regarding the identity Kripke and I were concerned with. Steve's remarks did not, in fact, concern the identity statement that K and I were concerned with in our respective arguments. ?He was concerned with an argument we did not defend. Bruce On Oct 14, 2009, at 9:43 AM, Baynesr @comcast.net wrote: I am skeptical of Kripke's conclusions, on the?meter stick as discussed by Wittgenstein (PI 50).??The focus of my remarks is, Naming and Necessity pp. 54-56). I sometimes type out stuff as I think, since I am my only audience "in lecture." But I thought that since I will be discussing this issue in the book, I would post a couple of things I've thought about but not, as yet, included in the book, because I need to work them out a bit more. So I thought I'd throw this at the list. Run it up the flag pole so to speak and see what the crowd does if anything. These are not conclusions; they are attempts at probing an issue before laying out my real conclusions, probably, elsewhere (the book). This is all getting set up to discuss Aune on related topics. This may substitute for discussion of his treatment of the meter stick example. We can't treat the identity 'The length of this stick = 39.37 inches' like just any other identity, especially if we take ?the length of this stick? as rigidly designating the length of this stick, now, here, etc. If we did, then 'The length of this stick = 39.37 inches' would be a necessary truth. Now there is the appearance of contingency; the stick it seems might have been a different length. But if this is the case, then I must account for the appearance of contingency. Keep in mind that the situation is one where I have two edges, clearly, in sight; two bodies that are rigid, at least relative to one another. I confess that I cannot imagine two such edges being congruent without the length of this stick being 39.37 inches, unless I am mistaken as to how many inches the foot-rule is from which we get the figure 39.37 inches. Part of the problem is that 'the length of this stick' refers to what Russell called a 'magnitude' and not a 'quantity'. But, now, let's ask: with respect to the necessity of identity does the requirement of explaining the appearance of contingency apply to both quantities and magnitudes or do we restrict this to quantities only? But in this case, the relevant identity is not between quantities (the two sticks) but, rather, magnitudes. Thus 'this stick is a meter long' is not an identity statement. When we say 'This stick is one meter long', we appear to be talking about a quantity, not a magnitude. This is not an identity but a predication. If we should say 'One meter is the length of this stick' then we seem to be talking about magnitudes. The relevant identity is an identity between two magnitudes, not two quantities, as in the case say of the identity ?Pain = C-fibers firing?: a quantity cannot be identical with a magnitude. So if we are comparing magnitudes how can we possibly imagine this magnitude being 39.37 inches not being a meter? I can no more say that there is an epistemic counterpart of ?the length of this stick? which is not 39.37 inches than I can say there is an epistemic counterpart of being the length of ? this ? stick, the one I?ve set beside the foot-rule, which is not 39.37 inches. By contrast, I ? can ? imagine an epistemic counterpart of ? water ? which is not H2O! There is no contingent property available to me that I can use to pick out the length of this stick unless it is the contingent property or some other stick having the same length. But then our dilemma is recreated with this other stick. If we take ?meter? to be a magnitude, then on Kripke ?s view it cannot be 39.37 inches long, since I cannot explain the appearance of contingency of this identity. Essential is the idea of congruence. If two bodies are rigid, relative to one another, and they are congruent, then I cannot imagine an epistemic counterpart where congruency does not obtain. Therefore, I cannot explain the appearance of contingency; therefore the identity fails. Let?s consider the problem from a, slightly, different angle. Suppose someone lays down the foot-rule and comes up with 39.37 inches and declares: "Witgenstein is wrong! Kant is wrong! As anyone can plainly see, this stick measures 39.37 inches and, so, we can attribute being a meter to this stick in Paris. Wittgenstein rises from the grave, saying "Just wait one moment young man! How can you say that this other stick is 39.37 inches long? Without pause the answer is: "Well I measured it against the standard foot-rule in Kookamonga and that what it shows." The ghost of Wittgenstein continues: "What justifies me in saying that that stick in Kookamonga is a foot long, and besides, you?ve been moving that stick around an awful lot; so, how can you say it is the length you say it is?" Answer: "I dunno." If ?the length of the meter stick in Paris? designates a particular length, a magnitude, we still have a problem: length is relative to the operation of measurement using a standard rigid body. Length is conceptually dependent on measurement, even conceptually. Fixing reference to one length seems to be a hold over from pre-Relativity days. I can hear the groans; but that, I?m afraid, was what Wittgenstein was talking about, viz. whether we can assert of something that it is such and such, absolutely. In the case of the meter stick?s being a meter we cannot make the attribution, let alone that it is absolute; the same holds for any elements which we take to be ultimate constituents of the world. We can no more attribute existence to these fundamental entities than we can attribute length to the meter stick in Paris. Kripke ignores the point. It?s old fashioned. Take another illustration. Suppose someone draws a line and calls it "the standard straight line." Someone says I can neither say that it is straight, nor that it is not. Someone runs up with a stick and lays it alongside what up to now is the standard stick. He declares, "Yes, this stick is straight. It is congruent with this stick, so I can say it is straight. You see I compared it to this other standard. Now here we are not speaking of metric properties, but the principle holds. If you don?t believe it, think of how one would in fact deal with the case of the standard straight line. There are no standard straight lines; there are no standard rigid bodies. It make no sense, and I wish to emphasize this, to say this body, the one I?m using as a metric in defining ?length?, is rigid. There is no length "out there" waiting to be designated. Steve Bayne -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune1 at verizon.net Thu Oct 15 07:04:56 2009 From: aune1 at verizon.net (Bruce Aune) Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2009 07:04:56 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Fwd: Re Steve on Kripke and the Meter Stick References: <3A15B4ED-E02C-4624-8924-E8DA8ED6BFED@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: <819873A5-164D-452D-BFC5-F30DCDB510A8@verizon.net> Begin forwarded message: > From: Bruce Aune > Date: October 14, 2009 3:08:33 PM EDT > To: Baynesr at comcast.net > Subject: Re Steve on Kripke and the Meter Stick > > Mea culpa, mea culpa! I took too quick a look at Witt's section 50 > of PI. Steve is right: Witt didn't say that the standard meter is > not 1 meter long; he said that it neither is nor is not a standard > meter. But Witt was dogmatic in making this claim; he offered no > argument to support this bizarre assertion: he simply affirmed that > the language-game we play with "meter" does not allow either > affirmation (that it is or that it is not). I would never say that > Witt was a fool (that would be a silly thing to say) but he was a > very confident, sometimes dogmatic man. Like me, Kripke thought > Witt was clearly wrong about "meter," but Kripke didn't actually > argue against him on this point. (He said, "let's suppose he is > wrong and that the stick is one meter long" [p.54].) Kripke > proceeds to argue that the statement, "Stick S is one meter long at > t-sub-o," is known a priori by someone who has fixed the metric > system by reference to stick S, even though this statement is not a > necessary truth. It is thus, he says, an example of a contingent a > priori statement. > > In my book I gave a streamlined version of Kripke's argument, one > that did not take account of various incidental matters that Kripke > took up in the passages where he gave his argument. (This morning I > had actually forgotten that he mentions Witt in this part of N&N.) > When I presented the argument, I said "some acute philosophers have > raised objections with Kripke's criticism of Kant's contention [that > anything known a priori is necessarily true], but if his argument is > reconstructed as follows, I think it is successful" (pp. 39-40). So > if Steve is going to criticize the arguments I have given, he should > direct his attention to the two paragraphs I include on pages 40-41. > > Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Thu Oct 15 09:25:10 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2009 13:25:10 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Re Steve on Kripke and the Meter Stick In-Reply-To: <819873A5-164D-452D-BFC5-F30DCDB510A8@verizon.net> Message-ID: <68303679.1190791255613109995.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> You think you made a mistake!? When I wrote my last post I was blurry eyed and I think it was about 5AM, which is about the time I usually get up. So I'm writing this thing, drinking coffee etc. The bird squawks; I threaten to eat him for breakfast and go on with the routine. However, in my last post all the time I was writing it I was thinking about necessary a posteriori propositions, rather than contingent a priori propositions. I LITERALLY did not know what I was talking about. Some of the things I said, I think, have value; but they have to be "reconstrued." Let me go back and give a shorter more cogent and relevant reply as long as I'm awake. Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: Baynesr at comcast.net Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2009 7:04:56 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Fwd: Re Steve on Kripke and the Meter Stick Begin forwarded message: From: Bruce Aune < aune at philos.umass.edu > Date: October 14, 2009 3:08:33 PM EDT To: Baynesr at comcast.net Subject: Re Steve on Kripke and the Meter Stick Mea culpa, mea culpa! ?I took too quick a look at Witt's section 50 of PI. ?Steve is right: Witt didn't say that the standard meter is not 1 meter long; he said that it neither is nor is not a standard meter. ?But Witt was dogmatic in making this claim; he offered no argument to support this bizarre assertion: he simply affirmed that the language-game we play with "meter" does not allow either affirmation (that it is or that it is not). I would never say that Witt was a fool (that would be a silly thing to say) but he was a very confident, sometimes dogmatic man. ?Like me, Kripke thought Witt was clearly wrong about "meter," but Kripke ?didn't actually argue against him on this point. (He said, "let's suppose he is wrong and that the stick is one meter long" [p.54].) ?Kripke proceeds to argue that the statement, "Stick S is one meter long at t-sub-o," is known a priori by someone who has fixed the metric system by reference to stick S, even though this statement is not a necessary truth. ?It is thus, he says, an example of a contingent a priori statement. In my book I gave a streamlined version of Kripke's argument, one that did not take account of various incidental matters that Kripke took up in the passages where he gave his argument. (This morning I had actually forgotten that he mentions Witt in this part of N&N.) When I presented the argument, I said "some acute philosophers have raised objections with Kripke's criticism of Kant's contention [that anything known a priori is necessarily true], but if his argument is reconstructed as follows, I think it is successful" (pp. 39-40). ?So if Steve is going to criticize the arguments I have given, he should direct his attention to the two paragraphs I include on pages 40-41. Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Oct 15 18:28:37 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2009 18:28:37 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Show-Down At Truth-Value Gap Message-ID: I think is the title of an essay by Horn, he told me, echoing a westerner, and Witters, we know, loved them. In a message dated 10/15/2009 9:26:40 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, Baynesr at comcast.net writes: But Witt was dogmatic in making this claim; he offered no argument to support this bizarre assertion: he simply affirmed that the language-game we play with "meter" does not allow either affirmation (that it is or that it is not). ---- In a way, it parallels my "Paying Paul to Rob Peter". In the polemic Strawson/Grice, Strawson was (they are both dead now so we can safely use the past tense) adamant in assuming truth-value gaps. Grice was confused and somewhat infuriated with that. "The king of France is not bald" is true, for Grice, with no king of France in view. For Strawson, it was truth-value gappy. Ditto, "The meter stick is one meter long" would be a perfectly true thing for me to say. But perhaps Grice's and my language games are easier to play than Witters's and Strawson's. Cheers, J. L. Speranza -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Fri Oct 16 13:47:41 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2009 17:47:41 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Comments on Aune's ETK Chpt. 2 Message-ID: <865727954.1692091255715261189.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Here are a few comments on the second chapter of Bruce's book. I'm not finished with the chapter, yet. These are off the top of my head and by no means my final view. Hopefully a couple will be of some interest to someone. Disregard the comments on Kripke as Bruce and I are discussing them and these have been covered. Bruce says (p. 38) that I learn some a priori truths from my teachers. But I think this can be misleading. I do not learn the truth of an a priori proposition from having a sentence which expresses it uttered by one of my teachers. Knowing amount to more than being told, even if by a usually reliable informant. If I am told that the theory of types is consistent, this is nothing I?ve learned. To do that I have to march myself like a soldier through the proof with comprehension. Bruce cites in a footnote Kaplan to the effect that ?I am here now? is analytic. (p. 39) This is certainly nothing that Kant would say. Being here now does not belong to the *concept* of myself. The concept is one thing; I am another. The concept corresponding to my self, and thus, the unity of apperception is unrlelated to whatever place ?here? may refer to. Now if it refers to wherever I AM, this is not a place subject to rigid designation. There are no terms usable for the purpose of "fixing" the reference of ?here?. Since it cannot be fixed, being part of my concept is an absurd proposal. This of course assumes rigid designation, which I may question at some future time. I know of nothing that would suggest that either Kaplan or Kripke have read Kant, let alone understood Kant?s theory of "reference." Bruce, also, says that we can know on the basis of the authority of someone who tells us that something is true. (p. 38) Knowing that what I?m told is true is different? How does knowing that what I?m told is true differ from knowing something because I am told? There is a big difference here. I can?t know the truth of the Booga Booga religion because some Boogan Boogan tells me it?s true. It has to BE true and I have to have other means of knowing this in order to count it as knowledge than being told. Bruce says that Kripke has an argument against Kant?s view that knowledge of the length of the meter stick in Paris is a priori. I can?t think of a reason for thinking Kant would agree. Kripke himself argues that the meter stick in Paris can be known to be a meter long because we can measure it. This would be Kant?s position too, in my opinion. I see no reason for believing that Kant would hold that *knowledge* of the length of a meter stick is a priori. Remember Kripke?s argument is based, mainly, on using a ruler; and this is directed specifically against Wittgenstein, whose views on the a priori must be distinguished from Wittgenstein. Moreover, even in the case of Wittgenstein the point is not that the fact that the meter stick is a meter is a priori, rather Wittgenstein?s point is that we can?t say that the meter stick is a meter long, nor that it is not. This cannot be taken as an assertion about what the length of the meter stick is; let alone that it is a priori. Kant is a lot tougher nut to crack than hitting it with a rubber hammer, which I think Kripke is doing, if Bruce is right in his characterization of Kripke?s actual position. Most all of Kripke?s references to Kant he owes to others, and there is little reason to believe that Kripke would read anyone as "old fashioned" as Kant. Moreover, Bruce cites pp. 97-105 as the place where Kripke refutes Kant, but there is no mention of Kant, nor do I believe the position being attacked has been shown to be attributable to Kant. Reading Kant is, always, helpful; perhaps some citations from the "old guy" himself might prove useful. I won?t discuss rigid designation in any detail here, but I have a slight problem with Bruce?s characterization of Kripke?s argument, the one he describes as taking place in Kripke (1972, pp. 97-105). The way Bruce describes it (Aune p. 41) it seems that because we know Franklin was necessarily Franklin that we "therefore" know the necessity of Franklin?s being the person who invented (discovered?) bifocals. Now from (x)(x=x) it follows that, given that Franklin is in our domain of objects, that Franklin is Franklin, but it does not follow that Franklin discovered bifocals. If a def. des. Is a rigid designator then if two such designators designate the same thing in this world, it can be argued that they will designate the same thing in any world, since a rigid designator by definition designates the same thing in all worlds. That may be a better way of expressing it, but I?ll check it out. The problem is there IS a step that goes unmentioned: if two designators designate whatever they do in this world in all possible worlds, and they designate the same object in this world, then they designate the same thing in all worlds. But what if I should deny this! Suppose I say, that just because two designators designate the same thing in this world, and those designators are rigid, WHY should I believe they designate the same thing in all worlds? Now it may seem obvious. But it also seems obvious that if ?p? then ?p or q?, but even here I rely on truth tables to justify my point. What do I appeal to in order to justify the INFERENCE to the conclusion that the two designators designate the same thing in all worlds, and that that they do do so is necessary a posteriori. It may be obvious, but do we rely on intuition, definition, or do we revert to some theorems in one of many of the modal systems where rigidity doesn?t ever really enter? Now a couple of trivial points. Just as an aside, the meaning of ?same? in ?designates the same thing in this world? may not mean what it does in ?designates the same thing in all worlds?. This is a complex issue; the answer isn?t obvious to how we go about ensuring identity of meaning. But let?s pass on this. First, Aune cites Nicod?s system using the Sheffer stroke. Trivial point: The pagination is given as p. 26 in Kneale and Kneale, but it is in fact p. 526. Second, he says that ?if?then? is indicated with a horseshoe. This is sometimes the case, but if I?m not mistaken ?if?then..? is generally distinguished from ?implies? and it is ?implies? that gets the horseshoe. If there is a doubt take a look at Russell?s Principles of Mathematics 1903 "Implication and Formal Implication." It?s an old book, but I can?t recall a case where ?if?then?? gets the horseshoe, but maybe. Any examples? Reichenbach did do this occasionally. It Is not uncommon to think of entailment is just a bracketed expression where the primary operator is material implication, but where outside the left bracket we have a necessity operator. Here there is no need to make a distinction. As for Nicod?s axiom, Bruce says it is hardly self evident. I would say that once you understand it is self-evident. Some people find the axioms of Riemannian geometry difficult to believe but easy to understand. This is a sort of complementary case. Aune seems to hold it against rationalists that they have not "supported their conviction that all logical truths can be derived from self-evident axioms?" p. 46 However, at one point Russell made this claim and he was a "dangerous" empiricist who was proven to be wrong by an idealist and, probably a Kantian, Godel. In addition, it was by rational means that undecidabiliy was proven, not empirical means; I think this strengthens the rationalist?s case. I can?t recall a rationalist since Godel who has, actually, made this claim on the basis of axiomatic systems, which no longer have the "punch" they used to. It is one thing to say: "Give me any sentence of logic you care to and I will show it is valid, if it is valid." It is another thing to say "I can show you that all valid sentences of logic are valid." Bruce has gone "hog wild" over the necessary a posteriori, something I reject in toto. He suggests that modus ponens is an example; but setting aside my own rejection what is it that brings him to this conclusion. I?m not sure the text makes this clear. Maybe this could be clarified. If Bruce can show it is a valid argument form, I don?t see how it can be a posteriori, but some clarification might be in order. Aune in his attack on rationalism draws attention to religious devotees who lob off people?s heads, for example, in order illustrate, I believe, the fallibility of moral appeal to ethical intuitions. He notes that various cultures believe in different things and all this may be just a matter of social perspective. He notes that there are non-Euclidean geometries that dispel the certainty over certain axiomatic systems, thereby showing that which system we adopt is relative to our interests, such as figuring out the nature of physical space. But I find this approach, if not unconvincing at some level. A bit disturbing. What if anything makes it wrong to lob off someone?s head for some moral reason, empirical or otherwise? Aune seems to embrace utilitarianism without mentioning its flaws. It appears that outside of, possibly, narrow cultural centrism (this cannot be dismissed on Aune?s principles), there is nothing wrong with lobbing of people?s heads. Maybe one day we will discover it was all for the best. If a person does not believe that there is a fact of the matter in ethics, then the grumble seems to be that pain is bad. But what sort of pain; and what?s so bad about pain if there are arguments, utilitarian arguments that may support lobbing off heads for, allegedly, screwy religious reasons combined with reflections on the pain of infidelity? Anyway, I think jumping back to ethics from Riemann doesn?t really advance the issue. I think there are some things that are immoral. There are some act so horrendous that no adjustment for context and culture can obviate their validity. Yep, I?m an ethical absolutist in a sense. I find myself writing a lot about Aune. Here?s why. I never turn a page without having had two ideas I?ve never had before. So, while my strong disagreement with him on some issues should be taken along with the fact that his work is provocative in the way that the last 500 page ?jingle? on the so and so puzzle is not; "outsiders" will know what I mean. Aune has an argument the rule ?~(p & ~p)? is cannot be self-evident because it is false on certain assumptions. We have a sentence in a sphere (?The sentence in the rectangle is true?) and another sentence in a rectangle (?The sentence in the circle is false?). From these two we derive the contradiction ?(p & ~p)?. He seems to believe this is a counterexample to the "law" ?(p)~(p & ~p)? because we have it that (Ep)(p & ~p). I don?t get this, actually. By the truth tables ?(p & ~p)? is false, so the law is not refuted. As for the derivation, what it shows is that one of the two statements (or both), either the one in the rectangle is false or the one in the circle is false. Which one is it? Why the one in the circle, of course! Just kidding. All kidding aside, here I think we will have trouble with the identifying the referent of the definite description in either without violating something like Russell?s "vicious circle principle," that is, as long as we work in Russell?s framework. If we take another approach to the paradoxes, say, Zermelo, then we rule out this possibility another way. Since this rule is derived in some systems and not in others, few would say that in the absence of an axiomatic system that it is self-evident and, therefore, true. It may be self-evident but derived. It doesn?t occur among Hilbert and Ackermann?s axioms, e.g. In their system as I recall from that "dreadful" book their axioms for the sentential calculus they either have no such principle, at all, or, if you insist, it can be derived from logical addition, the principle of excluded middle, and DeMorgan. I?m not sure they do it this way, but it can be done. But this takes us in a direction away from epistemology. If Aune could show that ?p & ~p? is ever true. Finally, notice that without accepting the law of excluded middle Aune?s argument can?t really get off the ground. So one might argue that either the law of contradiction or that of excluded middle must be accepted, and accepting it doesn?t require certainty or self-evidence. By self-evident I take it that Bruce means something like ?known true by intuition?. If you look at the truth tables then there seems to be "no way out," by intuition. Eventually, we will get back to intuitions, most likely. Suppose we can derive a contradiction from the law of non-contradiction, or in some other way arrive at a contradiction. Aune says that we can rule out these sentences because they are contradictory. (p. 54)But advocates of the self-evidence of logical principles are not ruling out sentences, otherwise there would be no proof by reduction ad absurdum. So what are they ruling out? Answer: taking contradictions as true, that?s all. Further, if we don?t rule out as false apparent counter instances to the law which are derived from certain other propositions, then we could never rule out these propositions by reduction ad absurdum. We would have to rely on self reference. Why are these more important to Aune than any other sentence(s) from which a contradiction is derived? I think I take a position something like the one Bruce argues against. But my position is not that there is a special class of propositions that intuition justifies, but rather that certain inferences are justified by means of a rational intuition. Now he is sure to wonder what a "rational intuition" is, but that is for another occasion. The point is that, as a rationalist, I?m not affirming a special class of sentences; instead I am defending one way of justifying a connection between sentences. Aune argues that where ?P? has the truth value ?indeterminate? the ?P v P? can not be either true or false. Two points. First, if you mean by ?indeterminate? a truth value, then the claim is trivial. Second, bivalence is not the same as the law of excluded middle. If you accept bivalence and you accept it that both occurrences of ?p? mean the same, then the principle will hold, even though you may not know which of the two truth values hold for ?p?. Again, what Bruce seems to be denying by interjecting ?IND? is not the principle of excluded middle but, rather bivalence. If he accepts bivalence, he must accept ?p or ~p?. Here is a comment I don?t want the reader to make much of but may be worth mentioning. Aune mentions that some people, e.g. Sorensen (2006) think vague sentences are either true or false. But if a sentence is vague, it is reasonable to suppose that there I no proposition it expresses. If the sentence does not express a proposition, then it might be maintained that it has no truth value. If it has no truth value it cannot provide the sort of counterexample Aune is looking for. At one point, Aune says that if a proposition has the value IND then the principle of excluded middle fails. But now that he has introduced a new truth value, of course it is going to fail. The relevant "law" would be: ?p v ~p v INDp?. By keeping bivalence constant and illicitly introducing a new truth value without adjusting bivalence he achieves his end surreptitiously. Regards Steve Bayne ? ? ? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Oct 16 22:23:33 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2009 22:23:33 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] "If" and "If ..., Then ..." Message-ID: I do not want to intrude in the interesting Bayne/Aune commentary, but it may do to express my reaction upon reading Grice, "Indicative Conditionals", WoW. Way of Words. He says, rather stipulatively, that "if p, q" gets the horseshoe. The addition of the 'inferrability' particle, "then", notably does NOT get the horseshoe. ---- I would think the point may do in the Romance Languages. The 'if' particle if just the 'si' of Latin, 'se' of Italian, 'si' of French and Spanish. "si p, q" the addition of 'then' may be a trick. In some Spanish-language logic textbooks, it gets translated as "entonces", "si p, entonces q" --- but it's never a phrase I heard a neighbour say! I would think the French equivalent may be the 'donc', but you bet. Now, as R. Grandy knows -- see his contribution to "Legacy of Grice" for the Berkeley Linguistics Society, it was Strawson who mainly Grice is thinking of. Strawson held that there is a parallel between ASSERTED inferences p ____ therefore, q and unasserted inferences if p, q if p, then q Now, for some reason, the 'therefore' gets translated in Spanish-language textbooks as "por consiguiente", o "luego", which is NOT again something I ever heard any of my neighbours utter. In Latin it would be 'ergo', but Russell/Whitehead POSTdates Latin! ----- So the best way is indeed to deal, as Bayne does, with Philonian (versus Chrysippan?) implication, and consider the horseshoe (whatever its linguistic realisation) as purely truth-functional. Grice seems to be saying that the addition of the "then" makes for MORE than a truth-functional operator. Uttering "if" clauses without the 'then' re-inforcer is to Grice no breach to the 'paradoxes' of material implication, which are all true. Oddly, this PHILO is NOT the Philo, apparently, that occupies a few volumes in my beloved Loeb Classical Library. It is, as it were, a minor Philo. When I was reviewing articles for Margarita Costa for the Bulletin of the Institute of Philosophy (in that wonderful building of the University of Bueos Aires in 25 de mayo Street in downtown Buenos Aires) I recall coming across what I then (and still now) thought a jewel: J. F. Thomson, "In defense of the material conditional" --- this was a posthumous lecture by Thomson, dated 1966 (I think) and poshumously published by Mrs. Thompson (Judith Jarvies). Thompson, who collaborated with Grice on this and that, holds very similar tenets. Strawson's reply on the other hand had been doing the rounds since 1968, and was finally published by Grandy/Warner, in the PGRICE festschrift. (Strawson has also reprinted it in his Entity and Identity, for the Clarendon Press). In this paper, Strawson 'recollects' Grice's distinction between conventionally implies non-conventionally implies This, _NOT_ in the sense referred to by Bayne in the segment below. Rather, in terms of 'implicature'. For Grice (and recall he is basically criticising Strawson's vademecum, Introduction to logical theory, 1952), by uttering "if p, q", the utterer NON-CONVENTIONALLY (i.e. conversationally) implies (or 'implicates' as he prefers) that there is an inferrability link between p and q. This is cancellable, for example, in the paradoxes of material implication. For Strawson, rather, and this seems to be Grandy's point in the Legacy of Grice symposium by uttering "if p, q", the utterer CONVENTIONALLY implies such inferrability link. I recall a class on conditionals (held on Saturday mornings no less) by D. S. M. Edgington. She, oddly, had never seen the Strawson paper till I showed it to her (The meetings were in a rather derelict, if that's the word, section of Buenos Aires, where the Argentine Society for Philosophical Analysis was holding those seminars). Edgington had come fresh from Oxford to teach the natives that neither Grice nor Strawson nor Russell nor C. I. Lewis were RIGHT. "If p, q" has NO truth-conditions! If anything, her seminar served me to systematise all the theories involved, and with the help of some Jackson and D. K. Lewis, to arrive at a neo-Griceanism of sort which still holds the 'identity' thesis between, yes, the 'if p, q' and the horseshoe. But a horse says nay. Cheers, J. L. Speranza" In a message dated 10/16/2009 1:48:59 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, Baynesr at comcast.net writes: he says that ?if?then? is indicated with a horseshoe. This is sometimes the case, but if I?m not mistaken ?if?then..? is generally distinguished from ?implies? and it is ?implies? that gets the horseshoe. If there is a doubt take a look at Russell?s Principles of Mathematics 1903 "Implication and Formal Implication." It?s an old book, but I can?t recall a case where ?if?then?? gets the horseshoe, but maybe. Any examples? Reichenbach did do this occasionally. It Is not uncommon to think of entailment is just a bracketed expression where the primary operator is material implication, but where outside the left bracket we have a necessity operator. Here there is no need to make a distinction. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Sat Oct 17 06:47:41 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sat, 17 Oct 2009 10:47:41 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] "If" and "If ..., Then ..." In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <611236695.1899761255776461352.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Ok! Reichenbach does this and others. Mostly a matter of convention there remain some underlying issues. By the way, Speranza, Hist-Analytic has received thousands and thousands of hits on Grice and Strawson's review of Quine's Two Dogmas. Have you been rereading this thing ten thousand time or more, or are Grice and Strawson cited in SpaceGhetto or Masters of Blasters, or some such? Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: Jlsperanza at aol.com To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Sent: Friday, October 16, 2009 10:23:33 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: "If" and "If ..., Then ..." I do not want to intrude in the interesting Bayne/Aune commentary, but it may do to express my reaction upon reading Grice, "Indicative Conditionals", WoW. Way of Words. He says, rather stipulatively, that ???? "if p, q" gets the horseshoe. The addition of the 'inferrability' particle, "then", notably does NOT get the horseshoe. ---- I would think the point may do in the Romance Languages. The 'if' particle if just the 'si' of Latin, 'se' of Italian, 'si' of French and Spanish. "si p, q" the addition of 'then' may be a trick. In some Spanish-language logic textbooks, it gets translated as "entonces", ?? "si p, entonces q" --- but it's never a phrase I heard a neighbour say! I would think the French equivalent may be the 'donc', but you bet. Now, as R. Grandy knows -- see his contribution to "Legacy of Grice" for the Berkeley Linguistics Society, it was Strawson who mainly Grice is thinking of. Strawson held that there is a parallel between ASSERTED inferences ??? p ??? ____ ??? therefore, q and unasserted inferences ??? if p, q ??? if p, then q Now, for some reason, the 'therefore' gets translated in Spanish-language textbooks as "por consiguiente", o "luego", which is NOT again something I ever heard any of my neighbours utter. In Latin it would be 'ergo', but Russell/Whitehead POSTdates Latin! ----- So the best way is indeed to deal, as Bayne does, with Philonian (versus Chrysippan?) implication, and consider the horseshoe (whatever its linguistic realisation) as purely truth-functional. Grice seems to be saying that the addition of the "then" makes for MORE than a truth-functional operator. Uttering "if" clauses without the 'then' re-inforcer is to Grice no breach to the 'paradoxes' of material implication, which are all true. Oddly, this PHILO is NOT the Philo, apparently, that occupies a few volumes in my beloved Loeb Classical Library. It is, as it were, a minor Philo. When I was reviewing articles for Margarita Costa for the Bulletin of the Institute of Philosophy (in that wonderful building of the University of Bueos Aires in 25 de mayo Street in downtown Buenos Aires) I recall coming across what I then (and still now) thought a jewel: ??? J. F. Thomson, "In defense of the material conditional" --- this was a posthumous lecture by Thomson, dated 1966 (I think) and poshumously published by Mrs. Thompson (Judith Jarvies). Thompson, who collaborated with Grice on this and that, holds very similar tenets. Strawson's reply on the other hand had been doing the rounds since 1968, and was finally published by Grandy/Warner, in the PGRICE festschrift. (Strawson has also reprinted it in his Entity and Identity, for the Clarendon Press). In this paper, Strawson 'recollects' Grice's distinction between ????????? conventionally implies ????????? non-conventionally implies This, _NOT_ in the sense referred to by Bayne in the segment below. Rather, in terms of 'implicature'. For Grice (and recall he is basically criticising Strawson's vademecum, Introduction to logical theory, 1952), ????? by uttering "if p, q", the utterer NON-CONVENTIONALLY (i.e. conversationally) implies (or 'implicates' as he prefers) that ???????????? there is an inferrability link between p and q.? This is cancellable, for example, in the paradoxes of material implication. For Strawson, rather, and this seems to be Grandy's point in the Legacy of Grice symposium ???? by uttering "if p, q", the utterer CONVENTIONALLY implies such inferrability link. I recall a class on conditionals (held on Saturday mornings no less) by D. S. M. Edgington. She, oddly, had never seen the Strawson paper till I showed it to her (The meetings were in a rather derelict, if that's the word, section of Buenos Aires, where the Argentine Society for Philosophical Analysis was holding those seminars). Edgington had come fresh from Oxford to teach the natives that neither Grice nor Strawson nor Russell nor C. I. Lewis were RIGHT. "If p, q" has NO truth-conditions! If anything, her seminar served me to systematise all the theories involved, and with the help of some Jackson and D. K. Lewis, to arrive at a neo-Griceanism of sort which still holds the 'identity' thesis between, yes, the 'if p, q' and the horseshoe. But a horse says nay. Cheers, J. L. Speranza" In a message dated 10/16/2009 1:48:59 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, Baynesr at comcast.net writes: he says that ?if?then? is indicated with a horseshoe. This is sometimes the case, but if I?m not mistaken ?if?then..? is generally distinguished from ?implies? and it is ?implies? that gets the horseshoe. If there is a doubt take a look at Russell?s Principles of Mathematics 1903 "Implication and Formal Implication." It?s an old book, but I can?t recall a case where ?if?then?? gets the horseshoe, but maybe. Any examples? Reichenbach did do this occasionally. It Is not uncommon to think of entailment is just a bracketed expression where the primary operator is material implication, but where outside the left bracket we have a necessity operator. Here there is no need to make a distinction. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Sun Oct 18 10:39:43 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sun, 18 Oct 2009 14:39:43 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Aune, Kripke 'S' and meta-statements of identity In-Reply-To: <819873A5-164D-452D-BFC5-F30DCDB510A8@verizon.net> Message-ID: <1464664368.2109161255876783635.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Bruce, "Stick S is one meter long at t0" ? Try spelling out 'S' and see what happens. This is either an open sentence or 'S' stands for some thing. Whatever the case may be, try filling out this 'S' and see what happens. THEN we will have something. Second point. Kripke distinguishes three thesis (NN p. 4). I will discuss two, one in particular. The first is that identical objects are necessarily identical; the second is that true identity statements between rigid designators are necessary. Note how they differ according to Kripke. The first is not, but the?second is, metalinguistic. So if we have it that 'a=b' then ''Nec(a=b)' is true'. The sentence is about a sentence, whence it's being "metalinguistic." Kripke, further, maintains - against those who maintain that two people can have the same name disproves the rigidity thesis - that requiring that each name have one object in not "a major oversimplification." He, then, goes on to discuss at greater length cases where the same name refers to different objects. But as I see it this is not what he should be concerned with so much. What he should be concerned with, I think, is that an object in this world may have two names - and here is where I begin my suggestion that his uniqueness requirement is an oversimplification which side steps issues concerning rigidity. The reason I say this is in view of the following situation. One object has two names, 'a' and 'b' say'; both are rigid designators. Now it turns out that a and b?are found to be identical. Both names are rigid; that is, they designate the same thing in all possible worlds in which they designate at all. Fine. But suppose in one world 'a' doesn't name at all. Now remember we are talking about the second thesis, the one that is metalinguistic. Now if 'a' doesn't designate then in the world where it doesn't we cannot assert ''a=b' is true'. Why? There is no 'a', or 'a' doesn't designate at all. In this case, we can't say that the sentence 'a=b' is true in all possible worlds. We CAN say that a and b are identical in all possible worlds, but not ''a=b' is true' in all possible worlds. Now I don't know why he doesn't raise this example; it is far more challenging than the ambiguity (?) of 'Aristotle'. There may be an easy way around this; but I don't see it. ? Regards Regards STeve ?----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: Baynesr at comcast.net Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2009 7:04:56 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Fwd: Re Steve on Kripke and the Meter Stick Begin forwarded message: From: Bruce Aune < aune at philos.umass.edu > Date: October 14, 2009 3:08:33 PM EDT To: Baynesr at comcast.net Subject: Re Steve on Kripke and the Meter Stick Mea culpa, mea culpa! ?I took too quick a look at Witt's section 50 of PI. ?Steve is right: Witt didn't say that the standard meter is not 1 meter long; he said that it neither is nor is not a standard meter. ?But Witt was dogmatic in making this claim; he offered no argument to support this bizarre assertion: he simply affirmed that the language-game we play with "meter" does not allow either affirmation (that it is or that it is not). I would never say that Witt was a fool (that would be a silly thing to say) but he was a very confident, sometimes dogmatic man. ?Like me, Kripke thought Witt was clearly wrong about "meter," but Kripke ?didn't actually argue against him on this point. (He said, "let's suppose he is wrong and that the stick is one meter long" [p.54].) ?Kripke proceeds to argue that the statement, "Stick S is one meter long at t-sub-o," is known a priori by someone who has fixed the metric system by reference to stick S, even though this statement is not a necessary truth. ?It is thus, he says, an example of a contingent a priori statement. In my book I gave a streamlined version of Kripke's argument, one that did not take account of various incidental matters that Kripke took up in the passages where he gave his argument. (This morning I had actually forgotten that he mentions Witt in this part of N&N.) When I presented the argument, I said "some acute philosophers have raised objections with Kripke's criticism of Kant's contention [that anything known a priori is necessarily true], but if his argument is reconstructed as follows, I think it is successful" (pp. 39-40). ?So if Steve is going to criticize the arguments I have given, he should direct his attention to the two paragraphs I include on pages 40-41. Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Sun Oct 18 11:25:22 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Sun, 18 Oct 2009 11:25:22 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Reply to Steve on C2, Part 1 Message-ID: Here is the first part of my remarks in response to Steve's comments on my Chapter 2. I will send along the second part in a day o two. I hope Steve doesn't undertake an ambitious response to these remarks; I would prefer to have him continue on with comments on my book. We can always respond to responses later on. I attach my remarks in a pdf file. Using this format allows me to use some symbols that aren't transmitted in the regular email format. Bruce -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Steve on C2.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 54798 bytes Desc: not available URL: From danny.frederick at btinternet.com Sun Oct 18 14:36:11 2009 From: danny.frederick at btinternet.com (Danny Frederick) Date: Sun, 18 Oct 2009 19:36:11 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism Message-ID: <7C60AD4C42D24E1893D72CA0C3FDD777@DFLVQC1J> Hi Steve, You say: 'I've never been completely convinced that the Cogito is a bad argument.' The cogito seems plainly to be a valid argument, since 'Fa' entails 'Ex (x = a)', at least in the sense that if the former is true then so is the latter. But is it sound? Could its premise be false when enunciated? It seems plain to me that it could. 'I' brings with it a theory, or a rag-bag of theories, about the self, any or all of which may be false. Thus to affirm 'I think' already presupposes 'I exist' (i.e. that some of these theories are true); and thus the cogito is a petitio principii. Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Sun Oct 18 15:01:59 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sun, 18 Oct 2009 19:01:59 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism In-Reply-To: <7C60AD4C42D24E1893D72CA0C3FDD777@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <194956446.2156631255892519633.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Danny, The performative component of the argument, I think, rules out its being false if enunciated by the subject ot the sentence. Playing around with '(Ex)(x=b)' can be fun. For example, if 'a=b' then why not, where, the designators are rigid, say 'Nec(Ex)(x=b)'? But maybe all that you can really get is 'Nec[(a=b -> (Ex)(a=b); but if you have 'a=b' you can, where again the designators are rigid, 'Nec[(a=b)'. Now this "asymmetry is a bit curious when looked at in terms of this Cartesian argument. I can't go into this. I just point it out since you raise an interesting idea worth pursuing. Scope has always been an interesting topic in the discussion of these sorts of argument. By the way, I do believe (today at least) that 'I' refers and that Hume was not right. There is, I believe, a transcendental Self, although it may not be a "substance" in the usual sense. Selves have minds; bodies don't. Knowledge of my own existence is, I believe, justified without any appeal to induction.I don't believe that the nature of existence can be captured in the?quantification theory of first order logic etc. Theser are worldy issues without any resolution in semantics. By the way Gimbel was more right than I was, at the time, on Reichenbach. I'm going back over Reichenbach. He's not good on Kant, but very good on physics. I'm gonna take a look at the notion of a Kantian intuition and see how this might tie in with the Poincare vs. Reichenbach debate. I'm just coming off a big project in action theory, so it'll take me a couple of months to think about these problems. Also, by the way: I'm intent on putting up O. Veblen's _Analysis Situs_. I've got the first three or so chapters done but can't find the rest. I'll put up what I've got, unless someone can get me a copy of the rest. There are a few other things on the way for the data base, soon. In view of Danny's interest, maybe Hintikka's paper on the subject. I have every reason to believe Hintikka would not object. Best wishes Steve --- On Sun, 10/18/09, Danny Frederick wrote: From: Danny Frederick Subject: RE: Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Sunday, October 18, 2009, 2:36 PM Hi Steve, You say: ?I've never been completely convinced that the Cogito is a bad argument.? The cogito seems plainly to be a valid argument, since ?Fa? entails ?Ex (x = a)?, at least in the sense that if the former is true then so is the latter. But is it sound? Could its premise be false when enunciated? It seems plain to me that it could. ?I? brings with it a theory, or a rag-bag of theories, about the self, any or all of which may be false. Thus to affirm ?I think? already presupposes ?I exist? (i.e. that some of these theories are true); and thus the cogito is a petitio principii. Cheers. Danny ----- Original Message ----- From: "Danny Frederick" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Sunday, October 18, 2009 2:36:11 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: RE: Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism Hi Steve, You say: ?I've never been completely convinced that the Cogito is a bad argument.? The cogito seems plainly to be a valid argument, since ?Fa? entails ?Ex (x = a)?, at least in the sense that if the former is true then so is the latter. But is it sound? Could its premise be false when enunciated? It seems plain to me that it could. ?I? brings with it a theory, or a rag-bag of theories, about the self, any or all of which may be false. Thus to affirm ?I think? already presupposes ?I exist? (i.e. that some of these theories are true); and thus the cogito is a petitio principii. Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Mon Oct 19 05:39:19 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2009 10:39:19 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Foundational Adventures Message-ID: <1255945159.4622.12.camel@rbj-laptop> I thought perhaps that some hist-analytic subscribers might not be aware of, but might be interested in the material now available on the internet about: FOUNDATIONAL ADVENTURES: CONFERENCE IN HONOR OF THE 60th BIRTHDAY OF HARVEY M. FRIEDMAN Streaming video of most of the presentations is now available at: http://people.cohums.ohio-state.edu/tennant9/videos.html There is a lot of material relevant to the philosophy and foundations of mathematics here. It is particularly interesting to me to see these videos of people with whose work I am acquainted, and with whom I may have engaged on the internet but who I have never met in person, and will be a big distraction for me for quite some time! Roger Jones From danny.frederick at btinternet.com Sun Oct 18 15:24:32 2009 From: danny.frederick at btinternet.com (Danny Frederick) Date: Sun, 18 Oct 2009 20:24:32 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism In-Reply-To: <194956446.2156631255892519633.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <7C60AD4C42D24E1893D72CA0C3FDD777@DFLVQC1J> <194956446.2156631255892519633.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <0C16FC6FB7A84CE69F7984A61D45A890@DFLVQC1J> Hi Steve, <> Suppose a simple machine utters it. Presumably, 'I think' is then false (not an I, not a thinker). But how do I know that I do not fail to satisfy the conditions for being an I? One condition is some minimal endurance through time; but perhaps I am really just an infinite succession of momentary quasi-Is (this is one of Kant's arguments in the Paralogisms). <> Even where 'a' and 'b' are rigid designators of the same thing, 'a = b' is a contingent truth if a is a contingent existent. What is necessary is that: if a exists, then a = b. Kripke is explicit about this, though he usually suppresses the qualification about existence and talks of 'a = b' being necessary if true. Of course, if a is a necessary existent, then a = b is a necessary truth simpliciter, and thus 'Ex (x = a)' is a necessary truth too. But this latter is trivial given that we have supposed that a is a necessary existent. <> I've not read it since I was an undergrad. I would be pleased to see it again. Best wishes, Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune1 at verizon.net Sat Oct 24 10:36:11 2009 From: aune1 at verizon.net (Bruce Aune) Date: Sat, 24 Oct 2009 10:36:11 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] On Steve's Comments on my Ch 2, part 2 Message-ID: <62D4C784-F118-4499-8474-7009BCF33341@verizon.net> Steve takes issue with what I say about logic in chapter 2. He does not describe my position accurately, though, and his objections call for some clarification. Rationalists typically claim that they can simply ?see? the truth of basic logical laws such as the principle of non-contradiction. I argue against this, saying that such ?laws? have a kind of generality that makes them an inappropriate object of a supposed truth- ascertaining act of mental ?vision.? I will enumerate and state some of the claims I was making. The ?laws? in question are normally stated in schematic form. Steve uses quantifers, but they are not normally stated that way (unless substitution-quantifiers are used), for a reason I mention in footnote 26. The actual content of the laws is that all instances of the schemas are true. I claim that the supposed acts of vision cannot survey the relevant instances and therefore add credibility to the claim that all of them are true. How do I know that the mental survey fails in this way? For three distinguishable reasons. (A) Some sentences that have the appearance of being appropriate instances can be shown to be false if classical logical principles are applied to them; (B) Some such sentences are arguably not true, though they are not false; and (C) Arguments corresponding to conditional sentences supposedly expressing logical truths are actually debatable and have convinced very intelligent philosophers that they are counter instances to supposedly valid arguments. The arguments given in my second chapter are expressed in language that I have worked very hard to make transparently clear. I have read them over many times, and I am convinced that I succeeded in making them clear. I can?t expect to improve on them in a short post, but knowing that they span a large chunk of text, I can at least highlight a number of points that bring out crucial steps in my argument that some readers, Steve and Danny Frederic included, seemed to miss. The points in question shouldn?t be considered controversial. They are actually quite familiar to all teachers of logic in any but the most elementary level. Here is a comment on my reason (A) stated in paragraph 2 above. I identify two statements supporting reason (A). I describe one sentence as appearing in a sphere and another appearing in a rectangle. The sentence are, ?The sentence in the rectangle is true? and ?The sentence in the circle is false?. From the two sentences I derive a contradiction. Steve says, ?As for the derivation, what it shows is that one of the two statements (or both), either the one in the rectangle is false or the one in the circle is false. Which one is it?? This is wrong. My derivation is valid, and its conclusion has the form of ?p and not-p. We do not ?know? that one of these conjuncts is false and not true. What we know is this: If standard logic applies to them, they are both true and both false. The proof I give shows this. Steve thinks that my claim can be refuted by using truth tables. He is wrong. A proper truth table will have values for sentences that are truth-functions of the elementary statements occurring in the argument. Two such statements are the disjunctions from which a conjunction, ?A and not-A?, is inferred. This conjunction tops a column containing Ts and only Ts. There will, of course, be another column under another such conjunction containing only Fs. Observation: I do not claim that the contradictions I derive should be accepted as both true and false, as some contemporary logicians do (e.g. Graham Priest). My claim is that the decision of how to accommodate them requires argumentative considerations far more discursive than anything plausibly supplied by immediate intuition. Their status as true or false requires a kind of support not available to the rationalist. Here is my comment on reason B: Certain vague statements are widely conceded to violate the principle of bivalence, which requires statements to have the value T or F but not both. If ?Tom is thin? is such a statement, then if it is abbreviated as ?A?, the conjunction ?A and not-A? and the disjunction ?A or not-A? should not have the value T, which classical logic requires. Immediate intuition provides no counter-assurance that they are true. It is philosophically useless here. Steve offers some criticisms of my claims regarding B, but they do not succeed. He says, for instance, ?what Bruce seems to be denying by interjecting [a third value] ?IND? is not the principle of excluded middle but, rather bivalence.? Not true. If certain statements are assigned a third value distinct from truth and falsity, the conjunctions and disjunctions mentioned in the last paragraph will not have the value T, which they should have if classical logic accommodates them. The principle of excluded middle would thus have a counter instance, not a false one but one not having the value T. Steve says, ?if a sentence is vague, it is reasonable to suppose that there is no proposition it expresses. If the sentence does not express a proposition, then it might be maintained that it has no truth value. If it has no truth value it cannot provide the sort of counterexample Aune is looking for.? Claiming that vague sentences don?t express propositions and therefore don?t belong within the purview of standard logic is a familiar move in philosophical logic. I don?t think it is a very plausible move, because vague statements are often clearly true or clearly false. ?Fat? might be a vague predicate, but if Sally in anorexic, the statement ?Sally is fat? is clearly false. Vague statements are neither true nor false when they are asserted of borderline cases. But however this may be, the decision to regard vague statements as not expressing propositions and therefore as not being covered by classical logic principles is not incompatible with anything I claim. I was arguing against the rationalist claim that basic logical truths are known by immediate intuition. But this kind of intuition does not identify vague statements as excluded instances of classical logical principles. The decision to classify them in a way that does plausibly exclude them fits in nicely with the position I was defending. I might mention here that Steve suggested a way of excluding paradoxical self-referring statements from the scope of classical logic; he said that Russell?s vicious circle principle or Zermelo?s ?approach? might work. Steve?s details aren?t right, since Russell?s vicious circle principle succumbed to criticism by Frank Ramsey, and Zermelo?s ?approach? has nothing to do with the so-called semantic paradoxes (it provided an alternative to Frege?s axiom of abstraction in set theory, to which Russell had given a counter instance). But the basic strategy Steve used was in full agreement with what I was claiming. The paradoxical assertions are not surveyed, let alone accommodated, by the rationalist?s appeal to immediate intuition. The latter is powerless to discriminate proper from reasonably excluded instances of logical laws and inference patterns. Re reason [C]. In spite of what he said about Russell and Zermelo, Steve says he still ?takes a position something like the one Bruce argues against. But my position is not that there is a special class of propositions that intuition justifies, but rather that certain inferences are justified by means of a rational intuition.? My argument against knowing inferences are valid this way is based specifically on arguable counter instances to modus ponens, which some shrewd philosophers defend claim. The plausibility of these instances undermines the supposed compelling evidence provided by rational intuition. But Steve has not yet commented on these instances; in a recent note to me, he says he is in the process of preparing comments on them. Final remark: I was not concerned to argue that classical logic (laws or inference patterns) is defective in any way. Rather, I wanted to identify statements and laws that appear to be contrary to such laws or patterns and whose status as true, false, acceptable or unacceptable rests on a basis clearly different from immediate intuition. I think that the rationalist position offers an over- simplified and erroneous picture of how logical laws and patterns of inference?their acceptable and excluded instances?are reasonably identified and justified. Showing this was perhaps my basic concern in chapter 2. Bruce Aune -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Sun Oct 25 09:35:34 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2009 13:35:34 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] On Steve's Comments on my Ch 2, part 2 In-Reply-To: <62D4C784-F118-4499-8474-7009BCF33341@verizon.net> Message-ID: <1572244474.226311256477734582.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Bruce has offered a number of compelling remarks. What I'm going to do is reply to them after I finish all my comments. If I digress to answer each point of disagreement, then I will probably never finish the book, itself. One problem with his using pdf is that I can't quote from it very easily. Still there are numerous areas where I need to comment. Sometimes Bruce seems to suggest that I am in a state of complete ignorance and bewilderment over Kripke.. For example he says "Steve wonders why a certain designator (i.e. a certain description) whould designate the same thing in all possible worlds." Then he goes on to give an account that simply does not answer the question! Kripke, himself , gives an answer which in no way, even remotely resembles Bruce's. In fact, Bruce doesn't appear to be address this question, but I can't really tell. If you've read Kripke, you KNOW what the answer to the question is. Here are Kripke's own words: "My main remark, then, is that we have a DIRECT INTUITION of the rigidity of names..." (NN. p. 13). Now Bruce has been very hard on the concept of inuition, but Kripke relies on it everywhere. Take another example: "Of course some philosphers think that something's having intuitive content is very inconclusiver evidence in favor of it. I think it is very heavy evidence in favor of anything myself." (NN p. 42). So Bruce never does give a clear answer to the question: "What evidence or reason do I have for believing that a name is a rigid designator?" Kripke's answer is intuition. If there is a better example IN THE TEXT, then I'd like to see it. One other point. Bruce and I differ wildly, I think, in our general orientation. My belief is that much?analytical philosophy for the most part over the last twenty years or so is not wortth reading. Instead we should be reading better philosophy we have forgotten about in favor of a hand full of half understood puzzles that have no bearing on the major themes as understood in the history of philosophy. Kripke doesn't "have a clue" as to what Kant said or meant, on most major issues. This is not to slight his work. But it is symptomatic of "troubled times." The fact that today in analytical philosophy "we" mean such and such simply won't cut it. You can't get away with reading the rubbish in the current journals. Clearly there is some very good stuff, but the trend is obvious. So we differ on Kant. I know of no philosopher who brought so many concepts together. Kripke's work is replete with references to "intuition." Now maybe we mean something else by that term these days, but life is short and I'll stick with Kant. He has not been refuted on virtually any issue in my opinion. As I go through Bruce's invigorating work, keep in mind that I will be viewing it as if I were a strict Kantian. (As strict as possible). I'm preparing a large body of work to be put on Hist-Analytic. Also, I am htmling a new front page. Also, I have a lot of comments on the rest of Bruce's chapter. I'll have it out in a few days, unless I read the paper Putnam wrote on colors. I was never happy with this paper, although it is quite good, and I'm thinking about rereading it, but this might cause delay. So I probably won't. ? Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Saturday, October 24, 2009 10:36:11 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: On Steve's Comments on my Ch 2, part 2 Steve takes issue with what I say about logic in chapter 2. He does not describe my position accurately, though, and his objections call for some clarification. Rationalists typically claim that they can simply ?see? the truth of basic logical laws such as the principle of non-contradiction. ? I argue against this, saying that such ?laws? have a kind of generality that makes them an inappropriate object of a supposed truth-ascertaining act of mental ?vision.? ? I will enumerate and state some of the claims I was making. 1. The ?laws? in question are normally stated in schematic form. ? Steve uses quantifers, but they are not normally ?stated that way (unless substitution-quantifiers are used), for a reason I mention in footnote 26. ? The actual content of the laws is that all instances of the schemas are true. 1. I claim that the supposed acts of vision cannot survey the relevant instances and therefore add credibility to the claim that all of them are true. ? How do I know that the mental survey fails in this way? ? For three distinguishable reasons. ? (A) Some sentences that have the appearance of being appropriate instances can be shown to be false if classical logical principles are applied to them; (B) Some such sentences are arguably not true, though they are not false; and (C) Arguments corresponding to conditional sentences supposedly expressing logical truths are actually debatable and have convinced very intelligent philosophers that they are counter instances to supposedly valid arguments. 1. The arguments given in my second chapter are expressed in language that I have worked very hard to make transparently clear. ? I have read them over many times, and I am convinced that I succeeded in making them clear. I can?t expect to improve on them in a short post, but knowing that they span a large chunk of text, I can at least highlight a number of points that bring out crucial steps in my argument that some readers, Steve and Danny Frederic included, seemed to miss. The points in question shouldn?t be considered controversial. They are actually quite familiar to all teachers of logic in any but the most elementary level. 1. Here is a comment on my reason (A) stated in paragraph 2 above. 1. I identify two statements supporting reason (A). I describe one sentence as appearing in a sphere and another appearing in a rectangle. ? The sentence are, ?The sentence in the rectangle is true? and ?The sentence in the circle is false?. From the two sentences I derive a contradiction.? 1. Steve says, ?As for the derivation, what it shows is that one of the two statements (or both), either the one in the rectangle is false or the one in the circle is false. Which one is it?? ? This is wrong . My derivation is valid, and its conclusion has the form of ?p and not-p. We do not ?know? that one of these conjuncts is false and not true. What we know is this: If standard logic applies to them, they are both true and both false. The proof I give shows this. 1. Steve thinks that my claim can be refuted by using truth tables. ? He is wrong. ? A proper truth table will have values for sentences that are truth-functions of the elementary statements occurring in the argument. ? Two such statements are the disjunctions from which a conjunction, ?A and not-A?, is inferred. This conjunction tops a column containing Ts and only Ts. There will, of course, be another column under another such conjunction containing only Fs. 1. Observation: I do not claim that the contradictions I derive should be accepted as both true and false, as some contemporary logicians do (e.g. Graham Priest). My claim is that the decision of how to accommodate them requires argumentative considerations far more discursive than anything plausibly supplied by immediate intuition. ? Their status as true or false requires a kind of support not available to the rationalist. 1. Here is my comment on reason B: 1. Certain vague statements are widely conceded to violate the principle of bivalence, which requires statements to have the value T or F but not both. ? If ?Tom is thin? is such a statement, then if it is abbreviated as ?A?, the conjunction ?A and not-A? and the disjunction ?A or not-A? should not have the value T, which classical logic requires. ? Immediate intuition provides no counter-assurance that they are true. ? It is philosophically useless here. 1. Steve offers some criticisms of my claims regarding B, but they do not succeed. He says, for instance, ?what Bruce seems to be denying by interjecting [a third value] ?IND? is not the principle of excluded middle but, rather bivalence.? Not true. If certain statements are assigned a third value distinct from truth and falsity, the conjunctions and disjunctions mentioned in the last paragraph will not have the value T, which they should have if classical logic accommodates them. ? The principle of excluded middle would thus have a counter instance, not a false one but one not having the value T. 1. Steve says, ?if a sentence is vague, it is reasonable to suppose that there is no proposition it expresses. If the sentence does not express a proposition, then it might be maintained that it has no truth value. If it has no truth value it cannot provide the sort of counterexample Aune is looking for.? ? Claiming that vague sentences don?t express propositions and therefore don?t belong within the purview of standard logic is a familiar move in philosophical logic. ? I don?t think it is a very plausible move, because vague statements are often clearly true or clearly false. ?Fat? might be a vague predicate, but if Sally in anorexic, the statement ?Sally is fat? is clearly false. ? Vague statements are neither true nor false when they are asserted of borderline cases. ? But however this may be, the decision to regard vague statements as not expressing propositions and therefore as not being covered by classical logic principles is not incompatible with anything I claim. I was arguing against the rationalist claim that basic logical truths are known by immediate intuition. ? But this kind of intuition does not identify vague statements as excluded instances of classical logical principles. ? The decision to classify them in a way that does plausibly exclude them fits in nicely with the position I was defending. 1. I might mention here that Steve suggested a way of excluding paradoxical self-referring statements from the scope of classical logic; he said that Russell?s vicious circle principle or Zermelo?s ?approach? might work. ? Steve?s details aren?t right, since Russell?s vicious circle principle succumbed to criticism by Frank Ramsey, and Zermelo?s ?approach? has nothing to do with the so-called semantic paradoxes (it provided an alternative to Frege?s axiom of abstraction in set theory, to which Russell had given a counter instance). But the basic strategy Steve used was in full agreement with what I was claiming. The paradoxical assertions are not surveyed, let alone accommodated, by the rationalist?s appeal to immediate intuition. The latter is powerless to discriminate proper from reasonably excluded instances of logical laws and inference patterns. 1. Re reason [C]. In spite of what he said about Russell and Zermelo, Steve says he still ?takes a position something like the one Bruce argues against. But my position is not that there is a special class of propositions that intuition justifies, but rather that certain inferences are justified by means of a rational intuition.? My argument against knowing inferences are valid this way is based specifically on arguable counter instances to modus ponens, which some shrewd philosophers defend claim. The plausibility of these instances undermines the supposed compelling evidence provided by rational intuition. ? But Steve has not yet commented on these instances; in a recent note to me, he says he is in the process of preparing comments on them. 1. Final remark: ? I was not concerned to argue that classical logic (laws or inference patterns) is defective in any way. ? Rather, I wanted to identify statements and laws that appear to be contrary to such laws or patterns and whose status as true, false, acceptable or unacceptable rests on a basis clearly different from immediate intuition. I think that the rationalist position offers an over-simplified and erroneous picture of how logical laws and patterns of inference?their acceptable and excluded instances?are reasonably identified and justified. ? Showing this was perhaps my basic concern in chapter 2. Bruce Aune -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune1 at verizon.net Tue Oct 27 08:30:01 2009 From: aune1 at verizon.net (Bruce Aune) Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2009 08:30:01 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Steve's Latest Message-ID: <7E584413-717F-45CF-A301-22F5B463FA71@verizon.net> Steve may have a little too much on his plate right now. He may be trying to respond to too much input by me and others. I hate to pile more on top of him, but I do want to address a personal matter that Steve raised when he said, in his last post: ?Sometimes Bruce seems to suggest that I am in a state of complete ignorance and bewilderment over Kripke. For example he says ?Steve wonders why a certain designator (i.e. a certain description) should designate the same thing in all possible worlds." Then he goes on to give an account that simply does not answer the question!? I assure you all that I had no intention of suggesting that Steve is in such a state. I made the remark Steve cites in response to a question he asked in his comments on my chapter 2. He asked, ?What do I appeal to in order to justify the INFERENCE to the conclusion that the two designators designate the same thing in all worlds, and that that they do so is necessary a posteriori. It may be obvious, but do we rely on intuition, definition, or do we revert to some theorems in one of many of the modal systems where rigidity doesn?t ever really enter?? The answer I gave, which Steve says ?simply does not [really] answer the question,? does give my reason for believing that a certain designator ?should, in his words, ?designate the same thing in all possible worlds.? It does so, I said, thinking of ?the inventor of bifocals? in the sentence I used, because it is being used referentially to pick out a certain person rather than picking out whatever person is taken to have invented bifocals in an assumed possible world or context of discussion. If we are thinking of a situation in which we regard the term as applying to Thomas Jefferson, say, we are using the term non-rigidly; if we use it to refer to a certain person, Benjamin Franklin, whom we may think of as not, in some situation, being the inventor of bifocals, we re using it rigidly. Used this last way, we could coherently think, ?The inventor of bifocals might not have invented bifocals.? Compare ?The man over there drinking a Martini might possibly have been drinking a glass of water instead.? His last post shows that Steve is now reading Kripke. (I am not suggesting that he has not done so numerous times.) But if he is evaluating the argument I gave in my second chapter (ascertaining whether its conclusion is true, which concerned me, not whether it is involves a good reading of the argument Kripke actually gave, which concerns me only secondarily), Kripke?s actual thinking about rigid designators is not centrally important. Suppose I stipulate that I am using the term ?the inventor of bifocals? in the following sentence purely referentially to pick out the person who, as it happened (as we know in empirical grounds), did invent bifocals but may (might possibly have) failed to do so: ?Benjamin Franklin = the inventor of bifocals.? I contend that the following sentence, with the define description so understood, is true: Benjamin Franklin = the inventor of bifocals --> N(Benjamin Franklin = the inventor of bifocals). (The sentence is a UI consequence of the theorem Steve attributes to Ruth Marcus.) If we know a posteriori that the antecedent is true and, on the basis of that knowledge, conclude that N(Benjamin Franklin = the inventor of bifocals), we shall know a posteriori (for the reason I gave in an earlier post) that N(Benjamin Franklin = the inventor of bifocals). But since what we know here is necessary, we have an element of a posteriori knowledge that is necessary rather than contingent. Best, Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Tue Oct 27 09:33:29 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2009 13:33:29 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Steve's Latest In-Reply-To: <7E584413-717F-45CF-A301-22F5B463FA71@verizon.net> Message-ID: <1071780916.932671256650409901.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Bruce has attempted an answer to the question: 'What evidence do I have for believing a name is a rigid designator?" (A rigid designator being one that designates the same thing in all worlds in which it designates). Here is his answer: "It does so, I said, thinking of ?the inventor of bifocals? in the sentence I used, because it is being used referentially to pick out a certain person rather than picking out whatever person is taken to have invented bifocals in an assumed possible world or context of discussion. How I know it is a rigid designator and how it designates across worlds etc are two, not one, question. Admittedly, there may have been some ambiguity in the way I phrased matters, but I did ask for why I should believe any designator is rigid. I gave Kripke's own reply which depended ESSENTIALLY on INTUITION. Bruce restates the problem in his answer. For even if we accept the idea that if a designator designates by "picking out whatever person is taken to have invented bifocals in an assumed possible world or context of discussion" the question remains "How do I kow this term designates the same thing in all possible worlds? Now Bruce slides over this by wording it this way "an assumed world," but this alters matters. Now we have to talk about "assumed worlds." What Kripke says is "all possible worlds," not "an assumed" world. So the question remains: How do I KNOW that a name designatees the same thing in any "assumed" world. Kripke is RIGHT! I have to rely on intuition. There is no higher authority. There is no other convincing authority. His argument depends on meeting what he calls the "intuitive test." (NN. p. 48).That test is whether intuition justifies saying " This man might have done such and such." How do I know that the man who might have done such and such is this man? Intuition and intuition alone. Now I think this is a strong argument. I think it is the right way to go. My "beef" with the theory is the way it has been interpreted in relation to other theories, theories Kripke knows little or nothing about, something he FREELY admits. But his theory of rigid designators per se is, I think, right; partly because it answers Leibniz. In fact if you look at Kripke's rejection of Leibniz you will find his view against Leibniz is very close to Kant's. BOTH philosophers rely on intuition. But why should this matter? It matters because if we do rely on intuitions, ala Kripke, then we have a problem with the idea that we know necessary identities a posteriori. We in fact do not; we know them by to be necessary by intution, ie. the intuition that the designators are indeed rigid. But then what happens to Bruce's empiricism, one that depends on Kripke? Well, we are back to a priori intuitions whic are NOT empirical. I'll get back with more. I appreciate Bruce's understanding that I am swamped, trying to figure all these html codes, and pdf this stuff, and finish the final wording of the book. So I do appreciate that very much. So this posting? is also written "on the fly" and I may take a closer look. But I've got to get back to that "crazy" exception Bruce discusses to MP. It' fun stuff! Regards STeve "----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Tuesday, October 27, 2009 8:30:01 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Steve's Latest Steve may have a little too much on his plate right now. He may be trying to respond to too much input by me and others. ? I hate to pile more on top of him, but I do want to address a personal matter that Steve raised when he said, in his last post: ?Sometimes Bruce seems to suggest that I am in a state of complete ignorance and bewilderment over Kripke. For example he says ?Steve wonders why a certain designator (i.e. a certain description) should designate the same thing in all possible worlds." Then he goes on to give an account that simply does not answer the question!? I assure you all that I had no intention of suggesting that Steve is in such a state. I made the remark Steve cites in response to a question he asked in his comments on my chapter 2. ? He asked, ?What do I appeal to in order to justify the INFERENCE to the conclusion that the two designators designate the same thing in all worlds, and that that they do so is necessary a posteriori. It may be obvious, but do we rely on intuition, definition, or do we revert to some theorems in one of many of the modal systems where rigidity doesn?t ever really enter?? The answer I gave, which Steve says ?simply does not [really] answer the question,? does give my reason for believing that a certain designator ?should, in his words, ?designate the same thing in all possible worlds.? It does so, I said, thinking of ?the inventor of bifocals? in the sentence I used, because it is being used referentially to pick out a certain person rather than picking out whatever person is taken to have invented bifocals in an assumed possible world or context of discussion. If we are thinking of a situation in which we regard the term as applying to Thomas Jefferson, say, we are using the term non-rigidly; if we use it to refer to a certain person, Benjamin Franklin, whom we may think of as not, in some situation, being the inventor of bifocals, we re using it rigidly. Used this last way, we could coherently think, ?The inventor of bifocals might not have invented bifocals.? Compare ?The man over there drinking a Martini might possibly have been drinking a glass of water instead.? His last post shows that Steve is now reading Kripke. (I am not suggesting that he has not done so numerous times.) But if he is evaluating the argument I gave in my second chapter (ascertaining whether its conclusion is true, which concerned me, not whether it is involves a good reading of the argument Kripke actually gave, which concerns me only secondarily), Kripke?s actual thinking about rigid designators is not centrally important. Suppose I stipulate that I am using the term ?the inventor of bifocals? in the following sentence purely referentially to pick out the person who, as it happened (as we know in empirical grounds), did invent bifocals but may (might possibly have) failed to do so: ?Benjamin Franklin = the inventor of bifocals.? I contend that the following sentence, with the define description so understood, is true: ? Benjamin Franklin = the inventor of bifocals --> ?N(Benjamin Franklin = the inventor of bifocals). ? (The sentence is a UI consequence of the theorem Steve attributes to Ruth Marcus.) If we know a posteriori that the antecedent is true and, on the basis of that knowledge, conclude that N(Benjamin Franklin = the inventor of bifocals), we shall know a posteriori (for the reason I gave in an earlier post) that N(Benjamin Franklin = the inventor of bifocals). ? But since what we know here is necessary, we have an element of a posteriori knowledge that is necessary rather than contingent. Best, Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Tue Oct 27 10:48:29 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2009 14:48:29 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Aune and the meter stick Message-ID: <200910271448.34638.rbj@rbjones.com> In Chapter 2 of his ETK Bruce Aune presents an argument which purports to exhibit a proposition which is a priori but contingent. I believe this argument to be fallacious. This is because I see no adequate basis for the claim that the proposition in question is a priori. The proposition is held to be a priori because it is known from a stipulative definition of the concept of standard meter. However, this is insufficient ground for it to be a priori. A proposition can be known a priori if it is logically derivable from the content of such a stipulation. But an a priori derivation may not make use of any aspect of the stipulation other than the meaning assigned to the term. The form of the definition, the manner of its presentation, the accidents leading to and from the stipulation, are all information which we might happen to have about this stipulation and from which we might draw further conclusions, but no conclusion based on such information would be a priori. Considerable emphasis is sometimes placed in the case of stipulations of the referent of supposedly rigid designators, that the manner in which the referent is picked out is irrelevant to the reference of the designator in other possible worlds. This information is not a part of the meaning, of the designator and may not be used in any a priori argument. The proposition in question is about a rod r which happens to be used in defining the standard meter. What we know about r from our knowledge of the stipulation comes from aspects of the stipulation other than its content, and this knowledge is not therefore a priori. Roger Jones -- rbjones.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From aune1 at verizon.net Tue Oct 27 14:59:13 2009 From: aune1 at verizon.net (Bruce Aune) Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2009 14:59:13 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Aune and the meter stick In-Reply-To: <200910271448.34638.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <200910271448.34638.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: I think Roger will have to focus his criticism more directly on the argument I offered. Let me state it this way: Rod r is before us. 1. Let L be the length r now has, whatever that length may be (stipulation for meaning of "L"). 2. ?x(L sub m (x) = 1 iff x has L) (stipulation for "Length in meters for x = 1") 3. L sub m (r) = 1 iff r has L. (from 2, UI) 4. r has L (from 1: L is the length r now has). 5. L sub m(r) = 1 (conclusion of a priori derivation). 6. It is not necessary that r has L: it would have a different length under contingently different circumstances, 7. It is not necessary that L sub m (r) = 1 (from 3and 2) I can't see anything objectionable with this argument. VBruce From rbj at rbjones.com Tue Oct 27 17:10:59 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2009 21:10:59 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Kripke on Franklin and bifocals Message-ID: <200910272111.06198.rbj@rbjones.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I now offer a diagnosis of the fallacy in Kripke's argument for the claim that some propositions are necessary but a posteriori. The argument I criticise is the one presented in Aune ETK chapter 2, though in this case Bruce presents it as being Kripke's original argument rather than his own variant. Accepting for the sake of the argument the supposition that the designators "Franklin" and "the man who invented bifocals" are both rigid designators in our language and designate the same individual, I concur with Kripke in judging that the claim "Franklin is the man who invented bifocals" is necessary, but I argue contra Kripke (and Aune) that it is also a priori. Kripke's argues fallaciously that since the identity of the inventor of bifocals is contingent, the claim must be a posteriori. His fallacy lies in not distinguishing between information required to establish what proposition is expressed by the claim and information needed to establish the truth of the proposition. The meanings of natural languages are contingent. If the use of a contingent proposition about the meaning of a sentence debarred knowledge of its truth from being a priori then no sentence in a natural language could be known a priori. In making a judgement about whether a proposition expressed by some sentence is a priori or a posteriori, it is first necessary to establish what the proposition is, and then to ask how that proposition could be justified. If the meaning of a sentence is contingent then the connection between the sentence and the proposition it expresses will be contingent, and will be a posteriori. However this does not debar the proposition itself from being a priori. The proposition expressed by the claim: "Franklin was the inventor of bifocals" (subject to the assumption that the two designators are rigid) is simply an instance of the reflexivity of identity (this fact is used in the argument to establish its necessity), and hence can be known a priori. The contingent fact that Franklin did invent bifocals is relevant only to establishing the meaning of the sentence, i.e. the proposition expressed, and is not material to its truth. Roger Jones - -- rbjones.com PGP public key at: rbjones.com/rbj.asc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkrnYeMACgkQpS+qcQX1oA+WYgCfSJk8Rm1H19PsaUTT+ed4nYMU NvgAoN6gxkaoq2mZjMjov0LZK3IlY/YO =Pc0X -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rbj at rbjones.com Tue Oct 27 17:16:04 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2009 21:16:04 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Aune and the meter stick In-Reply-To: References: <200910271448.34638.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <200910272116.04612.rbj@rbjones.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Tuesday 27 October 2009 18:59:13 Bruce Aune wrote: > I think Roger will have to focus his criticism more directly on the > argument I offered. [proof of contingency, detail omitted] > I can't see anything objectionable with this argument. But look back at my message! I did not dispute the argument that the proposition is contingent. I disputed the claim that it is a priori. Roger - -- rbjones.com PGP public key at: rbjones.com/rbj.asc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkrnYxQACgkQpS+qcQX1oA9p0QCcDzCe1tg/f6olv25a8eCrbP0J ry0AniNoI1Oe5Lu4KLduXyVy2TMi8+Gq =jWG8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From Baynesr at comcast.net Tue Oct 27 17:42:22 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2009 21:42:22 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens In-Reply-To: <350671153.1151971256678362978.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <1558134094.1162641256679742153.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Bruce believes he has found a ?clear case? of modus tollens, which might have a counter instance. Since this one of the stronger claims he makes that the ?laws? of logic may be invalid, let?s have a look. Here is his example: If it rained yesterday, it did not rain hard (yesterday) It did rain hard (yesterday) Therefore, it did not rain yesterday. He offers little reason for believing that it may be invalid. He notes that it is a case worth discussing in the journals, but I don?t find this very convincing. (p. 59). His second argument is that an ?intuitive glimpse? should not suffice to assure ?sober? minded people will accept it. What we must not lose sight of is that just because a sentence contains ?if? that does not justify regarding it as a conditional. A good example is the concessive clause. So consider the following: If I lose I don?t care I care Therefore I won?t lose. This is hardly a refutation of logic as we know it. Notice that if I hold to the first sentence, as a concessive, then I won?t deny the concession by asserting the second premise although I could; but then it?s not a concessive. The example Bruce gives is not exactly a concessive, but I think it is close, and regardless is not a conditional in the first premise. Let?s look a bit closer at the peculiar semantics of this alleged counterexample. If it didn?t rain yesterday, then it, clearly, did not rain hard. So the falsity of the antecedent entails the truth of the consequent. In fact, whether the antecedent is true or false, the consequent is entailed. This makes it a theorem of logic. I don't think it's theorem of logic, however. I restate the argument. 1. If it rained yesterday, it did not rain hard (yesterday) 2. It did rain hard (yesterday) 3. Therefore, it did not rain yesterday Next consider the following description of it: 1'. P -> q (first premise) But if it didn't rain yesterday, niether was it the case that it rained hard. That is, if it didn't rain, it didn't rain hard; that much is certain, if not analytic. But this gives us 2. ~p -> q (?If it didn?t rain yesterday, then it didn?t rain? ?? hard yesterday?) /therefore (from (1') and (2) it follows that: pv~p. -> q Now it looks like it's a theorem of logic: It follows from logical prinicples, alone! But it is not a logical truth that it didn't rain hard yesterday. In any case, MT is safe! But just in case you doubt this, forget the argument I just gave.Instead, go back to the original argument. Take a look at the first premise: ?If it rained yesterday, it did not rain hard (yesterday)? A close look, now, reveals the problems with MT may arise from a misunderstanding of the syntax, not logic, of this sentence. I'm not sure, but it's worth examining . The sentence, to me, looks syntactically ambiguous. If it is, then the problem may be that ?not? does not modify the main verb but may be read as modifying the adverb, ?hard?. The sense of the sentence might then be stated, albeit, more awkwardly as: ??If it rained yesterday, it rained not hard?. This isn?t as bad as it looks at first since the following is grammatical: ?If it rained yesterday, it rained not hard at all?.? The point is that the second premise, ?It did rain hard yesterday? would not be the negation of ?It did not rain hard yesterday?. Now I don?t wish to make as much of this as what I said before. The case Bruce mentions is grammatically fascinating but logically uninteresting in my opinion. There are other cases. E.g. 1? If he knows, he?s not telling 2. He?s telling 3. Therefore, he does not know. But if he is telling then why would I assert the conditional etc? When it is pointed out that he is telling, I do not infer that he doesn?t know. I infer that ?If he knows he is not telling? is false. If someone says I am denying a conditional and so must affirm the antecedent and deny the consequent, I am incredulous. Why? Simple. It was never a conditional to begin with. Suppose someone says ?It rained five minutes ago?. I look at the ground and it is dry and the sun is out. I say, ?If it did rain, it didn?t rain hard?. But suppose the sidewalks were superheated, unknown to me. Someone points out that the sidewalks were superheated and, so, ?It did rain hard? is true. Do I conclude that it didn?t rain five minutes ago because now I know it rained hard five minutes ago? No. Do I conclude the premise was false? Yes! Do I concede that it was a conditional and, therefore, Modus Tollens is an invalid inference form? Not to mention that aside from being wrong I?ve condradicted myself? Of course not. Why not? Answer: it was never a logical conditional in the first place. In the next section, there is a list of entries of, purportedly intuitive truths, more specifically truths ?known by rational insight.? (p. 60). Dismissed from consideration is ?A square is a rectangle?. It is dismissed because it is thought to be true by definition. That much seems clear enough, but I?m not positive. Now what about ?red is a color?. Why does Bruce think this is true by definition? Why does he think this? He says it is ?clear that ?red? refers to a certain color. Now no one is arguing that it is not clear. But the question is whether its clarity is owing to ?rational insight.? No reason is given for thinking otherwise. Suppose we run to the dictionary, as Bruce does in the case of the first example. Ok. The dictionary says red is color. But suppose I am the sort of fellow who doesn?t trust dictionaries because they have too many philosophers doing the definitions. What do I have to check the dictionary against? If I say ?A tree is not a color?, what reason do I have for thinking this is true. It isn?t contingent (let?s suppose). So how can I be certain? I go to the dictionary and look up ?tree? and ?color?. Nothing rules the sentence out as false. So is this analytic? Clearly, a tree is not a bush. Now it may be that all I need to know this is to know language, but language is a tricky thing and someone might argue that it may turn out that a tree is a color. Essences are involved. Is the concept ?not a color? included in the concept of the subject? How do we know? It seems unreasonable to suppose otherwise. It is because of rational insight that we are justified in claiming a sentence is analytic and, so, certain definiens are used to define certain terms. What other appeal is there? Certainly, not the dictionary; many of these differ and some are dead wrong, and they are all written by people who depend on ?rational insight?. The rationalist finds admissible a question of this sort: What must the world be like in order that it make sense. If making sense requires a rational mind, then the rationalist becomes an idealist. Moving on to properties, I have another point where we don?t? see eye to eye. Bruce says that the concept red has ?built into it the idea that ?To be the way it looks a red object must look red when viewed in a good light by an observer with a good eye for colors.? Well, to begin with I don?t believe that all this ?goodness? is built in to the *concept*. For one who is to say what is ?good light? depends on what kind of light we have when what we see as red is actually red. But what kind of light is this? First we have to know that THIS is red, then we set a standard for excellence of vision, light etc. But knowing what this is presupposes an occasion where we know that what we are seeing is red. We can?t say light good for seeing red is derived from what is good for seeing blue etc. Eventually we have to fess up to the problem. And, even if we buy into this ad hoc device for avoiding sense data or some equivalent we then must distinguish concepts and properties, criteria and concepts etc. This is very much a mess and can?t be done as expeditiously as Bruce seems to think. So when Moore says that we are acquainted with the simple property red he isn?t talking about he concept; he is talking about a property that is the object of acquaintance. Anyway, this business about standard lighting is aping similar ideas in science, e.g. standard temperature and pressure. The problem is that we can?t set the standard without knowing what it should be. This is not, like ?meter?, an arbitrary matter. So in my opinion the idea that red as a property/concept has all this ?built in? is a convenient ad hoc device for avoiding rather than addressing the philosophical problems. As Broad says, the standard does not come out of the night trailing in a blaze of glory! I wish philosophy were all that simple; it is not. Sellars bought into this in his criticism of Broad, but here I think Wilfred is just wrong. Once we accept a difference, as we should, between concepts and properties then Aune complaints about ?discreteness? become significantly weaker. Kant was right on this, but that is a long story. Bruce seems to believe that all colors can be perceived. I?m not so sure that this is justified without certain physicalistic arguments I?m not prepared to accept unqualifiedly. Why can?t there be a mix of red in green in an object even though our eyes can?t perceive them, unless we assume that color is a secondary property? Even it colors are secondary properties, the eye may a poor instrument for becoming aware of all colors. A visitor from Mongo may see such things, nothing Bruce says rules it out as far as I can see. I'm going to digress a bit. Before moving on in Bruce's book, I want to take a look at Putnam (1956-57) cited in a footnote. It's not a recent article, but it is very much worth reading, or rereading. Let me take another look at this over the next few days. Bruce cites it (p. 68) but there is more to it than can fit in a small footnote. The artifcle is "Reds, Greens, and Logical Analysis," in Philosophical Review. LXV 1956 pp. 206-217. This is the main one; there is the one in 1957, which is a reply to Pap. Let's take a closer look, eh? Steve Bayne ? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune1 at verizon.net Wed Oct 28 02:39:52 2009 From: aune1 at verizon.net (Bruce Aune) Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2009 02:39:52 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Aune and the meter stick In-Reply-To: <200910272116.04612.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <200910271448.34638.rbj@rbjones.com> <200910272116.04612.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <9613F456-6F87-4C95-AA4E-2A78C5A23634@verizon.net> Well, I dispute what you are disputing. If something is deducible from stipulations, it is analytic in my opinion. And I think most philosophers wild agree. I am sure Carnap would have done so. Bruce From rbj at rbjones.com Wed Oct 28 06:06:54 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2009 10:06:54 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Aune and the meter stick Message-ID: <200910281007.00530.rbj@rbjones.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Wednesday 28 October 2009 06:39:52 Bruce Aune wrote: > Well, I dispute what you are disputing. If something is deducible > from stipulations, it is analytic in my opinion. And I think most > philosophers wild agree. I am sure Carnap would have done so. It is agreed that the proposition in question is contingent. So you think there are propositions which are analytic but contingent. In this you disagree not only with me, but also with Carnap and Kripke! Roger - - - -- rbjones.com PGP public key at: rbjones.com/rbj.asc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkroF74ACgkQpS+qcQX1oA/8NgCg19aMmVTjCx5p6JqzoAsJNu1B N3YAoI9Xka9S3CH0jJltYEA5BXsZc25/ =ln5E -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From aune1 at verizon.net Wed Oct 28 08:12:12 2009 From: aune1 at verizon.net (Bruce Aune) Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2009 08:12:12 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Aune and the meter stick In-Reply-To: <200910280900.41338.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <200910271448.34638.rbj@rbjones.com> <200910272116.04612.rbj@rbjones.com> <9613F456-6F87-4C95-AA4E-2A78C5A23634@verizon.net> <200910280900.41338.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <548360A8-90D1-4DAA-BCAC-BC76C13A77B9@verizon.net> Roger says, "So you think there are propositions which are analytic but contingent. In this you disagree not only with me, but also with Carnap and Kripke!" I do disagree, I think, with Carnap, who, so far as I know, did not consider the meter stick example, but I disagree with Kripke only verbally. Kripke said (somewhere in "N of N") that he restricts analytic truths to those known a priori, but he indicated that this is an arbitrary restriction that he would not insist upon. I think of analytic truths pretty much as Carnap did, but unlike him (so far as I know) I have thought about the novel case of the meter stick, which Kripke was the first to think of. I am confident that if Carnap thought of it, he would agree. His loyal student David Kaplan has never (to my nowledge) expressed any doubt about it. Bruce From Jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Oct 28 11:58:58 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2009 11:58:58 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] The good of Mercator's north poles and equators Message-ID: What an excellent way of having Witters right! I always found his statement that it is not true that the metre rod in Parigi was a metre long convincing. True, he did not say it is FALSE either. I suppose in the view of the early Witters -- I always go back to the early Witters -- it is something we should pass in silence (which it might be just as well -- for quantifications of lenghts can be irrisory, redundant if not plain rude). More below. In a message dated 10/27/2009 4:29:15 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, aune1 at verizon.net writes: Rod r is before us. 1. Let L be the length r now has, whatever that length may be (stipulation for meaning of "L"). 2. ?x(L sub m (x) = 1 iff x has L) (stipulation for "Length in meters for x = 1") 3. L sub m (r) = 1 iff r has L. (from 2, UI) 4. r has L (from 1: L is the length r now has). 5. L sub m(r) = 1 (conclusion of a priori derivation). 6. It is not necessary that r has L: it would have a different length under contingently different circumstances, 7. It is not necessary that L sub m (r) = 1 (from 3and 2) ---- I think that French man (whoever he was) who stipulated all that _was_ a genius. For one, 'metron', in Greek, and in Latin, I suppose, only meant 'measure' -- which MAKES the thing totally analytic, and A PRIORI. "A measure is a measure is a measure". All this talk confuses me bunches (slightly) -- for while the duration of a SECOND can be measured objectively as having to do with the rotation of the earth, the 'metre rod' is -- it -- sorry for ignorance -- measured according to distance to the sun? Nay, it is a fraction of the earth length. It goes to show that possibly Kant was right about the SPACE and TIME being a priori things (categories). They seem pure concepts of the understanding. But ONCE you start "measuring" them you bring a human element that the puritan in me and Kant slightly detest ("God cannot measure in metres"). Someone said, "Natural numbers were created by God" -- Similarly, Carroll in Hunting of the Snark, goes, "What's the good of Mercator?" And shan't we agree! J. L. Speranza --- He had bought a large map representing the sea, Without the least vestige of land: And the crew were much pleased when they found it to be A map they could all understand. 'What's the good of Mercator's North Poles and Equators, Tropics, Zones, and Meridian Lines?" So the Bellman would cry: and the crew would reply "They are merely conventional signs! "Other maps are such shapes, with their islands and capes! But we've got our brave Captain to thank" (So the crew would protest) "that he's bought us the best - A perfect and absolute blank!" -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at btinternet.com Thu Oct 29 16:42:01 2009 From: danny.frederick at btinternet.com (Danny Frederick) Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2009 20:42:01 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens In-Reply-To: <1558134094.1162641256679742153.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <350671153.1151971256678362978.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> <1558134094.1162641256679742153.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: Hi Steve, It seems to me that your discussion of the following example is unnecessarily complicated: If it rained yesterday, it did not rain hard (yesterday) It did rain hard (yesterday) Therefore, it did not rain yesterday. The argument is plainly valid (on standard logical principles) because the premises are inconsistent. The second premise entails 'it rained yesterday.' The second premise in conjunction with the first entails (by modus tollens) 'it is not the case that it rained yesterday.' Thus the two premises together entail a proposition of the form 'p and not-p.' I think the example may be confusing because, if we restrict ourselves to propositional logic, the inconsistency of the premises cannot be seen: they come out as simply 'if p, then not-q' and 'q.' But if we use predicate logic, along with Davidson's analysis of the logical form of statements about events, the inconsistency of the premises becomes evident, thus: If (Ex)(Rx & Yx) then ~ (Ex)(Rx & Hx & Yx) (Ex)(Rx & Hx & Yx). >From the second premise we get: (Ex)(Rx & Yx). From the conjunction of the first and second we get: ~(Ex)(Rx & Yx). The premises are formally inconsistent. The argument is not a counter-instance to modus tollens at all. Its conclusion contradicts one of its premises because the premises contradict themselves. Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Oct 29 19:23:13 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2009 19:23:13 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] If That Mocking-Bird Won't Sing Message-ID: "I only said, 'if'" "Oh, no; you said a great deal more than that". Alice in Wonderland. ---- Factuality, Non-Factuality, and Counter-Factuality in "Biscuit" Conditionals and Other "If you are hungry, there are biscuits in the cupboard" (Mrs. Austin, to master J. L. to his annoyance) In a message dated 10/29/2009 7:09:45 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, danny.frederick at btinternet.com writes: If it rained yesterday, it did not rain hard (yesterday) It did rain hard (yesterday) Therefore, it did not rain yesterday. The argument is plainly valid (on standard logical principles) because the premises are inconsistent. ---- Oddly, the other day, I was having a bad night -- but luckily a Southerner who could sing me a lullaby! It was, encyclopaedic brain that I have (he he), not one I was too familiar with, except, perhaps via a Carly Simon recording. It went along the line: if the mocking bird won't sing I will buy you a diamond ring. It struck me as modus tollens. In any case, before considering the mocking bird, let us focus slightly on "it did not rain hard" -- the apodosis of "if it did rain yesterday, it did not rain hard" --- It strikes me that the 'not' in the apodosis can or should be considered seriously -- i.e. as the twiggly, "-". Threfore it should be given the chance to operate maximally and externally, sans implicature, or as I now prefer to say, hygienically DISimplicated. Consider, "if the king of France combs his hair, he is not bald" --- it strikes me that "he is not bald", in the apodosis, is consistent with the non-existence of the king of France: "he is not bald; in fact, he is not (simpliciter): he doesn't exist." Ditto, "it did not rain hard" would be consistent with a Strawsonian it-less world -- a sad world, undoubtedly. Recall his "What is the logical form of "It rains"? What is "it"?" (Intro. to Logical Theory). Now, it strikes me that the mocking bird WILL sing. True, it is NOT, to echo Kripke, a necessary a priori condition that he will, but I'll be damned (by God) if a lullaby singer ever did have to proceed to step 2, and really get the diamond ring to the lullabeed. Cheers, J. L. Speranza -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Thu Oct 29 21:05:25 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2009 01:05:25 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Additions: Veblen, Lukasiewicz, Ayer, Schwinger Message-ID: <279767070.2122661256864725138.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I've added the following to the data base. Sorry for cross postings. ? Foundations of Empirical Knowledge by A. J. Ayer Pt. 1 1. The Argument from Illusion http://www.hist-analytic.org/Ayer1.pdf Pt. 2 2. The Characterization of Sense Data http://www.hist-analytic.org/Ayer2.pdf Pt. 3 3. The Egocentric Predicament 4. Causailty and Perception http://www.hist-analytic.org/Ayer3.pdf Pt. 4 5. The Consititution of Matter http://www.hist-analytic.org/Ayer4.pdf Aristotle's Syllogistic by JanLukasiewicz Pt. 1. 1. Elements of the System 2. Theses of the System http://www.hist-analytic.org/Lukasiewicz1.pdf Pt. 2 3. The System 4. Aristotle's System in Symbolic Form http://www.hist-analytic.org/Lukasiewicz2.pdf ? Pt. 3 5. The Problem of Decision 6. Aristotle's Modal Logic of Propositions http://www.hist-analytic.org/Lukasiewicz3.pdf Pt. 4 7. The System of Modal Logic 8. Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic 9.Index http://www.hist-analytic.org/Lukasiewicz4.pdf ? Analysis Situs by Oswald Veblen Pt. 1 1. Linear Graphs 2. Two-Dimensional Manifolds 3. Complexes and Manifolds of n Dimensions 4. Orientable Manifolds http://www.hist-analytic.org/VeblenAnalysisSitus.pdf Of Julian Schwinger it has been said: "Schwinger was one of the most important and influential scientists of the twentieth century. The list of his contributions is staggering, from his early work leading to the Schwinger action principle, Euclidean quantum field theory, and the genesis of the standard model, to later valuable work on magnetic charge and the Casimir effect." http://www-history.mcs.st-andrews.ac.uk/Biographies/Schwinger.html Hist-Analytic is pleased to announce that heretofore unpublished material on philosophy by Prof. Schwinger is now being made available for the first time. This has been made possible by the exceptional generosity of Stefan Baumrin who has been very helpful to Hist-Analytic and, by extention, students of philosophy of science world wide. http://www.hist-analytic.org/Schwinger3.pdf ? Regards Steven R. Bayne www.hist-analytic.org -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Fri Oct 30 07:31:06 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2009 07:31:06 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens In-Reply-To: References: <350671153.1151971256678362978.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> <1558134094.1162641256679742153.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: You are right that the argument is valid, Danny. I argue this in my chapter 3. But see what I saw about modus ponens. IN doing so, note my question, What is modus ponens? Best, Bruce From Baynesr at comcast.net Fri Oct 30 09:09:43 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2009 13:09:43 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <1264318093.2232251256908183231.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Danny, Sorry Danny, I just don't understand much of this. For example, you bring in Davidson, but I see no reason to: where are the event variables for example, if you are taking a Davidsonian approach? It is obvious the argument is valid IF the first premise is a conditional. I argue against this. You ignore the argument. I don't mind that. But if, f as you say the premises are inconsistent, then of course anything follows and modus ponens needn't enter the picture at all. Elsewhere, I've argued that Davidson is wrong on the treatment of adverbials, in particular across prepositional phrases where the verbs are causal. Can't digress into Davidson, now. Of course Bruce likes what you say, but I don't think his argument (or yours) rules out seeing that the premise (first) is no conditional at all etc. In short, you've ignored my argument and substituted reasons for thinking the argument is invalid. I agree it is invalid but it is not a modus ponens, tollens, argument etc. I think the question "What is modus ponens?" is somewhat rhetorical. It's a rule that says that if you have 'p implies q' and 'p' then you can derive 'q'. No mystery here, OR we are in for a revolution in logic, which I doubt. Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Danny Frederick" To: "hist-analytic" Sent: Thursday, October 29, 2009 4:42:01 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: RE: Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens Hi Steve, It seems to me that your discussion of the following example is unnecessarily complicated: If it rained yesterday, it did not rain hard (yesterday) It did rain hard (yesterday) Therefore, it did not rain yesterday. The argument is plainly valid (on standard logical principles) because the premises are inconsistent. The second premise entails ?it rained yesterday.? The second premise in conjunction with the first entails (by modus tollens) ?it is not the case that it rained yesterday.? Thus the two premises together entail a proposition of the form ?p and not-p.? I think the example may be confusing because, if we restrict ourselves to propositional logic, the inconsistency of the premises cannot be seen: they come out as simply ?if p, then not-q? and ?q.? But if we use predicate logic, along with Davidson?s analysis of the logical form of statements about events, the inconsistency of the premises becomes evident, thus: If (Ex)(Rx & Yx) then ~ (Ex)(Rx & Hx & Yx) (Ex)(Rx & Hx & Yx). >From the second premise we get: (Ex)(Rx & Yx). From the conjunction of the first and second we get: ~(Ex)(Rx & Yx). The premises are formally inconsistent. The argument is not a counter-instance to modus tollens at all. Its conclusion contradicts one of its premises because the premises contradict themselves. Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Fri Oct 30 10:11:06 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2009 07:11:06 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens In-Reply-To: <1264318093.2232251256908183231.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <454172.40300.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Danny, ? You have two occurrences of 'Ex'; Your proof violates rules for EI. You can't EI the first occurrence with the same constant as the second. So the argument is not valid. I think you need to state the argument in standard form; that way this should become transparent, when you EI. ? Regards ? STeve ? --- On Fri, 10/30/09, Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: From: Baynesr at comcast.net Subject: Re: Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens To: "hist-analytic" Date: Friday, October 30, 2009, 9:09 AM #yiv188251479 p {margin:0;} Danny, ? Sorry Danny, I just don't understand much of this. For example, you bring in Davidson, but I see no reason to: where are the event variables for example, if you are taking a Davidsonian approach? ? It is obvious the argument is valid IF the first premise is a conditional. I argue against this. You ignore the argument. I don't mind that. But if, f as you say the premises are inconsistent, then of course anything follows and modus ponens needn't enter the picture at all. ? Elsewhere, I've argued that Davidson is wrong on the treatment of adverbials, in particular across prepositional phrases where the verbs are causal. Can't digress into Davidson, now. ? Of course Bruce likes what you say, but I don't think his argument (or yours) rules out seeing that the premise (first) is no conditional at all etc. In short, you've ignored my argument and substituted reasons for thinking the argument is invalid. I agree it is invalid but it is not a modus ponens, tollens, argument etc. ? I think the question "What is modus ponens?" is somewhat rhetorical. It's a rule that says that if you have 'p implies q' and 'p' then you can derive 'q'. No mystery here, OR we are in for a revolution in logic, which I doubt From danny.frederick at btinternet.com Fri Oct 30 09:26:04 2009 From: danny.frederick at btinternet.com (Danny Frederick) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2009 13:26:04 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens In-Reply-To: <1264318093.2232251256908183231.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <1264318093.2232251256908183231.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: Hi Steve, My concern was simply to rebut the claim that the argument is a counter-instance to modus tollens. For that claim to be true, the argument would have to be invalid, since it evidently (to me) is of the modus tollens form. But I showed that the argument is valid, and thus not a counter-instance to modus tollens. When I use predicate logic to exhibit the formal inconsistency of the premises, I use a variable 'x' that ranges over events (hence the reference to Davidson). Thus, (Ex)(Rx & Hx & Yx) means: there is an event which is a raining, a hard raining and happened yesterday. I am making no comment on the success or otherwise of Davidson's analysis of event-statements as a semantic analysis of English. I utilise it simply as a way of putting the puzzling argument into logical form. For what it is worth, I do not believe that the structure of English is exhibited by first-order predicate logic. I don't deny that it is possible to interpret the 'if' in the first premise in other ways. Plainly, that seems natural to you; for what it is worth (not much) it seems unnatural to me. Perhaps this is just a slight difference between our idiolects or, perhaps more likely, a difference in assumptions about the context of utterance. Do note that I am saying that the argument is VALID. That is why it is not a counter-instance to modus tollens (which it exemplifies). I think Bruce's question about modus ponens is about the meaning of 'if' and the logician's hook. Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at btinternet.com Fri Oct 30 10:51:51 2009 From: danny.frederick at btinternet.com (Danny Frederick) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2009 14:51:51 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens In-Reply-To: <454172.40300.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <1264318093.2232251256908183231.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> <454172.40300.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <017FE50400B64FC890D334035AE8D7FB@DFLVQC1J> Hi Steve, You seem to have misunderstood me. Here is the 'proof' of inconsistency spelt out (I am a bit rusty on this formal stuff, but here goes). [1] If (Ex)(Rx & Yx) then ~ (Ex)(Rx & Hx & Yx) [Premise] [2] (Ex)(Rx & Hx & Yx) [Premise] [3] Ra & Ha & Ya [from 2 by EI] [4] Ra & Ya [from 3 by conjunction elimination] [5] ~(Ex)(Rx & Yx) [from 1 and 2 by modus tollens] [6] For all x, ~(Rx & Yx) [from 5 by the rule for passing 'not' through the quantifiers] [7] ~(Ra & Ya) [from 6 by UI] [8] ~Ra or ~Ya [from 7 by De Morgan] [9] if Ra then ~Ya [from 8 by the conversion rule for 'or' and 'if-then'] [10] Ra [from 4 by conjunction elimination] [11] ~Ya [from 9 and 10 by modus ponens] [12] Ya [from 4 by conjunction elimination] [13] Ya & ~Ya [from 11 and 12 by conjunction introduction] No violation of the rules for EI, which was used only once. Cheers. Danny From aune at philos.umass.edu Fri Oct 30 11:12:21 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2009 11:12:21 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens In-Reply-To: <454172.40300.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <454172.40300.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <2A3319C0-6A93-4581-8184-06F99588C071@philos.umass.edu> I think Steve's reply to Danny on modus ponens confuses "implies" with an if-then connective. "A imples B" has the form of "I(A,B)," where A and B are singular terms, i.e. designators of sentences, that-clauses, and the like. An argument having the form of "If p then q; p; therefore q" would normally be said to be an instance of modus ponens, but as I point out there are different kinds of conditionals for which the English "if" might be used. There are also "if"-statements that can, if Steve is right, be reasonably considered not conditionals. I am not convinced by Steve's argument concerning such "if"s, but I am not prepared to dispute it either. I haven't made up my mind on this matter. Bruce On Oct 30, 2009, at 10:11 AM, steve bayne wrote: > Danny, > > You have two occurrences of 'Ex'; Your proof violates rules for EI. > You can't EI the first occurrence with the same constant as the > second. So the argument is not valid. I think you need to state the > argument in standard form; that way this should become transparent, > when you EI. > > Regards > > STeve > > > > --- On Fri, 10/30/09, Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: > > > From: Baynesr at comcast.net > Subject: Re: Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/ > Tollens > To: "hist-analytic" > Date: Friday, October 30, 2009, 9:09 AM > > > > #yiv188251479 p {margin:0;} > > > > > > > Danny, > > Sorry Danny, I just don't understand much of this. For example, you > bring in Davidson, but I see no reason to: where are the event > variables for example, if you are taking a Davidsonian approach? > > It is obvious the argument is valid IF the first premise is a > conditional. I argue against this. You ignore the argument. I don't > mind that. But if, f as you say the premises are inconsistent, then > of course anything follows and modus ponens needn't enter the > picture at all. > > Elsewhere, I've argued that Davidson is wrong on the treatment of > adverbials, in particular across prepositional phrases where the > verbs are causal. Can't digress into Davidson, now. > > Of course Bruce likes what you say, but I don't think his argument > (or yours) rules out seeing that the premise (first) is no > conditional at all etc. In short, you've ignored my argument and > substituted reasons for thinking the argument is invalid. I agree it > is invalid but it is not a modus ponens, tollens, argument etc. > > I think the question "What is modus ponens?" is somewhat rhetorical. > It's a rule that says that if you have 'p implies q' and 'p' then > you can derive 'q'. No mystery here, OR we are in for a revolution > in logic, which I doubt From baynesrb at yahoo.com Fri Oct 30 12:49:14 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2009 09:49:14 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens In-Reply-To: <017FE50400B64FC890D334035AE8D7FB@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <967440.27776.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Danny, ? Ok, now it is clear. Yes, vaid. However, I was under the impression that you were challenging Bruce on whether MT actually has a counter instance. You seem to disagree with him at this point.So how does this impact the alleged counterexample, or its possibilty. ? I saw this earlier, but opted for my formulation since it leaves the consequent of the first premise a logical truth, which makes it not just invalid but counterintutitive in the sense that obviously (?) it is not a logical truth! ? So what you have provided is a proof that the argument is invalid, not that MT does or does not have a counter instance. My point was that there is no counter instance here because the first premise is not a conditional; it is in fact something of a conjunction. That would dipsose of the counter example, which of course our proof does not actually do. ? Regardsd ? STeve ? --- On Fri, 10/30/09, Danny Frederick wrote: From: Danny Frederick Subject: RE: Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens To: "'hist-analytic'" Date: Friday, October 30, 2009, 10:51 AM Hi Steve, You seem to have misunderstood me. Here is the 'proof' of inconsistency spelt out (I am a bit rusty on this formal stuff, but here goes). [1]??? If (Ex)(Rx & Yx) then ~ (Ex)(Rx & Hx & Yx) [Premise] [2]??? (Ex)(Rx & Hx & Yx)? [Premise] [3]??? Ra & Ha & Ya? [from 2 by EI] [4]??? Ra & Ya? [from 3 by conjunction elimination] [5]??? ~(Ex)(Rx & Yx)? [from 1 and 2 by modus tollens] [6]??? For all x, ~(Rx & Yx)? [from 5 by the rule for passing 'not' through the quantifiers] [7]??? ~(Ra & Ya)? [from 6 by UI] [8]??? ~Ra or ~Ya? [from 7 by De Morgan] [9]??? if Ra then ~Ya? [from 8 by the conversion rule for 'or' and 'if-then'] [10]??? Ra? [from 4 by conjunction elimination] [11]??? ~Ya? [from 9 and 10 by modus ponens] [12]??? Ya? [from 4 by conjunction elimination] [13] Ya & ~Ya? [from 11 and 12 by conjunction introduction] No violation of the rules for EI, which was used only once. Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Fri Oct 30 13:09:54 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2009 17:09:54 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] One Brief Addendum Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens In-Reply-To: <1264318093.2232251256908183231.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <1660288205.2323981256922594824.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Just a brief point on Danny's last point. First, I'm glad he made his argument explicit. Bruce may have a reply. He may simply deny that Davidsonian event variables are admissable. I reject them, myself, but I can't go into all that myself. Two points, Bruce can, simply, come up with a case where event variables will not suffice to derive a contradiction. Take my example: 1? If he knows, he?s not telling 2. He?s telling 3. Therefore, he does not know. If (1) is a conditional then this form calls MT into as much question as the example provided. But you cannot, using Davidson's sleight of hand, derive a contradiction. Now you might just accept this but I think that would be very strange. Again, we are dealing with concessive clauses which I think are very much like the example given. So far no reply to my argument, per se. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: Baynesr at comcast.net To: "hist-analytic" Sent: Friday, October 30, 2009 9:09:43 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens Danny, Sorry Danny, I just don't understand much of this. For example, you bring in Davidson, but I see no reason to: where are the event variables for example, if you are taking a Davidsonian approach? It is obvious the argument is valid IF the first premise is a conditional. I argue against this. You ignore the argument. I don't mind that. But if, f as you say the premises are inconsistent, then of course anything follows and modus ponens needn't enter the picture at all. Elsewhere, I've argued that Davidson is wrong on the treatment of adverbials, in particular across prepositional phrases where the verbs are causal. Can't digress into Davidson, now. Of course Bruce likes what you say, but I don't think his argument (or yours) rules out seeing that the premise (first) is no conditional at all etc. In short, you've ignored my argument and substituted reasons for thinking the argument is invalid. I agree it is invalid but it is not a modus ponens, tollens, argument etc. I think the question "What is modus ponens?" is somewhat rhetorical. It's a rule that says that if you have 'p implies q' and 'p' then you can derive 'q'. No mystery here, OR we are in for a revolution in logic, which I doubt. Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Danny Frederick" To: "hist-analytic" Sent: Thursday, October 29, 2009 4:42:01 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: RE: Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens Hi Steve, It seems to me that your discussion of the following example is unnecessarily complicated: If it rained yesterday, it did not rain hard (yesterday) It did rain hard (yesterday) Therefore, it did not rain yesterday. The argument is plainly valid (on standard logical principles) because the premises are inconsistent. The second premise entails ?it rained yesterday.? The second premise in conjunction with the first entails (by modus tollens) ?it is not the case that it rained yesterday.? Thus the two premises together entail a proposition of the form ?p and not-p.? I think the example may be confusing because, if we restrict ourselves to propositional logic, the inconsistency of the premises cannot be seen: they come out as simply ?if p, then not-q? and ?q.? But if we use predicate logic, along with Davidson?s analysis of the logical form of statements about events, the inconsistency of the premises becomes evident, thus: If (Ex)(Rx & Yx) then ~ (Ex)(Rx & Hx & Yx) (Ex)(Rx & Hx & Yx). >From the second premise we get: (Ex)(Rx & Yx). From the conjunction of the first and second we get: ~(Ex)(Rx & Yx). The premises are formally inconsistent. The argument is not a counter-instance to modus tollens at all. Its conclusion contradicts one of its premises because the premises contradict themselves. Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at btinternet.com Fri Oct 30 16:01:41 2009 From: danny.frederick at btinternet.com (Danny Frederick) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2009 20:01:41 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] One Brief Addendum Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens In-Reply-To: <1660288205.2323981256922594824.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <1264318093.2232251256908183231.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> <1660288205.2323981256922594824.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <021EF1134AC9480C8EB36B4C3827B478@DFLVQC1J> Hi Steve, This argument (if the first sentence is a conditional): 1 If he knows, he's not telling 2. He's telling 3. Therefore, he does not know. is valid because its premises are inconsistent, just like the other argument. I am assuming here that telling implies knowing. As in the other case, we can 'prove' the inconsistency informally. But we can also show it formally by using predicate logic. This would do it: If Ka then ~Ta [Premise 1] Ta [Premise 2] If Ta then Ka [meaning postulate] >From premise 2 and premise 1, we get ~Ka. >From premise 2 and the meaning postulate, we get Ka. Putting the two together, we get a contradiction. If you don't like meaning postulates, you can use Quine's trick to get rid of them. That is, 'he's telling' gets put into logical form as: 'Ta & (x)(if Tx then Kx)'; that is, the predicate 'y is telling' gets transcribed as 'Ty and (x)(if Tx then Kx)'. Then the argument becomes: If Ka then ~( Ta and (x)(if Tx then Kx)) Ta and (x)(if Tx then Kx) The inconsistency of these two premises can be 'proved' formally. Best wishes, Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at btinternet.com Fri Oct 30 15:44:23 2009 From: danny.frederick at btinternet.com (Danny Frederick) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2009 19:44:23 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens In-Reply-To: <967440.27776.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <017FE50400B64FC890D334035AE8D7FB@DFLVQC1J> <967440.27776.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1103A9F231F84165A12E0B82196922CE@DFLVQC1J> Hi Steve, I denied that the example we have considered is a counter-example to modus tollens. Bruce denies it too in his Chapter 3. But I am open to the general possibility that modus tollens has a counterexample (or loads of them). I think dialetheists accept counter-examples to modus tollens, since they think some contradictions are theorems and, since these contradictions are both true and false and implied by true axioms, they generate exceptions to modus tollens (MT). I am not quoting here: this is just what I think I recall from some reading I did a few months ago (Graham Priest). Similarly, with other logical rules like modus ponens and conjunction elimination: there are serious and competent logicians who have denied them in order to try to solve difficulties with standard logic. What all this means is that it is not self-evident that there are no counter-examples to standard logic: the latter is not a priori true/valid. What I provided, once again, is a 'proof' that the argument (the supposed counter-example to MT) is VALID and thus not a counter-example to MT. But, as you say, this leaves it open as to whether MT has any other counter-examples. I did not understand your last sentence. Incidentally, the reason I put 'proof' in quotes all the time is that we can never be sure that a proposed proof is really a proof. We can give a 'proof' in standard logic, say; but the 'proof' is questionable because standard logic is questionable. The same applies to every other logical system. Whether or not something is a proof is something we can only guess at. Best wishes, Danny _____ From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of steve bayne Sent: 30 October 2009 16:49 To: 'hist-analytic' Subject: RE: Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens Danny, Ok, now it is clear. Yes, vaid. However, I was under the impression that you were challenging Bruce on whether MT actually has a counter instance. You seem to disagree with him at this point.So how does this impact the alleged counterexample, or its possibilty. I saw this earlier, but opted for my formulation since it leaves the consequent of the first premise a logical truth, which makes it not just invalid but counterintutitive in the sense that obviously (?) it is not a logical truth! So what you have provided is a proof that the argument is invalid, not that MT does or does not have a counter instance. My point was that there is no counter instance here because the first premise is not a conditional; it is in fact something of a conjunction. That would dipsose of the counter example, which of course our proof does not actually do. Regardsd STeve --- On Fri, 10/30/09, Danny Frederick wrote: From: Danny Frederick Subject: RE: Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens To: "'hist-analytic'" Date: Friday, October 30, 2009, 10:51 AM Hi Steve, You seem to have misunderstood me. Here is the 'proof' of inconsistency spelt out (I am a bit rusty on this formal stuff, but here goes). [1] If (Ex)(Rx & Yx) then ~ (Ex)(Rx & Hx & Yx) [Premise] [2] (Ex)(Rx & Hx & Yx) [Premise] [3] Ra & Ha & Ya [from 2 by EI] [4] Ra & Ya [from 3 by conjunction elimination] [5] ~(Ex)(Rx & Yx) [from 1 and 2 by modus tollens] [6] For all x, ~(Rx & Yx) [from 5 by the rule for passing 'not' through the quantifiers] [7] ~(Ra & Ya) [from 6 by UI] [8] ~Ra or ~Ya [from 7 by De Morgan] [9] if Ra then ~Ya [from 8 by the conversion rule for 'or' and 'if-then'] [10] Ra [from 4 by conjunction elimination] [11] ~Ya [from 9 and 10 by modus ponens] [12] Ya [from 4 by conjunction elimination] [13] Ya & ~Ya [from 11 and 12 by conjunction introduction] No violation of the rules for EI, which was used only once. Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Fri Oct 30 17:13:44 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2009 17:13:44 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] One Brief Addendum Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens In-Reply-To: <021EF1134AC9480C8EB36B4C3827B478@DFLVQC1J> References: <1264318093.2232251256908183231.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> <1660288205.2323981256922594824.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> <021EF1134AC9480C8EB36B4C3827B478@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <0CD6D47E-44F7-4655-BB6F-BE09B558FF41@philos.umass.edu> I agree with most of what Danny says in his last two memos to Steve; I disagree only with some of his skeptical claims. As I ague in my third chapter, I think standard logic can be "saved" by making suitable restrictions on what we allow as "proper substituends" for the schematic letters in our Logical laws and inference patterns. Of course, making such restrictions raises problems elsewhere. We have to find acceptable ways of handing the formulas (sentences) that we have excluded. New systems may be neeed. Bruce From Baynesr at comcast.net Fri Oct 30 17:26:24 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2009 21:26:24 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] One Brief Addendum Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens In-Reply-To: <0CD6D47E-44F7-4655-BB6F-BE09B558FF41@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: <889064162.2428991256937984831.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I'm getting swamped by all this and I must move on to the issues raised by Putnam etc., otherwise it will take forever to get throught Bruce's book. I am OK with giving others the last word. So far no one has engaged my argument based on the "analyticity" of 'q' in the posting where I bring up concessives etc. Since I believe these arguments remain valid and have not been specifically addressed, I'll let stand what has been said by Bruce and Danny. Be back soon, hopefully, with something on Putnam etc. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: "Danny Frederick" Cc: Baynesr at comcast.net, "hist-analytic" Sent: Friday, October 30, 2009 5:13:44 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: One Brief Addendum Discussion of Aune's ETK, Chapter Two: Modus Ponens/Tollens I agree with most of what Danny says in his last two memos to Steve; I ? disagree only with some of his skeptical claims. ?As I ague in my ? third chapter, I think standard logic can be "saved" by making ? suitable restrictions on what we allow as "proper substituends" for ? the schematic letters in our Logical laws and inference patterns. ?Of ? course, making such restrictions raises problems elsewhere. ?We have ? to find acceptable ways of handing the formulas (sentences) that we ? have excluded. ?New systems may be neeed. Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Fri Oct 30 17:47:33 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2009 21:47:33 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] The status and relevance of "standard logic" In-Reply-To: <1103A9F231F84165A12E0B82196922CE@DFLVQC1J> References: <017FE50400B64FC890D334035AE8D7FB@DFLVQC1J> <967440.27776.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <1103A9F231F84165A12E0B82196922CE@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <200910302147.43769.rbj@rbjones.com> On Friday 30 October 2009 19:44:23 Danny Frederick wrote: > Incidentally, the reason I put 'proof' in quotes all the time is that we > can never be sure that a proposed proof is really a proof. We can give a > 'proof' in standard logic, say; but the 'proof' is questionable because > standard logic is questionable. The same applies to every other logical > system. Whether or not something is a proof is something we can only guess > at. If the "standard logic" you speak of here is first order predicate logic then there are straightforward metamathematical proofs of its soundness. These make the possibility that this logic is unsound not much more doubtful than the truths of elementary arithmetic (say, the associativity of multiplication), and much less doubtful than generally accepted (and themselves relativity straightforward by the standards of professional mathematicians) results such as Godel's two incompleteness theorems. Skeptical doubts know no bounds, but it is useful to know whether a doubt is serious or academic, or better, to have a sense of the ranking of doubtfulness of propositions. Doubt about the applicability of this logic to any argument in a natural language are of an entirely different order. For example, in the example discussed in this thread, the supposition that the claim: if it rained today, it did not rain heavily can properly be understood as a material implication, is highly doubtful, and hence the value of a naive translation into "standard logic" is moot. Roger Jones -- rbjones.com PGP public key at: rbjones.com/rbj.asc From aune at philos.umass.edu Fri Oct 30 17:46:43 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2009 17:46:43 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Steve on Concessives In-Reply-To: <1660288205.2323981256922594824.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <1660288205.2323981256922594824.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <9C99A128-3556-46B4-9FC2-7CD501583CFA@philos.umass.edu> This is just to express my opinion that Steve might be right about concessives. I am not convinced by his arguments that "If it rains, it rains hard" is not a conditional, but some "if"s might not introduce genuine conditionals. I introduced some nonstandard claims about certain "if"s in a paper on "If"s that appeared years ago in the first edition of the Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Things I say there might interest J.L. if he takes a look at the article. My memory of what I said there is a bit dim, though. Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at btinternet.com Sat Oct 31 12:44:05 2009 From: danny.frederick at btinternet.com (Danny Frederick) Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2009 16:44:05 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] The status and relevance of "standard logic" In-Reply-To: <200910302147.43769.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <017FE50400B64FC890D334035AE8D7FB@DFLVQC1J> <967440.27776.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <1103A9F231F84165A12E0B82196922CE@DFLVQC1J> <200910302147.43769.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: Hi Roger, The metamathematical proofs to which you refer have hidden axioms that are far from obvious. In order to avoid paradoxes which refute the whole system, they typically have a theory of logical or linguistic types which is built into the formation rules for formulae of the system. Such type-theories are a lot more doubtful than the truths of elementary arithmetic. Besides, the question of how doubtful something appears does not bear upon its truth. Frege was one of the greatest mathematicians. His Basic Law V seemed self-evident to him. Yet it was shown by Russell to be logically false. As Russell stated in PM (second edition, p.59) we have no guarantee that another paradox will not surface however happy we may be with the latest set of axioms (open and hidden). Cheers. Danny From rbj at rbjones.com Sat Oct 31 16:48:47 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2009 20:48:47 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] The status and relevance of "standard logic" In-Reply-To: References: <017FE50400B64FC890D334035AE8D7FB@DFLVQC1J> <200910302147.43769.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <200910312048.49947.rbj@rbjones.com> On Saturday 31 October 2009 16:44:05 Danny Frederick wrote: > The metamathematical proofs to which you refer have hidden axioms that are > far from obvious. There are no "hidden axioms" involved. > In order to avoid paradoxes which refute the whole > system, they typically have a theory of logical or linguistic types which > is built into the formation rules for formulae of the system. Such > type-theories are a lot more doubtful than the truths of elementary > arithmetic. All the results I mentioned (including Godel's incompleteness results) are provable in logical systems weaker than PA (first order arithmetic). A type theory is not necessary. > Besides, the question of how doubtful something appears does not bear upon > its truth. How can this be? > Frege was one of the greatest mathematicians. His Basic Law V > seemed self-evident to him. Yet it was shown by Russell to be logically > false. As Russell stated in PM (second edition, p.59) we have no guarantee > that another paradox will not surface however happy we may be with the > latest set of axioms (open and hidden). The problem you cite concerns reliability of our intuitions about the truth of basic axioms. I made no appeal to intuitions about truth but cited results about the strength (and hence riskiness) of the logical contexts in which these results (about soundness, which includes the truth of the axioms) are formally provable. As I stated in my message, nothing is beyond doubt and we have no absolute warrants of truth, which is why I gave evidence about relative dubitability. suggesting that doubting the soundness of classical logic is equivalent to doubting the truth of quite elementary parts of established mathematics. Roger Jones -- rbjones.com PGP public key at: rbjones.com/rbj.asc From Baynesr at comcast.net Mon Nov 2 12:09:42 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2009 17:09:42 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Putnam, Kripke, Kant etc. Message-ID: <620964017.3133731257181782504.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Sorry for not posting sooner, but I spent my weekend trying to figure out how to get one file to another place on my webmaking what-cha-call-it. Slow going; Kant is easier, I'm afraid. However, a couple of philosophical thoughts. First, before proceeding with Aune's book, I want to look at Putnam's excellent essay "Reds, Greens, and Logical Analysis" Phil. Review, (1956) pp. 206-217. This is a tricky little essay. Putnam, as you all know, is a first class logician. This is all the more reason for persons interested in "general philosophy" (the term is Russell's) to be cautious. I'm going to allege that Putnam begs the question in the early going and that his project doesn't succeed. Much depends on his reliance on the transitivity of "x is exactly the same color as y." At this point (I may change my mind), I believe this is a fatal error and begs the question. I could post Putnam's paper, but since leaving the Boston area I have little or no access to Phil. Review. Even my limited JSTOR account will not allow it. The issue is not legal etc. One other thing. People still thinking about Kripke and the meter stick might consider whatever contrasts they find between two kinds of identities. The first is Hesperus is Phosphorus. The second is 'The meter stick in Paris is 39.37 inches long'. If these are both identity statements, then there are going to be some problems. It will turn out, if I am right, that the second is no more a valid identity that the identity of pain and C-fiber stimulation. More on that later. I want to emphasize that I do buy into rigid designation as a thesis about counterfactuals. Kripke's "intuitive test" for rigidity is met here and I think his point is valid: When I speak of Aristotle counterfactually I am speaking of that very man; not a counterpart etc. This demands something like rigidity; so the semantics of counterfactuals is the source of the strength of rigid designation. More, later, perhaps. Also, I've begun moves towards writing a full length manuscript on "Kant and the Logical Positivists." Kripke on rigidity is going to figure in here. Some of the best discussions of Kant and intuition appeared before Kripke's paper. People like Sellars and Manley Thompson. Thompson in particular has caught my attention lately. Sellar's work on Kant is, I think, superb only not as thorough say, as Allison etc, although Allison is, I think, the best commentator in English on Kant since Kemp-Smith. However, he is not "into" semantics. Which is, as far I'm concerned, "cool." Allison is a damned good philosopher! His book _Kant's Transcendental Idealism_, Yale, 1983 is, I think one of the very best things ever written in the history of philosophy. I read it a few years back and I'm definitely going to return once I use Aune as a refresher course in epistemology (and more besides) The paper I'll be examining by Thompson is his 1972 paper. "Singular Terms and Intuitions and Kant's Epistemology." Rev. of Metaphysics. Dec. 1972. no. 2, vol. XXXVI, pp. 314-344. I think I can get Rev of Met. people to allow webifying it; in the past they have been very helpful.For now a look at Putnam. The reason for this digression is that it seems to me that the strongest inducement to give Aune's book a close read is his discussion of the a priori and observational knowledge. So I want to be strong coming in on a discussion of the a priori, which I haven't touched seriously in about twenty years. So if anyone can get me Putnam's paper I'll put it up. I am reworking the front page of Hist-Analytic. It is proving laborious, but I think it will be far easier to navigate and "cleaner." Regards Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at btinternet.com Tue Nov 3 04:30:25 2009 From: danny.frederick at btinternet.com (Danny Frederick) Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2009 09:30:25 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] The status and relevance of "standard logic" In-Reply-To: <200910312048.49947.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <017FE50400B64FC890D334035AE8D7FB@DFLVQC1J> <200910302147.43769.rbj@rbjones.com> <200910312048.49947.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: Hi Roger, <> A distinction between language and metalanguage must be made in order to avoid semantic paradoxes. This is a theory of linguistic types. Further theories of linguistic types are also assumed. For example, the following is a logical truth (in PL + identity): Ex(x = a). This amounts to the claim that every name designates. It is not possible to say (truly) in first-order logic that Santa Claus does not exist. We have to go to the metalanguage and say that 'Santa Claus' does not designate anything, or 'Santa Claus' is not a name. Do you think that the claims that Santa Claus is not a name, and that 'Nothing is identical to Santa Claus' is ill-formed, are as obvious as parts of elementary mathematics? They seem to me to be obviously false. And can a theory of linguistic types be separated from a theory of logical types? I don't think so. Thus, there are a many dubious assumptions needed to make the system work. And they are hidden because they are not explicitly stated as axioms of the system: they are just assumed by the system builder. You ask: how can it be that the question of how doubtful something appears does not bear upon its truth? Just consider some examples. Basic Law V was not doubtful to anyone before Russell produced his paradox. All manner of moral and religious truths are indubitable to fundamentalists. That simultaneity is relative to a co-ordinate system was highly doubtful when Einstein proposed it (I think it still is highly doubtful), yet it is nowadays generally accepted as true by physicists and others. <> This sounds as if it concedes my point. In fact, I think it does. But you will disagree because you want to order doubts according to HOW doubtful they are and because you want to link this (purely subjective) order to an (objective) order of closeness to truth (or perhaps likelihood of truth). But this cannot be done. I agree we can often say that one thing seems to be more doubtful to us than another. But this is purely subjective: it has no bearing on the question of truth (consider the previous list of examples and others like them). Cheers. Danny. From Baynesr at comcast.net Tue Nov 3 14:26:48 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2009 19:26:48 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] The Two Color Problem, Putnam, and the Synthetic A Priori Message-ID: <1427147749.3685721257276408340.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Bruce says, "But if two determinate colors are conceded to be distinguishable, it _follows logically_ that nothing possesses both of them at the same place at the same time." (ETK p. 66) He adds that this is "very easily proved." (ETK p. 66). The reason he gives is: If we take 'DC' as 'determinate color', and DCxt=A for 'the determinate color of x at t = A' then on a proposal by Stephen Schwartz we have: (A)(B)(DC(a) & DC(B) & Distinguishable (A,B) -> ~(A=B) Bruce says that "the impossibility of DC(xt) = A & DC(xt) = B & Distinguishable (A, B) follows ALMOST IMMEDIATELY by conditional proof" (ETK p. 66). Now the problems I have with this are: 1. I don't think it can be "very easily proved." If it can, then Bruce will simply state the proof in the sort of format Danny provided in his clarifying remarks. So we need to see exactly how this proof is supposed to work. Nothing is obvious, especially with so many symbols and definitions. So let's see the cards! 2. I'm not sure there are such things as determinate colors; try laying down conditions for partitioning the class of red objects. Putnam spends a great deal of time and introduces numerous postulates in arriving at an understanding of what a determinate shade is. He knew this was crucial. It is. So what IS a determinate shade? 3. Even if the proof goes through, it misses the point. We all agree that a thing can't be red and green all over at the same time. That is not the issue. The issue is whether this is synthetic a priori, relying on the structure of intuitions or some such thing, or whether it is analytic. Why should I believe that '(A)(B)(DC(a) & DC(B) & Distinguishable (A,B) -> ~(A=B)' is analytic? And if it is not analytic, why should I reject self evidence as the basis for the claim that nothing can be red and green all over etc.? Indeed why should I believe this premise to be true? Can't be self evidential because this is exactly what Bruce seems to be denying. 4. Putnam has a lot of gizmos for stating the meaning of one essential relation: 'exactly the same color as'. Without this relation, i. e.?his "basic idea" (this being the idea upon which the proposed proof here is based), there is no proving analyticity of the thesis. Now these considerations, I think, should at least impel us to a further examination of Putnam. I will soon show that Putnam's argument is not pursuasive. Too many postulates, too many assumptions, too much razimataz?to be?a satisfying solution to the problem. But it's not just logical "bulk" that concerns me; it is the failure to match the analysis with a solution to the problem as posed. So give me a day or so to wade through Putnam's argument and get back to yuz. Regards STeve Bayne -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Tue Nov 3 15:12:29 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2009 15:12:29 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Grice's Informants (Was: Synthetic A Priori) Message-ID: S. Bayne quotes from B. Aune: "But if two determinate colors are conceded to be distinguishable, it _follows logically_ that nothing possesses both of them at the same place at the same time." (Empiricist Theory of Knowledge, p. 66) ----- A disgression of the Gricean type. When reading S. Chapman's bio of the man (Grice) I was amused by a commentary by Mrs. Grice from the time they were living in that apartment on Woodstock road, not far from St. John's, in Oxford. Chapman writes: "IT is clear that the nature of analytic and synthetic sentences, and of our knowledge of them, exercised Grice a good deal both at this time and later. [Mrs.] Grice recalls that, during the 1950s, he delighted in questioning his children [Karen and Timothy]'s playmates about 'whether something can be red and green all over' and enjoyed their subsequent CONFUSION, insisting that spots and stripes were NOT allowed. (Mrs. Grice, personal communication). As he observes in his own notes, "Nothing can be red and green all over" is a supposed candidate for a statement that is both synthetic and a priori. *'The Way of Words', Studies in: Notes, offprints and draft material. H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley). Grice was presumably amusing himself by testing this claim out on some genuinely naive informants." -- for surely Karen and Timothy were 'in the know'. (p.54) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at btinternet.com Tue Nov 3 14:55:33 2009 From: danny.frederick at btinternet.com (Danny Frederick) Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2009 19:55:33 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] The status and relevance of "standard logic" In-Reply-To: <5B5CBD16E73D894582927B93BEBEDD7E06E086710E@IOWAEVS08.iowa.uiowa.edu> References: <017FE50400B64FC890D334035AE8D7FB@DFLVQC1J> <200910302147.43769.rbj@rbjones.com> <200910312048.49947.rbj@rbjones.com> <5B5CBD16E73D894582927B93BEBEDD7E06E086710E@IOWAEVS08.iowa.uiowa.edu> Message-ID: <9D9653CCF106477094CE0AF8B3674BBA@DFLVQC1J> Hi Gregory, Thanks for your contribution. I am not sure if it is intended as a rebuttal of what I was saying or whether it is intended merely to add some other points. Let me take it as the former and respond to it on that basis. You begin: 'I think that a distinction between language and meta-language is essential to the very intelligibility of the notion of a "formal axiomatic system".' You may be right. But I notice that you say 'I think.' And even if it is so, it is not obvious (certainly not as obvious as elementary arithmetical truths). Further, I think it is something that it took the paradoxes to force upon people's attention. Without the paradoxes, anyone making such a distinction would surely have seemed to be a pedant par excellence! What will he talk of next? How many angels can dance on a pinhead? Of course, it needn't have been the paradoxes that motivated the distinction: it could have been other perplexities into which we fall in using natural language. But the point is, the distinction is put forward to solve a problem. And any problem solution is only ever one possibility amongst others. Dialetheists, for example, find Tarski's solution ad hoc: they think it is better to accept that some contradictions are true. You say: 'it is now known how to formulate a first order predicate logic that does not yield any existential theorems.' Thanks for the information. Does the system include names (individual constants)? Either way, it will include a (perhaps unarticulated) theory about names and designation and meaning - a theory that some people will dispute - a theory that no one can seriously claim to be as obvious as the truths of elementary arithmetic. You say: 'One cannot "say" anything in predicate logic. Saying something concerns interpretation and is a semantic issue' I think this is contentious. First, we can treat predicate logic as a pure formalism, in which case none of its formulae say anything. But even then it does not follow that the formulae are empty of meaning. They have their formal meaning: 'P' represents a predicate, 'a' a name, and so on. There's a semantics of syntax! Second, it is natural and common to say that there are some things we can say in first-order predicate logic (such as 'the king of France is bald') and some things we cannot (stuff involving opaque contexts, for example). The reason this is natural is that predicate logic is a formal logic, a formalisation of arguments: the whole point of it is to represent things that can be said and to show their implications. Best wishes, Danny -----Original Message----- From: Landini, Gregory [mailto:gregory-landini at uiowa.edu] Sent: 03 November 2009 14:35 To: 'Danny Frederick' Subject: RE: The status and relevance of "standard logic" Hey all: I think that a distinction between language and meta-language is essential to the very intelligibility of the notion of a "formal axiomatic system". It not motivated by any paradox but by efforts to be clear about the meaning of "well formed formula," "consistency", "semantic completeness", and the like. There were, of course, paradoxes that arise from confused uses of words like "nameability" or "definability," but most of these have been sorted out thanks to Tarski and demoted from paradoxes to puzzles (whose solutions are known). For instance, it is now a puzzle whose solution is known (and not a paradox) that argues (as Koenig and Dixon did) that the non-denumerability of real numbers is incompatible with the axiom of choice. This was the puzzle that using choice we can well order the reals and that there would then be the first unnameable real (which we seem to have just named). Classical first order predicate logic (quantification theory) with identity has the theorem: (Ex)(x=x). Hence in the classical semantics for logical truth, no domain is empty. Therefore, we can add denumerably many individual constants to the language of first order predicate logic and we could even allow them to occur in axioms for identity so that we get "c=c" as an axiom. Hence, for our individual constants c1, c2, ... etc we get the theorems "(Ex)(x=c1)", "(Ex)(x=c2)" ...etc. This is deemed innocuous since the semantics of first order logical truth can assign all the constants to the same member of the domain. This extended first order predicate logic (that has the constants) is not logically committed to the existence of more than one entity. Some don't like this. Russell banned all individual constants (and function constants) from the language of pure logic. (His theory of definite descriptions shows how to do this.) Moreover, it is now known how to formulate a first order predicate logic that does not yield any existential theorems. (Its semantics embraces an empty domain.) One cannot "say" anything in predicate logic. Saying something concerns interpretation and is a semantic issue. One can write the following in a first order language: "-(Ex)( Sy <->y y=x)." Then one can interpret "Sy" so that it means "y lives at the north pole and delivers gifts to all good people on Christmas". With that interpretation, it comes out true. Under the interpretation that assigns "Sy" to "y is natural satellite of earth" it is false. "(Ex)(x = Santa Claus)" is a theorem of classical predicate logic with identity whose language is extended by the addition of the singular term "Santa Claus" and which allows "Santa Claus = Santa Claus" as an axiom. But its being logically true just means that in every non-empty domain we can make some assignment to "Santa Claus" so that it comes out true. Of course, none of these interpretations make it say that something is Santa Claus or that "Santa Claus" refers. No interpretation is such that there is a unique object x in the domain who lives at the North Pole and delivers gifts to all good people on Christmas and is such that "Santa Claus" is assigned to x. We must finally admit there is no Santa Claus. Gregory Gregory -----Original Message----- From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of Danny Frederick Sent: Tuesday, November 03, 2009 3:30 AM To: 'hist-analytic' Subject: RE: The status and relevance of "standard logic" Hi Roger, <> A distinction between language and metalanguage must be made in order to avoid semantic paradoxes. This is a theory of linguistic types. Further theories of linguistic types are also assumed. For example, the following is a logical truth (in PL + identity): Ex(x = a). This amounts to the claim that every name designates. It is not possible to say (truly) in first-order logic that Santa Claus does not exist. We have to go to the metalanguage and say that 'Santa Claus' does not designate anything, or 'Santa Claus' is not a name. Do you think that the claims that Santa Claus is not a name, and that 'Nothing is identical to Santa Claus' is ill-formed, are as obvious as parts of elementary mathematics? They seem to me to be obviously false. And can a theory of linguistic types be separated from a theory of logical types? I don't think so. Thus, there are a many dubious assumptions needed to make the system work. And they are hidden because they are not explicitly stated as axioms of the system: they are just assumed by the system builder. You ask: how can it be that the question of how doubtful something appears does not bear upon its truth? Just consider some examples. Basic Law V was not doubtful to anyone before Russell produced his paradox. All manner of moral and religious truths are indubitable to fundamentalists. That simultaneity is relative to a co-ordinate system was highly doubtful when Einstein proposed it (I think it still is highly doubtful), yet it is nowadays generally accepted as true by physicists and others. <> This sounds as if it concedes my point. In fact, I think it does. But you will disagree because you want to order doubts according to HOW doubtful they are and because you want to link this (purely subjective) order to an (objective) order of closeness to truth (or perhaps likelihood of truth). But this cannot be done. I agree we can often say that one thing seems to be more doubtful to us than another. But this is purely subjective: it has no bearing on the question of truth (consider the previous list of examples and others like them). Cheers. Danny. From aune at philos.umass.edu Tue Nov 3 16:10:40 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2009 16:10:40 -0500 Subject: [hist-analytic] Correction In-Reply-To: <1427147749.3685721257276408340.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <1427147749.3685721257276408340.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <3496CDC4-0943-458C-A4DA-CC487D65D915@philos.umass.edu> A clause was left out from one definition in the proof I sent out. I attach a correction. Parenthetically, I ask to be pardoned for all the typos in my last post. I didn't see them when I sent off the post. Bruce -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: PROOF.doc Type: application/msword Size: 29696 bytes Desc: not available URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Tue Nov 3 18:12:09 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2009 18:12:09 -0500 Subject: [hist-analytic] The Two Color Problem, Putnam, and the Synthetic A Priori Message-ID: > > Steve, Because I can't convey symbols in an email text, I include > the proof you ask for in an attachment to this post. > > You say, "Even if the proof goes through, it misses the point. We > all agree that a thing can't be red and green all > over at the same time. " THE PROOF HARDLY MISSES THE POINT. What I > show is that the impossibility of a thing having distinct > determinate colors at the same time follows from a basic convention > we use in distinguishing determinate colors as we do. We don't all > agree that a thing can't be red and green all over at the same > time. I note in my text that this is impossible empirically > (because of the way the eye works) but it is not impossible > conceptually; I support this by an analogous claim about yellow and > green. (See my reminder at the end of the attached proof.) You > should think that there are such things as determinate colors; non- > determonate colors are generic colors, and nothing could be > generically red without being a specific shade of red, that is, > without having some determinate shade of it. > > I devote many pages in the chapter to criticizing the notion of self- > evidence, but you seem not to be unaware of the details of my > argument. Note that I did not credit Stephen Schwartz with any > proposal. He simply brought Putnam's paper to my attention; I had > heard of that paper before but did not actually study it. I did not > get my argument from Putnam; I thought it up myself. > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: PROOF.doc Type: application/msword Size: 29696 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Wed Nov 4 07:20:34 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2009 12:20:34 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] The Two Color Problem, Putnam, and the Synthetic A Priori In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <185556716.3955151257337234505.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Bruce, I will examine the prooof you supply. Just thought I'd mention it just in case you thought I would pass it by. I won't. But my first comment, and it may the most important, is that it relies on 'determinate color'. There is one other problem I think I see but it is shared by Putnam; and I will get to this. Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: "hist-analytic" Sent: Tuesday, November 3, 2009 6:12:09 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: The Two Color Problem, Putnam, and the Synthetic A Priori Steve, Because I can't convey symbols in an email text, I include the proof you ask for in an attachment to this post. You say, " Even if the proof goes through, it misses the point.?We all agree that a thing can't be red and green all over at the same time . ?" ?THE PROOF HARDLY MISSES THE POINT. ?What I show is that the impossibility of a thing having distinct determinate colors at the same time follows from a basic convention we use in distinguishing determinate colors as we do. ?We? don't ?all agree that a thing can't be red and green all over at the same time. ?I note in my text that this is impossible empirically (because of the way the eye works) but it is not impossible conceptually; I support this by an analogous claim about yellow and green. ?(See my reminder at the end of the attached proof.) You should think that there are such things as determinate colors; non-determonate colors are generic colors, and nothing could be generically red without being a specific shade of red, that is, without having some determinate shade of it. ? I devote many pages in the chapter to criticizing the notion of self-evidence, but you seem not to be unaware of the details of my argument. Note that I did not credit Stephen Schwartz with any proposal. ?He simply brought Putnam's paper to my attention; I had heard of that paper before but did not actually study it. I did not get my argument from Putnam; I thought it up myself. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Wed Nov 4 07:13:27 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2009 12:13:27 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] The Two Color Problem, Putnam, and the Synthetic A Priori In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <1248236461.3954541257336807892.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Bruce, I haven't presented my argument yet. The business about determinate colors is a good approach. Putnam has a correlative manuever. Your argument is somewhat different but if I am right then it falls prey to similar criticisms. Among them is reliance on some notion of determinate color. I don't believe you have given an account of what a determinate color is. Putnam understands that this is very important for the case. I will explain why as I go through the Putnam, comparing his approach to yours. Now I don't believe that the anatomy of the eye will provide any basis for solving philosophical problems. This may reflect a "metaphilosophical" difference between us. I don't know how signficant that will become. However, if a problem's solution is to be found to be solvable by medicine, then the malady was not philosophical to begin with, unless of course philosophy is a sort of disease requiring "therapy," a position that I will simply pass over in silence. A philosophical point unrelated to anatomy can be made here. I can't imagine an object with two colors at the same time all over etc. Now the physiological approach to philosophy will now have to be extended to cover memory, the imagination as a neural process, etc.? However, since I doubt the existence of matter and reject physicalism doing this weakens the case. No, until you can show that it is analytic that an object (mental or physical) cannot be two colors all over, then you have done nothing to dispose of the synthetic a priori or intuition. I will say this much about this approach: it does raise questions about the nature of secondary properties. Are they merely mental? But if there is just the brain etc, they are no different than other physical properties. It may be that the synthetic a priori is tied to this issue. I do find one strength in your position Putnam's lacks. Putnam has to with colors. Indeed, the problem you seem comfortable ignoring, the problem of defining 'determinate shades', requires, even by his own lights, the notion of a continuum. So Putnam says: "The point I am leading up to by the way is very simple: the color properties are not isolated ; the form a system (or better a continuum)." ("Reds, Greens, and Logical Analysis" _Necessary Truth_ edited by L. M. Sumner and J. Woods, p. 73. The problem is this: The approach will not address the question: why can't two things have the same shape at the same time? Notice there is no "all over" to contend with. By the way, even if the anatomy of the eye ruled out seeing a two colored object, this does nothing to dispose of the question: "CAN an object be two colors at once etc.?" The powers of the eye are not so important, nor the brain. Were the brain different we could experience infrared but so what? Esse est percipi may enter at some point; that is another issue. As for not understanding you: well maybe not. I apologize. However, I do think there are weaknesses or at least questions regarding your argument, in particular with 'determinate color' and how this ties in to your brief footnote. Whatever the case may be Putnam is VERY thorough in stating his reasoning towards your conclusion. Let me get to that soon and, perhaps, show where both your position and his may be in doubt. Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: "hist-analytic" Sent: Tuesday, November 3, 2009 6:12:09 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: The Two Color Problem, Putnam, and the Synthetic A Priori Steve, Because I can't convey symbols in an email text, I include the proof you ask for in an attachment to this post. You say, " Even if the proof goes through, it misses the point.?We all agree that a thing can't be red and green all over at the same time . ?" ?THE PROOF HARDLY MISSES THE POINT. ?What I show is that the impossibility of a thing having distinct determinate colors at the same time follows from a basic convention we use in distinguishing determinate colors as we do. ?We? don't ?all agree that a thing can't be red and green all over at the same time. ?I note in my text that this is impossible empirically (because of the way the eye works) but it is not impossible conceptually; I support this by an analogous claim about yellow and green. ?(See my reminder at the end of the attached proof.) You should think that there are such things as determinate colors; non-determonate colors are generic colors, and nothing could be generically red without being a specific shade of red, that is, without having some determinate shade of it. ? I devote many pages in the chapter to criticizing the notion of self-evidence, but you seem not to be unaware of the details of my argument. Note that I did not credit Stephen Schwartz with any proposal. ?He simply brought Putnam's paper to my attention; I had heard of that paper before but did not actually study it. I did not get my argument from Putnam; I thought it up myself. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Nov 4 08:36:22 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2009 08:36:22 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] "Red and Green All Over" (Was: Synthetic A Priori, Grice's Informants Message-ID: I think Chapman misses the point, slightly when she writes, as per below, "amusing himself". True, philosophy ceases to be philosophy when you take 'the fun' out of it; but it seems Grice was into the same campaign as Aune! (And I was delighted that Schwartz repr. Grice, "Causal Theory of Perception" in one of his collections, on "Sensing" -- what a beautiful verb). Sure there's the pun that Grice should have known, what is black and white and red all over? "Not the Daily Telegraph, precisely -- I cannot go through the classifieds". Now, 'green and yellow', which is I think Aune's example, strikes me as slightly different from Grice's "red and green". For there's nothing in COMMON between 'red' and 'green', while, strictly, green IS yellow and blue. It strikes me that a case can be made that via implicature, if you see 'green' you are seeing blue AND yellow. But my knowledge of physics is nil. I would disgress as well into the role of physical theory, etc. Grice, for example, was open-minded when it comes to the role that physics would play in a 'philosophical' theory of perception of the causal type that Grice defended (and Bayne has made charmingly publicly available via the Aristotelian Society version in his site). In Section III, Grice expands on the philosopher needing to _draw a blank_, I think his wording is, as to how the philosophical approach HAS to give room for a physical theory of perception that is somehow consistent with it. Etc. J. L. Speranza ---- S. Bayne quotes from B. Aune:"But if two determinate colors are conceded to be distinguishable, it _follows logically_ that nothing possesses both of them at the same place at the same time." (Empiricist Theory of Knowledge, p. 66. A disgression of the Gricean type. When reading S. Chapman's bio of the man (Grice) I was amused by a commentary by Mrs. Grice from the time they were living in that apartment on Woodstock road, not far from St. John's, in Oxford. Chapman writes: "IT is clear that the nature of analytic and synthetic sentences, and of our knowledge of them, exercised Grice a good deal both at this time and later. [Mrs.] Grice recalls that, during the 1950s, he delighted in questioning his children [Karen and Timothy]'s playmates about 'whether something can be red and green all over' and enjoyed their subsequent CONFUSION, insisting that spots and stripes were NOT allowed. (Mrs. Grice, personal communication). As he observes in his own notes, "Nothing can be red and green all over" is a supposed candidate for a statement that is both synthetic and a priori. *'The Way of Words', Studies in: Notes, offprints and draft material. H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley). Grice was presumably amusing himself by testing this claim out on some genuinely naive informants." -- for surely Karen and Timothy were 'in the know'. (p.54) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Wed Nov 4 09:38:28 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2009 14:38:28 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] "Red and Green All Over" (Was: Synthetic A Priori, Grice's Informants In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <1626550254.3986441257345508697.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I think Grice was closest to being right about meaning in natural language than anyone else. Nothing here on neurology etc. His work on personal identity AND perception distinguishes him signficantly from people like J. L. Austin. I have a great respect for Austin's work How to Do Things With Words. It is a superb analysis, but it is more linguistics than philosophy in my opinion. As for physics. I side with Carnap in one respect (as well as others, like Schlick, Reichenbach etc): the most important questions of epistemology will come down to those related to science. This is not to say that I don't maintain a need to get a good theory of perception going. Science trades in laws, for the most part; perception with individual events connected to action. That is the crucial nexus that will not be found in the "nomological net." My "beef" with a lot of folks who fall back on current physical theory is that current physical theory is, typically, as wrong as current philosophy and it's application to philosophy tends to cheapen philosophical questions by reformulating them in such a way that philosophy becomes a simple matter. If you think the problems of philosophy are scientific, then for heaven's sake do science not philosophy. But once you go at these traditional problems head-on I think you find current science is a very flexible crutch, serving to prop up easy solutions to problems that no one really thinks are problems in the first place. That is my bias; but, again, the epistemology of the scientific enterprise is at the heart of my own epistemology. Physical theories about physical events are not so much my concern. I leave them to the experts in science. I am not a "wanna-be" scientist stuck in philosophy. Sometimes I get this impression from J. J. Smart; not sure. Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: Jlsperanza at aol.com To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2009 8:36:22 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: "Red and Green All Over" (Was: Synthetic A Priori, Grice's Informants I think Chapman misses the point, slightly when she writes, as per below, "amusing himself". True, philosophy ceases to be philosophy when you take 'the fun' out of it; but it seems Grice was into the same campaign as Aune! (And I was delighted that Schwartz repr. Grice, "Causal Theory of Perception" in one of his collections, on "Sensing" -- what a beautiful verb). Sure there's the pun that Grice should have known, what is black and white and red all over? "Not the Daily Telegraph, precisely -- I cannot go through the classifieds". Now, 'green and yellow', which is I think Aune's example, strikes me as slightly different from Grice's "red and green". For there's nothing in COMMON between 'red' and 'green', while, strictly, green IS yellow and blue. It strikes me that a case can be made that via implicature, if you see 'green' you are seeing blue AND yellow. But my knowledge of physics is nil. I would disgress as well into the role of physical theory, etc. Grice, for example, was open-minded when it comes to the role that physics would play in a 'philosophical' theory of perception of the causal type that Grice defended (and Bayne has made charmingly publicly available via the Aristotelian Society version in his site). In Section III, Grice expands on the philosopher needing to _draw a blank_, I think his wording is, as to how the philosophical approach HAS to give room for a physical theory of perception that is somehow consistent with it. Etc. J. L. Speranza ---- S. Bayne quotes from B. Aune: "But if two determinate colors are conceded to be distinguishable, it _follows logically_ that nothing possesses both of them at the same place at the same time." (Empiricist Theory of Knowledge, p. 66. A disgression of the Gricean type. When reading S. Chapman's bio of the man (Grice) I was amused by a commentary by Mrs. Grice from the time they were living in that apartment on Woodstock road, not far from St. John's, in Oxford. Chapman writes: "IT is clear that the nature of analytic and synthetic sentences, and of our knowledge of them, exercised Grice a good deal both? at this time and later. [Mrs.] Grice recalls that, during the 1950s, he delighted in questioning his children [Karen and Timothy]'s playmates about? 'whether something can be red and green all over' and enjoyed their subsequent CONFUSION, insisting that spots and stripes were NOT allowed. (Mrs. Grice, personal communication). As he observes in his own notes, "Nothing can be red and green all over" is a supposed candidate for a statement that is both synthetic and a priori.? *'The Way of Words', Studies in: Notes, offprints and draft material. H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley). Grice was presumably amusing himself by testing this claim out on some genuinely naive informants." -- for surely Karen and Timothy were 'in the know'. (p.54) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Wed Nov 4 11:00:52 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2009 16:00:52 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] The Two Color Problem, Putnam, and the Synthetic A Priori In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <200911041600.56426.rbj@rbjones.com> Though I have not been following this thread closely, I did look at Bruce's proof, and find it to be unsound for the following reason. The purported definition D1 for the function DC is problematic as it stands. For this to constitute a definition it would be necessary first for us to have a definition of the phrase "x has A at t", and secondly for us to know that whenever x has A at t and x has B at t then A = B. The definition therefore depends for its validity on the principle for the proof of which it was defined. This is a proof by Petitio Principii. Roger Jones From aune at philos.umass.edu Wed Nov 4 14:48:45 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2009 14:48:45 -0500 Subject: [hist-analytic] The Two Color Problem, Putnam, and the Synthetic A Priori In-Reply-To: <200911041600.56426.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <200911041600.56426.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <339B327E-E9CA-4769-AFDF-8354989E13A7@philos.umass.edu> I am surprised by Roger's objection. There is nothing wrong with my definition of "x the determinate color of x at t = A." Roger says I first have to give a definition for "x has A at t," but this doesn't need defining; it just means that the individual x has the property A at a time t. There are certainly problems about the notion of a property (I taken them up in my chapter 4), but the idea of a thing having a property at a time is so basic to philosophy that even nominalists need to have a way of making sense of it. Roger's other objection--that prior to giving the definition I gave we need to know (P) that whenever x has A at t and B at t, A = B--overlooks the fact that P does not follow from my definition, which is merely a terminological convenience. (P) is really a consequence of the principle DD. That principle has the status of a meaning postulate for "determinate color." I take up the notion of a meaning postulate in chapter 3. When I discuss the color example in chapter 2 I say that I will be making sense of analyticity in the chapter to come. Bruce From rbj at rbjones.com Wed Nov 4 17:48:30 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2009 22:48:30 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] The Two Color Problem, Putnam, and the Synthetic A Priori In-Reply-To: <339B327E-E9CA-4769-AFDF-8354989E13A7@philos.umass.edu> References: <200911041600.56426.rbj@rbjones.com> <339B327E-E9CA-4769-AFDF-8354989E13A7@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: <200911042248.41684.rbj@rbjones.com> On Wednesday 04 November 2009 19:48:45 Bruce Aune wrote: > I am surprised by Roger's objection. There is nothing wrong with my > definition of "x the determinate color of x at t = A." Roger says I > first have to give a definition for "x has A at t," but this doesn't > need defining; it just means that the individual x has the property A > at a time t. I agree that it need not be defined. > Roger's other > objection--that prior to giving the definition I gave we need to know > (P) that whenever x has A at t and B at t, A = B--overlooks the fact > that P does not follow from my definition, which is merely a > terminological convenience. I did not allege that P follows from your "definition". I claim that it is a necessary condition for the property you cite to be a definition of a function. It is easy to derive a contradiction if arbitrary formulae are admitted as definitions. (define f x = y iff y is a number, then prove 0=1). > (P) is really a consequence of the principle DD. It does not seem to me to be obvious that this is the case. Can you prove it? Roger From aune1 at verizon.net Thu Nov 5 07:09:37 2009 From: aune1 at verizon.net (Bruce Aune) Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2009 07:09:37 -0500 Subject: [hist-analytic] The Two Color Problem, Putnam, and the Synthetic A Priori In-Reply-To: <956C6AD9-BADB-41A2-80B5-320C4B50CFF9@philos.umass.edu> References: <200911041600.56426.rbj@rbjones.com> <339B327E-E9CA-4769-AFDF-8354989E13A7@philos.umass.edu> <200911042248.41684.rbj@rbjones.com> <956C6AD9-BADB-41A2-80B5-320C4B50CFF9@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: Mea culpa, mea culpa. Roger is right about my definition. I intended it as providing only some useful terminology, but I see, now that Roger has pointed it out, that my functor "DC(x,t)" does denote a function, i.e. has a unique value. So my definition is, as Roger says, a substantive principle. But I contend that it is analytically true just the same. Like the principle DD it amounts to a meaning postulate, something true by virtue of the meaning of "A is a determinate color." As we (all normal speakers of English) conceive of colors, if a thing has a color in a certain region at a certain time (if it is not invisible there and then, for example), it has just one color there and then. (The qualification about the region where the color exists was something I explicitly mentioned in the text and presupposed in my argument.) My principle DD just gives expression to the fact that determinate colors are distinguishable just when they are distinct. So the color-incompatibility (or CI) principle, as it might be called, is true by virtue of the meaning; it is like the principle, "A fake duck is not a real one." One COULD speak of a "color" for which the CI principle failed, but one would be using the word "color" in a deviant way that one would have to explain. It would not have the meaning presupposed by rationalists who insist that the principle is true. Rationalists are wrong if they thing that generic colors are incompatible--as I point out, they are simply careless in saying this--but they are right when they say this of determinate (non- generic colors), though they are wrong about how they know they are right. My thanks to Roger. Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Thu Nov 5 11:31:09 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2009 16:31:09 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] The status and relevance of "standard logic" In-Reply-To: References: <017FE50400B64FC890D334035AE8D7FB@DFLVQC1J> <200910312048.49947.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <200911051631.12935.rbj@rbjones.com> On Tuesday 03 November 2009 09:30:25 Danny Frederick wrote: > A distinction between language and metalanguage must be made in order to > avoid semantic paradoxes. This is a theory of linguistic types. Further > theories of linguistic types are also assumed. I can understand your believing this if your information on this matter comes primarily from the papers which Tarski wrote in the 1930s, but it is not correct. I believe Tarski proved one definite and very specific result, by formalising the liar paradox in first order arithmetic, viz. that arithmetic truth is not arithmetically definable. From this he concluded, without proof, some general and vague principles along the following lines: a) that the semantics of a language L can only be defined in some other language which is strictly more expressive (in some sense) than L b) that the relevant kind of expressiveness is that obtained by the availabilty of objects of higher type. Something can be made of the first intuition, but only by making it more precise and less general than it appears to be. I think it doubtful that the second can be cashed in. The logical system of preference for defining semantics is first order set theory. This is semantically more expressive than any type theory (subject to some caveats on what one takes its semantics to be). However, to define the semantics of a pure first order language, and to demonstrate the soundness of the usual deductive system relative to that semantics, is particularly simple and can readily be accomplished in PA or even weaker systems. In this is should be noted that PA is, in an appropriate sense relevant to intuition (a), much more expressive and proof theoretically stronger than a pure first order logic (but does not involve objects of higher type). I might add here that my allegation is about what logical systems suffice for a formal proof of the soundness of first order logic. Of course, underpinning such a proof there may be all sorts of philosophical presumptions, which may be of relevance is assessing the significance of such a proof. Of these I say nothing. I allege only that there exists a valid proof in PA, the proof itself making use of no further "assumptions" beyond the accepted axioms of PA. > For example, the following > is a logical truth (in PL + identity): > > Ex(x = a). > > This amounts to the claim that every name designates. It is not possible to > say (truly) in first-order logic that Santa Claus does not exist. We are back on the "vacuous names" tack here which gave much entertainment to Speranza a while back. There a multiple strategies which enable the expression in first order logic of the claim that Santa Claus does not exist, the most famous of course is Russell's doctrine that "Santa Claus" should be construed as a description and formalised by the method described in his paper "On Denoting". There is a difficulty in knowing what kind of first order formalisation is satisfactory, since we have no generally accepted criteria for when sentences in distinct languages express the same proposition. However, I would suggest that the principle difficulty here is in deciding what is the meaning of "Santa Clause does not exist", once that is done finding a way of saying the same thing in first order logic will be much less problematic. > Do you think that the claims that > Santa Claus is not a name, and that 'Nothing is identical to Santa Claus' > is ill-formed, are as obvious as parts of elementary mathematics? They seem > to me to be obviously false. I am inclined to agree with you on this, though I can't see what bearing this has on the matter at issue (which is I believe, whether first order logic is sound). > And can a theory of linguistic types be separated from a theory of logical > types? I don't think so. If you are asking me whether a logical type theory is necessary for formalising talk about language then the answer is "no". > You ask: how can it be that the question of how doubtful something appears > does not bear upon its truth? > > Just consider some examples. Basic Law V was not doubtful to anyone before > Russell produced his paradox. All manner of moral and religious truths are > indubitable to fundamentalists. That simultaneity is relative to a > co-ordinate system was highly doubtful when Einstein proposed it (I think > it still is highly doubtful), yet it is nowadays generally accepted as true > by physicists and others. The considerations you raise speak against appearances being conclusive but not against their being relevant. > <> > > This sounds as if it concedes my point. In fact, I think it does. Which of your points do you take this to be conceding? > But you > will disagree because you want to order doubts according to HOW doubtful > they are and because you want to link this (purely subjective) order to an > (objective) order of closeness to truth (or perhaps likelihood of truth). I don't recall making a claim about objectivity in this. > But this cannot be done. I agree we can often say that one thing seems to > be more doubtful to us than another. But this is purely subjective: it has > no bearing on the question of truth (consider the previous list of examples > and others like them). I am puzzled as to the relevance of this to any discussion. Evidently the appearances lead you to believe various propositions with sufficient strength to argue them against others with a determination which is suggestive of conviction. Are you suggesting that my own rather more subtle skepticism should keep me in silence? Roger Jones From Baynesr at comcast.net Thu Nov 5 11:54:40 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2009 16:54:40 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Kripke and Contiingently Necessary Truth!? Message-ID: <2106037986.4506961257440080460.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> In view of a couple of comments by Bruce, I'm taking a little more time replying to his argument. Also, I want to include a reply to Putnam as well, since their views are at least related. This will be forthcoming, soon. But in the meantime a question occurred to me, one I have no time to think about, presently. Here it is, just for fun. One of Kripke's favorite identity statements is "heat = molecular motion." He argues that, given that it is true, then it is necessarily true. But there is a common occurrence that raises a question I've never seen discussed. I'm sure it has been discussed; just about everything he has said has been discussed, it seems. The occurrence I have in mind is where a plasma becomes completely ionized. For our purposes think of this as the result of ?taking molecules, heating them to such an extent that their structure breaks down to the point where we are left with a bunch of ions (proton, electrons, positrons, nutrinos, etc). You might compare this to a "cell free" system in biology. Setting aside the special treatment in physics which might involve things like introducing different concepts of temperature, just consider the semantics of the situation, ala Kripke. Here we have it that 'Nec(heat = molecular motion)', ex hypothesis. But now we have a dilemma of sorts. (Well, maybe we don't). The "dilemma" is that? if we use 'heat' to describe plasma, as we would use it to describe the gases constituting the atmosphere, then we cannot accept the idea that 'heat' IS molecular motion (there are no molecules constitutive of what I've described. But, if this is so ,what we thought was a necessary truth ('heat is molecular motion') is false or contingent; or we can't use 'heat' in this contexts. If not, why not? (I think we can and do). So what do we do? Do we say that necessary truths may be contingent? (Ugh!) Or, do we say that we were wrong in the first place? Neither is satisfying. Now we do have operational concepts of temperature ; but that is not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about heat! So how can such a plasma be 'heated' if 'heat is molecular motion' is a necessary truth. Now I think at this point Kripke would return to the distinction between meaning and and fixing the reference; or, between analyticity and necessity. Not sure. Has anyone got a reference on this? Or an easy solution? Or a denial that there is an issue here? Regards STeve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Nov 5 12:27:57 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2009 12:27:57 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Hot Potatoes Message-ID: "The potato was hot" In a message dated 11/5/2009 11:58:36 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, Baynesr at comcast.net writes: Not sure. Has anyone got a reference on this? Or an easy solution? Or a denial that there is an issue here? --- ---- Oddly, I did learn the predicate, 'hot', in phrases like "the potato was hot". So, aged 10 -- the right age for informants regading synthetic a priori, necessary/contingent -- Grice tells us -- there was no 'meaning postulate' that linked 'hot' with 'molecular movement'. With Grice, I would 'analyse' "hot" as a 'sensing' predicate, -- object of WHAT sense? Touch, no doubt -- although objects can _look_ hot -- what they cannot really is 'sound hot' or 'smell hot', I would assume). Taste hot, too. Touch and taste. Now, the physiology of the relevant organ of that particular sense (taste and touch) will tell us that there IS a link with 'molecular motion'. I.e. in normal circumstances, it is molecularly mobile things that we perceive as 'hot'. I'm surprised that the French, who are so systematic, haven't come out with a unit of heat, deposited in some cool museum in Paris. The 'calorie' is possibly the closest we can get. But is this measured along the number of molecules that are moved, and at what speed? Etc. J. L. Speranza -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Nov 5 12:19:31 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2009 12:19:31 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] "Santa Claus does not exist" Message-ID: Empty Names -- and the history of analytic philosophy D. Frederick writes to R. B. Jones, "It is not possible to say (truly) in first-order logic that Santa Claus does not exist." to which R. B. Jones replies, "We are back on the "vacuous names" tack here which gave much entertainment to Speranza a while back. There a multiple strategies which enable the expression in first order logic of the claim that Santa Claus does not exist, the most famous of course is Russell's doctrine that "Santa Claus" should be construed as a description and formalised by the method described in his paper "On Denoting". There is a difficulty in knowing what kind of first order formalisation is satisfactory, since we have no generally accepted criteria for when sentences in distinct languages express the same proposition. However, I would suggest that the principle difficulty here is in deciding what is the meaning of "Santa Clause does not exist", once that is done finding a way of saying the same thing in first order logic will be much less problematic. [And regarding D. Frederick's query, "Do you think that the claims that Santa Claus is not a name, and that 'Nothing is identical to Santa Claus' is ill-formed, are as obvious as parts of elementary mathematics? They seem to me to be obviously false"]. I am inclined to agree with you on this, though I can't see what bearing this has on the matter at issue (which is I believe, whether first order logic is sound)." I agree with ... Sant..., er I mean R. B. Jones. Santa Claus does not exist. As per the definition of 'exist', I take it, via meaning postulate (cfr. Aune, "A fake duck is no duck"), ... is a spatio-temporal continuant. Surely the "concept" of "Santa Claus" exists (if we are materialistic, in the brain of some children). But, with Frege (re: horses) we can say that the concept of "Santa Claus" is not a concept. So, the obvious answer is to say that "Santa Claus" is an _empty_ name. So is "Socrates". But whereas Socrates once _filled_ "Socrates", agnostics claim that "Santa Claus" never allowed for a containee. Grice writes, "We don't want (no) Meinongian jungle", in his "Vacuous Names", and we don't. To refer to "Santa Claus" as a _full_ (i.e. not empty or vacuous) name makes the whole vacuous/full distinction ... otiose. Now, Nicholas of (Alexandria?) is claimed, by some, to have been the real "Santa Claus", so we should consider here different "dossiers", to use Grice's terminology.. Consider: "Santa Claus, whoever he was, did not exist" "Santa Claus did not exist, but the person some persons believed to have filled the empty name, 'Santa Claus' _certainly_ existed." So, in the second utterance, the dossier (for "Santa Claus") is a 'narrow' one. As opposed to little Tommy's dossier for which, "Santa Claus is a bearded good old man who gives gifts to most children in the world, the good ones, lives in the North Pole, and flies in a rein-moved flying carriage". Etc. J. L. Speranza -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Thu Nov 5 16:16:31 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2009 21:16:31 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Hot Potatoes In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <1404847771.4654851257455791883.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> J. L. The problem, here, is with 'heat' not 'hot'. There is a critical difference: 'hot' is a comparative adjective in the positive degree; 'heat' is a simple ajdective. However, unlike most people, I extend the concept of common adjectives into he domain of comparatives. This has to do with the seldom noticed difference between ordinary adjectives and comparatives in the positive degree. Anyone interested might want to check out my note: "A Note on Covering Concepts, Comparatives and Relative Identity." http://www.hist-analytic.org/COVERINGCONCEPTS.htm I like your comment though on what I'll call "French Semantics." Let's have a standard balloon filled with standard 'hot air'! Call it the 'the standard bag of hot air in Paris'. No offense to the French intended. In fact the reply I'm making to Aune and Putnam is build, largely, on that great genius of about everything Henri Poincare! The most often "borrowed" from Frenchman by English speakers in philosophy ever. Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: Jlsperanza at aol.com To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Sent: Thursday, November 5, 2009 12:27:57 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Hot Potatoes "The potato was hot" In a message dated 11/5/2009 11:58:36 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, Baynesr at comcast.net writes: Not sure. Has anyone got a reference on this? Or an easy solution? Or a denial that there is an issue here? --- ---- Oddly, I did learn the predicate, 'hot', in phrases like ??? "the potato was hot". So, aged 10 -- the right age for informants regading synthetic a priori, necessary/contingent -- Grice tells us -- there was no 'meaning postulate' that linked 'hot' with 'molecular movement'. With Grice, I would 'analyse' "hot" as a 'sensing' predicate, -- object of WHAT sense? Touch, no doubt -- although objects can _look_ hot -- what they cannot really is 'sound hot' or 'smell hot', I would assume). Taste hot, too. Touch and taste. Now, the physiology of the relevant organ of that particular sense (taste and touch) will tell us that there IS a link with 'molecular motion'. I.e. in normal circumstances, it is molecularly mobile things that we perceive as 'hot'. I'm surprised that the French, who are so systematic, haven't come out with a unit of heat, deposited in some cool museum in Paris. The 'calorie' is possibly the closest we can get. But is this measured along the number of molecules that are moved, and at what speed? Etc. J. L. Speranza -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Fri Nov 6 03:24:15 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2009 08:24:15 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism Message-ID: <200911060824.18224.rbj@rbjones.com> This is a bit of rave from the grave, I wrote most of it ages ago, filed it in drafts, and only just got back to it. Really i wanted to make some more substantial observations about prevalent misconstruals of the extent of Carnap's metaphysics, but it will have to wait for another time. On Monday 12 October 2009 Steve Bayne wrote: [RBJ] > "The upshot is that a philosophical theory of perception > in which our knowledge of the world is mediated by > sense data which correspond closely to conscious events is > in my opinion untenable." [SB] > On the theory we are talking about the idea is not that sense data mediate > anything. Sense data ARE the world. I thought we were talking about the philosophies of Carnap and Reichenbach, and I don't believe that either of them subscribed to that kind of metaphysics. Furthermore, I was explicitly talking about theories of perception, which seems to me more relevant to the aufbau than metaphysical ontology, since we know from Carnap's writings that he did not intend the Aufbau to be understood as metaphysics. > That is, given a strict empiricist > methodology on this theory, or one version of it (say Russell in Mysticism > and Logic), there are only sense data. I don't see that even a strict empiricism commits you to that position. Conceivably a strict positivism might, but neither Carnap nor Reichenbach were strict positivists in that sense. > It is the world. That is the theory. > Now I could play devil's advocate and, I think, present a good case for this > view. Feel free. I, and I believe Carnap and Reichenbach would say that there is not, and could not be, a shred of evidence in favour of that theory. > It is, basically, Hume's view as well. I should be interested to have references to substantiate that. Though Hume is an extreme sceptic about our knowledge of an external world, I have not myself seen anything in his writings which amounted to a denial that there is such a world. > There are impressions and > ideas. Impressions can be thought of as sense-data (on one "traditional" > construal of sense data); and ideas are only less vivacious reminders of > those impressions. If you are a strict Humean the closest thing to substance > you will ever get are impressions. Maybe you can't get any closer, but that doesn't mean that material objects don't exist. > "I thought he held that there was a "real world" (that of Platonic forms) > and that we do have opinion of the world of appearances if not > actual knowledge." > > You've misunderstood. It may be my fault. Let me clarify. The sophist, as > opposed to the philosopher who can view the Forms, denies the existence of > images, because he uses images in his craft of persuasion. If he admits to > them, he admits being a deceiver. That is Plato's theory throughout his > entire career. No exceptions. You are surely not telling me that Plato was a sophist!? In any case, I don't see how that bears upon my point, though we have now lost to much context to know what the real issue is here. > "What I recommend is that we simply accept that scientific > theories provide models of aspects of reality" > > But now how do we distinguish "models" and "theories" and "laws"? Typically > "laws" in a collective can be identified with a theory. I'm not keen on > this, but this is a popular view. But then how does a model differ from a > theory? Of course they differ, but on your view how? A theory (which I agree might encompass a collection laws) is a claim about reality which, provided its meaning is clear, will be either true or false. A model is not a claim about reality, and so is not the kind of thing which can be true or false. Having constructed a model, one may then wish to say something about its merits, but in this one can be more refined than a bald assertion of truth or falsity. Thus we might say of Newtonian mechanics, when presented as a model of certain aspects of the behaviour of physical objects, that it has a certain degree of accuracy when applied to certain classes of systems, and we would be able in such a claim to stipulate bounds on the velocities involved. > "Popper, I understand. tried to work out some notion of > "verisimilitude" which is a measure of how close a theory > comes to truth," > > Not sure if this, rightly, characterizes Popper. I haven't done much with his > theory of probability. It wasn't offered as a characterisation. > I think there are problems with it, but I haven't > take a close look. But just one question: How can I know how close to truth > I am if I don't know where the truth is? Is it like hide the thimble, a game > I played in early youth. The thing is hidden and the hidder can tell you > when you are getting close by saying 'hot' or 'you're getting cold'. But the > hidder has to know where it is; so, someone has to know. Elaborate, if you > care to, on how I can know how close a theory comes to truth without knowing > what the truth is. I agree that there are problems with the notion of verisimilitude. Talk of models is an alternative to talk about verisimilitude, and works without our needing to have any wholly satisfactory (or "true") theory. Roger Jones From aune at philos.umass.edu Fri Nov 6 08:05:38 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2009 08:05:38 -0500 Subject: [hist-analytic] Kripke and Contiingently Necessary Truth!? In-Reply-To: <2106037986.4506961257440080460.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <2106037986.4506961257440080460.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <5A2C2C92-2177-4BB4-A50E-4A83B0FDC1CC@philos.umass.edu> I am not sure what to say about Steve?s proposed counter example to Kripke?s identity statement, ?heat = molecular motion.? Kripke?s idea was that if in all circumstances in which we apply the commonsense term ?heat? a certain kind of molecular motion is taking place and vice versa, then we may justifiably assert that heat is that kind of molecular motion. Kripke offered no scientific details, and I doubt that he is committed to the idea that micro-processes in question involve one kind of micro process rather than another?molecules, say, rather than ions. (From what I remember of organic chemistry, it might be true that molecular interactions are always ionic reactions, H2O being, for instance, an aggregate of H3O+ and OH- ions.) But Steve?s example does bring to mind a difficulty with the alleged identities involving common sense and theoretical concepts, a difficulty that has always made me doubt the truth of such identities as water and H2O. The difficulty is that the various substances picked out by ?water? do not have any single micro-analysis. As I expressed the point in chapter 5 of my book: ?No one supposes that a homogeneous substance actually fills all our lakes, ponds, and streams or that the liquids in those different geographical sites are chemically identical. Although we have very good reason to believe that any water we drink, swim in, or sail on consists largely of H2O, our normal means of identifying a sample of water does not depend on this belief or on any other chemical lore. A chemist can tell us what proportion of a given liquid is H2O or what other compounds it contains, but the deci sion to apply the label ?water? to the liquid in the Cuyahoga river (which once caught fire), the Campus Pond at my university (which is often black and murky owing to the presence of thousands of migrating aquatic birds), the Dead Sea (which is heavily saline), or a highly diluted gallon of what was once Chardonnay wine, will not depend on such a person?s deci sion. In fact, if our acid rain began to contain substantial amounts of the chemicals mak ing up the XYZ liquid that fills the rivers and ponds of Putnam?s Twin Earth without any significant effects on its ability to quench the thirst of animals or contribute to the growth of familiar plants, ordinary people would call it ?water? without hesitation and continue to do so if, owing to some extraordinary natural change, it became pure XYZ. These and comparable other facts make it evident, I believe, that a meaningful reference to water does not depend, conceptually or semantically, on any set proportion of actual H2O in the liquid a normal person is thinking of. A person with a smattering of chemistry might, of course, conceive of water as H2O, but this conception would be anomalous in practice, for no water most persons have ever drunk is close to being pure H2O. Good drinking water is heav ily dependent on its mineral content.? Best regards, Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Fri Nov 6 14:59:45 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2009 19:59:45 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Kripke and Contiingently Necessary Truth!? In-Reply-To: <5A2C2C92-2177-4BB4-A50E-4A83B0FDC1CC@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: <1858019250.5034021257537585388.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I don't follow Bruce's description in terms of "common sense." Kripke never discusses this. Here is my take. We identify heat by the sensations it produces?in us. This is a contingent property. There is nothing here about "common sense."? The referent of 'heat' is fixed by this contingent property;?'heat', then, supposedly denotes the same thing in all worlds, viz. "molecular motion." Thus, IF the identity statement is correct, 'heat' denotes molecular motion in all possible worlds. But now it turns out that the contingent property we use to fix the referent is also had by processes not involving molecular motion at all! We are faced with two possibilities. 1. We can admit to being wrong in saying that 'heat is molecular motion'. But then what is it heat has in common with all its instances, if anytyhing? 2. We can attempt to identify all that is captured by the sensation that fixes the referent of 'heat' with something else. But what? (2) is out, since there is no "something else." Changing how we measure temperature is no help. So we are left rejecting (1). If we admit to (1) then we are back to "analyzing" heat, not 'heat'. But now there are serious questions. The heat of the fire IS identifiable with molecular motion; the heat of the plasma is not identifiable with molecular motion. Ergo, in the first instance we have a true identity, but it is not necessary, even though the terms are rigid! This is because 'heat' does not refer to the same thing even in this world. The same contingent property can fix a single term in two ways incompatible with one another. Kripke's theory (or lack of one) concerning microprocesses is not at issue. Not in the least. What is at issue in this instance is the non-necessity of identities where the designators are rigid ex hypothesis. Again, in the case of the fire heat IS molecular motion; in the case of plasma it is not. Therefore, 'heat' is not a rigid designator or not all identities are necessary. Here is the risk for Kripke if this holds water: the notion of a "cluster theory" of reference will be reintroduced by way of disjunction: 'heat is molecular motion or P^1 or P^2 etc.' Now as for the last paragraph of Bruce's message, I think Kripke addresses his particular concerns at pp. 136-138 of NN. I may be wrong, but it looks that way to me, at least. Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: Baynesr at comcast.net Cc: "hist-analytic" Sent: Friday, November 6, 2009 8:05:38 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Kripke and Contiingently Necessary Truth!? I am not sure what to say about Steve?s proposed counter example to Kripke?s identity statement, ?heat = molecular motion.? ? Kripke?s idea was that if in all circumstances in which we apply the commonsense term ?heat? a certain kind of molecular motion is taking place and vice versa, then we may justifiably assert that heat is that kind of molecular motion. ? Kripke offered no scientific details, and I doubt that he is committed to the idea that micro-processes in question involve one kind of micro process rather than another?molecules, say, rather than ions. ? (From what I remember of organic chemistry, it might be true that molecular interactions are always ionic reactions, H 2 O being, for instance, an aggregate of H 3 O + and OH - ions.) But Steve?s example does bring to mind a difficulty with the alleged identities involving common sense and theoretical concepts, a difficulty that has always made me doubt the truth of such identities as water and H 2 O. The difficulty is that the various substances picked out by ?water? do not have any single micro-analysis. As I expressed the point in chapter 5 of my book: ?No one supposes that a homogeneous substance actually fills all our lakes, ponds, and streams or that the liquids in those different geographical sites are chemically identical. Although we have very good reason to believe that any water we drink, swim in, or sail on consists largely of H 2 O, our normal means of identifying a sample of water does not depend on this belief or on any other chemical lore. A chemist can tell us what proportion of a given liquid is H 2 O or what other compounds it contains, but the deci?sion to apply the label ?water? to the liquid in the Cuyahoga river (which once caught fire), the Campus Pond at my university (which is often black and murky owing to the presence of thousands of migrating aquatic birds), the Dead Sea (which is heavily saline), or a highly diluted gallon of what was once Chardonnay wine, will not depend on such a person?s deci?sion. In fact, if our acid rain began to contain substantial amounts of the chemicals mak?ing up the XYZ liquid that fills the rivers and ponds of Putnam?s Twin Earth without any significant effects on its ability to quench the thirst of animals or contribute to the growth of familiar plants, ordinary people would call it ?water? without hesitation and continue to do so if, owing to some extraordinary natural change, it became pure XYZ. These and comparable other facts make it evident, I believe, that a meaningful reference to water does not depend, conceptually or semantically, on any set proportion of actual H 2 O in the liquid a normal person is thinking of. A person with a smattering of chemistry might, of course, conceive of water as H 2 O, but this conception would be anomalous in practice, for no water most persons have ever drunk is close to being pure H 2 O. Good drinking water is heav?ily dependent on its mineral content.? Best regards, Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Sat Nov 7 11:11:27 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sat, 7 Nov 2009 16:11:27 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Question for Bruce on Message-ID: <1621514299.43911257610287268.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Bruce, In responding to your position on the "two color problem" I need to know what you mean by a "determinate color," which is at the heart of your argument. Also, what do you take a color to be. If you mean a qualia or some such that is one thing; if you mean something like "that property which causes an object to be seen as (e.g.) yellow under standard circumstances" that is VERY different. We are talking about one thing being two colors all over. So what is a color on your view. That is essential to where I go from here. Also, the business about determinate? colors. I don't think there are any, but you appear to. What are they? Regards STeve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Sat Nov 7 11:07:04 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sat, 7 Nov 2009 16:07:04 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism In-Reply-To: <695634805.40251257609150683.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <1055206933.43011257610024336.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I'm going to reply to Roger's post piece meal. "I thought we were talking about the philosophies of Carnap and Reichenbach, and I don't believe that either of them subscribed to that kind of metaphysics." You can have a theory where it is believed by the theorizer that there is no reality. One can have an atomic theory without believing atoms are real. The idea goes back as far as the early astronomers who held that the Copernican theory was only a calculational device. So I reject th eidea that a theory must be a theory of "reality" even when it is scientific. I don't think I ever suggested that a model is a claim. You do with a model what you will in order to arrive at novel predictions that will confirm the theory suggesing the model. A theory can be, and has been, regarded as a set of laws. You persist in denying that Carnap's views were, at least at one point, very metaphysical. You need to look at the Aufbau. It is a phenomenalist approach to constructionism. Later he took physical objects as fundamental but during this period he did not. The work is one of ontology, not semantics. That comes after Tarski. Reichenbach would deny being a metaphysician, but so did Kant. What these guys say and what they do are different, sometimes, especially when "metaphysics" is involved. Nor did Carnap abandon his metaphysical approach in the Aubau. Oh, he would say it wasn't metaphysics, but it clearly is; his use of relation; his denial of any difference between objects and events etc. Moreover, Carnap says of the Aufbau: "I still agree with the philosophical orientation which stands behind this book." This was in 1961! The basic elements of his system are "elementary experiences," not physical objects (whatever those are). He is, essentially, a Machian; who of course was a neutral monist and held highly metaphysical views on such things as the unreality of atoms etc. So forget Schillp; look at the text. I'm not saying Carnap was exactly a Machian; indeed he was far more metaphysical than Mach. One might quibble with the word, but forget that approach. Look at the text; look at the Aufbau; it is a great work in reconstructive metaphysics! Regards STeve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbarnett at valdosta.edu Sat Nov 7 13:18:15 2009 From: rbarnett at valdosta.edu (Ron Barnette) Date: Sat, 7 Nov 2009 13:18:15 -0500 Subject: [hist-analytic] Question for Bruce on In-Reply-To: <1621514299.43911257610287268.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <1621514299.43911257610287268.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <753BD679F7474F8FB7E79FF72697E9F1@Library> Hi Steve, I've been following this discussion, and wondered the same things that you asked! Thanks for posting the questions. While not a fan of qualia (as you might have guessed from earlier communication a la Dennett), the question of what is color seems quite apt in the context of clarification on your current discussion. Regards, Ron Barnette _____ From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of Baynesr at comcast.net Sent: Saturday, November 07, 2009 11:11 AM To: hist-analytic Subject: Question for Bruce on Bruce, In responding to your position on the "two color problem" I need to know what you mean by a "determinate color," which is at the heart of your argument. Also, what do you take a color to be. If you mean a qualia or some such that is one thing; if you mean something like "that property which causes an object to be seen as (e.g.) yellow under standard circumstances" that is VERY different. We are talking about one thing being two colors all over. So what is a color on your view. That is essential to where I go from here. Also, the business about determinate colors. I don't think there are any, but you appear to. What are they? Regards STeve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Sat Nov 7 17:08:20 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sat, 7 Nov 2009 22:08:20 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Question for Bruce on In-Reply-To: <753BD679F7474F8FB7E79FF72697E9F1@Library> Message-ID: <497240743.113541257631700084.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Ron, In all fairness to Bruce, he has said this much at least in reply to Roger: '"my definition is, as Roger says, a substantive principle.? But I contend that it is analytically true just the same.? Like the principle DD it amounts to a meaning postulate, something true by virtue of the meaning of "A is a determinate color."? As we (all normal speakers of English) conceive of colors, if a thing has a color in a certain region at a certain time (if it is not invisible there and then, for example), it has just one color there and then." I'm afraid making it a postulate does not suffice to refute the rationalist. A postulate is just that: something we postulate, and even if? we all "conceive" of color this way, this does not address the relevant question of its analyticity. I may may only be able to conceive of a cause that precedes its effect; I may go on to construct a "meaning postulate" which within some constructional system renders the?judgment analytic. But this is an unsatisfactory answer to the question whether it is a? synthetic a priori judgment that one thing?can't have two colors all over. There is no need for such a postulate, unless it is license describing the judgment as analytic. The approach is not altogether unKantian. Kant introduced a set of Categories of the Understanding. These essentially guarantee syntheticity of a priori judgments relating concepts we do not acquire by experience. Some have thought it ad hoc; but it is no more ad hoc, I don't believe, than introducing a meaning postulate and declaring "victory." No, the issue is much richer, I think. We'll see. I'm finishing up some of the logical details of Putnam. At least Bruce has one postulate; Putnam has a flack jacket made up of "postulates" (with a couple more in his back pocket). Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Ron Barnette" To: Baynesr at comcast.net, "hist-analytic" Sent: Saturday, November 7, 2009 1:18:15 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: RE: Question for Bruce on Hi Steve, I?ve been following this discussion, and wondered the same things that you asked! Thanks for posting the questions. While not a fan of qualia (as you might have guessed from earlier communication a la Dennett), the question of what is color seems quite apt in the context of clarification on your current discussion. Regards, Ron Barnette From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of Baynesr at comcast.net Sent: Saturday, November 07, 2009 11:11 AM To: hist-analytic Subject: Question for Bruce on Bruce, In responding to your position on the "two color problem" I need to know what you mean by a "determinate color," which is at the heart of your argument. Also, what do you take a color to be. If you mean a qualia or some such that is one thing; if you mean something like "that property which causes an object to be seen as (e.g.) yellow under standard circumstances" that is VERY different. We are talking about one thing being two colors all over. So what is a color on your view. That is essential to where I go from here. Also, the business about determinate? colors. I don't think there are any, but you appear to. What are they? Regards STeve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Sat Nov 7 17:24:09 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Sat, 7 Nov 2009 17:24:09 -0500 Subject: [hist-analytic] Question for Bruce on In-Reply-To: <497240743.113541257631700084.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <497240743.113541257631700084.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <98FC8435-B1DF-4862-9AFA-62C9C50C9A9B@philos.umass.edu> I think we should put off discussing meaning postulates until we consider my exposition in chapter 3, where I discuss the concept of a meaning postulate. When I discuss the color example in chapter 2, I say that I can't fully justify my claim that the single color claim (if I can call it that) is analytic until I clarify the notion of analytic truth in the chapter to follow. The clarification I offer makes use of Carnap's notion of a meaning postulate, which is not undermined by the critical observations Steve's offers. Bruce From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sat Nov 7 20:25:37 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sat, 7 Nov 2009 20:25:37 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Qualia: A Gricean Account Message-ID: In a message dated 11/7/2009 11:12:36 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, Baynesr at comcast.net writes: what do you take a color to be. If you mean a qualia or some such that is one thing; if you mean something like "that property which causes an object to be seen as (e.g.) yellow under standard circumstances" that is VERY different. ---- That was S. R. Bayne's query to B. Aune, and I'm following the thread with interest. Thanks to S. R. Bayne for his comment on 'hot potatoes'. The issues may relate, and I agree with S. R. Bayne's reply to B. Aune that possibly 'hot' is _not_ a 'common sense' notion (I have discussed elsewhere Putnam's Twater -- fool's water, as the online song goes!). It may do to consider Grice's informants again, since this is Aune, ch. 2, where he uses the 'color' problem only exemplificatorily before immersing onto a discussion of meaning postulates. Chapman then reports how Grice would ask children aged 10 can a thing be red and green all over? --- On the other hand, his case (this above was more along the lines of "Defense of a dogma") in the history of philosophy was for a causal theory of perception that Bayne has summarised neatly, regarding the pillar box seems red the pillar box looks red -- and the 'causal link' that should explain any of the two statements. Notably for Grice it would seem that the first ("seems") statement is _entailed_ by the second ("is") statement, but of course Dalton would object. (Otherwise, it is not clear that uttering (i) is to utter a weaker claim than (ii); Grice notes this). Then there are the types of Rogers Albritton objections that he considers (Grice does) in "Some remarks about the senses" (originally in Butler, Analytic Philosophy). That man looks good-looking That man is good looking There seems to be a regressus ad infinitum in what I once called 'phenomenalist' ("seems") language (versus 'noumenalist' rather than 'physicalist') language: It seems as if it seems as if it seems as if ... seems as if the pillar box is red. Now it was objected to me re: the The potato is hot that things may _look_ or _sound_ hot to people. One boils oils to fry an omelette, smells 'the heat' and 'sees' the boilage. One would hardly need to put the finger in it. I would think animals behave like people in this respect. It would be surreal to watch my cat attempt to 'drink' from the fawcett as it spills boiling water. But it would seem that in these cases what we have is a seem-is paraphernalia ('noumenalistic/phenomenalistic'): If I smell the boiling oil and I see it boil, it would seem that the evidence is directly to the claim that the oil _seems_ hot. I.e. that WERE I TO TOUCH it it would be, indeed, 'hot' to the organ of touch. (I'm being conservative here and following Urmson, "The objects of the five senses", Brit. Ac., that there are only five and five only senses). Now, there seems to be an asymmetry between 'hot' and 'red' (or 'green'). It did always struck me as odd, along the lines put forward by Bayne in his query to Bruce, that the pillar box _is_ red versus the pillar box _seems_ red connotes an 'otiose' distinction. For 'red' is in the _seeing_. Things cannot but _seem_ red. I am thus committed to a 'qualia' account of 'red' -- not a physical one in terms of 'range' in a spectrum. Oddly, Grice considers another odd example with colours. In this case, colours -- changeable as they seem -- of ties. This is in 1967 Logic and Conversation, iii: He is considering the notion (that the does not label explicitly) of 'disimplicature'. If Austin and Witters, he says, ignored implicature, they most obviously ignored disimplicature or were tricked by it. If implicature is the phenomenon by which an utterer means more than he says, a disimplicature is the phenomenon by which a loose utterer drops an entailment that it standardly communicated by what is said: Grice is considering the scenario of a couple trying to decide on what tie to buy to a friend. They know the friend only would like a medium-blue tie (I think is the term he uses). The consider one particular tie, and one utterer 'goes' -- this is not a ValleyGirlism, but a report of a phatic act, alla Austin) The tie seems to be light-blue in this light (rather than medium-blue). The other objects Yes, but it does look as if it might seem dark-blue in this other light (rather than medium blue). Grice wants to say that these two utterances are _too prolix_, if that's the word, and thus a flout to the conversational maxim, avoid prolixity. It's more likely they would go: The tie _is_ light blue under this light. Yep, on the other hand, it is dark blue under this other light. Grice notes words to the effect that in 'circumstances where a change of colour is hardly likely to occur, utterers are entitled to _disimplicate_ like that'. But with this latter comment, he seems to be leaning then for a 'physicalist' rather than a qualia approach to colour. Chapman notes in her excellent exegesis that if Grice meant anything to the history of analytic philosophy, it was a reconsideration of a non-posit ivistic attitude: it was a 'regress' to a way of doing philosophy that WOULD allow qualia that were 'exterminated' by the 'rednecks' (sic! it's Grice's word! in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, "Actions and Events", 1986) of the Vienna Circle. By allowing for a qualia-approach to sensa he is turning English philosophy back to the right tracks of the empiricist tradition of a Locke. But of course problems remain: the seem/is, and the loose uses of language point to the complexity of the issues even for a Gricean, or so it would _seem_ to me. Cheers, J. L. Speranza BU -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Sun Nov 8 07:45:15 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Sun, 8 Nov 2009 07:45:15 -0500 Subject: [hist-analytic] Question for Bruce on In-Reply-To: <1388210576.144541257640943604.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <1388210576.144541257640943604.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <3830ED43-30D3-44E0-8C9D-60C3B54ED94C@philos.umass.edu> Steve recently sent this response to an email in which, having been asked what a determinate color is, I told him to reread my discussion of Tom., Mary, and Harry, who argue about a particular color they see. (That particular color is an example of a determinate color.) Since others have expressed an interest in this matter, I am sending on cite Steve's reponse and my response to that response. Steve's response: I don't see the discussion of Tom, Mary, and Harry as clarifying matters much. One problem is that you were only talking about what color things appear to be, not what colors are. I don't think my puzzlement, nor Barnette's, is uwarranted. Recall, that you say (somewhat sarcastically - nothing personal, purely philosophically) that if a de re "correlate" (?) for 'red' is needed then the best we can expect is, merely, a "fuzzy set," so it's not a crazy question to ask how you get determinateness out of a fuzzy set. Now we are into degrees and ranges, but when I see a red rubber ball there is nothing fuzzy about the color, or so it seems. So on the one hand there is fuzzyness; then there is what color things appear to be according to different people (none of whom, I suppose, need be "right"); and if we had three hands, then, we might get something "specifiable by a quantified formula" etc. No, I think the question of what you mean by a determinate color needs to be stated more definitively. I don't think the suggestion that people aren't reading the book etc. will resolve what is a very reasonable question. My response to Steve: I think you seriously misunderstand my discussion of the May, Tom, and Harry case. So I will go over your comments and relate them to what I actually said in my chapter. 1. You say, "One problem is that you were only talking about what color things appear to be, not what colors are." This is wrong. I did talk about how three different people classified the color (the specific, determinate color) that all three of them saw. But I had noting to say about a mere appearance. 2. You add that I say "(somewhat sarcastically - nothing personal, purely philosophically) that if a de re "correlate" (?) for 'red' is needed then the best we can expect is, merely, a "fuzzy set," so it's not a crazy question to ask how you get determinateness out of a fuzzy set." Fact: I wasn't being sarcastic; I was pointing our that if a de re correlate for the word "red" (the word that applies to an enormous number of different shades of red) were needed, the most we could expect is a fuzzy set. Why fuzzy? Because the shades in question are not sharply delimited. There are a great many clear cases of red shades (vermillion, scarlet, red madder would be instances) but there are also many borderline cases, where the instances, though reddish to some degree, could be classified otherwise--for instance, as reddish orange, which would be a shade of orange--just as an orangish red would be a shade of orange. 3. When you conclude, "so it's not a crazy question to ask how you get determinateness out of a fuzzy set," you get things exactly backwards: We have no need to get determinateness out of a fuzzy set; we have to form a set from the determinate shades that we can encounter in experience. 3. You then say, "Now we are into degrees and ranges,but when I see a red rubber ball there is nothing fuzzy about the color, or so it seems." Of course. The ball you see (assuming it to be homogeneous in color) is, if red, a determinate shade of red. There is nothing fuzzy about a determinate shade. (If you are hung up on the word "determinate," which has a long history in philosophy, use the words "specific shade"). What is fuzzy is the class of specific shades, the class of reds. 4. Finally, you say" "So on the one hand there is fuzzyness; then there is what color things appear to be according to different people." You have the dichotomy wrong here. There is the fuzziness of the class of red shades (or green or yellow shades) and then there are specific shades that are in the class, the specific shades that people see. When I speak of a determinate color, I mean the specific color shades that people can see. 5. Steve's misunderstanding of my discussion may have resulted from an ambiguity that is attached to a world like "red." A red object--that is, an object belonging to the class of red things--may change in color but nevertheless remain red. How is this possible? Because it may change from being scarlet to being vermillion. Things that are scarlet are rightly classified as red and so are things that are vermillion. As I see it, it is entirely possible (conceptually) for an object with a single shade of color to be rightly classifiable (according to some accepted classificatory scheme) as an instance of two different generic colors--for instance, green and yellow. But no thing, I argue, can have more than one specific color-shade (if it is not spotted, for instance). Both Steve and Ron Barnett ask what I take color to be. In one post Steve asked if I take it to be a property of an object that causes a certain kind of color sensation. As it happens, I have considered views on the nature of color as a natural phenomenon (I discussed it at length in my fist book and a couple of years before I retired I gave a graduate seminar on the subject), but I did not try to insert those views into my discussion of the color example in my second and third chapters. Why didn't I? Because I was concerned with an epistemological issue involving an alleged impossibility. That issue involves a naive conception of color. Color is something that once can directly observe (according to the example), and the red and greens thus observable cannot (it is argued) belong to the same object at the same time. I did not argue with the "given" of the issue. I did argue about the way it should be resolved. Saying more about what I personally take color to be will simply take us away from the issue in question. Bruce Aune (countable and uncountable) Any of a range of colours having the longest wavelengths, 670nm, of the visible spectrum; a primary additive colour for transmitted light: the colour obtained by subtracting green and blue from white light using magenta and yellow filters. Best regards, Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Sun Nov 8 09:49:03 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sun, 8 Nov 2009 14:49:03 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Question for Bruce on In-Reply-To: <3830ED43-30D3-44E0-8C9D-60C3B54ED94C@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: <1573620818.223391257691743494.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> ? One reason for dwelling on this is that in connection with the paper Bruce cites Putnam provides a very detailed account of what amounts to being a definitions of definite color. Unlike Bruce, one of his central concerns arises from the realization that color is to be undertood as a continuum. Because of this there are no discrete colors, since in a continuum there is always a color between any two others. So all this business about fuzzy sets we have in Bruce's account is unnecessary. Instead we have a bunch of postulates, but a very good accounting of what a determinate shade is in terms of the relation 'exactly the same color as'. The procedure is familiar, going back to the definition of number in Russell, where we define a number in terms of sameness of correlation etc. But for Bruce there ARE determinate colors and, so, there is presumably no color continuum in Putnam's sense. Can Bruce "get away" with not viewing color as a continuum? Only if he can give a definition of what it is to BE a determinate color! This, despite his protestations regarding my failure to understand, has not been done. We don't say a "determinate" dog can be defined as whatever dog we happen to see. There is no continuum running from beaglehood to snouzerhood, etc. But set this aside. If color is a continuum then in the sense that there is always a color between any two others there are no discrete colors, which is the view I take. You see, once you reject the idea of the continuum then an explicit definition of what such a discrete color is is something quite significant, as Putnam fully understood. I will respond, briefly, to each of Bruce's points. 1. "I did talk about how three different people classified the? color (the specific, determinate color) that all three of them saw.? But I had noting to say about a mere appearance." You repeatedly describe What 'Tom describes' what 'Mary describes' what 'Harry...describes' as "the color." Until you tell me what it is that makes what they describe a distinctive color, then there will be some question of what we are talking about. But couching matters in terms of how people might, rightly or wrongly describe as "the" color obscures more than clarifies what you mean by a "determinate" color. What is a determinate color, so described? Again, reporting on how people report a color doesn't get us down to an answer to the question what IS a determinate color? Do you believe colors exist; can a color be individuated; what is a color; are colors secondary properties? These are the sorts of things people are wondering about when they wonder what a "determinate" color is. So when you say "the specific determinate color" you use a term you have yet to explain. The confusion Tom or Harry may experience in arguing over greenish-blue or bluish-green serves only to illustrate the need to resolve the matter. Their confusion doesn't substitute for an answer or even the beginning of an answer. 2.? "Because the shades in question are not sharply delimited.? There are a great many clear cases of red shades (vermillion, scarlet, red madder would be instances) but there are also many borderline cases," Well, then, it appears there are no determinate colors! And if there were we still would know what they are. You cannot have a determinate color when that color is understood as made up of "fuzzy sets." You are trying to have your "fuzz" and "determinate" colors at once. This strikes me as counterintuitive. What is not counter intuitive is the view I would take: there are no determinate colors! Let's put it this way: how do we distinguish there being no determinate colors from there being "fuzzy" sets of colors, only? This brings us to your next point. 3.? "When you conclude, "so it's not a crazy question to ask how you get determinateness out of a fuzzy set,"? you get things exactly backwards:? We have no need to get determinateness out of a fuzzy set; we have to form a set from the determinate shades that we can encounter in experience." Now if we form a set consisting of determinate shades, then wherein lies the fuzziness? Can we say that a "determinate shade" is that particular shade we encounter whenever we experience an ordinary object? Whether there are fuzzy sets is, on your view it seems, irrelevant to what constitutes a "determinate" shade, since the shades are determinate but it is merely *the sets in which they are included that are fuzzy*? But what we are interested in is what makes the shade a determinate one, regardless of what set it belongs to, fuzzy or not. 3. "The ball you see (assuming it to be homogeneous in color) is, if red, a determinate shade of red." All shades are determinate it would seem. But what do you mean when you say this? What account can you give that makes it true? 4.? "When I speak of a determinate color, I mean the specific color shades that people can see." Now we are stuck with "specific color."? 5. "Steve's misunderstanding of my discussion may have resulted from an ambiguity that is attached to a world like "red."? A red object--that is, an object belonging to the class of red things--may change in color but nevertheless remain red.? How is this possible?? Because it may change from? being scarlet to being vermillion.? Things that are scarlet are rightly classified as red and so are things that are vermillion.? As I see it, it is entirely possible (conceptually) for an object with a single shade of color to be rightly classifiable (according to some accepted classificatory scheme) as an instance of two different generic colors--for instance, green and yellow.? But no thing, I argue, can have more than one specific color-shade (if it is not spotted, for instance)." I agree with most of this. More later, perhaps. Bruce concludes saying (among other things): "...(countable and uncountable) Any of a range of colours having the longest wavelengths, 670nm, of the visible spectrum; a primary additive colour for transmitted light: the colour obtained by subtracting green and blue from white light using magenta and yellow filters..." Once you start talking about color as wavelengths then when you argue that nothing can be two colors "all over" you have to give an account of what "all over" means in this context. Here the issue of surfaces emerges; there are no sufaces to a field, and an object having these spectral properties does not have a surface in any definable topological sense. Color has always been a hot topic in philosophy. Whether they are quale, universals, pariculars, tropes, etc. All these questions figure in the issue we are discussing. We cannot dismiss them with a wave of the hand. I'm cutting off the message I'm replying to; it screws up the archives, I'm told. I'm formulating a "policy" of sorts in deferrence to the archives, which are becoming increasingly popular. Regards STeve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Sun Nov 8 17:26:46 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sun, 8 Nov 2009 22:26:46 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Qualia: A Gricean Account In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <1064517648.319221257719206189.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> J.L You raise good points. I can't respond to all of them; so, let me just lay out a couple of things in a way that does, but may not appear to, cohere with your methodology, here. There is a very interesting point made by Eddington (I don't have the reference right at hand but it was in The Nature of the Physical World. Do your recall the fuss about elliptical pennies and round pennies? If you do, much of what you will recall is related to this distinction between sense data and the objects that are supposedly constructed from them. We look at a penny and what we "actually" apprehend is an ellipse. If someone asks what I see I may say: "I see a round penny." However, some will maintain that this is an inference and that that with which I am immediately acquainted is elliptical. Others will say I'm not aware of any *thing* elliptical; I am merely experiencing elliptically, or some such adverbization. My own bias opinion is that this approach is pretty bad. I am seeing something in some sense of 'see' that is, definitely, elliptical and no linguistic consideration will convince me that I am not cognitively aware of this shape. Now what is interesting is what Eddington says. He suggests that the description of a penny as an ellipse is taken from a perspective, a subjective perspective from a single point, more or less. But the description of the penny as round is not perspectival; it is taken from all perspectives other than where the penny is at, presumably. This is how I recall it but his description is much more brief and maybe not as detailed. The point is that the 'seeming' is in some sense subjective. Now this relates to some of what you say in the following way. The sense of 'seem' which is a "hedge" (like the 'believe' in 'I believe it, but I might be wrong') comes out of this perspectival description; it is what is subjective. Now we ask: What is subjective about color, if anything? But let's not go into that here. However, ask yourself the question: Why don't I say "round all over" whereas I do say "red all over"? Nothing as a whole is partly round, but a whole can be partly red. Can a thing be red "partly" in two senses of 'partly'? That is, if a thing were to be both red and blue all over would it be "partly" red? Saying that something is red and blue all over certainly does not have the feel of "This ball is round all over." But can we exclude both if we were to speak of the conditions for an empirical object in general? I think we can; and by doing so, explain not only linguistic puzzles but rule out things like being two colors at once or two shapes at once or round all over or both square and round all over without adding a postulate for each exclusion. The concept of an object in general is, however, not a set of postulates licensing analytic propositions. Finally, 'hot' is semantically and, maybe, morphologically related to 'heat'. Notice that the comparative 'hotter' and 'colder' cannot be distinguished in terms of temperature. The comparative in the postive degree enters in determining that from 'x is hotter than y' that y is hot, but from 'x is warmer than y' we don't get 'y is warm'. This is subtle difference; i suspect it obtains only in a number of idiolects; it does mine. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: Jlsperanza at aol.com To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Sent: Saturday, November 7, 2009 8:25:37 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Qualia: A Gricean Account In a message dated 11/7/2009 11:12:36 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, Baynesr at comcast.net writes: what do you take a color to be. If you mean a qualia or some such that is one thing; if you mean something like "that property which causes an object to be seen as (e.g.) yellow under standard circumstances" that is VERY different. ---- That was S. R. Bayne's query to B. Aune, and I'm following the thread with interest. Thanks to S. R. Bayne for his comment on 'hot potatoes'. The issues may relate, and I agree with S. R. Bayne's reply to B. Aune that possibly 'hot' is _not_ a 'common sense' notion (I have discussed elsewhere Putnam's Twater -- fool's water, as the online song goes!). It may do to consider Grice's informants again, since this is Aune, ch. 2, where he uses the 'color' problem only exemplificatorily before immersing onto a discussion of meaning postulates. Chapman then reports how Grice would ask children aged 10 ??????????????? can a thing be red and green all over? --- On the other hand, his case (this above was more along the lines of "Defense of a dogma") in the history of philosophy was for a causal theory of perception that Bayne has summarised neatly, regarding ??????? the pillar box seems red ??????? the pillar box looks red -- and the 'causal link' that should explain any of the two statements. Notably for Grice it would seem that the?first ("seems") statement is _entailed_ by the second ("is") statement, but of course Dalton would object. (Otherwise, it is not clear that uttering (i) is to utter a weaker claim than (ii); Grice notes this). Then there are the types of Rogers Albritton objections that he considers (Grice does) in "Some remarks about the senses" (originally in Butler, Analytic Philosophy). ????? That man looks good-looking ??????That man is good looking There seems to be a regressus ad infinitum in what I once called 'phenomenalist' ("seems") language (versus 'noumenalist' rather than 'physicalist') language: ??? It seems as if it seems as if it seems as if ... seems as if the pillar box is red. Now it was objected to me re: the ??? The?potato is hot that things may _look_ or _sound_ hot to people. One boils oils to fry an omelette, smells 'the heat' and 'sees' the boilage. One would hardly need to put the finger in it. I would think animals behave like people in this respect. It would be surreal to watch my cat attempt to 'drink' from the fawcett as it spills boiling water. But it would seem that in these cases what we have is a seem-is paraphernalia ('noumenalistic/phenomenalistic'): If I smell the boiling oil and I see it boil, it would seem that the evidence is directly to the claim that the oil _seems_ hot. I.e. that WERE I TO TOUCH it it would be, indeed, 'hot' to the organ of touch. (I'm being conservative here and following Urmson, "The objects of the five senses", Brit. Ac., that there are only five and five only senses). Now, there seems to be an asymmetry between 'hot' and 'red' (or 'green'). It did always struck me as odd, along the lines put forward by Bayne in his query to Bruce, that ???? the pillar box _is_ red versus ???? the pillar box _seems_ red connotes an 'otiose' distinction. For 'red' is in the _seeing_. Things cannot but _seem_ red. I am thus committed to a 'qualia' account of 'red' -- not a physical one in terms of 'range' in a spectrum. Oddly, Grice considers another odd example with colours. In this case, colours -- changeable as they seem -- of ties. This is in 1967 Logic and Conversation, iii: He is considering the notion (that the does not label explicitly) of 'disimplicature'. If Austin and Witters, he says, ignored implicature, they most obviously ignored disimplicature or were tricked by it. If implicature is the phenomenon by which an utterer means more than he says, a disimplicature is the phenomenon by which a loose utterer drops an entailment that it standardly communicated by what is said: Grice is considering the scenario of a couple trying to decide on what tie to buy to a friend. They know the friend only would like ???????????????? a medium-blue tie (I think is the term he uses). The consider one particular tie, and one utterer 'goes' -- this is not a ValleyGirlism, but a report of a phatic act, alla Austin) ??? The tie seems to be light-blue in this light (rather than medium-blue). The other objects ??? Yes, but it does look as if it might seem dark-blue in this other light (rather than medium blue). Grice wants to say that these two utterances are _too prolix_, if that's the word, and thus a flout to the conversational maxim, ???????? avoid prolixity. It's more likely they would go: ???? The tie _is_ light blue under this light. ???? Yep, on the other hand, it is dark blue under this other light. Grice notes words to the effect that in 'circumstances where a change of colour is hardly likely to occur, utterers are entitled to _disimplicate_ like that'. But with this latter comment, he seems to be leaning then for a 'physicalist' rather than a qualia approach to colour. Chapman notes in her excellent exegesis that if Grice meant anything to the history of analytic philosophy, it was a reconsideration of a non-positivistic attitude: it was a 'regress' to a way of doing philosophy that WOULD allow qualia that were 'exterminated' by the 'rednecks' (sic! it's Grice's word! in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, "Actions and Events", 1986) of the Vienna Circle. By allowing for a qualia-approach to sensa he is turning English philosophy back to the right tracks of the empiricist tradition of a Locke. But of course problems remain: the seem/is, and the loose uses of language point to the complexity of the issues even for a Gricean, or so it would _seem_ to me. Cheers, J. L. Speranza BU -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Mon Nov 9 11:35:53 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 16:35:53 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism In-Reply-To: <1055206933.43011257610024336.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <1055206933.43011257610024336.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <200911091635.56287.rbj@rbjones.com> On Saturday 07 November 2009 16:07:04 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: > You persist in denying that Carnap's views were, at least at one point, > very metaphysical. You need to look at the Aufbau. It is a phenomenalist > approach to constructionism. Later he took physical objects as fundamental > but during this period he did not. The work is one of ontology, not > semantics. That comes after Tarski. Reichenbach would deny being a > metaphysician, but so did Kant. What these guys say and what they do are > different, sometimes, especially when "metaphysics" is involved. If you want to describe the Aufbau as metaphysics feel free, but Carnap had a coherent and stable conception of what metaphysics is, which dates from as early as 1928, and in terms of that conception the Aufbau is not metaphysics. Most crucially, if at the time of the Aufbau you had asked Carnap: "do you deny the existence of anything but phenomena" He would certainly have said "No". The temporal sequence of beliefs which you attribute to Carnap is a fiction. He did not change his mind about what objects were "fundamental" he never expressed an opinion on the matter, except to observe that he could make no sense of that kind of question (or perhaps more dogmatically, to deny that it had any meaning). > So forget Schillp; look at the > text. I'm not saying Carnap was exactly a Machian; indeed he was far > more metaphysical than Mach. One might quibble with the word, but > forget that approach. Look at the text; look at the Aufbau; it is a great > work in reconstructive metaphysics! This is like saying "don't worry about what Carnap means, just see what he says". Its the Quinean approach to ontological commitment, in which regardless of what people say about their metaphysical beliefs they are held to be committed to the existence of an entity if they ever use language in which quantifiers range over that kind of entity. This would make everyone who agrees that there is a prime number larger than 19 into a Platonist, and everyone who engages in discussion about the characters in a work of fiction would on this theory be held to believe it a factual account. Roger Jones From Baynesr at comcast.net Mon Nov 9 14:27:17 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 19:27:17 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Defiending Kant Against Kripke Message-ID: <205924728.626031257794837799.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> In a couple of posts I argued that Kripke has not refuted Kant on the matter of the, alleged, impossibility of the contingent a priori. Essentially, my argument at one point was this: from the truth of an identity statement, even if necessity follows, you can't know that the statement is necessary in virtue of experience, alone, and, so the truth or judgment cannot be necessary a posteriori; and this is because you need more than knowledge that the proposition is true in order to know it is necessary. Since you don't know it is necessary a posteriori, the truth is not a posteriori. Kripke in his closing remarks in NN p. 159 provides further reasons for thinking I'm right on this. Take a look. Kripke addresses my very concern, which I think (of course!) is much to his credit. He says, "Nor can Kant argue that experience can tell us that a mathematical proposition is *true*, but not that it is necessary..." At this point the crucial question is: "Why can't Kant argue this way. Here is Kripke's answer: "...for the peculiar character of mathematical propositions ...is that one knows (a priori) that they cannot be contingently true; a mathematical statement, if true, is necessary." But this is hardly reason to deny to Kant the option of arguing that whereas it may be the "peculiar" character of mathematical propositions" that they be known a priori, that we do know them a priori is precisely why (!) we cannot be said to know them a posteriori! In the very next line Kripke says that this is not a feature peculiar to mathematics; it holds for "all the cases of necessary a posteriori advocated in the text." If this true, then there is a problem, it seems. Suppose, then, that I know that the theory of types is consistent because my teacher told me so - this is Kripke's argument not mine, although I supply the example. Now I have some difficulty accepting this, but let's let it pass. Now the quesion is this: if I have empirical knowledge of the truth of some identity statement, 'p', how do I know that 'Nec(p)' is true? Kant will say I cannot know this by way of experience. Kripke quotes Kant, and he selects, thanks to Stroud, the perfect quotation. It goes: "Experience teaches us that a thing is so, but not that it cannot be otherwise." So DOES experience teach me that 'Nec(p)', which is just another way of saying p could not be otherwise? If Kripke is right, then since it is necessary a posteriori, it should be knowable a posteriori. However, by his own admission there is reason to doubt this. According to Kripke, and he actually says this (p. 159), such necessary identities are known to be necessary because "Philosophical analysis tells us that they cannot be contingently true..." But how can we equate this with knowing a posteriori?! Something has gone wrong, or so it seems. But wait! There's more. Kripke says that IF we accept this reliance on "philosophical analysis" then empirical knowledge of the truth of these propositions is "automatically empirical knowledge that they are necessary." But this is simply incorrect. The use of "automatic" is the tip off. What we have here is an inference to knowledge of the necessity of these truth from "philosophical analysis," NOT experience. Again, the identity may be necessary, and THAT it is necessary may follow from analysis or logic etc. But?it does NOT follow from *experience* as an a posteriori truth. Ergo, Kripke is wrong. That is my argument. It should be noted that Kripke, unlike many of his epigones, is most definitely not doctrinaire. He has advanced these issue to new heights, particularly in the semantics of counterfactuals and the model theoretic treatment of the modalities; but he has not refuted Kant! One other point on Kant. We can't expect most folks, philosophers or otherwise, to be Kant scholars. The table of contents of the First Critique is an education of sorts in its own rights, but if anyone maintains that Kant has been refuted then a few well memorized misunderstood facts about Kant will not suffice. Here's the point. Kant view of the a priori differs from Leibniz's, but he isn't always clear where he moves from earlier to latter views (his) on the matter. Kant realized that his synthetic a priori judgments concerned knowledge of this, our human species. He knew or believed that other minded entities may not share the same set of Categories of the Pure Understanding etc. So in a very real sense, Kant knew all along that there is a contingent a priori, where "a priori" is laden with the notion of the "transcendental," something that supplies a good laugh particularly among those who haven't read Kant very closely, as a rule. So claiming a contingent a priori is no refutation of Kant. Regards STeve Bayne -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Mon Nov 9 16:54:52 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 21:54:52 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Kripke on the A priori and A posteriori Message-ID: <200911092154.55849.rbj@rbjones.com> Since Steve is banging this drum at the moment I thought I would throw in my ha-penneth. There are two fundamental defects in Kripke's conception of the a priori/a posteriori distinction which render it unsatisfactory and cast doubt on the validity of his supposed refutations of predecessors. Of course I am more interested in rebutting the suggestion that Kripke refuted Carnap than Kant, but the problems may be relevant to both. The first is that Kripke takes the ways we come to believe a proposition as crucial to its epistemic status, whereas in my opinion they is quite irrelevant. To get a classification of propositions one must consider not how a belief originates, but what we are prepared to accept as a justification of the claim that the proposition in question is true. Not only should the manner of discovery be disregarded, but even the justification offered by the believer. The only question is what kind of justification would be acceptable for that kind of proposition. The second problem is that in determining whether a justification offered for a proposition is a posteriori or a priori one must carefully separate out matters which relate properly to the justification of the proposition from those which relate to the determination of which proposition is expressed by some sentence under consideration. The connection between a sentence and the proposition it expresses will in general be contingent, and empirical evidence may therefore be necessary to explicate the meaning of the sentence. This should be disregarded in determining the epistemic status of the proposition expressed by the sentence, otherwise all propositions will be a posteriori. This latter issue is of particular importance in Kripke's philosophy because of his views about rigid designation, the effect of which is to make the full meaning of a proposition obscure. I would argue that we do not know fully the meaning of a sentence containing a rigid designator until we know which object it designates, and therefore that any empirical observation needed to establish what objects are so designated should be disregarded when determining the epistemic status of the proposition expressed by a sentence involving the designators. Presumably Kripke would disagree with me on this point about the semantics of rigid designators, but if he does so then his theories become irrelevant to the refutation of Carnap on these matters, since Carnap's conception of semantics is a truth conditional account which entails that the intension of a rigid designator must include its referent. Kripke therefore argues at cross purposes with Carnap and his criticisms miss their mark. Roger Jones From aune at philos.umass.edu Tue Nov 10 07:03:18 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2009 07:03:18 -0500 Subject: [hist-analytic] Fwd: Question for Bruce on References: <1533357706.904481257854184184.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: Begin forwarded message: > From: Baynesr at comcast.net > Date: November 10, 2009 6:56:24 AM EST > To: Bruce Aune > Subject: Re: Question for Bruce on > > Bruce, > > I suspect you forgot to send this to the list. I thought, at first, > it was just a > transmission delay to the Approval site, but apparently you hit > 'Reply' > rather than 'Reply All' or some such thing. So just resend to Hist- > Analytic > and it'll go through. > > Regards > > STeve > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Bruce Aune" > To: Baynesr at comcast.net > Sent: Monday, November 9, 2009 10:19:59 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada > Eastern > Subject: Re: Question for Bruce on > > I think my exchanges with Steve have gone on about as far as they > should, because no matter how carefully I describe my position, > Steve finds a way of misunderstanding what I say. I will say (for > the last time) just a couple of things about his continued failure > to understand, and then point out an instance of what G.E. Moore > would have called a "howler" in his reasoning. But this is my last > post on the subject; our discussion is going nowhere. > First, Steve?s continued misunderstanding: > 1. I said the set of red shades is fuzzy because the set is "not > sharply delimited.? ?There are," I said,? a great many clear > cases of red shades (vermillion, scarlet, red madder would be > instances) but there are also many borderline cases." Steve > responds, "Well, then, it appears there are no determinate colors! > And if there were we still would know what they are. You cannot have > a determinate color when that color is understood as made up of > "fuzzy sets." This contains a bad inference and an almost complete > misunderstanding of what I said. The fact that there are borderline > cases shows that the set of shades is fuzzy; it does not show [here > is the bad inference] that vermillion, scarlet, and red madder do > not exist. They are examples I gave of what I mean by ?determinate > colors.? > > 2. Steve asks," Now if we form a set consisting of determinate > shades, then wherein lies the fuzziness?" My answer: The fuzziness > is the result of the uncertainty of where the borderline cases > belong; they are not definitely in the set; they have a probability > of being in it that is less than 1. (Fuzzy sets have probabilistic > membership conditions.) > > 3. Steve says, "You cannot have a determinate color when that color > is understood as made up of ?fuzzy sets.?? I never said or > implied that a determinate color is made up of fuzzy sets. I said > determinate colors are members of certain fuzzy sets. > > 4. To my remark, made in my preceding post, ?"The ball you see > (assuming it to be homogeneous in color) > is, if red, a determinate shade of red," Steve replied: ?All shades > are determinate it would seem. But what do you mean when you say > this?? My answer: In saying this I was giving an example of the > sort of thing I was referring to when I use the expression ?a > determinate color.? > > 5. Steve is greatly impressed by Putnam?s definition of a > determinate color, which is built on the relational primitive, > ?exactly the same color as.? But how are we to understand this > primitive? What are the terms of the relation it denotes? Aren?t > they determinate colors? They certainly aren?t generic ones. > > I now come to Steve?s howler. He said, ?If color is a continuum > then in the sense that there is always a color between any two > others there are no discrete colors, which is the view I take.? > Isn?t this analogous to saying, ?If the relation SMALLER THAN > holding between real numbers is dense?such that if x < y, there is > a z such that x < z and z < y?then there are no real numbers?? > Steve might reply, ?I said there are no ?discrete colors,? not > no colors at all,? but this response raises the question, ?Just > what are the colors between which there is always another color?? > If these colors aren?t ?definite,? what are they? What is > Steve talking about? > > I think Steve has gone around the bend talking about color being a > continuum. Suppose I go to a paint store and buy a can of Forest > Green paint. I use it to plaint a lawn chair. (I have actually done > this many times.) Isn?t the chair I successfully painted now Forest > Green in color? And isn?t that a definite color? (It is in fact > another example of what I call a determinate color.) Where is the > color that is continuous with the color of this chair? And if you > can find it for me, show me the color that is between the two?and > so on and so on and so on?. What reason is there for believing > that the colors we see belong to a color continuum, a continuum of > visible (seeable) colors? I certainly can?t make infinite > discriminations. My computer monitor is capable of displaying > ?millions of colors,? but not infinitely many of them. Am I > supposed to be capable of discriminating more colors than my > computer can display? > > Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Tue Nov 10 09:43:16 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2009 14:43:16 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Carnap In-Reply-To: <8CBE4F7103476D6-E18-1AD0@WEBMAIL-MA03.sysops.aol.com> Message-ID: <399299.83237.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Yes, I think there are a number of metaphysical views in Carnap. Now much depends on what one takes metaphysics to be, but still, there is a metaphysical presence as reflected in the remarks on the ontology of intensions and properties etc. ? But the point I wish to make here is that some of my negative commentary on Carnap must be tempered. Moreover, I am not adverse to metaphysical conjecture etc. It is part of philosophy, otherwise one is doing something else, usually. ? Allow me a good word. One thing Carnap brought to center stage was methodology. In particular, his method of reconstruction with the help of metaluages set the stage for people like Goodman, etc. But, as I said, most of the philosophy is actually done independently of the constructive moves (constructing languages, that is) But its value is this: Carnap's methodology is one that makes a philosophical position "explicit"; and that is crucial. One finds something much like this in Chomsky, whom I believe owes a debt of gratitude, perhaps, to Goodman, although I hear Goodman was negative on Chomsky, much to my regret, since Goodman is a first class thinker. ? What Chomsky wants to do in constructing a "generative grammar" is make grammar explicit. Generative grammar is a grandchild of logical reconstruction. The problem with Goodman was that his nominalism when expressed in a canonical language became an impediment. His use, along with Quine's, of "syncategoremata" is a case in point. By invoking this one loses structure. Chomsky saw this, in my opinion. There are a number of other instances where becomig dogmatic about the language has an effect. Chomsky generative grammars have frequently been revised without a great effect on his philosophical views on such things as universal grammar. But Carnap's approach while productive may lead to an implicit dogmatism which resides in adherence to constricted views on the nature of the canonical languages pertinent to philosophy. There is no anti-metaphysics in Chomsky, nor metaphysics. This is the methodological asymmetry. ? Still, Carnap towers above most others. He is, quite simply, the most influential philosopher of the last two thirds of the?last century. ? sTeve ? ? --- On Thu, 8/6/09, jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: From: jlsperanza at aol.com Subject: Analytic Philosophy: Oxonian Varieties To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Date: Thursday, August 6, 2009, 5:50 PM In his interesting post on Carnap, R. B. Jones goes autobiographical and writes: "My own first introduction to this [logicist] conception of philosophy was in "Language Truth and Logic" in which Ayer gives his Oxonian interpretation of Logical Positivism." and goes on to quote a vivid passage from Gollancz's vintage of 1946 fresh from his tidily kept notes at http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/history/aaq001.htm#Q002 AYER: "In other words, the propositions of philosophy are not factual, ? but linguistic in character - that is, they do not describe ? the behaviour of physical, or even mental, objects; ? they express definitions, or the formal consequences of definitions. ? Accordingly we may say that philosophy is a department of logic*2. ? For we will see that the characteristic mark of ? a purely logical enquiry, is that it is concerned with ? the formal consequences of our definitions and not with ? questions of empirical fact." Jones comments: "It was to Ayer's advantage as a propagandist that he was not so interested as Carnap was in the technical details. Consequently, he does make the plain statements (...)." Exactly, It should perhaps, but not to nitpick, noted that by 1946 Ayer had stopped being (cfr. beating one's wife) an Oxonian philosopher? (Interesting that his extremist views had been held while an undergrad at Oxon, but did he ever form a school?). Having read his auto-bios I felt that he never perhaps fit in Oxford. He was a Londoner born and bred and teaching at London by the time the Gollancz book was published? (I have to review the dates, and this new mailer I'm using make things all very clumsy to me!) But back to the quote by Ayer. He is saying that propositions of philosophy are 'linguistic'. Seeing that this is a rather clumsy thing to say -- try to express a proposition that is NOT linguistic -- he feels the need to add that they are 'logical'. The issue of 'logical construction' may be what he is having in mind? As when Grice, in 1941, predating Ayer, defines "I" as a logical construction (via Broad) in terms of mnemic states. The issue of 'definition', that Ayer also plays with, would need a Robinson (before you can say Robinson) for Oxford to feel quaintly satisfied with the notion (His classic for the Clarendon Press, Definition -- Robinson a fellow of Oriel). While Grice's "I" may be said to define "I" (in terms of mnemic states), it may be argued that the speech act, as it were, underlying the collective act of collective philosophers is not just DEFINE. The philosophical gamut may cover: commend, show, testify, express, impress, or what have you! (In fact, in our best moments, philosophers just philosophize, which should be viewed, as SOMETHING indeed alla Ayer playing with definitions and logical entailments, where the focus is on the yielding of a conclusion analytically from its premises) Jones is very right later on to distinguish the branches of philosophy. Since Ayer was, after all, Oxonian in essentialist spirit or not, a Lit. Hum. (was he? His tutors must have been overwhelmed, but then Ryle wanted a change), one wonders what conception of philosophy as taught by the Lit. Hum. programme Ayer was rejecting. Indeed psychologia rationalis, ontologia, metaphysica, ontologia specialis, and the rest of it. And THEN there was 'dialectica' or logic. This the Classics considered notably vis a vis ethika. The logika propositions were later schematised by the schoolers (as I prefer to spell the scholars) as 'trivial' (as in trivial) pursuit -- along with Chomsky's grammar -- and this makes for a charming triviality in a dictum by Russell that Grice adored: grammar as a "pretty good guide to logical form". So all this must be resonating in Ayer's mind with a vengeance. Especially in validating the empiricist positions of Hume and Locke: with all the minutiae for impressions, ideas, etc. they were after all just defining terms and playing symbolically with them. I still think that nobody can beat Grice ("Conceptual analysis and the province of philosophy", delivered for, of all audience, the girls at Wellesey), He is so clear as to what analytic philosophy, Oxonian style, did look like -- the fact that he kept files (Chapman tells us), entitled, "Oxford philosophy" suggests that he was feeling the burden of responsibility of a self-appointed annalist of Oxonian analyticity, as it were. (Recall the marketing thing too: he was lecturing mainly the USA as proponent of "Oxonian philosophy" and he had to keep the right tracks). (What charms me about Grice on analysis -- vis a vis eg Hare or Hampshire -- is that he is never one for generalising, and speaks just for hisself (as it were) and the bite that the motivation of one conceptual issue in need for analysis would have for him) Grice mentions Ayer's Language, truth and logic in his Prejudices and predilections (the original title of his life and opinions) and his sentiment seems to be that Ayer had gone too far? (He had, after all, blatanlty crossed the Channel and come back with an attitude after his sojourn at Vienna -- and not precisely humming The Merry Widow). Urmson (Philosophical analysis betweeen the wars) and Warnock (English philosophy since 1900) have expressed similar views on what they felt was the 'crudity' of Ayer's approach (but then you HAVE to be an Oxon don in postwar Oxford to find that quaint book crude!).? As if Ayer's tenets were found too extreme for a philosophy don to digest. True, Ayer concocted his views while still an undergrad at Oxford, not a 'don' proper -- but, back to the Oxonianism of his views, can you claim to be truly Oxonian when you've been appointed Grote prof. of philosophy of mind at London? Can you have your cake and eat it, or hunt with the hounds and run with the hare? (Perhaps Ayer finally gained Oxford status when rebuking the American boxer, "You may be an international boxing star, but I'm the former Wykeham professor of Logic"), The topic of Oxonian analysis fascinates me and P. M. S. Hacker, who succeeded Grice (in a second degree, after Baker) as tutor at St. John's, I'm pleased to learn, has undertaken the description of Oxonian and other varieties of analysis to a nice level of detail that should prove useful to the historiographer of philosophy. It would seem that, you count the members of the playgroup that Grice belonged to, and there are as many varieties of analysis as there were varieties of, say, taste for different blends of tobacco (not infinite, though). Cheers, J. L. Speranza -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Tue Nov 10 09:40:21 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2009 14:40:21 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Question for Bruce on In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <373536976.938951257864021593.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> All of this business about my "howlers" and lack of understanding etc would be?unnecessary if?Bruce would fill?in the following blank as best he can: "Let us use 'discrete color' to refer to ..." My comment on the continuum of colors has to be taken in connection with Bruce's identifying colors in terms of what people claim to?see. If there are always two colors that the seers cannot discriminate then there is no such thing, for them, as discrete colors. Of course, it does not follow, e.g., that the fact that the real number line is continuous that there are no discrete numbers. I would never argue such a thing; but if one were to say that Tom and Mary cannot distinguish two different weights that are close together, given that the metric for weight is continuous then for the observers there are no discrete weights. Similarly, if it is always the case that between any two colors there is a third, and if the discrimination of individuals is limited, then there will be no discrete colors for these individuals, notwithstanding their belief reports. Part of the problem is that Bruce is unclear as to what he means by 'discrete color'. There is another problem, one that explains Putnam's concern without explaining Bruce's seeming indifference. 'Redder' is transitive; if colors are discrete I can't see how this is to be explained. Nor do I see how the irreflexivity of 'redder'can be explained; nor how the asymmetry can be explained. Another problem for Bruce is that he on some occasions appears to argue colors are objects of science; then observation; then something else in contrast to Moore's universals. This creates uncertainty. I think Bruce gets wrong his attempt at making use of fuzzy sets, just as I believe he fails to understand the point of meaning postulates in Carnap's sense. The contrast with Putnam will make this clear, I believe. I'm making this business on the "two color" problem something of a larger "deal" than Bruce's discussion would suggest is warranted, but it serves us well to examine it, because the nature of the a priori is well illustrated by these examples. Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2009 7:03:18 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Fwd: Question for Bruce on Begin forwarded message: From: Baynesr at comcast.net Date: November 10, 2009 6:56:24 AM EST To: Bruce Aune < aune at philos.umass.edu > Subject: Re: Question for Bruce on Bruce, I suspect you forgot to send this to the list. I thought, at first, it was just a transmission delay to the Approval site, but apparently you hit 'Reply' rather than 'Reply All' or some such thing. So just resend to Hist-Analytic and it'll go through. Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" < aune at philos.umass.edu > To: ? Baynesr at comcast.net Sent: Monday, November 9, 2009 10:19:59 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Question for Bruce on I think my exchanges with Steve have gone on about as far as they should, because no matter how carefully I describe my position, Steve finds a way of misunderstanding what I say. ?I will say (for the last time) just a couple of things about his continued failure to understand, and then point out an instance of what G.E. Moore would have called a "howler" in his reasoning. But this is my last post on the subject; our discussion is going nowhere. First, Steve?s continued misunderstanding: 1. ?I said the ? set ?of red shades is fuzzy because the set is "not sharply delimited.???There are," I said,? a great many clear cases of red shades?(vermillion, scarlet, red madder would be instances) but there are also many?borderline cases." ?Steve responds, "Well, then, it appears there are no determinate colors! And if there were?we still would know what they are. You cannot have a determinate color when?that color is understood as made up of "fuzzy sets." ? This contains a bad inference and an almost complete misunderstanding of what I said. ? The fact that there are borderline cases shows that the ? set ?of shades is fuzzy; it does not show [here is the bad inference] that vermillion, scarlet, and red madder do not exist. ?They are examples I gave of what I mean by ?determinate colors.? 2. ?Steve asks,"?Now if we form a set consisting of determinate shades, then wherein lies the?fuzziness?" My answer: The fuzziness is the result of the uncertainty of where the borderline cases belong; they are not definitely in the set; they have a probability of being in it that is less than 1. (Fuzzy sets have probabilistic membership conditions.)? 3. ?Steve says, "You cannot have a determinate color when?that color is understood as made up of ?fuzzy sets.?? ? I never said or implied that a determinate color is made up of fuzzy sets. ? I said determinate colors ? are ? members ? of certain fuzzy sets. 4. ? ? To my remark, made in my preceding post, ?"The ball you see (assuming it to be homogeneous in color) is, if red, a determinate shade of red," Steve replied: ?All shades are determinate it would seem. But what do you mean when you say this?? My answer: ? ? In saying this I was giving an example of the sort of thing I was referring to when I use the expression ?a determinate color.? 5. ? ? Steve is greatly impressed by Putnam?s definition of a determinate color, which is built on the relational primitive, ?exactly the same color as.? ? ? But how are we to understand this primitive? ? ? What are the terms of the relation it denotes? ? ? Aren?t they determinate colors? ? They certainly aren?t generic ones. I now come to Steve?s howler. ? ? He said, ?If color is a continuum then in the sense that there is always a color between any two others there are no discrete colors, which is the view I take.? ? ? Isn?t this analogous to saying, ?If the relation ? SMALLER THAN ? holding between real numbers is dense?such that if x < y, there is a z such that x < z and z < y?then there are no real numbers?? ? ? Steve might reply, ?I said there are no ?discrete colors,? not no colors at all,? but this response raises the question, ?Just what are the colors between which there is always another color?? If these colors aren?t ?definite,? what are they? ? ? What is Steve talking about? I think Steve has gone around the bend talking about color being a continuum. ? ? Suppose I go to a paint store and buy a can of Forest Green paint. I use it to plaint a lawn chair. (I have actually done this many times.) Isn?t the chair I successfully painted now Forest Green in color? ? ? And isn?t that a definite color? (It is in fact another example of what I call a determinate color.) ? ? Where is the color that is continuous with the color of this chair? ? ? And if you can find it for me, show me the color that is between the two?and so on and so on and so on?. ? ? What reason is there for believing that the colors we see belong to a color continuum, a continuum of visible (seeable) colors? ? ? I certainly can?t make infinite discriminations. ? ? My computer monitor is capable of displaying ?millions of colors,? but not infinitely many of them. ? ? Am I supposed to be capable of discriminating more colors than my computer can display? Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Tue Nov 10 09:44:52 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2009 14:44:52 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] CORRECTION: Message-ID: <1329561647.940391257864292219.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I just accidentally sent out a very old post on Carnap I did not intend to send. This was written a long time ago and my views etc may be different. Please disregard. I hope it doesn't make the archives. Regards STeve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Tue Nov 10 10:30:41 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2009 10:30:41 -0500 Subject: [hist-analytic] Question for Bruce on In-Reply-To: <373536976.938951257864021593.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <373536976.938951257864021593.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: As usual, Steve simply ignored what I said in the post to which he just responded. There is no point saying anything more. Bruce From Baynesr at comcast.net Wed Nov 11 07:21:07 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2009 12:21:07 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Kripke on the A priori and A posteriori In-Reply-To: <200911092154.55849.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <1192210738.1343591257942067127.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> There are two things Kripke might say. The first thing he would say is that you are attributing views to him he doesn't hold, and that you need to be more specific as to where he has said what you think he believes, otherwise we fall?into impressionism. But there is another point you make, one that in a somewhat different form was made earlier by Gareth Evans. I'm not sure that they are the same point, but they are in the same spirit. Evans claims - and I think he is right, although I'm not sure of what conclusions we can draw - that Kripke's notion of rigid designation is "relativized" to an individual, whereas on Evans's view it is not; that is, it is tied to a public language. ("Reference and Contingency" in Collected Works, Oxford, 1985. p. 182-83). Now this, I think, is crucial in dealing with some issues, such as the private language controversy, but it doesn't arise in Kripke's book on the private language problem. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Monday, November 9, 2009 4:54:52 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Kripke on the A priori and A posteriori Since Steve is banging this drum at the moment I thought I would throw in my ha-penneth. There are two fundamental defects in Kripke's conception of the a priori/a posteriori distinction which render it unsatisfactory and cast doubt on the validity of his supposed refutations of predecessors. Of course I am more interested in rebutting the suggestion that Kripke refuted Carnap than Kant, but the problems may be relevant to both. The first is that Kripke takes the ways we come to believe a proposition as crucial to its epistemic status, whereas in my opinion they is quite irrelevant. ?To get a classification of propositions one must consider not how a belief originates, but what we are prepared to accept as a justification of the claim that the proposition in question is true. ?Not only should the manner of discovery be disregarded, but even the justification offered by the believer. The only question is what kind of justification would be acceptable for that kind of proposition. The second problem is that in determining whether a justification offered for a proposition is a posteriori or a priori one must carefully separate out matters which relate properly to the justification of the proposition from those which relate to the determination of which proposition is expressed by some sentence under consideration. The connection between a sentence and the proposition it expresses will in general be contingent, and empirical evidence may therefore be necessary to explicate the meaning of the sentence. ?This should be disregarded in determining the epistemic status of the proposition expressed by the sentence, otherwise all propositions will be a posteriori. This latter issue is of particular importance in Kripke's philosophy because of his views about rigid designation, the effect of which is to make the full meaning of a proposition obscure. ? I would argue that we do not know fully the meaning of a sentence containing a rigid designator until we know which object it designates, and therefore that any empirical observation needed to establish what objects are so designated should be disregarded when determining the epistemic status of the proposition expressed by a sentence involving the designators. Presumably Kripke would disagree with me on this point about the semantics of rigid designators, but if he does so then his theories become irrelevant to the refutation of Carnap on these matters, since Carnap's conception of semantics is a truth conditional account which entails that the intension of a rigid designator must include its referent. Kripke therefore argues at cross purposes with Carnap and his criticisms miss their mark. Roger Jones -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Nov 11 08:04:50 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2009 08:04:50 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] In defense of a third dogma Message-ID: In a message dated 11/11/2009 7:22:23 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, Baynesr at comcast.net writes: There are two things Kripke might say. The first thing he would say is that you are attributing views to him he doesn't hold, and that you need to be more specific as to where he has said what you think he believes, otherwise we fall into impressionism. But there is another point you make, one that in a somewhat different form was made earlier by Gareth Evans. I'm not sure that they are the same point, but they are in the same spirit. --- writes S. Bayne in reply to R. Jones on Kripke on the a posteriori/a priori. Reading Jones's original post, I was reminded of a few things. Of Lord Quinton, whom Strawson thought valuable enough to include his "A priori" in Philosophical Logic. Of Grandy being called 'mischivious' by Grice as he (Grandy) described him (Grice) as ready to be counted to "rally to the defense of the underdogma". Hence the title of this post. Quine, as every philosophical school-boy knows (I use the idiom, as qualified, to apply to any field of expertise), considered Empiricism to be 'damped' if that's the word, by two odious dogmas: the analytic-synthetic, and the 'base knowledge'. The first is actually a dogma of rationalism (alla Kant) but Quine couldn't care less about rationalism. Grice came to the defense of it, and he could have come to the defense of it as a dogma of RATIONALISM (for he always felt to be more of a rationalist -- conservative irreverrent, he adds in "Prejudices and Predilections" -- than an empiricist of the boring (to him) British expectable tradition). Yet, one does NOT see in the literature (as one sees Quinton) a lot of arguing for or against the a priori-a posteriori, thus I found Jones's comments refreshing. For surely the original 'distinction' must have been, as Jones notes, in terms of 'proof'. Now Jones considers Kripke is wrong in taking the a priori/a posteriori distinction for granted. And here, to defend the underdogma, I will. One day I met Habermas in Buenos Aires, and I told him, "What you do is Grice, but in German". He wasn't impressed, but I was myself nicely impressed when I found out that my own paper (called "German Grice: Reading Habermas Reading Grice") he (Habermas) cared to include in his "Pragmatics of Communication" (MIT -- reference list). For Habermas there is a 'warranty claim' as it were. Talk of warranty claims can go over the top. As D. Frederick taught me, a lot of these Dummettian emphasis on warranty claims (assertability claims) makes you feel that you are talking about your right to use a public toilet! But that need _not_ be so. It is true, as Jones notes, that there is no 'semantic' link between a claim "p" and its 'warranted assertability' conditions. To start with 'assertability' has to be generalised to cover utterances of a force OTHER than assertoric (e.g., "Prohibit gay marriage!") But when it comes to the _conversational_ locus of a claim, the 'link', though not semantic (and pragmatic in nature) comes to the core: A says "p" B understands that. He understands that by uttering "p", A means that p. But he needs to _contribute_ further to the conversation. And thus he can do various things. One is to provide further evidence for "p" ("Right you are, further there's "q" which is just as a posteriori -- or a priori as the case may be) as "p""). Or he may wax sceptical and provide counter-evidence, "q". "Yes, but "q" -- and "q" seems to refute your claim that "p". ---- A second consideration seems to be Mill. I loved the cheek, moxie, panache and debonair of a man taking empiricism to its limits. For mathematical truths, which -- well, not Kant, as he was misguided on that front, as he brooded over 7 + 5 = 12 which he thought 'synthetic' -- for every or almost every other defender of the a priori-a posteriori distinction comes out as 'a priori' were 'a posteriori'! People did NOT laugh at Mill. They did laugh at Kant, but Mill, and his System of Logic was still revered in Oxford at one time just before Ayer convinced every empiricist worth his name that mathematical truths, like logical truths, are a priori -- and mere 'regulations' of the 'logical syntax of the world'. --- So, Kripke is to be revered for having allowed us to play with combos beyond Kant. And the a priori/a posteriori distinction is a good one to re-evaluate along his lights and other. Could it be that 'a priori' and 'a posteriori' have a meaning OTHER than 'proof'. Well, what every schoolboy does NOT know is that SOME schoolboys take the 'a priori' and the 'a posteriori' in terms of "TEMPORALITY", actual temporality. After all, 'prior' IS a temporal qualifier, ednit? "Prior to the meeting, Jones had a sandwich". Surely it would be otiose that we are talking about proof theory here. Ditto, 'a posteriori' would be 'after the fact', temporally qualified. This poses the question that 'mathematical truths', as they stand, have little to do with time, and fall under that charming label Grice re-stated in the philosophical lexicon, "timeless" -- i.e. eternal. But the 'less' in timeless is not the 'aeternum', for it just doesn't hold water (or make sense) to say that 7 + 5 = 12 is 'eternal'. The thing just DOESN'T have anything to do, to echo Kripke, chronologis. I.e. we do not NEED to postulate a t1 and a t2 (such as t1 smaller than t2, where t stands for time) such that (t) (7 + 5 = 12). The algebraic formula holds truth 'for all times'. We may just as well say that "hope springs eternal" (Speranza resurge eterna). Good rhetoric, but empty. In his "Defense of a dogma" Grice (and yes, Strawson) held TWO criteria to keep the dogma as valid: --- the 'intelligibility' claim (analytically false claims are unintell igible) --- the 'non-credence' claim (synthetically false claims are beyond belief). (two sides of the same criterion, really). Could something along those lines be held for the a priori-a posteriori. Well, Grice in retrospect in his "Valedictory Essay" (in WoW, Epilogue) came to see his defense as yet another Urmsonian PCA strategy. And so, if I would like to defend the a priori-a posteriori, I too would like to be seen doing so along Urmsonian lines. Therefore we need to find a crystal-clear case of paradigmatic distinction, where ALL that is RELEVANTLY said about a claim, "p" is its method of proof. Perhaps that's back to the Vienna Circle adored by Jones and revered at a time by Grice, 'the meaning of a proposition is its method of verification'. We tend to overlook it, and go straight to the _content_ of what we say because, well, we are logicians at heart and into logical form. But wait to get your Aunt Matilda utter an incredibly extraneous judgement. You get to know what SHE *means*, but you are not satisfied. It's not the topic that slightly embarrass you, and you don't want, alla Quine, to 'change' it. It's her PROOFS to utter such aunty remark. So, in teleological justification, I would say that creatures such as human exchange bits of information and pieces of advice that they mutually understand. But come to the grits, they should be held responsible to supply, on (rational) demand, ALL the justificatory steps towards such claims. And don't mention 'rigid' to my Aunt Matilda -- she finds it a rude lexeme out of her 'repertoire'! Cheers, JL Speranza -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Wed Nov 11 09:45:50 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2009 14:45:50 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Kripke on the A priori and A posteriori In-Reply-To: <1192210738.1343591257942067127.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <1192210738.1343591257942067127.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <200911111445.50695.rbj@rbjones.com> On Wednesday 11 November 2009 12:21:07 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: > There are two things Kripke might say. The first thing he would say is that > you are attributing views to him he doesn't hold, and that you need to be > more specific as to where he has said what you think he believes, otherwise > we fall into impressionism. I hope it he did say that he would also be specific about which attribution he was contesting. and I hope I may be excused in this context from supplying details until challenged, specifically! I have read very little of Kripke and have no intention of reading any more than necessary, so I posted on this topic risking criticism on my understanding of Kripke (aiming primarily to defend Carnap against the possibility that Kripke might have refuted him). > Evans claims - and I think he is right, although I'm not sure of what > conclusions > we can draw - that Kripke's notion of rigid designation is "relativized" to > an > individual, whereas on Evans's view it is not; that is, it is tied to a > public language. I can't see how that bears upon the arguments i presented. I might add, that my arguments against Kripke are independent of whether there are rigid designators, and even of what expressions are rigid designators. Roger Jones From Baynesr at comcast.net Wed Nov 11 11:00:52 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2009 16:00:52 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Kripke on the A priori and A posteriori In-Reply-To: <200911111445.50695.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <212202998.1409161257955252421.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Ah, C'mon Roger! Read Kripke before critizing him. He's really a hell of a lot more fun than most of those other guys, even Carnap; and he has some really very compelling views. If you detach the association I made in my last posting with Evans, then I think most all of your criticisms are not criticisms of Kripke at all. They are far more general. But that "cool" with me, just so long as I can figure out from where you begin to where you are going. Not so sure. For example, what do you take a proposition to be? There is a lot of disgreement here. What you've said may apply to only a couple versions etc. Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Wednesday, November 11, 2009 9:45:50 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Kripke on the A priori and A posteriori On Wednesday 11 November 2009 12:21:07 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: > There are two things Kripke might say. The first thing he would say is that > you are attributing views to him he doesn't hold, and that you need to be > more specific as to where he has said what you think he believes, otherwise > we fall into impressionism. I hope it he did say that he would also be specific about which attribution he was contesting. and I hope I may be excused in this context from supplying details until challenged, specifically! I have read very little of Kripke and have no intention of reading any more than necessary, so I posted on this topic risking criticism on my understanding of Kripke (aiming primarily to defend Carnap against the possibility that Kripke might have refuted him). > Evans claims - and I think he is right, although I'm not sure of what > conclusions > we can draw - that Kripke's notion of rigid designation is "relativized" to > an > individual, whereas on Evans's view it is not; that is, it is tied to a > public language. I can't see how that bears upon the arguments i presented. I might add, that my arguments against Kripke are independent of whether there are rigid designators, and even of what expressions are rigid designators. Roger Jones -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Thu Nov 12 07:25:42 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2009 12:25:42 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] In Defense of a Third Dogma Message-ID: <1550270939.1760871258028742690.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> There is a very good exchange between Rawls and Habermas. Rawl's lengthy reply is very instructive. Habermas has a good grasp of the big picture; a little less understanding of the details; still, he is very good at what he does, or did (?). I won't comment just now on much of what you said since it concerns "Two Dogmas" and we will no doubt get to that as we continue; once, that is, I get past this business of two colors. I'm dwelling on it a bit because it brings together different ways of doing philosophy in viewing a single problem. Often these problems are "theory internal." These are usually problems that in the big picture require a high aptitude but seldom result in significant insights with respect to the larger problems of "general philosophy." One example might be free logics. I might be taking a closer look at this, but diddling with free logics, to me, is like fiddling while Rome burns. Nevertheless, if I had a hundred years more to live, I'd probably play around with this. It's interesting and related to that meter stick in Paris stuff, as I'll note in a future post. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: Jlsperanza at aol.com To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Sent: Wednesday, November 11, 2009 8:04:50 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: In defense of a third dogma ..snip... One day I met Habermas in Buenos Aires, and I told him, "What you do is Grice, but in German". He wasn't impressed, but I was myself nicely impressed when I found out that my own paper (called "German Grice: Reading Habermas Reading Grice") he (Habermas) cared to include in his "Pragmatics of Communication" (MIT -- reference list). For Habermas there is a 'warranty claim' as it were. Talk of warranty claims can go over the top. As D. Frederick taught me, a lot of these Dummettian emphasis on warranty claims (assertability claims) makes you feel that you are talking about your right to use a public toilet! But that need _not_ be so. It is true, as Jones notes, that there is no 'semantic' link between a claim ? ...snip... 'rigid' to my Aunt Matilda -- she finds it a rude lexeme out of her 'repertoire'! Cheers, JL Speranza -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Thu Nov 12 10:43:52 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2009 15:43:52 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] In defense of a third dogma In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <200911121543.52603.rbj@rbjones.com> On Wednesday 11 November 2009 13:04:50 Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: > Quine, as every philosophical school-boy knows (I use the idiom, as > qualified, to apply to any field of expertise), considered Empiricism to be > 'damped' if that's the word, by two odious dogmas: the analytic-synthetic, > and the 'base knowledge'. I'm not convinced he did (consider it, assuming that to entail belief), but he did say something like that. > The first is actually a dogma of rationalism > (alla Kant) but Quine couldn't care less about rationalism. I don't think either side can claim ownership, it is after all, Hume's fork. > Yet, one does NOT see in the literature (as one sees Quinton) a lot of > arguing for or against the a priori-a posteriori, thus I found Jones's > comments refreshing. Though I wasn't actually doing that! I too take the distinction for granted, though I expect some better explication than Kripke's intuitions. > For surely the original 'distinction' must have been, as Jones notes, in > terms of 'proof'. Well, "justification". An empiricist has to settle for less that proof most of the time. > Now Jones considers Kripke is wrong in taking the a > priori/a posteriori distinction for granted. I think his arguments disputing the coincidence of necessity and a priority are fallacious. > For Habermas there is a 'warranty claim' as it were. Talk of warranty > claims can go over the top. As D. Frederick taught me, a lot of these > Dummettian emphasis on warranty claims (assertability claims) makes you > feel that you are talking about your right to use a public toilet! Danny insists that justification must mean something other than I mean by it, in fact it is for him I believe, a "vacuous concept" (which would be sufficient reason in my book to use the word for something else) so its hard to include him in a conversation in which the word justification plays a significant role. However, so far as my arguments go. its not important what a justification is, it suffices that we have an idea of what a priori and a posteriori mean as properties of justifications. > So, Kripke is to be revered for having allowed us to play with combos > beyond Kant. And the a priori/a posteriori distinction is a good one to > re-evaluate along his lights and other. I'm afraid I can't follow you there. I wouldn't mind if Kripke were explicitly exploring alternative meanings for these concepts. We could then judge the alternatives on their merits. But his intuitive method allows him simply to trash the preceding conceptual schemes without offering a well considered replacement, and lacks any legitimacy. > Could it be that 'a priori' and 'a posteriori' have a meaning OTHER than > 'proof'. Well, what every schoolboy does NOT know is that SOME schoolboys > take the 'a priori' and the 'a posteriori' in terms of "TEMPORALITY", > actual temporality. A posteriori definitely excludes logical proof, and the discussions of the relations between analytic/necessary/a priori need not get into the matter, for the distinction between a priori and a posteriori can be stated in terms of whether the justification makes material use of contingent propositions (or sensory input) without any need to consider the detail of what justifications might suffice (which question might be answered in lots of different ways according to context, and in very few contexts is proof expected). > After all, 'prior' IS a temporal qualifier, ednit? "Prior to the meeting, > Jones had a sandwich". Surely it would be otiose that we are talking about > proof theory here. Ditto, 'a posteriori' would be 'after the fact', > temporally qualified. I don't think time really has a place here. Prior in some ordering, not necessarily temporal, and in this case prior to admitting empirical evidence or contingent premises. > Could something along those lines be held for the a priori-a posteriori. > Well, Grice in retrospect in his "Valedictory Essay" (in WoW, Epilogue) > came to see his defense as yet another Urmsonian PCA strategy. And so, if > I would like to defend the a priori-a posteriori, I too would like to be > seen doing so along Urmsonian lines. What's a PCA strategy? > Therefore we need to find a crystal-clear case of paradigmatic distinction, > where ALL that is RELEVANTLY said about a claim, "p" is its method of > proof. Perhaps that's back to the Vienna Circle adored by Jones and > revered at a time by Grice, 'the meaning of a proposition is its method of > verification'. That's not a bit that I swallowed (and I'm not the adoring kind). RBJ From rbj at rbjones.com Fri Nov 13 17:11:20 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2009 22:11:20 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Kripke on the A priori and A posteriori In-Reply-To: <212202998.1409161257955252421.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <212202998.1409161257955252421.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <200911132211.20331.rbj@rbjones.com> On Wednesday 11 November 2009 16:00:52 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: > ... what do you take a proposition to be? I use proposition to mean the meaning of a sentence in some language given sufficient context to disambiguate the sentence. It doesn't matter for my arguments exactly what a proposition is and I allow that to be language specific, but it is essential for the concept of analyticity as defined by carnap that propositions fully encompass all that is determinate about the truth conditions of the sentence in the relevant context. This includes the domain of the truth conditions, i.e. the relevant notion of possible world (which also I allow to be language specific for present purposes). Roger From Baynesr at comcast.net Sat Nov 14 09:22:32 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sat, 14 Nov 2009 14:22:32 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Kripke on the A priori and A posteriori In-Reply-To: <200911132211.20331.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <891500012.2530301258208552726.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I'm still immersed in colors and Kripke, so I can offer only a very modest response to your suggestion. The relevant link to consider, if this is your take on propositions, is that between worlds and propositions. One widely considered view is that a proposition is a sort of mapping from worlds to truth values. This is a good suggestion as long as we're doing algebra. But how do we approach the question: "What is the relation between an actual thought and the proposition which supplies the content of a thought?" Propositions don't occur in time, but thoughts do. What, then, is the relation of this algebraic device to the actual thoughts of a given individual? It has become fashionable to reject such questions a "merely" psychological, but this is not a good answer. It is a bad way of dodging the real philosophy. To be sure there is a role for abstract (timeless) entities in semantics, but the place of semantics in understanding the nature of the mind is, I think, more fundamental than semantics, philosophically speaking. In a world without minds, there is no language (beyond "System S" - that sort of thing); in a world without language no propositions. Then there is a problem with the relation of facts and propositions. Are we going to embrace propositions but reject facts?! I find that a dubious proposal, but it may not be part of your proposal. It is a popular view, unfortunately. We'll get to analyticity and, therefore, the nature of necessity and propositions. One big problem is going to be domonstratives. But this is the first link between minds, contexts, and propositions addressing the issues I would raise. By the way, I just got software called "Coffee Cup." I'm finally beginning to upgrade the hist-analytic website. So far this is the onl software of its kind I've been able to understand with little effort. When people bring in context after a hearty breakfast of what is more or less set theory, I begin to wonder if maybe something has gone wrong. A bunch of subscripts ala Montague is no substitute for an analysis of context. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Friday, November 13, 2009 5:11:20 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Kripke on the A priori and A posteriori On Wednesday 11 November 2009 16:00:52 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: > ... what do you take a proposition to be? I use proposition to mean the meaning of a sentence in some language given sufficient context to disambiguate the sentence. It doesn't matter for my arguments exactly what a proposition is and I allow that to be language specific, but it is essential for the concept of analyticity as defined by carnap that propositions fully encompass all that is determinate about the truth conditions of the sentence in the relevant context. ?This includes the domain of the truth conditions, i.e. the relevant notion of possible world (which also I allow to be language specific for present purposes). Roger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Sun Nov 15 12:52:29 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sun, 15 Nov 2009 17:52:29 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Kripke on the A priori and A posteriori In-Reply-To: <891500012.2530301258208552726.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <422116673.2780691258307549846.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> It occurred to me that my response to Roger was "ideological," involving the integration of issues of "general philosophy" into the discussion of propositions and content. This isn't, really, so bad but it fails to address Roger's immediate concerns. Since I did something similar in response to Danny vis a vis Davidson, allow me the small correction in order. First, the matter of "context" is a mess; it gets tied up with the notion of content; then there is the problem of what to include in context. For example, the semantical properties of a sentence are well known to be affected by being embedded in various operators, e.g. modal operators. So if you think of content epistemically you find yourself asking questions like: "Do we index truth to a world, and is the world index , part of context?" And what about the idea of epistemological equivalence in respect of "content" and this in respect to "context." All this needs to be thrashed out. Sometimes embeddings in modal context do not affect semantics, for example where the issue is over identities where "=" is flanked by rigid designators. I'm inclined to argue, along with others, that particularly in the case of identities of this sort the modality can be treated de dicto , but this affects how we view "content." This ties in with the issue Danny raised on Davidson, or so I seem to recall. My objection to Davidsonian semantics is mainly that it presupposes compositionality . Jerry Katz in one of the two volumes in a collection of essays on Davidson makes this point in detail. But I don't think natural language can be compositional, and where canonical languages have their semantics stipulated, while this may be implied, it guarantees minimal sufficiency in dealing with the semantics of natural language. In a related respect, when we embed propositions etc. in modal operations, there may be semantic "changes" that accrue to this embedding. In my own criticisms of Katz this was shown to be the case in regard to verb/preposition interaction. Similarly, something like this may be going on with respect to the "interaction" of matters of modality and embedding. I'm beginning to regain an understanding of some of this stuff, which I am moving on. Still I'm going to be presenting something on the "two color problem." In fact, I'm going to show that not only is the proposition 'Nothing can be two colors all over at the same time' is, probably, false; or, can be viewed as false, depending on the premises etc. you take in taking a "constructivist" approach to the problem. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: Baynesr @comcast.net To: hist-analytic@ simplelists .com Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2009 9:22:32 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Kripke on the A priori and A posteriori I'm still immersed in colors and Kripke , so I can offer only a very modest response to your suggestion. The relevant link to consider, if this is your take on propositions, is that between worlds and propositions. One widely considered view is that a proposition is a sort of mapping from worlds to truth values. This is a good suggestion as long as we're doing algebra. But how do we approach the question: "What is the relation between an actual thought and the proposition which supplies the content of a thought?" Propositions don't occur in time, but thoughts do. What, then, is the relation of this algebraic device to the actual thoughts of a given individual? It has become fashionable to reject such questions a "merely" psychological, but this is not a good answer. It is a bad way of dodging the real philosophy. To be sure there is a role for abstract (timeless) entities in semantics, but the place of semantics in understanding the nature of the mind is, I think, more fundamental than semantics, philosophically speaking. In a world without minds, there is no language (beyond "System S" - that sort of thing); in a world without language no propositions. Then there is a problem with the relation of facts and propositions. Are we going to embrace propositions but reject facts?! I find that a dubious proposal, but it may not be part of your proposal. It is a popular view, unfortunately. We'll get to analyticity and, therefore, the nature of necessity and propositions. One big problem is going to be domonstratives . But this is the first link between minds, contexts, and propositions addressing the issues I would raise. By the way, I just got software called "Coffee Cup." I'm finally beginning to upgrade the hist-analytic website. So far this is the onl software of its kind I've been able to understand with little effort. When people bring in context after a hearty breakfast of what is more or less set theory, I begin to wonder if maybe something has gone wrong. A bunch of subscripts ala Montague is no substitute for an analysis of context. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" < rbj @ rbjones .com> To: hist-analytic@ simplelists .com Sent: Friday, November 13, 2009 5:11:20 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Kripke on the A priori and A posteriori On Wednesday 11 November 2009 16:00:52 Baynesr @comcast.net wrote: > ... what do you take a proposition to be? I use proposition to mean the meaning of a sentence in some language given sufficient context to disambiguate the sentence. It doesn't matter for my arguments exactly what a proposition is and I allow that to be language specific, but it is essential for the concept of analyticity as defined by carnap that propositions fully encompass all that is determinate about the truth conditions of the sentence in the relevant context. ?This includes the domain of the truth conditions, i.e. the relevant notion of possible world (which also I allow to be language specific for present purposes). Roger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Nov 16 19:24:04 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2009 19:24:04 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Out of Context Message-ID: "Context" in analytic philosophy Perhaps this should be called 'out of context' (as in title of Balderston's book on Borges) R. B. Jones and S. R. Bayne are engaged in a discussion on the nature of 'proposition'. Jones threw in 'context', and Bayne, colloquially, replied that context is a 'mess'. This is good! It reminded me of some extravagant note on 'context' that S. R. Chapman unburied from those 13 cardboard boxes at the UC/Berkeley (the Grice Papers). (It may relate, I hope, to Bayne's interesting mention of the Montagovian conception of context as 'indexing'. And cfr. Grice on 'presupposition' and conversational implicature, WoW, on 'contextualising' of things like 'the' king of France is bald). Grice wrote more general about context in what I want to believe was a general polemic with people like J. L. Austin and linguists like Firth or Gardiner, or Entwistle. "Philosophers," Grice writes, "often say that context is VERY IMPORTANT." (I like that -- He is being amused by a state of affairs that would have Bayne saying that it is a 'mess', rather!) Grice continues: "Let us take this remark seriously." [i.e. that context is very important.] "Surely, if we do, we shall want to consider this remark not merely in its relation to this or that problem, i.e. in context, but also in itself, i.e. _out of context_." Waggish Grice at his best. "If we are to take THIS seriously, we must be systematic, that is thorough and orderly." --- This is a 'lecture' by Grice, hence the slightly patronising tone, jocular mode, by Grice -- hey, you cannot patronise an _Oxford_ student! "If we are to be orderly we must start with what is relatively SIMPLE." "_Here_, though not of course everywhere, to be simple is to be as ABSTRACT as possibly; by this I mean merely that we want, to begin with, to have as few cards on the table as we can." -- I thought it was only a limited amount in poker. Or is the metaphor with _bridge_ -- that he championed? "Orderliness will then consist in seeing first what we can do with the cards we have; and when we think that we have exhausted this investigation, we put another card on the table, and see what that enables us to do." (Grice, "The general theory of context', a lecture, The Grice Papers, cited by Chapman, p. 97). Grice goes on, Chapman notes, to argue that "thinking seriously about context" -- these are Chapman's words -- "means thinking about conversation." --- The metaphor is then that of a 'hand'. As Chapman notes, "[Grice's] method of limiting HIS HAND was to result in certain highly artificial simplifications, but he made these simplifications deliberately and knowingly. For instance, the RELEVANT CONTEXT was to be assumed to be limited to what he called the 'LINGUISTIC ENVIRONMENT': to the content of the conversation itself. Not too illuminating. But perhaps the indexing would play a role in his later lecture then, "Presupposition and Conversational Implicature". I found his comments on the table -- vis a vis -- the king of France charming. Grice writes of a phi operator that SHOULD appeal to Jones. All very familiar stuff, but interesting I find, in setting the job of indexing with some care. Grice writes: Grice's example (adapted): the book on the table ... is rather boring. "As there are, obviously, MANY BOOKS on TABLES in the world, if we [were] to treat such a 'sentence' [or proposition, to echo Jones. JLS] as being of the form, The F is G and as being, on that account, ripe for Russellian expansion, we might do WELL to treat it as exemplifying the MORE SPECIFIC form The F which is phi is G where "phi" represents _an epithet to be identified in a particular context of utterance_." [When one hears lecturers lecturing on Jason Stanley's new contextualism -- e.g. Keith DeRose -- as if he (Jason) had invented the thing!, one wants them all to remind them of this charming epithet mentioned by Grice way back in 1970!] Grice continues: ""phi" being a sort of QUASI-DEMONSTRATIVE" -- in perhaps a courtesy to Kaplan! "Standardly," Grice goes on, "to identify the REFERENCE of 'phi' for a particular utterance of the book on the table is ... very boring a [addresee] would proceed via the identification of a _particular_ book as being a good _candidate_ for being the book _meant_, and would identify the reference of "phi" by FINDING in the candidate a feature, for example, that of 'being in this room' which could be used to yield a COMPOSITE epithet book-on-the-table-IN-THIS-ROOM which would, in turn, fill the bill of being an epithet which the [utterer] had in mind as being UNIQUELY satisfied by the book selected as a candidate. If the [addresee] FAILS to find a suitable reference for "phi" in relation to the selected candidate, then he would, normally, seek another candidate." ---- Grice goes on to mention how we arrive at the _contextual_ expansion of 'the book on the table' then as uniquely referring to a particular book. Some corollary on the alleged polysemy of 'certain'. Grice writes: "So, determining the reference of "phi" would standardly involve determining what feature the [utterer] MIGHT have in mind as being UNIQUELY instantiated y an ACTUAL OBJECT, and this in turn would standardly involve satisfying oneself that some PARTICULAR FEATURE atually is uniquely satisfied by a PARTICULAR actual object -- e.g. a particular book --. So, utterances both of 'the book on the table ... is [boring]' ... would imply (in one way or another) the existence of a PARTICULAR book on a table." My, some orderliness! But what about indefinite reference? Of course I'm not posing this as a problem for Grice, for he would lecture me on 'phi's in indefinite cases of references. I am amused by the alleged polysemy of 'certain'. Ayer, who never really understood the nature of 'knowledge', played with 'certain' (certainty) -- Witters too, an in book form too! I am certain that p. But what about "A certain book on the table ... is boring." It strikes me I'm not sure if to derive the meaning of 'certain' (as used by Ayer) from 'certain' adj. or vice versa. I suppose the Romans ('certanus'?) were never so uncertain! What irritates me (slightly -- along the bad weather) about 'context' is what I call the intrusive 'n'. Shouldn't it be just plain 'co-text'. Or is the idea that there is "Text" and things which are "cum" (i.e. _with_ text). Grice plays very seriously with 'context' in the ending remarks of ''Meaning". Surely he KNEW that a general theory of context need NOT be just the LINGUISTIC (or verbal) environment! In a way that parallels his looking for 'analogues' to the four conversational categories (informativeness, trustworthiness, relevance, and perspicuity) in non-conversational instances (WoW, ii), he plays with the 'analogue' of 'context' in non-verbal situations: In Chapman's wording, "The [addresee] may sometimes look to specific CONTEXT to determine the precise INTENTION behind an utterance; he may consider, for instance, which of two possible interpretations would be the most relevant to what has gone before, or would most obviously fit the [utterer's] purpose." "Grice notes," Chapman adds, and 'unsurprisingly' _I_ add, "that such criteria are NOT confined to linguistic examples." But it was the charm of Grice to provide the _right_ examples! Grice: "Context IS a criterion in settling the question of WHY a man who has just put a cigarette in his mouth has put his hand in his pocket." ("Relevance to an obvious end is a criterion in settling why a man is running away from a bull.") "Context IS a criterion in settling the question of WHY a man who has just put a cigarette in his mouth has put his hand in his pocket." Or as Stanley Jason would contextualise, "Context is a criterion in settling the question of THE REASON why a man who has just put an UNLIT cigarette in the SURROUNDING LIPS to his mouth has put his RIGHT hand in the POCKET of his JACKET." Cheers, JL Speranza -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Nov 16 20:00:05 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2009 20:00:05 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] A Priori/A Posteriori -- Revisited Message-ID: The apriori/a posteriori: the history of a distinction Thanks to R. B. Jones and S. R. Bayne for their comments on my defense of a third dogma, the a priori/a posteriori distinction. Jones mentioned the idea of 'proof' and 'justification' (as NOT used by D. Frederick), etc. And the distinction as NOT being 'temporal' in nature. I am reminded of 'nihil est in intellectu quod prior non fuerit in sensu', a good use of 'prior' (if not 'priori'). Of course the obvious continuation is "a posteriori _empereia" (to combine pigLatin with pigGreek) and "a priori empereia". --- I am also reminded of Dummett, and Jones may like to elaborate on that! For the intuitionists, a proof (or justification) is something that _TAKES time_: it's a step by step process. So, I guess they would go on to say that all proof (or justification) is _a posteriori_. Yes, we have had rounds of discussion discussing the a posteriori of mathematical truths, but the Dummettians take it _pretty_ seriously. -- I wonder if by merely analysing the 'proposition' one should determine, by the mere lights of one's intellect -- cfr. Enlightenment -- where the proposition 'p' requires an a priori or a posteriori justification. I would think so, but examples do not come out easily. "Computers can't think" strikes me as 'analytic' (true or false) rather than in need of a posteriori justification. On the other hand, Noel Coward was possibly being jocular when he wrote in his re-write of Cole Porter's "Let's do it" "Probably we'll live to see machines do it" (Let's do it, let's fall in love). -- If I understand Jones aright, he is saying that Kripke makes a distinction (between a priori/a posteriori) that conflates with the 'necessary/contingent', if not the 'analytic/synthetic'. Wasn't Kripke's idea that while the apriori/aposteriori distinction is epistemic (or doxastic), the necessary/contingent is 'metaphysical', or ontic, and the analytic/synthetic logical? God knows! Back to propositions, I was amused (in a good way) by Jones's pragmatism. Surely he doesn't need to _specify_ what a 'proposition' is, and he is ready to have the notion as 'language specific' and 'contextual' in nature. I was reminded of a similar 'pragmatist' (but he'd call it transcendental) approach to 'propositions' by Grice in "Prejudices and Predilections" (aka "Reply to Richards"). Drawing on conversations with Geo. Myro (the Russian emigre from Ukrania that Grice befriended since he settled in Berkeley in 1967 -- Myro had studied in Oxford, but I'm unaware if they had met back then), Grice mentions that what a proposition is may well depend on the theoretical role it may play in different approaches. A proposition, I hold, is what a theory of "propositional attitudes" needs. We need propositions to have the propositional attitudes (so-called, Grice prefered, 'psychological attitude') hooked onto something. ---- believes that ---- (For a psychological attitude like 'belief' holds between the 'arguments' of the believer and what is believed -- and beliefs and psychological attitudes are, contra Quine, compositional and relational, no?) A metaphysician may need propositions for other reasons, i.e. to fulfil other theoretical metiers. Myro's point was that there is NOT just one answer as to what a proposition is, but many (or none). --- Grice played for years -- as evidenced in Reply to Richards -- with the idea of a COMPLEX (or propositional complex) as being more basic than proposition! A propositional complex (I think I've seen the same idiom in writings by Peacocke) is just the schematism of the _content_ of a belief, say, into its minimal components (the belief that SOME cat, Tibbles, is on some old rug in SOME kitchen, say -- rather than talk, in abstracto and out of context, of the proposition that the cat sat on the mat). Cheers, JL Speranza ps. PCA was paradigm-case argument -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Tue Nov 17 07:10:14 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2009 12:10:14 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] List Approval Delay Message-ID: <1335644708.3461641258459814906.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I have to be in Evanston IL for a day or so. I may have computer access but I'm not sure. So there may be a brief delay in postings. Sorry for the inconvenience etc. Regards Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Wed Nov 18 07:06:37 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2009 12:06:37 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Kripke on the A priori and A posteriori In-Reply-To: <891500012.2530301258208552726.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <891500012.2530301258208552726.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <200911181206.37307.rbj@rbjones.com> On Saturday 14 November 2009 14:22:32 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: > I'm still immersed in colors and Kripke, so I can offer only > a very modest response to your suggestion. I was not so much making a suggestion as explaining my usage of the term proposition (at your request). > The relevant link to consider, if this is your take on > propositions, is that between worlds and propositions. One > widely considered view is that a proposition is a sort of > mapping from worlds to truth values. This is one way of representing the truth conditions which I stipulated should be "encompassed" by a proposition. > This is a good suggestion > as long as we're doing algebra. Its not particularly useful for algebra, since algebraic truths are necessary, true in every possible world, and therefore the truth conditions in this sense are always the same (a constant function always yielding "true"). > But how do we approach the > question: "What is the relation between an actual thought > and the proposition which supplies the content of a thought?" I don't understand why we need to consider this question. The relationship which is relevant to the point at issue is that between sentences and propositions, i.e. semantics, rather than that between thoughts (whatever they are) and propositions. > Propositions don't occur in time, but thoughts do. What, then, > is the relation of this algebraic device to the actual thoughts > of a given individual? It has become fashionable to reject > such questions a "merely" psychological, but this is not a > good answer. It is a bad way of dodging the real philosophy. You need to establish relevance in this context. > To be sure there is a role for abstract (timeless) entities > in semantics, but the place of semantics in understanding the > nature of the mind is, I think, more fundamental than semantics, > philosophically speaking. In a world without minds, there is > no language (beyond "System S" - that sort of thing); in a world > without language no propositions. How does this bear upon the matter at stake? > Then there is a problem with > the relation of facts and propositions. Are we going to embrace > propositions but reject facts?! What is the problem here with the naive view that a fact is a true proposition? > I find that a dubious proposal, > but it may not be part of your proposal. I'm certainly not engaging in a campaign against "facts" (or for them for that matter!). Let me summarise the context. Aune has presented in his ETK two arguments which originated in Kripke, one to the effect that there exist propositions which are necessary but a posteriori and the other to the effect that there are propositions which are contingent but a priori. These have often been taken as refuting aspects of Carnap's philosophy, specifically part of the idea which I have called "the fundamental triple- dichotomy", which identified the concepts of analyticity, necessity and the a priori, and I am intent of rebutting the idea that Kripke's arguments can be taken as a refuting doctrines of Carnap. To this end I have given separate specific criticism of each of the two arguments, and followed up by an attempt at a broader characterisation of what seems to me the source of the errors in Kripke's reasoning. I have been unable to understand your responses so far, and would welcome a clearer statement of which parts of my material (if any) you dispute and on what grounds. Roger From aune at philos.umass.edu Wed Nov 18 09:27:07 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2009 09:27:07 -0500 Subject: [hist-analytic] Putnam and Aune on Color-incompatibilities Message-ID: Largely because I wondered how Steve could have become so confused about what I said about the incompatibility of colors in my second chapter and why he insisted so strongly that I give him a definition rather than examples of what I meant by ?determinate color,? I reread Hilary Putnam?s paper, ?Reds, Greens, and Logical Analysis,? which Steve introduced into our discussion. I had looked the paper over when Steve Swartz reminded me of it, but I didn?t give it the careful read it deserved. I knew that Putnam?s argument was different from mine, but I thought we were defending the same basic thesis. When I looked at the paper the other day, I realized that we weren?t defending the same thesis at all. Readers who followed my exchanges with Steve (if any readers actually did so) might be interested in some of the differences I found. 1. Putnam?s wanted to show that ?Nothing is red all over and green all over at the same time? is an analytic truth. Not only did I not want to show this; I don?t even think it is an a priori truth. (I argued that a related assertion regarding yellow and green, which are equally generic colors, could in fact be false.) Also, I did not share Putnam?s conception of an analytic truth. I didn?t actually say, in my second chapter, what conception of analytic truth I accepted, but my discussion was structured in accordance with the definition I would defend in my third chapter. Putnam?s paper therefore contains an argument that is very different from the one I offered, and it arrives at a very different conclusion. 2. Putnam was working with Frege?s conception of analyticity. Putnam described it by saying ?An analytic sentence is one that can be reduced to a theorem of formal logic by putting synonyms for synonyms.? Because he accepted this conception, he had to show that his target sentence could be reduced to a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms. To do this he had to provide definitions giving synonyms for the predicates in his target sentence?specifically, for ?red? and ?green.? Since I was not working with this conception of analyticity, I had no need for such definitions. They were not pertinent to my task. 3. The conception of analytic truth I accept is an extension (or development) of the definition Carnap used later in his career: A statement is analytic true just when it is true by virtue of semantical rules. (This is a rough statement, of course; I discuss pertinent qualifications in my chapter 3 and in two appendices.) Why don?t I accept the Fregean conception that Putnam accepts? It is not that it isn?t good as far as it goes; it is that, like Kant?s conception, it doesn?t go far enough. There are statements deserving the status of analytic truths that do not satisfy Kant?s conception or Frege?s conception. Neither conception shows why logical truths are true, for instance (Frege?s simply assumes it), and neither accounts for the analytic character of certain assertions containing predicates that are only partially defined. As I explain in chapter 3, Carnap left Frege?s conception behind the early 1930?s, when he introduced the concept of a bilateral reduction sentence. 4. Carnap regarded meaning postulates (he later preferred the description ?A-postulates?) as special cases of semantical rules. For him, A-postulates are specifications of meaning, either complete or partial. If I propose to use a certain relation symbol, say ?Rxy?, to represent an asymmetrical relation, I may indicate this by the A- postulate, ?(x)(y)(Rxy --> ~ Ryx).? This shows us that if the symbol ?R? applies to a pair of objects , it does not apply to the pair . 5. My proof that nothing can possess two determinate colors at the same place and time involved two A-postulates, which hold true for my talk about colors and, as I contend, for sophisticated English speech generally. One is that determinate colors are distinct just when they are distinguishable and the other (RBJ made me realize this a distinct postulate) is that if anything possesses a determinate color C at a place and time, any determinate color it possesses there and then is C and only C. This last postulate underlies our use of the definite article in such expressions as ?the color of a (at p and t).? We use similar expressions (technically, functors) for a wide range of attributes that we attribute to familiar things: the temperature of s (at t), the length in inches of x at t, the speed of x in miles per hour, and so on. 6. I could easily meet Steve?s often-repeated request for a definition of ?determinate color?, but I didn?t want to introduce another word he would say he doesn?t understand. The definition I would want to give is, ?A determinate color is any non-generic color.? This definition uses the expression ?generic color,? which is no more difficult than ?generic property,? which is perfectly familiar to most analytic philosophers.* But for my purposes, no such definition is needed anyway. My meaning should be perfectly evident from the examples I cite. Most of the words we use can?t be given explicit definitions. Think of ?sardonic,? ?sarcastic,? ?silly? or ?stupid.? I give long lists of such words at various places in my book. 7. As I said on my last post, almost all of which Steve simply ignored in his last reply to me, Steve?s emphasis on the continuity (or denseness) of color is badly misplaced. If color is supposed to be something we can perceive (as it is taken to be by philosophers worrying about color incompatibilities), there is no plausibility in the idea that it (or some relation on it) is dense in the way Steve said. If two shades of red are very similar, very close to one another on a color chart, I may be able to recognize another shade as intermediate between those shades, but I can?t do this indefinitely: I will eventually encounter shades that are minimally different from one another: I will be unable to perceive any additional shade that separates them. My inability here will not be idiosyncratic; any other human being will share it. The continuity Steve imagines simply doesn?t exist in the domain of perceptible color. Steve, holding fast to the continuity idea anyway, thinks that the existence of humanly imperceptible color differences (which he accepts) shows that there are no ?discrete colors?. As he puts it, ?if it is always the case that between any two colors there is a third, and if the discrimination of individuals is limited, then there will be no discrete colors for these individuals.? But if discrete colors are recognizable colors, this contention is absurd; it involves the logical howler I accused him of. From the fact (if it is a fact) that there are differences between shades of red that I cannot recognize, it hardly follows that I cannot distinguish any shades of red at all--dark shades from a light shades, or a shades of red from a shade of green. The analogy I drew between real numbers ordered by SMALLER THAN and shades of color ordered by the supposedly dense relation Steve seems to have in mind is, in fact, sound. In both cases we have a conditional assertion, ?(x)(y)(xRy --> there is a z such that xRz & zRy),? and to infer from this that some minimal term z? possesses a special minimal value, we need a premise of the form ?aRb? that we can know to be true. For this premise, the value of ?a? and ?b? need not be minimal at all. Another point needs to be made in connection with the continuum of colors that Steve accepts. Suppose all shades of color can indeed be ordered (or are ordered) in some continuous way. What implication does this have for the shades I can see? Suppose I paint a room with a pearl gray latex paint. The room is well lighted. As I look at a freshly painted wall, everything I see is pearl gray. Am I supposed to infer that the existence of infinitely many shades of many different colors proves that I do not see anything pearl gray or that the color I see is not ?discrete?? I put ?discrete? in quotes because it is a term that Steve introduced. He insisted that I define it,** but it is not a term I used: it is his, and I am not sure what he means by it. Possibly he may believe it is just a stylistic variant of ?determinate color,? which I did introduce. But the property of being non-generic, which is all ?determinate? connotes here, does not require discreteness in some sense. Specificity or determinateness is perfectly compatible with Steve?s fancied continuum of color shades. Bruce Aune *If I were asked to explain what a generic property is to a student, I would begin with some examples. Could anything be an animal, I would ask, without being some kind of animal?a dog, worm, or bird, for instance? Of course not. Could something be a dog without beingsome kind of dog--an Airedale, a collie, or a mutt, for instance? Could something be an Airedale without being one Airedale rather than another ?without being a particular instance of the kind? Of course not. When I speak of a generic property, then, I am speaking of the sort of higher-order property that things possess only by virtue of possessing some lower-order property. Lowest-order or absolutely determinate properties are properties things possess without having to possess a property of any lower-order. Determinate colors can alternatively be described as color properties of the lowest order. There is nothing generic about them. **In his last post he said, ?All of this business about my ?howlers? and lack of understanding etc would be unnecessary if Bruce would fill in the following blank as best he can: ?Let us use 'discrete color' to refer to ....?? (Am I responsible for his arguments and claims about ?the? color continuum?) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Wed Nov 18 16:46:14 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2009 21:46:14 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] A Priori/A Posteriori -- Revisited In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <200911182146.14166.rbj@rbjones.com> On Tuesday 17 November 2009 01:00:05 Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: > --- I am also reminded of Dummett, and Jones may like to elaborate on that! Don't understand this one, did I mention him somewhere? > For the intuitionists, a proof (or justification) is something that _TAKES > time_: it's a step by step process. So, I guess they would go on to say > that all proof (or justification) is _a posteriori_. Yes, we have had > rounds of discussion discussing the a posteriori of mathematical truths, > but the Dummettians take it _pretty_ seriously. This is rather a nitpick, but you do seem simply to take orderings as if they were necessarily temporal and this ain't so, and prior and posterior are applicable in the context of any ordering temporal or not. Strictly speaking the propositions in a proof are partially ordered by the transitive closure of the relationship "A is a premise from which B is directly inferred (in the proof)". This is not in itself a temporal order, though the ordering might be presented temporally. It might be spatially presented on a page, or it might be just something in the memory of a computer, neither spatial nor temporal. I'm not familiar with the Dummett connection, I am very ignorant about Dummett's philosophy. > -- I wonder if by merely analysing the 'proposition' one should determine, > by the mere lights of one's intellect -- cfr. Enlightenment -- where the > proposition 'p' requires an a priori or a posteriori justification. I would > think so, but examples do not come out easily. Before Kripke (at least, in Carnap!) this story was fairly easy, because the analytic/synthetic distinction coincided with the other two, so to determine the epistemic status you have only to decide whether the sentence is analytic of synthetic. Nowadays you have to reject Kripke's analysis of the relevant concepts before you can work in this way. > "Computers can't think" > > strikes me as 'analytic' (true or false) rather than in need of a > posteriori justification. On the other hand, Noel Coward was possibly > being jocular when he wrote in his re-write of Cole Porter's "Let's do it" > > "Probably we'll live to see machines do it" (Let's do it, let's fall > in love). Those are both hard cases. But I'm pleased to see that you assume a connection between analyticity and a priority. > -- If I understand Jones aright, he is saying that Kripke makes a > distinction (between a priori/a posteriori) that conflates with the > 'necessary/contingent', if not the 'analytic/synthetic'. Wasn't Kripke's > idea that while the apriori/aposteriori distinction is epistemic (or > doxastic), the necessary/contingent is 'metaphysical', or ontic, and the > analytic/synthetic logical? God knows! The "essential" difference, between Kripke and myself and Carnap is that Kripke held analytic, necessary and a priori all to be distinct, whereas we hold them to be at least coextensional. I don't know how he described the analytic/synthetic, I would call it semantic, and I would observe that in this matter semantics and metaphysics are intricately intertwined. Kripke cannot separate the two and be considered to be using the same concepts as Carnap. However, our recent conversations have been on the epistemic connection, and in this Kripke's distinctive conceptions are completely broken. > Back to propositions, I was amused (in a good way) by Jones's pragmatism. > Surely he doesn't need to _specify_ what a 'proposition' is, and he is > ready to have the notion as 'language specific' and 'contextual' in > nature. Yes. The context in question here. is any context necessary to disambiguate a sentence, so that "the proposition" which it expresses is definite, bearing in mind that the one constraint I offered for the notion of proposition was that the proposition should embody the determinate truth conditions somehow (though it might be more than that). So the context is used to identify the proposition, and the proposition is itself insensitive to (this kind of) context. I think elsewhere the word context might have been used with reference to the "possible world" relative to which a propositions truth value is determined. It remains of the essence of the proposition that its truth value (unless it be necessary or contradictory) will vary in different possible worlds (or situations if you like, or state descriptions). It might be worth pointing out the differences in attitude towards propositions which I take (depending on "context"!) The talk of propositions here is in the context of a discussion of Carnap against Kripke, and the doctrines in question (Carnap's at least, not Kripke's) relate primarily to formal languages rather than to natural languages. These are languages which have been designed by some person (or committee!) and which have been given a formal semantics. Now with the methods I advocate the notion of proposition would feature in such a semantics and its details would be chosen to reflect the desired semantics. However, one very general approach would be to have a proposition as a truth valuation (map from possible worlds to truth values) and the only bit of that likely to change from one language to the next would be the domain, i.e. the notion of possible world. So the language specific bit of proposition is the metaphysics you want to embed into the language. On this conception metaphysics is a part of a formal semantics and this explains how it is that a semantic concept like analyticity turns out to be the same as a "metaphysical" concept like necessity. Carnap has a different explanation, which comes from taking necessity as "true in all possible worlds" and analyticity (aka logical truth) as (following the tractatus) "tautological" i.e. true for all state descriptions. (of course you have to abandon Wittgenstein's insistence on the logical independence of atomic propositions for this to work). If one wants to talk about propositions expressed by natural languages the situation is much more murky, for two reasons. Firstly if you take a proposition to be the meaning of a sentence (in context), then its not so easy to figure out what meanings are. Secondly, if you want proposition to mean what it means in natural language then that is something else again (in that case there are diverse uses to grapple with). Those are problems which don't interest me. On other hand, though in the account above in relation to formal languages, propositions are just conveniences in presenting the semantics, there are interesting issues which arise if you start to worry about the identity conditions, and these I think set you off in the direction of something I might call metaphysics. We can devise any number of different formal languages in which the truths of elementary arithmetic are expressible. According to the above notion of proposition, what we might informally think of as being the same arithmetic proposition is likely to be a different abstract entity in each of these languages. At the same time, though for many purposes taking a proposition simply to be the truth conditions will suffice, this has the opposite disadvantage, all necessary propositions turn out to be identical. So if you want a notion of proposition which is not just good enough to express the semantics of some chosen formal language, but is good enough to reflect the possibility that the same proposition can be expressed in many different languages, and to ensure that propositions are not identified just because they have the same empirical content (truth conditions), then it gets complicated. That's a bit of "metaphysics", I don't know how important it is, but most of my talk about propositions belongs to semantics not metaphysics > I was reminded of a similar 'pragmatist' (but he'd call it > transcendental) approach to 'propositions' by Grice in "Prejudices and > Predilections" (aka "Reply to Richards"). > > Drawing on conversations with Geo. Myro (the Russian emigre from Ukrania > that Grice befriended since he settled in Berkeley in 1967 -- Myro had > studied in Oxford, but I'm unaware if they had met back then), Grice > mentions that > > what a proposition is > > may well depend on the theoretical role it may play in different > approaches. Yes. > A proposition, I hold, is what a theory of "propositional > attitudes" needs. Yes, though that's not the only reason we need them. I would say however, that much of this is more to do with convenience than necessity. Its not so much that one could absolutely not do without them, but that it would be much more complicated to deal with such topics while eschewing a convenient ontology. This kind of pragmatism, which is in the spirit of Carnap whose "internal questions" are the results of pragmatic choices of ontology in the design of languages, I would urge upon Steve B., who constantly worries about supposed metaphysical problems arising from a usage which need not be construed as involving a metaphysical commitment (especially when its Carnap and we know that everything which sounds like the kind of metaphysics which he proscribed really isn't going to be that kind of metaphysics, and who invented the internal/external distinction just so that he could talk as if he had a metaphysics but not actually take that extra (content-less) step). > We need propositions to have the propositional attitudes > (so-called, Grice prefered, 'psychological attitude') hooked onto > something. "propositional attitude" is better. Its what its about that makes it interesting here, not the kind of thing that is about it, and we are really talking about propositional attributes which are not psychological at all. so maybe "attitude" too strong. Necessity and a priority, then, are propositional attributes? Incidentally one of the main points historically about these things is that they are places where some kinds of "transparency" fail, e.g. referential, and so you can't substitute synonyms willy-nilly in propositions of which someones attitude is asserted. These failures of substitution give us clues about propositional inequalities (the proscribed kinds of substitution give different propositions, that's why they can't be permitted). So they give us information about some kinds of information which there must be in propositions over and above truth conditions (though possibly only about what must be in the propositions expressed in this particular natural language, not necessary yielding metaphysical truths about propositions.) > > ---- believes that ---- > > (For a psychological attitude like 'belief' holds between the 'arguments' > of the believer and what is believed -- and beliefs and psychological > attitudes are, contra Quine, compositional and relational, no?) I don't know what that means. > A metaphysician may need propositions for other reasons, i.e. to fulfil > other theoretical metiers. Myro's point was that there is NOT just one > answer as to what a proposition is, but many (or none). But perhaps some are better than others. > --- Grice played for years -- as evidenced in Reply to Richards -- with the > idea of a COMPLEX (or propositional complex) as being more basic than > proposition! A propositional complex (I think I've seen the same idiom in > writings by Peacocke) is just the schematism of the _content_ of a belief, > say, into its minimal components (the belief that SOME cat, Tibbles, is on > some old rug in SOME kitchen, say -- rather than talk, in abstracto and > out of context, of the proposition that the cat sat on the mat). But propositions are closed under conjunction, so isn't a propositional complex only doing what might as well be done with a complex proposition? RBJ From aune at philos.umass.edu Thu Nov 19 06:40:09 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2009 06:40:09 -0500 Subject: [hist-analytic] OOPS Message-ID: <087651CF-F03C-4C64-A6F6-381EEC17C50F@philos.umass.edu> In my last post to simplelists the clause "and only C" should be deleted from the second sentence in my paragraph 5; it doesn't belong there. A Cartesian demon seems to sit on my shoulder as a write and introduce errors. I can't escape them. Bruce From baynesrb at yahoo.com Thu Nov 19 07:42:08 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2009 04:42:08 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] OOPS In-Reply-To: <087651CF-F03C-4C64-A6F6-381EEC17C50F@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: <915935.955.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> ?"A Cartesian demon seems to sit on my shoulder as a write and introduce errors.? I can't escape them." ? Bruce, ? It's just the nature of the medium. This is a fast moving method of exchange and mistakes are unavoidable. The only option is to stay out of the discussion. This is the approach of a lot of people who would rather ride their reputation than do what they see as "putting it on the line." You are one of a very few that prefers the exchange despite the risk (which is largely imaginary). ? I? finding my bearings after a few days of interupted angling within an entirely different domain of discourse. Your post was useful. It changes a bit the way I see things. Meaning postulates will figure in here. When we get to analyticity etc. this will be more of a factor, I supppose. ? Regards ? STeve ? --- On Thu, 11/19/09, Bruce Aune wrote: From: Bruce Aune Subject: OOPS To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Thursday, November 19, 2009, 6:40 AM In my last post to simplelists the clause "and only C" should be deleted from the second sentence in my paragraph 5; it doesn't belong there.? A Cartesian demon seems to sit on my shoulder as a write and introduce errors.? I can't escape them. Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at btinternet.com Thu Nov 19 08:32:35 2009 From: danny.frederick at btinternet.com (Danny Frederick) Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2009 13:32:35 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] OOPS In-Reply-To: <915935.955.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <087651CF-F03C-4C64-A6F6-381EEC17C50F@philos.umass.edu> <915935.955.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <7E09B4BBFCD547A9BC608914CC1F40E3@DFLVQC1J> Hi Bruce/Steve, I have a mountain of emails from hist-analytic that I have not looked at yet, including one from Roger that is addressed to me. I will get around to them eventually. But this little exchange caught my attention. I am very familiar with Bruce's situation; in fact I have been so for years. And, at least in my case (though I feel sure it is universal), it is not just in fast-moving email exchanges that I find unaccountable errors creeping in. I say 'unaccountable' because they are the sorts of errors that should never have been made (presumably, like Bruce's 'and only' clause), given that I knew full well it was an error when I made it, so it baffles me how I came to make it. If it was only in fast-moving exchanges that this happened, it would not be (so) baffling. But it happens even in carefully composed and long-thought-over pieces that I have left alone for a while precisely so that, when I return to them, I will be more likely to see the silly mistakes - and I still don't! Actually, I usually spot them as soon as I send off the piece of work to wherever it needs to go. This is not just a philosophical thing. Until just over three years ago I was an accountant, and I had this problem in connection with management reports or proposals or complex spreadsheets. It seemed like a curse. There was almost invariably some minor blemish that I somehow failed to see, despite taking great care to get things right. A Cartesian demon sitting on the shoulder is an apt metaphor! I think it tells us something about the human condition. Best wishes, Danny _____ From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of steve bayne Sent: 19 November 2009 12:42 To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Subject: Re: OOPS "A Cartesian demon seems to sit on my shoulder as a write and introduce errors. I can't escape them." Bruce, It's just the nature of the medium. This is a fast moving method of exchange and mistakes are unavoidable. The only option is to stay out of the discussion. This is the approach of a lot of people who would rather ride their reputation than do what they see as "putting it on the line." You are one of a very few that prefers the exchange despite the risk (which is largely imaginary). I finding my bearings after a few days of interupted angling within an entirely different domain of discourse. Your post was useful. It changes a bit the way I see things. Meaning postulates will figure in here. When we get to analyticity etc. this will be more of a factor, I supppose. Regards STeve --- On Thu, 11/19/09, Bruce Aune wrote: From: Bruce Aune Subject: OOPS To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Thursday, November 19, 2009, 6:40 AM In my last post to simplelists the clause "and only C" should be deleted from the second sentence in my paragraph 5; it doesn't belong there. A Cartesian demon seems to sit on my shoulder as a write and introduce errors. I can't escape them. Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Nov 19 14:36:29 2009 From: jlsperanza at aol.com (jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2009 14:36:29 -0500 Subject: [hist-analytic] If +> Iff: history of a claim In-Reply-To: <915935.955.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <915935.955.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <8CC3766B960F02B-2D9C-4872@webmail-m019.sysops.aol.com> -----Original Message----- From: steve bayne To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Thu, Nov 19, 2009 9:42 am Subject: Re: OOPS ?"A Cartesian demon seems to sit on my shoulder as a write and introduce errors.? I can't escape them." ? Bruce, ? ...You are one of a very few that prefers the exchange despite the risk (which is largely imaginary). ?------ Hear, Hear This was vis a vis: " the clause "and only C" should be deleted from the second sentence in my paragraph 5; it doesn't belong there."? -- And I was amusingly reminded of L. Horn?s first essay for the Journal of Pragmatics, to the effect that "if" conversationally implicates "iff". I was discussing that paper with Horn, and I pointed out to him a passage by D. F. Pears, in Canadian J. Philosophy -- later repr. in Berlin, ed. Essays on Austin, to the very same effect, ?sometimes, "if" conversationally implicates "iff"" Had D. F. Pears written. (Incidentally, it was my providing a quote from that Pears paper to the OED editor that has the quote now under "implicature" in the OED3 -- genial man, Pears!) Now, while not philosophically strictly but more into linguistics (and common usage), Horn reviews in that article the manifestations of that infamous claim, if infamous it is -- well, Aune ?credits? it to a malignant demon -- that people don?t mind to utter "if" unless they also mean, cancellably, "iff". How unclever language works! to mis-echo Warnock on Grice (Warnock, op. cit. same volume ed. Berlin). Cheers, J. L. S. From Baynesr at comcast.net Tue Nov 24 11:59:36 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2009 16:59:36 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Aune, Kripke, and my delay Message-ID: <1441302126.6159681259081976557.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> A word of explanation for my delay in posting on Bruce's views on the "two color problem." One is technical related to the issue; the second concerns recent thoughts I've had on contingent a priori in Kripke. First, both Bruce and Putnam do not consider certain modal arguments that are pertinent to this issue. Theirs is a one world treatment and, I think, this is a problem since what we are discussing here is the necessity or analyticity of the impossibility of a thing being two colors all over. I have several pages on the problem, most of which are not related to this issue; but the issue of analyticity figures in Kripke's treatment of the contingent a priori. A brief word is in order. Kripke use of the meter stick case is CENTRAL to his treatment of rigid designation as well as the contingent a priori. He does not discuss two things, although he mentions them in passing. First, he notes that one of his motives is to distinguish meaning and fixing reference; second he is reluctant to discuss analyticity as if the issue is unrelated to what we might want to call "metaphysical necessity." However, I think the entire issue of the contingent a priori is in a sense a radical sublimation of the issue of the nature of the relation of analyticity to the a priori. The positivists tended to identify the class of a priori propositions and the class of analytic propositions. Thus when issues like the two color problem surface there is no consideration of the the possibility of a synthetic a priori. The reluctance is so powerful that the preference is to distinguish completely the matter of contingency and synthetic-ness. This is a complex matter I need to think out a bit. I have arrived, tentatively, at one conclusion. Whereas most critics of the contingent a priori (Donnellan, Plantiga, G. Evans) have located the problem elsewhere I think the problem with Kripke's approach if, indeed, there is one has to do with his avoidance of the issue of analyticity and in concert with his discussion of the meter stick are reluctance to discuss the scientific aspect of fixing measures. He thinks, or seems to think, that the issue is merely the place of operationalism and that his semantics can be worked around this, but I think not. I think this and the issue of analyticity persist. At bottom, a criticism of his position, if I am right, revolves around the issue of de re vs. de dicto modality. I should have something on the Aune position (and Putnam) in a few days. I could post incrementally but that would invite replies I could not respond to, under the circumstances, in a ?timely fashion. So I'll complete the thing before posting so we can move on the Aune very rich discussion of analyticity and sorts etc. Regards STeve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Fri Nov 27 16:40:38 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2009 21:40:38 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] The Death of Myles Brand Message-ID: <132195024.7049001259358038771.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I just found out something many of you, probably, know already: Myles Brand died of pancreatic cancer, Sept. 16, 2009. Here is an obit by his wife, Dr. Peg Brand: http :// www . iu . edu /brand/obituary. shtml Myles was interested in the theory of action. Although he authored a number of works, his anthology _The Nature of Human Action_ . Scott, Foreman and Co. 1970 had a great influence on my own work and that of others. I first saw Brand at the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle in the late sixties. In the area of action theory it was one of the best departments in the world. It was a subject, completely, alien to my positivist upbringing. When he rose to speak at one of those scheduled talks that many departments have one afternoon. I took note that he wore bell bottoms and was a pretty "hip" guy. This resonated with me at the time inasmuch as I was, and remain, something of a child of the sixties. His lecture was interesting but the ideas were new to me. I went back to other stuff. One day someone suggested that I write a book on Anscombe . I'll mention that person when permission "clears." I recalled Brand's lecture and the echoes that had quietly reverberated in my mind over the years. After some work, it occurred to me to contact Brand who by this time had been President of Indiana U. and, later, President of the NCAA. I asked if he was "still interested in philosophy." He gave an affirmative and I invited him to subscribe to Hist-Analytic and he DID! Rarely, but occasionally, at least, he would email me. Once introducing me to a friend, also, a current list member. I only recently learned of his passing. I think this has affected me more than most deaths in philosophy. One reason is that for the brief time I taught I preferred teaching athletes. I got to know the "culture." Sometimes these guys can put the heat on a teacher, even suggesting legal action. I, always, resisted reacting to this sort of thing; BUT I did take into account the fact that I was dealing with some people interested in a career, the path of which was somewhat defined already. So, I'd go a bit easy. This was a mistake. Brand wouldn't have done this; Brand was a better man than I. Myles, I believe, thought first and foremost, not of the career and the law, etc. He thought of the kids. Judging from the revolution he brought in college athletics I think his guiding star in times of doubt was to reflect on students, qua, students and future citizens and the obligation of the university to not let them down. He was faithful to that end to the very?end. I never met him; I never, really, got to know him but he was a "Hist-Analytic guy," and I am proud of that. Before hearing of his death, I had written a brief few sentences in my book on its origins. I had hoped to send him a copy for his amusement, perhaps.His demise suggests to me that this is no longer the best of all possible worlds, even for Leibnizians . He will be missed by those he served, many of whom will never know his name. Good night Myles. You will be missed even by strangers. (I know some of you knew him, whereas, I did not (in fact). Any reflections would be warmly received. Regards STeve Bayne www .hist-analytic.org -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Tue Nov 24 14:06:57 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2009 14:06:57 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] When Pigs Can Fly: Kripke on the contingent a priori Message-ID: It strikes me that speakers are pretty subtle with counterfactives. The other day I heard someone explaining a vernacular idiom to an English speaker, and the item related, in my view, to "when pigs can fly" --- This is used, I claim, NOT as a statement of the analytically false, but as the synthetically contingent a posteriori. Perhaps Kripke would claim it's a priori. The point: A: When are we going to be able to have that world cruise, dad? B: When pigs can fly. Literally, B is NOT denying the analytic falsehood of anything -- he is stating that a natural kind, 'pig', may still be deemed the same natural kind, 'flying pig'. In which case, it may well be in the near future (if not _now_: "Surely pigs can fly if we travel with them in planes, no, dad?"). I'm not sure if there are other types of these clauses: "If I'm a Dutchman" ---- seems to work better. Surely if "I" rigidly designates a non-Dutch, speaker, "If I am a Dutchman" would involve a breach of Kripke's revered Leibniz Law, for "I" would cease to be "I" if I (who am not Dutchman) becomes one. But with European Union conventions, it may be claimed that I (J. L. Speranza) am already a Dutchperson of sorts -- I can enter Amsterdam and leave Amsterdam as I, qua Dutchperson, wish. Grice was into something serious when asking the playmates of his children, Karen, and Timothy, Can a surface be two colours all over? --- He was into the PCA (Paradigm Case Argument). I was surprised when reading G. Sampson ("Making Sense", Clarendon) that he reports a MA dissertation (Lancaster Univ, England) to the effect of an experimental testing of what issues were regarded as analytic by informants: Spring follows Winter for example. Analytic. Pigs can't fly. Thatcher is a Dutchman seem to be subtler, if sillier, cases. Cheers, JL Speranza -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Dec 9 21:01:25 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2009 21:01:25 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Toulmin and the Play Group Message-ID: Sad news about the death of Toulmin, I know a favourite with S. Bayne. Anyway, this short notice to share the obit with the list, and share a tidbit of my research. The man, Toulmin, lectured on philosophy of science at Oxford from 1949 to 1954, pretty much the early heyday of Ordinary Language Philosophy --. His "Uses of Inferences" came out in 1958 -- when he had left Oxford already but, via an online checklist of his publications I found that Urmson reviewed it for _Nature_ for that year, and in another site featuring an online interview with Toulmin he makes the rather good sarcastic comment: Q. The Uses of Argument has received an enormous amount of attention. Are you surprised by the overwhelming critical reception of that book and of the so-called "Toulmin method" of argumentation? A. It was not initially overwhelming, particularly in England. I published it in England, and P. F. (later Sir Peter, and collaborator with Grice -- JLS) Strawson wrote a dismissive review in The Listener, the BBC's intellectual weekly; that was the end of the matter so far as my colleagues in England were concerned. --- Oddy, my personal concern with Toulmin's book was ideographical. He has a BEAUTIFUL drawing of a cat being on a mat ('the cat sat on the mat') in that book, and I have used that illustrations in lectures I've given. I especially treasure one at the University of Buenos Aires -- as an assistant to Rabossi --. I thought that the drawing being straight from Toulmin gave my lecture a lot of respectability. -- the header to note that while Strawson and Urmson did belong to Austin's playgroup -- of the heyday of Oxford ordinary language philosophy, that met Saturday mornings -- vide Grice, "Reply to Richards" in Grandy/Warner, and Warnock, "Saturday mornings" in Berlin et al, Essays on Austin -- Toulmin didn't. jls -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Fri Dec 11 09:17:06 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2009 14:17:06 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Toulmin, Hanson, and the Ethics of Disclosure In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <1169067407.446191260541026791.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Thanks for bringing us the bad news, JL. I met Toulmin a couple of times and spent what I considered a great deal of time on one occasion discussing philosophy and a number of other issues several years ago. He was, as you may know, a subscriber to Hist-Analytic, and there are remarks by him on remarks made by me on Wittgenstein (as well as some insights by Dick Schmitt out of U. of Chicago). At one point in our discussion, Toulmin confided in me certain facts about his work in philosophy of science; in particular in regard to Norwood Russell Hanson. Both philosophers had a great deal to do with how history of science and philosophy of science relate. Being a small time journalist, in "another world," I asked if his comments were for the record. He said only on condition that Hanson's wife was no longer alive. I made numerous inquiries and postings and could never make this determination with any certainty. Given the lapse of time, I believe she is no longer alive. Moreover, the death of Toulmin, himself, alters the moral equation, somewhat. So I'm tinkering with the idea of repeating what he said in connection with Hanson. If there are other sources on this, I'd like to know. I DO know that Toulmin was working on memoirs. If anyone knows anything about the status of this work, please let me know. I commented at a meeting on Toulmin's philosophy of science, years ago. He was prepared and wrote up a rather detailed set of notes on my comments and read them in reply to my commentary. Some of this stuff was historically significant but I never saw the copy and I forgot some of his points of clarification. This had to do with Foresight and Understanding, I believe. If anyone knows of archives that would be helpful. I'll consider going public on the Hanson thing. In the meantime. Regards Steve Bayne ----- Original Message ----- From: Jlsperanza at aol.com To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Sent: Wednesday, December 9, 2009 9:01:25 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Toulmin and the Play Group Sad news about the death of Toulmin, I know a favourite with S. Bayne. Anyway, this short notice to share the obit with the list, and share a tidbit of my research. The man, Toulmin, lectured on philosophy of science at Oxford from 1949 to 1954, pretty much the early heyday of Ordinary Language Philosophy --. His "Uses of Inferences" came out in 1958 -- when he had left Oxford already but, via an online checklist of his publications I found that Urmson reviewed it for _Nature_? for that year, and in another site featuring an online interview with Toulmin he makes the rather good sarcastic comment: Q. The Uses of Argument has received an enormous amount of attention. Are you surprised by the overwhelming critical reception of that book and of the so-called "Toulmin method" of argumentation? A. It was not initially overwhelming, particularly in England. I published it in England, and P. F. (later Sir Peter, and collaborator with Grice -- JLS)?Strawson wrote a dismissive review in The Listener , the BBC's intellectual weekly; that was the end of the matter so far as my colleagues in England were concerned. --- Oddy, my personal concern with Toulmin's book was ideographical. He has a BEAUTIFUL drawing of a cat being on a mat ('the cat sat on the mat') in that book, and I have used that illustrations in lectures I've given. I especially treasure one at the University of Buenos Aires -- as an assistant to Rabossi --. I thought that the drawing being straight from Toulmin gave my lecture a lot of respectability. -- the header to note that while Strawson and Urmson did belong to Austin's playgroup -- of the heyday of Oxford ordinary language philosophy, that met Saturday mornings -- vide Grice, "Reply to Richards" in Grandy/Warner, and Warnock, "Saturday mornings" in Berlin et al, Essays on Austin -- Toulmin didn't. jls -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Dec 16 20:49:21 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2009 20:49:21 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Toulmin and the Play Group Message-ID: Thanks to S. Bayne for his comments. Excellent to KNOW that Toulmin subscribed to Hist-Anal. I suppose his son, Greg, though of a state other than California, will try and have the Toulmin papers (if he left any) safely deposited in some uni. It would be interesting to know in which. I have done some little more research about his associations with Oxford's play group (i.e. the Saturday morningers of Austin). Toulmin was university lecturer in the philosophy of science from 1949 to 1954 -- but I still ignore which college he was associated with. This was the heyday of "Oxford ordinary school philosophy" almost (as Grice notes in "Prejudices and Predilections", in Grandy et al, "PGRICE"), so it is not surprising that there ARE some cross-references: ON THE PART OF THE PLAYGROUP The cross references seem perhaps minimal. I have been able to trace -- Hare, R. M. Review of Toulmin, An examination of the place of reason in ethics. Philosophical Quarterly 1951. Note that this is an early Hare. In fact, I unburied that reference when Hare died, and I was checking the list of his publications from his Practical Inferences. I would hope Hare's son deposited his unpublications, if he left any, safely somewhere -- Urmson, J. O. The province of logic: being a review of Toulmin, The uses of argument. In Nature, 1958, pp. 213- (doublecheck page number) available online if you log-in. If a member to this can do that and share pdf with us, nice (See Toulmin's refs. to Urmson below) -- Strawson, P. F. Review of Toulmin, The uses of argument. In The Listener, the BBC weekly, 1958. ---- ON THE PART OF TOULMIN. Apparently, Toulmin was more affiliated with the OTHER group popular or influential at the time, led by Ryle. Ryle was possibly Toulmin's doktorvater (if the term applies) while in Oxford (as Braithwaite had been in Cambridge). Of course, unofficial, since Toulmin had earned his DPhil already with the "Examination of the place of reason in ethics". Toulmin acknowledges Ryle in Uses of Argument and indeed shares a good anecdote: Otto Bird provided a review of Uses of Argument for _Mind_ due to Ryle (who edited it). In that review Bird connects Toulmin's enterprise with Aristotle's in Topica. I have a friend who dedicates her life to Topica so she should be pleased. She dedicates her life to book VIII, of the Topica, if you can believe that. Graciella Chichi. --- So, there are some references to Oxford philosophers who were not part of the playgroup. Some I'm not sure, e.g. D. G. Brown. -- But when it comes to playgroup members proper (the list I take from Grice, op. cit. above) we have -- alphabetically: AUSTIN, J. L. Toulmin cites ONLY "Other Minds". This is an interesting essay by Austin which -- as it relates to Grice's A-philosophers -- has been commented by Roger B. Jones. Toulmin is concerned with 'qualifiers' to 'claims to knowledge'. He is having in view his model for argument, complete with claim, data, warrant, backing, and rebuttal. Austin was alive then, but his early death meant a stop to any further cross-reference here. HARE, R. M. Toulmin deals extensively (or perhaps not so extensively) with Hare, Language of Morals. Oddly, he is not into what Hare would later call micropragmatic (the subatomic particles of logic: the clistic, tropic, neustic and phrastic). Instead Toulmin passes muster of the is-ought question as it relates to practical inferences, and how you cannot claim a value-judgement unless at least one of the data is also a value-judgement, etc. HART, H. L. A. Toulmin cites from the locus classicus by Hart on the ascription of responsibilities and rights. He is interested in the ceteris-paribus defeasibility of inferential patterns. He notes re: Hart something he possibly did not like of critics reading his own (Toulmin's work): the legalese. In the case of Hart, it can be said that legalese (or jurisprudential reasoning) was at the 'heart' of it, as he would later become Prof. of Jurisprudence at Oxford -- a fact that perhaps lost him to the narrow philosophical community. (In Argentina, it was the fashion of 'lawyers' to get a Brit Council fellowship and earn a doctorate under Hart, e.g. C. S. Nino). STRAWSON, P. F. Toulmin cites extensively from "Introduction to Logical Theory". I would assume that Strawson's review of Toulmin for the Listener SHOULD have concentrated on his criticisms of Strawson. Toulmin was particularly hurt, it seems, that Strawson only cared to 'roundly damn' the book. Toulmin's observations on various aspects of Strawson's programme merit a closer review. URMSON, J. O. Toulmin quotes various essays by Urmson. Perhaps the most important one, for which he does not care to give the exact biblio reference is "Two senses of 'probable'". This has an anti-Gricean ring to it (recall his modified Ockham's razor, 'do not multiply senses beyond necessity'), and its treatment occupies a whole section of Toulmin's book ambiguously titled, "Is 'probably' ambiguous?". His prose is so subtle that I wasn't sure if he meant that it's not. I guess "'probable' NOT ambiguous" would have made for a better title of a section if that was his claim. As with Strawson, Hart, and Austin, Toulmin provides the full biblio references at the end of his book. So, we see he is also using Urmson's wonderful essay on "Validity" (where he pre-dates Grice in some of the conversational maxims, etc.). He also quotes from Urmson, "On grading". A classic repr. along with R. Hall, Excluders, in Chappel (as I recall). There may be other cross-references I missed. In any case, this is the Toulmin that, historically, interests me. He has a topical, "On describing", co-authored with Baier, which was possibly very influential THEN. For some reason, whatever interest he had in ways that overlapped with the playgrouppers evolved into something different. He was possibly of broader interests. He quotes extensively for example from Ryle's colleague, Kneale and his work on induction and probability. So he was perhaps less parochial than the Saturday morning as wickedly recollected by Warnock -- 'we were only interested in what the others of the group were thinking' (Saturday mornings, in Berlin, Essays on Austin). This is perhaps unfair on Grice, since he is seen quoting a distant author like Stevenson, or a not so distant one like Witters -- and with a straight face, too! Cheers, JL Speranza The Grice Club, etc. ---- S. Bayne writes: --- Thanks for bringing us the bad news, JL. I met Toulmin a couple of times and spent what I considered a great deal of time on one occasion discussing philosophy and a number of other issues several years ago. He was, as you may know, a subscriber to Hist-Analytic, and there are remarks by him on remarks made by me on Wittgenstein (as well as some insights by Dick Schmitt out of U. of Chicago). At one point in our discussion, Toulmin confided in me certain facts about his work in philosophy of science; in particular in regard to Norwood Russell Hanson. Both philosophers had a great deal to do with how history of science and philosophy of science relate. Being a small time journalist, in "another world," I asked if his comments were for the record. He said only on condition that Hanson's wife was no longer alive. I made numerous inquiries and postings and could never make this determination with any certainty. Given the lapse of time, I believe she is no longer alive. Moreover, the death of Toulmin, himself, alters the moral equation, somewhat. So I'm tinkering with the idea of repeating what he said in connection with Hanson. If there are other sources on this, I'd like to know. I DO know that Toulmin was working on memoirs. If anyone knows anything about the status of this work, please let me know. I commented at a meeting on Toulmin's philosophy of science, years ago. He was prepared and wrote up a rather detailed set of notes on my comments and read them in reply to my commentary. Some of this stuff was historically significant but I never saw the copy and I forgot some of his points of clarification. This had to do with Foresight and Understanding, I believe. If anyone knows of archives that would be helpful. I'll consider going public on the Hanson thing. In the meantime. Regards Steve Bayne ----- Original Message ----- From: Jlsperanza at aol.com To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Sent: Wednesday, December 9, 2009 9:01:25 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Toulmin and the Play Group Sad news about the death of Toulmin, I know a favourite with S. Bayne. Anyway, this short notice to share the obit with the list, and share a tidbit of my research. The man, Toulmin, lectured on philosophy of science at Oxford from 1949 to 1954, pretty much the early heyday of Ordinary Language Philosophy --. His "Uses of Inferences" came out in 1958 -- when he had left Oxford already but, via an online checklist of his publications I found that Urmson reviewed it for _Nature_ for that year, and in another site featuring an online interview with Toulmin he makes the rather good sarcastic comment: Q. The Uses of Argument has received an enormous amount of attention. Are you surprised by the overwhelming critical reception of that book and of the so-called "Toulmin method" of argumentation? A. It was not initially overwhelming, particularly in England. I published it in England, and P. F. (later Sir Peter, and collaborator with Grice -- JLS) Strawson wrote a dismissive review in The Listener, the BBC's intellectual weekly; that was the end of the matter so far as my colleagues in England were concerned. --- Oddy, my personal concern with Toulmin's book was ideographical. He has a BEAUTIFUL drawing of a cat being on a mat ('the cat sat on the mat') in that book, and I have used that illustrations in lectures I've given. I especially treasure one at the University of Buenos Aires -- as an assistant to Rabossi --. I thought that the drawing being straight from Toulmin gave my lecture a lot of respectability. -- the header to note that while Strawson and Urmson did belong to Austin's playgroup -- of the heyday of Oxford ordinary language philosophy, that met Saturday mornings -- vide Grice, "Reply to Richards" in Grandy/Warner, and Warnock, "Saturday mornings" in Berlin et al, Essays on Austin -- Toulmin didn't. jls From Baynesr at comcast.net Thu Dec 17 09:55:14 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2009 14:55:14 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Toulmin and the Play Group In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <59523539.2543571261061714813.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> ? JL , Thanks for this. I DO have some leads on Toulmin's estate, which I hope to follow up on soon. Actually, I'm behind in doing something similar with Scriven . Just a couple of point. First, P. H. Nowell-Smith informed me in correspondence some years ago that he was in this group. In fact, a close read of his _Ethics_ reveals some striking use of language one finds in Austin. I asked him if these locutions ( I don't have them at my finger tips) were his or Austin's. He was uncommitted but seemed to indicate they were Austin's. Also, the expression 'pro-attitude' occurs in Nowell-Smith's _Ethics_ which we find in Davidson. Toulmin indicated to me in discussion, by the way, that in his memoirs he would give definitive statement on what transpired with respect to "Wittgenstein's poker." Hugely busy. I found a non-sequitur in?D. Lewis?in Convention. I stumbled across it while examining "reciprocity" in Rawls, mainly because I was in discussion with a bright fellow who disagreed with me based on Lewis. I've got a mountain of stuff on the color problem and Aune. It's gotta come to a stop. I might risk ridicule by simply beginning to post it without caveats, hedging, qualifications etc. I want to get on with Aune's book. His stuff on concepts, meaning and the analytic are superb. So I might just raise this "crap" of mine up the flag pole and see if anyone salutes. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: Jlsperanza @ aol .com To: hist-analytic@ simplelists .co. uk Sent: Wednesday, December 16, 2009 8:49:21 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Toulmin and the Play Group Thanks to S. Bayne for his comments. Excellent to KNOW that Toulmin ? subscribed to Hist-Anal. I suppose his son, Greg, though of a state other than ? California, will try and have the Toulmin papers (if he left any) safely ? deposited in some uni. It would be interesting to know in which. I have done some little more research about his associations with ?Oxford's play group (i.e. the Saturday morningers of Austin). Toulmin was ? university lecturer in the philosophy of science from 1949 to 1954 -- but I ?still ignore which college he was associated with. This was the heyday of "Oxford ordinary school philosophy" almost (as ? Grice notes in "Prejudices and Predilections", in Grandy et al , " PGRICE "), so it ?is not surprising that there ARE some cross-references: ? ON THE PART OF THE PLAYGROUP The cross references seem ?perhaps minimal. I have been able to trace ?? -- Hare, R. M. Review of Toulmin , An examination of the place ?of ?? ? ? ? ?reason in ethics. ?Philosophical Quarterly 1951. ?? ?? ? ? ? ?Note that this is an ?early Hare. In fact, I unburied that reference when Hare died, and I was ?checking the list of his publications from his Practical Inferences. I would ?hope Hare's son deposited his unpublications , if he left any, safely ?somewhere ? ?? -- Urmson , J. O. The province of logic: being a review ?? ? ? ?of Toulmin , The uses of ?argument. In Nature, 1958, pp. 213- (doublecheck page number) ?? ? ? ?available online if you ?log-in. If a member to this can do that and share pdf with us, nice ? ?? ? (See Toulmin's refs. to Urmson below) ? ?? ?-- Strawson , P. F. Review of Toulmin , ?? ? ? The uses of argument. In The Listener, ?the BBC weekly, 1958. ? ---- ? ON THE PART OF TOULMIN . ? Apparently, Toulmin was more affiliated with the OTHER group popular or ? influential at the time, led by Ryle . Ryle was possibly Toulmin's doktorvater ? (if the term applies) while in Oxford (as Braithwaite had been in Cambridge). Of ?course, unofficial, since Toulmin had earned his DPhil already with the ?"Examination of the place of reason in ethics". Toulmin acknowledges Ryle in ?Uses of Argument and indeed shares a good anecdote: Otto Bird provided a review ?of Uses of Argument for _Mind_ due to Ryle (who edited it). In that review Bird ?connects Toulmin's enterprise with Aristotle's in Topica . I have a friend who ?dedicates her life to Topica so she should be pleased. She dedicates her life to ?book VIII, of the Topica , if you can believe that. Graciella Chichi. ? --- ? So, there are some references to Oxford philosophers who were not part of ? the playgroup. Some I'm not sure, e.g. D. G. Brown. ? -- But when it comes to playgroup members proper (the list I take from ? Grice , op. cit. above) we have -- alphabetically: ? ?? ?AUSTIN, J. L. Toulmin cites ONLY "Other Minds". This is ?an interesting essay by Austin which ?? ? ?-- as it relates to Grice's A-philosophers ?-- has been commented by Roger B. Jones. Toulmin ?? ? ?is concerned with 'qualifiers' to 'claims to ? knowledge' . He is having in view his model for ?? ? ?argument, complete with claim, data, ?warrant, backing, and rebuttal. ?? ? ?Austin was alive then, but his early death ?meant a stop to any further cross-reference here. ? ?? ?HARE, R. M. Toulmin deals extensively (or perhaps not so ?extensively) with Hare, Language ?? ? ? of Morals. Oddly, he is not into what ?Hare would later call micropragmatic (the subatomic ?? ? ? particles of logic: the clistic , ?tropic, neustic and phrastic ). Instead Toulmin passes ?? ? ? muster of the is-ought question as it ?relates to practical inferences, and how you cannot ?? ? ? claim a value-judgement unless at ?least one of the data is also a value-judgement, etc. ? ?? ?HART, H. L. A. Toulmin cites from the locus classicus by ?Hart on the ascription of responsibilities ?? ? ? and rights. He is interested in the ?ceteris-paribus defeasibility of inferential patterns. He notes ?? ? ? re: Hart something he possibly did not ?like of critics reading his own ( Toulmin's work): the ?? ? ? legalese. In the case of Hart, it can ?be said that legalese (or jurisprudential reasoning) was ?? ? ? at the 'heart' of it, as he would ?later become Prof. of Jurisprudence at Oxford -- a fact that ?? ? ? perhaps lost him to the narrow ?philosophical community. (In Argentina, it was the fashion ?? ? ? of 'lawyers' to get a Brit Council ?fellowship and earn a doctorate under Hart, e.g. C. S. Nino ). ? ?? ? STRAWSON , P. F. Toulmin cites extensively from ?"Introduction to Logical Theory". I would assume ?? ? ?that Strawson's review of Toulmin for the ?Listener SHOULD have concentrated on his criticisms of ?? ? ? Strawson . Toulmin was particularly hurt, it ?seems, that Strawson only cared to 'roundly damn' the ?? ? ?book. Toulmin's observations on various ?aspects of Strawson's programme merit a closer ?? ? ?review. ? ?? ? URMSON , J. O. Toulmin quotes various essays ?by Urmson . Perhaps the most important one, ?? ? ?for which he does not care to give the exact ? biblio reference is "Two senses of 'probable' ". This ?? ? ?has an anti-Gricean ring to it (recall his ?modified Ockham's razor, 'do not multiply senses ?? ? ?beyond necessity' ), and its treatment ?occupies a whole section of Toulmin's book ambiguously ?? ? ?titled, "Is 'probably' ambiguous?". His ?prose is so subtle that I wasn't sure if he meant ?? ? ?that it's not. I guess " 'probable' NOT ?ambiguous" would have made for a better title of a ?? ? ?section if that was his claim. As with ? Strawson , Hart, and Austin, Toulmin provides the ?? ? ?full biblio references at the end of his ?book. So, we see he is also using Urmson's wonderful ?? ? ?essay on "Validity" (where he pre-dates ? Grice in some of the conversational maxims, etc.). ?? ? ?He also quotes from Urmson , "On grading". A ?classic repr . along with R. Hall, Excluders , ?? ? ?in Chappel (as I recall). ? There may be other cross-references I missed. In any case, this is the ? Toulmin that, historically, interests me. He has a topical, "On describing", ? co-authored with Baier , which was possibly very influential THEN. For some ? reason, whatever interest he had in ways that overlapped with the playgrouppers ?evolved into something different. He was possibly of broader interests. He ?quotes extensively for example from Ryle's colleague, Kneale and his work on ?induction and probability. So he was perhaps less parochial than the Saturday ?morning as wickedly recollected by Warnock -- 'we were only interested in what ?the others of the group were thinking' (Saturday mornings, in Berlin, Essays on ?Austin). This is perhaps unfair on Grice , since he is seen quoting a distant ?author like Stevenson, or a not so distant one like Witters -- and with a ?straight face, too! ? Cheers, ? JL Speranza ?? The Grice Club, etc. ? ---- ? ? S -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Dec 17 10:33:29 2009 From: jlsperanza at aol.com (jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2009 10:33:29 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Nowell-Smith and Grice Message-ID: <8513.b724f48.385ba949@aol.com> In a message dated 12/17/2009 9:58:15 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, Baynesr at comcast.net writes: First, P. H. Nowell-Smith informed me in correspondence some years ago that he was in this group. In fact, a close read of his _Ethics_ reveals some striking use of language one finds in Austin. I asked him if these locutions ( I don't have them at my finger tips) were his or Austin's. He was uncommitted but seemed to indicate they were Austin's. ---- Aha. I guess I knew about that. Nowell-Smith was _Trinity_, next to Grice's (St. John's -- they share the stone-wall and Trinity's gardens seem better for croquet than St. John's). Anyway, Nowell-Smith moved soon to Leicester and then Coventry, but returned to Oxford in later years, to everyone's happiness. I like my Oxford philosophers to live in Oxford. There is a PhD by an Italian called "Contextual implication" (the surname of the Italian, Rossi, of Firenze -- PhD submitted to an Italian university) where he compares Nowell-Smith with this other play group member, Grice. For 'contextual implication' has a lot to share with Grice's conversational implicature (oddly, I find in the online Short/Lewis Latin dictionary that 'implicatura' was used by Sidonius back in the 400s, A. D., to mean, of all things, 'entanglement' -- Loeb Classical Library). What's more interesting -- EVERYONE who was ANYONE, as the idiom goes (?), was writing about this type of 'pragmatic' implication by then: Hungerland, Grant, etc., and before them, Moore even, "Reply to Critics" in Library of Living Philosophers), is that the mechanisms for Nowell-Smith's contextual implication and Grice's conversational implicature are similar. In particular, historians of pragmatics (there _are_ such beasts!) who have traced the history of Grice's conversational maxims (notably Horn in his "Greek Grice: the history of conversational maxims" for the Chicago Linguistics Society, etc.) have noted that Nowell-Smith used, colloquially, the 'rule' as he calls it, 'be relevant' ---- Now, Grice will have this (under "Relation", to echo Kant) as one of the FOUR categories. In 1964, Relevance made a revival when Strawson published his "Identifying reference and truth-values" for THEORIA, repr. Logico-Linguistic Papers. He notes there is something like a "Principle" or Platitude as he amusingly calls it, of "Relevance" to guide the addressee into the right interpretation of "The king of France did not attend the recent exhibition at the Royal Academy; since, well, he does not exist". (Not that he would if he did). Grice would often refer to Nowell-Smith's views, I tend to recall, in "Prejudices and Predilections" but perhaps he doesn't. I think HE does when he recalls Nowell-Smith presenting Austin with a misquoted (by Grice) verse by Donne as 'unintelligible' English -- to get the proper Austinian rebuke, "perfectly intelligible to me". Nowell-Smith married and had many children and used to wear thick glasses. He has some other gems, too, like an essay in "Speech acts", and of course the proper essay in the Aristotelian Society on "contextual implication". His _Ethics_ is indeed a gem, and to think that it was published for Penguin shows how the world has changed (Penguin publishes erotica mainly today!). Cheers, JLS -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Dec 21 15:28:45 2009 From: jlsperanza at aol.com (jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 21 Dec 2009 15:28:45 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Toulmin in the History of Analytic Philosophy: The Oxford Years Message-ID: <4a0.2e2ec533.3861347d@aol.com> It would be too valiant to attempt an assessment of Toulmin in the history of analytic philosophy this December, seeing that Toulmin has died this December. Assessments like that take Decades. Plus, I seem to be mainly interested in what I call Toulmin's Oxford years, a few 6 years, from 1949 to 1954. His opus magnum, "The Uses of Argument", has received, as Bayne notes in his "Toulmin and the discovery of History", much attention in cyberspace, and here's yet another shot at it. For what _was_ Toulmin after? We should recall that Uses of Argument was published when Toulmin was quietly established as a lecturer in Leeds -- far from Oxonian polemics. ---- As I said elsewhere, it's best to see the Toulmin-Grice polemic (if any) via Strawson, for Strawson credits Grice as the man "from whom I never ceased to learn logic since he was my tutor in that topic" (or words to that effect -- does he mean, 'topic' qua discipline?) and formulates a few 'pragmatic rules' alla Grice ("I owe this pragmatic rule to H. P. Grice" -- he says in a footnote. Since Toulmin quotes extensively from Strawson's Introduction to Logical Theory, it is fair to assume that he was at least partially conscious that some pragmatic alternative or extensive analysis to any 'divergence' bewteen a logical constant and its natural-language counterparts _was_ availabe, or in the offing. ---- Yet Toulmin manages to speak of 'non-logical goats', which are herded away from the true logical goats like -- he cites, "or", "all" and "some". He _never_ uses the symbols, for his is an anti-formal, if not anti-logic, account. So it is difficult to see how he would react to a full-blown Gricean defense of the alleged divergence between a logical constant (as used in a classical logical calculus, when 'standardly interpreted in a bivalent way', as Grice has it) and their English, 'vulgar', analogues. ----- One thing is certain though. In his third preface to Uses of Argument, Toulmin compares books to children: they grow OUT of their parents, they move FROM their parents, to the point that they are hardly recognisable as one's offsprings. This, Toulmin claims, happened to his "Uses of Argument". Apparently, it received favourable critical reception in, of all places, America, where the fashion started for a new way of TEACHING logic -- 'informal logic', so-called. ------ But I propose to reconsider Toulmin's enterprise from the point where it started. I.e. without interference of any popularity Toulmin may have gained from this didactic pedagogic (apparent) facility of his book. E.g. is Toulmin seriously providing some Aristotelian backing to a 'new' way of treating 'inferences' and reasoning? I don't know! ------ It _is_ difficult to compare Toulmin and Grice because Grice, too, changed. Thus an online essay by Johnson on "Informal Logic" quotes from Grice, Aspects of Reason, 2001, 8, to the effect that actual reasoning does not adhere to "canonical inference patterns". This, taken out of context, is dangerous to give a definite interpretation. Grice, unlike Toulmin, seems to have regarded 'inference' (as 'sentence') as a value-oriented expression ('an inference is a GOOD inference'). On the other hand, a reader of Uses of Argument is treated to accounts of 'quasi-logical', 'quasi-valid' inferences which do not seem to foot the bill. ----- Then there's the topic of 'subject matter'. In "Logic and Conversation" Grice argues for an analysis of conversation (he is being partially jocular in his choice of words), 'regardless of its subject matter' to deal with a pet manoeuvre of his that he wants to criticise -- the alleged divergence between a logical constant and its vulgar counterpart --. But this context-invariance is precisely what Toulmin with his 'territorial-oriented validities' is meant to repudiate. ----- The 'discipline' of logic, beloved by Oxonians, was perhaps at the core of Toulmin's attack. It is NOT fair to deal with Toulmin as Grice deals with the informalists and formalists as accepting "two kinds of logic", for Toulmin, in his most serious, seems to negate that his 'working' logic is a _logic_ at all. I haven't seen his British Cataloguing in Publication data, but he would have had a fit if he saw his "Uses of Argument" catalogued as a "logic" book. But as a discipline, Logic, and Oxford logic in particular, is so florid; and Toulmin quotes extensively from his 'master' Ryle, making historical interpretations of his enterprise more difficult to evaluate. ----- In terms of his published stuff, it's easy to see where Grice is coming from. In his 1967 prolegomena to "Logic and Conversation" he lists then this 'manoeuvre' -- represented by Strawson, whom he quotes explicitly, regarding the divergence of logical constants. In those prolegoma Grice cites an alleged invalid inference regarding the first three connectives, "and" (He went to bed and took off his trousers), "or" (My wife is in the kitchen or in the garden, and I know where") and "if" (Strawson's convoluted definition, which Grice cares to cite in full: "each hypothetical statement made by this use of 'if' is acceptable (true, reasonable) if the antecedent statement, if made or accepted, would in the circumstances be a good ground or rason for accepting the consequent statement; and the making of the hypothetical statement carries the implication [implicature for Grice. JLS] either of uncertainty about, or of disbelief in, the fulfillment of both antecedent and consequent" (Strawson, op. cit., III, Pt 2). Since for 'and' and 'or' Grice does not care to provide a specific quote, it's best to regard that it was these 'indicative conditionals' he was having somewhat specifically in mind, and it's no surprise then than when he reprinted the lecture iv, he titled it, "Indicative Conditionals" -- for it is a full if somewhat inconclusive treatment of the alleged divergence (surely only alleged for Grice) between 'if' and the horseshoe. ------- Grice is ready to criticise his student. Strawson has acted properly, crediting Grice where credit is due, and Grice, a polemic figure in the best sense of the word, feels safely correcting this or that mistake in 'friends'. But where is _Toulmin_ coming from? ------- I for one couldn't yet find what his association with Oxford was, i.e. fellow of _what_ he was! In the other posts on "Toulmin and the Play Group" I have tried to provide some cross-references to the specific members of this play group that included Grice and Strawson and that Toulmin occasionally quotes in his vintage publications, and which may serve us to give us a better micro-picture of where he came from and what his impact was in Oxford, and why he obtained the reaction he obtained. I have NOT been able to trace Strawson's "Listener" review of Toulmin's "Uses of Argument", which Toulmin prides himself of having unsuccessfully 'damning (him) roundly', for "Uses of Argument" unlike "Introduction to Logical Theory" never came out of print. Then there's what I hope a less 'dismissive' (or aside-brushing) review by play group member J. O. Urmson in "Nature", entitled 'The province of logic' which should prove relevant when studying the Toulminiana in their proper context. In an online essay, G. M. Ross notes that for years British logicians felt that it was unfair to students to teach logic with Toulmin-type books. And Grice declares for a penchant for the 'tidiness' of the 'classical' logical calculus. The teaching of logic has undergone a transition from purely axiomatic methods (alla Euclid, indeed) to natural-deduction types, but to go the whole hog and replace "Principia" by "Uses of Argument" seems perhaps ... a bit too much? ---- In the long run, the reasons may be in the causes. Toulmin had come to Oxford already with an full-blown interest in the philosophy of science, where induction is all there is. Imagine his hurt ego when 'logicians' in Oxford would just dismiss that as 'invalid inferences' as mathematical logic has it. And while he did his 'linguistic botanising' best with words like 'probably', he got perhaps tired of do the same with logical goals -- he deals extensively with 'all', though, which he treats in ways parallel to the Strawson (guided by Grice) account in Introduction to Logical Theory. Perhaps when the Toulmin unpublications are made public we may be able to delve deeper in what counts as an interesting polemic in the heart of Oxford philosophy, by this "man", Wittgenstein called him, who had studied with Wittgenstein. Etc. Cheers, J. L. Speranza -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Dec 24 20:42:28 2009 From: jlsperanza at aol.com (jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 24 Dec 2009 20:42:28 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Glory Message-ID: I would like to drop a few points about the nature of 'proof-theory' of the type that R. B. Jones seems to be defending on this and other fora. Indeed, my main point is a query (to Jones or his 'ilk'!). I have been examining the apparent different conceptions of 'arguing', 'inferring', 'reasoning' and the like held by Grice and Toulmin. Toulmin, never a formalist, could care less (shall we say?) but for Grice the 'slate' diagrams, so called -- where each step of an inference is made explicit -- held some appeal for him. (see his refs. to the 'tidiness of modernist logic' in his Valedictory Essay in WoW and his commentary on a 'topologist' he knew who would often 'skip' a step in his 'proofs' -- in Reply to Richards). As tutors in logic may know, one Has to be somewhat tolerant when a student will skip a step in a proof. A proof, I take here, to be the 'arguitum' of Toulmin, i.e. the argument-qua-product, rather than argumentation-qua-process that most American endorsers of his book seem to have fallen in love with. Noel Coward warns us that everybody must do it, fall in love: teenagers squeazed into jeans do it. probably we'll live to see machines do it. let's do it, let's fall in love. ---- So how does proof-theory actually accounts for 'skips' in the reasoning? Shouldn't students (at least ONCE) be held responsible IF they SKIP, non-machine-wise, one step in the chain? I am amused by the talk on argument, etc. For Grice, part of the implicatum is indeed arguitum. The implicatum (of an implicature) is the result of a 'working-out' scheme by which the utterer intends the addressee will INFER (if not deductively, but more like abductively) the implicatum. Yet, Grice was a strict adherent, on days, of the 'tidiness' of 'formal valid inferences'. Toulmin, on the other hand, is more difficult to grasp. Ah, incidentally, the title is a reference to Humpty Dumpty. After displaying a sort of quasi-deductive argument in arithmetics 365 - 1 = 364 he exclaims, "There's glory for you". For, as I have argued elsewhere*, it may be thus that Oxford philosophy dons see this sometimes undefinable attribute. (* in Jabberwocky, "Humpty Dumpty's "Impenetrability"). Cheers, J. L. Speranza -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Dec 24 22:36:15 2009 From: jlsperanza at aol.com (jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 24 Dec 2009 22:36:15 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] "the class for all those whose classes have no members" Message-ID: No, not a neo-Russellian thing, well, almost. But A. G. N. Flew's (a student of Grice's) recollection of Grice's perhaps apt description of the 'playgroup' (cfr. WoW, "Conceptual analysis and the province of philosophy"). Cheers, J. L. S. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Dec 25 00:37:59 2009 From: jlsperanza at aol.com (jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 25 Dec 2009 00:37:59 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Run with the Hare, Hunt with the Hounds? Message-ID: I read from D. F. Pears's obit in The Independent: "J.L. Austin had his Saturday morning "kindergartens," in which David participated, as he did in A.J. Ayer's Tuesday evenings." So yet another sobriquet's for Grice's "playgroup", or "the class for all those whose classes have no members" -- the 'kindergartens'. Some caveats: 1) As G. E. L. Owens says in his obit. of Ryle in the Aristotelian Society, _after_ Austin died, Grice continued with the 'kindergartens', so it's unfair to see these as mainly Austinian in nature. 2) I once had Sir Stuart Hampshire granting me of the existence -- I have it in published form! -- of an "old playgroup" and a "new playgroup". You see, Hampshire had attended both what I called the old playgroup (with Austin and Ayer on Tuesday evenings at All Souls) AND, "less frequently, but I would dine with Grice often at his college", the 'new playgroup'. In a tape that S. Chapman transcribed for the gossipy entre nous, Grice confessed that he never attended the old playgroup's Tuesday evening meetings because he had been "brought up on the wrong side of the tracks". And he was! (I mean, if he said so). 3) So, this Pears attending BOTH the Tuesday evening meetings at Freddie's AND the kindergartens with J. Langshaw seems to me like the veritable hound-cum-hare. Etc. J. L. Speranza -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Dec 25 01:25:05 2009 From: jlsperanza at aol.com (jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 25 Dec 2009 01:25:05 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Pirate from Penzance Message-ID: In a message dated 12/17/2009 9:58:15 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, Baynesr at comcast.net writes: First, P. H. Nowell-Smith informed me in correspondence some years ago that he was in this group. In fact, a close read of his _Ethics_ reveals some striking use of language one finds in Austin. I asked him if these locutions ( I don't have them at my finger tips) were his or Austin's. He was uncommitted but seemed to indicate they were Austin's. Also, the expression 'pro-attitude' occurs in Nowell-Smith's _Ethics_ which we find in Davidson. ---- What a man, Patrick Horace. I learned from his obit. in the Independent that he was, of all places, from Polzeath, Cornwall! ---- Where I also learned that "Nowell-Smith" was concocted by P. H. after his father, "Nowell Charles Smith" but universally (as R. Grandy says H. P. Grice was known as Paul) known as "Nowell Smith". Aren't I moved to read from the obit: "Patrick became professor of philosophy at Leicester University in 1957, accepting the invitation, he said, because he felt overwhelmed by the presence at Oxford of JL Austin, Paul Grice and Peter Strawson (later Sir Peter, obituary, February 15), all of whom were "much cleverer" than he was." Of course they weren't! ---- And I treasure leads that P. H. gave to me to proceed, such as this PhD by Rossi on "Contextual implication" and "conversational implicature". For Grice's "be relevant" MUST be connected to Patrick Horace's 'rule of relevance'. And hey, both had attained firsts in classics in the 1930s. ---- "None the less, he believed that his reply to Austin's criticisms in the latter's celebrated 1956 paper, Ifs and Cans, was a complete answer to them" (i.e. to Austin, Grice and Strawson). ---- "It was typical that Patrick published it in 1960 in what he termed an obscure Scandinavian journal, where nobody read it, and did so because they asked to publish it." Indeed, he had a penchant for obscure publications... I treasure the citations of all his checklists of publications. ---- "Some who did so, and others, disapproved of his informal relations with his students. After marrying one of them, his second wife, he moved in 1968 to York University, Toronto, where he became emeritus professor in 1985." "A colleague of Patrick's joked that he was the only man he had ever met who felt that he had a positive moral duty to sleep with other men's wives. On hearing this, Patrick, who believed that wives were under no less an obligation, joked back that, as a utilitarian, he believed that he should add to the sum of human happiness - and had striven to do so. He did not always succeed, as he knew very well, but the world is a more solemn place without him." "One summer's day, when Patrick was eight or nine, he went for a walk with his mother. They decided to take note of how many different species of wild flowers they saw and counted to more than 100. He belonged to a different age and a different world" Indeed, quite a gap with D. H. Lawrence. He once asked an Italian, "What is this?" in Italian. The Italian replied, "It's a flower", to Lawrence's upset -- he wanted to know what _type_ of flower it was. "With his first wife, Perilla Southwell, he had three sons and a daughter, and with his second, Felicity Ward, he had two daughters. Both marriages ended in divorce." "This obituary has been revised since Colin Radford's death in 2001" Cfr. Speranza, "The Obituarist's Obituary". What an excellent man, Colin Radford was too. Hin "How can we be moved by Anna Karenina" being a masterpiece. Of course it is unethical to be moved by a fictional character! Cheers, J. L. Speranza From jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Dec 25 02:01:49 2009 From: jlsperanza at aol.com (jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 25 Dec 2009 02:01:49 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Unintelligible Engish, Misremembered Message-ID: In a message dated 12/17/2009 9:58:15 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, Baynesr at comcast.net writes: "First, P. H. Nowell-Smith informed me in correspondence some years ago that he was in this group. In fact, a close read of his _Ethics_ reveals some striking use of language one finds in Austin. I asked him if these locutions ( I don't have them at my finger tips) were his or Austin's. He was uncommitted but seemed to indicate they were Austin's. Also, the expression 'pro-attitude' occurs in Nowell-Smith's _Ethics_ which we find in Davidson." Indeed, as R. Paul has pointed out to me, either Grice or Nowell-Smith misremembered their Donne! Grice: at Austin's kindergartens: "One one occasion, [P. H.] Nowell-Smith [The 'Trinity' (Coll.) philosopher] (cast in the role of straight man) offered as an example of non-understandable English an extract from a sonnet of Donne: "From the round earth's imagined corners, Angels, your trumpets blow." "Austin said, 'It is perfectly clear what _that_ means; it means, 'Angels, blow your trumpets from what pe[r]sons less cautious than I would call the four corners of the earth'". (Grice, 'Reply to Richards'). As R. Paul notes, Holy Sonnet VII begins: At the round earth's imagined corners blow Your trumpets, angels, and arise, arise >From death, you numberless infinities Of souls, and to your scattered bodies go, All whom the flood did, and fire shall, overthrow... Of course 'extract' is free enough to be understood as 'rewrite'. Cheers, J. L. Speranza From jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Dec 25 02:14:54 2009 From: jlsperanza at aol.com (jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 25 Dec 2009 02:14:54 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] "No, thanks" (Was: Austin) Message-ID: In a message dated 12/17/2009 9:58:15 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, Baynesr at comcast.net writes: "First, P. H. Nowell-Smith informed me in correspondence some years ago that he was in this group. In fact, a close read of his _Ethics_ reveals some striking use of language one finds in Austin. I asked him if these locutions ( I don't have them at my finger tips) were his or Austin's. He was uncommitted but seemed to indicate they were Austin's. Also, the expression 'pro-attitude' occurs in Nowell-Smith's _Ethics_ which we find in Davidson." Other than the 'unintelligible, misremembered' Donne line, Grice recalls Strawson, Freedom and Resentment. Do we _take_ offence of, say, what a lunatic does? No. This limits, Strawson, says the cases only to what Grecian students do. Grice recalled the case when this Balkan student bribed P. L. Gardiner (as he told them at the kindergartens) allow the student an overnight visit to London. Nowell-Smith, in the role of the straight man, said that the proper way to signify that one has taken offence would be to say so. NIKOLAIDES enters room, offers money and says, "I hope that you will not be offended by this somewhat Balkan approach". GARDINER: (i) I do not take bribes on principle. (Nowell-Smith's suggestion) (ii) No, thanks (Austin's suggestion) Nowell-Smith went on discussing whether the implicature here was that Gardiner did take offence. Austin's suggestion seems to imply that a MINOR offence was taken, and that you do not need to _explicate_ (as per an explicature_) the reason for your taking offence, but keep the conversation smoothly Oxonian, all the time. Oddly, Warnock has Hare being "Nowell-Smith" here: The language of higher educationby I Healthcare - 2008 was making when he responded to R.M. Hare (Warnock 1973, 40n). How would one respond, ... Austin said: 'Would you, Hare? I think I'd say. ?No, thanks? .' ..." "I take no bribes on principle" "implied edifice of morals" So I think it WOULD be good if Toulmin explains for us the Wittgenstein poker. The more recent kindergartens seem to allow for some mnemonic divergences... (Of course I prefer Grice's to Warnock's -- more detailed and thus more bound to be truer). Cheers, J. L. Speranza From jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Dec 24 23:49:25 2009 From: jlsperanza at aol.com (jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 24 Dec 2009 23:49:25 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] The Play Group: D. F. Pears Message-ID: This is in memoriam. Pears, who died in July 2009, is a very important figure, in MY opinion, and others's, in the history of analytic philosophy. The Guardian obit has him as an "unsung hero", but that's a hateful phrase. My, give me a sung hero anyday. He cut a handsome figure, and I'm pleased that the photograph of his smart self graces the common room at Christ Church now. He collaborated with Grice in a paper that SHOULD be added should PGRICE gets a reprint! That's "Metaphysics", 1957 (co-authored Grice/Strawson/Pears) in Pears, very own, "The nature of metaphysics", 1955 Third programme lecturers aptly transcribed and published by David Francis (P). He would go on citing Grice -- and indeed, it was by courtesy of yours truly that Pears is credited as an early user of "implicature" in the online OED3 (quoting from his "Ifs and cans" -- a classic). But he'd also refer to Grice in various publications -- the best included in his Duckworth "Questions in the philosophy of mind" -- a must for those who look for a coherent theory of the mind by Oxonian philosophers and fail --. A notable quote comes from his "Motivated irrationality" when he reports Grice as protesting the theory of conversational implicature as being "too social to be true" when seen it applied by, of all people, Davidson, in his account -- failed one -- of "I shall but I won't" or "I will but I shan't". Grice in turn would quote Pears pervasively. My favourite of the Pears quotes by Grice is in "Intention and Uncertainty". Pears had indeed preceded Grice as Henriette Herz lecturer, so it was only appropriate that Grice would find a formidable way to end his talk by changing the topic from historical Prichard to the ever more contemporary Pears "and his work on the predictability of our decisions". There are some places that ONE associates with the Play Group: the Lamb and Flag, the Bird and Baby, St. John's itself, -- and now, we add: the long peripathetic walks in the Meadows, that Pears knew so well... A checklist of Pears' publications could only go to show what a genial, broad-minded interested, interesting philosopher (and more: he butterfly-collected) he was. Cheers, J. L. Speranza -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sat Dec 26 02:02:48 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sat, 26 Dec 2009 02:02:48 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] The Play Group: D. F. Pears Message-ID: I wrote of the peripathetic. A good malaprop, as it was. The obit in "The Independent" (by Paul Levy. Grice's obit in The Independent was written by J. O. Urmson) does go Aristotelian on this one, though: "He also says ..." [?] "that much Oxford philosophy of the time was peripatetic, conducted during long walks in the meadows and regular meetings of small groups." The problem is that a peripatos is really a come and go, go and come, up and down, down and up. For anyone who's been in the actual bit of Athens where those peripatoi took place, right? On the other hand, a long straight walk in the Meadows -- as you follow the river -- does not really qualify. Not much 'peri' about them. I felt MUCH more like in Plato's Hekademos (M. Chase has pointed out to me that "Academy" was created in memory of a hero known as "Hekademos", and, since, I cannot find myself using 'academy' anymore). The Hekademia was an olive grove, without the city wall, as it were -- and less peripatetic in nature then. The obit. continues: "J.L. Austin had his Saturday morning "kindergartens," in which David participated". I should check if the play group ever met at Christ Church. Warnock recalls that they (or at least Austin) seemed to prefer the big rooms of Grice's own college, St. John's, which had them look like successful businessmen. After Austin's death, Grice conducted the meetings at Corpus Christi. "I shall but I won't" "I won't but I shall" are perhaps too _blunt_ statements of the topics Pears and Grice were discussing. Grice only superficially refers to the 'shall' vs. 'will' distinction in "Intention and Uncertainty". But Pears's focus on the prediction aspects of our decisions may have bearing on this. Another delightful anecdote coming from Pears, I find is his discussion with this anonymous contender. The anecdote comes from the Times obituary, and paints Pears to a T, as they say: "Pears was at the centre of all this and a robust disputant: ?I wouldn?t stake my reputation on this,? said one prudent speaker. ?Who cares about your reputation?? was Pears?s comment, always intent on the philosophic, not the personal, nub." Christ Church is reputedly the best Oxonian college, and it was warming (if that's the expression) that Pears was the first curator of their Picture Gallery. It was also nice to learn that after all there _was_ a connection between that charming painting by Millais for the Pears's soap and the man whose obit we are commenting now. While educated at Devon, he had been born in fact in Bedfont, and he would meditate on the fact that the house of his actual birth was possibly 'obliterated' by that monster that is Heathrow. There _is_ a sort of festschrift for Pears, which I hope carries a good complete checklist of his publications. Etc. J. L. S. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Dec 27 02:46:44 2009 From: jlsperanza at aol.com (jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 27 Dec 2009 02:46:44 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Predicting and Deciding Message-ID: While I search for a wittier way to refer to Pears (I'm thinking on a pun with the famous soap of his ancestors or something alone the lines of 'pears' the fruits -- from the OED or something -- I'm titling this after Pears's lecture for the British Academy. Chapman notes that Grice's legacy will possibly be the 'first-person': he was an intentionalist, and thus the focus on the 'first person' was crucial to him. I want to think that that was the case with D. F. Pears. I'm trying to retrieve Grice's ref. to Pears in the last bit of "Intention and Uncertainty". If I'm not mistaken, Pears's distinction between (first-person) deciding and predicting _MAY_ relate to that distinction, often obliterated, if that's the word (but then, what _hides_ between the "ll" of "I'll" -- is it a 'will' or is it a 'shall'?) between what is perhaps best seen as Future Intentional and Future Factual. In "Intention and Uncertainty", Grice explores aspects of English modality which are pretty hard to conceptualise. Consider some of the examples from the elementary wiki entry on the 'future': begin quoted text: "In all of these, action within a future range of time is contemplated. However, in all cases, the sentences are actually voiced in the present tense, since there is no proper future tense in English. It is the implication of futurity that makes these present tense auxiliary constructions amount to a compound future quasi-tense. An additional form of expressing the future is "I am going to...". This reality, that expression of futurity in English is a function of the present tense, is born out by the ability to negate the implication of futurity without making any change to the auxiliary construction. When a verbal construction that suggests futurity (such as "I shall go") is subsequently followed by information that establishes a condition or presupposition, or the active verb stem itself contradicts a future indicative application of the construction, then any sense of future tense is negated - especially when the auxiliary will is used within its literal meaning, which is to voluntarily 'will' an action. For example: Person A says: "You will go now. You will not stay." Person B answers: "I shall go nowhere. I will stay." The second 'will', in B's response, is not only expressing volition here but is being used in contradistinction to the usual first person 'shall' in order to achieve emphasis. Similarly, in the case of the second and third persons, 'will' operates with 'shall' in reverse. For example: A: Will he be at the caf? at six o'clock? B: He will be there. [Normal affirmation] HOWEVER, B: He shall be there. [Stresses that this is not the usual pattern that was previously established or to be expected (Last time he was late or did not show up)] --- end of quoted text. In "Intention and Uncertainty", Grice quotes from Bertold Brecht's _Regufee Conversations_: "Denmark was at one time plagued by a succession of corrupt finance ministers. [...] To deal with this situation, a law was passed requiring periodic inspection of the books of the Finance Minister. A certain Finance Minister, when visited by the inspectors, said to them 'If you inspect my books, I shall not continue to be your finance minister. They retired in confusion, and only eighteen months later it wsa discovered that the Finance Minister had spoken nothing other than the literal truth." Grice, 'Intention and Uncertainty', Oxford, p. 11 Grice comments: "This anecdote [...] exploits a modal ambiguity in the future tense, between (a) the future indicated or factual and (b) the future intentional. "This ambiguity extends beyond the first person form of the tense; there is a difference between 'There will-F be light' (future factual) and 'There will-I be light' (future intentional). "God might have uttered the second sentence while engaged in the Creation." "Sensitive Englsh speakers (which most of us are not) may be able to mark this distinction by discriminating between 'shall' and 'will'. "'I shall-I go to London' stands to 'I intend to go to London' analogously to the way in which 'Oh for rain tomorrow!' stands to 'I wish for rain tomorrow'." ---- This bit below is what fascinates me about Grice and his focus on the first-person: "Just as NO ONE *ELSE* can say JUST what *I* say when I say "I shall-I go to London". "If someone else says "Grice will go to London", he will be expressing his, not my, intention that I shall go." (p. 11). ---- The asymmetries marked by the wiki entry for the future confuse me (slightly): "shall (and its subjunctive should). This implies obligation or determined intent when used in the second person and its plural, and implies a simple future meaning in the first and third. will (and its subjunctive form would). This implies wish or intent for the future, other than in the first and third person, in which it implies obligation or determined intent. Otherwise, it is used as the most neutral form and it is the most commonly used." and I hope Pears shed light on this. I recall Grice coining (or reviving) a nice turn of phrase for something like this distinction: 'protreptic' (versus merely 'exhibitive') Trespassers shall be prosecuted -- or some such example, Grice notes, does not merely exhibit the utterer's intention, but also aims at the addressee forming a similar intention. It's 'protrepsis'. But back to the predicting and deciding. Predicting then seems to be all about the 'factual', not the intentional. It's about the future 'indicated' as Grice has it (where I _think_ 'indicated' is 'cognate' with INDICATIVE, so that 'future intentional' would NOT be 'indicative' mode -- Grice hated 'mood' and adopted 'mode' apres Moravsik (sp?) after he would visit Grice across the bay. These points may connect with Bayne's research on Anscombe and notes like his "Deliberation and Grammar", this forum. Cheers, J. L. Speranza From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sat Dec 26 22:15:50 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sat, 26 Dec 2009 22:15:50 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Glory Message-ID: I wrote >I would like to drop a few points about the nature of 'proof-theory' of the type that R. B. Jones seems to be >defending on this and other fora. Indeed, my main point is a query (to Jones or his 'ilk'!). and wish to thank some useful offlist leads. For starters, there are a few distinctions to be made. The main one is to qualify the above in connection with "formal proof". --- May I share some running commentary on the wiki entry on 'formal proof'. My query related to 'computerised proof technology'. It seems that a computer can not and will not 'skip' a step. So why do we _allow_ that non-computers do it? Indeed Grice once remarked, as I recall -- in Aspects of Reason -- that the less inferential steps one displays explicitly, the more 'rational' one will be accounted as being. But since I titled this "Glory" i.e. Humpty Dumpty's 'a nice knockdown argument' -- only in the phrase, said smugly, and to Alice, only: "There's _glory_ for you". I was wondering if we can treat 'prove' as a factive, alla 'know'. So, we can say, 'the computer proved it', because, well, the computer, as per computerised proof technology never skipped a step. But if humans do, can we say that they _have_ proved (or as Americans may prefer, proven) it? Where _is_ the proof of the pudding? Is that the exception that proves the rule? Grice remarks of this topologist he knew who was regarded with something near veneration, "yet, everytime he wanted to display a proof, either there was at least one mistake, or a lapse in the sequencing" (words to that perlocutionary effect). In similar contexts, Grice would seem to have thought that Chomsky's rule derivations (for the formation of well-formed sentences) are _so_ complex that we cannot assume the human brain 'processes' them, and yet we _can_ produce well-formed transformations of well-formed sentences. I would think Grice, when challenged about the psychological _unreality_ of the 'precise' proof, would recourse to the concept of 'deeming' which became of favourite of his later philosophy. We can _deem_ a proof to have taken place. But I don't think the writers of wiki will agree. wiki starts by _defining_ a formal proof (or 'derivation') as "a finite sequence of sentences (called wff in the case of a formal language) each of which is an axiom or follows from the preceding sentences in the sequence by a rule of inference. The last sentence in the sequence is a theorem of a formal system." "The theorem is a SYNTACTIC consequence of all the well-formed formulas preceding it in the proof." (emphasis mine. JLS) "For a wff to qualify as part of a proof, it must be the result of applying a rule of the deductive apparatus of some formal system to the previous wffs in the proof sequence." "Formal proofs [can be] constructed with THE HELP OF COMPUTERS in interactive theorem proving." "Significantly, these proofs can be checked AUTOMATICALLY, also by computer." -- where automatically may mean, also, 'algorithmically', or in virtue of the existence of an algorithm or decision procedure, I don't know. wiki continues: "CHECKING formal proofs is usually simple, whereas FINDING proofs (AUTOMATED theorem PROVING) is generally computationally hard." I wonder if the above refers to 'abduction' vs. deduction. When I did logic -- never mind taught it -- I found that one was given some more freedom in FINDING a proof. Some exercises were pretty silly, in that they provided you the premise and the conclusion (or last sentence in the sequence) and motivated you to _prove_ it. Indeed, compared to that, which requires SOME imagination -- and more so if you are NOT given the conclusion -- _checking_ a proof seems like a piece of, er, pudding. The wiki entry then defines a 'formal language' as "a set of finite sequences of SYMBOLS." (cfr. Grice, cited in Strawson's obit, "If you can't put it in symbols, it's not worth saying") (I'm still struggling to provide for that the best symbolic notation possible). "Such a language", the wiki entry goes on, "can be defined without reference to any meanings of any of its expressions; it can exist before any interpretation is assigned to it ? that is, before it has any meaning." Point taken; it is syntactic. But 'rules of inference' alla Gentzen _usually_ seem to have a justification in terms of their intuitive reflection of 'ordinary-language' inferences. I cannot see how one can device (or even care to device) a rule of inference alla introduction or elimination of any logical constant unless one is in some way 'reconstructing' the intuitively valid inferences. The necessity of defining a formal language is obvious for, as the wiki entry goes, "Formal proofs are expressed in some formal language." "A formal grammar (also called formation rules) is a precise description of the wff of a formal language." "It is synonymous with the set of strings over the alphabet of the formal language which constitute well formed formulas." "A formal system (also called a logical CALCULUS, or a logical system) consists of a formal language together with a deductive apparatus (also called a deductive system). The deductive apparatus may consist of a set of transformation rules (also called inference rules) or a set of axioms, or have both. A formal system is used to derive one expression from one or more other expressions." It's amazing how well-versed was Grice in all this and circa 1967, i.e. before moving to "Formalistic America" (S. Chapman in her bio of _Grice_ in a rather irritating way has a whole chapter entitled, "American formalism" as if this were the property of Americans!). More amazing is to think that by 1969 he was able to quote from Boolos, Parsons, Myro, and Mates in his "System" in the festschrift for Quine. And by the same time, perhaps the end of it all was that hurtful remark by Putnam, "who, of all people," Grice confides in his "Prejudices and predilections" "complained that I was too formal". ---- Myro once relabelled Grice's System as "System G" -- in manuscripts made available to me by Sally Haslanger. And I have personally managed to expand Myro's system G into a 'highly powerful", as I proudly describe it, or alternatively, "hopefully possible" -- the idea is that it should abbreviate as "h. p." -- So that I get System G(hp) -- where hp is for 'herbert paul' that is. Oddly I was recently told that 'hp' can mean not just 'hire purchase' but a type of sauce. My friend Donal McEvoy having recently compiled for my delectation a little limerick: There once was a philosopher Grice Who when asked did he think H.P. (*) nice? Replied, "I'm not sure Of your saucy implicature - I'll get back to you when I've thought twice." (* In England a most famous version of brown or "Daddy's" sauce is "H.P. Sauce". [Hence "saucy implicature"]). wiki continues: "An interpretation of a formal SYSTEM or CALCULUS" Grice liked 'calculus' as when he said that he only really showed some interest, in "Prejudices and Predilections" for 'first-order predicate calculus' 'with identity', he hastens to add. "is the assignment of meanings to the SYMBOLS, and truth-values to the sentences of a formal system. The study of interpretations is called formal semantics." "Giving an interpretation is synonymous with constructing a model." References 'deduction', in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, External links "A Special Issue on Formal Proof". Notices of the American Mathematical Society. December 2008. http://www.ams.org/notices/200811/. 2?ix.com: Logic Part of a series of articles covering mathematics and logic. ---- In many publications Grice did want to go 'over the top' -- which is the _norm_ with formal proof, and proceed step by step. Notably in Aspects of Reason when he tries to reconstruct Shropshire's reasoning to the effect that the soul is immortal. (out of the premise that if you behead a chicken it runs for some five minutes). On the other hand, he would refer to 'implicit' reasoning. For Grice, to 'reason' when it comes to non-computers, involves a _causal_ link. There must be an intention to infer, and the intention that there is a VALID passage from datum to claim via a warrant (to use Toulmin's terminology) should play a causal role in the entertaining of a conclusion. I once shared this with Stich, and I don't know if it was the weather or what (it was at Campinas) but he said, smugly, "Preposterous" (implicating that Griceans don't know the first thing about causal roles in hard-core cognitive science). So it's EXPLICIT reasoning we are talking here. R. Warner, who edited Aspects of Reason, makes the distinction explicit. As Warner notes, it would be bold to consider that the following is an explicit piece of reasoning. Or a piece of explicit reasoning: Everybody loves my baby but my baby don't love nobody but me _____________________________________________________ Therefore, I am my baby. On the other hand, it can be made explicit as follows: 1. Everybody loves my baby (Ass.) 2. My baby don't love nobody but me (Ass.) 3. My baby is included in the class of everybody. 4. My baby loves my baby (From 1 and 3) ___________________________________ 5. Therefore, I am my baby Etc. (It's best the way Warner has it in non-formal prose, along the lines, "Everybody loves my baby but my baby don't love nobody but me, but since my baby is included in 'everybody', this yields that my baby loves my baby. Now, since my baby don't love nobody my baby, I am my baby." Another who was for formal proof was D. F. Pears. He would like to have people discussing hard pieces of reasoning with him. One was cautious, "I wouldn't like to risk my reputation by entering in such a difficult argumentation with you". To which Pears replied, "But honestly, who cares about your reputation?" As the obit reads, "always intent on the philosophic, not the personal, nub." Cheers, J. L. Speranza