From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Jul 6 09:25:22 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2009 09:25:22 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Intention and Uncertainty Message-ID: The other day I was reading a newspaper cartoon. It went: LITTLE GIRL (to little brother). Did you actually put a snake in my room? LITTLE BROTHER. I don't know! LITTLE GIRL (running away in horror) AAGGHHHH! FATHER appears. Little Brother says to Father "My latest trick is uncertainty" ---- And let us recall that while Grice _is_ quoting Anscombe, his main thing seems to be, as far as the title of his B. A. lecture goes, a reply (rumour had it) to Hart/Hampshire, "Intention and _Certainty_" (or words to that effect) in _Mind_. Indeed, I believe Grice (and Quinton) attended the seminar which originated the Hart/Hampshire essay -- should check with 'p.c.' here and there). Well, I've just checked (by telephone, as it happens!) and it seems Grice does not specifically refer to the shopping-list, but there we have. The reference is on p. 8 of the British Academy reprint. This lecture by Grice has been published in two formats: The one I have is the separatum issued by the Clarendon Press, numbered 1-... onwards, and the citation is on p. 8. If you do quote the Proceedings of the British Academy, the citation should be different. Let me check. vol. 57, pp. 263-279. So, according to my arithmetic, in that version, the Anscombe quote should be on p. 268. -- ----- (Personally, I cannot see how you have to pay ten pounds sterling to get the pdf.!). It's enough to put you in a bad mode _contra_ Grice, but don't let _that_ happen. I can see if I can provide further quote (by telephone, if I get the person to dictate it to me) of the passage leading to the Anscombe quote. The person that is dictating to me cannot read "Greek" and Grice has just referred to something in Greek by Aristotle ("There are some Greek signs here," she said). And then Grice writes (all emphasis mine) "This point _may_ be (and *I think* _has_ been [Footnote 1 -- "1 By Professor Anscombe"]) put vividly by saying that if a man fails to fulfil an intention we do not criticise his state of mind for failing to conform to the facts, we criticise the facts for failing to conform to this state of mind." --- Not as vivid as the shopping-list example, but some running comments on Bayne below -- thanking him for sharing the list of contents of his Anscombe book with the list -- very interesting. --- First some symbolism. In reflecting on the shopping list, I was reminded of some symbolism, which I think is 'cute'. And which I use using Word word-processing, under 'insert symbol'. It's the downward arrow and the upward arrow. This has been used, I think, by Searle in his taxonomy of speech acts -- and later used by Searle/Vanderveken. We would have then ? and ? To use the shopping-list example ? for the shopping list proper. and ? for the later check-up as to whether we 'shopped' the things in the list. Or to use Grice's example above (crediting Anscombe) for the vividness. ? "a man fails to fulfil an intention" we "criticise the facts for failing to conform to his state of mind" but _ ? we do _not_ "criticise his state of mind for failing to conform to the facts." Or again, in better rhetoric, to keep the ordering used by Grice: "a man fails to fulfil his intention" ? "we do _not_ criticise his state of mind for failing to conform to the facts," what we do is ? "criticise the facts for failing to conform to his state of mind" ----- I think this actually plays on some 'ambiguity' on 'fail' -- consider a man who fails to help himself -- or 'hisself' as I prefer! -- vis a vis S. Bayne's recent reply to M. Zeleny elsewhere --. "a man fails to fulfil his intention" may have a 'moral' shade to it, in which case we _may_ (go and) criticise the _man_, if not the woman (sorry for the latter, couldn't resist vis a vis _Anscombe_!). re: the 'man': I have elsewhere been criticised for having _quoted_ Grice's definition of 'implicature': books.google.com/books?isbn=0674852710... Grice, Logic and Conversation: "A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p has implicated that q, may be said to have conversationally implicated that q, provided that ..." (p. ). People do use 'fail' rather sloppily sometimes. And here we may very well have a case of what Grice has elsewhere called a 'disimplicature'. Consider: It's not that I failed; I never _tried_. I don't think it's good form to use 'fail' as it's ordinarily used, "A man fails to fulfil an intention". -- "of his own", we expect. Surely to 'fail to fulfil my mother's intention' seems a different animal altogether. 'fail' seems to get Grice 'disentangled' here. I use 'disentangle' _technically_. When browsing the online Short/Lewis, I noticed that the do have an entry for "inplicatura" sic with "n" -- and the reference being Sidonius (Loeb Classical Library). I checked with the English text, and it's translated as 'entanglement'. Thus, a 'disimplicature' should be a disentanglement, which makes sense (see my "Grice Disentangled" -- elsewhere). 'fail' should mean, explicitly, the mere occurrence of the "~" operator -- and the use of the lexeme (cognate with 'fallacy' for example) is rhetorical and merely meant to improve the prose. I think what Grice disimplicates here is the 'moral shade' to it. And so his "a man fails to fulfil an intention" (and does not get criticised in his 'state of mind' -- i.e. in his intention proper) should read as: ~ (A man fulfils his intention). --- Perhaps using "A" for agent, and "alpha" for action should make things more explicit: ~(A fulfils his intention to do alpha). -- For in this case, we can mutatis mutandis apply it to the shopping list. He's looking for truffles (I've had them last Saturday and loved them). He goes to the supermarket. Has them in his 'shopping list'. His intention is to buy truffles. But truffles are not for sale (sold out, not delivered, etc.). So surely we should criticise the retailer. But _my mother_ would criticise the _man_ for he failed (she overuses this word) to have a _proper_ intention, as she would call it, i.e. a reasonably fulfillable one (and she thinks truffles _are_ extravagant overrated sort of over-rotten French mushrooms, anyways [sic]). ----- Now, in "Aspects of Reason" Grice uses ? for the 'assertoric' operator ----- (and cfr. Grandy's quessertion, "? ?" -- or is it " ? ?" -- cited by Grice, WoW -- 'Meaning Revisited') and ! for the 'boulomaic' operator -- the distinction by Aristotle that immediately precedes Grice's reference to Professor Anscombe. But while cute -- and indeed Grice has three operators, ?, !, and ? -- but we can see the ? reductible to ! -- this fails to show the Fregean point so well discussed by Hare in his dissertation for Oxford -- Dictors. As Hare notes, Frege uses ? as a complex sign: each of the strokes here is relevant. --- while "!" (or ?for that matter) would be _opaque_ in that respect: i.e. it would fail to show the 'compositional' nature of the sign as first conceived by Frege for the 'assertoric' operator. Now for the commentary on Bayne: In a message dated 2/28/2009 2:12:22 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: >Thanks for this, I knew I could count on you! Thanks. I thought it was interesting that Grice (who belonged to this generation of philosophers who would _NOT_ end their essays with long, academic boring lists of references -- but have to do with the occasional footnote here and there --) cared to credit Anscombe, so it is a pleasure to provide the quote (and now page number) for anyone interested in Anscombe's philosophy and how it got received by her very own generation of Oxonian colleagues. Bayne: >Just a couple of >points. "I shall return" and make a couple of other points, but >my email is backing and...Anyway. >The business of the shopping list occurs in the context of >distinguishes two "knowledges" (the first plural use of >'knowledge' I can recall seeing). This is excellent. Indeed. I should recheck with Grice's Aristotelian Greek terms here. But if we are thinking of 'episteme', it _is_ idiosyncratic (but 'very Anscombe') to use 'knowledge' in the plural. >Recall that for Anscombe >(and Wittgenstein) knowledge is possible only where there >is a distinction to be drawn between thinking you know and >seeming to know (p. 14). I will -- I will recall. The other day I was telling a friend, "Recall Richards, who says that what is otiose should not be false" -- and provided the OED quote, which I find brilliant: "Sometimes it is held that whatever is redundant or otiose, whatever is not required, although not obstructive or disruptive, is also false." I. A. RICHARDS Princ. Lit. Crit. (1925) 269 -- (I'm happy to say that after my correspondence with the Richards executor at Cambridge, John Constable, Grice is now credited in the reprint of Richard, Meaning and Meaning -- Anyway, this friend, on my recalling him Richards, wrote back, "No. The damage has been done long ago" (or words to that effect) -- playing on 'recall' as used in Comercialese. I felt offended by failing to see the implicature, and promised myself never again to use 'recall'. Bayne: But I suppose I can be recalled that I have to distinguish between I seem to know. and I think I know. ---- The distinction seems to be that 'seem' is hardly propositional as 'think' is? Grice discusses 'factives' in WoW "Presupposition and Conversational Implicature", google books. Using an example, "He seemed to know the answer alright" i i.e. "He seemed to know that Jamestown was founded by John Smith" "He thought he knew the answer alright" ii i.e. "He thought he knew that Jamestown was founded by John Smith". In i, with "seem", we not need ascribe any propositional attitude to the alleged 'knower' other than 'know' itself, which we do not assert, hence the cancellability of i as iii iii He seemed to know that Jamestown was founded by John Smith, and it turned out that he was right and actually Knew that because as it happens Jamestwon WAS founded by John Smith. ii, on the other hand, ascribes to the 'knower' a previous propositional atittude of 'belief'. And the cancellability should yield differently: iv He thought he knew that Jamestown was founded by John Smith, and as it turned out, he was perfectly right in so thinking because Jamestown _was_ founded by John Smith. Bayne: >Now in Section 32 part of the >point is to distinguish observable knowledge and knowledge >"in intention." This distinction was necessitated by the >requirement that the relevant "Why?" question distinctive >in its applicability to cases of intention was distinguishable >from other senses, particularly where 'involuntary' entails >an understanding of intention. In these cases we can't >evade the "Why?" question by pleading an involuntary act. I see. I do look forward to your book. You've done some excellent work in disentangling Anscombe, too! Bayne: >The main point has to do with the relation of mistakes >or the possibility of being mistaken in relation to two >kinds of knowledge, suggesting two kinds of mistakes. These >two kinds are illustrated, respectively, by the detective >and the shopper. Direction of fit, if it pertains, is >alluded to in the relation of following the list as ordered >and making up the list. We can ignore this, momentarily, >although I think it is important in deciding a number of >questions. I see. I should explore the 'detective' scenario more closely, notably vis a vis this 'vividness' that Grice ascribes to Anscombe: "a man fails to fulfil his intention" ? "we do _not_ criticise his state of mind for failing to conform to the facts," what we do is ? "criticise the facts for failing to conform to his state of mind" --- Suppose it's Miss Marple (a woman, rather than a man) -- written by a woman, Agatha Christie. The detective has the intention to prove that the murderer was Lady Astley. Now, if the murdered was the Butler -- then Miss Marple fails to fulfil her intention. Personally, I would criticise Miss Marple for _having_ the intention in the first place. She should have stuck, as veritable detectives should, to _observable knowledge_, and she was "mistaken" (in having the intention). Certainly I would not criticise Lady Astley for having failed to conform to the detective's state of mind. --- I'm trying to recall the name of this Lady in this Penny Dreadful, but fail. (There's a DVD of it). Bayne: >I notice that the Grice essay you mention is from the >British Academy. The are VERY understanding on copyright, >very good, indeed! If I can get the citation, I'll put it >on hist-analytic at some point in the future. Okay. So far, without my rhetoric, it would go: "The point may be (and this has been 1 (*1 By Professor Anscombe)) put vividly by saying that if a man fails to fulfil an intention we do not criticse his state of mind for failing to conform to the facts, we criticise the facts for failing to conform to his state of mind." (p. 268) Grice, 'Intention and Uncertainty' Proceedings of the British Academy. 57. 263-279. (p. >I'll take a look at what else you've had to say, soon, >hopefully. Thanks. Take your time. I should paste here your list of contents for further examination, but one thing at a time. I loved the specificness of the table of contents. And all my support and morale for your undertaking. Yes, I do think that "Intention and Uncertainty" should be compiled in a collection of Grice, "Philosophical Papers" -- to be published by Clarendon, of course! (just joking) and which should include not just "Intention and Uncertainty" but his "Vacuous Names", "Actions and Events" (PPQ 1986), Aristotle on the multiplicity of being (PPQ 1988), Akrasia (in Vermazen/Hintikka), 'Metaphysics' (in Pears, The nature of metaphysics), and a few other gems from his unpublications filling 13 'big cardboard boxes' at Bancroft Library (UC/Berkeley). I cannot think of any other philosopher who has been so careful in_keeping_ drafts of things. Chapman notes that Grice kept essays he wrote while he was still living in Holborne, Warwickshire -- and that would be when he was in his early 20s. -- To think that he kept those drafts, and took them from Oxford to Berkeley when he moved _is_ moving. He also hoped that someone should transcribe the tapes he kept of his seminars in metaphysics, etc. We should fund an "H. P. Grice Memorial Trust", or something. Cheers, J. L. Speranza (we may retain the header, since, while Grice did not then refer to the shopping list itself, he does use the expression, googlebooks, in his "Metaphysics and Philosophical Eschatology") when he lists the things that eschatology should provide!) ---- For easy ref. 'Table of Contents' of Bayne, _Anscombe_ --- begin quoted text (c) S. R. Bayne: _Understanding Intention: Elizabeth Anscombe's Philosophical Psychology_. TABLE OF CONTENTS PART 1: INTENTION AND KNOWLEDGE 1: ?Prediction?, ?Intention?, and ?Intentional? 2: Prediction, Commands and the ?Falsity? of Expressions of Intention. 3: Expressions of Intention, Prediction and Talking Leaves. 4: The Agent as Sole Authority in Knowledge of Intentions PART 2: REASONS, INTENTIONS, AND KNOWLEDGE 5: ??A Certain Sense of the Question ?Why?? 6: Intentional ?Under a Description? a. Anscombe?s Later Discussion of ?Under a Description? b. Davidson?s Use of ?Under a Description? c. The Intentionality of Sensation d. Anscombe?s Criticism of Davidson on Agency e. Davidson on Tying One?s Shoes ?Under a Description? 7: The Involuntary 8: Non-Observational Knowledge a. Donnellan on ?Knowing What I Am Doing? 9: A Difficult Distinction Based on Causation 10: Introducing Mental Causes 11: Mental Causes are neither Intentions nor Desires 13: Backward Looking Motives and Motives-In-General 14: Mental Causes and Backward-Looking Motives 15: Mental Causes or Reasons? PART 2: ACTING WITHOUT REASON 16: ?I Don?t Know Why I Did It? 17: ?I Don?t Know Why I Did It? (Continued) 18: When the Answer to the Question ?Why?? Makes No Sense 19: What Makes an Action Intentional? 20: Non-Forward Looking Intentional Actions 21: Chains Consisting of Actions PART 3: SERIES OF INTENTIONAL ACTIONS 22: ?Acting with the Intention That? 23: Whether an Intentional Action has a Unique Description as Such 24: Individuating Actions 25: Identifying Intentional Actions 26: How Many Actions are There? 27: Acts of Intending and the Presumption of Their Efficacy a. Intentional Acts of Creation 28: Observational Knowledge of Intentions, Again 29: I Do What Happens 30: Against the Idea of Intentions as Initiating Causes of Action 31: Knowledge of Intention is not Like Our Knowledge of Commands 32: Lists and Two Kinds of Error: Introducing Practical Wisdom PART 4: PRACTICAL WISDOM 33: Aristotle?s Practical Syllogism 34: Wants and Practical Reasoning 35: Wanting as the Starting Point of a Practical Syllogism a. Actions as processes b. Wants not Included in a Practical Syllogism c. Incontinence and the Division of Responsibility d. The Difference between Theoretical and Practical Syllogisms 36: Wanting and Its Place in Reasoning --- end of quoted text. (c) S. R. Bayne **************An Excellent Credit Score is 750. See Yours in Just 2 Easy Steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1222377077x1201454398/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd=Jul yExcfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Tue Jul 7 20:31:29 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2009 17:31:29 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Intention and Uncertainty Message-ID: <717388.89515.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com> I have to reply piece meal since your post covers a lot of territory. I note with interest that Grice does not mention the shopping list case. What, specifically, do we have to relate the two in this case. Before you cited something on fitting. I don't have easy access to this right now, but was there a mention of Anscombe by name in any of these papers? I can't believe that her 1957 book had no influence on Grice, but given the paucity of citations of others in her own work, I don't count this against Grice. Anscombe is evasive on the subject of meaning in natural language. By this I mean that she rarely addresses the idea of meaning directly. If we can get hold of Grices British Academy Lecture I would put it on Hist-Analytic in a heart beat. The British Academy is remarkably generous in allowing others to use the lectures; they are a model and I would not in this regard anticipate any difficulty. So if we can get this I could put it up.? 'And then Grice writes (all emphasis mine) ??????????? "This? point _may_ be (and *I think* _has_ been ???????????? [Footnote 1 -- "1 By Professor Anscombe"]) ???????????? put vividly by saying that ??????????? if a man? fails to fulfil an intention ??????????? we do? not criticise his state of mind ??????????? for? failing to conform to the facts, ??????????? we? criticise the facts ??????????? for? failing to conform to this ??????????? state of? mind."' Yes, this is thematic in Anscombe; one finds something like it Prichard. By the way, your notation on fitting is fine; I think Searle's method is elegant but where does one go from there?! Or to use Grice's example above (crediting Anscombe) for the? vividness. Oh, I see you followed my comments on Zeleny; he is a very bright fellow, and more importantly, somewhat interesting. When I say things like "a man fails to fulfil his intention" There is an evaluation of his action as accomplishing his end, but I don't mean that he is morally benefited by satisfying his intentions; for example if they are evil, etc. ? I haven't gone into implicature; this is deserving of extended treatment, but if I march off in this direction I might never return. You remark: "of? over-rotten French mushrooms, anyways [sic])." Now why am I under the impression that only someone from S. America would say this. I like this but a DO have to commend the French for making interesting practically everything at which they excel, from cooking to chemistry; politics to geometry. In fact I'm thinking about putting up Nicod or Hintikka on Descartes. He would never object to this and I think I can get all other rights in order. Grandy's quessertion? I'm unfamiliar with this. Sounds interesting. I'll recheck WoW for it. "for the 'boulomaic' operator" It's things like "boulomaic operators" that drove me to Samuel Alexander. I'll pick this up, hopefully, where I left off later. Regards STeve --- On Mon, 7/6/09, Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: From: Jlsperanza at aol.com Subject: Intention and Uncertainty To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Date: Monday, July 6, 2009, 9:25 AM -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Fri Jul 10 16:47:13 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2009 20:47:13 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Deliberation and Grammar Message-ID: <172840282.163971247258833523.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> On linguistic intentions: I can only intend to say what grammar permits. Grammar therefore circumscribes the limits of my linguistic intentions to this degree: I cannot utter ?x? with the intention of saying ?y? unless ?y? is a sentence and ?x? may be a set of, say, Chomsky-Halle features. But this is not to claim that I cannot have the intention to say what grammar does not allow is impossible, unless there is a grammar to thought. That there is would appear to be the prevalent view. But grammatical impossibility stands in relation to linguistic intentions as possibility of success stands in relation to deliberation about means for Aristotle. The parallels are not exact, but they are suggestive. Steve Bayne -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Fri Jul 10 18:28:14 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2009 18:28:14 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Deliberation and Grammar In-Reply-To: <172840282.163971247258833523.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <172840282.163971247258833523.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <85A3F0B8-53ED-4CDD-8601-3F8E5BFF33DC@philos.umass.edu> Steve says, "I cannot utter ?x? with the intention of saying ?y? unless ?y? is a sentence and..." But surely I can utter "Bonjour" with the intention of saying "Hello" even though "Bonjour" is not a sentence. Am I missing something? Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Jul 10 19:56:38 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2009 19:56:38 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Quessertives Message-ID: Grice's Quessertions In a message dated 7/7/2009 8:31:46 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: Grandy's quessertion? I'm unfamiliar with this. Sounds interesting. I'll recheck WoW for it. ----- Little by little my reply then. But _yes_, Grice (1971) does quote Anscombe by name -- it's the footnote then, on the page I cited. The footnote just goes, "By Professor Anscombe". If that's not a footnote I don't know what one _is_. And the context was that vivid example "The point may be (and I think has been (* by Professor Anscombe)) put vividly by saying that if a man fails..." etc. Now for the quessertion. There was a Generative-Semantics piece on QUESSERTIVES -- but Grandy's discovery was independent! Grice (in "Meaning Revisited", lecture delivered in Sussex, 1982) writes of his 'mischiveous friend' (Grandy) and the idea that there are three illocutionary forces: assertion (.) "I say that p" question (?) "I ask whether p" order (!) "I order p" Now, Grandy suggested (jocularly) that 'assertion' and 'question' can combine -- in the case of Grice. So whatever Grice says can be interpreted as "Could it be possible that someone may want to assert that ..." (I'm relying on memory -- but the quote is googlebooks, "Meaning Revisited" Way of Words, then). Grice goes on to say that whatever he'll end up saying in that lecture will be highly 'quessertive'. (Grice says he cherishes the pun as much as he cherished Grandy's comment that Grice could always be rely to rally to the defense of the underodgma). (Now, this among nous, philosophers: Grandy can JOKE about questions and assertions being 'quessertions', but I think D. Kaplan is right when in the Partee paper online he is quoted as saying, "You (linguists) vacuum things that we philosophers say". They were using 'quessertives' literally -- L. Horn has a good example in a footnote of Natural History of Negation, but don't have access to it right now. Something like The car is how much did you say? (but not really, since that's a question -- but something that you cannot really evaluate truth-conditonally as an assertion, yet it looks like one -- we'll see if I can find it). Cheers, J. L. Speranza ----- **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1221323031x1201367232/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd= JulystepsfooterNO62) From Baynesr at comcast.net Fri Jul 10 19:10:43 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2009 23:10:43 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Deliberation and Grammar In-Reply-To: <85A3F0B8-53ED-4CDD-8601-3F8E5BFF33DC@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: <1154664598.202621247267443788.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I cannot utter 'Himself likes John' with the intent of saying 'John likes himself'. This is not just because I know English. My intention to say 'John likes himself' by saying 'himself like John' is grammatically excluded. Notice it can be argued, although nothing here is obvious, that synonomy is actually ruled out by the grammar, not the semantics. Anyway, we have it that a "mental fact," an intention is ruled out by syntax. Similarly, I believe, Aristotle observed that a deliberative desire, another "mental fact," is ruled out should it require deliberating about things outside of our power. Bruce remarks: "But surely I can utter "Bonjour" with the intention of saying "Hello" even though "Bonjour" is not a sentence. Am I missing something?" There is nothing ungrammatical about 'Bonjour'. There are problems you *may* be alluding to related to Church's criticism of Carnap (950), but I don't see how they would tie in here. I stick within the grammar of any given language. Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: Baynesr at comcast.net Cc: "hist-analytic" Sent: Friday, July 10, 2009 3:28:14 PM GMT -08:00 US/Canada Pacific Subject: Re: Deliberation and Grammar Steve says, " I cannot utter ?x? with the intention of saying ?y? unless ?y? is a sentence and..." But surely I can utter "Bonjour" with the intention of saying "Hello" even though "Bonjour" is not a sentence. Am I missing something? Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Jul 10 19:31:03 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2009 19:31:03 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Deliberation and Grammar Message-ID: In a message dated 7/10/2009 aune at philos.umass.edu writes: "Steve says, "I cannot utter ?x? with the intention of saying ?y? unless ?y? is a sentence and..." But surely I can utter "Bonjour" with the intention of saying "Hello" even though "Bonjour" is not a sentence. Am I missing something?". I'll get back to Steve (in a friendly way!) at a later stage; and Steve: don't feel my response or comment on B. Aune should direct your reply! I would generalise indeed B. Aune's point to the totally meaningless. (Grice, "Pirots karulise elatically" -- Cfr. ii. "Elatically pirots karulise karulise pirots pirots karulise" Suppose that ii _is_ meaningless. I can still utter that meaning to say "karulise elatically pirots karulise elatically" (another string of nonsense). I have discussed elsewhere this with S. R. Bayne and I recall my quote of Lombard/Stine, "Grice's Intentions". Philosophical Studies -- which we discussed at length. So, I would think that there is a way to narrow Bayne's point to 'that'-clauses, as follows: I wouldn't be able, by uttering 'x' -- by uttering which I would mean that my addressee is the cream in my coffee' -- with the intention of saying (or implicating) that my addressee is my pride and joy -- unless I mean something (in the sense of 'mean-that') with 'x' in the first place? JLS (I'm trying to give a synopsis here restricted to one 'screen'!) **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1221323031x1201367232/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd= JulystepsfooterNO62) From Baynesr at comcast.net Fri Jul 10 20:21:20 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2009 00:21:20 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Deliberation and Grammar In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <1396924273.215701247271680951.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> ----- Original Message ----- From: Jlsperanza at aol.com To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Sent: Friday, July 10, 2009 4:31:03 PM GMT -08:00 US/Canada Pacific Subject: Re: Deliberation and Grammar I can still utter that meaning to say "karulise elatically pirots karulise elatically" You can utter sounds some of which resemble morphemes, but you can't *say* anything. Even the finest mind has nothing to say in uttering 'karulise elatically pirots karlize elatically'. So the quoted sentence above is false. Regards Steve In a message dated 7/10/2009 aune at philos.umass.edu writes: "Steve says, "I cannot utter ?x? with the intention of saying ?y? unless ?y? is a sentence and..." But surely I can utter "Bonjour" with the intention of saying "Hello" even though "Bonjour" is not a sentence. Am I missing something?". I'll get back to Steve (in a friendly way!) at a later stage; and Steve: don't feel my response or comment on B. Aune should direct your reply! I would generalise indeed B. Aune's point to the totally meaningless. (Grice, "Pirots karulise elatically" -- Cfr. ii. "Elatically pirots karulise karulise pirots pirots karulise" Suppose that ii _is_ meaningless. I can still utter that meaning to say "karulise elatically pirots karulise elatically" (another string of nonsense). I have discussed elsewhere this with S. R. Bayne and I recall my quote of Lombard/Stine, "Grice's Intentions". Philosophical Studies -- which we discussed at length. So, I would think that there is a way to narrow Bayne's point to 'that'-clauses, as follows: I wouldn't be able, by uttering 'x' -- by uttering which I would mean that my addressee is the cream in my coffee' -- with the intention of saying (or implicating) that my addressee is my pride and joy -- unless I mean something (in the sense of 'mean-that') with 'x' in the first place? JLS (I'm trying to give a synopsis here restricted to one 'screen'!) **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1221323031x1201367232/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd= JulystepsfooterNO62) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Jul 10 20:25:04 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2009 20:25:04 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends Message-ID: Grice on Anscombe Then, yes, we can say that Grice did quote "Anscombe" by name in (1971), p. 8, footnote 1. So it makes more than little sense to make a few "Gricean points". Bayne is very right in bringing to some sort of fore the work of Sir Stuart N. Hampshire. His "Thought and Action" is a masterpiece -- and he has explored more issues in his "Freedom of Mind" and other essays --. Hampshire indeed of course hails from the best of the Oxford tradition. He gathered with Austin, Berlin, and others in the 'early beginnings of Oxford philosophy' (the meetings at All Souls College on Thursdays -- Grice would not attend these because, as S. R. Chapman notes, he was 'born on the wrong side of the tracks'. Of course he wasn't!). After the Second World War, Hampshire would occasionally attend the Saturday Mornings -- and indeed Grice lists him as a member of the 'Play Group' -- but I fear his "Thought and Action" had separated them from the English 'futilitarians' as Grice called himself and his friends (alla Bergman). ----- Grice did cite Anscombe then in the footnote 1 on p. 8 of "Intention and Uncertainty" (for the record). Bayne is very correct in noting in Grice -- and the previous generation, like Ryle -- a focus on 'logical constructions'. This is best seen in Grice's very early "Personal Identity". He is not going to be concerned with 'the self' (and cfr. Anscombe on "The First Person!") but on statements including "I" (or 'this person'). E.g. "This person was hit by a bat" (his mind? His body? both?) In her "Grice" (Chapman, Macmillan -- and I'll see if I can paraphrase her in another post, as I have the book with me right now), Chapman notes that 'intention' was perhaps the Basic Gricean Idea Ever. I recall my joy when reading Suppes's contribution to PGRICE (ed. Grandy/Warner) when I saw Suppes taking up some criticism by Biro and calling Grice an 'intentionalist' rather than a 'behaviourist'! Now, as for the intention vs. intenSion, Grice notably refers to 'intentions' in WoW, googlebooks, ch. 6, closing section. He has just introduced his LOOONG definition of 'utterer's meaning' (or rather, as S. Bayne would prefer, and I too) a 'statement' of the form: By uttering x, U meant-nn that p iff U intended that there exists some addressee A, such that and intends that there is no inference element such that the Addressee believes that... This was WJ-40, as L. Horn quotes it, i.e. more than 40 years ago in the WJames Lectures, so Grice NEEDED to provide a caveat for his extenstionalist audience (which included Quine): "Please do not despair over my use of quantifiers in INTENSIONAL contexts [Quantifying In. JLS]. There's nothing we can do about it. Meaning is per se an INTENSIONAL Notion. So you love it or leave it" (Words to that effect, of course). He (a year or so later) in "Vacuous Names" provides an intensional treatment of 'propositional attitudes' which he regards as dealing with questions of scope. He uses 'want-1' and 'want-2'. The idea (later rephrased in what he calls square-bracket device for the assignment of common-ground status) is :I am looking for (WANT TO MEET, or plain 'want') [that there exists] an honest man" I.e. "an honest man" we want. Surely this is 'ambiguous' not in the 'semantic' sense but the scope syntactic sense: we want that there is a honest man (?) versus there is a honest man and we want him. (QUANTIFYING OUT). ---- I should get back to this later. Just to reconsider the problems of INTENSIONAL contexts that obsessed Grice in a good way -- recall also his attitude towards or against Extensionalism in "Reply to Richards", where Extensionalism is regarded as a bete-noire, and which I have discussed here with R. B. Jones in "Criteria of Intensionality". In that post I mentioned J. O. Urmson, whose essay by that title I find of great help. (Proc. Arist. Soc.) ---- Bayne is very correct in identifying Anscombe within the linguistic turn (as Bergman called it, indeed) -- along with Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Grice. The focus was 'linguistic' or in terms of 'logical constructions' (in Grice): they were into the 'logical grammar' of things -- not substances per se. It was, if you will, and in my view, Empiricism with a Twist. For surely there has to be progress in philosophy. And, as Grice says, if philosophy generated no new problems it would be dead! -- What Grice and Anscombe did was to re-emphasise the linguistic interface, as it were. The mechanisms by which sensible talk on this or that can be brought to the fore. In Grice's case, it was his attempt to minimise the 'bombshells' of the Logical Positivism brought by Ayer after his soujourn in Vienna. They (Grice and perhaps Anscombe) had no agenda like Ayer had -- and could deal with the 'linguistic idiosyncrasies' of our talk over this and that over a cup of tea or something. I cherish Warnock's remembering of Grice's uttering, "How _clever_ language is!" (for, Warnock says, 'language makes the right distinctions just where we need them' -- from memory in "Saturday Mornings"). And I'm very pleased that Grice's name was "P. Grice" so that the festchrift could go: P. philosophical G. grounds of R. rationality: I. intentions, C. categories, E. ends. --- For it's the "I" of GrIce we's [sic] talking here! I'll try an acronym for Anscombe G E M A N S C O M B E Grounds of Existential Meaning: Analysis, Necessity, Sophisms, and Concepts -- Or, Morality, Beauty and Eudaimonia (?). Sorry, not too inspired tonight! Cheers, JL Speranza **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1221323031x1201367232/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd= JulystepsfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Fri Jul 10 21:10:27 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2009 18:10:27 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends Message-ID: <917324.52840.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Much to my regret, I can't comment on a lot of this. I need to get together all the citations and allusion in Grice to Anscombe. Time is closing in and I have to copyright the thing and start the index. I will comment on one thing: Chapman's comment. The more I look at this the more respect I have for Grice. I was shocked to notice that his paper "Meaning" is stated to have been published in SOME form in 1947! According to the contents of WoW. I'd like to read the original. One thing strikes me about Grice, as far as his historical significance is concerned. Braithwaite had powerful arguments suggesting that teleological explanation at best, so to speak, where it is benign occurs in intentional context. This is in _Scientific Explanation_, the section on causality. Consider reading intentions like getting someone to believe that a speaker intends something might be a sort of causation in the sense befitting some valid "teleological" explanation. But here is what is interesting w.r.t. the Grice connection. A lot of philosophers, e.g., Joel Feinberg, think in terms of two kinds of causal judgments: productive and explanatory. Now it seems to me that Grice's integration of causation and intention (compare the issue cause vs. reason) lends itself to a third category, one which is neither a matter of production or explanation. This is not as precise as I should be, since the two categories are meant to apply to judgments. In other words we have a category of causation, causing beliefs about intentions which concerns not judgments but action. I might be reading to much into it, but meaning is a sort of institutional fact, at least in part. I avoid discussing internalism etc. because it will lead to an uninteresting dead end. But meaning as cause (cfi Russell/Ducasse/Davidson is with intent is a very neat idea, one that for 1947 is somewhat astonishing. Regards Steve --- On Fri, 7/10/09, Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: From: Jlsperanza at aol.com Subject: Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Date: Friday, July 10, 2009, 8:25 PM Grice on Anscombe Then, yes, we can say that Grice did quote "Anscombe" by name in (1971), p. 8, footnote 1. So it makes more than little sense to make a few "Gricean points". Bayne is very right in bringing to some sort of fore the work of Sir Stuart N. Hampshire. His "Thought and Action" is a masterpiece -- and he has explored more? issues in his "Freedom of Mind" and other essays --. Hampshire indeed of course? hails from the best of the Oxford tradition. He gathered with Austin, Berlin,? and others in the 'early beginnings of Oxford philosophy' (the meetings at All? Souls College on Thursdays -- Grice would not attend these because, as S. R.? Chapman notes, he was 'born on the wrong side of the tracks'. Of course he? wasn't!). After the Second World War, Hampshire would occasionally attend the? Saturday Mornings -- and indeed Grice lists him as a member of the 'Play Group'? -- but I fear his "Thought and Action" had separated them from the English? 'futilitarians' as Grice called himself and his friends (alla Bergman). ----- Grice did cite Anscombe then in the footnote 1 on p. 8 of "Intention and? Uncertainty" (for the record). Bayne is very correct in noting in Grice -- and the previous? generation, like Ryle -- a focus on 'logical constructions'. This is best? seen in Grice's very early "Personal Identity". He is not going to be? concerned with 'the self' (and cfr. Anscombe on "The First Person!") but on? statements including "I" (or 'this person'). E.g. "This person was hit by a bat"? (his mind? His body? both?) In her "Grice" (Chapman, Macmillan -- and I'll see if I can paraphrase her? in another post, as I have the book with me right now), Chapman notes that? 'intention' was perhaps the Basic Gricean Idea Ever. I recall my joy when? reading Suppes's contribution to PGRICE (ed. Grandy/Warner) when I saw Suppes? taking up some criticism by Biro and calling Grice an 'intentionalist' rather? than a 'behaviourist'! Now, as for the intention vs. intenSion, Grice notably refers to? 'intentions' in WoW, googlebooks, ch. 6, closing section. He has just introduced? his LOOONG definition of 'utterer's meaning' (or rather, as S. Bayne would? prefer, and I too) a 'statement' of the form: ? ? ? By uttering x, U meant-nn that p iff U? intended that there exists some addressee A, such that ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? and intends that there is no inference element such that the Addressee believes? that... This was WJ-40, as L. Horn quotes it, i.e. more than 40 years ago in the? WJames Lectures, so Grice NEEDED to provide a caveat for his extenstionalist? audience (which included Quine): "Please do not despair over my use of quantifiers in? INTENSIONAL ? ? contexts [Quantifying In. JLS]. There's nothing we can? do about ? ? it. Meaning is per se an INTENSIONAL Notion. So you love? it or ? ? leave it" (Words to that effect, of course). He (a year or so later) in "Vacuous Names" provides an intensional? treatment of 'propositional attitudes' which he regards as dealing with? questions of scope. He uses 'want-1' and 'want-2'. The idea (later rephrased in what he calls? square-bracket device for the assignment of common-ground status) is ? ? ? ???:I am looking for (WANT TO? MEET, or plain 'want') [that there exists] an honest man" I.e. "an honest man" we want. Surely this is 'ambiguous' not in the 'semantic' sense but the scope? syntactic sense: ? ???we want that there is a honest man (?) versus ? ???there is a honest man and we want him. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? (QUANTIFYING OUT). ---- I should get back to this later. Just to reconsider the problems of? INTENSIONAL contexts that obsessed Grice in a good way -- recall also his? attitude towards or against Extensionalism in "Reply to Richards", where? Extensionalism is regarded as a bete-noire, and which I have discussed here with R. B. Jones in "Criteria of Intensionality". In that post I mentioned J. O.? Urmson, whose essay by that title I find of great help. (Proc. Arist.? Soc.) ---- Bayne is very correct in identifying Anscombe within the linguistic turn? (as Bergman called it, indeed) -- along with Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Grice. The focus was 'linguistic' or in terms of 'logical constructions' (in? Grice): they were into the 'logical grammar' of things -- not substances per se. It was, if you will, and in my view, Empiricism with a Twist. For surely there? has to be progress in philosophy. And, as Grice says, if philosophy generated no? new problems it would be dead! -- What Grice and Anscombe did was to? re-emphasise the linguistic interface, as it were. The mechanisms by which? sensible talk on this or that can be brought to the fore. In Grice's case, it was his attempt to minimise the 'bombshells' of the? Logical Positivism brought by Ayer after his soujourn in Vienna. They (Grice and? perhaps Anscombe) had no agenda like Ayer had -- and could deal with the 'linguistic idiosyncrasies' of our talk over this and that over a cup of tea or? something. I cherish Warnock's remembering of Grice's uttering, "How _clever_? language is!" (for, Warnock says, 'language makes the right distinctions just? where we need them' -- from memory in "Saturday Mornings"). And I'm very pleased that Grice's name was "P. Grice" so that the? festchrift could go: ???P.? ? ? ? ? ? philosophical ???G.? ? ? ? ? ? grounds of ???R.? ? ? ? ? ? rationality: ? ? I.? ? ? ? ? ? intentions, ???C.? ? ? ? ???categories, ???E.? ? ? ? ???ends. --- For it's the "I" of GrIce we's [sic] talking here! I'll try an acronym for Anscombe G E M A N S C O M B E Grounds of Existential Meaning: Analysis, Necessity, Sophisms, and Concepts -- Or, Morality, Beauty and Eudaimonia (?). Sorry, not too inspired? tonight! Cheers, JL Speranza **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1221323031x1201367232/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd= JulystepsfooterNO62) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Jul 10 21:00:54 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2009 21:00:54 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] neo-Prichardianism Message-ID: In a message dated 7/7/2009 8:33:25 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: >I have to reply piece meal since your post covers a lot of territory. >I note with interest that Grice does not mention the shopping list case. Actually that's a pity, but yes. No. He does mention "By Professor Anscombe" though, in that footnote on p. 8 of (1971) so it is true that Grice 'seldom quoted Anscombe' (at least once in print!). >What, specifically, do we have to relate the two in this case. >Before you cited something on fitting. I don't have easy access to >this right now, but was there a mention of Anscombe by name in >any of these papers? There is a mention to Anscombe in Grice, 1971 -- by name. In connection with the 'vivid' example. But not in connection with 'fit'. I mentioned 'fit' because 'direction of fit' as used by Searle and Anscombe was taken directly from Austin, and I would assume Grice was familiar with the terminology. I find it interesting that only TWO directions of fit are possible. So, in the case of a quessertion, for example -- what direction of fit? Surely Grandy is being jocular and he possibly meant, 'assertion' on the whole. Yet, not really 'assertion assertion' but more like a 'query' to the philosophical audience'. Why should we only "STATE" what we _assert_? 'Assert' sounds so STRONG. It does have one direction of fit -- and an emphatic one at that. In the case of a question, it's more like an order: "Have you fed the canary?" Cannot have direction of fit, like "No, I didn't". So the direction of fit is meta-linguistic: I WANT YOU (in the opposite direction of fit than an assertion) TO ASSERT TO "Yes, I fed the canary" or "No, I did not feed the canary") Of course there are exceptions (about silly Oxford dons -- 'just teasing' cfr. Grice "Have you stopped beating your wife?" (Doing some research I found this was a sophisma with the French: "Have you stopped eating iron?" "Tu no cessas edere ferrum". ---- Grice wants to say that even in that case, the direction of fit is assessable: "No, I haven't stopped beating my wife. I never started" "Yes, I have stopped beating my wife -- and you?" ---- Bayne: >I can't believe that her 1957 book had no influence on Grice, but >given the paucity of citations of others in her own work, I don't count >this against Grice. Right. A lot of the Grice context was lecture -- as Kripke. So you won't expect citations. Grice delivered a more specific paper (still unpublished) entitled "Intending" which Davidson has quoted extensively. But I do not think Grice would cite Anscombe in that lecture either. He is concerned with an elaboration by Davidson on the 'belief-condition upon intention' and indeed (as reported by Pears in "Motivated Irrationality") Grice comes out as rather 'smooth': he would say that the 'implicature-version' (i.e. to think that 'intends' only IMPLICATES belief') is "too social to be true" (Pears's wording). Grice suggests rather an 'entailment-view' where, as you note, it's more like a 'sense' of intention, rather than a 'use' of the word. -- etc. Bayne: >Anscombe is evasive on the subject of meaning in >natural language. By this I mean that she rarely addresses the idea of >meaning directly. Good. Perhaps Grice should NOT have focused so much on meaning either (I'm not on one of my days). Consider that one of the earliest apparitions of Grice in the literature is in a footnote in H. L. A. Hart, "Words and Signs: a review of Holloway, Language and Intelligence" Philosophical Quarterly 1952. Grice is considering 'mean' in connection with cases brought up by Stevenson ("Ethics and Language") -- it's not really 'word' meaning but the uses of 'mean' as in Those spots mean measles --- while indeed Grice's geniality (and few philosophers would be studying him otherwise) rests on his having extended a concept of 'meaning' that covers both the 'natural' and the 'non-natural' cases. I tend to think that a good push for the popularity of Grice, "Meaning" was his constant references in the literature meant for undergraduates, like Parkinson, "Theories of Meaning" (Oxford Readings in Philosophy) where Grice's theory is listed as a 'causal theory of meaning' or Alston's Philosophy of Language (Prentice Hall Textbooks) where Grice's theory is dubbed 'ideational' alla Locke. ---- So I wouldn't think Anscombe (who was much more influenced, first hand by Wittgenstein's 'pragmatism') would care much for 'entities' like 'meaning' in the way that one may think Grice was (but he wasn't!). Bayne: >If we can get hold of Grices British Academy Lecture I would put it 'And then Grice writes (all emphasis mine) "This point _may_ be (and *I think* _has_ been [Footnote 1 -- "1 By Professor Anscombe"]) put vividly by saying that if a man fails to fulfil an intention we do not criticise his state of mind for failing to conform to the facts, we criticise the facts for failing to conform to this state of mind."' Bayne comments: >Yes, this is thematic in Anscombe; one finds something like >it Prichard. Prichard _is_ cited by Grice. And indeed, as you say, there's little in the way of predecessors here and there. But Prichard seems to have been a must. As Aristotle. Grice goes on to mention even "Stout"! -- I would think that the popularity of Prichard here has to be credited to J. O. Urmson, who reprinted Prichard's main papers for OUP -- paperback. His "Willing" etc. Obscure little papers. Oddly, philosophers like Harman (in PGRICE) who have done very interesting work on the 'history' of intentional-theory manage to quote Stout directly and ditto Prichard. Bayne: >By the way, your notation on fitting is fine; I think >Searle's method is elegant but where does one go from there?! Well, for Austin ("The Meaning of a Word" or rather "How to Talk (Some Simple Ways") the collocation is indeed, "Direction of fit', rather than 'fitting' but I get your point! I do like Searle's attempt (In "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts", repr. in Meaning and Expression) of dividing everything in terms of the two main directions of fit: assertive and boulomaic, if you wish. Actually I wedded for a while to SCHIFFER's more complex taxonomy in his "Meaning" (now Oxford paperback). And in VERY FACT -- I recall -- I was always ENAMOURED by a little footnote in S. Levinson's "Pragmatics" (Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics). He says, "Grice has attempted to reduce all illocutionary forces to either 'believing' or 'wanting'". When I read Grice's METHOD (in philosophical psychology) I was fascinated that he even explores the way of reducing believing TO wanting! (Grandy, in The Journal of Philosophy, 1976 -- which I read _BEFORE_ the Grice piece, "Method" --, notes that the reduction can go either way, and that it involves a notion of 'modulo'. In fact, he also favours the reduction 'belief' to 'want' rather than the other way round). Bayne: >Or to use Grice's example above (crediting Anscombe) for the vividness. >Oh, I see you followed my comments on Zeleny; he is a very bright >fellow, and more importantly, somewhat interesting. When I say things like > >"a man fails to fulfil his intention" > >There is an evaluation of his action as accomplishing his end, but >I don't mean that he is morally benefited by satisfying his intentions; >for example if they are evil, etc. I see. Yes, all those things are tricky. And recall that the road to Heaven (or is it Hell?) is paved with ... >I haven't gone into implicature; this is deserving of extended treatment, >but if I march off in this direction I might never return. Exactly. Don't! But since you know so many things, you'll understand my point. The Theory of Implicature Strikes Back With A Vengeance here: For Prichard/Grice/Anscombe (Grice calls his theory 'neo-Prichardian'): A intends that p (for surely we don't need to have 'p' as REFERRING to A one can intend that one's goalkeeper keeps most goals) iff i. A wills that p ii. A believes that there's p(robability) > 0.5 that p. iii. A believes that (i) will cause p? ---- In the case of 'self-intentions' as I call them, I can see the point. "I intend to go to London" (I will go to London, I shall go to London, etc.) But "I intend that you go to London"? That sounds otiose! Surely I cannot expect that my willing will have an effect on the intended effect, or can I? In any case, just focusing on the A intends that p iff A believes that p is feasible with a probability > 0.5 then we have Facione and Pears rising objections. (Facione, "Meaning and Intention"). And Davidson thinking -- alla Sinnott-Armstrong -- 'ought' conversationally implies 'can' -- that what is at issue is the WEAKER notion of 'implicature': It's just OTIOSE to say "I intend that p" if you don't believe p is feasible. But it's not an ENTAILMENT concerning truth-conditions. And then you have Grice getting agitated and replying ('rough handling' I think Davidson called this), "The implicature view is too SOCIAL to be true". ----- Bayne plays with my "I intend to buy truffles in the supermarket" You remark: >"of over-rotten French mushrooms, anyways [sic])." >Now why am I under the impression that only someone from >S. America would say this. I like this but a DO have to commend the >French for making interesting practically everything at which they >excel, from cooking to chemistry; politics to geometry. OK. So perhaps it was a joke. I do LOVE trufles. I think my example may relate to "SOUR GRAPES" studies in irrationality. I intend to buy truffles. I do not find them ANYWHERE. Therefore I form the intention, that I don't LIKE truffles anymore ---- (I actually I'm a very poor shopper and haven't even looked!) Bayne: >In fact I'm >thinking about putting up Nicod or Hintikka on Descartes. He would >never object to this and I think I can get all other rights in order. Yes. And the best are the Truffles at the Savoy, as Harrison's song goes. >Grandy's quessertion? I'm unfamiliar with this. Sounds interesting. >I'll recheck WoW for it. It's the 'quessertives' of the linguists with a vengeance. If we have . for assertoric and ? for questions (and ! for orders) the quessertion, Grice notes, comes complete with its own illocutionary force indicating device -- they were making jokes of linguists taking philosohers SO Seriously and coining the jargon for them --: ?. (p) i.e. the combination of '.' and '?'. >"for the 'boulomaic' operator" >It's things like "boulomaic operators" that drove me to Samuel Alexander. :). Well, but we have to CALL it somehow! Allwood was good. Think of it, Von Wright coined 'alethic' and Grice loved that. I cannot think that the English Language had to wait for a Finnish philosopher to coin 'alethic'! (Just teasing). I actually contacted the OED once, and they say, "Yes, Mr. Speranza; 'boulomaic' sounds like the right word, and you are right that there is a gap in the OED as it stands -- maybe tomorrow. We'll call you back" (or words to that effect). But what did irritate me is people using 'epistemic' operators when they mean 'doxastic' (for it's belief rather than knowledge they are talking about), and so 'boulomaic' does seem to fill a gap. But we should compile a lexicon one day of the most horrid neologisms ever used by philosophers _EVER_ -- starting with Aristotle's 'cateogory'! (just teasing). Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1221323031x1201367232/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd= JulystepsfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Jul 10 21:17:13 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2009 21:17:13 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Deliberation and Grammar Message-ID: In a message dated 7/10/2009 8:22:52 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, Baynesr at comcast.net writes: You can utter sounds some of which resemble morphemes, but you can't *say* anything. Even the finest mind has nothing to say in uttering 'karulise elatically pirots karlize elatically'. So the quoted sentence above is false. ---- I see your point. And it's indeed a good, conservative (Grice referred himself as 'irreverent dissenting conservative' I think in googlebooks, "Reply to Richards") use of 'say'. Cf. dicere in Latin, or 'dire' in French. "I say!" It is a good sense of 'say' that sticks to the meaningful. There should be another word for the meaningless utterance of morpheme-like things. I was told that 'go' may be such a word. As when the Valley Girls go, "And then she went, 'oh no', and I go, 'yes', and we go, 'no'". "go" seems like 'say' = utter. My obscure comment on "You're the cream in my coffee" was meant as a type of metaphor (discussed by Grice) (By uttering "you're the cream in my coffee" I say 'You are the cream in my coffee' but I mean, 'you are my pride and joy' and thus that's what I _ultimately_ *say*). ----- I think Aristotle was possibly right when he limited a grammatically well-formed expression of a deliberation as 'grammar-constrained'. The example I used to quote was, "Ask for the moon" Can I ask for the moon? "Don't ask for the moon". Can you intend to fly? Don't intend to fly. So Aristotle is right in that only the rightly formulated deliberations should be the serious ones. This is not just a game! Even if Grice called it the PlayGroup. There is an interesting paper by Wiggins on this, "Deliberation", which is indeed the BOULESIS of Aristotle, hence the boulomaic! --- "Grammar" Bayne knows it all -- and he mentions Chomsky-Halle features. I sometimes wonder if the playgroupers (within which we may include Anscombe) were using 'grammar' alla Chomsky. I do know that Austin was fascinated by Syntactic Structures and they read it on the Saturday Morning meetings with Grice et al (Hampshire perhaps). Incidentally, I often wonder if 'well-formed formula' is not a redundancy. Not that I won't utter a redundancy (:)), but ... It seems that if it's not well-formed it's NOT a formula. Grice here refers to 'sentence' as a value-oriented notion. There are no good or bad sentences. Just sentences. "Sentence" itself includes its own method of evaulation. The problem with narrowing down the deliberation to the grammar could be: poets: can't they deliberate poetically? Let's deliberate if colourless green ideas HAVE to sleep furiously. I was recently arguing that indeed colourless green ideas _don't_ sleep furiously (I.e. the negation of nonsense is TRUE -- and 'colourless green ideas sleep furiously' -- SEMANTIC nonsense rather than syntactic humbug -- is FALSE. If it means drab immature ideas should be latent in the mind of people but ready to outburst it makes a lot of sense and I apologize! ---- What I like about Aristole is that he seems to narrow down 'deliberation' to yourself -- it would be even ill-formed to say, "Let's deliberate if it rains in Australia" "Let's deliberate if Pinochet should be brought back to Chile" (that latter does make sense, since surely it's not up to Pinochet). It always fascinates me that "let's" is so no Romance. We do use the first person plural optative. "LET US" play in the park sounds rather clumsy translated word by word. "YOU" let us play? And I always loved Noel Coward's song negating a 'let's': "Don't let's be beastly to the Germans!" Cheers, and Good Night! JL Speranza **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1221323031x1201367232/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd= JulystepsfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sat Jul 11 13:41:48 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2009 13:41:48 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Grice, "Disposition and Intention" Message-ID: Among the many unpublications by H. P. Grice that S. R. Chapman has unburied for posterity is this "Disposition and Intention" which is discussed in her biography of the man, and some excerpts of which I transcribe vis a vis our continuing interest in the history of analytic philosophy (-- inspired by S. R. Bayne's enthusiasm in the area and his seminal work on Anscombe). Chapman writes: "Grice circulated "Disposition and Intentions" among his colleagues just a few years after he had written 'Meaning'" That would be 1950. I note that it has to be at least after Ryle 1949. And I added a marginal note, J. C. D'Alession, "Intentions and Dispositions" Crititica. The Argentine philosopher J. C. D'Alessio was a student of Pears at All Souls and we would discuss Grice together. --- ""Disposition and Intention" has survived only in manuscript". He writes that "his purpose is to consider the best analysis of 'PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS'. He considers the 'dispositional' account, and the alternative, to consider 'intention' statements as describing "SPECIAL EPISODES". "Grice is dismissive of a third possibility: behaviourism" -- as 'silly' (a word I came to overused, too, :) -- it means etymologically, 'blissful'). Grice argues that the dispositional account runs into difficulties specially with "I intend." But surely it is not appropriate, Chapman notes, to switch to the 'special episode' account." The 'how do you know' is trick. "People," Chapman writes, "are not expected to be judging intention from OBSERVATION." In Grice's METAPHOR: "I am not in the audience, not even in the front row of the stalls. I am on the stage." (cited by Chapman, p. 67). -- brilliant, I'd expect you'd agree! For (3), Grice singles Ryle for criticism. ---- "Grice argues that the difference between speech and other forms of behavioiur is much greater than Ryle allows." "A man does not need to wait," Chapman notes, "to observe HIMSELF heading for the plate of fruit on the table before is in a position to KNOW that he wants pineapple". "Grice suggested solution to the failure ... of a, b, and c -- rests on intention." HYPOTHETICAL INTENTION. If so and so were the case I would behave in such and such a way "cannot be understood as a statement of hypothetical fact," Chapman writes, but "as a statement of hypothetical intention" but cfr. Dummett on 'hypothetical promises.' "just as long as the behaviour in question can be seen as VOLUNTARY." Furthermore, "It is not possible to say, "I am not sure whether I intend..." in the way it IS possible to doubt other psychological states." (Chapman notes). Grice's own positive theory in that paper relies on Stout and the ideas i. of FREEDOM FROM DOUBT that the intended action will take place as NOT dependent on any empirical evidence. --- Grice's "second observation is that the utterer must be prepared to take "the necessary steps", Chapman writes, "to bring about the fulfillment of the intention." -- Chapman observes: Grice has "JUSTIFIED the inclusion of psychological concepts in analyses; they do not need to be 'translated' away into behavioral tendencies or observable phenomena" --- although I'd nitpick about EMPIRICAL meaning 'inner experience'? --- "Second, he has established the concept of intention as PRIMARY". And no, I've checked in the index to Chapman's _Grice_ and there's no 'Anscombe'! I have made a few marginal notes to my Chapman. INCORRIGIBILITY, privileged access, are notions that Grice will come back to in "Method in philosophical psychology", and while 'intend' may figure as PRIMARY, I would think he ends up analysing it in terms of willing/judging and these two concepts themselves if not behaviouristically at least "functionalistically". Two footnotes: * Philosophers can be _wicked_. Chapman notes that the manuscript copy of "Disposition and Intention" contains, in a different hand, very wicked comments, which I won't transcribe (right now) but which Chapman suggest that could have been enough of a reason not for Grice to consider this or that. He could be sensitive. * Philosophers and 'absurdity'. Chapman quotes from the last passage in "Disposition and Intention" which may relate to Bayne's comments on 'absurdity' and grammar. Chapman writes: "Having established that a doubt over one's own intention is something of an ABSURDITY, he offers a characteristically tantalsing suggestion that, 'we hope that this may help to explain the ABSURDITY of analogous expressions mentioning some OTHER psychological concepts, though I wouldn't for a moment claim that it will help to explain ALL such absurdities.' (cited by Chapman, p. 69) For, indeed, 'what a piece of work is a pirot"! Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1221823300x1201398714/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd= JulystepsfooterNO62) From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Sat Jul 11 07:00:48 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2009 12:00:48 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Deliberation and Grammar In-Reply-To: <172840282.163971247258833523.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <172840282.163971247258833523.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: Hi Steve, Suppose someone is brought up in a community that speaks an extensional language but he wants to start talking about propositions, concepts, propositional attitudes and such like. Does he not intend to say things that his grammar does not permit? And can we not imagine ourselves to be in a similar situation. Someone may come up with a new idea that cannot be expressed using our present grammatical constructions, so he intends to say what our grammar does not permit. And could he not make himself understood, by metaphors initially, no doubt, so that we all come to extend our grammar in new ways? Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sat Jul 11 11:05:10 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2009 11:05:10 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Intending, Choosing, and Deciding Message-ID: -- the Grice/Pears Collaborations Grice/Thomson, Grice/Pears A brief historical note. When Grice recalls his philosophical collaborations in "Reply to Richards" ('Life and Opinions of Paul Grice') he first and foremost cites Strawson -- where the actual collaboration is _visible_: "In defense of a dogma". He goes on to mention collaboration with Judy Baker in 'ethics': (again visible: "Davidson on weakness of the will" -- in Vermazen/Hintikka) and a few interesting less known pairs: Grice/Warnock work on philosophy of perception. Warnock, b. 1923. Indeed, this fascinated Grice and Warnock, things like 'visa', etc. Grice/Staal -- work on logic and here's the interesting (to me) quote vis a vis the history of the philosophy of action: "work in the philosophy of action" Grice/Thompson (which I have been so far unable to locate -- this is J. F. Thompson, of Christ Church, Oxford, and later of MIT -- husband to Judith Jarvis) Grice/Pears -- This motivated me to look for and find Pears, Problems in the philosophy of mind, London: Duckworth. --- It is in connection with Pears -- that the 'deliberation and grammar' thing may interact. Unlike 'intending', Pears, (and Grice/Pears) was interested in "deciding" which I find it's like 'deliberating' with a vengeance. In the "Unpubications" of Grice, Grandy/Warner cite lectures on "Trying" given by Grice at Princeton which I always thought had the right title to them. Harman should have attended them. That was early 1960s. --- Pears is credited in "Intention and Uncertainty" by Grice (very last page), and inded Pears went on to lecture at the British Academy (or was it before that) on "Deciding". Pears has written extensively on "Intention and Belief" and other paradoxes of 'irrationality', and I can't read Pears without thinking Grice! (to the Mill). And I'm NOT very familiar with the Hampshire/Hart CERTAINTY theory of decision that Grice is apparently trying to 'water-down'. The Grice/Pears discussions fall within the context of Austin, "Ifs and Cans" and similar work undertaken by people like Nowell-Smith on 'choosing'. Seeing that deliberate is cognate with libra, scale, I think that Nowell-Smith was possibly right when he says that 'choice' pre-dates decision (if not intention). All very tricky! -- but fascinating. And I'm glad Bayne is using 'philosophical psychology' in the subtitle to his book. This is the phrase preferred by Grice too. Why he found 'philosophy of mind' too pompous we can only guess (and rightly!). -- All I know is that if you say, 'philosophical psychology' to _STICH_ he feels offended but that's _his_ problem! :) (He says 'psychology' can only be EMPIRICAL -- cfr. 'philosophical linguistics' -- but he's at Rutgers, right? :-)) Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1221823300x1201398714/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd= JulystepsfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sat Jul 11 10:39:04 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2009 10:39:04 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Deliberation and Grammar Message-ID: For the record, the etym. of 'deliberate' from the OED. It traces it back to 'deliber': Middle English from the French [not again! :)] d?lib?rer (15th c. in Littr?), _OR_ directly from the Latin de-liber-are, to weigh well, consider maturely, take counsel, etc., f. DE- I. 3 + liber-are to balance, weigh, from "libra" a balance, pair of scales. In 15-16th c. it varied with deliver: cf. the ordinary Romanic v from Latin b.] ----- So the 'scaling' thing is part of the _sense_. So it's like an alternative, "p vel q" or "p W q". I would think p v q 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 But really it should be analysable down to p v ~ p 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 But that's a tautology -- so it would take an ass to deliver on that (Buridan's -- matter of fact). ---- So let's revise S. R. Bayne's considerations he kindly shares with us: >I can only intend to say what grammar permits. It's even trickier with 'wanting' or boulemaic. For: I have taken from ROSENSCHEIN and others the idea that 'want' (or any boulemaic operator) is a propositional function W(A, p) A wants that p. But surely Grammar is complex enough NOT to allow those formations. "I want that you leave" ---> "I want you to leave" (Bayne knows all this stuff) Then consider the first clause in Grice's analysis of meaning Utterer meant by uttering x that p iff he intended his addressee to believe that ... here the object of the intention is exactly a doxastic operator W(A, B(B, p)) --- Incidentally, it is interesting that even for 'stating' we need to know the grammar before, as Aristotle would say -- and I always loved that passage in Ethica Nich. when he says, "Ethics is for post-graduates only; undergraduates I'm happy if they just speak well -- know the grammar" (or words to that effect). Grice played with 'central speech acts' which he found to be either assertions or orders (and questions and quessertions). But he wanted to GENERALISE the account, so that he would use "asterisk sub-psi", as a dummy for ANY propositional attitude co-related to this or that central speech act. Beliefs (or Judgings) for INDICATIVES Willings for IMPERATIVES, etc. In "Intention and Uncertainty" he plays with FUTURE INDICATIVE (the prediction, "I will go to London" vs. FUTURE INTENTIONAL ("I shall go to London") When it comes to FIRST PERSON PLURAL, consider Spanish bailamos? bailemos! The first is future indicative, "WILL WE DANCE?" or SHALL WE DANCE? And the answer is: WE SHALL DANCE! (or "Let's) The passage (which is Latin) between the 'a' stem of the indicative (bailar) versus the 'e' stem of the subjunctive ('bailEmos'). For 'e'-stemmed verbs, the operation is just the reverse and the 'e'-verbs change to an 'a'-stem in the subjunctive: comemos? comamos! Shall we eat? B: Indeed, we shall eat! ---- Bayne: >Grammar therefore circumscribes the limits of my linguistic intentions >to this degree: I cannot utter ?x? with the intention of saying ?y? unless ?y? >is a sentence and ?x? may be a set of, say, Chomsky-Halle features. Good point. Philosophers of the Grice generation with OBSESSED with 'say'. R. M. Hare has his dissertation for Oxford on Frege on 'dictive' component. 'dictor' he used. Later, when publishing his "Language of Morals" he coined the 'phrastic' for that aspect of what-is-said. Ditto Austin -- for what is his odd terminology, but an attempt to capture the subtleties of 'say': locutio, illocutio (in saying), perlocutio (by saying), the phatic act (what is said qua noise), the phemic act (the phonemic equivalent), the rhetic act (the indirect-speech report). Hare later added the neustic, the tropic and the clistic to the phrastic. And indeed the implicatio in Grice (implicatura, etc.) is but another way of restricting what-is-said to the truth-conditions, as it were. Bayne: >But this is not to claim that I cannot have the intention to say what >grammar does not allow is impossible, unless there is a grammar >to thought. Indeed. N. Block, who rediscovered Grice for a younger generation -- when he quoted Grice's Method in Philosophical Psychology for the masses in his "Philosophy of Mind" compilation -- did a similar job for Anscombe's husband when excerpting passages from Geach's brilliant _Mental Acts_. When I read Geach's _Mental Acts_ (in a course in modern philosophy -- taught by M. Costa) we analysed it vis a vis Ockham (sermo interioris). Just to put Fodor in Context! ---- Bayne: >That there is would appear to be the prevalent view. But there are a few category mistakes I find with the prevalent view. E.g. Cummins, in Mental Representation and Meaning, for example, has this rather ridiculous view of what the Gricean View of Mental Respresentation Having Meaning would be -- the homunculus theory. I replied to his criticisms in extenso elsewhere, "Conversation Without Representation" I think I titled it! It would be a regressus ad infinitum if we applied the SAME theory of intention-based semantics (as Schiffer calls it) to the mental representations. And while Anscombe may not have elaborated on the ONTOLOGY of 'intending', Grice notably -- and rather too academically for my taste -- does it in "Method in Philosophical Psychology", where he speaks of Ramsification and Functionalist Credos (almost). As Grandy/Warner explain in their intro to PGRICE. The view by Grice is a Turing-machine one: no psychological predicates without the behaviour (sense input or behavioural output) they are called upon to explain -- quoting Wittgenstein as per Anscombe's translation -- so that's another connection (he also quotes direct from Anscombe's Wittgenstein when in "Prolegomena" to WOW he criticises Wittgenstein, "A fork cannot look like a fork"): x (BLACK BOX) y sensory input 'intend' behavioural output ---- Bayne: >But >grammatical impossibility stands in relation to linguistic intentions >as possibility of success stands in relation to deliberation about >means for Aristotle. We should revise this. I always love Aristotle and enjoy close readings of his rather obscure (yet I said I always found it clear) prose. >The parallels are not exact, but they are suggestive. I think I get your point ('drift' is vulgar, right?) I think Kenny introduced that into the Gricean literature when he explained it to J. D. Atlas. For Kenny, there is extrinsic weighed desirability reasoning OF ENDS -- cfr. Rescher. and intrinsic weighed desirability reasoning of MEANS -- indeed. Back to the "p v ~p" I would assume that the first DELIBERATION then should be about the 'end'. Recall that's the "E" in PGRICE (E stands for End). The 'end' is the 'telos' also, rather circularly, the 'agathon' in Aristotle. For we want the good. (as a given) -- hence 'akrasia' and its problems. Then would come the DELIBERATION about the ends. And that SHOULD be algorithmic enough. But we have Kantian monsters saying, "The end justifies the means!" ---- There's also the CETERIS-PARIBUS. I want icecream I want LOADS of icecream? ----- No, I want only SOME icecream i.e. the premises in the practical syllogism are open-ended and the 'if' connectors should be read as 'defeasible' if p, ceteris paribus, p. Schiffer has tried to make sense of 'ceteris paribus' _laws_ as productive for the philosopher, but I'm not sure he extraordinarily succeeded! Again, if you have the time to explore the parallelisms, welcome! FEEL FREE to be very schematic (since we know you are busy otherwise), and just meaning to CLARIFY any possible misunderstanding. I thought 'deliber' was cognate with 'liber' as in 'liber arbitrium' (used by W. James) but it's not -- although R. M. Onians (online) would say yes). The 'weighing' metaphor features large in the Romance language: la pensee of the French is indeed the 'weight'. To think (penser, le penseur) is the weigher. As when you say, 'pensive' I imagine. That's why "Je pense, donce je exist" does not do for us what the simpler COGITO does! Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1221823300x1201398714/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd= JulystepsfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sun Jul 12 09:50:36 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2009 06:50:36 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Grice, "Disposition and Intention" Message-ID: <352816.42391.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> JL, What is the info on Chapman. I'd like to include reference to the quote you made to the effect that Anscombe's intention was the best Gricean idea yet. That would be interesting. Also, I'm curious about Chapman. I think Grice did a pretty terrible job in editing WoW. He "cleaned it up." Too much missing; too much edited out; not enough included. Don't get me wrong it is worth having and reading but it has limitations. On dispositions: I think this card has been played too often. I think the issue of dispositions because it goes back to the need to add operational definitions to extensional accounts of scientific explanation etc and because of its link to the verificationist position has an unchallenged respectability. To be sure "finkish dipsostions" do raise interesting questions about the semantics of counterfactuals in relation to these "theory terms" but I think concentrating on them as a way of either formulating or solving problems is far overdone. By the way, if you'd like to write up a ten page pdf on Grice's work and career etc. I'd be pleased to put it on HIst-Analytic when I make my next addition. I've already made the selection, a book. I think people will be surprised. It's one of H. H. Price's works. Price was superb; never agreed with him on much but he was a terrific philosopher. Regards STeve --- On Sat, 7/11/09, Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: From: Jlsperanza at aol.com Subject: Grice, "Disposition and Intention" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Date: Saturday, July 11, 2009, 1:41 PM Among the many unpublications by H. P. Grice? that S. R. Chapman has unburied for posterity is this "Disposition and? Intention" which is discussed in her biography of the man, and some excerpts of? which I transcribe vis a vis our continuing interest in the history of analytic? philosophy (-- inspired by S. R. Bayne's enthusiasm in the area and his seminal? work on Anscombe). Chapman writes: "Grice circulated "Disposition? and Intentions" among his colleagues just a few years after he had written? 'Meaning'" That would be 1950. I note that it has to be at least after? Ryle 1949. And I added a marginal note, J. C. D'Alession, "Intentions and? Dispositions" Crititica. The Argentine philosopher J. C. D'Alessio was a student? of Pears at All Souls and we would discuss Grice? together. --- ""Disposition and Intention" has survived only in? manuscript". He writes that "his purpose is to consider the best analysis? of 'PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS'. He considers the 'dispositional' account, and the? alternative, to consider 'intention' statements as describing "SPECIAL? EPISODES". "Grice is dismissive of a third possibility: behaviourism" --? as 'silly' (a word I came to overused, too, :) -- it means etymologically,? 'blissful'). Grice argues that the dispositional account runs into? difficulties specially with "I intend." But surely it is not appropriate,? Chapman notes, to switch to the 'special episode' account." The 'how do? you know' is trick. "People," Chapman writes, "are not expected to be? judging intention from OBSERVATION." In Grice's? METAPHOR: "I am not in? the audience, not even in? the front row of the? stalls. I am on the? stage." (cited by Chapman, p. 67). -- brilliant, I'd expect you'd? agree! For (3), Grice singles Ryle for criticism.? ---- "Grice argues that the difference between speech and other? forms of behavioiur is much greater than Ryle allows." "A man does not? need to wait," Chapman notes, "to observe HIMSELF heading for the plate of fruit? on the table before is in a position to KNOW that he wants? pineapple". "Grice suggested solution to the failure ... of a, b, and c? -- rests on intention." HYPOTHETICAL? INTENTION. If so and so were the? case I would behave in such and such a? way "cannot be understood as a statement of hypothetical fact," Chapman? writes, but "as a statement of hypothetical intention" but cfr. Dummett? on 'hypothetical promises.' "just as long as the behaviour in question? can be seen as VOLUNTARY." Furthermore, "It is not possible to? say, "I am not sure whether I intend..." in the way it IS possible to doubt? other psychological states." (Chapman notes). Grice's own positive theory? in that paper relies on Stout and the ideas i. of FREEDOM FROM DOUBT that? the intended action will take place as NOT dependent on any empirical? evidence. --- Grice's "second observation is that the utterer must? be prepared to take "the necessary steps", Chapman writes, "to bring about the? fulfillment of the intention." -- Chapman observes: Grice? has "JUSTIFIED the inclusion of psychological concepts in analyses; they do not? need to be 'translated' away into behavioral tendencies or observable? phenomena" --- although I'd nitpick about EMPIRICAL meaning 'inner? experience'? --- "Second, he has established the concept of? intention as PRIMARY". And no, I've checked in the index to Chapman's? _Grice_ and there's no 'Anscombe'! I have made a few marginal notes to my? Chapman. INCORRIGIBILITY, privileged access, are notions that Grice will come? back to in "Method in philosophical psychology", and while 'intend' may figure? as PRIMARY, I would think he ends up analysing it in terms of willing/judging? and these two concepts themselves if not behaviouristically at least? "functionalistically". Two footnotes: * Philosophers can be? _wicked_. Chapman notes that the manuscript copy of "Disposition and Intention"? contains, in a different hand, very wicked comments, which I won't transcribe? (right now) but which Chapman suggest that could have been enough of a reason? not for Grice to consider this or that. He could be sensitive. *? Philosophers and 'absurdity'. Chapman quotes from the last passage in? "Disposition and Intention" which may relate to Bayne's comments on 'absurdity'? and grammar. Chapman writes: "Having established that a doubt over one's? own intention is something of an ABSURDITY, he offers a characteristically? tantalsing suggestion? that, 'we? hope that this may help to? explain the? ABSURDITY of analogous? expressions mentioning some OTHER? psychological concepts, though I wouldn't for a? moment claim? that it will help to explain ALL? such absurdities.' (cited by Chapman, p. 69) For, indeed, 'what a piece of work is a? pirot"! Cheers, J. L. Speranza? **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1221823300x1201398714/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd= JulystepsfooterNO62) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sun Jul 12 09:00:50 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2009 06:00:50 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Deliberation and Grammar Message-ID: <181281.45789.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com> In my original posting on this, the idea was that I cannot utter something which is ungrammatical with the intention of saying something that would be expressed by a grammatical sentence. You mention the idea of speaking an extentional language. I'm not sure, exactly, what you have in mind, but the constructive point you raise, if I've understood you correctly, raises the question of whether intensionality is a necessary condition of intentionality. I don't think it is, but that is because I believe there are mental verbs which are extensional. In fact, I believe that the most fundamental mental relation, attention (broadly construed), is not intensional! Apologies to JLS at this point for not getting to his posts first, but since you contribute less frequently, I think he'll understand. Hey, by the way, do any of you guys remember a fellow named Cornman. He was a student of Sellars and dies prematurely, I believe. He was a fascinating fellow, and a VERY hard worker. Nice to hear from you Danny. Regards STeve --- On Sat, 7/11/09, Danny Frederick wrote: From: Danny Frederick Subject: RE: Deliberation and Grammar To: "'hist-analytic'" Date: Saturday, July 11, 2009, 7:00 AM Hi Steve, ? Suppose someone is brought up in a community that speaks an extensional language but he wants to start talking about propositions, concepts, propositional attitudes and such like. Does he not intend to say things that his grammar does not permit? ? And can we not imagine ourselves to be in a similar situation. Someone may come up with a new idea that cannot be expressed using our present grammatical constructions, so he intends to say what our grammar does not permit. And could he not make himself understood, by metaphors initially, no doubt, so that we all come to extend our grammar in new ways? ? Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sun Jul 12 09:16:08 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2009 06:16:08 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Intending, Choosing, and Deciding Message-ID: <261038.65659.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com> JlS, Having trouble keeping up with your posts. I read every word of all of them on Hist-Analytic. This book is going to press soon, so I've got to get the citations and credits down exactly right. So I'll go back and collect your contributions to the Grice/Anscombe discussion. This has to be done soon. But I thought I'd enter one comment here. You mention Grice on "trying"; this is a very interesting verb. In fact, in fact in my book I argue that it is one of an entire class of mental verbs of a very special sort. Suppose I'm doing my morning "thing" feeding my two birds. I've reached over the same shelf to get the "avi-cakes" for years. One day, I reach and, and suddenly, my arm freezes up (or gets thrown out of the sockets, whateva). I let go with a brief "yipe" and someone comes in and ask: "What happened?" I reply "I was trying to get the avi-cakes and my arm came out of its socket." Here is what to notice: Had someone come in as I was reaching, just before the arm came out of its socket, and asked: "What are you doing?" I would NOT have said "I'm trying to get the avi-cakes. It is only if I FAIL that I say "I was trying..." Now this has been noticed with respect to individual verbs but no one has noticed that this is a class, It is a condition of use that I am thwarted or that there is a special circumstance. Ryle's use of 'voluntary' is like this; but the same sort of thing is, I suspect, in play in the cse of Grice's 'look's' and, here I'm alluding to his doubt or denial condition. This can be extended to "My intention was..." Notice, also, the tense connnection. Regards Steve --- On Sat, 7/11/09, Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: From: Jlsperanza at aol.com Subject: Intending, Choosing, and Deciding To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Date: Saturday, July 11, 2009, 11:05 AM -- the Grice/Pears Collaborations Grice/Thomson,? Grice/Pears A brief historical note. When Grice recalls his philosophical? collaborations in "Reply to Richards" ('Life and Opinions of Paul Grice') he? first and foremost cites Strawson -- where the actual collaboration is? _visible_: "In defense of a dogma". He goes on to mention collaboration with? Judy Baker in 'ethics': (again visible: "Davidson on weakness of the will" -- in? Vermazen/Hintikka) and a few interesting less known? pairs: Grice/Warnock? work on philosophy of perception. Warnock, b.? 1923. Indeed, this fascinated Grice and Warnock, things like 'visa',? etc. Grice/Staal -- work on logic and here's the interesting (to? me) quote vis a vis the history of the philosophy of action: "work in the? philosophy of action" Grice/Thompson (which I have been so far unable to? locate -- this is J. F. Thompson,? of Christ? Church, Oxford, and later of MIT -- husband to Judith Jarvis) Grice/Pears? -- This motivated me to look for and find Pears, Problems? in the philosophy of mind, London:? Duckworth. --- It is in connection with Pears --? that the 'deliberation and grammar' thing may interact. Unlike 'intending',? Pears, (and Grice/Pears) was interested in? "deciding" which I find it's like 'deliberating' with a? vengeance. In the "Unpubications" of Grice, Grandy/Warner cite lectures? on "Trying" given by Grice at Princeton which I always thought had the right? title to them. Harman should have attended them. That was early? 1960s. --- Pears is credited in "Intention and Uncertainty" by? Grice (very last page), and inded Pears went on to lecture at the British? Academy (or was it before that) on "Deciding". Pears has written? extensively on "Intention and Belief" and other paradoxes of 'irrationality',? and I can't read Pears without thinking Grice! (to the Mill). And I'm NOT? very familiar with the Hampshire/Hart CERTAINTY theory of decision that Grice is? apparently trying to 'water-down'. The Grice/Pears discussions fall within the context of Austin, "Ifs and? Cans" and similar work undertaken by people like Nowell-Smith on 'choosing'.? Seeing that deliberate is cognate with libra, scale, I think that? Nowell-Smith was possibly right when he says that 'choice' pre-dates decision? (if not intention). All very tricky! -- but fascinating. And I'm glad Bayne is using 'philosophical psychology' in the subtitle to? his book. This is the phrase preferred by Grice too. Why he found 'philosophy of? mind' too pompous we can only guess (and rightly!). -- All I know is that if you? say, 'philosophical psychology' to _STICH_ he feels offended but that's _his_? problem! :) (He says 'psychology' can only be EMPIRICAL -- cfr. 'philosophical? linguistics' -- but he's at Rutgers, right? :-)) Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1221823300x1201398714/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd= JulystepsfooterNO62) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Jul 12 10:40:51 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2009 10:40:51 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Deliberation and Grammar Message-ID: In a message dated 7/12/2009 9:53:04 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: Apologies to JLS at this point for not getting to his posts first, but since you contribute less frequently, I think he'll understand. ---- I do! What I'd love is if you could expand on the three last sentences or so of your original post, where you mention the parallelism (rough?) between this point about the grammar (or lack of grammar) and Aristotle on the deliberation about the means! It seems your critics (friendly speaking: Aune and Frederick) have focused on the first part of your thing -- second actually, "... and Grammar" -- rather than on the first,""Deliberation and ..." I wonder if we can combine the two things and speak of ungrammatical correlatives of 'pseudo-deliberations' (about the means)? Cheers, JL **************An Excellent Credit Score is 750. See Yours in Just 2 Easy Steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1222377098x1201454399/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd=Jul yExcfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Jul 12 11:11:14 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2009 11:11:14 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Grice, "Disposition and Intention" Message-ID: In a message dated 7/12/2009 9:50:48 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: >What is the info on Chapman. I'd like to include reference to the >quote you made to the effect that Anscombe's intention was >the best Gricean idea yet. That would be interesting. Also, >I'm curious about Chapman. ---- The reference is Chapman, Siobhan (R.). Grice: philosopher and linguist. Houndsmille, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 2005 >Also, I'm curious about Chapman She was born c. 1970, I presume in Liverpool. She has interesting work with the Nottingham Journal of Linguistics (I believe). Her PhD (I think with the Department of Linguistics maybe of LIverpool) was on 'Implicature and ACCENT -- and dialect", but mainly accent -- which I always found fascinating (the topic) and which I hope she considers in connection with the "Scouse". (I first learned Scouse via "Letter to Brezhnev" -- with Firth. Unfortunately Firth does not play a Scouse there, but a Russian, complete with Russian furrin accent -- but I loved him anyways [sic]. Chapman has done 'popular' work (as I call it, i.e. meant to _educate_) on philosophy and linguistics. I first heard about her when there was a query in PHILOS-L for a Dictionary of Ideas or Biographies. It was submitted by who I think is Chapman's partner, Chris Routledge. Routledge wrote to me re: my offering to write the entry on Grice, "Thanks but no thanks; Siobhan will take care about that!". The entry is available online, and very interesting it is too -- she cares to mention Grice's mother quite a bit: Mabel Fenton. The book _Grice_ is pretty interesting, and I did review it elsewhere, etc, and am thinking of listing all the unpublications she manages to cite -- to compare vis a vis "The unpublications of H. P. Grice" in Grandy/Warner (vis a vis "The publications of H. P. Grice"). Apaprently the story goes, "Okay, Paul -- we have this long list of things that you 'unpublished'. How would we call them?" "Unpublications, surely". ----- >I think Grice did a pretty terrible job in editing WoW. He >"cleaned it up." Too much missing; too much edited out; >not enough included. Don't get me wrong it is worth having >and reading but it has limitations. Remember that he died of enthysema and dropsy (in1988) and he was suffering quite a bit. The good thing about it is that he did write, under the circumstances, in 1987, the "Retrospective Epilogue" that he managed to include. Recall too that the book came out in 1989, while he indeed died in August 1988. For the expert Griceans we can only go back to the original versions, as you write. -- He did a bit of cutting out. I think that considering it was his first book, he feared that keeping the things _as originally published_ would tire the readers. Note also that he was under contract with Harvard U. P. -- since the (c) of the William James delivered at Harvard _had_ to be published with Harvard University Press. The two other books published "by" Grice (1991, 2001: Conception of Value and Aspects of Reason) were published by Clarendon (like the festschrift in 1986). >On dispositions: I think this card has been played too >often. I think the issue of dispositions because it goes >back to the need to add operational definitions to >extensional accounts of scientific explanation etc and >because of its link to the verificationist position has an >unchallenged respectability. Indeed. One marginal note to my section here makes a reference to Lewis and the counterfactuals. And of course serious students of philosophy (of science) are well aware of the problems with 'fragile' (Breakable). Recall that Grice was writing in 1949 -- but indeed the problem with dispositional analysis of 'breakable' and C. I. Lewis on the strict implication should have been familiar to him. Bayne: >To be sure "finkish dispostions" >do raise interesting questions about the semantics of >counterfactuals in relation to these "theory terms" but >I think concentrating on them as a way of either formulating >or solving problems is far overdone. Right. BUT ONE THING is of VALUE here, though. That while the 'special episode' and the behaviourist' account are excluded, there is a good point in the dispositional analysis in the EXPLICATURE (or explicit expansion) of a statement of intention "I intend that p" -- surely no 'ps' or 'qs' need to be minded here ('mind your ps and qs') unless we are Georg Von Wright (And I am on Sundays). Suppose "the door is shut" --- p p is the state to be brought about. I intend (that) the door BE shut. By some strange metamorphosis (or transformations, if you will) this becomes I INTEND (to) shut the door. (cfr. with meaning, though, "I intend my addressee to believe that ..." -- the 'other'-intention, as it where, intention that SOMEONE other than myself brings about this or that -- I'm speaking loosely since it SHOULD be reduced to MY intention to do this or that, anyway). So the 'dispositional' account at least helps us understand the logical form of 'statements of intentions' as INVOLVING an 'action' as Chapman puts it, "What he lables the 'dispositional' account, whereby the relevant concept is seen as A DISPOSITION TO ACT in certain ways in certain hypothetical situations." (Chapman here uses the example, "I like X" which is a bit of a trick). And in any case reminds me of my discussions of the theory of "Meaning" as causalist. I recall that in "Meaning" Grice dismisses "mean-to' as a case of NATURAL-meaning, or of using 'mean' in the 'natural' "sense". I MEAN *to* shut the door. Indeed, early exegeses of Grice, "Meaning" would focus that the 'mean' we are interested here is not the 'mean' ('to be important' -- you mean a lot to me), or the 'mean' = intend. "To mean to open the door". But surely Grice saw a continuum here. Bayne goes on to mention his additions (and thanks for the offer) to hist-analytic: > I've already >made the selection, a book. I think people will be surprised. >It's one of H. H. Price's works. Price was superb; never agreed >with him on much but he was a terrific philosopher. Indeed. And congrats. Later, J. L. Speranza **************An Excellent Credit Score is 750. See Yours in Just 2 Easy Steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1222377098x1201454399/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd=Jul yExcfooterNO62) From aune at philos.umass.edu Sun Jul 12 10:54:21 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2009 10:54:21 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Deliberation and Grammar In-Reply-To: <181281.45789.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <181281.45789.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <66AB0CEB-154B-40D6-806E-B9ED244530B9@philos.umass.edu> Jim Cornman, whinme I met when I taught at Pitt and he there on a sabbatical visit, became a good friend of mine. Our families became quite close before he died in an accident on, I think, the Penn Turnpike. He was not a student of Sellars but of Chisholm; he did become interested in Sellars' philosophy, although he was generally critical of it. Bruce From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Jul 12 12:10:44 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2009 12:10:44 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Grice, Lectures on Intention and Trying (Brandeis) Message-ID: In a message dated 7/12/2009 9:53:31 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: >This book is going to press soon, so I've >got to get the citations and credits down exactly right. So I'll go back >and collect And recall, it's NOT definitive! Some of my quotes refer to 'conversations' or 'unpublished' work so you shouldn't worry. You have done more than your share! Just a _mention_ of Grice would have interested readers heading in the right direction. You don't have to supply _every_ step in *that* direction! And recall that people will be reading _you_! It's what _you_ say or write that matters! -- >I thought I'd enter one comment here. You mention Grice on "trying"; Yes. I'm not sure, but I think the reference, which you SHOULDN'T Have in your references section would be: Grice, "Lectures on Trying". Princeton, 1961. --- They are cited in "The unpublications of H. P. Grice" in Grandy/Warner, PGRICE. Oxford: Clarendon. I _SEEM_ to remember a discussion of an example or two. 'try' seems indeed a very different 'animal' 'trying to jump the wall', is I think Grice's example. --- AND it's again discussed in "Prolegomena" in WoW (1967), vis a vis, I think to remember, H. L. A. Hart -- will check this 'Prolegomena' reference. the implicature that "He tried to do it" but did not succeed WRONG: It may be otiose (but still true) to say, "He tried to do it, and indeed succeeded" --- I'll try to get the Nowell-Smith reference correct. He is a genius, Nowell-Smith, and he himself edited a little list of his publications, and he has WONDERS scattered here and there: some in the philosophy of action, on 'choosing' and 'doing'. And then, I was thinking, this leads us to the LIBERTARIAN problem posed by Strawson with "I resent that p" (Freedom and Resentment that Grice adored -- and quotes in a footnote in "Conception of Value"). The way I read Strawson (read in the past, that is -- note the morpheme) was in terms of ascription of 'freedom' (not just freedom from observation) but freedom simpliciter. I cannot resent that it rained all day yesterday. I can only resent that Strawson did not tell me there was a party at the swimming-pool, or something. I recall I discussed this at length with my thesis advisor in Buenos Aires, Eduardo Rabossi. I had to complete a doctoral seminar with Beatriz Lavandera, and she died. I said to Rabossi (before she had died, but when nobody had explained to me why the seminar had been cancelled), "I resent what she did -- abandon the course in the middle of it". He said, "You are an idiot" (or words to that effect). "Surely you cannot resent anything that she does. She is a sick woman" (meaning healthwise --). I felt so awkward after that meeting with my tutor. Tutees can be so idiotically selfish! So Lavandera did NOT abandon her students; she was 'forced' to do it. Since she was not FREE to do it, it is UNGRAMMATICAL to resent what she did; we can only pity her. And may she rest in peace. --- Back to 'try': >this is a very interesting verb. In fact, >in fact in my book I argue that it is one of an entire class of mental >verbs of a very special sort. Oddly, Rabossi (may he rest in peace) I always thought I found very difficult to discuss with; but then I blame Ryle. The man (Rabossi) found time between his football matches and his cookouts in his ranch to translate (for the masses) Ryle, "The concept of mind" -- el concepto de lo mental. I WOULD NEVER TRY! Rabossi was obsessed with verbs of action. Knowing that I was in the audience for a public 'tutorial', we played with referring to Grice 'intend' as INTENDER -- and this I have used PUBLICLY and in a publication too -- cited in Habermas, The pragmatics of communication, MIT -- "Speranza" is the name --. "Intender" will NOT do, for in Spanish, the 'int-' became 'ent-'. "Entender" (French entendre) means to 'understand', although it is cognate with English 'intend'. We do have in Spanish, "intentar", which is a doublet, I think they are called, i.e. a Latinate term of a later date, vis a vis 'entender'. ----- end of Rabossiana. Back to 'try': >Suppose I'm doing my morning "thing" >feeding my two birds. I've reached over the same shelf to get the >"avi-cakes" for years. One day, I reach and, and suddenly, my >arm freezes up (or gets thrown out of the sockets, whateva). I let >go with a brief "yipe" and someone comes in and ask: "What >happened?" I reply "I was trying to get the avi-cakes and my arm >came out of its socket." Here is what to notice: Had someone >come in as I was reaching, just before the arm came out of its >socket, and asked: "What are you doing?" I would NOT have >said "I'm trying to get the avi-cakes." You would _not_; Maybe _I_ would. People ask too many questions. :). >It is only if I FAIL that I say "I was trying..." Now this has been >noticed with respect to individual verbs but no one has noticed >that this is a class. Interesting point, as it relates to a point I was going to make (but forgot) regarding Grice's little sympathy for the 'special episode' account of PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS -- and here the idea of 'concept' is interesting because it boils down for Grice to the role of these concepts in a (folksy) psychological theory, complete with 'proper' generalisations). His argument -- as expanded in Chapman -- is that special episode special episode special episode . . trying to sing trying to dance trying to sing and dance i.e. Surely, it is as if Grice is wanting to say, we need some 'transparency' here! And recall that Quine has 'propositional attitude' verbs as MONADIC! Chapman writes: "The alternative (to the dispositional account) is to consider that such statements as describing 'special episodes', in other words to concede that they can be understood as DESCRIPTIVE." --- and here I make a note on keeping a diet, and observing yourself heading for the plate of ravioli -- etc. which Chapman/Grice have denied. And cfr. the title of Pears' lecture, "Predicting and deciding". It seems 'predicting' _IS_ descriptive? and isn't 'introspection' a sort of observable experience, etc. "they can be understood as descriptive, only of PRIVATE sensations," --- and I see that 'private language' in the OED credits Anscombe -- "directed simply at the INDIVIDUAL [not generic] CONCEPT in question. These sensations takae the form of a SPECIAL and highly SPECIFIC psychological ENTITIES, such as 'liking-feelings' [or 'trying-feelings. JLS]. But then, Chapman notes, "Every case of wanting [or 'trying' -- to honour Grice and Bayne -- JLS], for instance, must create A SEPARATE PSYCHOLOGICAL *EPISODE*." "The system of explanation quickly becomes UNWIELDY; wanting an apple [or trying to reach for the bird food -- JLS] "for instance, must be a DISCRETE phenomenon, different from wanting an orange [or trying to reach for a beer -- JLS] "or a pear or a banana" ---- Bayne: >It is a condition of use that I am thwarted >or that there is a special circumstance. Ryle's use of 'voluntary' >is like this; but the same sort of thing is, I suspect, in play >in the case of Grice's 'looks' and, here I'm alluding to his >doubt or denial condition. This can be extended to "My intention >was..." Notice, also, the tense connection. ---- Yes, you are very correct. I would think Grice would generalise the point here in what he calls "A-philosophers". Where I _THINK_ "A" stands for 'appropriateness' (in WoW prolegomena googlebooks). For he wants to say that an 'appropriateness' condition -- the special circumstance where you are thwarted cfr. Ryle 'voluntary' that Grice credits in WoW, i. or Austin, 'No modification without aberration' HIS target of attack -- vis a vis Searle's defense in "Modifications and Aberrations", British Analytic Philosophy or indeed "The pillar box SEEMS red to me" or Hart on 'trying', etc. -- is NEITHER a necessary nor a sufficient condition, but only an 'implicature'. The notion of 'implicature' he "coins" in WoW, ii -- so we have to wait for a week -- I assume the lectures were once a week, I don't know. I couldn't have slept in the interim. (at least a day). ---- So he would say that 'try' means whatever it means but the 'and I'm thwarted' is an implicature arising from expectations of optimal informativeness: Why bother to say, "I tried" -- when you _also_ know that you succeeded and when you think that that is in the interest in your audience? What are _you_ doing? I'm trying to get the avi-cakes. Okay. Sorry. Allow me to let you succeed. TELEPHONE RINGS JL. Hi Danny Frederick. What are you doing? JL. Nothing really. I was trying to get myself an immersion bath with foam in the tub Danny Frederick. I suppose I'm calling in a bad time. I _am_ interrupting. JL. Not really. I'm only TRYING to get myself a nice immersion bath. But I never do (get it)! Just _trying_ makes me feel _so_ good. Danny Frederick. Have you been reading Grice lately. JL. _Trying_. Danny Frederick. OK. I'll see if I can try AND call you back when you are in a less, er, philosophical mode. JL. There's no harm in _trying_. I've checked it's Brandeis, not Princeton -- and Harman expands on the example: Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends - Google Books Result by Richard E. Grandy, Richard Warner, H. Paul Grice - 1988 - Philosophy - 512 pages This shows that no attitude involved in trying to defeat the plant's security ... 9 I owe these examples to Grice's lectures on intention and trying at ... books.google.com/books?isbn=0198244649... - The cricket batter tries to throw the ball OVER the pitcher's head expecting the ball to arrive waist high having been told that otherwise the throw will fall short. The security officer tries to defeat an atomic power plant's security system as a way of testing HOPING he will not be able to succeed The athlete tries to push over a wall in order to build up his muscles ("I owe these examples to Grice's lectures on intention and trying at Brandeis University in the early sixties." (p. 370). In "Prolegomena" Grice's example is He tries to turn off the light implicature or appropriateness condition: "It IS or might have been a matter of SOME difficulty for me to turn off the light." Studies in the way of words - Google Books Result by Paul Grice - 1989 - Philosophy - 394 pages Prolegomena There is a familiar and, to many, very natural maneuver which is of frequent occurrence in conceptual inquiries, whether of a philosophical or ... books.google.com/books?isbn=0674852710... - I recheck and indeed it's pp. 6-7 of WoW where he expands on 'trying' -- thus titled the subsection. It's NOT Ascribed to Hart (he ascribes 'carefully' to Hart). Chapman notes, and I add this as a final note for this post, that in "Intention and Uncertainty" Grice indeed wants to reformulate an earlier view of 'intention' in terms of trying that he held. And this helps Chapman to propose that Grice's career has been mainly a development of his own philosophical self. He was somewhat obsessed with the views he held and kept good record of them; he certainly saw life as a 'philosophical' development. Which I always found inspirational. I.e. as if philosophy is a long conversation (or short as in the case of Ramsey say) with one self -- or with, to put it vaguely with one's former self (vide. Grice, "Personal Identity"). (Although I prefer to converse with my future self on occasions -- his use of slang leaves me cold -- 'cool'). Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************An Excellent Credit Score is 750. See Yours in Just 2 Easy Steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1222377098x1201454399/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd=Jul yExcfooterNO62) From Baynesr at comcast.net Sun Jul 12 12:47:59 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2009 16:47:59 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Deliberation and Grammar In-Reply-To: <156592677.462091247417262102.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <1368623726.462141247417279127.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> This is something I haven't thought out as carefully as I hope to. In addition to the Anscombe book I have about 250 more pages of a book I'm doing on the history of the theory of action where I will be dealing in the later chapters with contemporary matters, such as those related to mental causation and causation by entrainment. But let me touch on what you've mentioned here since it is, I think,an important move with respect to this second perhaps overly ambitious project. I'm not sure what you mean exactly by "pseudo-deliberations": I think I have some idea but I'm going to remain cautious and say something that may not address your question. Uttering is like a sequence of "basic actions" (in the sense of Danto et al). It is not to be described in terms of acoustics, but rather "articulatory gestures." (Liberman/Mattingly phonetics). These gestures are like basic actions in fulfilling an intention. Now move to Aristotle, briefly. One can think of a practical syllogism as relating a want and a choice (a desire and an intention). The "logic" is what relates them. Similarly, deliberation as to what to utter begins with wanting to *say* something (convey a thought); that is an utterance follows deliberation as to *how* to say what want to express the thought; something like basic actions following deliberation about how to achieve a goal. Now if the goal of utterance is like the goal (I use 'goal' in a familiar way) of a basic action, then constraints on the possibility of action constrain deliberating about what to do, since, as Aristotle noted, we deliberate only on those things within our power. Just as physical possibility limits our intentions; since these are choices and we arrive at these by deliberation, our intentions are limited by physical possibility. Grammar is like physical reality: some things are possible, other are not. So grammar constrains our linguistic intentions just as what is possible constrains our non-linguistic intentions: physics as the "grammar" of the universe, so to speak. My intrigue is over this similarity. Recall my comment on Feinberg? Some intentions are concerns about doings; some of my linguistic intentions are concerns about explanations; but there is a third category, one I think, Grice may have identified. Here intentions are concerned with doings but not making things happen in any obvious way. Instead intentions are linguistic having to to with "evocations" such as the belief that I uttered such and such with the intention that my audience know....etc. This is not a making; it is bringing into being a belief by means of language. But the rules are like productions etc. in that the deliberation leading up consummation of the linguistic act is circumscribed by *conventions*. What Popper might have called "institutional facts." Much more to be said here. I haven't thought it all through. It occurred to me a week or so ago. It may be a "wind egg." Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: Jlsperanza at aol.com To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Sent: Sunday, July 12, 2009 7:40:51 AM GMT -08:00 US/Canada Pacific Subject: Re: Deliberation and Grammar In a message dated 7/12/2009 9:53:04 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: Apologies to JLS at this point for not getting to his posts first, but since you contribute less frequently, I think he'll understand. ---- I do! What I'd love is if you could expand on the three last sentences or so of your original post, where you mention the parallelism (rough?) between this point about the grammar (or lack of grammar) and Aristotle on the deliberation about the means! It seems your critics (friendly speaking: Aune and Frederick) have focused on the first part of your thing -- second actually, "... and Grammar" -- rather than on the first,""Deliberation and ..." I wonder if we can combine the two things and speak of ungrammatical correlatives of 'pseudo-deliberations' (about the means)? Cheers, JL **************An Excellent Credit Score is 750. See Yours in Just 2 Easy Steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1222377098x1201454399/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd=Jul yExcfooterNO62) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Sun Jul 12 12:52:17 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2009 16:52:17 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Deliberation and Grammar In-Reply-To: <66AB0CEB-154B-40D6-806E-B9ED244530B9@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: <1803754336.463121247417537887.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I enjoyed Cornman, immensely. It has been many years since I read his book (green hardback as I recall). He wrote with Aunian lucidity. There was nothing pretentious, nothing held back. I've been thinking of him as a subject of historical curiosity on HIst-Analytic. He had passion for what he was doing, something sorely lacking today in my opinion. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: "steve bayne" Cc: "hist-analytic" Sent: Sunday, July 12, 2009 7:54:21 AM GMT -08:00 US/Canada Pacific Subject: Re: Deliberation and Grammar Jim Cornman, whinme I met when I taught at Pitt and he there on a sabbatical visit, became a good friend of mine. Our families became quite close before he died in an accident on, I think, the Penn Turnpike. He was not a student of Sellars but of Chisholm; he did become interested in Sellars' philosophy, although he was generally critical of it. Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Jul 12 14:53:07 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2009 14:53:07 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Grice's Frown Message-ID: "Avowals" --- In a message dated 7/12/2009 12:48:13 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, Baynesr at comcast.net writes: >Uttering is like a sequence of "basic actions" (in the sense of >Danto et al). It is not to be described in terms of acoustics, but >rather "articulatory gestures." (Liberman/Mattingly phonetics). Right. For the record, I think it's a bit of a Gricean joke to use 'utter' as he did in "Meaning". Etymologically, to utter is 'to out' -- which seems to lead to the 'ghost-in-the-machine' picture of the world. So I do think he just meant it as 'doing this or doing that'. --- >These gestures are like basic actions in fulfilling an intention. >Now move to Aristotle, briefly. One can think of a practical >syllogism as relating a want and a choice (a desire and an >intention). The "logic" is what relates them. Excellent point. And indeed, if Grice is right in "Aspects of Reason" the 'logic' underlying 'theoretical' syllogisms and 'practical' ones is one and the same. >Similarly, deliberation >as to what to utter begins with wanting to *say* something (convey >a thought); Point taken. And this actually reminds me of that Genius, Zeno Vendler. Surely we can say, "That's what you've been saying all day long yesterday" But it seems incorrect (ungrammatical) to say "That's what you've been MEANING all day long yesterday" It seems that 'mean', like 'know' is not a process verb: "Yesterday I spent the day knowing that 2 + 2 = 4" "You mean you're not _knowing_ it now?" Bayne: >that is an utterance follows deliberation as to *how* to >say what want to express the thought; something like basic >actions following deliberation about how to achieve a goal. Excellent. And the 'dispositional' struck back with a vengeance in Grice. I recall in a seminar with Rabossi (where we were discussing Chomsky, Rules and Representations) I presented an essay, "Grice's Aunt Matilda". For Grice's Aunt Matilda knows that by uttering 'runt' -- she'll be taken to mean, 'undersized person' (metaphorically) Yet, 'she has no intention or willingness or in the least a disposition to utter 'runt' -- yet she knows what that means, and so we can say that she has a procedure in her repertoire to utter 'runt' to mean 'under-sized person' even if she'd rather be seen dead than using that word herself." (WoW, vi). Bayne: >Now if the goal of utterance is like the goal (I use 'goal' in a >familiar way) of a basic action, then constraints on the >possibility of action constrain deliberating about what to do, >since, as Aristotle noted, we deliberate only on those things >within our power. Good. In a way this connects with a PRACTICAL application on the belief-constraint upon intention that Grice plays with. In more than one occasion (I counted 5 -- and shared them all with STAMPE, as I recall! -- and Martinich and Biro) Grice speaks uses 'intend' SERIOUSLY to mean, 'think it is possible or feasible'. It would not be within Humpty Dumpty's POWER for example to utter "impenetrability" to mean "let's change the topic" for Humpty Dumpty recognises himself (or itself, it's a wind-egg), "You don't know till I tell you". ---- So he cannot _mean_ that. I actually wrote a paper for the Lewis Carroll Society which I entitled, "Humpty Dumpty's Impenetrability". Bayne: >Just as physical possibility limits our intentions; since these >are choices and we arrive at these by deliberation, our intentions >are limited by physical possibility. Grammar is like physical >reality: some things are possible, other are not. So grammar >constrains our linguistic intentions just as what is possible >constrains our non-linguistic intentions: physics as the "grammar" >of the universe, so to speak. And thus "a pretty good guide" to echo Russell to logical form. >My intrigue is over this similarity. >Recall my comment on Feinberg? Some intentions are >concerns about doings; some of my linguistic intentions are >concerns about explanations; but there is a third category, one >I think, Grice may have identified. Here intentions are concerned >with doings but not making things happen in any obvious way. >Instead intentions are linguistic having to to with "evocations" such >as the belief that I uttered such and such with the intention that >my audience know....etc. This is not a making; I see your point. Indeed, I'm always fascinated by the distinction, very subtle, between 'making' and 'doing' (and 'baking') Since I knew you were coming I baken you a cake. did a cake (no!) made a cake (yes) Romance speakers confound those, -- but it's augere (to do -- hence 'action') and 'facere' -- to make, hence 'fact', etymologically. Bayne: >it is bringing into >being a belief by means of language. Excellent. And it's always a BELIEF only, for 'protreptic' utterances, as Grice called them, "Trespassers Will be Prosecuted" have to be 'digested' first as 'exhibitions' of the _utterer's_ intentions. (cfr. "Thou shalt not kill"). Bayne: >But the rules are like >productions etc. in that the deliberation leading up consummation >of the linguistic act is circumscribed by *conventions*. Well, there Humpty Dumpty and I would disagree -- and perhaps Grice when he says (WoW, Meaning Revisited), "I don't think that meaning is essentially linked with 'convention' at all!". But this required a longer post. I take 'convention' to mean, at least, alla Lewis's book (Convention) 'arbitrary' procedure. But a lot of our 'utterances' spring from 'natural' outbursts of this and that -- a yawn, a frown, etcetera. These are 'meaningful' utterances and yet not really 'conventional'. Bayne: >What Popper >might have called "institutional facts." Much more to be said here. >I haven't thought it all through. It occurred to me a week or so >ago. It may be a "wind egg." Well, this is actually also an Anscombian distinction, right? institutional vs. brute. I think it's original Rawlsian, vis a vis regulative and constitutive and overused by Searle? --- I never liked Searle's 'regulative rules' (since I found it pleonastic). But indeed, a 'brute fact' would be a, say, burp. Now that's gross and uninvited (at least in Western societies, I am told it's good manners in Japan, or, for all I know, some areas of Provence -- just teasing). But some people (and actually, children, pride on this) can "imitate" a natural burp. Yet this would be 'institutionalised'. This actually may relate to this example by Grice -- cited by Chapman. You yawn when you are bored. Then you can also say, "I'm bored" Or you can say, "There's a play being played" Chapman writes: "Grice argues that the difference between speech and other forms of behaviour is much greater than Ryle allows. In particular, while it is possible to 'sham' behaviour, such as yawning without being false, a 'shammed' statement, "I feel bored" will be simply false. A statement of boredom is not of the same order as a yawn when it comes to offering INFORMATION precisely because, as Ryle acknoweldges, it is UTTERED voluntarily and DELIBERATELY." "Grice adds another possible indicator of boredom into the comparison." "When listening to a political speech, we might give an indication that we feel bored by saying, "I feel bored", by yawning, or indeed by making a remark such as "There is a good play coming on next week". "This last remark [this may relate to my previous example of 'implicature' of "You're the cream in my coffee" _meaning_ you are my pride and joy. JLS] is ALSO voluntary and DELIBERATE, but it does NOT offer anything like the same STRENGTH of EVIDENCE of our state of boredom as the alleged 'AVOWAL', precisely because it is not directly concerned with our state of mind." "Only 'I am bored' is a way of TELLING someone that you are bored." This is the physics of toughts, as Bayne explains. "Furthermore, although it MIGHT be possible to some extent to sustain a theory of AVOWALS or other behaviour as offering INFORMATION about the state of mind of others, it will HARDLY DO FOR ONE'S *OWN* STATE OF MIND. A man does not need to wwait to observe himself heading for the plate of fruit on the table before he is in a position to know that he wants pineapple." (Chapman, p. 68). 'Actually he does if dieting' I added in the marginal note. Recall those photos of fat people people put on refrigerators, as reminders of 'objective' impressions of how silly people do look when, like salivating Pavlovian dogs, they head for a plate of ravioli (if not, of course, the over-refined truffles). M. Green, online, has explored this in his Grice's Frown -- I have corresponded with him, and want to say that I hope some of my views were not totally non-naturally intended by me to have had an effect on him. _HIS_ views made a good effect on me! M. Green choses the 'frown' mentioned by Grice as the passage from 'spontaneous' to rationally-controlled intention behaviour which we should ONLY call 'meaning' -- our view is that 'mean' as in 'The thermostat 'means' that the temperature in the room is high' is METAPHORICAL and 'anthropomorphic' in the worst sense of the terms! cfr. Searle on 'computers' meaning this or that alla Grice, 'I ordered the computer to 'print' the document'. and Haugeland/Grice's thoughts on this). J. L. Speranza **************An Excellent Credit Score is 750. See Yours in Just 2 Easy Steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1222377098x1201454399/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd=Jul yExcfooterNO62) From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Sun Jul 12 15:00:30 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2009 20:00:30 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Deliberation and Grammar In-Reply-To: <181281.45789.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <181281.45789.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <7CB8A2548E3847C3884C3C247640C8C2@DFLVQC1J> Hi Steve, I was suggesting that, as grammar involves a conceptual scheme, and as it is always possible that a given conceptual scheme may be replaced with a better one, then it is possible for someone to have a thought that he cannot express in a grammatical sentence of his current language. The only way forward is for him to extend the current range of grammatical constructions; and this would naturally be done by means of analogy or metaphor. And because it can be done in this way, there is some hope that his interlocutors will understand what he is getting at and follow suit. I suspect that this is how languages have in fact evolved. The reference to an extensional language was merely to provide a readily understood example of a syntactically well-defined language type in which some very ordinary statements cannot be made - at least, not in a way that reveals their grammatical structure. I did not raise the question of whether intensionality is a necessary condition of intentionality - at least, not intentionally. But now that you mention it, I think that it is not, given that intensionality is (I presume) a feature of language, and some non-language-using animals have (so we think) intentional states. On the other hand, I doubt that we can attend to something without classifying it in some way (if only as a thing). But classification requires concepts, not necessarily language. Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Jul 12 19:02:19 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2009 19:02:19 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Make Believe Message-ID: In a message dated 7/12/2009 12:50:36 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, Baynesr at comcast.net writes: there is a third category, one I think, Grice may have identified. Here intentions are concerned with doings but not making things happen in any obvious way. Instead intentions are linguistic having to to with "evocations" such as the belief that I uttered such and such with the intention that my audience know....etc. This is not a making; it is bringing into being a belief by means of language. --- I loved that! But we _do_ speak of Make Believe! or perhaps more or less seriously "You make me feel so young" (Sinatra) I would say that 'doing this or that' (by "uttering" 'x') brings about an effect indeed in the world. In _my_ case, if I say, "It's raining" I hope my uttering will induce in my audience the belief (I believe that) it is raining; and I WILL be concerned with my 'making-believe', for I want my addressee to DISPLAY in her subsequent behaviour the 'necessary steps' (She grabs an umbrella, for example) Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************An Excellent Credit Score is 750. See Yours in Just 2 Easy Steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1222377098x1201454399/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd=Jul yExcfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Jul 12 16:29:58 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2009 16:29:58 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Frege's Eschatology Message-ID: In a message dated 7/12/2009 3:33:05 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk writes: The only way forward is for him to extend the current range of grammatical constructions; and this would naturally be done by means of analogy or metaphor. ---- I'll let Steve replies your finest points -- but a note here and there that may prove of interest. In founding "Philosophical Eschatology" Grice mentions 'analogy' and 'metaphor' as THE methods. But I'm not sure your point is so _narrow_. You seem to be inviting also the question of the well-formed formulae: (Ex)Fx is a well-formed formulae in the grammar of first-order predicate logic with identity. What about (Ex)(Ex)F(Ex)F That seems to be something _otiose_ to say, if only because it's meaningless? Or consider the connectives (Grice's forte) p --> q But instead, you utter --> p q ---> q q p p --> ---> and add, "That's a profound thought -- I wish you had the grammar to understand it. Surely your grammar that only allows for 'p --> q' is restricted in that way? ---- I fear that sticking to 'analogy and metaphor' is solving the problem the EASY way. For we want to be able to express a 'thought' WITH the apparatus of Frege's 'first-order predicate logic with identity'. Or you think he was just playing with symbols -- and that you can change a conceptual scheme alla Davidson at a drop of a Popperian hat? --- Frege _devised_ the first-order predicate logic with identity because, after arduous deliberations with himself and other philosophers -- e.g. Aristotle, Leibniz, etc -- we decided it is _The_ Logic of Thought! Oddly, I found 18 cites for Anscombe in The OED but all referring to her work as "tr. Wittgenstein, 1953, Phil. Inv'" This possibly played with Anscombe in an interesting way philosophically. It would be as irritating as to think that J. L. Austin should only be remembered (as some think he would not) as the tr. of Frege's Grundlagen der Arithmetik (which he, like Anscombe, also did for Blackwell -- even if not, like Anscombe, in a dual-language edition). What a genius, Frege. J. L. Speranza **************An Excellent Credit Score is 750. See Yours in Just 2 Easy Steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1222377098x1201454399/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd=Jul yExcfooterNO62) From Baynesr at comcast.net Mon Jul 13 09:25:47 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2009 13:25:47 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Deliberation and Grammar In-Reply-To: <7CB8A2548E3847C3884C3C247640C8C2@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <384468530.624071247491547553.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> A lot has been said about conceptual schemes. Some good; some not so good. But as long as we are talking about the relation of conceptual schemes to grammar, then we are talking about something slightly different than what people like Davidson and Rorty and Aune have talked about. Although I don't know its current status - I haven't worked in this area in a good number of years - there have been theories relating grammar and "conceptual schemes." Here I have in mind what linguists (Gruber, Jackendoff et al) have called "theta theory." Theta theory is based on the idea of "theta role" such as "agent" and "patient" etc A noun e.g. can me "marked" in the sense that it has a theta role. The grammatical connection comes in by using theta roles to formula conditions for case assignment. Up until about 1980 Chomsky did nothing with case marking; he relied on "transformation rules" to make structure explicit. But later with the introduction of arguments for studying case this changed. People like Tim Stowell and others constructed elegant theories of case assignment based on the "theta criterion." So "concepts" in the form of theta roles become connected to case assignment and case assignment determined much as to word order ("case assignment under ajacency"). This theory is probably old fashioned now. Don't know but it is great illustration of the interface of syntax and semantics if you consider these roles semantical. Now if you look, carefully, at the origin of theta theory you will find that it, contrary to what some linguists think, goes back to Davidson's logical form of action sentences. Later I think it was Charles Parsons who applied it to modeling action. I did some work on the interaction of theta roles and constructions involving what were (are?) called GO PPs, that is prepositions indicating motion, e.g. 'under the rug' as in 'it rolled under the rug' as opposed to 'it lies under the rug'. This conception is owing to Jackendoff (Semantic Structure, MIT, 1990). I bring it up to illustrate how grammar and "conceptual structures" interrelate. Now as to the discussions of late about concptual structure, I haven't looked at it in a while, and at least with respect to cononical languages I think it is a waste of time, but I'd want to reserve final judgment until I've looked more carefully. Aune has a good paper on this as I recall, although owing to my recent work I have been unable to give it a close look. Check the hist-analytic site if you are interested. I've largely lost interest in a lot of this. If you go to a good linguistics library, MIT for example (if the books haven't as yet all been stolen) has rows and rows of journals like "Linguistics and Philosophy". Much of this is very good, very good. But it is of little consequence to "general philosophy" which is my main interest. Clever algebraists who know seventeen languages have a shot at excellence, but like most of the articles contained in these journals not much more than tenure comes out of them. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Danny Frederick" < danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk > To: "hist-analytic" < hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk > Sent: Sunday, July 12, 2009 12:00:30 PM GMT -08:00 US/Canada Pacific Subject: RE: Deliberation and Grammar Hi Steve, I was suggesting that, as grammar involves a conceptual scheme, and as it is always possible that a given conceptual scheme may be replaced with a better one, then it is possible for someone to have a thought that he cannot express in a grammatical sentence of his current language. The only way forward is for him to extend the current range of grammatical constructions; and this would naturally be done by means of analogy or metaphor. And because it can be done in this way, there is some hope that his interlocutors will understand what he is getting at and follow suit. I suspect that this is how languages have in fact evolved. The reference to an extensional language was merely to provide a readily understood example of a syntactically well-defined language type in which some very ordinary statements cannot be made ? at least, not in a way that reveals their grammatical structure. I did not raise the question of whether intensionality is a necessary condition of intentionality ? at least, not intentionally. But now that you mention it, I think that it is not, given that intensionality is (I presume) a feature of language, and some non-language-using animals have (so we think) intentional states. On the other hand, I doubt that we can attend to something without classifying it in some way (if only as a thing). But classification requires concepts, not necessarily language. Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Jul 13 11:29:24 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2009 11:29:24 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Hypercategorial Message-ID: I would add the 'hypercategorial' (Grice 'supercategorial'/trans-categorial' epithets, WoW, xix) and 'metacategorial' (as per, I see, 'metacategorial grammar') Grice and Strawson were _obsessed_ with the so Ariskantian notion of 'category': the "C" in "P.G.R.I.C.E": philosophical grounds of rationality: intentions, categories, ends. I prefer 'hypercategorial' to Grice's supracategorial in that it seems less of a hybrid? ---- I wonder what D. Frederick thinks of all this! (In that WoW essay, Grice explicitly compares hypercategories with metaphor and analogy -- that Danny was mentioning vis a vis 'conceptual schemes' alla Davidson). The theta thing sounds VERY interesting. Cheers, J. L. Speranza --- In a message dated 7/13/2009 9:29:08 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, Baynesr at comcast.net writes: A lot has been said about conceptual schemes. Some good; some not so good. But as long as we are talking about the relation of conceptual schemes to grammar, then we are talking about something slightly different than what people like Davidson and Rorty and Aune have talked about. Although I don't know its current status - I haven't worked in this area in a good number of years - there have been theories relating grammar and "conceptual schemes." Here I have in mind what linguists (Gruber, Jackendoff et al) have called "theta theory." Theta theory is based on the idea of "theta role" such as "agent" and "patient" etc A noun e.g. can me "marked" in the sense that it has a theta role. The grammatical connection comes in by using theta roles to formula conditions for case assignment. Up until about 1980 Chomsky did nothing with case marking; he relied on "transformation rules" to make structure explicit. But later with the introduction of arguments for studying case this changed. People like Tim Stowell and others constructed elegant theories of case assignment based on the "theta criterion." So "concepts" in the form of theta roles become connected to case assignment and case assignment determined much as to word order ("case assignment under ajacency"). This theory is probably old fashioned now. Don't know but it is great illustration of the interface of syntax and semantics if you consider these roles semantical. Now if you look, carefully, at the origin of theta theory you will find that it, contrary to what some linguists think, goes back to Davidson's logical form of action sentences. Later I think it was Charles Parsons who applied it to modeling action. I did some work on the interaction of theta roles and constructions involving what were (are?) called GO PPs, that is prepositions indicating motion, e.g. 'under the rug' as in 'it rolled under the rug' as opposed to 'it lies under the rug'. This conception is owing to Jackendoff (Semantic Structure, MIT, 1990). I bring it up to illustrate how grammar and "conceptual structures" interrelate. Now as to the discussions of late about concptual structure, I haven't looked at it in a while, and at least with respect to cononical languages I think it is a waste of time, but I'd want to reserve final judgment until I've looked more carefully. Aune has a good paper on this as I recall, although owing to my recent work I have been unable to give it a close look. Check the hist-analytic site if you are interested. I've largely lost interest in a lot of this. If you go to a good linguistics library, MIT for example (if the books haven't as yet all been stolen) has rows and rows of journals like "Linguistics and Philosophy". Much of this is very good, very good. But it is of little consequence to "general philosophy" which is my main interest. Clever algebraists who know seventeen languages have a shot at excellence, but like most of the articles contained in these journals not much more than tenure comes out of them. **************An Excellent Credit Score is 750. See Yours in Just 2 Easy Steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1222585090x1201462820/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd=Jul yExcfooterNO62) From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Mon Jul 13 15:41:20 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2009 20:41:20 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Deliberation and Grammar In-Reply-To: <384468530.624071247491547553.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <7CB8A2548E3847C3884C3C247640C8C2@DFLVQC1J> <384468530.624071247491547553.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <07272D5B9AE4437384888B6BD86E91DC@DFLVQC1J> Hi Steve and JL, Did you read that paper to which Stephen Clark posted a link on Philos-L last week? The woman who wrote it has a companion piece, entitled 'Linguistic Relativity,' available on her webpage, in which she considers a sentence 'the elephant ate the peanuts.' She says: 'In Russian, the verb would need to include tense and also whether the peanut-eater was male or female (though only in the past tense), and whether said peanut-eater ate all of the peanuts or just a portion of them.' Now suppose that a particular Russian speaker has the idea that elephants are not animals at all, but are cleverly constructed machines placed on earth by aliens to monitor us and send information back to some planet with an unpronounceable name. He thinks, then, that elephants have no sex. If he wants to say that the elephant ate the peanuts, he can do so only by violating a rule of Russian grammar. His Russian comrades (if they are still called that) who are aware of his eccentric theorising will understand what he means despite, or because of, the solecism. His thought could be expressed only by means of an ungrammatical sentence; and it could be understood (given some context) in virtue of the kind of grammatical error made. I don't speak Russian, so this example may need some re-working to be stated properly. But it seems to be a simple enough case. It also shows that, in the sense of 'conceptual scheme' commonly associated with linguistic relativity, we really can change a conceptual scheme at the drop of a hat (Popperian or other). But it is (or was) generally thought that grammar reflects a conceptual scheme in a much more metaphysically significant way. Thus, the subject-predicate relation seems to be straightforwardly linked to the metaphysics of objects and properties. The Russell-Frege logic of relations and functions had metaphysical implications (I can only vaguely remember it, but I recall that Russell's book on Leibniz laboured this point). But even Russell-Frege logic retains the particular-universal metaphysic, as relations are just universals instantiated by ordered n-tuples. But we do not need to have a metaphysic of objects and properties/relations, do we? We could have a stuff or 'feature-placing' metaphysics, or a Parmenidean or Einsteinian block-universe view, or something else. And young children, according to Piaget, initially inhabit a world of free-floating properties rather than things. It may be that we can only properly describe the world in these various ways by breaking the bounds of our ordinary grammar. This is all a bit speculative and unthought-out, as I have very little time to read, think or write at the moment, being preoccupied with more practical affairs. But any comments are welcome, especially critical ones. Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Tue Jul 14 16:36:00 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2009 16:36:00 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Eddington's Two Tables Message-ID: In a post some time ago, S. R. Bayne wrote >I thought I would >"share with you" (".od" I hate the expression) >two items I've added to Hist-Analytic. [...] >The other is Eddington's statement on >"Two Tables." it can be had at: >http://www.hist-analytic.org/EddingtonNature.pdf --- I've been keeping to find (without success) the ref. by Grice to these things (Eddington's tables) and trying and intending (to find them). I now see it was an UNPUBLISHED note yet again cited by Chapman, p. 177 of her book. And Eddington is credited in the name index. Chapman writes: "In [Grice's] notes from around this time [1988], Grice compares the vulgar and the learned with reference to what he [I add marginally, in my book: and millions more. JLS] calls 'Eddington's table' and 'the vulgar table'. Grice's reference here is to Arthur Eddington's The nature of the physical world, first published in 1928. Eddington begins his book, originally delivered as a series of lectures, with the assertion that as he sat down to write he was confronted with not ONE table but TWO. There is the ordinary, familiar table: 'a commonplace object of that environment which I call the world'. There is also a scientific table, an object of which he has become aware only comparatively recently. Whereas the ordinary table is SUBSTANTIAL," --- cfr. D. Frederick on hypercategorials "the scientific table is mostly empitness, rushing about with great speed; but their combined bulk amounts to less than a billionth of the bulk of the table itself.' [end-note]. Eddington argues that the two different descriptions of the table are discreet and serve distinct purposes. Although they might ultimately be said to describe the same object, the scientist must keep the two descriptions separate, in effect ignoring the 'ordinary table' and concentrating only on the 'scientific table'". --- so far so good: elementary stuff, but recall the book is meant for undergraduates in both lings. and philo. Now, tersely, Chapman adds: "Grice's brief notes suggest that he is happy to accept both the vulgar and the learned description of the table. There is, he notes, 'no conflict ... Scientific purposes and everday purposes are _distinct_'[emphasis Grice's. JLS]" ENDNOTE FOR CITATION: Grice, "Notes on 'vulgar' and learned'" -- H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. ---- cited by Chapman, p. 178 Nothing earth-shattering, but, as they say, for the record (of the annals of analysis, as it were). Cheers, J. L. S. **************An Excellent Credit Score is 750. See Yours in Just 2 Easy Steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1221323036x1201367247/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd=Jul yExcfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Tue Jul 14 08:34:47 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2009 08:34:47 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Philosophical 'Solecisms': Hypercategorial? Message-ID: In a message dated 7/14/2009 6:59:06 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk writes: any comments are welcome, especially critical ones. ---- I would make two briefs observations, seeing that you are busy with other things: -- Note the title, "philosophical solecism" -- meant to be jocular, but with a twist. It always struck me that Thales of Mileto, the founder of our project ('philosophy') was a 'solecist'. Apparently, 'solecism' comes from "Soloi" -- this not being far from Mileto, in Asia Minor -- the point about 'philosophy' having an _Asian_ origin via phoenician trade and other has always irritated some classicists. Now Thales was 'first-class' though, I understand. His 'solecism' is a pedigreed one. For his 'dialect' was that of an Athenian 'colonist'. Having lived in Buenos Aires among MANY colonials of various types (notably expat Brits) I can share the feeling! For example, the Anglo-Argentines pride themselves (or 'theirselves' as I solecistically prefer) to speak better than the English -- you know the type. So since you _do_ mention 'solecism', just a background that we are speaking, originally, of a _DIA-_lect (or idiolect if you wish) that has some degree of respectability. It's not "philosophical CREOLE", or "philosophical PIDGIN" if you know what I mean. Indeed, if I were to see a paper by Grice called "Philosophical Solecisms", I would expect it to be all about G. E. Moore's Hegelian. -- vide his essays on Moore and common sense in WoW. For the things Moore HEARD from the Hegelians like Bradley ('the thisness of the red is causated by the no-no of the beingness of the thatness") was enough to have him repeat, in a louder voice, "And I have _Two_ Hands!". -- Moore's programme is more serious than it sounds, as Grice allows. The Man -- and recall Austin, "Some like Witters, but Moore's my man" -- was defending COMMON-SENSE expressions as Kantianly metaphysically justified via transcendental argumentation. The programme that Grice's tutee, Strawson, later undertood in _Individuals: an essay in descriptive metaphysics_. (For example, while you rather conversationally speak of the basic ontology of 'objects and properties', I would say 'THINGS and properties' -- maybe. The word 'object' to a Romance speaker -- sounds VERY German, and we prefer a more ontologically-oriented term.) * My second observation is in the tag, 'hypercategorial?' -- this is meant as a gesture for Grice, 'supra-categorial' epithets -- one essay, the last one, in WoW is all about 'he is a just man' as being supracategorial for Trasymachus and Socrates in _different_ conceptual schemes: Trasymachus working with a conceptual scheme where the legal 'just' is PRIOR (ontological) to moral 'just', while Socrates is working with a conceptual scheme where it is prior (epistemological) only. So I would remind the "C" in PGRICE, the categories. I would NOT think that Strawson would have written the "Individuals" book just to prove Kant right (he did that in "Bounds of Sense" with a vengeance). Rather it was because of the common concern with Grice in matters of Aristotelian ontology -- as per _Categories_ (Loeb Classical Library -- edited with Peri Hermeneias). For, what _is_ a 'category'? Surely Grice wants to say -- notably in his "The Life and Opinions of Paul Grice" -- that it is a very _basic_ notion. Forget Frege: I think Grice was mainly into Russell's comments on the stone-age metaphysics and grammar being a 'pretty good guide' to logical form. The point, basic as it is, being that ontological category epistemological linguistic ---- It's only because a 'category' is ONTOLOGICAL (e.g. 'things and properties' rather than Einsteinian 'empty' tables in the Pagetian 'petits enfants' -- if they are infants, they shouldn't be _heard_ -- only seen) that it can claim to become EPISTEMOLOGICAL. Surely the passage is CONDITIONED, and 'epistemological' is a bit of a mouthful, for what is mainly a reflex response consolidated by our sense-organ structure. Kant's "a priori" and 'trascendental subject' and the 'apperception of the ego' --. And the problems he would have in having to adapt the Newtonian metaphysics of common sense to the Einsteinian one of wavicles. And THEN, and only THEN, is the 'linguistic'. Strawson's "Subject and Predicate in logic and grammar" being basic, here. I would think. For 'subject' and 'predicate' (or even the more basic, SYNTACTICAL 'categories' rather than 'functional ones -- 'noun' and 'verb') seem just the ordinary things a pirot would develop to _understand_ the world around him. The study of 'categories' as parts of speech is an old one. My very first philosophical paper was, appropriately, on Plato's Kratyl, for which I revised some of the linguistics literature. Robins, for example in his one and only History of Linguistics credits Plato not just with his ramblings on etymology, but for having distinguished for the first time in Western civilisation between the ONOMA and the RHEMA. It is just _fascinating_ that a few generations later, via Aristotle (De Cat.) we have Dionysios providing us with what is the _classical_ "table of categories" (8, not 10, like Aristotle thought). Chapman has elaborated on how serious was Grice, for example in using 'category' in even a FURTHER 'sense': informativeness, etc. For surely your example about 'the elephant eating all the peanuts' is exactly like Kroch's early paper on the invited inference of "He ate an apple" (all of it? or the edible bit of it?). Grice humorously then refers to the MORE ECONOMICAL "Table of Categories" in Kant -- to rephrase them in 'metaphorical' terms to apply to things like 'quantity' of information, 'quality' of information (truth-value), relation (relevance) and 'manner' or modus. Chapman writes: "In _Categories_, Aristotle describes not just CATEGORIES of lexical MEANING, but also the types of relationships holding between words. In his Oxford lectures, Chapman notes, Grice starts to consider these, which "appear in more or less their final form under the FOUR CATEGORIES of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner (or, sometimes, Mode)." "In arranging things in this way, Grice had the semi-serious motive of echoing the use of CATEGORIES in such orthodox philosophies as those of Aristotle and Kant" (Kantotle). ""And more importantly, to draw on THEIR (Aristotle, Kant) ideas of NATURAL, UNIVERSAL divisions of EXPERIENCE." "Grice's collaborative work with Strawson had been concerned with Aristotle's division of EXPERIENCE into 'categories' of substances. Aristotle's original formulation of the list of such properties allows that they can take the form of 'either substance or quantity or qualification or a relative or where or when or being-in-a-position or having or doing or being-affected'" "Aristotle concentrates mainly on the first FOUR, and these received the most attention in subsequent developments of his work." "The were the starting point for KANT's use of CATEGORIES to describe types of HUMAN [Russians included -- JLS] experience, and his argument that these form the basis of ALL POSSIBLE HUMAN knowledge. In the Kritik der Reiner Vernunft, Kant proposes to divide the pure concepts of understanding into four main divisions: 'Following Aristotle we will call these concepts CATEGORIES, for our aim is basically identical with his although very distinct from it in execution."" "These are categories 'Of Quantity', 'Of Quality', 'Of Relation' and 'Of Modality', with various -- indeed 3 -- the most symmetrical table ever, as every tutor in modern philosophy will comment. JLS -- subdivisions ascribed to each." "Kant's claims for the both the fundamentaal AND the EXHAUSTIVE nature of these categories are explicit: "The division is systematically generated from a common principle, namely the faculty of JUDGING (which is the same as the faculty of thinking), and has not ARISEN RHAPSODICALLY from a HAPHAZARD search for pure concepts, of the completeness of which one could never be certain."" "Kant goes so far as to suggest that his TABLE of CATEGORIES, containing all the basic concepts of understanding, could provide the basis for ANY PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY." "These, therefore, offered Grice divisions of experience with a sound pedigree and an estalbished claim to be universals of human cognition" (Chapman, p. 100) Cheers, J. L. Speranza The Grice Club, etc. **************An Excellent Credit Score is 750. See Yours in Just 2 Easy Steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1221323036x1201367247/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default .aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd=JulyExcfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Tue Jul 14 14:37:31 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2009 14:37:31 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Anscombe cited by Grice -- twice Message-ID: We see the first cite (well, Grice 1971) is a terse footnote, "By Professor Anscombe" relating to some 'vivid' example which Grice says _might_ have been pursued by Anscombe. The second, which I had read, but forgotten, is not much of a muchness or nothing to write home about, but then I'm writing hist-analytic (just joking). In fact, as I type this, I ask S. Bayne forebearance if that's the word. He (Bayne) may find the quote even offensive. But on the merits of the hist. of anal. philosphy, I add it. It is on p. 42 of Chapman's book -- I had read it _a couple of times_ --. She is discussing the chapter on 'post-war' Oxford (her book is chronological). She writes, and I'll check the end-note before I post this: "Many years later [than the 1940s -- JLS], when Grice was thinking back to the days of the Play Group, he jotted down a list of Oxford philosophers of the time. Interestingly, he divides his list into _three_ categories: 'yes' (Austin, Grice, Hampshire, Strawson, Warnock ...) 'no' (Anscombe, Dummett, Murdoch ... and 'overage' (Ryle, Hardie ...)" (p. 42) [CITATION DETAIL: "Notes for Ox Phil 1948-1970, APA, H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 09/135c, the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley." -- I wrote marginally for the 'overage': Wood, Cox, Mabbott for the 'yes' I added Urmson, Pears, Thomson, Hare. I realise this is in rather bad taste -- to supply a 'no' on a list promoted by an author who is engaged in a bio of Anscombe --, so take it lightly! Why would he write 'no'? Of course, it's jocular: Dummett, for example, Grice does quote, extensively in "Indicative Conditionals" for what I refer. And Murdoch I think collaborated to the "The Nature of Metaphycis" that Grice also collaborated. --- In any case, a sort of erratum for Chapman -- is that Anscombe, while cited in her book (p. 42) is not credited in the name-index. Things like these make you wonder about unpublicatons; I mean, they are lovely -- but surely to be taken with a pinch of salt and morality. It's not like Grice cites Anscombe _TWICE_: it's ONCE in "Intention and Uncertainty" (p. 8). This second 'cite' is frivolous and not meant for publication --. In any case, it is a pointer. I recall when researching for Grice I would list loads of books with the comment: "Grice not cited", "Grice not listed", "no mention of Grice". This sounded _positive_ to me! So ditto, the fact that he has ""no" (Anscombe)" should prove of some interest. ---- I was also reading that indeed in those days 'women' were not accepted in (some) colleges, so there was no way Anscombe could have joined, I would think, the Play Group. In fact Mrs. Grice and his daughter confided in Chapman that THEY felt pretty much outsiders when not allowed at St. John's (Grice's collage) even for refreshment on 'open days' or something like that. :(. Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************An Excellent Credit Score is 750. See Yours in Just 2 Easy Steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1221323036x1201367247/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd=Jul yExcfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Tue Jul 14 15:22:49 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2009 15:22:49 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Hampshire and Grice on Trying Message-ID: S. R. Bayne writes: >You [JLS] mention Grice on "trying"; this is >a very interesting verb. In fact, >in fact in my book I argue that it is one of an entire class of mental >verbs of a very special sort. ----- For the record, further to my notes on Grice's Brandeis Lectures on Trying, I've just caught a quote in Chapman (p. 99) that serves to show the way that Grice was _so_ into the 'conversational' aspects of philosophy. As I noted, there's a section entitled 'Trying' in "Prolegomena" (WoW) and Harman (PGRICE) refers to the Brandeis examples. This is what Chapman writes and they way we can see that Grice is connecting the 'issue' to discussions with both Hamsphire and Pears (both 'yes' --:)): Grice refers [-- in his unpublished note in faint pencil handwring --] back to the discussion at a previous [meeting] [with Pears] when the _exact_ 'meaning' of 'to try' was discussed. Hampshire had apparently claimed that if someone did something it is ALWAYS possible to say that X tried to do it. This was challenged;" -- cfr. Grice's examples reported by Harman in previous post "in situations when there is no obvious difficulty or risk of failure involved it is INAPPROPRIATE to talk of someone's TRYING to do something" --- and Bayne may care to comment if he reads this 'inappropriate' in the early Grice as himself an A-philosopher as 'ungrammatical'!? That would be _too_ strong, wouldn't it? I don't know! Since English grammar I wasn't born with a grammar gaffe may lead me sometimes cold :(. "Grice's answer had been that, while it is ALWAYS TRUE to say that X tried to do something, this may sometimes be a MISLEADING way of speaking. If X succeeded in performing the act, it would be MORE INFORMATIVE and therefore more coooperative [helpful] to say so. Therefore, an utterance of 'X tried to do it' will IMPLY [implicate], but not actually say, that X did not succeed" -- cited by Chapman, p. 99 Cheers, J. L. S. Bayne: "Suppose I'm doing my morning "thing" feeding my two birds. I've reached over the same shelf to get the "avi-cakes" for years. One day, I reach and, and suddenly, my arm freezes up (or gets thrown out of the sockets, whateva). I let go with a brief "yipe" and someone comes in and ask: "What happened?" I reply "I was trying to get the avi-cakes and my arm came out of its socket." Here is what to notice: Had someone come in as I was reaching, just before the arm came out of its socket, and asked: "What are you doing?" I would NOT have said "I'm trying to get the avi-cakes. It is only if I FAIL that I say "I was trying..." Now this has been noticed with respect to individual verbs but no one has noticed that this is a class, It is a condition of use that I am thwarted or that there is a special circumstance. Ryle's use of 'voluntary' is like this; but the same sort of thing is, I suspect, in play in the cse of Grice's 'look's' and, here I'm alluding to his doubt or denial condition. This can be extended to "My intention was..." Notice, also, the tense connnection." **************An Excellent Credit Score is 750. See Yours in Just 2 Easy Steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1221323036x1201367247/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd=Jul yExcfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Wed Jul 15 07:24:56 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2009 04:24:56 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Anscombe cited by Grice -- twice In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <772431.98455.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Thanks for this JL. I'm having trouble catching up on email. I'm finding it more and more interesting that there is little or no published connection between Grice and Anscombe. I notice that Hampshire is a "yes" and Anscombe a "no." Further I notice that Ayer is not mentioned. Somewhere Ayer said that Anscombe's work was the best thing to come out of the work of the later Wittgenstein. For the life of me I cannot find that quote! Ayer spent a considerable amount of time "chasing" women. I think it was Ryle who suggested the cost to him was greatness in philosophy. Moreover, although I'd have to check, his came between Ayer and Hamphire at one point. Clearly, they did not get along. (_Ayer: A Life_ by Ben Rogers. Grove, 1999, p. 260. Ayer believed he was better at philosophy. But here is the point: Hampshire's work _Thought and Action_ while not eclipsed by Anscombe did not survive criticism as well. Davidson is involved in this. They (Anscombe and Hampshire) both published on intention. Frankly, I am impatient as I read through Hampshire's book. It's just not as deep. Anscombe is, oddly (perhaps) more like Austin in some ways. I've been falling behind in my posting and replies (apologies to Danny until I can get my act together). One reason is that I'm concluding the chapters relating to singularist theories of causation. This take a very interesting turn with respect to the place of counterfactuals. One argument against Hume has been based on a Humean's alleged inability to accommodate a semantics for subjunctives and counterfactuals; but in the absence of laws of some sort the whole rationale for such a semantics, that is as being required to account for 'cause' get knocked around a bit, or worse. Once you embrace singularist theories of causation a new light is shed on "agent causation." I'm still exploring the implications here, so I'm sort of busy; these are the last few pages of the book. I'm finding Braithwaite a terrific way to approach Goodman's 'grue' etc. At first he and Goodman look totally out of sink with one another, but their "solutions" are strangely similar. Some will see this as tangent to the Anscombe issues. I think not. Don't feel bad about offending Anscombe. She once wrote a dreadful little note to a student. That exchange became an oft reported incident among people "in the know." It was never discussed in publication. I happened to have known the student, who described the incident to me when it occurs. After years of having to weigh my opinion on Anscombe against this incident I've finally softened a bit on her, but not entirely. The student died shortly thereafter. I tell that story and one other. The other is a tempestuous exchange betwenn Anscombe and Brodbeck. I've been reluctant to discuss these matters. As an historian I experience no resistance, but as a philosopher I do. I look at a picture of Anscomb and Geach. It's online but I don't have the URL here. In this picture they look like two peoplel who love ONLY each other. I am uncettain of my views on Geach. He is a terrific philosopher; I can't deny THAT! But his view of Broad on McTaggart is just absurd, or so it seems. Maybe Anscombe thought she only had to be close to God and Peter. I can find no stories describing her as a wonderful person etc. My couple of brief encounters suggests to me that there is no reason for surprise. Anscombe I don't believe would have liked me very much; but that makes it easier, having this belief, to be objective in some ways. Let me ask you this: that one quote from Grice mentioning Anscombe. Could you provide the full reference once more? I'll get to Danny and a couple of other posts. Offline someone sent an ingenious little note on embedded attitude verbs. I want to remark to the author that I am not struck speechless, but I DO have to finish this book. Regards Steve --- On Tue, 7/14/09, Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: From: Jlsperanza at aol.com Subject: Anscombe cited by Grice -- twice To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Date: Tuesday, July 14, 2009, 2:37 PM We see the first cite (well, Grice 1971) is a? terse footnote, "By Professor Anscombe" relating to some 'vivid' example which? Grice says _might_ have been pursued by Anscombe. The second, which I had? read, but forgotten, is not much of a muchness or nothing to write home about,? but then I'm writing hist-analytic (just joking). In fact, as I type this, I ask? S. Bayne forebearance if that's the word. He (Bayne) may find the quote even? offensive. But on the merits of the hist. of anal. philosphy, I add? it. It is on p. 42 of Chapman's book -- I had read it _a couple of times_? --. She is discussing the chapter on 'post-war' Oxford (her book is? chronological). She writes, and I'll check the end-note before I post? this: "Many years later [than the 1940s --? JLS], when Grice was thinking back to the? days of the Play Group, he jotted down a? list of Oxford philosophers of the time.? Interestingly, he divides his list into _three_? categories: 'yes' (Austin, Grice, Hampshire,? Strawson, Warnock ...) 'no' (Anscombe, Dummett,? Murdoch ... and 'overage' (Ryle, Hardie? ...)"???(p. 42) [CITATION DETAIL: "Notes for Ox Phil 1948-1970,? APA, H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 09/135c, the? Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley." -- I wrote? marginally for the 'overage': Wood, Cox, Mabbott for the 'yes' I? added Urmson, Pears, Thomson, Hare. I realise this is in rather bad taste? -- to supply a 'no' on a list promoted by an author who is engaged in a bio of? Anscombe --, so take it lightly! Why would he write 'no'? Of course,? it's jocular: Dummett, for example, Grice does quote, extensively in "Indicative? Conditionals" for what I refer. And Murdoch I think collaborated to the "The? Nature of Metaphycis" that Grice also collaborated. --- In any case, a? sort of erratum for Chapman -- is that Anscombe, while cited in her book (p.? 42) is not credited in the name-index. Things like these make you wonder? about unpublicatons; I mean, they are lovely -- but surely to be taken with a? pinch of salt and morality. It's not like Grice cites Anscombe _TWICE_: it's? ONCE in "Intention and Uncertainty" (p. 8). This second 'cite' is? frivolous and not meant for publication --. In any case, it is a pointer. I? recall when researching for Grice I would list loads of books with the comment:? "Grice not cited", "Grice not listed", "no mention of Grice". This sounded? _positive_ to me! So ditto, the fact that he has ""no" (Anscombe)"? should prove of some interest. ---- I was also reading that indeed in? those days 'women' were not accepted in (some) colleges, so there was no way? Anscombe could have joined, I would think, the Play Group. In fact Mrs. Grice? and his daughter confided in Chapman that THEY felt pretty much outsiders when? not allowed at St. John's (Grice's collage) even for refreshment on 'open days'? or something like that. :(. Cheers, J. L.? Speranza **************An Excellent Credit Score is 750. See Yours in Just 2 Easy Steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1221323036x1201367247/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd=Jul yExcfooterNO62) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Jul 15 18:47:55 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2009 18:47:55 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Potching and Cotching Message-ID: Stevenson, that Grice (1948) quotes uses the scare quotes when he says a high temperature 'means' fever and "a reduced temperature 'means' convalescence" (Stevenson, p. 38) This is a 'scare quote' use because only _analogically_ (going a rung lower in the evolutionary ladder, to use Grice's metaphor) can we say a reduced temperature 'means'. Mind, Grice would not even ascribe 'mean' to Nim Chimpksy! Evolutionary biologists _may_ but a philosopher is a philosopher is a philosopher, and there's no way Ariskant got it right on _that_ front! 'Meaning' [sans double scare quotes]is a mark of rationality. Grice here quotes Wittgenstein (tr. Anscombe) on 'intend' and 'expect'. As Danny Frederick recently note: an animal may intend (display an intention) -- but an 'intenSion'? Grice would not use 'intenSion' openly _there_ but more guardedly as an "M-intention" i.e. a meaning-constitutive intention: There is some caution here to avoid threat of circularity. Grice writes in his "Life and Opinions" (which he previously had labelled, "Prejudices and Predilections. Which become life and opinions"): "I think I _would_ have good prospects of winning the day [about intensions] but unfortunately a victory on this front would not be enough. For, in a succession of increasingly elaborate moves designed to thwart a sequence of Schifferian counterexamples I have been LED to RESTRICT the intentions which are to CONSTITUTE utterrer's meaning to M-intentions; and whatever might be the case in general with regard to intending, M-intending is plainly TOO SOPHISTICATED A STATE to be found in a language-destitute creature. So the unavoidable rearguard actions seem to have undermined the raison-d'etre of the campain." (Grice, p. 85 in Grandy/Warner, PRIGRCE) But could a pirot think something izzes something else? This note mainly to accommodate (my weekly verb) R. B. Jones's delightful 'colourful'. In his pdf on Izzing and Hazzing etc he mentions Grice's "colourful terminology". For the record let's be reminded once more that this is Grice's little homage to Locke-Russell-Carnap. I haven't been able to check the Russell source. But in Essay Locke speaks of Prince Maurice's Parrot, "a very intelligent, rational parrot" -- but hardly "a very intelligent rational man" Grice liked that: 'parrot' and 'man' were for Grice (and for that matter, for me) _functional_ terms with a vengeance. A 'man' is a compound of physical and mental properties. It's not JUST spatio-temporal continuity Or merely mental properties. A parrot with the mental, but none of the physical properties, of a man we would NEVER call a man. Why? --- Russell and Canap, independently from Locke arrived at the conclusion that Pirots karuluze elatically. --- Grice, as cited by Chapman, _Grice_: CITATION DETAIL H. P. Grice, 'Lecture 1', 'Lectures on Language and Reality' H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. was always intersted in 'artificial' languages. Here is a sample of what, as Chapman amusingly puts it, Grice's audience is 'treated to' [this is a transcription from a tape] (and we'll relate it to izzing and hazzing presently): "A pirot can be said to potch of some obble x as fang or feng; also to cotch of x, or some obble o, as fang or feng; or to cotch of one obble o and another obble o' as being fid to one another." The code (note the [Alan] "Code" -- although this is a good one: to think that Alan Code is the code for the hazzing and the izzing of Grice. -- call it, "Code for Grice" -- Grice De-Coded. "A pirot, [as a good Kantian], inhabit a world of obbles. To potch is something like to perceive and to cotch something like to think. Feng and fang are possible descriptions, much like our adjectives [and] fid is a possible relation between obbles." So this may explain why Grice chose I(x, y) as the logical form of izzing (and H(x, y) as the logical form of hazzing). For he is interested -- with a view to a teleological, pirotological, explanation: why would a pirot need the 'concept' of 'izz'? why would a pirot need not just to potch that o izz o'. But also on occasion to cotch it? Let's be reminded that sense-data won't do for Grice: 'we ingest, digest, ex-gest obbles -- not sense data'. Similarly we _see_ them. Obbles nourish (and also threaten the continued operancy or survival) of pirots -- flows of impressions don't. --- So, regardless of what Kant said of 'existence' NOT being a property, izzing _is_ a 'relation' -- is a form of fidding really the pirot potch of one obble and of another obble o' as being fid to one another. But does this work? I don't think so. I wouldn't think that "an apple" is in relation to another object called "a fruit" and yet we do say I(x, y) -- in Jones's terminology, "An apple izz a fruit". One pirot Grice calls a squarrell who goggles nuts. Perhaps 'apple izz fruit' is something otiose to say. But consider a note that Grice wrote in a sick bag, Chapman tells, on his way back from Oxford, "read chimp. literature" --- Now consider the biggest sentence that Nim Chimpsky ever produced: Give orange me give eat orange me eat orange give me eat orange give me you --- Long as it is, it is not as colourful as the some of the OTHER that Nim delivered: Apple me eat Banana Nim eat Banana me eat Drink me Nim Eat Nim eat Eat Nim me Eat me Nim Eat me eat Finish hug Nim Give me eat Grape eat Nim Hug me Nim Me Nim eat Me more eat More eat Nim Nut Nim nut Play me Nim Tickle me Nim Tickle me eat Yogurt Nim eat Banana Nim banana Nim Banana eat me Nim Banana me Nim me Banana me eat banana Drink Nim drink Nim Drink eat drink eat Drink eat me Nim Eat Nim eat Nim Eat drink eat drink Eat grape eat Nim Eat me Nim drink Grape eat Nim eat Grape eat me Nim Me Nim eat me Me eat drink more Me eat me eat Me gum me gum Nim eat Nim eat Play me Nim play Tickle me Nim play --- consider: Banana eat me Nim Grape eat me Nim surely EAT refers to "EDIBLE" And so we can find that Nim (lab pirots ARE lazy) finding it successful to have I (banana, edible) I (grape, edible) i.e. a banana izz edible and grape izz edible (actually I think hazz edible sounds 'less harsh' to use Berkeley/Locke/Grice's idiom). --- Oddly, I read in _Science_ "Suzanne Chevalier-Skolnikov descrbed to the conference an occasion on which she watched gorilla Koko persistently MISPERFORM an action demanded on her. Finally her teacher, Penny Patterson, signed to her in exasperation, 'Bad gorilla'. To which Koko responded with the signs for 'Funny gorilla,' and laughed." implicating, "Motherese!" [This cites actually comes from this essay -- ! -- in _Science_, "A horse says neigh" which lead me to Katz, but not the colleague of the author of LOT2: Sexual Harassment in the Horse Community I have been working with the horse community in the area of sexual harassment. Our feeling is that when a horse says 'Nay,' it's exactly what they *mean*. While Grice seldom seems to have used 'cognition' -- Chapman quotes a list where he lists 'cognition' along 'breath (why?)', ingestion, digestion, excretion, repair, reproduction' as 'mandatory functions -- he _was_ obsessed (in the right philosophical sense of the term) with 'potching', or perceiving Suppose we 'design' a pirot to look like ("Some remarks about the senses", WoW): O O i o o ii U It would not do to say that this pirot looks like a have one pair of eyes too many, for if the pirot talks and tells and shows that when he potches of an oggle as feng with i and when he potches of an oggle as feng with ii there is 'a world of [experiential] difference' -- we won't. Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************Performance you need and the value you want! Check out great laptop deals from Dell! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1223081934x1201714279/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Faltfarm.mediaplex.com%2Fad%2Fck%2F12309%2D819 39%2D1629%2D4) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Jul 15 08:23:53 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2009 08:23:53 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] "Professional Philosopher and Amateur Cricketer" Message-ID: The Play Group Anscombe ctd by Grice, Proc.Brit.Ac. 1971 (263-279.) p. 268 It's "Intention and uncertainty" as per header, and the quote going: He is discussing _something_ like direction of fit and Aristotle's two typs of things, and writes: "The point may be (and I think has been (1 -- by Professor Anscombe) put vividly by saying that if a man fails to fulfil an intention we do not criticise his state of mind for failing to conform to the facts, we criticise the facts for failing to conform to his states of mind" In a message dated 7/15/2009 7:25:08 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: Let me ask you this: that one quote from Grice mentioning Anscombe. Could you provide the full reference once more? ----as per above, then. ---Very interesting comments you made on Anscombe. The photo, which I did see too and loved, is by S. Pyke. There is an interview by this Leicester-born (non-philosophically-educated but brilliant) man in an issue of The Philosopher's Magazine, online). You are right as to what that photo casts: the love for each other. I tend to think that Geach (after Urmson) is perhaps the greatest living philosopher. I write that as someone who has always valued the Oxford temperament, and perhaps Geach did not have it! ---- I do think the yes no overage ---- did not cite Ayer, as you rightly note -- because I think Grice (and this was sort of public since Chapman did find it in this folder -- there are 14 Big CARTONS deposited in the Library at Berkeley which someone should provide a catalogue raisone once and for all -- why does not the Philo Dept at Berkeley engage ONE?) is considering the origin of the 'second play group' as I call it. The first play group Grice did not participate -- because, he says he came 'from the wrong side of the tracks'. This was the pre-war (1930s) play group that Austin formed with indeed Ayer (when they were friends), Hampshire, Berlin, and a few others. ---- AFTER THE WAR, the second play group started. Chapman writes: "Grice was there from the start". But the 'leader' was indeed Austin -- it was a 'by invitation' thing only restricted to full-time tutors and held on Saturdays NOT on published thing (they never discussed Grice's "Meaning" for example -- Austin dismissed established views made 'public' and frozen for good) and meant as a 'game' rather: mainly to botanise linguistically. My best understanding of the group's activities came from reading, of all things, the obit on Ryle by G. E. L. Owen in the Proc. Arist. Soc. (a volume that I found at the Buenos Aires Association of English Culture, of all places!). Owens writes to honour Ryle, and notes that the icon-status that people endowed to both Ryle AND Austin was misguided. "And in any case, people followed Austin MORE BLINDLY than they did Ryle" (I think he says). The point is that Ryle had his own group which included Mabbott (a Scots philosopher and like Grice also fellow of St. John's) and a few others --. Surely the other 'overage' that Grice mentioned: Hardie -- who had been Grice's tutor and whom he loved; and I add following Owen, Cox. (J. Roxbee Cox is a VERY interesting figure and while not being a part of the "Play Group" but the Ryle Group rather, he wrote very much alla Grice: I recall his publications on perception -- indeed citing Grice extensively). The 'overage' was something that Quine detected, and it was like an unwritten thing. Austin had been born in 1911, and obviously, as a leader he did not want anything older than him. (*I* would feel very embarrassed if I had to _lead_ someone older than me -- in philosophy or anything). Grice once sort of suggested to Austin (the man was very distant), But do you _have_ to lead? The reply by Austin, the Chapman quotes is, "OK -- they may not want me to lead this" "If they don't want [I add 'need' in my marginal note. JLS] to follow me, whom DO they want to follow?" --- exactly. The constitution of that playgroup exerted me for a while, so by the 'no', Grice may be just saying that, as a matter of fact, Anscombe -- as we suppose anway she would not -- did not attend the (second) playgroup meetings. Murdoch we would assume she would not either, hence the 'no'. Dummett I don't think would be interested at all -- hence the 'no'. I think the early Dummett was into very technical 'intuitionist' stuff -- and would gather rather with people like E. J. Lemmon, or others. So -- the Playgroup itself -- and its members (on which I may expand on another post) would be: alphabetically AUSTIN GRICE HAMPSHIRE HARE HART NOWELL-SMITH (cited by Grice as indeed belonging) PAUL PEARS STRAWSON THOMSON URMSON WARNOCK -- Oscar P. Wood (who wrote on "Linguistic Rules") I would place with the Ryle Group. There may be others, but it wasn't anything systematic. It was also cross-generational because, for example, Strawson was originally Grice's tutee. What I enjoyed about the Owens article is that he writes, "Austin dead, Grice led the group" -- but apparently the 1960s and an Austin-less group did not have the same potency. When he established in Berkeley Grice tried to maintain this conviviality -- but it wasn't really the same with sort of 'mandatory' meetings, as it were, with colleagues and STUDENTS -- at his own home up in the hills. They met once a week for a seminar ON CAMPUS but they were expected to meet in the more relaxed atmosphere of Grice's home. --- Family life was perhaps very important to Anscombe too, seeing that the love she had for God and Peter also 'materialised' in the Geaches (children). --- And then she was usually more engaged with Cambridge -- so that her involvement with the Oxford 'social' life must have been tangential to her. She looks like a VERY confident philosopher. I like the photo in the wiki entry. The portrait of the Geaches by Pyke is more on the 'artsy' variety -- and I find it a bit empty. Couldn't he place a few books in the background, as the other photo of Anscombe in the wiki has: it makes it all more cosy. (I wonder if philosphers got paid to have their portraits taken -- it does seem a bit intrusive -- and I'm sure they did get paid. Hart has a delightful anecdote on this, since Pyke, the photographer, asked the philosophers to expand on the meaning of philosophy for 50 words, and he'd publish the things in the CATALOGUE. And he did. The Hart entry (perhaps not meant-nn to be published) runs: "Honest, I think your idea of having philosophers explain their discipline in 50 words is ridiculous. You should drop it." --- Ayer was here and there. His OXFORD OXFORD OXFORD days were in fact pre-grad, or under-grad, as they say -- even before Grice's time -- with Ryle as tutor. Then he spent his time in Vienna and CAME BACK and was operative in Austin's first play group. After the war he was involved in London -- he was appointed Grote prof. in London -- and so I would think he was not seen in Oxford all that often. It was much later that he was appointed the Wkyeham prof. of logic -- which provoked that famous commentary to the boxer on courting this model, "You may be a famous American boxer; but I am the former Wykeham prof. of Logic". -- I did quite some research into the Oxford of his days -- and there are ZILLIONS (almost) of philosophers who felt Grice's influence: Unger, for example, was Grice's student (Unger had his D. Phil) -- Schiffer, Searle, etc. were more under the supervision of Strawson, but would mix with Grice, too. Then there's the non-Rhode Scholars group -- it seems all the American Griceans were Rhode Scholars: Gareth Evans cites Grice, McDowell, McGinn (though he notes Grice had already gone when he arrived in Oxford, "Memoirs of a philosopher), P. Snowdon, etc. There were the early critics too: L. Jonathan Cohen being one of them, but writing only after Grice had left, I would think. --- I have elsewhere made long (well, ...) lists of cross-references and (primary and) secondary bibliography like that -- which I should revise _someday_. :-). Of course the Play Group should not be given more importance than it did. It should be turned into a 'cult', etc. But the good thing about it, is that it may focus one's reading -- for example, if you concentrate on the first-bibliography they produced. Surely a historic interest. And it's interesting to collect Grice quotes in the specific written histories of English philosophy: -- Warnock, English Philosophy (I would have to recheck if this has Grice -- I don't think so) but PASSMORE (which is really a history of philosophy not just 'English' or Oxford) "A hundred years of philosophy" has this footnote on Grice as being this tutor who published so little, etc. Memoirs like MABBOTT, "Oxford memories". is also interesting in mentioning and expanding on Grice's influence on Strawson. --- I think Hacker/Baker also have expanded in recent (by Hacker) historical work on the 'significance' of Grice's work in the 'philosophical network' of Oxford philosophy of his day. It should be pointed out that it's a by-gone era in some respects, where meetings at the Philosophy Society at Oxford were the _place_ to have your views shared _at most_. And where 'teaching duties' and 'lecture duties' were really _primary_ (professionally speaking). They seem to take the TUTORIAL system pretty seriously up there, and honest, to be a tutor for an undergraduate seems like exhausting job already --. Chapman does note that the 'teaching load' Grice received on his first appointment with St. John's college -- with which he was for 30 years -- was not minimal, and later he was 'promoted' to 'university lecturer' too, which entailed other responsibilities, like the (mainly joint) seminars with Warnock, Pears, Strawson et al. I find the idea of a joint seminar delightful from what Chapman retells. I have attended a few though, and it's never as it is painted! Students seem to feel 'out of touch' with them, and _I_ would in a Grice & Co. seminar -- where the student is meant to be a member of the audience, rather! When in Berkeley he became more Socratic and there are tapes which Chapman notes display him as being very much into the efforts that 'bringing out' (maieutically) something out of a student entails. And then there was cricket, bridge, or the piano -- "He was always doing something" (Mrs. Grice tells Chapman). Indeed, the curious "Professional philosopher and amateur cricketer" was the title of Grice's obit in The Times -- which I find amusing in that it plays on what counts as 'professional' in CRICKET! Surely 'professional' as applied to 'philosopher' is thought-provoking (I love that phrase), and it's 'professional cricketer' that the conjoined noun clauses are meant to evoke. (Imagine the inverse -- obit of Yogi Berra: professional batsman and amateur philosopher Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************Performance you need and the value you want! Check out great laptop deals from Dell! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1223081934x1201714279/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Faltfarm.mediaplex.com%2Fad%2Fck%2F12309%2D819 39%2D1629%2D4) From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Wed Jul 15 10:23:09 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2009 15:23:09 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Philosophical 'Solecisms': Hypercategorial? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Blimey, JL, you call that 'brief'! I am not entirely sure what you are saying. But it seems to imply that a concept is categorial only if it has instances (and perhaps is also fundamental in some way). And behind this lies a picture: ontological categories (which exist out there in the real world) cause perceptions and perceptions cause concepts which reflect the ontological categories. I work with a different picture: inherited theories contain categories which shape perceptions and structure the world as experienced. Further, inherited theories can be criticised, modified or abandoned (so long as something is put in their place). Consequently, whether the categories of any theory have (real) instances is something we can never know. The picture you suggest is Aristotelian: forms migrate from things into our sense organs. My picture is Popperian; that is, it is Kantian insofar as the forms are contributed by the subject, but it is fallibilist in that the forms can lead us astray but can be modified by us. The Popperian picture was developed to take account, initially, of scientific practice, and, later, of the discoveries since Aristotle's time, in empirical psychology, neuroscience and the history of science. What was the point of Strawson's 'descriptive metaphysics'? He was exploring a conceptual scheme, viz., that of Oxford-educated common sense, that had already been shown to be primitive and mistaken by advances in the sciences, particularly physics. Surely, he would have produced something more relevant to contemporary thought if he had tried to examine the challenges to that scheme posed by scientific developments. But he just takes it for granted that the scheme he is describing is permanent and unhchangeable ('Individuals,' p.10). I am not saying his book is worthless. It is not: I have read it several times and learned a lot from it. But it is curiously detached from the common human enterprise of knowledge. He is like the loner sitting in a side room while the party goes on in the main room next door. Needless to say, it would take me a lot of time and work to defend what I just said! But I may return to it later. Best wishes, Danny From Jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Jul 16 10:35:39 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2009 10:35:39 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] A Scientist's Landscape Message-ID: In a message dated 7/16/2009 8:44:07 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk writes: I am not entirely sure what you are saying. --- never mind what I'm saying. To echo Grice: mind what I'm meaning! :) >But it seems to imply that a >concept is categorial only if it has instances Oops. R. B. Jones should help us here since he is the expert of vacuity! >(and perhaps is also >fundamental in some way). Yes, 'fundament' is a good one. Even for continentals. Wasn't it Husserl who dreamed of a philosophy without presuppositions? grundlos, I think his word was? >And behind this lies a picture: ontological >categories (which exist out there in the real world) well, as R. B. Jones would say, only an obble IZZES. We wouldn't say that the 'whiteness' (QUALITY) of the object exists, or that the 'in-between' in which it finds itself with another obble (RELATION) exists, or that if there is another obble the the TWO exist (QUANTITY) and that if it's picturesque, its picturesqueness exist (MANNER). It's the "tode ti" of Aristotle-Code-Grice that exists. The particular individual spatio-temporal continuant. "Individuals exist", as Strawson would say -- hence his choice of title for the book, I hope. >cause perceptions and >perceptions Well, the obble (or thing really, _noumenon_ for Kant) causes the 'obble' as 'ob-jectum' . The noumenon or thing _threatens_ the subject, and the subject replies by 'objectifying' it. >cause concepts which reflect the ontological categories. Yes. The passage from potching to cotching, to use Grice's colourful (which you'll dub 'idiotic') terminology is tricky at its best. Many things that we perceive (that p), I cannot claim that we form a concept (I think that p) -- and in one list of 'mandatory functions', Grice includes cognition (but not perception!). So there! * * * * * NOW FOR THE INTERESTING PART * * * * hopefully to motivate him. >I work with a different picture: inherited theories contain categories Well, the idea of a 'concept' as a notion qua 'conceptual role' or ROLE it plays in a theory did appeal Grice the functionalist. It's the 'observational' versus 'theoretical' here at play. >which >shape perceptions and structure the world as experienced. I see. Piagetianism, neo-Kantianism and Popperianism at its best. This may relate, in a less continental way, to Hanson (a favourite with Bayne) and his 'theory-laden observation'. I buy that (on Thursdays). >Further, inherited >theories can be criticised, modified or abandoned (so long as something is >put in their place). I guess you'll think a 'pirot' without a theory becomes an 'ex-pirot'. I'm not so sure. My tutor, Ezequiel de Olaso, was a sceptic and died as one! I never see him hold _ANY_ belief (his grading was pretty categoryless, too, if you axe (sic) me. >Consequently, whether the categories of any theory have >(real) instances is something we can never know. I see. I'm not sure about the instantiation, but I like that. Will think about it. --- >The picture you suggest is Aristotelian: forms migrate from things into our >sense organs. My picture is Popperian; that is, it is Kantian insofar as the >forms are contributed by the subject, transcendental, not empirical? Don't think so. That's where it's more like _neo-_Kantian rather than Kantian proper, right? >but it is fallibilist in that the >forms can lead us astray but can be modified by us. The Popperian picture >was developed to take account, initially, of scientific practice, and, >later, of the discoveries since Aristotle's time, in empirical psychology, >neuroscience and the history of science. Interesting to check the Kant-Popper polemic and to focus on 'the discoveries' since KANT's time. >What was the point of Strawson's 'descriptive metaphysics'? He was exploring >a conceptual scheme, viz., that of Oxford-educated common sense, that had >already been shown to be primitive and mistaken by advances in the sciences, >particularly physics. You are right here, as when Chapman says that linguistic botanising (of the Play group) was congenial to the types in that it provided a leisurely activity for the 'gentleman' and that left everything as it is. >Surely, he would have produced something more relevant >to contemporary thought if he had tried to examine the challenges to that >scheme posed by scientific developments. I guess they'd say, "That's Cambridge forya!". I mean, they were STILL trying to digest Eddington's "Two Tables" -- in fact Grice, I see refers to this as "Eddington's table" -- as he would NOT use 'table' in the plural here. You should be surprised by Oxbridge enemities. In fact, as the biographer of Ayer notes (cited by Chapman) and this may relate to Anscombe NOT being quoted -- the fact that something was POPULAR in Cam (as Witters was -- the mimeo of Anscombe, Chapman notes, circulated in Oxford in the 1940s, apparently?) is enough of a trigger NOT to be considered proper for Oxonian dialectics. --- >But he just takes it for granted >that the scheme he is describing is permanent and unhchangeable >('Individuals,' p.10). As far as his brain is concerned? I mean, it takes _Generations_ to accept _things_. Consider 'flows of impressions' don't threaten us, objects do. But then, the Allies were bombing Hiroshima with "atomic" things -- isn't a wavicle 'threatening'? Strawson, and you'll take it with a pinch of salt here, describes himself proudly as a 'petit-bourgeois' in his "Intellectual Autobiography" -- Library Living Philosophers, and as Chapman notes, recall that for the Lit. Hum. Oxon 'NO LIVING PHILOSOPHER' was included in the syllabus --. >I am not saying his book is worthless. It is not: I >have read it several times and learned a lot from it. But it is curiously >detached from the common human enterprise of knowledge. He is like the loner >sitting in a side room while the party goes on in the main room next door. -- Oddly this reminds me of Borges. When he was in Oxford (1971) there was a party at the Randolph in his honour. Murdoch, etc, were in attendance -- and the party was going on mainly in the groundfloor -- the piano room which I love --. Yet, Borges hisself spent most of his time in the 'next' room (upstairs, actually, to add insult to injury) with a young Fellow of Corpus -- discussing the metrics of the Beowulf -- Harmon -- Faber, Anglo-Saxon Verse) recollected in Woodfield, "The man in the mirror". Strawson provoked Quine with "A logician's landscape". I'll provoke D. F., in a good way, I hope, with _my_ header to this post! Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************S T R E T C H your technology dollars with great laptop deals from Dell! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1223081712x1201714210/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Faltfarm.mediaplex.com%2Fad%2Fck%2F12309%2D81939%2D1629%2 D5) From aune at philos.umass.edu Thu Jul 16 13:18:13 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2009 13:18:13 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Philosophical 'Solecisms': Hypercategorial? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <01CE289F-81A8-4CD3-B82E-35E30D3A3C97@philos.umass.edu> I agree with Danny. Bruce On Jul 15, 2009, at 10:23 AM, Danny Frederick wrote: > Blimey, JL, you call that 'brief'! > > I am not entirely sure what you are saying. But it seems to imply > that a > concept is categorial only if it has instances (and perhaps is also > fundamental in some way). And behind this lies a picture: ontological > categories (which exist out there in the real world) cause > perceptions and > perceptions cause concepts which reflect the ontological categories. > > I work with a different picture: inherited theories contain > categories which > shape perceptions and structure the world as experienced. Further, > inherited > theories can be criticised, modified or abandoned (so long as > something is > put in their place). Consequently, whether the categories of any > theory have > (real) instances is something we can never know. > > The picture you suggest is Aristotelian: forms migrate from things > into our > sense organs. My picture is Popperian; that is, it is Kantian > insofar as the > forms are contributed by the subject, but it is fallibilist in that > the > forms can lead us astray but can be modified by us. The Popperian > picture > was developed to take account, initially, of scientific practice, and, > later, of the discoveries since Aristotle's time, in empirical > psychology, > neuroscience and the history of science. > > What was the point of Strawson's 'descriptive metaphysics'? He was > exploring > a conceptual scheme, viz., that of Oxford-educated common sense, > that had > already been shown to be primitive and mistaken by advances in the > sciences, > particularly physics. Surely, he would have produced something more > relevant > to contemporary thought if he had tried to examine the challenges > to that > scheme posed by scientific developments. But he just takes it for > granted > that the scheme he is describing is permanent and unhchangeable > ('Individuals,' p.10). I am not saying his book is worthless. It is > not: I > have read it several times and learned a lot from it. But it is > curiously > detached from the common human enterprise of knowledge. He is like > the loner > sitting in a side room while the party goes on in the main room > next door. > > Needless to say, it would take me a lot of time and work to defend > what I > just said! But I may return to it later. > > Best wishes, > > Danny From rh1 at york.ac.uk Thu Jul 16 14:20:53 2009 From: rh1 at york.ac.uk (rh1 at york.ac.uk) Date: 16 Jul 2009 19:20:53 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] "Professional Philosopher and Amateur Cricketer" In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: JL, The Cox you mention was I think a Fellow of Lincoln; I met him once. Not my friend and contemporary Roxbee Cox (B.Phil, 1956, like me). All the best, Roland From Jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Jul 16 18:17:11 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2009 18:17:11 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Roxbee and all the Coxes Message-ID: Somerset and all the Maughams do it let's do it -- let's fall in love. Coward apres Porter In a message dated 7/16/2009 2:21:08 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, rh1 at york.ac.uk writes: JL, The Cox you mention was I think a Fellow of Lincoln; I met him once. Not my friend and contemporary Roxbee Cox (B.Phil, 1956, like me). All the best, Roland ---- Oh -- is that so!? I actually keep correspondence with J. Roxbee Cox and we never talked about that! J. Roxbee Cox sent me a nice letter from Lancaster, and I was too polite to ask of his associations with Gilbert Ryle -- I'm glad I didn't! James Roxbee Cox is a _genius_: I read his two papers on perception; I especially enjoyed the contribution to the Lancaster symposium on Perception which I think Warnock attended. Later still, I did get hold of Warnock's book, Language and Morality, where further Griceana can be unburied. Yesterday, browsing again Chapman's book -- (I was asking myself, why do I rather read this book 5 more time than get a novel by _Julia_ Grice? Is there something wrong with me or with (Julia) Grice?). Anyway, Chapman uses the word 'retrospective', 'retrospective', 'retrospective'. Apprently the idea of a, er, retrospective Warnock/Grice was in the works. And among the Griceana filling those 14 cardboard boxes there is a transcript of some _very_ recent Gricean thoughts (by Grice) as _spoken_ to Warner and transcribed by Warner -- or maybe it just reads, "Dictated to Warner". Grice had a lot of confidence on Warner. If someone were dictating to _me_, I cannot think what would come out! Anyway, alas Warnock died in the 1990s after a cruel (if that's the word) fight with throat cancer -- M. Warnock recollects his last days, online. I find the Warnock/Grice 'retrospective' a JEWEL -- and anyone seriously interested in that should go to Roxbee Cox. Austin's _Sense and Sensibilia_ is also a must, and G. A. Paul. I recall that once I wrote a letter to G. A. Paul. I got a letter back from the College, "Dear Mr. Speranza Sorry to inform you that G. A. Paul died 45 years ago. Or something. --- I mean, I possibly KNEW he was dead, but no harm trying! I mean, I never read the obit. of the man, and Grice _loved_ him. That would finish the 'philosophy of perception' thing, I hope: Roxbee-Cox, Warnock, Austin, Grice, Paul -- and perhaps Snowdon. I recall mentioning Snowdon in some correspondence with S. Clark, and he wrote back, "Snowdon is _no_ relation to Armstrong who is a 'new' peer, anyway, just because he was married to Maggie". Anyway, ... --- I actually held correspondence with Hampshire, and he told me: "NO! Grice never attended the All Souls meetings" I kept dreaming he _might_. But he confirmed all the other names, -- but they escape me now. I must have that letter from Stanford that he sent somewhere (I hope). In any case, reading the Owens's obit of Ryle the mention of the Ryle group interested, and as you say, there was this Cox (who HAS to be Lincoln -- I'm so no familiar with Lincoln!). I think someone should sponsor a chair (in Helsinki of course) called, "The Play Group". E.g. David Mitchell (Worcester Coll.) author of a _Logic_. Who was he? I have his book and it's lovely, but we don't find a lot about him anymore. Or one "Chalmers" (I think) author of another book on Logic. Then there's Oscar P. Wood -- he did write to me from his house in Hertfordshire explicating me the connection with the Grice quote in "Some remarks about the senses". Since Wood compiled the book on Ryle (and I was fascinated by his "Linguistic Rules" in the Arist. Soc.) I was interested. He sounded as if he was _younger_ (or too young) to belong to the Ryle group. Mabbott was a case. (A good one). Grice was _aware_ that Mabbott had mentioned him in "Oxford Memories" -- which I got hold of. In two pages, Mabbott finishes the Strawson/Grice thing -- specifying how Mabbott also 'tutored' Strawson for a while (I think). And Mabbott _is_ listed, I think, by Owens as a member of the Ryle Group. -- In any case, I would think that Ryle was never so organised as Austin, in his way, was -- and later Grice when he took the lead of the 'playgroup' down to 1967. The playgroup starting meeting in different colleges, and Warnock mentions that they felt at best when at St. John's -- looking like a meeting of executives in an important business board. I have been to St. John's, but I think I missed that room! There are new extensions now to the College, and must say that in any case my taste is for small, damp rooms that you can have an excuse to get out from and run for the "Lamb and Flag". Incidentally, D. Frederick was saying: Strawson, the "Oxford-educated man". What does he want?! I mean, people HAVE to be educated _somewhere_. In any case, it was the talk of the town (if not of the gown) that Strawson was PPE not LitHum and that he, -- God forgive it! :) -- he had had a 'second'! In any case I never saw anyone loving a student as much as Grice loved Strawson! (Chapman recalls Grice recalling how Lady Ann (Martin) Strawon would sometimes get slightly irritated that Grice would phone Strawson so late at night!) J. L. Speranza **************S T R E T C H your technology dollars with great laptop deals from Dell! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1223081712x1201714210/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Faltfarm.mediaplex.com%2Fad%2Fck%2F12309%2D81939%2D1629%2 D5) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Jul 17 20:15:43 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2009 20:15:43 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Philosophy of Perception: Oxford Style Message-ID: Good that B. Aune agrees with D. Frederick -- I love an argument. I have since composed "A logician's landscape" and of course in our discussions of the _best_ of Oxford philosophy we should never forget the interactions of B. Aune when visiting the dreaming spires, and his first-experience with Grice and the playgroup (or what was left of it, after Austin's demise). Chapman makes a bit about the death of Austin. I wonder if it shocked Grice to _learn_ that the man was dying. Apparently it was all very sudden. I wonder for how long before Austin died Grice knew. I would have been devastated to _learn_! --- (And S. Bayne -- thanks for the tidbit about the 'nasty' note by G. E. M. A. to the student -- and don't you doubt! Anscombe is LOVING you from Heavens Above for the work you've done with her!) --- Of course the title provocative of _this_ post. No, there is _no_ Oxford style, really, and I'm sure what Warnock/Grice and others were doing was possibly having analogues elsewhere, notably inspired to 'challenge' some of Ayer's dogmatisms in "Empirical Theory of Knowledge" In the case of Roxbee Cox -- I'll systematise him as 'post-Gricean' even! (:)). J. W. Roxbee Cox I feel that my previous was in a too familiar tone. I apologise for that. In any case, after a quick search about "Harold Cox" -- in an online "Oxford Made Me", I read about him. Born in Glasgow, took his life. A fascinating character as that online link reads. So this as a re-consideration of J. Roxbee Cox -- who I till today, I guess -- thought was the "Cox" cited by Owen in the obit. of Ryle. Some info on Jeremy W. Roxbee Cox then: He is cited by Sibley -- (a great author -- his papers now publ. by Clarendon along with a festschrift or memorial volume). COX, J. R. W. "Distinguishing the Senses"-- Mind, 1970. citing Grice 1962. -- cfr. Grice, "Some remarks about the senses" -- in Butler, 1962 Coady, "The sense of Martians" (citing Grice 1962) I should try a search in the Philosopher's Index to get the detail of the J. W. R. Cox peace in the Sibley but I'm sure he cites Grice (1961) and it's about the 'causal' theory of perception. JSTOR: Perception: A Philosophical Symposium. PERCEPTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL SYMPOSIUM. Edited by F. N. SIBLEY London, ... The conditions Cox adds are more complex, but the main work is done by .. From rbj at rbjones.com Sat Jul 18 03:43:48 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2009 08:43:48 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] A Scientist's Landscape In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <200907180843.48670.rbj@rbjones.com> On Thursday 16 July 2009 15:35:39 Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: >In a message dated 7/16/2009 8:44:07 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, >danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk writes: >>But it seems to imply that a >>concept is categorial only if it has instances > >Oops. R. B. Jones should help us here since he is the expert of vacuity! I'm touched that you think me expert in nothing. As far as Aristotle is concerned I'm still a novice, and the notion of a categorial concept has not yet come up. We have these two kinds of predication (essential and accidental) which involve "terms", which, if Aristotle's syllogistic logic is to be sound cannot be empty. However syllogistic reasoning is not sound (it seems) for accidental (or inter categorial) predication anyway so its not clear how much weight one can place on Aristotle's logic when considering his metaphysics. >>(and perhaps is also >>fundamental in some way). > >Yes, 'fundament' is a good one. Even for continentals. Wasn't it Husserl >who dreamed of a philosophy without presuppositions? grundlos, I think his >word was? > >>And behind this lies a picture: ontological >>categories (which exist out there in the real world) There is only one category of substance. Do the others exist out there (rather than merely being instantiated out there)? >well, as R. B. Jones would say, > >only an obble IZZES. > >We wouldn't say that the 'whiteness' (QUALITY) of the object exists, or >that the 'in-between' in which it finds itself with another obble (RELATION) >exists, or that if there is another obble the the TWO exist (QUANTITY) and >that if it's picturesque, its picturesqueness exist (MANNER). > >It's the "tode ti" of Aristotle-Code-Grice that exists. The particular >individual spatio-temporal continuant. > >"Individuals exist", as Strawson would say -- hence his choice of title for > the book, I hope. But the individuals include individual attributes (e.g. whiteness). If you don't want whiteness to be "out there" then you have to stick to particulars (individual substances). RBJ From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sat Jul 18 06:26:34 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2009 06:26:34 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] A Scientist's Landscape Message-ID: In a message dated 7/18/2009 3:44:11 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, rbj at rbjones.com writes: "As far as Aristotle is concerned I'm still a novice, and the notion of a categorial concept has not yet come up. We have these two kinds of predication (essential and accidental) which involve "terms", which, if Aristotle's syllogistic logic is to be sound cannot be empty. However syllogistic reasoning is not sound (it seems) for accidental (or inter categorial) predication anyway so its not clear how much weight one can place on Aristotle's logic when considering his metaphysics. [...] There is only one category of substance. Do the others exist out there (rather than merely being instantiated out there)? [...] But the individuals include individual attributes (e.g. whiteness). If you don't want whiteness to be "out there" then you have to stick to particulars (individual substances)." Excellent commentary, R. B. Jones. Indeed, "Particulars exists". I have to refine my _finesse_! And we want the Greek terms here! 'tode ti' seems -- I think Code (who cares perhaps slighlty more than Grice -- in published views -- on the equivalent Greek terms as used by Aristotle) seems to hit the mar, the individual man, as it were. The particular individual man, that Socrates -- a 'spatio-continuant temporal' sometime in the past IZZ, or more properly, WAZZ. --. What Grice and Strawson were somehow obsessed -- I guess one _gets_bored of a landscape (?) and needs to move around? -- with two notions: it's the substantiation. I think Strawson calls it in "Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar" -- 'Her particular paleness filled the room as Marilyn Monroe entered the room'. I know Grice, more eschatological, called it 'transsubstantiation' -- 'metaphysical', he adds -- as opposed to 'physical', I expect, which was the old philosopher's stone -- alchemy. And his examples are subtler: a 'human', for example, transsubstantiates into a 'person' ("We are not hanging a human", the Sheriff addressed the crowds gathering around the tree, "we're hanging a _person_ -- and a bad'un at that!" -- Crowds cheer). When Strawson wrote, "A logician's landscape" (PQ -- review of Quine, From a logical point of view, really -- and which I don't think has been reprinted, as it should -- because it contains some observations not found in the otherwise large corpus of Strawson's writings) he was being _serious_, not just metaphorical. We hope. I realise of the seriousness of the enterprise when reading "Prejudices and predilections -- which become life and opions" by you-know-who (in Grandy/Warner, PGRICE). After a long discussion of why we _have_ to speak ordinary English (when talking with the ordinarily English) Grice adds, words to the effect -- they are not expecting as to pegasise constantly, or to treat propositional attitudes as monadic predicates. The landscape that Quine expected the logician to _paint_ was _not_ 'just' a fine one of desert and empty plains. It was one that had been _impoverished_: desert and plains when there are roses in bloom, I think. R. B. Jones who hails from the Heart of England, as H. P. Grice did (Grice born in the 'affluent suburb', Chapman has it, of Harborne, Warwickshire) may be warmed by the focus on the landscape. I LOVE landscapes (or rather engravings) of the Heart-of-England little village landscape. Those lanes and stone walls, and the cottage gardens, and the thatched trees, and the clouds, and the haywain, and the church steeple, and the sheep, and the occasional human to add a touch of 'transcendental' category to the picture (although cottage and haywain may do for the imaginative ones). _That_'s the landscape we were grown into. (I know Grice 'is' being metaphoric -- so don't satirise me!) That's the landscape our eyes are prepred to see. That's the landscape we want to _talk_ about. That's the landscape people will ask us questions about. That's the landscape we have ("This England!" forever!) to keep! The scientist's landscape "is alright as a hobby", as Aunt Agatha said to John Lennon, "but you'll never make a job off it". (I was told, for example, that Einstein never _taught_ -- just did _science_. So the dialogue of scientists and their landscapes is something they sometimes _feel_ they _have_ to keep for theirselves (sic). Unless you _ask_. But again, I think the eyes are important. Microscopes allow us to see things in the landscape we would otherwise not detect. As Hare said, if I say, "There is an animal in the back of the garden", I don't expect you to treat me with a bacteria (or my Aunt Matilda). With 'atoms' and 'quanta' is even trickier in that as Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle shows (first quote by Eddington, in the OED), 'Eddington's table' (as Grice qualifies it) keeps changing as you observe it, turning the 'observational' vs. 'theoretical' distinction Ramsified at least! When Grice wrote 'The Causal Theory of Perception' he gathered his amount of criticism when he is describing brain red man retina light waves pillar box (and the essay is kept by Bayne in his pages). Grice is merely interested in the disimplicatures of The pillar box is red The pillar box seems red -- the 'causal causal causal' (scientific) story is nice as a story but the philosopher is free to _leave_ a blank here, he says (since perception is pretty well understood anyway, and see if you can catch an Oxford philosopher uttering an _empirical_ claim!) Ditto, in his more polemic last section on "From the banal to the bizarre", with comments by Myro, he lectures us on "the devil of Scientism" that would have us think that since we don't know that we know, we better appeal to the scientist -- the 'neurophysiologist' in this case -- for help about our willings and judgings! The topic that D. Frederick and B. Aune are emphasising: the fallibilism and corregibility of categorial schemes is nice, -- And the Oxonians may have been a bit stern here (and appeal to Aristotle with a more provocative intent than needed) but is it _mandatory_ to *be* Patricia Churchland? :) Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1222377099x1201454424/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd= JulystepsfooterNO62) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Sat Jul 18 07:27:04 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2009 11:27:04 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] A Scientist's Landscape In-Reply-To: <200907180843.48670.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <765685055.4158301247916424532.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I happened to have a couple of minutes and this is the first post that popped up. I was delayed in approviing messages because I forgot to pay the bill. Anyway, in Aristotle we have about four or five definitions of 'substance'. The one people generally attack is the one identifying substances as essences. Others, including the one that says that substance is that which can be predicated of but not predicated is a more or less logical conception. Then there is the one that says something like that a substance is the referent of 'this' or 'that'; then there is the idea of substance as a continuant, etc. But notice how these might be related. Sellars and Strawson, I believe, exchanged ideas in a couple papers "Logical Subjects and Physical Objects." It's been a very long time since I read them but they were preparatory as I recall, for Strawson, who later wrote his book _Individuals_. I would make a general point. A lot of anti-substance rhetoric has fallen on what Kant was attempting to do in the Transcendental Deduction. Strawson, a terrific philosopher in my opinion, played around with "Sortals" to some extent to this end. Which "sortal" categories; which 'phenomenal qualities' to accept or reject has been a large part of the ontology/epistemology "interface." Eventually it gets caught up in linguistic "tricks" such as the "under a description" gambit. But there is someting to the problem. When philosphers speak of a problem as a "pseudo-problem" I'm inclined to run as fast from him as I do from people who say God speaks to them! This is not to reject the "linguistic turn" but I can't see that the dividends have been impressive; the debate over counterfactuals is one of the best of the linguistic type issues, but even here it begins to faulter (preemption etc), then the tendency is to return to ontology, dispostional properties etc. One other "stream of consciousness" remark: the predication issue really goes back to Plato's _Sophist_. Kneale and Kneale, actually, locate the origins of the syllogism by going back to this. _The Development of Logic_. Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: Jlsperanza at aol.com Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Sent: Saturday, July 18, 2009 12:43:48 AM GMT -08:00 US/Canada Pacific Subject: Re: A Scientist's Landscape On Thursday 16 July 2009 15:35:39 Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: >In a message dated 7/16/2009 8:44:07 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, >danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk writes: >>But it seems to imply that a >>concept is categorial only if it has instances > >Oops. R. B. Jones should help us here since he is the expert of vacuity! I'm touched that you think me expert in nothing. As far as Aristotle is concerned I'm still a novice, and the notion of a categorial concept has not yet come up. We have these two kinds of predication (essential and accidental) which involve "terms", which, if Aristotle's syllogistic logic is to be sound cannot be empty. However syllogistic reasoning is not sound (it seems) for accidental (or inter categorial) predication anyway so its not clear how much weight one can place on Aristotle's logic when considering his metaphysics. >>(and perhaps is also >>fundamental in some way). > >Yes, 'fundament' is a good one. Even for continentals. Wasn't it Husserl >who dreamed of a philosophy without presuppositions? grundlos, I think his >word was? > >>And behind this lies a picture: ontological >>categories (which exist out there in the real world) There is only one category of substance. Do the others exist out there (rather than merely being instantiated out there)? >well, as R. B. Jones would say, > >only an obble IZZES. > >We wouldn't say that the 'whiteness' (QUALITY) of the object exists, or >that the 'in-between' in which it finds itself with another obble (RELATION) >exists, or that if there is another obble the the TWO exist (QUANTITY) and >that if it's picturesque, its picturesqueness exist (MANNER). > >It's the "tode ti" of Aristotle-Code-Grice that exists. The particular >individual spatio-temporal continuant. > >"Individuals exist", as Strawson would say -- hence his choice of title for > the book, I hope. But the individuals include individual attributes (e.g. whiteness). If you don't want whiteness to be "out there" then you have to stick to particulars (individual substances). RBJ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sat Jul 18 10:53:22 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2009 10:53:22 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Rosebushes and Cherry-Trees: Grice's Harborne Revisited Message-ID: Do _cherry trees_ grow in Harborne? We expect so. I trust the red rose of England (immortalised in "Merry England" "Dan Cupid hath a garden..."). Suppose we visit Harborne. "Looking for the birthplace of H. P. Grice" --- "That hospital over there" "Hospital?" This was March 26 1913 -- I expect he was born in a house? (Anyway: Blue placque expected). Suppose we arrive in the Spring -- rosebushes and cherry-trees in bloom. Yet, suppose we ask a landscape painter to provide us a 'representation'. He does, but snow-flakes in evidence -- all lean and 'bleak' as Christina Rossetti would put it. What's going wrong? Well, Grice refers to his once 'tutee' Strawson, "A logician's landscape" -- which I have rephrased as a _scientist's landscape_. For consider the sort of objection that D. Frederick raises: "Oh, don't take me wrong: I think _Individuals_ is not totally useless" or words to that effect. The sentiment may echo what Grice expresses in "Prejudices and Predilections" (Grandy/Warner, p. 53): Russell went over the top, Grice claims, when he speaks of 'stone-age metaphysics'. 'Stone-age _physics_' [emphasis Grice's] , rather, he suggests, "if by that we mean a primitive set of HYPOTHESES about how the world goes". He suggests that EVEN if refuted, 'stone-age physics' may share something with 'twentieth-century physics' --; he suggests, 'some very general characterisation of the nature of reality". And even if we grant Russell with his choice of 'metaphysic': surely the PRESENTATION of such a metaphysics should turn out to be a perfectly LOGICAL 'enterprise', "though not," he hastens to add, an enterprise in _physical_ science" (again emphasis Grice's). Echoes of Unified Science obvious. --So back to the landscape painter: Is the Scientists _bound_ ('condemned') to Minimalism? "In favour of Minimalism," Grice writes, "we might hear an appeal, echoing Quine, to the beauty of 'desert landscapes'." "But such an appeal I would regard as INAPPROPRIATE." "We are _not_ being asked by a Minimalist to give our [aesthetic] vote to a special, and no doubt very _fine_, type of landscape." "We are being asked to express our preferences for an ORDINARY SORT OF LANDSCAPE [-- as his beloved Harborne. JLS] "... at a recognisably _lean_ time: to rosebushes and cherry-trees in mid-winter, rather than in spring or summer. To change the image somewhat" [And who said that his prose grew beautifully florid in the best sense of 'rhetoric' with age?] "... what _bothers_ me about what I am being offered [to buy] is not that it is _bare_, but that it has been SYSTEMATICALLY and RELENTLESSLY _undressed_" Which is back to Cole Poter, I guess: -- and Paul _Anything-Goes_ Feyerabend*, but for a longer day: "If driving fast cars you like if old hymns you like if bare limbs you like or me undressed you like well then nobody will oppose!" Cheers, J. L. Speranza *Feyerabend grew increasingly agitated when he co-examined students at Berkeley with Grice: "Last week we spent the whole examination torturing the student with his intuitions as to what his 'conversational move' to "There is a rhinoceros in the refrigerator" would be". **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1222377099x1201454424/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd= JulystepsfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sat Jul 18 10:16:10 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2009 10:16:10 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Zeno's Epicheiremata -- The Oxford Revival Message-ID: S. R. Bayne comments interestingly on R. B. Jones's ref. to Aristotle. Jones: >>We have these two kinds of predication (essential and accidental) >>which involve "terms", which, if Aristotle's syllogistic logic >>is to be sound cannot be empty. However syllogistic reasoning >>is not sound (it seems) for accidental (or inter categorial) >>predication anyway so its not clear how much weight one >>can place on Aristotle's logic when considering his metaphysics. Bayne: >the predication issue really goes back to Plato's >_Sophist_. Kneale and Kneale, actually, >locate the origins of the syllogism by going back to this. >_The Development of Logic_. Beautiful. I always enjoyed Kneale (a Rylean, I think!) having giving those lectures in Oxford as -- to me the more euphonic title, "The _growth_ of logic_." I _think_ it may relate to Zeno's famous book, as per header, the "Epicheirema". Apparently, one of the oldest books ever written by a philosopher. Now, I don't know what Davidson would say of 'saying that' as applied to the Pre-Socratics, but all those 'disquotational' remarks don't do, seeing that the Greeks didn't have a proper grammar full with quotation marks in the first place. So, I understand, what we do know is that "Zeno, in his epicheiremata [singular, epicheirema], suggest a "he eis to adunaton apagoge", _reductio_ not necessarily _ad absurdum_ but more exactly, to the 'transconsistent'. The standard 'indirect proof' that Grice uses in "Vacuous Names" for: (~, +) p p If ____ and ________, ~p q ~q -- If I'm correct, this may relate to Bayne's connection with 'predication' in the Sophist. The issues involved in the subtleties of Greek grammar here have been, in my view, _best_ treated by (my once correspondent) David Bostock, of Merton -- the greatest logician that ever lived [in Merton! -- I love him]. In "The Journal of Ancient Philosophy", I think the title of the journal is, he wrote on "Plato on 'is-not'" and the essay is full of the classicist's delight of chapter and verse. Wiggins, whose portrait at the Ryle Group (shouldn't we have an "Austin" group -- it does look like a bit of a mixed bad --) one can see online -- very handsome man --, did contribute to a Vlastos compilation on 'negation'. When I was researching on Grice, -- and reading Chapman -- she notes, words to that effect, he felt he was a DIS-senting rationalist. Indeed, as "Prejudices and Predilections" has it, an 'irreverent, dissenting conservative" (or words to that effect). And it amuses me that the FIRST ever publication by Grice that remains is one entitled, "No!" -- almost! i.e. "Negation" (his account is 'verificationist' though but makes some good pragmatic points), i.e. a sort of Zenoan 'epicheirema' -- with a vengeance. (Grice returned to 'Negation' early in 1961, etc.) The topic of negation has a long history in 20th. Oxford philosophy starting with an infamous symposium by Mabbott (of St. John's) and Ryle, in the annals of the Aristotelian Society. Mabbott recalls in "Oxford Memories" that's how he met 'Witters' -- and a bit of a shock he gave him, as I recall. Diogenes's bio of Zeno is on the gossipy side, "He was a _tall_ man", he said with some reverence. And so was Grice, there! (Diog. adds: "And Aristotle, in his Sophist [sic] says that he was the inventor of dialectics". Why predication and negation? Well, for Parmenides-Zeno-Plato-Aristotle-Grice etc. it is _true_ to say It is not the case that Pegasus flies. since, well, nodoby has ever seen him fly -- let alone _him_. For Strawson ('terrific' as he was, I agree!) that's a presupposition-, ground-less thing to say, rather!) -- And if _one_ thing motivated Grice to deliver the "Logic and Conversation" lectures was Strawson's 'misunderstandings' (if that's the word) of his (Grice's) teaching logic to Strawson back at St. John's before the 'Phoney' War. ('Phoney' very ironic and well meant seeing that, counterfactually, we should not be talking about them even as _unphoney_ as it was). Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1222377099x1201454424/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=62&bcd= JulystepsfooterNO62) From rbj at rbjones.com Tue Jul 21 05:45:36 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2009 10:45:36 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] A Scientist's Landscape In-Reply-To: <765685055.4158301247916424532.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <765685055.4158301247916424532.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <200907211045.36754.rbj@rbjones.com> Interesting to see Steve mention so many different notions of substance in Aristotle. My own Aristotelian efforts are greatly handicapped at present by my having read so little of the primary sources, a problem which I hope in due course to remedy. (one might say something similar of my knowledge of any philosopher at all! how absurd that I am contemplating a history, even if only of aspects of philosophical logic) On Saturday 18 July 2009 12:27:04 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: >When philosphers speak of a problem as a "pseudo-problem" >I'm inclined to run as fast from him as I do from people who say >God speaks to them! Ah, but surely the problem of pseudo-problems is real! I looked back to see what I said on pseudo-problems in my comparison of Metaphysical Positivism and Logical Positivism. (http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/x003.html) Though I do talk about pseudo-problems there, because I am making a comparison with Carnap, I'm not much inclined to engage in a witch hunt or to use the terminology myself. There are conditions which one must meet for sound deductive reasoning, and my inclination is to promulgate a method of analysis which complies with these conditions. Having said that, even though I'm not inclined to make much of it, I do think that most philosophy is unsound or meaningless or both, and that philosophers should be concerned about this! Let me add, that the dismissal of one philosophers views by another who regards it as meaningless is not confined to positivists, and I am under the impression that I have suffered this kind of dismissal at your hands more than once. As soon as I start talking about "meaning" you beat a hasty retreat, apparently abandoning any attempt to understand what I am saying. >One other "stream of consciousness" remark: the predication issue >really goes back to Plato's _Sophist_. Kneale and Kneale, actually, >locate the origins of the syllogism by going back to this. >_The Development of Logic_. I had a poke around in Google books, but didn't find a lot of enlightenment. The Grice paper does provide Plato at third or fourth hand, since its Code's presentation of Aristotle's account of Plato's metaphysics (as well as his own). However, I have still not understood most of what Code actually says, and don't understand the detail of what his formal material is trying to say about the relationship between Plato and Aristotle. RBJ From Baynesr at comcast.net Wed Jul 22 07:28:27 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2009 11:28:27 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] A Scientist's Landscape In-Reply-To: <200907211045.36754.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <449831300.5144581248262107503.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Primary source reading is time consuming. It takes a very long time to achieve familiarity with the literature. However, there are some good shortcuts. I think I mentioned Kneale and Kneale's _Development of Logic_. It comes in for some criticism, but the first third on Logic before Boole is, really, very worthwhile and is a lot more interesting than wading through the _Posterior (or Prior) Analytics_. I highly recommend it. The notion of substance is something one must, I think, be captivated by in order to understand. Historical questions abound. Sellars, one of those philosophers you learn from rather just struggle with, is a good illustration of what good can come out of understanding the historical issues, such as those related to Kant. H. H. Price was another. It may be the case that all philosophy is is a conflation of "pseudo-problems," but I think this is the easy way out. All you have to do is develop some criterion for being a "pseudo-problem," e.g. verifiability, etc and then you can just apply your mechanical pseudo-problem solver and all is well. I know of no "pseudo-problem detector" that doesn't rely on a linguistic approach to traditional problems. I, myself, make serious use of linguistic techniques for trying to solve a problem, but rarely if ever (a few exceptions) consider linguistic solutions. Rather it is a methodology in attempting to unearth connections. On meaning: I think Grice actually allows us to set this notion aside for the most part and pursue philosophy. Let's not confuse logic and language. Logic supplies a good tool. But if you look at the history of philosophy of science you find instances where a preoccupation with meaning has had a stultifying effect. A good example in my opinion is the issue of causation. Here the notion of a law becomes a linguistic notion. This leads to the appearance of progress, then falters; there being no where to go. You solve the problems with a linguistic or logical "gizmo" without even understanding what is at issue, once that is the "pseudo-problem" detector buzzes. One finds the brown spot on the apple without ever tasting an apple. The only way to know if the apple is good is to taste it; the brown spot may be part of the natural color. Philosophers sometimes feel compelled to solve the problems of philosophy in a single life time. A physicist would never think this way. Pseudo-problem methodology is the attempt at a shortcut. Won't work. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: Baynesr at comcast.net Cc: "hist-analytic" Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2009 2:45:36 AM GMT -08:00 US/Canada Pacific Subject: Re: A Scientist's Landscape Interesting to see Steve mention so many different notions of substance in Aristotle. My own Aristotelian efforts are greatly handicapped at present by my having read so little of the primary sources, a problem which I hope in due course to remedy. (one might say something similar of my knowledge of any philosopher at all! how absurd that I am contemplating a history, even if only of aspects of philosophical logic) On Saturday 18 July 2009 12:27:04 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: >When philosphers speak of a problem as a "pseudo-problem" >I'm inclined to run as fast from him as I do from people who say >God speaks to them! Ah, but surely the problem of pseudo-problems is real! I looked back to see what I said on pseudo-problems in my comparison of Metaphysical Positivism and Logical Positivism. (http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/x003.html) Though I do talk about pseudo-problems there, because I am making a comparison with Carnap, I'm not much inclined to engage in a witch hunt or to use the terminology myself. There are conditions which one must meet for sound deductive reasoning, and my inclination is to promulgate a method of analysis which complies with these conditions. Having said that, even though I'm not inclined to make much of it, I do think that most philosophy is unsound or meaningless or both, and that philosophers should be concerned about this! Let me add, that the dismissal of one philosophers views by another who regards it as meaningless is not confined to positivists, and I am under the impression that I have suffered this kind of dismissal at your hands more than once. As soon as I start talking about "meaning" you beat a hasty retreat, apparently abandoning any attempt to understand what I am saying. >One other "stream of consciousness" remark: the predication issue >really goes back to Plato's _Sophist_. Kneale and Kneale, actually, >locate the origins of the syllogism by going back to this. >_The Development of Logic_. I had a poke around in Google books, but didn't find a lot of enlightenment. The Grice paper does provide Plato at third or fourth hand, since its Code's presentation of Aristotle's account of Plato's metaphysics (as well as his own). However, I have still not understood most of what Code actually says, and don't understand the detail of what his formal material is trying to say about the relationship between Plato and Aristotle. RBJ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Thu Jul 23 14:55:23 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2009 19:55:23 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] A Scientist's Landscape In-Reply-To: <449831300.5144581248262107503.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <449831300.5144581248262107503.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <200907231955.24393.rbj@rbjones.com> I had a lot of difficulty understanding what Steve is saying about pseudo-problems. On Wednesday 22 July 2009 12:28:27 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: >It may be the case that all philosophy is is a conflation >of "pseudo-problems," but I think this is the easy way >out. All you have to do is develop some criterion for >being a "pseudo-problem," e.g. verifiability, etc and then >you can just apply your mechanical pseudo-problem >solver and all is well. I thought a pseudo-problems didn't have answers! How could it be an easy way out to believe that most philosophical problems are psedo-problems? Surely you then have the difficult problem of identifying real (and worthwhile) problems to solve. >I know of no "pseudo-problem >detector" that doesn't rely on a linguistic approach to >traditional problems. I, myself, make serious use of >linguistic techniques for trying to solve a problem, but >rarely if ever (a few exceptions) consider linguistic >solutions. Rather it is a methodology in attempting to >unearth connections. I'm going to try to represent Carnap in this, because he is the only one whose views on this I know anything about. For Carnap a pseudo problem is one which he is unable to comprehend. I don't believe he had some "linguistic technique" to detect them. You just try to understand a problem, and if you fail and come to doubt that it is meaningful you label it a pseudo problem. Of course, your philosophical beliefs about what makes a sentence meaningful are significant, and in his most radical phase when he identified meaning with conditions for verification one might think that this myopic conception of meaning blinded him to the content of many meaningful sentences. However, later his conception of meaning came closer to truth-conditions, and it is harder to dismiss this in the areas which he was considering. Still, we don't so much have a method for solving problems as a stipulation of some preconditions for attempting a solution. It seems to me quite essential be very careful about what kinds of problem you take seriously, and I think its also a good idea to be as explicit as you can be about the criteria involved, even though my own criteria are a little more liberal than Carnap's. It seems to me that your nominalistic tendencies are much the same kind of thing. You decline to consider explanations which invoke entities about whose existence you are sceptical. How does this differ from the rejection of pseudo-problems? >On meaning: I think Grice actually allows us to set this >notion aside for the most part and pursue philosophy. Are you saying that Grice thinks that all putative problems deserve to be taken seriously by philosophers? >Let's not confuse logic and language. Logic supplies >a good tool. But if you look at the history of philosophy >of science you find instances where a preoccupation >with meaning has had a stultifying effect. A good >example in my opinion is the issue of causation. >Here the notion of a law becomes a linguistic notion. >This leads to the appearance of progress, then >falters; there being no where to go. I'm afraid I don't understand the issue here. >You solve the problems with a linguistic or logical >"gizmo" without even understanding what is at issue, >once that is the "pseudo-problem" detector buzzes. Any chance of you spelling this out for me, what is "the problem" here, why is it considered a pseudo problem, how does that constitute a solution and why is that a bad thing? RBJ From Baynesr at comcast.net Fri Jul 24 09:30:11 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2009 13:30:11 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] A Scientist's Landscape In-Reply-To: <200907231955.24393.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <2040686392.5801331248442211210.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I don't recall Carnap ever saying that he was unable to comprehend a pseudo-problem. If pseudo-problems were incomprehensible they wouldn't present much of a problem. The "problem" with pseudo-problems is that they look like real problems but in fact arise from confusions in ordinary language. They look this way because the sentences in which they are formulated are "pseudo-object statements" in the "material mode" of speech.Generally, Carnap speaks more about "pseudo-sentences" rather than pseudo-problems. But not always. My reason for bringing this up is that pseudo-sentences ARE incomprensible within an "syntactical language." In the material mode they look fine. Here I address the Carnapian view. For Carnap "pseudo-questions" (and here he does use this expression) arise from metaphysical statements purporting to be about objects that go beyond the domain of science. _Logical Syntax of Language_ p. 331.Compare Kant in this regard; they are close to this point, at least with respect to Kant proclamations against metaphysics. Consider the following example: "The world is the totality of facts not things." Of course, this is the sentence Wittgenstein uses to begin the Tractatus. This sentence occurs in the "material mode" of speech. It raises pseudo-problems about the nature or ontology of facts, etc.But the point Carnap is making is that by translating the pseudo-sentences that give rise to these pseudo-problems we state the scientific content without the problmatic dross. So instead of this sentence we have in the syntactical language: "Science is a system of sentences not names." (op cit. p. 303). The situation is similar to the one that Plato addresses in the Sophist and elsewhere: the appearances are used to create an illusion and that illusion is persuasive; the philosophical "art" then becomes a game of illusion and persuasion, not truth seeking. The pseudo-problem is a way of rejecting any requirement of a solution because the problem is bogus. This is a *sort* of realist attack on sophistry that arises prior to the answer to a philosophical question. The sophist will take a question that may be real; but then he will proffer illusory solutions. For him there is not reality, man being the measure of all things. But let's stick to Carnap. Let's take an examplle. You remark: "It seems to me that your nominalistic tendencies are much the same kind of thing. You decline to consider explanations which invoke entities about whose existence you are sceptical. How does this differ from the rejection of pseudo-problems?" I am a nominalist; in fact a radical nominalist! The only entities are particulars (of the lowest type). Much of what passes for semantics on my view is purely a matter of psychology. Philosophical psychology is central. Philosophical problems associated with explanation etc. are also central. But ontologically I'm a nominalist. Carnap would consider my ontology, or any ontology outside the domain of science a breeding ground for pseudo problems; but my view is that the "ideal language" (syntactical language) approach is barren. When I ask: "What is a number?" for Carnap this is a pseudo-question. Not for me. For me this is a legit question. I think Grice is right about meaning. Meaning is the thorn in the side of the Carnapians, in my opinion. The wind up taling about worlds, and these in my opinion are pseudo objects if ever there were one! Grice is a pragmatist of a SORT. He views language neither as a mirror of nature nor as a medium of exchange; it is an instrument. I think this is right, but it leaves my metaphysics untouched. You remark: >Let's not confuse logic and language. Logic supplies >a good tool. But if you look at the history of philosophy >of science you find instances where a preoccupation >with meaning has had a stultifying effect. A good >example in my opinion is the issue of causation. >Here the notion of a law becomes a linguistic notion. >This leads to the appearance of progress, then >falters; there being no where to go. Carnap's idea of philosophy is the examination of the "logic of the language of science." This is not a dubious conflation of 'logic' and 'language' but I do disagree with him (especially circa 193X). I'm inclined to agree that the issue of causation by becoming inextricably linked to law has taken us in some rather unproductive directions. But this is understandable at a certain level. Hume was the first to really link regularity with cause, and then subjectivize it. The idea (that of a deductive nomological characterization of scientific explanation) is, actually, turned against Hume (at one point) by Popper and Kneale, leading us to the Goodman story on lawlikeness, which gets tangled up with the semantics of counterfactuals. This is brilliant work. (Canap, Hempel, et al) but causes get lost. The problem of "pre-emption" with respect to radical treatments of cause in terms of counterfactuals has, I believe stymied this approach (D. Lewis etc). Davidson buys in wholesale to the language/ law connection. At the root of this dispute, in my opinion, is the status of singular causal relations. I am a "singularist" in this dispute. But that is a long story which I address in part in my book. Anscombe was a singularist, probably one of her best positions. >You solve the problems with a linguistic or logical >"gizmo" without even understanding what is at issue, >once that is the "pseudo-problem" detector buzzes. There is no decision procedure for telling when a problem is pseudo. If it is failure of translatability into a canonical language then you are reformulating what used to be called dogmatism. Moreover the same world that contains atoms contains actions, ethical actions. A comprehensive picture of the world is what makes philosohy difficult. Leibniz knew this as did Kant. Carnap did not. He dominates most of the last century in my opinion. He was a towering figure; but it is time to take another look at the old problems; no syntactical language will resolve our problems with the help of translation. Regards ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: Baynesr at comcast.net Cc: "hist-analytic" Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2009 11:55:23 AM GMT -08:00 US/Canada Pacific Subject: Re: A Scientist's Landscape I had a lot of difficulty understanding what Steve is saying about pseudo-problems. On Wednesday 22 July 2009 12:28:27 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: >It may be the case that all philosophy is is a conflation >of "pseudo-problems," but I think this is the easy way >out. All you have to do is develop some criterion for >being a "pseudo-problem," e.g. verifiability, etc and then >you can just apply your mechanical pseudo-problem >solver and all is well. I thought a pseudo-problems didn't have answers! How could it be an easy way out to believe that most philosophical problems are psedo-problems? Surely you then have the difficult problem of identifying real (and worthwhile) problems to solve. >I know of no "pseudo-problem >detector" that doesn't rely on a linguistic approach to >traditional problems. I, myself, make serious use of >linguistic techniques for trying to solve a problem, but >rarely if ever (a few exceptions) consider linguistic >solutions. Rather it is a methodology in attempting to >unearth connections. I'm going to try to represent Carnap in this, because he is the only one whose views on this I know anything about. For Carnap a pseudo problem is one which he is unable to comprehend. I don't believe he had some "linguistic technique" to detect them. You just try to understand a problem, and if you fail and come to doubt that it is meaningful you label it a pseudo problem. Of course, your philosophical beliefs about what makes a sentence meaningful are significant, and in his most radical phase when he identified meaning with conditions for verification one might think that this myopic conception of meaning blinded him to the content of many meaningful sentences. However, later his conception of meaning came closer to truth-conditions, and it is harder to dismiss this in the areas which he was considering. Still, we don't so much have a method for solving problems as a stipulation of some preconditions for attempting a solution. It seems to me quite essential be very careful about what kinds of problem you take seriously, and I think its also a good idea to be as explicit as you can be about the criteria involved, even though my own criteria are a little more liberal than Carnap's. It seems to me that your nominalistic tendencies are much the same kind of thing. You decline to consider explanations which invoke entities about whose existence you are sceptical. How does this differ from the rejection of pseudo-problems? >On meaning: I think Grice actually allows us to set this >notion aside for the most part and pursue philosophy. Are you saying that Grice thinks that all putative problems deserve to be taken seriously by philosophers? >Let's not confuse logic and language. Logic supplies >a good tool. But if you look at the history of philosophy >of science you find instances where a preoccupation >with meaning has had a stultifying effect. A good >example in my opinion is the issue of causation. >Here the notion of a law becomes a linguistic notion. >This leads to the appearance of progress, then >falters; there being no where to go. I'm afraid I don't understand the issue here. >You solve the problems with a linguistic or logical >"gizmo" without even understanding what is at issue, >once that is the "pseudo-problem" detector buzzes. Any chance of you spelling this out for me, what is "the problem" here, why is it considered a pseudo problem, how does that constitute a solution and why is that a bad thing? RBJ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Jul 24 10:32:12 2009 From: jlsperanza at aol.com (jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2009 10:32:12 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] The Aristotelian Society -- Annals of Analysis Message-ID: <8CBDA82AB0A3BB6-1C00-20E@Webmail-mg13.sim.aol.com> R. B. Jones wrote in ?Re: A Scientist?s Landscape?, (should recheck number of post, but this was some time ago): "The Grice paper does provide Plato at third or fourth hand, since its Code's presentation of Aristotle's account of Plato's metaphysics (as well as his own). However, I have still not understood most of what Code actually says, and don't understand the detail of what his formal material is trying to say about the relationship between Plato and Aristotle." I would think the Code formalisation -- for which we need of course a "Grice De-Coded" (stay tuned) allows basically to answer the question of 'universalia' (do properties exist? etc.) I found it of interest, having had to read Jaeger?s doctrine of the early "platonist" Aristotle, that the izzing and the hazzing actually allows us to delve rather deeply into the subtleties of what distinction between "Aristotelian" and "Platonist" may amount to. It always amused me that, when studying about the history of philosophy there?s this boring bunch, led by Cudworth, of the Cambridge platonist, who may, I think, have an influence on the metaphysical (boring) poets such as Donne, etc. On the other hand, to be Aristotelian (and Oxonian, on top) was tops -- The Aristotelian Society was founded in London for the gentleman with a degree in "Greats" (Lit. Hum.) who would find it relaxing to converse on Aristotle down from Oxford -- and withou t the pressure of a paper to give! Cheers, J. L. Speranza From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sat Jul 25 16:48:07 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2009 13:48:07 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Armstrong/Heathcote Message-ID: <627152.54950.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Just a quick note for those who are familiar with Heathcocote and Armstrong "Causes and Laws" Nous, 1991, pp. 63-73. It looks like they've neglected the issue of epistemic counterparts in fashioning an argument parallel to the one Kripke makes us of in the case of 'water = H20'. In addition, there is a problem here in treating identity statements involving sequences analogously. I might have something to say on this if anyone has worked on this. They address Anscombe on Davidson on singularist theories of causation. Good paper; closely argued but flawed in ways I never would have suspected; both are good philosophers, very good. Australia continues to dominate the world of philosophy, or so it seems to me. Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Sun Jul 26 15:40:29 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2009 20:40:29 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] A Scientist's Landscape In-Reply-To: <2040686392.5801331248442211210.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <2040686392.5801331248442211210.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <200907262040.30074.rbj@rbjones.com> On Friday 24 July 2009 14:30:11 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: >I don't recall Carnap ever saying that he was unable to >comprehend a pseudo-problem. Probably not. Let me explain how I got there. Carnap's own precis in his "intellectual autobiography" describes his position on pseudo-problems (by which he seems to mean metaphysics) as having evolved through the following stages: 1. They are useless 2. They are meaningless 3. They lack cognitive content Now for a first cut stage 2 corresponds to a confession that he does not understand pseudo-problems. If they are meaningless, how could he? Of course, its more in-your-face than that, his words imply that neither he nor anyone else understands them because they are nonesensical. In time Carnap becomes more conciliatory, but this is not apparent in the story about pseudo problems. These three stages all appear very early, he has already arrived at stage 3 in 1931, with nearly another 40 years of further development to come. Perhaps the shortfall in the account arises because he stopped using the phrase. However his position in relation to metaphysics does continue to evolve, and this is apparent in things like "the liberalisation of empiricism" and his "principle of tolerance". In his "liberalisation of empiricism" Carnap admits first physicalistic and then theoretical languages, even though these are in radical positivism going beyond the given into progressively remote "metaphysics". His principle of tolerance elucidated through the internal/external distinction effectively commit Carnap to accepting the most speculative metaphysics provided only that it is presented in the right way. (or at least reduce his opposition fall back to a claim of uselessness). This is how it works, in relation to any metaphysical theory which is held to consist of necessary truths. Carnap defines necessity in terms of analyticity, so to persuade Carnap that your theory is necessary you just have to define the semantics of your metaphysical language appropriately. If your theory is logically consistent then this will always be possible (actually, you don't even need to know that its consistent). Once you have done this, the claims of the theory become internal to the language you have defined, and they will in that language be necessarily true. There remains the external question of whether the language in which you have formalised your metaphysics is acceptable. For Carnap, the external question is to be resolved pragmatically, and therefore the worst he can say about it is that it is useless, which if you think of metaphysics in the way in which Hardy thought of pure mathematics, won't greatly worry you. This may seem like a trick to you, but it seems to me that Carnap is wrongly thought of as dogmatist, though he undoubtedly did pass through a pretty dogmatic phase (which he partly attributes to Wittgenstein's influence), and that there is a pretty good chance that he could have been persuaded by arguments on these lines to take one step further of liberalisation. The step further would be not simply to accept that his principle of tolerance (etc,) demand a return to a pragmatic consideration of metaphysics, but, on the basis of arguments I have not yet produced, to accept that even speculative metaphysics can sometimes be useful. >If pseudo-problems were >incomprehensible they wouldn't present much of a >problem. The "problem" with pseudo-problems is that they >look like real problems but in fact arise from confusions >in ordinary language. They look this way because the >sentences in which they are formulated are "pseudo-object >statements" in the "material mode" of speech.Generally, >Carnap speaks more about "pseudo-sentences" rather than >pseudo-problems. But not always. My reason for bringing this >up is that pseudo-sentences ARE incomprensible within >an "syntactical language." In the material mode they >look fine. Here I address the Carnapian view. This does not correspond to my understanding of Carnap's position in his syntactic phase. The role of "semantic ascent" is not in dealing with pseudo-problems, but in dealing with analytic or necessary propositions, for example the propositions of mathematics. These propositions can be understood by translating them from the misleading material mode into the formal mode. Then you can see that they are necessary. A pseudo-question is one in the material mode which talks about pseudo-objects but cannot be translated into the syntactic mode. >For Carnap "pseudo-questions" (and here he does use this >expression) arise from metaphysical statements purporting >to be about objects that go beyond the domain of science. >_Logical Syntax of Language_ p. 331.Compare Kant in this >regard; they are close to this point, at least with respect to >Kant proclamations against metaphysics. Consider the >following example: "The world is the totality of facts not >things." Of course, this is the sentence Wittgenstein uses >to begin the Tractatus. This sentence occurs in the "material >mode" of speech. It raises pseudo-problems about the >nature or ontology of facts, etc.But the point Carnap is >making is that by translating the pseudo-sentences that >give rise to these pseudo-problems we state the scientific >content without the problmatic dross. So instead of this >sentence we have in the syntactical language: "Science is a >system of sentences not names." (op cit. p. 303). I think if you can do the translation then Carnap would not regard the original as a pseudo-problem, even though he would describe it as a statement in pseudo-object mode. >Let's take an examplle. You remark: > >"It seems to me that your nominalistic tendencies are >much the same kind of thing. You decline to consider >explanations which invoke entities about whose existence >you are sceptical. How does this differ from the >rejection of pseudo-problems?" > > >I am a nominalist; in fact a radical nominalist! The only >entities are particulars (of the lowest type). Much of what >passes for semantics on my view is purely a matter of >psychology. Philosophical psychology is central. Philosophical >problems associated with explanation etc. are also central. >But ontologically I'm a nominalist. Carnap would consider >my ontology, or any ontology outside the domain of >science a breeding ground for pseudo problems; but my >view is that the "ideal language" (syntactical language) >approach is barren. When I ask: "What is a number?" for >Carnap this is a pseudo-question. Not for me. For me this >is a legit question. I would like to understand your position better than I can from the above description. Presumably in your belief that your particulars are unacceptable to Carnap you are thinking of his phenomenalistic phase. But I would guess that the first stage in his liberalisation (embracing physicalistic language) is pretty much the admission of an ontology of particulars. Carnap doesn't actually have a problem with numbers, even though in his early phase he would have considered them pseudo-objects. Even the question "What is a number?" would be OK provided you settle the context. In the syntactic phase it surely is held to translate into a question about numerals? I don't care for this, but I think he could give a much more satisfactory answer later on. (e.g. in the language of set theory we have standard definitions of numbers). Most importantly, to have a conversation with you about many of the topics which are common on this list, I need to know how as a radical nominalist you can talk about the meaning of sentences. Is this possible? If so, how can you have discussions about necessity? Or indeed, how can you do any philosophy at all! I point out to you, that you effectively duck out of conversations as soon as I mentions meanings or propositions, without any enquiry into what I consider their ontological status. How do you know that I am not a radical nominalist? (I'm pretty close to being a fictionalist in respect of all non-particulars). >I think Grice is right about meaning. Meaning is the thorn >in the side of the Carnapians, in my opinion. The wind up >taling about worlds, and these in my opinion are pseudo >objects if ever there were one! Grice is a pragmatist of a >SORT. He views language neither as a mirror of nature >nor as a medium of exchange; it is an instrument. I think >this is right, but it leaves my metaphysics untouched. "Possible worlds" are, in my book, just abstract objects, which for present purposes we can treat as fictions. So what's the problem? (I think Carnap's principle of tolerance is pretty much like fictionalism, it rules out the idea that questions about the existence of abstract objects have objective answers, but allows that we use them anyway). >You remark: From here on in you are commenting not on my remarks but on your own remarks as quoted in my last response! RBJ From Baynesr at comcast.net Sun Jul 26 17:05:15 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2009 21:05:15 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] A Scientist's Landscape In-Reply-To: <200907262040.30074.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <1675727528.6252131248642315069.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> You remark: "Let me explain how I got there." I can't really comment without giving my own account of how I go where I'm at. This would require a lot of documentation. Moreover, you make statements I can't really accept without a good source. For example, you say, "Carnap defines necessity in terms of analyticity" This illustrates what a complicated story we have: 'necessity' in terms of 'analyticity''; 'analyticity' in terms of 'L-truth' etc. And this is just one stage in his development. Pseudo-problems enter as a class before Tarski, which initiated profound changes in his views, eventuating in a semantics of intensions that may very well carrya metaphysical aspect. After all, if we take pseudo-problems as resulting from using pseudo-statements in a certain way and pseudo-statements as statements lacking cognitive content; and those lacking cognitive contents as being is some sense not confirmable or verified or in some way grounded in experience, then what IS the "cognitive content" of a statement about intensions. Again, if we are doing a study of Carnap we have a mess if for no other reason than, like Russell, he was prolific. But if we are interested in problem solving then as much as I think the history is crucial we have to move on. There is a very complex and beautiful story to be told relating Russell's principle of acquaintance to verificationism and this later to the whole issue of "pseudo-questions." A lot depends, and here I borrow from the usage of the linguists, on your "technologies." So do you accept intensions? Do you accept classes, worlds, concepts, objects, functions etc? All of this gets thrown into the soup. What is important and productive is to pursue the history as you pursue a particular problem. That's when one really learns about guys like Russell, whom contemporaries continue to undervalue. If I am puzzled by questions of imminent causation, for example, I am not discouraged by the latest "rage" over substance or the lack of it. Pursue the problem. Then if current fashion looks attractive try it on, but don't be discouraged about metaphysics because on Carnap's view or any other the question is meaningless. Let me explain autobiographically how I got to THIS position. In high school I picked up a copy of Kan't first Critique. We had a first class high school library, everyone from Le? Szil?rd to Darwin, from Kropotkin to Plato. So I pick up Kant. I look at the thing. I can't understand it. I was fluent in English. I asked myself "what is the problem." I went to college. I was told by my ordinary language teachers that this was all "metaphsical nonsense." The next semester the same guy is assigned the task of teaching Kant. "This ought be interesting!" I say to myself. Well it was. Kant came to life. The anti-metaphysical stance of Kant became a "pseudo-problematic" on in Phil. 303. It was not problematic in Phil. 311. So what was I to do? Answer: pursue the problem, forget the "program." And that is what I'm saying here. The problem of agent causation is not a pseudo problem, but I don't think quantification with identity tacked on to an improvised formal semantics is going to solve this or any other problem. Nor is rejecting the problem on extraneous programmatic considerations an option. Nor, even, is science. Causation is not, really, an issue for science. I conclude witht two terse sounding comments. We are friendly enough that I'm sure you will take them in stride. First, it is clear that you haven't taken a close look at the Logical Syntax of Language. This is, probably, Carnap's most important book. The last chapters, the one I referred to is on Hist-Analytic. Take a look. Second, I don't believe there are abstract objects, so I don't believe there are abstract worlds. Remember the origin of "abstract." It is from the Latin verb meaning to "drag." ('trahere' I think, have to check). So if a world is abstract from what is it "dragged"? Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: "hist-analytic" Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2009 12:40:29 PM GMT -08:00 US/Canada Pacific Subject: Re: A Scientist's Landscape On Friday 24 July 2009 14:30:11 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: >I don't recall Carnap ever saying that he was unable to >comprehend a pseudo-problem. Probably not. Let me explain how I got there. Carnap's own precis in his "intellectual autobiography" describes his position on pseudo-problems (by which he seems to mean metaphysics) as having evolved through the following stages: 1. They are useless 2. They are meaningless 3. They lack cognitive content Now for a first cut stage 2 corresponds to a confession that he does not understand pseudo-problems. If they are meaningless, how could he? Of course, its more in-your-face than that, his words imply that neither he nor anyone else understands them because they are nonesensical. In time Carnap becomes more conciliatory, but this is not apparent in the story about pseudo problems. These three stages all appear very early, he has already arrived at stage 3 in 1931, with nearly another 40 years of further development to come. Perhaps the shortfall in the account arises because he stopped using the phrase. However his position in relation to metaphysics does continue to evolve, and this is apparent in things like "the liberalisation of empiricism" and his "principle of tolerance". In his "liberalisation of empiricism" Carnap admits first physicalistic and then theoretical languages, even though these are in radical positivism going beyond the given into progressively remote "metaphysics". His principle of tolerance elucidated through the internal/external distinction effectively commit Carnap to accepting the most speculative metaphysics provided only that it is presented in the right way. (or at least reduce his opposition fall back to a claim of uselessness). This is how it works, in relation to any metaphysical theory which is held to consist of necessary truths. Carnap defines necessity in terms of analyticity, so to persuade Carnap that your theory is necessary you just have to define the semantics of your metaphysical language appropriately. If your theory is logically consistent then this will always be possible (actually, you don't even need to know that its consistent). Once you have done this, the claims of the theory become internal to the language you have defined, and they will in that language be necessarily true. There remains the external question of whether the language in which you have formalised your metaphysics is acceptable. For Carnap, the external question is to be resolved pragmatically, and therefore the worst he can say about it is that it is useless, which if you think of metaphysics in the way in which Hardy thought of pure mathematics, won't greatly worry you. This may seem like a trick to you, but it seems to me that Carnap is wrongly thought of as dogmatist, though he undoubtedly did pass through a pretty dogmatic phase (which he partly attributes to Wittgenstein's influence), and that there is a pretty good chance that he could have been persuaded by arguments on these lines to take one step further of liberalisation. The step further would be not simply to accept that his principle of tolerance (etc,) demand a return to a pragmatic consideration of metaphysics, but, on the basis of arguments I have not yet produced, to accept that even speculative metaphysics can sometimes be useful. >If pseudo-problems were >incomprehensible they wouldn't present much of a >problem. The "problem" with pseudo-problems is that they >look like real problems but in fact arise from confusions >in ordinary language. They look this way because the >sentences in which they are formulated are "pseudo-object >statements" in the "material mode" of speech.Generally, >Carnap speaks more about "pseudo-sentences" rather than >pseudo-problems. But not always. My reason for bringing this >up is that pseudo-sentences ARE incomprensible within >an "syntactical language." In the material mode they >look fine. Here I address the Carnapian view. This does not correspond to my understanding of Carnap's position in his syntactic phase. The role of "semantic ascent" is not in dealing with pseudo-problems, but in dealing with analytic or necessary propositions, for example the propositions of mathematics. These propositions can be understood by translating them from the misleading material mode into the formal mode. Then you can see that they are necessary. A pseudo-question is one in the material mode which talks about pseudo-objects but cannot be translated into the syntactic mode. >For Carnap "pseudo-questions" (and here he does use this >expression) arise from metaphysical statements purporting >to be about objects that go beyond the domain of science. >_Logical Syntax of Language_ p. 331.Compare Kant in this >regard; they are close to this point, at least with respect to >Kant proclamations against metaphysics. Consider the >following example: "The world is the totality of facts not >things." Of course, this is the sentence Wittgenstein uses >to begin the Tractatus. This sentence occurs in the "material >mode" of speech. It raises pseudo-problems about the >nature or ontology of facts, etc.But the point Carnap is >making is that by translating the pseudo-sentences that >give rise to these pseudo-problems we state the scientific >content without the problmatic dross. So instead of this >sentence we have in the syntactical language: "Science is a >system of sentences not names." (op cit. p. 303). I think if you can do the translation then Carnap would not regard the original as a pseudo-problem, even though he would describe it as a statement in pseudo-object mode. >Let's take an examplle. You remark: > >"It seems to me that your nominalistic tendencies are >much the same kind of thing. You decline to consider >explanations which invoke entities about whose existence >you are sceptical. How does this differ from the >rejection of pseudo-problems?" > > >I am a nominalist; in fact a radical nominalist! The only >entities are particulars (of the lowest type). Much of what >passes for semantics on my view is purely a matter of >psychology. Philosophical psychology is central. Philosophical >problems associated with explanation etc. are also central. >But ontologically I'm a nominalist. Carnap would consider >my ontology, or any ontology outside the domain of >science a breeding ground for pseudo problems; but my >view is that the "ideal language" (syntactical language) >approach is barren. When I ask: "What is a number?" for >Carnap this is a pseudo-question. Not for me. For me this >is a legit question. I would like to understand your position better than I can from the above description. Presumably in your belief that your particulars are unacceptable to Carnap you are thinking of his phenomenalistic phase. But I would guess that the first stage in his liberalisation (embracing physicalistic language) is pretty much the admission of an ontology of particulars. Carnap doesn't actually have a problem with numbers, even though in his early phase he would have considered them pseudo-objects. Even the question "What is a number?" would be OK provided you settle the context. In the syntactic phase it surely is held to translate into a question about numerals? I don't care for this, but I think he could give a much more satisfactory answer later on. (e.g. in the language of set theory we have standard definitions of numbers). Most importantly, to have a conversation with you about many of the topics which are common on this list, I need to know how as a radical nominalist you can talk about the meaning of sentences. Is this possible? If so, how can you have discussions about necessity? Or indeed, how can you do any philosophy at all! I point out to you, that you effectively duck out of conversations as soon as I mentions meanings or propositions, without any enquiry into what I consider their ontological status. How do you know that I am not a radical nominalist? (I'm pretty close to being a fictionalist in respect of all non-particulars). >I think Grice is right about meaning. Meaning is the thorn >in the side of the Carnapians, in my opinion. The wind up >taling about worlds, and these in my opinion are pseudo >objects if ever there were one! Grice is a pragmatist of a >SORT. He views language neither as a mirror of nature >nor as a medium of exchange; it is an instrument. I think >this is right, but it leaves my metaphysics untouched. "Possible worlds" are, in my book, just abstract objects, which for present purposes we can treat as fictions. So what's the problem? (I think Carnap's principle of tolerance is pretty much like fictionalism, it rules out the idea that questions about the existence of abstract objects have objective answers, but allows that we use them anyway). >You remark: From here on in you are commenting not on my remarks but on your own remarks as quoted in my last response! RBJ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Mon Jul 27 11:17:04 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2009 16:17:04 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] A Scientist's Landscape In-Reply-To: <1675727528.6252131248642315069.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <1675727528.6252131248642315069.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <200907271617.04532.rbj@rbjones.com> On Sunday 26 July 2009 22:05:15 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: > you make > statements I can't really accept without a good source. For example, you > say, > >"Carnap defines necessity in terms of analyticity" That probably should have been "defines necessity in terms logical truth", which is the same thing for Carnap. There is a nice explanation of this in the Schilpp volume in the last paragaph of page 65. This I take to be Carnap's mature view, though I am not aware of his ever having taken a contrary view, though he might have expressed it in many ways. >This illustrates what a complicated story we have: 'necessity' in terms of > 'analyticity''; 'analyticity' in terms of 'L-truth' etc. This seems to be simple to me! > And this is just one stage in his development. But when did he ever hold a substantively different position on this topic? > Pseudo-problems enter as a class before > Tarski, which initiated profound changes in his views, eventuating in a > semantics of intensions that may very well carrya metaphysical aspect. > After all, if we take pseudo-problems as resulting from using > pseudo-statements in a certain way and pseudo-statements as statements > lacking cognitive content; and those lacking cognitive contents as being is > some sense not confirmable or verified or in some way grounded in > experience, then what IS the "cognitive content" of a statement about > intensions. Again, if we are doing a study of Carnap we have a mess if for > no other reason than, like Russell, he was prolific. Carnap was surely quite clear that the propositions of analytic philosophy are analytic. Carnap's philosophy seems to be coherent in its principle themes and to develop in an orderly way throughout his life. It ends up somewhere very different, in detail, from where he started, but in a much more credible place, and though it is quite uncommon to do so, I think it proper to judge him by his final position, to which the Schilpp volume is presumably a reasonable guide. On the ontological question he took great pains to make himself clear, I believe he succeeded and I am aware of no philosopher who has a better position or who has found (what I consider to be) significant problems in his stance. >But if we are interested in problem solving then as much as I think the > history is crucial we have to move on. There is a very complex and > beautiful story to be told relating Russell's principle of acquaintance to > verificationism and this later to the whole issue of "pseudo-questions." A > lot depends, and here I borrow from the usage of the linguists, on your > "technologies." So do you accept intensions? Following Carnap, I would have to defer until you make clear what you suppose them to be! We have no objection to them in principle. > Do you accept classes, worlds, > concepts, objects, functions etc? All of this gets thrown into the soup. But for Russell these are all "logical fictions" and I would be inclined to go further and regard ontology in its entirety as conventional (with some caveats). > If I am puzzled by questions of imminent causation, for example, I am not > discouraged by the latest "rage" over substance or the lack of it. Pursue > the problem. Then if current fashion looks attractive try it on, but don't > be discouraged about metaphysics because on Carnap's view or any other the > question is meaningless. Carnap's mature position is so accomodating that it has little tendency to inhibit constructive metaphysics. > Let me explain autobiographically how I got to > THIS position. > >In high school I picked up a copy of Kan't first Critique. We had a first > class high school library, everyone from Le? Szil?rd to Darwin, from > Kropotkin to Plato. So I pick up Kant. I look at the thing. I can't > understand it. I was fluent in English. I asked myself "what is the > problem." I went to college. I was told by my ordinary language teachers > that this was all "metaphsical nonsense." The next semester the same guy is > assigned the task of teaching Kant. "This ought be interesting!" I say to > myself. > >Well it was. Kant came to life. The anti-metaphysical stance of Kant became > a "pseudo-problematic" on in Phil. 303. It was not problematic in Phil. > 311. So what was I to do? Answer: pursue the problem, forget the "program." > And that is what I'm saying here. The problem of agent causation is not a > pseudo problem, but I don't think quantification with identity tacked on to > an improvised formal semantics is going to solve this or any other problem. > Nor is rejecting the problem on extraneous programmatic considerations an > option. Nor, even, is science. Causation is not, really, an issue for > science. If you can make sense of it, by all means. >I conclude witht two terse sounding comments. We are friendly enough that > I'm sure you will take them in stride. First, it is clear that you haven't > taken a close look at the Logical Syntax of Language. I'd be interested to know why you think that clear. However, it is true. I have read his "Philosophy of Logical Syntax", and take this to be a reasonable account of the philosophical side of the work. My notes on this are at: http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/bibliog/carnap34.htm and if anyone thinks I got the wrong end of the stick then I would be very pleased to hear from them. > This is, probably, > Carnap's most important book. The last chapters, the one I referred to is > on Hist-Analytic. Take a look. As it happens I have these on my laptop and I have looked over them. At first glance the philosophical material looks very similar to that in "Philosophy and Logical Syntax". I doubt that I will ever find the time to read LSL, I am much more interested in Carnap's mature position than in his early philosophy, but in any case I have no pretensions to scholarship, and will read only what seems to my helpful for my own projects. > Second, I don't believe there are abstract > objects, so I don't believe there are abstract worlds. Remember the origin > of "abstract." It is from the Latin verb meaning to "drag." ('trahere' I > think, have to check). So if a world is abstract from what is it "dragged"? It makes no difference to me whether or not abstract objects exist, I care only that their supposition is consistent and useful. Your denial of their existence has great disutility because it makes difficult a discussion of semantics or mathematics (and many other topics). As to what they are, they are exactly whatever we consistently suppose them to be (in the context of that supposition). The origin of the word is of no consequence for the usage which I endorse. RBJ From Baynesr at comcast.net Tue Jul 28 07:20:02 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2009 11:20:02 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] A Scientist's Landscape In-Reply-To: <200907271617.04532.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <387167905.6699441248780002902.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Without providing actual citations it is futile to attempt to arrive at a consensus as to what Carnap says, let alone what he means. This is a common problem with online discussion, since this requires the kind of effort expected in a hard-copy publication, but it is absolutely essential to arrive at a real picture. So I'll probably disengage from this project until you cite specifics. Then we can go from there. So when you say, e.g. "Carnap was surely quite clear that the propositions of analytic philosophy are analytic. Carnap was surely quite clear that the propositions of analytic philosophy are analytic." I'd like to see something. Wittgenstein famously remarked to the effect that "a question [exists -sb] only where an answer exists..." (Tractatus 6.51). Do I think Carnap believed it "clear" that this is analytic? No. Do I have any doubt that this is a statement of analytical philosophy? None. This is why the tedious business of citation is worthwhile, especially in tricky areas. Another consideration is the evolving history of his views. I think he was on track in 1927 and fell off track after Tarski. His formalizations are often just a bit worthless, e.g. those at the back of his _Introduction to Symbolic Logic_. Same with Woodger's formalizations of biology, although I've been told that this approach to language is what led to Chomsky's generative grammar, not sure. You remark: "But for Russell these are all "logical fictions" and I would be inclined to go further and regard ontology in its entirety as conventional (with some caveats)." Well, that would require quite a debate. The way the world is may be just a logical construct; but if so the world itself would not exist. I'm inclined to believe it is real and that ontology is what these constructs are constructed out of. But it's a topic that requires a systematic approach. I'm inclind to think that ontology is the "real deal" and logic is a set of conventions about marks on paper, but I'm not sure. I waver on this; thinking one thing at one time and another at another time. It's a serious question. "It makes no difference to me whether or not abstract objects exist, I care only that their supposition is consistent and useful. Your denial of their existence has great disutility because it makes difficult a discussion of semantics or mathematics (and many other topics)." The existence of abstract entities is not essential. Much depends on what you take philosophy of mathematics to be. My view that there are no abstract entities required for mathematics, as fleeting as it is from time to time, doesn't really impact my view on proof theory; avoiding the paradoxes; or the nature of infinity. Others may see it another way, of course, but that is where the debate begins not ends. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: "hist-analytic" Sent: Monday, July 27, 2009 8:17:04 AM GMT -08:00 US/Canada Pacific Subject: Re: A Scientist's Landscape On Sunday 26 July 2009 22:05:15 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: > you make > statements I can't really accept without a good source. For example, you > say, > >"Carnap defines necessity in terms of analyticity" That probably should have been "defines necessity in terms logical truth", which is the same thing for Carnap. There is a nice explanation of this in the Schilpp volume in the last paragaph of page 65. This I take to be Carnap's mature view, though I am not aware of his ever having taken a contrary view, though he might have expressed it in many ways. >This illustrates what a complicated story we have: 'necessity' in terms of > 'analyticity''; 'analyticity' in terms of 'L-truth' etc. This seems to be simple to me! > And this is just one stage in his development. But when did he ever hold a substantively different position on this topic? > Pseudo-problems enter as a class before > Tarski, which initiated profound changes in his views, eventuating in a > semantics of intensions that may very well carrya metaphysical aspect. > After all, if we take pseudo-problems as resulting from using > pseudo-statements in a certain way and pseudo-statements as statements > lacking cognitive content; and those lacking cognitive contents as being is > some sense not confirmable or verified or in some way grounded in > experience, then what IS the "cognitive content" of a statement about > intensions. Again, if we are doing a study of Carnap we have a mess if for > no other reason than, like Russell, he was prolific. Carnap was surely quite clear that the propositions of analytic philosophy are analytic. Carnap's philosophy seems to be coherent in its principle themes and to develop in an orderly way throughout his life. It ends up somewhere very different, in detail, from where he started, but in a much more credible place, and though it is quite uncommon to do so, I think it proper to judge him by his final position, to which the Schilpp volume is presumably a reasonable guide. On the ontological question he took great pains to make himself clear, I believe he succeeded and I am aware of no philosopher who has a better position or who has found (what I consider to be) significant problems in his stance. >But if we are interested in problem solving then as much as I think the > history is crucial we have to move on. There is a very complex and > beautiful story to be told relating Russell's principle of acquaintance to > verificationism and this later to the whole issue of "pseudo-questions." A > lot depends, and here I borrow from the usage of the linguists, on your > "technologies." So do you accept intensions? Following Carnap, I would have to defer until you make clear what you suppose them to be! We have no objection to them in principle. > Do you accept classes, worlds, > concepts, objects, functions etc? All of this gets thrown into the soup. But for Russell these are all "logical fictions" and I would be inclined to go further and regard ontology in its entirety as conventional (with some caveats). > If I am puzzled by questions of imminent causation, for example, I am not > discouraged by the latest "rage" over substance or the lack of it. Pursue > the problem. Then if current fashion looks attractive try it on, but don't > be discouraged about metaphysics because on Carnap's view or any other the > question is meaningless. Carnap's mature position is so accomodating that it has little tendency to inhibit constructive metaphysics. > Let me explain autobiographically how I got to > THIS position. > >In high school I picked up a copy of Kan't first Critique. We had a first > class high school library, everyone from Le? Szil?rd to Darwin, from > Kropotkin to Plato. So I pick up Kant. I look at the thing. I can't > understand it. I was fluent in English. I asked myself "what is the > problem." I went to college. I was told by my ordinary language teachers > that this was all "metaphsical nonsense." The next semester the same guy is > assigned the task of teaching Kant. "This ought be interesting!" I say to > myself. > >Well it was. Kant came to life. The anti-metaphysical stance of Kant became > a "pseudo-problematic" on in Phil. 303. It was not problematic in Phil. > 311. So what was I to do? Answer: pursue the problem, forget the "program." > And that is what I'm saying here. The problem of agent causation is not a > pseudo problem, but I don't think quantification with identity tacked on to > an improvised formal semantics is going to solve this or any other problem. > Nor is rejecting the problem on extraneous programmatic considerations an > option. Nor, even, is science. Causation is not, really, an issue for > science. If you can make sense of it, by all means. >I conclude witht two terse sounding comments. We are friendly enough that > I'm sure you will take them in stride. First, it is clear that you haven't > taken a close look at the Logical Syntax of Language. I'd be interested to know why you think that clear. However, it is true. I have read his "Philosophy of Logical Syntax", and take this to be a reasonable account of the philosophical side of the work. My notes on this are at: http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/bibliog/carnap34.htm and if anyone thinks I got the wrong end of the stick then I would be very pleased to hear from them. > This is, probably, > Carnap's most important book. The last chapters, the one I referred to is > on Hist-Analytic. Take a look. As it happens I have these on my laptop and I have looked over them. At first glance the philosophical material looks very similar to that in "Philosophy and Logical Syntax". I doubt that I will ever find the time to read LSL, I am much more interested in Carnap's mature position than in his early philosophy, but in any case I have no pretensions to scholarship, and will read only what seems to my helpful for my own projects. > Second, I don't believe there are abstract > objects, so I don't believe there are abstract worlds. Remember the origin > of "abstract." It is from the Latin verb meaning to "drag." ('trahere' I > think, have to check). So if a world is abstract from what is it "dragged"? It makes no difference to me whether or not abstract objects exist, I care only that their supposition is consistent and useful. Your denial of their existence has great disutility because it makes difficult a discussion of semantics or mathematics (and many other topics). As to what they are, they are exactly whatever we consistently suppose them to be (in the context of that supposition). The origin of the word is of no consequence for the usage which I endorse. RBJ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Tue Jul 28 16:46:38 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2009 13:46:38 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Omission and Action Message-ID: <622180.55392.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com> I have a number of things to say about omissions in the book. Here are two sentences from that discusson. "We feel the compulsion, at some point, to ask: what must be added to an event that never happened in order to make it an omission?? An omission, unlike a bodily movement which had it happened would have been just that, viz. a bodily movement, is such a nonoccurrence of an event that had it occurred would have been intentional. Omissions constitute a special class, or category, although Anscombe may be right to criticize Davidson on this matter, no one, including Anscombe, has presented a satisfactory theory concerning its nature." Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbarnett at valdosta.edu Tue Jul 28 17:04:19 2009 From: rbarnett at valdosta.edu (Ron Barnette) Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2009 17:04:19 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Omission and Action In-Reply-To: <622180.55392.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <622180.55392.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <3E30D29DBD0C49C3B2740BD0A7765FC8@Library> Steve, I'm glad to learn that you address omissions in the book, as they constitute a very special class---one might argue class of actions---in which something intentional is definitely undertaken..say, my deliberately remaining steadfast, perfectly still and silent during an intense cross-examination. My refusal to answer a question would correctly be construed as something I did intentionally, yet without overt bodily movement. So are there actions that do not involve bodily movements? Interesting implications with either 'yes' or 'no,' no? Good work, Steve.Btw, this brought to mind many discussions on this very topic I had in the late 60's with dear Abe Melden who (you know) served faithfully on my dissertation committee. Ron Barnette _____ From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of steve bayne Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2009 4:47 PM To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Subject: Omission and Action I have a number of things to say about omissions in the book. Here are two sentences from that discusson. "We feel the compulsion, at some point, to ask: what must be added to an event that never happened in order to make it an omission? An omission, unlike a bodily movement which had it happened would have been just that, viz. a bodily movement, is such a nonoccurrence of an event that had it occurred would have been intentional. Omissions constitute a special class, or category, although Anscombe may be right to criticize Davidson on this matter, no one, including Anscombe, has presented a satisfactory theory concerning its nature." Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Tue Jul 28 18:58:09 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2009 15:58:09 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Omission and Action In-Reply-To: <3E30D29DBD0C49C3B2740BD0A7765FC8@Library> Message-ID: <954729.95082.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> The cross examination case is good because it shows that the condition I mention may be necessary but is not sufficient for omission: The witness refuses to testify, had he testified it would have been an intentional act; but it is not an omission on his part but a refusal, suggesting that refusal and omission might belong to a larger class. I didn't omit calling the mayor's office because I never had that intention. This is another interesting case. As if to imply that had I called since it would have had to be intentional to be an omission and inasmuch as I had no such intention I, therefore did not "omit" calling the mayor. I have a short section devoted to Melden. Melden was far more thought provoking form me than Hampshiire, although other of Hampshire's works I find very good. Regards Steve --- On Tue, 7/28/09, Ron Barnette wrote: From: Ron Barnette Subject: RE: Omission and Action To: "'steve bayne'" , hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Tuesday, July 28, 2009, 5:04 PM Steve, I?m glad to learn that you address omissions in the book, as they constitute a very special class---one might argue class of actions---in which something intentional is definitely undertaken?.say, my deliberately remaining steadfast, perfectly still and silent during an intense cross-examination. My refusal to answer a question would correctly be construed as something I did intentionally, yet without overt bodily movement. So are there actions that do not involve bodily movements? Interesting implications with either ?yes? or ?no,? no? Good work, Steve?Btw, this brought to mind many discussions on this very topic I had in the late 60?s with dear Abe Melden who (you know) served faithfully on my dissertation committee. Ron Barnette ? From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of steve bayne Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2009 4:47 PM To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Subject: Omission and Action ? I have a number of things to say about omissions in the book. Here are two sentences from that discusson. "We feel the compulsion, at some point, to ask: what must be added to an event that never happened in order to make it an omission?? An omission, unlike a bodily movement which had it happened would have been just that, viz. a bodily movement, is such a nonoccurrence of an event that had it occurred would have been intentional. Omissions constitute a special class, or category, although Anscombe may be right to criticize Davidson on this matter, no one, including Anscombe, has presented a satisfactory theory concerning its nature." Steve ? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Wed Jul 29 03:07:35 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2009 08:07:35 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Omission and Action In-Reply-To: <954729.95082.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <3E30D29DBD0C49C3B2740BD0A7765FC8@Library> <954729.95082.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <812AD7C1660F44C68E1D56217BABBBCA@DFLVQC1J> Hi Steve, Do we need to distinguish intentional, unintentional and non-intentional omissions? I omit to do many things because I just forget to do them (like popping into the shop on the way home): I omit them unintentionally. I omit to do many more things because it just never occurs to me to do them (like performing a song-and-dance routine while I am waiting for a bus): I omit them non-intentionally. But some things I omit to do intentionally (like omitting to talk in the cross examination). Perhaps: intentional omissions are those that I try to omit; unintentional and non-intentional ones are those that I do not try to omit. Unintentional omissions seem to be ones that conflict with our intentions or plans, whereas non-intentional ones don't. Just a first stab. Danny _____ From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of steve bayne Sent: 28 July 2009 23:58 To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com; Ron Barnette Subject: RE: Omission and Action The cross examination case is good because it shows that the condition I mention may be necessary but is not sufficient for omission: The witness refuses to testify, had he testified it would have been an intentional act; but it is not an omission on his part but a refusal, suggesting that refusal and omission might belong to a larger class. I didn't omit calling the mayor's office because I never had that intention. This is another interesting case. As if to imply that had I called since it would have had to be intentional to be an omission and inasmuch as I had no such intention I, therefore did not "omit" calling the mayor. I have a short section devoted to Melden. Melden was far more thought provoking form me than Hampshiire, although other of Hampshire's works I find very good. Regards Steve --- On Tue, 7/28/09, Ron Barnette wrote: From: Ron Barnette Subject: RE: Omission and Action To: "'steve bayne'" , hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Tuesday, July 28, 2009, 5:04 PM Steve, I'm glad to learn that you address omissions in the book, as they constitute a very special class---one might argue class of actions---in which something intentional is definitely undertaken..say, my deliberately remaining steadfast, perfectly still and silent during an intense cross-examination. My refusal to answer a question would correctly be construed as something I did intentionally, yet without overt bodily movement. So are there actions that do not involve bodily movements? Interesting implications with either 'yes' or 'no,' no? Good work, Steve.Btw, this brought to mind many discussions on this very topic I had in the late 60's with dear Abe Melden who (you know) served faithfully on my dissertation committee. Ron Barnette _____ From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of steve bayne Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2009 4:47 PM To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Subject: Omission and Action I have a number of things to say about omissions in the book. Here are two sentences from that discusson. "We feel the compulsion, at some point, to ask: what must be added to an event that never happened in order to make it an omission? An omission, unlike a bodily movement which had it happened would have been just that, viz. a bodily movement, is such a nonoccurrence of an event that had it occurred would have been intentional. Omissions constitute a special class, or category, although Anscombe may be right to criticize Davidson on this matter, no one, including Anscombe, has presented a satisfactory theory concerning its nature." Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Wed Jul 29 07:03:23 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2009 04:03:23 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Omission and Action In-Reply-To: <812AD7C1660F44C68E1D56217BABBBCA@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <5079.2664.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Danny, Good point! I take this up, briefly, in the book. Accidental omissions and deliberate omission have to be distinguished. One distinction I make considerable use of, one which is implicit in your remarks is between what I call "willful" action and an "acts of will." It is something like Anscombe's distinction between being intentional but done without an intention. One example might be a particular movement of the hands in tying a fancy knot, say half way through. Or seeing a spot on your jacket and thoughtlessly brushing it off. Actually the distinction goes back to James; at least one contemporary has been credited with discovering it, but its' been around the block a couple of times. Anyway, an intentional omission is never, if I am right, a merely intentional act, rather than one one backed by its own formulated intension. The idea of a "formulated" intention is closely tied, historically, to what James and others called a "resolve." Say I'm on a firing squad and I don't want to shoot. I don't. I had this resolve from the beginning. I "formulated" an intention. But suppose I am walking through the wood and see a flash of color. I may shoot without formulating an intention. Also, I may turn quick and not fire at a potential threat. In this latter case, I wouldn't call it an "omission." Best wishes Steve --- On Wed, 7/29/09, Danny Frederick wrote: From: Danny Frederick Subject: RE: Omission and Action To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Wednesday, July 29, 2009, 3:07 AM Hi Steve, ? Do we need to distinguish intentional, unintentional and non-intentional omissions? I omit to do many things because I just forget to do them (like popping into the shop on the way home): I omit them unintentionally. I omit to do many more things because it just never occurs to me to do them (like performing a song-and-dance routine while I am waiting for a bus): I omit them non-intentionally. But some things I omit to do intentionally (like omitting to talk in the cross examination). Perhaps: intentional omissions are those that I try to omit; unintentional and non-intentional ones are those that I do not try to omit. Unintentional omissions seem to? be ones that conflict with our intentions or plans, whereas non-intentional ones don?t. Just a first stab. ? Danny From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of steve bayne Sent: 28 July 2009 23:58 To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com; Ron Barnette Subject: RE: Omission and Action ? The cross examination case is good because it shows that the condition I mention may be necessary but is not sufficient for omission: The witness refuses to testify, had he testified it would have been an intentional act; but it is not an omission on his part but a refusal, suggesting that refusal and omission might belong to a larger class. I didn't omit calling the mayor's office because I never had that intention. This is another interesting case. As if to imply that had I called since it would have had to be intentional to be an omission and inasmuch as I had no such intention I, therefore did not "omit" calling the mayor. I have a short section devoted to Melden. Melden was far more thought provoking form me than Hampshiire, although other of Hampshire's works I find very good. Regards Steve --- On Tue, 7/28/09, Ron Barnette wrote: From: Ron Barnette Subject: RE: Omission and Action To: "'steve bayne'" , hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Tuesday, July 28, 2009, 5:04 PM Steve, I?m glad to learn that you address omissions in the book, as they constitute a very special class---one might argue class of actions---in which something intentional is definitely undertaken?.say, my deliberately remaining steadfast, perfectly still and silent during an intense cross-examination. My refusal to answer a question would correctly be construed as something I did intentionally, yet without overt bodily movement. So are there actions that do not involve bodily movements? Interesting implications with either ?yes? or ?no,? no? Good work, Steve?Btw, this brought to mind many discussions on this very topic I had in the late 60?s with dear Abe Melden who (you know) served faithfully on my dissertation committee. Ron Barnette ? From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of steve bayne Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2009 4:47 PM To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Subject: Omission and Action ? I have a number of things to say about omissions in the book. Here are two sentences from that discusson. "We feel the compulsion, at some point, to ask: what must be added to an event that never happened in order to make it an omission?? An omission, unlike a bodily movement which had it happened would have been just that, viz. a bodily movement, is such a nonoccurrence of an event that had it occurred would have been intentional. Omissions constitute a special class, or category, although Anscombe may be right to criticize Davidson on this matter, no one, including Anscombe, has presented a satisfactory theory concerning its nature." Steve ? ? ? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Wed Jul 29 10:27:59 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2009 10:27:59 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Steve's and Roger's recent interchange Message-ID: The recent interchange on simplelists between Steve and Roger Bishop Jones interested me in a number of ways, one being RBJ?s supportive remarks about Carnap. In this note I want to say something about Roger?s claim, ?Carnap was surely quite clear that the propositions of analytic philosophy are analytic.? Steve disputed this claim, citing a remark by Wittgenstein,? but Roger?s claim is very plausible if it rephrased in a way that he would probably accept. ?The propositions of analytic philosophy,? as Roger meant it, surely does not apply to every proposition a philosopher qua philosopher has asserted. Heidegger?s ?Nothing noths? (or whatever it was) is a case in point. Carnap clearly held that many such claims (or ?propositions?) are meaningless. The propositions Roger no doubt had in mind were true propositions of a distinctly philosophical kind. In the course of expounding their philosophical ideas, philosophers make many empirical claims, but these claims are normally incidental to their official philosophical pronouncements. There are debatable exceptions, of course: G.E. Moore?s ?I know I have hands is perhaps one of them.? But a more distinctly philosophical claim that Moore used this latter claim to support concerned the relatively acceptability of commonsensical claims about hands and philosophical theories (such as Hume?s) that have been taken to put those claims in doubt. A proposition about this relative acceptability could be shown to be true, Carnap would have said, only by some purely analytic procedure, and the proposition itself would then have to be analytic. This brings me to a topic discussed in this forum some time ago: Hume?s fork. The legitimate objects of the human understanding are exhausted by relations of ideas and matters of fact and existence. Carnap reconstructed this dichotomy into truths and falsities knowable by analysis (they are either analytically true or analytically false) and truths and falsities known empirically--by observation, memory, and (broadly speaking) inductive inference. For him, there is no other way of knowing anything. Generally speaking, philosophical pronouncements, when true, are not known to be so empirically: they are not verifiable in a matter of fact way. If they are knowable at all, it must be by analysis. So if they are true, or false, their truth, or falsity, must be analytic. For what it is worth, I think Carnap was right about this. Anyone who disagrees (Steve perhaps?) should outline the alternative method by which such things can be known. I would be eager to hear what this alleged method is. Bruce Aune From baynesrb at yahoo.com Wed Jul 29 16:00:06 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2009 13:00:06 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Steve's and Roger's recent interchange In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <363533.52109.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com> My dispute was over whether "Carnap was surely quite clear..." Now an argument may be made for this, but Roger was pretty confident about this so I'm hoping no argument is needed; just give me a page number, that's all. Bruce says, "The legitimate objects of the human understanding are exhausted by relations of ideas and matters of fact and existence." I think this gets right to the main point. This is the statement of an analytical philosopher, indeed a very good one, but part of the problem though is that the sentence begs the question of what a "legitimate object" is. If we presuppose as true that all there is in this world are ideas or matters of facts then our understanding of 'legitimate object' may be question begging. So let's be clear on legitimacy first, then whether this class is coextensive with ideas, facts or some combination. John's going to the store is not a fact because he didn't go to the store; his going to the store is not an idea, nor is John so John's going to the store is neither a relation of ideas nor a matter of fact; and, of course, the store may not exist. My point here is that while there may be a good Humean answer to the issues raised, there is nothing "quite clear" about how we ought to address them. When Wittgenstein remarks 'The world divides into facts not things' what is he denying? Certainly not a particular relation among facts, nor ideas, unless things are ideas. Again, we have a problem circumnavigating the conceptual terrain. In addition, there are other problems. E.g. I am obliged to keep my promises. Right? Suppose this is right. Is this a fact; well what then of the is/ought distinction? Again, it may be depend on what we take to be a "fact" but isn't that really part of our dilemma, and one for all Humeans as a well? Recall that Carnap maintains that all topological properties of space and time can be dealt with using purely non-metrical methods. Suppose this is true. Is it "analytic"? Suppose it is not. Is it then a fact. Well yes, but it is about theories and theories are relations of ideas. So are the classes of fact and ideas (and their relations) such as to have a null overlap? This is another problem. If so is this a matter of fact or a relation of ideas. There are two big problems. First, there is no argument for believing the class of relations of ideas and matters of fact are exhaustive; if not, then some analyses may not involve relations of ideas etc. Second, if the classes are so broad then there is always, available, the useless "shuffle" of saying "Oh that's a relation of ideas," or "Oh that is a matter of fact. The question for Carnapians (circa 1939) is this: aren't there analyses of what Carnap calls "cognitively meaningless" ideas which qualify as statement by analytical philosophers? I'm inclined to think so; and Wittgenstein is one such philosopher in the Tractatus! But now we have the "legitimate object" problem. On this I am not as yet "quite clear." There is another question: are all truths acquired by analysis analytic. Mightn't their be theories that follow upon some analysis that might have been arrived at some other way? Well, what would exclude this. The burden of proof that there are not seems to reside with those who affirm that only truths arrived at by analysis are analytic. In fact, I'm not so sure there are analytic sentences, but of course that would take us off track at this juncture, or so it seems. It may be true that I have an obligation (to return to an earlier example) but my obligation may not be a fact, at least on some theories of what facts are. In addition, there is the problem of 'analysis'. Carnap in addressing the issue I raised above about topological properties and metrical properties makes use of an axiomatic system. But how good, really, is this as a method of analysis in philosophy? Russell didn't use it; Moore didn't use it. But Carnap uses it in making an epistemological point. Until Carnap's notion of analysis is made clear and I get at least a couple of page references, I'm afraid I'm as skeptical as ever that all statments of analytical philosophy are analytic. Of course we may care to deny that there are philosophical statements. Indeed, I can't recall Carnap ever telling us what these are, let alone that all of them are analytic. Regards Steve --- On Wed, 7/29/09, Bruce Aune wrote: From: Bruce Aune Subject: Steve's and Roger's recent interchange To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Wednesday, July 29, 2009, 10:27 AM The recent interchange on simplelists between Steve and Roger Bishop Jones interested me in a number of ways, one being RBJ?s supportive remarks about Carnap.? In this note I want to say something about Roger?s claim, ?Carnap was surely quite clear that the propositions of analytic philosophy are analytic.?? Steve disputed this claim, citing a remark by Wittgenstein,? but Roger?s claim is very plausible if it rephrased in a way that he would probably accept. ?The propositions of analytic philosophy,? as Roger meant it, surely does not apply to every proposition a philosopher qua philosopher has asserted.? Heidegger?s ?Nothing noths? (or whatever it was) is a case in point. Carnap clearly held that many such claims (or ?propositions?) are meaningless. The propositions Roger no doubt had in mind were true propositions of a distinctly philosophical kind.? In the course of expounding their philosophical ideas, philosophers make many empirical claims, but these claims are normally incidental to their official philosophical pronouncements.? There are debatable exceptions, of course: G.E. Moore?s ?I know I have hands is perhaps one of them.? But a more distinctly philosophical claim that Moore used this latter claim to support concerned the relatively acceptability of commonsensical claims about hands and philosophical theories (such as Hume?s) that have been taken to put those claims in doubt.? A proposition about this relative acceptability could be shown to be true, Carnap would have said, only by some purely analytic procedure, and the proposition itself would then have to be analytic. This brings me to a topic discussed in this forum some time ago: Hume?s fork.? The legitimate objects of the human understanding are exhausted by relations of ideas and matters of fact and existence.? Carnap reconstructed this dichotomy into truths and falsities knowable by analysis (they are either analytically true or analytically false) and truths and falsities known empirically--by observation, memory, and (broadly speaking) inductive inference.? For him, there is no other way of knowing anything.? Generally speaking, philosophical pronouncements, when true, are not known to be so empirically: they are not verifiable in a matter of fact way.? If they are knowable at all, it must be by analysis.? So if they are true, or false, their truth, or falsity, must be analytic.? For what it is worth, I think Carnap was right about this.? Anyone who disagrees (Steve perhaps?) should outline the alternative method by which such things can be known.? I would be eager to hear what this alleged method is. Bruce Aune -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Wed Jul 29 16:44:23 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2009 13:44:23 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Steve's and Roger's recent interchange In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <300512.51303.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> An afterthought: Quine approaches Carnap. Quine says: "I've just shown there are no analytical sentences." "There are no analytical sentences?" adding "But that is not the statement of analytic philosophy?" Or, "It is analytic that there are no analytic sentences, therefore there are analytic sentences." His reasoning may have been: "Quine arrived at this by analysis, so it must be analytic; or, it must be the statement of an analytical philosopher and must be analytic." But isn't the problem similar to the paradoxes? Aren't we dealing with classes that need to be parred down or restricted? Regards Steve --- On Wed, 7/29/09, Bruce Aune wrote: From: Bruce Aune Subject: Steve's and Roger's recent interchange To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Wednesday, July 29, 2009, 10:27 AM The recent interchange on simplelists between Steve and Roger Bishop Jones interested me in a number of ways, one being RBJ?s supportive remarks about Carnap.? In this note I want to say something about Roger?s claim, ?Carnap was surely quite clear that the propositions of analytic philosophy are analytic.?? Steve disputed this claim, citing a remark by Wittgenstein,? but Roger?s claim is very plausible if it rephrased in a way that he would probably accept. ?The propositions of analytic philosophy,? as Roger meant it, surely does not apply to every proposition a philosopher qua philosopher has asserted.? Heidegger?s ?Nothing noths? (or whatever it was) is a case in point. Carnap clearly held that many such claims (or ?propositions?) are meaningless. The propositions Roger no doubt had in mind were true propositions of a distinctly philosophical kind.? In the course of expounding their philosophical ideas, philosophers make many empirical claims, but these claims are normally incidental to their official philosophical pronouncements.? There are debatable exceptions, of course: G.E. Moore?s ?I know I have hands is perhaps one of them.? But a more distinctly philosophical claim that Moore used this latter claim to support concerned the relatively acceptability of commonsensical claims about hands and philosophical theories (such as Hume?s) that have been taken to put those claims in doubt.? A proposition about this relative acceptability could be shown to be true, Carnap would have said, only by some purely analytic procedure, and the proposition itself would then have to be analytic. This brings me to a topic discussed in this forum some time ago: Hume?s fork.? The legitimate objects of the human understanding are exhausted by relations of ideas and matters of fact and existence.? Carnap reconstructed this dichotomy into truths and falsities knowable by analysis (they are either analytically true or analytically false) and truths and falsities known empirically--by observation, memory, and (broadly speaking) inductive inference.? For him, there is no other way of knowing anything.? Generally speaking, philosophical pronouncements, when true, are not known to be so empirically: they are not verifiable in a matter of fact way.? If they are knowable at all, it must be by analysis.? So if they are true, or false, their truth, or falsity, must be analytic.? For what it is worth, I think Carnap was right about this.? Anyone who disagrees (Steve perhaps?) should outline the alternative method by which such things can be known.? I would be eager to hear what this alleged method is. Bruce Aune -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Wed Jul 29 19:44:41 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2009 19:44:41 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Steve's and Roger's recent interchange In-Reply-To: <363533.52109.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <363533.52109.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: I think Steve got carried away by HUME's distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact and existence. I started with that to emphasize the empiricist theme, but I quickly turned to Carnap's refinement of that distinction in terms of analytic truths (or falsity) and empirical truths. My claims were about Carnap' views, not Hume's. If Steve wants to refute me, he has to provide a counter- instance to my claims--specifically, he has to provide a clearly true (or false) statement that is (a) distinctively philosophical and (b) is neither analytically true (nor false) nor empirical--that is, not known by observation, memory, and (broadly speaking) inductive inference. Furthermore, if (c) he provides an example satisfying (a) and (b), he should meet my challenge of telling us how we are supposed know that it is true. I can't see that he has done any of this. Bruce From rbj at rbjones.com Wed Jul 29 18:15:01 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2009 23:15:01 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Steve's and Roger's recent interchange In-Reply-To: <363533.52109.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <363533.52109.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <200907292315.01644.rbj@rbjones.com> On Wednesday 29 July 2009 21:00:06 steve bayne wrote: >My dispute was over whether "Carnap was surely quite clear..." Now an > argument may be made for this, but Roger was pretty confident about this so > I'm hoping no argument is needed; just give me a page number, that's all. > Bruce says, No, I can't find one. Mainly I think because Carnap uses "logical truth" normally rather than analytic, though I think he was quite clear that these two are the same thing! More on this later. Some points of clarification. Firstly I said "Carnap was quite clear". I did not say that Carnap said it was quite clear, or that he believed that it was easy to establish whether a sentence is analytic. Just that it seems to me central and plain in Carnap's philosophy that he regarded philsophical propositions as analytic. I do not claim that Carnap believed that every proposition asserted by a philosopher is analytic. He was stipulating what should properly be regarded as philosophical. Thus, if G.E.Moore makes a true claim about natural English, Carnap does not consider him to be making an analytic claim. He would regard it as an empirical claim, and consider it not to be analytic philosophy (in his syntactic phase, he says "philosophy is the application of the syntactic method", and the application that method yields propositions in the formal mode, which are about logical syntax, and are if true, logically true). When Wittgenstein makes an apparently metaphysical claim in the Tractatus, then this will be regarded not as philosophy but as sheer nonsense, unless it proves possible to translate it from the material mode into the formal mode, in which case it may be philosophical, and will be analytic if true. >"The legitimate objects of the human understanding are exhausted by > relations of ideas and matters of fact and existence." > >I think this gets right to the main point. This is the statement of an > analytical philosopher, indeed a very good one, but part of the problem > though is that the sentence begs the question of what a "legitimate object" > is. If we presuppose as true that all there is in this world are ideas or > matters of facts then our understanding of 'legitimate object' may be > question begging. So let's be clear on legitimacy first, then whether this > class is coextensive with ideas, facts or some combination. John's going to > the store is not a fact because he didn't go to the store; his going to the > store is not an idea, nor is John so John's going to the store is neither a > relation of ideas nor a matter of fact; and, of course, the store may not > exist. My point here is that while there may be a good Humean answer to the > issues raised, there is nothing "quite clear" about how we ought to address > them. This is Hume not Carnap. Carnap is defining a language in which we get a classification of propositions, and if he gets the details right it will be possible to prove that there is the stated exhaustive dichotomy. This can be done formally, though we can question whether Carnap got it right. His syntactic phase was inspired by the techniques for arithmetisation of metatheory in Godel's papers, which made him think he could provide a method for translating philosophical propositions into arithmetic (i.e. logic, for a logicist). Carnap's position is coherent. He is putting forward a conceptual scheme and a method, and in these activities he does not offer philosophical claims. But when he does make claims then he believes these to be logically true and provable in the appropriate linguistic context. >When Wittgenstein remarks 'The world divides into facts not things' what is > he denying? Certainly not a particular relation among facts, nor ideas, > unless things are ideas. Again, we have a problem circumnavigating the > conceptual terrain. In addition, there are other problems. E.g. I am > obliged to keep my promises. Right? Suppose this is right. Is this a fact; I don't think it is "factual" for either Hume or Carnap. Though to say it is a fact might mean simply that it is true, and I don't know that they would deny that. (we use this term in relation to mathematics, "2+2=4 is a fact", but in our context, that of Hume and Carnap, we are using "fact" specifically to mean "empirical fact", we have a narrow usage relative to which neither mathematical nor ethical propositions are factual.) > well what then of the is/ought distinction? Again, it may be depend on what > we take to be a "fact" but isn't that really part of our dilemma, and one > for all Humeans as a well? As far as the present issue is concerned, evaluative propositions are not considered by Carnap to be part of philosophy. There might be some analytic propositions in ethics, and these might belong to analytic philosophy but then they would not be genuinely evaluative. >Recall that Carnap maintains that all topological properties of space and > time can be dealt with using purely non-metrical methods. Suppose this is > true. Is it "analytic"? Suppose it is not. Is it then a fact. Well yes, but > it is about theories and theories are relations of ideas. So are the > classes of fact and ideas (and their relations) such as to have a null > overlap? This is another problem. If so is this a matter of fact or a > relation of ideas. There are two big problems. > >First, there is no argument for believing the class of relations of ideas > and matters of fact are exhaustive; if not, then some analyses may not > involve relations of ideas etc. Second, if the classes are so broad then > there is always, available, the useless "shuffle" of saying "Oh that's a > relation of ideas," or "Oh that is a matter of fact. Yes there are such arguments. Actually they are very simple arguments. I don't understand your shuffle. >There is another question: are all truths acquired by analysis analytic. The ones obtained by certain specific methods of analysis are. Among these methods are the method of logical syntax. > Mightn't their be theories that follow upon some analysis that might have > been arrived at some other way? Well, what would exclude this. The fact that Carnap is speaking of specific kinds of analysis, and makes no claim about analysis in general. > Until > Carnap's notion of analysis is made clear and I get at least a couple of > page references, I'm afraid I'm as skeptical as ever that all statments of > analytical philosophy are analytic. The central purpose of Carnap's "Philosophy and Logical Syntax" (which I have read) and I guess also LSL (which I have not) is to present "the method of logical syntax". This is probably the most precise and complete a description of a method of philosophical analysis as has ever been given. In this method, the truth of all philosophical propositions is to be achieved either by logical demonstration (if they are already in formal mode) or by translation into formal mode so that they can be so demonstrated. Hence, any philosophical proposition which can be shown to be true by Carnap's method must be a logical truth (and hence, in Carnap's terminology, analytic). Carnap does not consider a couple of pages enough to properly articulate his method. Will you settle for a couple of books? RBJ From baynesrb at yahoo.com Wed Jul 29 21:25:55 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2009 18:25:55 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Steve's and Roger's recent interchange In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <156590.25275.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> The question is whether the following is true: "Carnap was surely quite clear that the propositions of analytic philosophy are analytic." ? I provided counterexamples. But then there was a sort of mission creep. What I mean is that what began as a claim about whether any philosopher can assert a proposition of analytic philosophy which is not analytic became the question whether *Carnap*? ever asserted a proposition of analytical philosophy which was not analytic. I pointed out that I believe he had. But then, Bruce, addressed yet a different issue: Can I produce an instance of a statement of analytical philosophy which is (a) distinctively philosophical and (b) is neither analytically true (nor false) nor empirical--that is, not known by observation, memory, and (broadly speaking) inductive inference. If this is the question, then it is "surely quite clear" that there are such propositions. But this does not appear to be the question Bruce now raises. The question he appears to be raising is whether there is any such instance in Carnap that Carnap would admit to. Now that is another matter altogether, one I never had in mind when the original question arose. It is one thing to restrict the propositions an analytical philosopher can meaningfully assert; it is another to say that if Carnap would not make such an assertion then neither can another analytical philosophy. Notice another slight emendation of the original issue. There is a move from things like "legitimate objects" to the insistence on the satisfaction of a truth condition, as if no sentence of analytical philosophy whether Carnap's or some other's can be false or, alernatively, untrue. Would any of Goodman's main theses in The Structure of Appearance qualify? I don't think so. Goodman is not setting out a system of truths; rather it is a way of "world making" that is of giving the logical structure of experience. That is what Goodman is up to. But giving the logical structure of the world is something Carnap gave up on. The philosopher is not attempting to provide information of an exotic sort, in this instance; nor was Descartes, for that matter. If we make it a requirement that it be true, or something we can in principle know to be true, then I think we've set the bar a bit too high in order to qualify as a proposition of a certain sort, as if having sense (of any sort) depended on being true (or false) a familiar fallacy. Part of the problem here is that Carnap never really appreciated, as did Sellars, for example, what all is philosophically relevant to the distinction between sensation and observation. No philosophical remarks of value that I know of concerning the relation of sensation to perception has been either empirical or analytic. Even so in many cases observation is not sufficient, where it may be necessary. Carnap as early as "Testability and Meaning" came to realize that "choice" enters into our understanding of what we take a term to mean. So choice and truth are linked in a way that disguises certain issues; it is a way of obviating the need for non-cognitive elements. I think it is something of a parlor trick but it does allow a resolution of certain issues in a way sufficiently uninteresting as to inspire belief among impatient empiricists. But while this is relevant it may be tangential. Lumping induction, observation, memory etc. raises further questions. I already gave an example which EVEN in Carnap's case is neither an empirical truth nor an analytical truth: the properties of space-time may have no metrical features. Carnap can easily accommodate the restrictions Bruce is attempting to impose by introducing choice or selection. Regards Steve --- On Wed, 7/29/09, Bruce Aune wrote: From: Bruce Aune Subject: Re: Steve's and Roger's recent interchange To: "steve bayne" Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Wednesday, July 29, 2009, 7:44 PM I think Steve got carried away by HUME's distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact and existence. I started with that to emphasize the empiricist theme, but I quickly turned to Carnap's refinement of that distinction in terms of analytic truths (or falsity) and empirical truths.? My claims were about Carnap' views, not Hume's.? If Steve wants to refute me, he has to provide a counter-instance to my claims--specifically, he has to provide a clearly true (or false) statement that is (a) distinctively philosophical and (b) is neither analytically true (nor false) nor empirical--that is, not known by observation, memory, and (broadly speaking) inductive inference.? Furthermore, if (c) he provides an example satisfying (a) and (b), he should meet my challenge of telling us how we are supposed know that it is true.? I can't see that he has done any of this. Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbarnett at valdosta.edu Wed Jul 29 19:52:33 2009 From: rbarnett at valdosta.edu (Ron Barnette) Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2009 19:52:33 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Omission and Action In-Reply-To: <812AD7C1660F44C68E1D56217BABBBCA@DFLVQC1J> References: <3E30D29DBD0C49C3B2740BD0A7765FC8@Library> <954729.95082.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <812AD7C1660F44C68E1D56217BABBBCA@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <2F0F5FE080EE4CBCA20E9402C1621289@Library> In fact, Danny's distinctions are quite helpful, and conceptually instructive when they might be applicable in, say, the law. Especially with regard to his last point re: conflicts with intentions. Very interesting observation, which, I suspect, is reflected in Anglo-Saxon law..where are we, Hart and Honore??? Best, Ron _____ From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of Danny Frederick Sent: Wednesday, July 29, 2009 3:08 AM To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Subject: RE: Omission and Action Hi Steve, Do we need to distinguish intentional, unintentional and non-intentional omissions? I omit to do many things because I just forget to do them (like popping into the shop on the way home): I omit them unintentionally. I omit to do many more things because it just never occurs to me to do them (like performing a song-and-dance routine while I am waiting for a bus): I omit them non-intentionally. But some things I omit to do intentionally (like omitting to talk in the cross examination). Perhaps: intentional omissions are those that I try to omit; unintentional and non-intentional ones are those that I do not try to omit. Unintentional omissions seem to be ones that conflict with our intentions or plans, whereas non-intentional ones don't. Just a first stab. Danny _____ From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of steve bayne Sent: 28 July 2009 23:58 To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com; Ron Barnette Subject: RE: Omission and Action The cross examination case is good because it shows that the condition I mention may be necessary but is not sufficient for omission: The witness refuses to testify, had he testified it would have been an intentional act; but it is not an omission on his part but a refusal, suggesting that refusal and omission might belong to a larger class. I didn't omit calling the mayor's office because I never had that intention. This is another interesting case. As if to imply that had I called since it would have had to be intentional to be an omission and inasmuch as I had no such intention I, therefore did not "omit" calling the mayor. I have a short section devoted to Melden. Melden was far more thought provoking form me than Hampshiire, although other of Hampshire's works I find very good. Regards Steve --- On Tue, 7/28/09, Ron Barnette wrote: From: Ron Barnette Subject: RE: Omission and Action To: "'steve bayne'" , hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Tuesday, July 28, 2009, 5:04 PM Steve, I'm glad to learn that you address omissions in the book, as they constitute a very special class---one might argue class of actions---in which something intentional is definitely undertaken..say, my deliberately remaining steadfast, perfectly still and silent during an intense cross-examination. My refusal to answer a question would correctly be construed as something I did intentionally, yet without overt bodily movement. So are there actions that do not involve bodily movements? Interesting implications with either 'yes' or 'no,' no? Good work, Steve.Btw, this brought to mind many discussions on this very topic I had in the late 60's with dear Abe Melden who (you know) served faithfully on my dissertation committee. Ron Barnette _____ From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of steve bayne Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2009 4:47 PM To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Subject: Omission and Action I have a number of things to say about omissions in the book. Here are two sentences from that discusson. "We feel the compulsion, at some point, to ask: what must be added to an event that never happened in order to make it an omission? An omission, unlike a bodily movement which had it happened would have been just that, viz. a bodily movement, is such a nonoccurrence of an event that had it occurred would have been intentional. Omissions constitute a special class, or category, although Anscombe may be right to criticize Davidson on this matter, no one, including Anscombe, has presented a satisfactory theory concerning its nature." Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Thu Jul 30 06:51:31 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2009 06:51:31 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Steve's and Roger's recent interchange In-Reply-To: <156590.25275.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <156590.25275.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <7B3980F5-E84C-4860-A4AE-6B586194CC7A@philos.umass.edu> It seems that Steve didn't take the time to read what I said with any care. Let me go through it one more time. 1. The claim that prompted my remarks was one RBJ made, ""Carnap was surely quite clear that the propositions of analytic philosophy are analytic." This was a claim about Carnap, not philosophers generally. Right, Steve? 2. I said, Steve disputed this claim, citing a remark by Wittgenstein, but I added that "Roger?s claim is very plausible if it rephrased in a way that he would probably accept." 3. Why did I say it should be rephrased? Because, as I put it, [the phrase] ?The propositions of analytic philosophy,? as Roger meant it, surely does not apply to every proposition a philosopher qua philosopher has asserted." Why not? Because, as I said, "Heidegger?s ?Nothing noths? (or whatever it was) is a case in point. Carnap clearly held that many such claims (or ?propositions?) are meaningless. The propositions Roger no doubt had in mind were true propositions of a distinctly philosophical kind." 4. Why do the philosophical in question have to be true? Because (according to 1 above) Carnap (according to RBJ) said they were analytic. Analytic propositions are neither false nor meaningless. Thus, we are talking abut propositions that Carnap would consider analytic. 5. Given 4, Steve, to dispute RBJ's claim ON A PLAUSIBLE READING should cite propositions that are (a) distinctively philosophical and (b) true. 6. Why "distinctly philosophical? Because (as I said) "In the course of expounding their philosophical ideas, philosophers make many empirical claims, but these claims are normally incidental to their official philosophical pronouncements." And Carnap's claim [according to 1] was not about incidental claims that are not analytic. 7. Steve said he gave counter-examples of the requisite kind. Did he? He cited examples of things various philosophers have said, but he didn't show that they were true. Why is this important? Read sentence 4 again. 8. In his last contribution to the discussion, Steve said: "What I mean is that what began as a claim about whether any philosopher can assert a proposition of analytic philosophy which is not analytic became the question whether *Carnap* ever asserted a proposition of analytical philosophy which was not analytic." This is an erroneous account of the claim I began with. (See 1 above.) 9. It is also an erroneous claim about what the suppose initial claim became. Why erroneous? Because the issue in question never concerned the status of the propositions Carnap asserted; they concerned (a) the true propositions of (b) a distinctly philosophical kind that (c) Carnap would (according to 1) consider philosophical and analytic. 10. Given 1-9 here, the following claim by Steve seriously MISREPRESENTS what I was claiming: "It is one thing to restrict the propositions an analytical philosopher can meaningfully assert [I never did this]; it is another to say that if Carnap would not make such an assertion then neither can another analytical philosophy. [I never said this] Notice another slight emendation of the original issue. There is a move from things like "legitimate objects" to the insistence on the satisfaction of a truth condition, as if no sentence of analytical philosophy whether Carnap's or some other's can be false or, alernatively, untrue." [I never assumed or implied this.] 11. I think on-line discussions are a good thing, but when we take part in them, we should be careful not to misrepresent what other disussants are saying. Bruce From Baynesr at comcast.net Thu Jul 30 12:28:02 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2009 16:28:02 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Steve's and Roger's recent interchange In-Reply-To: <7B3980F5-E84C-4860-A4AE-6B586194CC7A@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: <240383858.7422581248971282650.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I think some of the difficulty is that Carnap isn't being cited. As you know there is a lot of disagreement over what Hume meant, and Hume is about the clearest philosopher to write in English, otherwise Hobbes, maybe. Anyway, I have a reply to your probing commentary, but it occurs to me that a lot of potential misunderstanding could be avoided if you did one thing in particular: Cite a passage from Carnap, a sentence, one that you take to be a "distinctly philosophical" sentence of this, particular, analytical philosopher. If you do that I think some misunderstandings can be avoided. Best wishes Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: "steve bayne" Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2009 3:51:31 AM GMT -08:00 US/Canada Pacific Subject: Re: Steve's and Roger's recent interchange It seems that Steve didn't take the time to read what I said with any care. Let me go through it one more time. 1. The claim that prompted my remarks was one RBJ made, ""Carnap was surely quite clear that the propositions of analytic philosophy are analytic." This was a claim about Carnap, not philosophers generally. Right, Steve? 2. I said, Steve disputed this claim, citing a remark by Wittgenstein, but I added that "Roger?s claim is very plausible if it rephrased in a way that he would probably accept." 3. Why did I say it should be rephrased? Because, as I put it, [the phrase] ?The propositions of analytic philosophy,? as Roger meant it, surely does not apply to every proposition a philosopher qua philosopher has asserted." Why not? Because, as I said, "Heidegger?s ?Nothing noths? (or whatever it was) is a case in point. Carnap clearly held that many such claims (or ?propositions?) are meaningless. The propositions Roger no doubt had in mind were true propositions of a distinctly philosophical kind." 4. Why do the philosophical in question have to be true? Because (according to 1 above) Carnap (according to RBJ) said they were analytic. Analytic propositions are neither false nor meaningless. Thus, we are talking abut propositions that Carnap would consider analytic. 5. Given 4, Steve, to dispute RBJ's claim ON A PLAUSIBLE READING should cite propositions that are (a) distinctively philosophical and (b) true. 6. Why "distinctly philosophical? Because (as I said) "In the course of expounding their philosophical ideas, philosophers make many empirical claims, but these claims are normally incidental to their official philosophical pronouncements." And Carnap's claim [according to 1] was not about incidental claims that are not analytic. 7. Steve said he gave counter-examples of the requisite kind. Did he? He cited examples of things various philosophers have said, but he didn't show that they were true. Why is this important? Read sentence 4 again. 8. In his last contribution to the discussion, Steve said: "What I mean is that what began as a claim about whether any philosopher can assert a proposition of analytic philosophy which is not analytic became the question whether *Carnap* ever asserted a proposition of analytical philosophy which was not analytic." This is an erroneous account of the claim I began with. (See 1 above.) 9. It is also an erroneous claim about what the suppose initial claim became. Why erroneous? Because the issue in question never concerned the status of the propositions Carnap asserted; they concerned (a) the true propositions of (b) a distinctly philosophical kind that (c) Carnap would (according to 1) consider philosophical and analytic. 10. Given 1-9 here, the following claim by Steve seriously MISREPRESENTS what I was claiming: "It is one thing to restrict the propositions an analytical philosopher can meaningfully assert [I never did this]; it is another to say that if Carnap would not make such an assertion then neither can another analytical philosophy. [I never said this] Notice another slight emendation of the original issue. There is a move from things like "legitimate objects" to the insistence on the satisfaction of a truth condition, as if no sentence of analytical philosophy whether Carnap's or some other's can be false or, alernatively, untrue." [I never assumed or implied this.] 11. I think on-line discussions are a good thing, but when we take part in them, we should be careful not to misrepresent what other disussants are saying. Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Thu Jul 30 20:46:21 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2009 17:46:21 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Steve's and Roger's recent interchange In-Reply-To: <200907292315.01644.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <995292.26278.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Roger, "...because Carnap uses "logical truth" normally rather than analytic, though I think he was quite clear that these two are the same thing!" Yes, this is correct L-truth and analytic truth are one and the same, except that Carnap didn't like the term 'analytic' owing to its imprecision. He mentions this in his Introduction to Symbolic Logic. Within the first 20 pages or so. "I do not claim that Carnap believed that every proposition asserted by a philosopher is analytic. He was stipulating what should properly be regarded as philosophical." Well this is a bit different. Yous use 'stipulation' and I have no problem with this. On the stipulation that a philosophical assertion is analytic, then all philosophical propositions are analytic. Oh, C'mon Roger, you have a better case than this. Let me put it the way I would put it if I were you. Carnap has taken the "linguistic turn" (Bergmann). He believes that analysis is, essentially, one of translation; we translate sentences in the object language into the metalanguage. It is in the metalanguage that we give the semantics but it is in the translation that we give the analysis of terms and concepts of the object language. What is crucial are the predicates of the object language and their logical properties. We pick the predicates of the metalanguage depending on the translation we want. So if we want to translate sentences about the ancestral relation without commitment to one sort of predicate, say, individuals (as did H. S. Leonard and Goodman), then you might want to use sets, instead. One important point is this: Which you choose is a matter which is, basically, the same as choosing meters over yards - whence my example dealing with the analysis of space-time without using metrical concepts at all. Translation requires synonomy (as Quine emphasized in Two Dogmas); the relation of object language and metalanguage is "analytic" in this sense (the business about "meaning postulates." So the sense in which all statements of analytical philosophy insofar as they are translations are analytic. In this sense, all statements of analytical philosophy are "analytic." But my point is, merely, that Carnap would not, as you indicate, claim that all proposition uttered by an analytic philosopher need be analytic. No. But all propositions "stipulated" as statements of analytic philosophy are analytic only if you buy into Carnap's program. Any approach to philosophy that rules out speech of any sort, even if it proposes a "principle of charity" is dogmatic, and this is what I was resisting, not the idea that there is no understanding under which Carnap would deny that only statements, ala Carnap, are truly philosophical. You are probably a bit younger than I. If so you may not recall the frequent "move in the philosophical game" which goes something like: "Oh, you can't say that." You had Wittgenstein talking about things "whereof" we could not even speak; and we have verificationist denouncing as nonsense anything lacking empirical content of such and such sort (although they never quite got it right). >> obliged to keep my promises. Right? Suppose this is right. Is this a fact; >I don't think it is "factual" for either Hume or Carnap. >Though to say it is a fact might mean simply that it is true, >and I don't know that they would deny that. >(we use this term in relation to mathematics, "2+2=4 is a fact", >but in our context, that of Hume and Carnap, we are using "fact" >specifically to mean "empirical fact", we have a narrow usage >relative to which neither mathematical nor ethical propositions >are factual.) Well, we need a theory of facts, don't we? You can tell me what you think; I can tell you what I think; but what we need are arguments to test each position. There is VAST literature on facts. Huge. I know of no new ideas about what a fact is since Russell and Wittgenstein. >As far as the present issue is concerned, evaluative propositions >are not considered by Carnap to be part of philosophy. Exactly, and because there are analytical statements in ethics Carnap cannot be right, unless you accept his "stipulations" but even then I'm not so sure if he can do this so easily. Much depends on what the power of stipulation is. >Yes there are such arguments. >Actually they are very simple arguments. Nothing is simple. Give an actual argument and I'll tell you why. >The central purpose of Carnap's "Philosophy and Logical Syntax" >(which I have read) and I guess also LSL (which I have not) >is to present "the method of logical syntax". >Like Russell Carnap went through a number of changes. I think he >was at his best up to about 1931; after Tarski things went downhill >in my opinion. Compare his method of analysis in Philosophy and Logical Syntax to his methods in Introduction to Symbolic Logic (second half). The latter evolved from the former but they are very different. Let me conclude with a point of logic. If you take a look at Russell's "principle of abstraction" in PM or Halmos's "Axiom of Specification" you have statement that is neither arrived at by induction nor observation. Nor is it analytic. It is, however, a statement of analysis and something of a philosophical one at that. Carnap's method is translation into a metalanguage. Philosophizing is thinking about the metalanguage we use to "explicate" certain notions; familiar one's like "class," "number," "function," "continuity," etc. (in the mathematical foundations case). Our CHOICE for Carnap of predicates is not determined by metaphysics. For me, "choice" is something of "cop out," symptomatic of a philosophical anemia brought on as a consequence of a certain perversion of Ockham. Regards Steve d, 7/29/09, Roger Bishop Jones wrote: From: Roger Bishop Jones Subject: Re: Steve's and Roger's recent interchange To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Wednesday, July 29, 2009, 6:15 PM On Wednesday 29 July 2009 21:00:06 steve bayne wrote: >My dispute was over whether "Carnap was surely quite clear..." Now an > argument may be made for this, but Roger was pretty confident about this so > I'm hoping no argument is needed; just give me a page number, that's all. > Bruce says, No, I can't find one. Mainly I think because Carnap uses "logical truth" normally rather than analytic, though I think he was quite clear that these two are the same thing! More on this later. Some points of clarification. Firstly I said "Carnap was quite clear". I did not say that Carnap said it was quite clear, or that he believed that it was easy to establish whether a sentence is analytic. Just that it seems to me central and plain in Carnap's philosophy that he regarded philsophical propositions as analytic. I do not claim that Carnap believed that every proposition asserted by a philosopher is analytic. He was stipulating what should properly be regarded as philosophical. Thus, if G.E.Moore makes a true claim about natural English, Carnap does not consider him to be making an analytic claim. He would regard it as an empirical claim, and consider it not to be analytic philosophy (in his syntactic phase, he says "philosophy is the application of the syntactic method", and the application that method yields propositions in the formal mode, which are about logical syntax, and are if true, logically true). When Wittgenstein makes an apparently metaphysical claim in the Tractatus, then this will be regarded not as philosophy but as sheer nonsense, unless it proves possible to translate it from the material mode into the formal mode, in which case it may be philosophical, and will be analytic if true. >"The legitimate objects of the human understanding are exhausted by > relations of ideas and matters of fact and existence." > >I think this gets right to the main point. This is the statement of an > analytical philosopher, indeed a very good one, but part of the problem > though is that the sentence begs the question of what a "legitimate object" > is. If we presuppose as true that all there is in this world are ideas or > matters of facts then our understanding of 'legitimate object' may be > question begging. So let's be clear on legitimacy first, then whether this > class is coextensive with ideas, facts or some combination. John's going to > the store is not a fact because he didn't go to the store; his going to the > store is not an idea, nor is John so John's going to the store is neither a > relation of ideas nor a matter of fact; and, of course, the store may not > exist. My point here is that while there may be a good Humean answer to the > issues raised, there is nothing "quite clear" about how we ought to address > them. This is Hume not Carnap. Carnap is defining a language in which we get a classification of propositions, and if he gets the details right it will be possible to prove that there is the stated exhaustive dichotomy. This can be done formally, though we can question whether Carnap got it right. His syntactic phase was inspired by the techniques for arithmetisation of metatheory in Godel's papers, which made him think he could provide a method for translating philosophical propositions into arithmetic (i.e. logic, for a logicist). Carnap's position is coherent. He is putting forward a conceptual scheme and a method, and in these activities he does not offer philosophical claims. But when he does make claims then he believes these to be logically true and provable in the appropriate linguistic context. >When Wittgenstein remarks 'The world divides into facts not things' what is > he denying? Certainly not a particular relation among facts, nor ideas, > unless things are ideas. Again, we have a problem circumnavigating the > conceptual terrain. In addition, there are other problems. E.g. I am > obliged to keep my promises. Right? Suppose this is right. Is this a fact; I don't think it is "factual" for either Hume or Carnap. Though to say it is a fact might mean simply that it is true, and I don't know that they would deny that. (we use this term in relation to mathematics, "2+2=4 is a fact", but in our context, that of Hume and Carnap, we are using "fact" specifically to mean "empirical fact", we have a narrow usage relative to which neither mathematical nor ethical propositions are factual.) > well what then of the is/ought distinction? Again, it may be depend on what > we take to be a "fact" but isn't that really part of our dilemma, and one > for all Humeans as a well? As far as the present issue is concerned, evaluative propositions are not considered by Carnap to be part of philosophy. There might be some analytic propositions in ethics, and these might belong to analytic philosophy but then they would not be genuinely evaluative. >Recall that Carnap maintains that all topological properties of space and > time can be dealt with using purely non-metrical methods. Suppose this is > true. Is it "analytic"? Suppose it is not. Is it then a fact. Well yes, but > it is about theories and theories are relations of ideas. So are the > classes of fact and ideas (and their relations) such as to have a null > overlap? This is another problem. If so is this a matter of fact or a > relation of ideas. There are two big problems. > >First, there is no argument for believing the class of relations of ideas > and matters of fact are exhaustive; if not, then some analyses may not > involve relations of ideas etc. Second, if the classes are so broad then > there is always, available, the useless "shuffle" of saying "Oh that's a > relation of ideas," or "Oh that is a matter of fact. Yes there are such arguments. Actually they are very simple arguments. I don't understand your shuffle. >There is another question: are all truths acquired by analysis analytic. The ones obtained by certain specific methods of analysis are. Among these methods are the method of logical syntax. > Mightn't their be theories that follow upon some analysis that might have > been arrived at some other way? Well, what would exclude this. The fact that Carnap is speaking of specific kinds of analysis, and makes no claim about analysis in general. > Until > Carnap's notion of analysis is made clear and I get at least a couple of > page references, I'm afraid I'm as skeptical as ever that all statments of > analytical philosophy are analytic. The central purpose of Carnap's "Philosophy and Logical Syntax" (which I have read) and I guess also LSL (which I have not) is to present "the method of logical syntax". This is probably the most precise and complete a description of a method of philosophical analysis as has ever been given. In this method, the truth of all philosophical propositions is to be achieved either by logical demonstration (if they are already in formal mode) or by translation into formal mode so that they can be so demonstrated. Hence, any philosophical proposition which can be shown to be true by Carnap's method must be a logical truth (and hence, in Carnap's terminology, analytic). Carnap does not consider a couple of pages enough to properly articulate his method. Will you settle for a couple of books? RBJ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Jul 31 14:42:44 2009 From: jlsperanza at aol.com (jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2009 14:42:44 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] The Taste of Schwater Message-ID: <8CBE025D3597989-1544-953@WEBMAIL-DZ35.sysops.aol.com> S. Bayne refers to Heathcocote & Armstrong, re: ?"the case of 'water = H20'." "Australia continues to dominate the world of philosophy." I met Anscombe and call me South American, but he just looks, sounds, and behaves like your common or garden regular ?Anglo? to me -- but then whenever I meet an Australian I misjudge him to be Cockney! But this brief note to share this tidbit of the annals (as it were) of analytic philosophy. Have you noticed that when Putnam invented his example he used "twater"?? This expression, I am told, since call me Aunt Matilda (*) in this respect, is very low slang! (The OED notes that R. Browning used it -- or its back formation, rather, in a poem, but only because he THOUGHT it meant something else -- a part, by metonymy, of a nun?s attire --. In most internet sites discussing Putnam?s example it has been politically corrected to ?schwater?... Oddly, I like to think of Grice as having invented that sort of Twin Earth experiments. I don?t think we get any earlier example than his "Martians" (amicably, of course, and always willing, oh so willing, to chat!) in ?Some remarks about the senses?. Oddly and back to Down Under, it?s Coady, of Melbourne, who has provided the best exegesis and criticism of the Grice-type scenarios (in "The Senses of Martians"). When it comes to doxastic counterparts of twater-water ex periments, I find the work of Brian Loar illuminating. He has executed (for that?s what executors do, right?) Grice?s Aristotle paper for his own edited Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, and has contributed engagingly on matters Gricean for, inter alia, Cosenza, The Legacy of Grice (Republic of San Marino). I have always found his externalism very credible, but then I?ll grant you that anyone with a Gricean bias tastes like ambrosia to me (Loar actually hails from the best of Oxonian philosophy, his D.Phil Oxon supervised on ?Sentence Meaning? by Grice?s collaborator, Sir Geoffrey J. Warnock, sometime Vice-Chancellor of the Varsity! Cheers, J. L. Speranza From rbj at rbjones.com Fri Jul 31 11:08:54 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2009 16:08:54 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] A Scientist's Landscape In-Reply-To: <387167905.6699441248780002902.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <387167905.6699441248780002902.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <200907311608.54602.rbj@rbjones.com> I'd like to respond on one point from a message of Steve's from a few days back. On Tuesday 28 July 2009 12:20:02 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: >You remark: > >"But for Russell these are all "logical fictions" and I would >be inclined to go further and regard ontology in its entirety >as conventional (with some caveats)." > >Well, that would require quite a debate. The way the world is may be just a > logical construct; but if so the world itself would not exist. I would not say that the world is a fiction, but that there may be no single way of carving it up into pieces so that we can talk about it. It is not reality which is similar to a logical fiction, but rather that the ways in which we elect to talk about it may have that character. I don't personally think of abstract objects as fictions, because to talk of something being a fiction is to admit that it does not in fact exist. However, explaining the status of abstract objects in a sentence is not easy, and to go along with Russell's talk of logical fictions gets you reasonably close. Unfortunately, one then is construed as denying their existence. > I'm inclined > to believe it is real and that ontology is what these constructs are > constructed out of. But it's a topic that requires a systematic approach. Yes, I think I have one of those. > I'm inclind to think that ontology is the "real deal" and logic is a set of > conventions about marks on paper, but I'm not sure. I waver on this; > thinking one thing at one time and another at another time. It's a serious > question. I think Logic is the most fundamental "real deal" we have. i.e. that the notion of logical truth is very important very fundamental and objective (when properly construed).. It is, in the underlying metaphysic of "Metaphysical Positivism" a most fundamental concept. In this conception of logical truth, abstract ontology is significant (it plays a role in the explication of logical truth), but it cannot in my scheme of things be considered prior to logic. It is a foundational co-conspirator. >"It makes no difference to me whether or not abstract objects >exist, I care only that their supposition is consistent and useful. >Your denial of their existence has great disutility because it >makes difficult a discussion of semantics or mathematics >(and many other topics)." > >The existence of abstract entities is not essential. Much depends on what > you take philosophy of mathematics to be. My view that there are no > abstract entities required for mathematics, as fleeting as it is from time > to time, doesn't really impact my view on proof theory; avoiding the > paradoxes; or the nature of infinity. Others may see it another way, of > course, but that is where the debate begins not ends. The main point of this response is to correct an _apparent_ misunderstanding which you seem here to show of my indifference to the existence of abstract entities. It is not that I contemplate with equanimity doing without the assumption that they exist. I have not the least inclination to engage in nominalistic reconstructions of mathematics or philosophy. I am indifferent to the existence of abstract entities, because I am quite confidence that mathematics would be just as effective when done under the presumption of their existence, even if that presumption were false. If they really were fictions, (i.e. counterfactual hypotheses or presuppositions), this would not diminish the coherence and utility of mathematics. Or even its truth, so long as the propositions of mathematics are (as I believe they should be) interpreted in a metaphysically neutral way. I do care whether the assumptions we make about abstract objects are consistent, for there would quite possibly be dire practical consequences of their not being. RBJ From jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Jul 31 16:36:16 2009 From: jlsperanza at aol.com (jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2009 16:36:16 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] The Paradox of Analysis -- With a Vengeance Message-ID: <8CBE035AFE8357A-1544-ED6@WEBMAIL-DZ35.sysops.aol.com> B. Aune: "If Steve wants to refute me, he has to provide a counter-instance to my claims--specifically, he has to provide a clearly true (or false) statement that is (a) distinctively philosophical and (b) is neither analytically true (nor false) nor empirical--that is, not known by observation, memory, and (broadly speaking) inductive inference. Furthermore, if (c) he provides an example satisfying (a) and (b), he should meet my challenge of telling us how we are supposed know that it is true." Neatly put! I think Grice would agree! I for one, can tell I *am* a philosopher (of a Gricean type, granted) because when in a serious mode I can but utter analyticities -- and while they amuse me (cfr. Wilson, What we know we know) they leave non-philosophers unamused. Having done work in (ugly word this, but what can you do about it) "interdisciplinary" pragmatics, I can testify to NEVER having been able to hold one single conversation (let alone argument) of a philosophical nature with a non-philosopher! Yet, while empirical facts leave me cold, I would not like to say that all I (or Grice for that matter) has been doing is engaged in 2 + 2 = 4. Thus, I wish S. Bayne *is* right and there?s more than Carnapianism to philosophy! Grice recalls how with Hampshire and Austin (during those infamous* Saturday mornings -- *infamous to Russeell, meetings among middle-class unimaginative folks held at=2 0cold mornings) they tried to reach a verdict as to what makes a question (let alone proposition) philosophical. Less dramatic than Popper giving that talk at Braithwaite?s room -- for the Moral Science Society -- on "Are there philosophjical problems?" but the offshoot of which transpired in an R. M. Hare contribution for the Journal of Philosophy. Cheers, J. L. Speranza From jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Jul 31 15:33:06 2009 From: jlsperanza at aol.com (jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2009 15:33:06 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] The Gricean Omission Message-ID: <8CBE02CDCAF1604-1544-BDE@WEBMAIL-DZ35.sysops.aol.com> S. Bayne re: "the cross examination case" supplied by A. Melden supervisee R. Barnett, and "Melden was far more thought provoking form me than Hampshire" But the most provocative (more provocative than provoking!) has been to me, you guessed right, Grice. I don?t have the reference to hand but will see if I can unbury it for the annals of analysis. In his "Actions and Events" (a rarely cited paper by Grice, published in 1986 for the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly and merely meant as a criticism of Davidson) Grice does consider omissions, typically, a man who omits to take his hat off -- or something. Grice, who spent YEARS discussing action with Davidson (I often think what a sadder place for both Grice and Davidson would Berkeley had been for either!), wants to say that Davidson (is this his behaviourist, Davidson?s, background or what?) endorses a rather too meagre metaphysics or ontology of actions (and/or omissions). In a rather mixed bag of an essay, Grice overviews inter alia von Wright?s logic of events, and ends up with some typically Kantotelian distinctions. Personally, I never omit a thing. I know Bayne loves the word, ?to do? -- a pro-verb if ever there was one. And I can?t start digesting that things I have NOT done will count as my credentials. But then South Americans take war seriously. None of your conscientious objector?s omissive stuff! (It=C 2s bloody mandatory down here!). Hampshire was a good?un. I recall enjoying most of his obit that anecdote involving the French p. o. w. I forget if what Sir Stuart meant to do was omitted or what. I don?t think Grice (never mind Anscombe!) omitted many things in his life! Then there?s counter-omissions: things OTHER people think you SHOULD have done, and since you haven?t, they do it ON YOUR BEHALF! Bitter but Strawsonianly true. Chapman ("Grice") recounts the well-known story: Grice delivered (read) from his copy of "Meaning" in a meeting of the Oxford Philosophical Society in 1948. 8 years later, Sir Peter asked for the manuscript. Unbeknownst to Grice, Strawson and Lady Ann (a proof reader of good sorts!) edited it slightly, as she typed it, and submitted, signed "H. P. Grice, University of Oxford" to the Philosophical Review. The next thing "H. P. Grice" was the world?s most famous philosopher! So, yes, perhaps he did omit to send the paper hisself (sic) but there you are, the parochialism of the man you love or leave! Cheers, J. L. Speranza From rbj at rbjones.com Fri Jul 31 08:33:25 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2009 13:33:25 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Carnap on Philosophy Message-ID: <200907311333.26380.rbj@rbjones.com> I observed in an earlier message that: "Carnap was surely quite clear that the propositions of analytic philosophy are analytic." Not thinking that this would be a controversial claim. Steve asked for citations to support it, and I could not immediately locate a straightforward statement of this principle. In fact, I already had on my web site some relevant quotes, in my "Quotations from the Writings of Rudolph Carnap" at: http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/history/rcq001.htm From the autobiographical part of the Schilpp volume (p13) talking of "The Logico-Analytic Method in Philosophy", Carnap says: "Whereas Frege had the strongest influence on me in the fields of logic and semantics, in my philosophical thinking in general I learned most from Bertrand Russell. In the winter of 1921 I read his book, Our Knowledge of the External World, as a Field For Scientific Method in Philosophy. Some passages made an especially vivid impression on me because they formulated clearly and explicitly a view of the aim and method of philosophy which I had implicitly held for some time. In the Preface he speaks about "the logical-analytic method of philosophy" and refers to Frege's work as the first complete example of this method. And on the very last pages of the book he gives a summarizing characterization of this philosophical method in the following words:" Then he quotes a passage from Russell which is also on my web site in a page entitled: "Quotations from the Writings of Bertrand Russell" at: http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/history/brq001.htm#Q008 "The study of logic becomes the central study in philosophy: it gives the method of research in philosophy, just as mathematics gives the method in physics...." "All this supposed knowledge in the traditional systems must be swept away, and a new beginning must be made. . . ." "To the large and still growing body of men engaged in the pursuit of science, . . . the new method, successful already in such time-honored problems as number, infinity, continuity, space and time, should make an appeal which the older methods have wholly failed to make. The one and only condition, I believe, which is necessary in order to secure for philosophy in the near future an achievement surpassing all that has hitherto been accomplished by philosophers, is the creation of a school of men with scientific training and philosophical interests, unhampered by the traditions of the past, and not misled by the literary methods of those who copy the ancients in all except their merits." (from: Our Knowledge of the External World, as a Field For Scientific Method in Philosophy) Carnap follows the Russell Quote with: "I felt as if this appeal had been directed to me personally. To work in this spirit would be my task from now on! And indeed henceforth the application of the new logical instrument for the purposes of analyzing scientific concepts and of clarifying philosophical problems has been the essential aim of my philosophical activity." There is a more explicit quote from Russell at: http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/history/brq001.htm#Q003 Which concludes: "Philosophy, if what has been said is correct, becomes indistinguishable from logic as that word has now come to be used." (from: On Scientific Method in Philosophy) My own first introduction to this conception of philosophy was in "Language Truth and Logic" in which Ayer gives his Oxonian interpretation of Logical Positivism. see: http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/history/aaq001.htm#Q002 "In other words, the propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character - that is, they do not describe the behaviour of physical, or even mental, objects; they express definitions, or the formal consequences of definitions. Accordingly we may say that philosophy is a department of logic*2. For we will see that the characteristic mark of a purely logical enquiry, is that it is concerned with the formal consequences of our definitions and not with questions of empirical fact." It was to Ayer's advantage as a propagandist that he was not so interested as Carnap was in the technical details. Consequently, he does make the plain statements which we sometimes have to hunt around for in Carnap. The best places to look for these in Carnap are in the Schilpp volume (the autobiographical part and also in those parts of the "responses" where he summarises his then current position before responding in detail to his critics), and in "Philosophy and Logical Syntax" which are transcripts of public lectures in London and are not therefore confused by too much technical detail. The Schilpp volume is in my view enormously important for any real understanding of Carnap's philosophy, because it is the norm for people to speak of Carnap as if his philosophy consisted of the Aufbau or terminated with his philosophy of logical syntax. His philosophy continued to improve throughout his life, for example, his presentation of semantics and analyticity is improved in the Schilpp to overcome some of the spurious objections raised by Quine. Anyway, going back to the main thesis, and looking again for short explicit statements to support my claim, we find: "The only proper task of Philosophy is Logical Analysis." (Philosophy and Logical Syntax I.7, p35) and the rest of that section is very relevant, discussing their disagreement with Wittgenstein on the status of philosophical propositions and leaving no doubt about what he thinks their status is, but actually not containing anything quite explicit enough for our present purposes. Later he asks: "What kind of sentences are those which express the results of logical Analysis?" (III.1 p68) But frustratingly his answer is: ."..sentences of logical syntax ..." not quite explicit enough perhaps. Actually, the most explicit concise indication of the view in question is in the diagram on page 32. I have transcribed this into my notes at: http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/bibliog/carnap34.htm#SecI6 What is says is (in my words): Philosophy as traditionally conceived may be considered to have three components, which are: 1. Metaphysical (including ethics) 2. Psychological 3. Logical Of these: 1. the first is expressive rather than descriptive, and therefore should properly be considered a form of art. 2. the second belongs to empirical science and only the third should properly be considered philosophy. (hence, the propositions of philosophy as conceived by Carnap are logical). On the word "analytic", he says on p55 of PLS, "Among the valid sentences some are analytic, namely those which are valid on the basis of the L-rules alone" (note that by "valid" he seems to mean "true") On the L-rules he has said on p50 "Take for instance the system of Principia Mathematica. In its present form it contains only such primitive sentences and rules of inference as have a purely logical character. Transformation rules of this logical or mathematical character we will call L-rules" and on p54 "Thus every valid sentence is analytic" and we see in his table that he means here L-valid. Finally, I observe, that though the discussion arising from my claim about Carnap has often considered matters which pertain to the tenability of Carnap's position, I have not myself asserted that it is tenable. I do not myself hold that all true propositions of philosophy are analytic, and have no inclination to eject from philosophy those which are not. I am inclined to think that Lao-Tzu had some interesting philosophical insights, but doubt that many of them could be construed as matters of logic. In Metaphysical Positivism a method of logical analysis for use in philosophy (and elsewhere) has a central place. Its scope of applicability is deductive reasoning. Any philosophy in which deductive arguments are found is a candidate for analysis by the methods which I advocate, as well as other demonstrative sciences, and nomologico-deductive science. And of course, many varieties of metaphysics. Roger Jones From aune at philos.umass.edu Sat Aug 1 06:13:13 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Sat, 1 Aug 2009 06:13:13 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Carnap on Philosophy In-Reply-To: <200907311333.26380.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <200907311333.26380.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: I am glad to say that I can agree with everything Roger says in this missive. Bruce From rbarnett at valdosta.edu Fri Jul 31 21:23:27 2009 From: rbarnett at valdosta.edu (Ron Barnette) Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2009 21:23:27 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Hello! In-Reply-To: <8CBE025D3597989-1544-953@WEBMAIL-DZ35.sysops.aol.com> References: <8CBE025D3597989-1544-953@WEBMAIL-DZ35.sysops.aol.com> Message-ID: <749BB94D758C4F7BA87555D987E22B8F@Library> A bit of clarification in your last sentence? Do you mean "I met Armstrong....", or is there a sex-identity mixup?? Cheers, Ron Barnette -----Original Message----- From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of jlsperanza at aol.com Sent: Friday, July 31, 2009 2:43 PM To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Subject: The Taste of Schwater S. Bayne refers to Heathcocote & Armstrong, re: ?"the case of 'water = H20'." "Australia continues to dominate the world of philosophy." I met Anscombe and call me South American, but he just looks, sounds, and behaves like your common or garden regular ?Anglo? to me -- but then whenever I meet an Australian I misjudge him to be Cockney! From Baynesr at comcast.net Sat Aug 1 07:45:42 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sat, 1 Aug 2009 11:45:42 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Carnap on Philosophy In-Reply-To: <200907311333.26380.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <219173233.7896881249127142004.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> "Among the valid sentences some are analytic, namely those which are valid on the basis of the L-rules alone" Now if philosophy is the search for analytical sentences then it is the search for L-rules, and if Carnap can be said to follow Russell remarks: "Philosophy, if what has been said is correct, becomes indistinguishable from logic as that word has now come to be used," the actual record of his work should show it. It does not. I am going to address two issues. First, Carnap's conception of philosophy and, second, Russell's relation to Carnap, the discussion having evolved as indicated by the change is subject header. I won't repeat what I've already said about Carnap's methodology. That methodolgy consists in the construction of formal metalanguages that translate from an object language into the "syntax language." The "analyticity" of the analytical propositions is not in the sentences translated into. The "analyticity" resides in translatability from one language to another, that is capturing the meaning in the syntax language that remains once the "dross" is removed from object language. But there is a problem for Carnap's methodology. It is not always clear what kind of translation you want and what and why you omit certain concepts is, also, subject to debate. Logic cannot resolve these questions, even for Carnap. The Schilpp is fine for an idea of Carnap's final position on issues, but it is no substitute for approaching the original sources if your interest is understanding where is coming from. The problem for Carnap's methodology is that there are always sentences that logic simply cannot resolve. If I am right these are the philosophical questions. Let me give you an example. Carnap in Meaning and Necessity says, "Some remarks may help toclarify the sensein which we intend to us theterm 'proposition'. Like the term 'property', it is used neither for a linguistic expression nor for a subjective mental occurrence, but rather for something objective that may or may not be explemfied in nature." (MN. p. 27) Lest there be any doubt that Carnap is talking about the world and not logic, consider what he says just a bit later (after expressing disagreement with Russell), "Any proposition must be regarded as a complex entity, consisting of component entities, which, in their turn may be simple or again complex." (MN. p. 30) These are not analytic statement! They do not follow from logic alone; they are not empirical claims. They are metaphysical CONCLUSIONS! The problem for Carnap is that he must at some point exorcise these ontogical commitments. But his only approach can be to come up with some translation into a language that dispenses with property variables and constants. Neat trick, but by this time all the philosophy is over. You have an "analytical" translation but a metaphysical thesis. So the point is you FIRST establish by philosophical reasoning what kind of language you want to translate into. You then go about the business of creating such a language. Another point. The Carnap of 1927 is the Carnap under the heavy influence of Russell. By the time of Schilpp he is no longer so much under the influence of Russell as Tarski. The very concept of logic as between Russell and Frege on the one hand and Tarski and Carnap on the other is positively VAST. So just talking about "logic" is not of much value. Take Russell. The guy quoted above identify logic with philosophy. NONE of Russell's philosophical work of significance is pure logic. Take The Analysis of Matter or even Our Knowledge of the External World or many of those essays in Mysticism and Logic. Very little logic in these works. In fact the best logic in the second cited is on continuity and I don't think continuity is a logical notion as such. So my polint is: Carnap makes a lot of metaphysical claims; the metaphysical work is done before constructing canonical languages. As Bergmann said: there is a metaphysics to positivism! Carnap was such a metaphysician during his most productive years. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Friday, July 31, 2009 5:33:25 AM GMT -08:00 US/Canada Pacific Subject: Carnap on Philosophy I observed in an earlier message that: "Carnap was surely quite clear that the propositions of analytic philosophy are analytic." Not thinking that this would be a controversial claim. Steve asked for citations to support it, and I could not immediately locate a straightforward statement of this principle. In fact, I already had on my web site some relevant quotes, in my "Quotations from the Writings of Rudolph Carnap" at: http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/history/rcq001.htm >From the autobiographical part of the Schilpp volume (p13) talking of "The Logico-Analytic Method in Philosophy", Carnap says: "Whereas Frege had the strongest influence on me in the fields of logic and semantics, in my philosophical thinking in general I learned most from Bertrand Russell. In the winter of 1921 I read his book, Our Knowledge of the External World, as a Field For Scientific Method in Philosophy. Some passages made an especially vivid impression on me because they formulated clearly and explicitly a view of the aim and method of philosophy which I had implicitly held for some time. In the Preface he speaks about "the logical-analytic method of philosophy" and refers to Frege's work as the first complete example of this method. And on the very last pages of the book he gives a summarizing characterization of this philosophical method in the following words:" Then he quotes a passage from Russell which is also on my web site in a page entitled: "Quotations from the Writings of Bertrand Russell" at: http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/history/brq001.htm#Q008 "The study of logic becomes the central study in philosophy: it gives the method of research in philosophy, just as mathematics gives the method in physics...." "All this supposed knowledge in the traditional systems must be swept away, and a new beginning must be made. . . ." "To the large and still growing body of men engaged in the pursuit of science, . . . the new method, successful already in such time-honored problems as number, infinity, continuity, space and time, should make an appeal which the older methods have wholly failed to make. The one and only condition, I believe, which is necessary in order to secure for philosophy in the near future an achievement surpassing all that has hitherto been accomplished by philosophers, is the creation of a school of men with scientific training and philosophical interests, unhampered by the traditions of the past, and not misled by the literary methods of those who copy the ancients in all except their merits." (from: Our Knowledge of the External World, as a Field For Scientific Method in Philosophy) Carnap follows the Russell Quote with: "I felt as if this appeal had been directed to me personally. To work in this spirit would be my task from now on! And indeed henceforth the application of the new logical instrument for the purposes of analyzing scientific concepts and of clarifying philosophical problems has been the essential aim of my philosophical activity." There is a more explicit quote from Russell at: http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/history/brq001.htm#Q003 Which concludes: "Philosophy, if what has been said is correct, becomes indistinguishable from logic as that word has now come to be used." (from: On Scientific Method in Philosophy) My own first introduction to this conception of philosophy was in "Language Truth and Logic" in which Ayer gives his Oxonian interpretation of Logical Positivism. see: http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/history/aaq001.htm#Q002 "In other words, the propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character - that is, they do not describe the behaviour of physical, or even mental, objects; they express definitions, or the formal consequences of definitions. Accordingly we may say that philosophy is a department of logic*2. For we will see that the characteristic mark of a purely logical enquiry, is that it is concerned with the formal consequences of our definitions and not with questions of empirical fact." It was to Ayer's advantage as a propagandist that he was not so interested as Carnap was in the technical details. Consequently, he does make the plain statements which we sometimes have to hunt around for in Carnap. The best places to look for these in Carnap are in the Schilpp volume (the autobiographical part and also in those parts of the "responses" where he summarises his then current position before responding in detail to his critics), and in "Philosophy and Logical Syntax" which are transcripts of public lectures in London and are not therefore confused by too much technical detail. The Schilpp volume is in my view enormously important for any real understanding of Carnap's philosophy, because it is the norm for people to speak of Carnap as if his philosophy consisted of the Aufbau or terminated with his philosophy of logical syntax. His philosophy continued to improve throughout his life, for example, his presentation of semantics and analyticity is improved in the Schilpp to overcome some of the spurious objections raised by Quine. Anyway, going back to the main thesis, and looking again for short explicit statements to support my claim, we find: "The only proper task of Philosophy is Logical Analysis." (Philosophy and Logical Syntax I.7, p35) and the rest of that section is very relevant, discussing their disagreement with Wittgenstein on the status of philosophical propositions and leaving no doubt about what he thinks their status is, but actually not containing anything quite explicit enough for our present purposes. Later he asks: "What kind of sentences are those which express the results of logical Analysis?" (III.1 p68) But frustratingly his answer is: ."..sentences of logical syntax ..." not quite explicit enough perhaps. Actually, the most explicit concise indication of the view in question is in the diagram on page 32. I have transcribed this into my notes at: http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/bibliog/carnap34.htm#SecI6 What is says is (in my words): Philosophy as traditionally conceived may be considered to have three components, which are: 1. Metaphysical (including ethics) 2. Psychological 3. Logical Of these: 1. the first is expressive rather than descriptive, and therefore should properly be considered a form of art. 2. the second belongs to empirical science and only the third should properly be considered philosophy. (hence, the propositions of philosophy as conceived by Carnap are logical). On the word "analytic", he says on p55 of PLS, "Among the valid sentences some are analytic, namely those which are valid on the basis of the L-rules alone" (note that by "valid" he seems to mean "true") On the L-rules he has said on p50 "Take for instance the system of Principia Mathematica. In its present form it contains only such primitive sentences and rules of inference as have a purely logical character. Transformation rules of this logical or mathematical character we will call L-rules" and on p54 "Thus every valid sentence is analytic" and we see in his table that he means here L-valid. Finally, I observe, that though the discussion arising from my claim about Carnap has often considered matters which pertain to the tenability of Carnap's position, I have not myself asserted that it is tenable. I do not myself hold that all true propositions of philosophy are analytic, and have no inclination to eject from philosophy those which are not. I am inclined to think that Lao-Tzu had some interesting philosophical insights, but doubt that many of them could be construed as matters of logic. In Metaphysical Positivism a method of logical analysis for use in philosophy (and elsewhere) has a central place. Its scope of applicability is deductive reasoning. Any philosophy in which deductive arguments are found is a candidate for analysis by the methods which I advocate, as well as other demonstrative sciences, and nomologico-deductive science. And of course, many varieties of metaphysics. Roger Jones -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Sat Aug 1 14:59:52 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Sat, 1 Aug 2009 19:59:52 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Steve's and Roger's recent interchange In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1374D4EBE2F7498FB22FA6F8BBAE85D2@DFLVQC1J> Hi Bruce, I am trying to catch up with emails and just came across one of yours on which I have something to say. I deny that the propositions of analytic philosophy are analytic. This is a simple consequence of my view that there are no analytic propositions, and thus that there are no propositions that can be shown to be true by some purely analytic procedure. There is clearly something in Hume's fork: there is a difference between, on the one hand, thinking up possible observations or experiments that may decide between two (or more) theories, and, on the other hand, thinking up new theories to test or even devising thought experiments to test a theory imaginatively. But these are just different aspects of thinking; and all thinking is ultimately empirical if it is anything other than humbug (by 'ultimately empirical' I mean that it is intended eventually to yield falsifiable conclusions that can be tested against observation statements). I think this is reasonably clear as regards traditional philosophy. The ancient atomists' speculations about atoms and the void were metaphysical but eventually became scientific; Descartes' metaphysical identification of matter with extension was eventually rejected by science, and similarly for Kant's transcendental proof of Newtonian mechanics. But it also seems to be clear with regard to analytic philosophy. For example, contemporary 'virtue epistemology' seems to be inconsistent with the history of science and with some of the results of experimental psychology; Moore's claims about certainty are either false or pure humbug; the so-called 'principle of total evidence' is either false or humbug depending on how it is interpreted; and so on. Incidentally, my rejection of the notion of analytic truths does not derive from Quine: I have no time for his verificationism, holism, or radical meaning-scepticism. It derives from the work of Popper, Lakatos and Bartley, though none of them explicitly rejected the possibility of analytic propositions. The rejection must, of course, be an empirical conjecture if it is not to be humbug. What I mean by 'humbug' is not the positivists' meaninglessness. It is rather Popper's 'pseudo-science,' that is, perfectly meaningful statements that are secured from falsification by ad hoc manoeuvres. Whether or not a statement is humbug depends not on the statement but on the attitude of he who makes it. Cheers. Danny From Baynesr at comcast.net Sun Aug 2 09:08:14 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sun, 2 Aug 2009 13:08:14 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Hello! In-Reply-To: <749BB94D758C4F7BA87555D987E22B8F@Library> Message-ID: <731539796.8084101249218494574.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Yes, I second Ron's request. I think J.L. means Armstrong, right, J.L? Armstrong is a fine philosopher. _A World of States of Affairs_ is a work I frequently disagree with, but it's thought provoking to say the least; much influenced by the sort of thing D. Lewis was up to. A word on Hampshire: I've been a bit negative on Thought and Action. Was he in a lazy period when he wrote it? I read it standing on one foot, so to speak. But his work on Spinoza which I read years ago was a very fine work; very good! Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Ron Barnette" To: jlsperanza at aol.com, hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Sent: Friday, July 31, 2009 6:23:27 PM GMT -08:00 US/Canada Pacific Subject: Hello! A bit of clarification in your last sentence? Do you mean "I met Armstrong....", or is there a sex-identity mixup?? Cheers, Ron Barnette -----Original Message----- From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of jlsperanza at aol.com Sent: Friday, July 31, 2009 2:43 PM To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Subject: The Taste of Schwater S. Bayne refers to Heathcocote & Armstrong, re: ?"the case of 'water = H20'." "Australia continues to dominate the world of philosophy." I met Anscombe and call me South American, but he just looks, sounds, and behaves like your common or garden regular ?Anglo? to me -- but then whenever I meet an Australian I misjudge him to be Cockney! -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Aug 5 13:12:59 2009 From: jlsperanza at aol.com (jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 05 Aug 2009 13:12:59 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Analytic Philosophy: The Latitude and The Longitude In-Reply-To: <219173233.7896881249127142004.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <219173233.7896881249127142004.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <8CBE4071E1FE166-1BD4-362@WEBMAIL-DZ25.sysops.aol.com> ?The problem with you is that you confuse longitude with latitude" Tweedledee to Tweedledum Historiography of Analytic Philosophy I agree with S. Bayne that Carnap can be one of the most metaphysica authors of all time! Especially, I read his writings which make Heidegger?s plunges into metaphysics a mere word play! How to Carnap: some simpler ways I forget how the philosophical lexicon defines a carnap. But this reminds me of Grice?s longitudinal and latitudinal unity of philosophy. And who?s a Carnap, other than Carnap? Other than Hume, does he credit a philosopher in the past whose views he feels like expanding (longitudinal unity). Grice was very provocative in this. He seems to have realised, when retiring -- the PGRICE thing was a festschrift -- that philosophers won?t do unless they can see theirselves (sic) in the grand chain of being of an activity that started with Thales. He notes that the study of the longitudinal unity is an enrichment when focusing on the ?greats? (who while dead, should be treated as ?live? with a bit of an idiomatic change here and there). On the other hand, there are what he called ?minor? figures. Nobody would have objected to his having listed Wollaston in the list, or Bosanquet (although I love this Balliol logic historian) -- but as M. Platts noted in his Mind review of the festschrift, t he fact that Grice goes on to include Witters among the minors was _meant_ to provoke. On the other hand, I think it was E. Gosse who said, I love a minor poet -- such as Housman: big poets are, er, too big. JL Speranza -----Original Message----- From: Baynesr at comcast.net To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Sat, Aug 1, 2009 8:45 am Subject: Re: Carnap on Philosophy "Among the valid sentences some are analytic, namely those which are valid on the basis of the L-rules alone" Now if philosophy is the search for analytical sentences then it is the search for L-rules, and if Carnap can be said to follow Russell remarks: "Philosophy, if what has been said is correct, becomes indistinguishable from logic as that word has now come to be used," the actual record of his work should show it. It does not. I am going to address two issues. First, Carnap's conception of philosophy and, second, Russell's relation to Carnap, the discussion having evolved as indicated by the change is subject header. I won't repeat what I've already said about Carnap's methodology. That methodolgy consists in the construction of formal metalanguages that translate from an object language into the "syntax language." The "analyticity" of the analytical propositions is not in the sentences translated into. The "analyticity" resides in translatability from one language to another, that is capturing the meaning in the syntax language that remains once the "dross" is removed from object language. But there is a problem for Carnap's methodology. It is not always clear what kind of translation you want and what and why you omit certain concepts is, also, subject to debate. Logic cannot resolve these questions, even for Carnap. The Schilpp is fine for an idea of Carnap's final position on issues, but it is no substitute for approaching the original sources if your interest is understanding where is coming from. The problem for Carnap's methodology is that there are always sentences that logic simply cannot resolve. If I am right these are the philosophical questions. Let me give you an example. Carnap in Meaning and Necessity says, "Some remarks may help toclarify the sensein which we intend to us theterm 'proposition'. Like the term 'property', it is used neither for a linguistic expression nor for a subjective mental occurrence, but rather for something objective that may or may not be explemfied in nature." (MN. p. 27) Lest there be any doubt that Carnap is talking about the world and not logic, consider what he says just a bit later (after expressing disagreement with Russell), "Any proposition must be regarded as a complex entity, consisting of component entities, which, in their turn may be simple or again complex." (MN. p. 30) These are not analytic statement! They do not follow from logic alone; they are not empirical claims . They are metaphysical CONCLUSIONS! The problem for Carnap is that he must at some point exorcise these ontogical commitments. But his only approach can be to come up with some translation into a language that dispenses with property variables and constants. Neat trick, but by this time all the philosophy is over. You have an "analytical" translation but a metaphysical thesis. So the point is you FIRST establish by philosophical reasoning what kind of language you want to translate into. You then go about the business of creating such a language. Another point. The Carnap of 1927 is the Carnap under the heavy influence of Russell. By the time of Schilpp he is no longer so much under the influence of Russell as Tarski. The very concept of logic as between Russell and Frege on the one hand and Tarski and Carnap on the other is positively VAST. So just talking about "logic" is not of much value. Take Russell. The guy quoted above identify logic with philosophy. NONE of Russell's philosophical work of significance is pure logic. Take The Analysis of Matter or even Our Knowledge of the External World or many of those essays in Mysticism and Logic. Very little logic in these works. In fact the best logic in the second cited is on continuity and I don't think continuity is a logical notion as such. So my polint is: Carnap makes a lot of metaphysical claims; the metaphysical work is done before constru cting canonical languages. As Bergmann said: there is a metaphysics to positivism! Carnap was such a metaphysician during his most productive years. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" <rbj at rbjones.com> To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Friday, July 31, 2009 5:33:25 AM GMT -08:00 US/Canada Pacific Subject: Carnap on Philosophy I observed in an earlier message that: ?? "Carnap was surely quite clear that ?? ?the propositions of analytic philosophy ?? ?are analytic." Not thinking that this would be a controversial claim. Steve asked for citations to support it, and I could not immediately locate a straightforward statement of this principle. In fact, I already had on my web site some relevant quotes, in my ?? "Quotations from the Writings of Rudolph Carnap" at: http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/history/rcq001.htm From the autobiographical part of the Schilpp volume (p13) talking of "The Logico-Analytic Method in Philosophy", Carnap says: ??"Whereas Frege had the strongest influence on me ?? in the fields of logic and semantics, in my philosophical ?? thinking in general I learned most from Bertrand Russell. ?? In the winter of 1921 I read his book, Our Knowledge of ?? the External World, as a Field For Scientific Method in ?? Philosophy. Some passages made an especially vivid impression A 0? on me because they formulated clearly and explicitly a view ?? of the aim and method of philosophy which I had implicitly held ?? for some time. In the Preface he speaks about ?? "the logical-analytic method of philosophy" and refers to ?? Frege's work as the first complete example of this method. ?? And on the very last pages of the book he gives a summarizing ?? characterization of this philosophical method ?? in the following words:" Then he quotes a passage from Russell which is also on my web site in a page entitled: ?? "Quotations from the Writings of Bertrand Russell" at: http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/history/brq001.htm#Q008 ?? ?"The study of logic becomes the central study in philosophy: ?? ? it gives the method of research in philosophy, ?? ? just as mathematics gives the method in physics...." ?? ?"All this supposed knowledge in the traditional systems ?? ? must be swept away, and a new beginning must be made. . . ." ?? ?"To the large and still growing body of men engaged in ?? ? the pursuit of science, . . . the new method, successful ?? ? already in such time-honored problems as number, infinity, ?? ? continuity, space and time, should make an appeal which the ?? ? older methods have wholly failed to make. ?? 0 The one and only condition, I believe, which is necessary ?? ? in order to secure for philosophy in the near future ?? ? an achievement surpassing all that has hitherto been accomplished ?? ? by philosophers, is the creation of a school of men with ?? ? scientific training and philosophical interests, unhampered ?? ? by the traditions of the past, and not misled by the literary ?? ? methods of those who copy the ancients in all except their merits." (from: Our Knowledge of the External World, ?as a Field For Scientific Method in Philosophy) Carnap follows the Russell Quote with: ?? "I felt as if this appeal had been directed to me personally. ?? ?To work in this spirit would be my task from now on! ?? ?And indeed henceforth the application of the new logical ?? ?instrument for the purposes of analyzing scientific concepts ?? ?and of clarifying philosophical problems has been ?? ?the essential aim of my philosophical activity." There is a more explicit quote from Russell at: http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/history/brq001.htm#Q003 Which concludes: ?? "Philosophy, if what has been said is correct, ?? ?becomes indistinguishable from logic as that word ?? ?has now come to be used." (from: On Scientific Method in Philosophy) My own first introduction to this c onception of philosophy was in "Language Truth and Logic" in which Ayer gives his Oxonian interpretation of Logical Positivism. see: http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/history/aaq001.htm#Q002 ??"In other words, the propositions of philosophy are not factual, ?? but linguistic in character - that is, they do not describe ?? the behaviour of physical, or even mental, objects; ?? they express definitions, or the formal consequences of definitions. ?? Accordingly we may say that philosophy is a department of logic*2. ?? For we will see that the characteristic mark of ?? a purely logical enquiry, is that it is concerned with ?? the formal consequences of our definitions and not with ?? questions of empirical fact." It was to Ayer's advantage as a propagandist that he was not so interested as Carnap was in the technical details. Consequently, he does make the plain statements which we sometimes have to hunt around for in Carnap. The best places to look for these in Carnap are in the Schilpp volume (the autobiographical part and also in those parts of the "responses" where he summarises his then current position before responding in detail to his critics), and in "Philosophy and Logical Syntax" which are transcripts of public lectures in London and are not therefore confused by too much technical detail. The Schilpp volume is in my view enormously important for any real understanding of Carn ap's philosophy, because it is the norm for people to speak of Carnap as if his philosophy consisted of the Aufbau or terminated with his philosophy of logical syntax. His philosophy continued to improve throughout his life, for example, his presentation of semantics and analyticity is improved in the Schilpp to overcome some of the spurious objections raised by Quine. Anyway, going back to the main thesis, and looking again for short explicit statements to support my claim, we find: ?? "The only proper task of Philosophy is Logical Analysis." (Philosophy and Logical Syntax I.7, p35) and the rest of that section is very relevant, discussing their disagreement with Wittgenstein on the status of philosophical propositions and leaving no doubt about what he thinks their status is, but actually not containing anything quite explicit enough for our present purposes. Later he asks: ??"What kind of sentences are those which express ?? the results of logical Analysis?" (III.1 p68) But frustratingly his answer is: ."..sentences of logical syntax ..." not quite explicit enough perhaps. Actually, the most explicit concise indication of the view in question is in the diagram on page 32. I have transcribed this into my notes at: http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/bibliog/carnap34.htm#SecI6 What is says is (in my words): Philosophy as traditionally conceived may be considered to have three components, which are: ?? 1. Metaphysical (including ethics) ?? 2. Psychological ?? 3. Logical Of these: ?? 1. the first is expressive rather than descriptive, ?? ? ?and therefore should properly be considered a form of art. ?? 2. the second belongs to empirical science and only the third should properly be considered philosophy. (hence, the propositions of philosophy as conceived by Carnap are logical). On the word "analytic", he says on p55 of PLS, "Among the valid sentences some are analytic, namely those which are valid on the basis of the L-rules alone" (note that by "valid" he seems to mean "true") On the L-rules he has said on p50 "Take for instance the system of Principia Mathematica. In its present form it contains only such primitive sentences and rules of inference as have a purely logical character. Transformation rules of this logical or mathematical character we will call L-rules" and on p54 "Thus every valid sentence is analytic" and we see in his table that he means here L-valid. Finally, I observe, that though the discussion arising from my claim about Carnap has often considered matters which pertain to the tenability of Carnap's position, I have not myself asserted that it is tenable. I do not myself hold that all true propositions of philosophy are analytic, and have no inclination to eject from philosophy those which are20not. I am inclined to think that Lao-Tzu had some interesting philosophical insights, but doubt that many of them could be construed as matters of logic. In Metaphysical Positivism a method of logical analysis for use in philosophy (and elsewhere) has a central place. Its scope of applicability is deductive reasoning. Any philosophy in which deductive arguments are found is a candidate for analysis by the methods which I advocate, as well as other demonstrative sciences, and nomologico-deductive science. And of course, many varieties of metaphysics. Roger Jones = From jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Aug 5 12:44:35 2009 From: jlsperanza at aol.com (jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 05 Aug 2009 12:44:35 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Conversational Impenetrability In-Reply-To: <749BB94D758C4F7BA87555D987E22B8F@Library> References: <749BB94D758C4F7BA87555D987E22B8F@Library> Message-ID: <8CBE403260B0D6D-1BD4-1F4@WEBMAIL-DZ25.sysops.aol.com> I did meet Armstrong, thank you! I recall he was lecturing finely on, of all things, facts and events. It sounded all pretty Davidsonian to me, and since it was a seminar type thing, with audience participation, I did recall he elicited from me the definition of an ?event? as a ?time-consuming fact?. His approach looked strictly Humean and atomistic, but fun. I had been familiar with Armstrong?s views in the less cited paper on "Meaning and Communication", where he considers seriously the belief-condition on intention. In views like his, Humpty Dumpty cannot really mean, ?There?s a knockdown argument for you, Alice", when he utters, ?glory? -- nor can he mean that Alice should keep his contributions short by uttering "Impenetrability". I entitled a paper "Dumpty?s Impenetrability" that was published in, of all places, a rather unknown journal called "Jabberwocky" (published at Luton, Beds), where I suggest that even if Dumpty cannot mean this or that, if Armstrong is right, you still cannot have a communicative omelette without breaking an egg (or two). JL Speranza -----Original Message----- From: Ron Barnette To: jlsperanza at aol.com; hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Sent: Fri, Jul 31, 2009 10:23 pm Subject: Hello! A bit of clarification in your last sentence? Do you mean "I met Armstrong....", or is there a sex-identity mixup?? Cheers, Ron Barnette -----Original Message-----=0 D From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of jlsperanza at aol.com Sent: Friday, July 31, 2009 2:43 PM To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Subject: The Taste of Schwater S. Bayne refers to Heathcocote & Armstrong, re: ?"the case of 'water = H20'." "Australia continues to dominate the world of philosophy." I met Anscombe and call me South American, but he just looks, sounds, and behaves like your common or garden regular ?Anglo? to me -- but then whenever I meet an Australian I misjudge him to be Cockney! From jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Aug 6 17:50:35 2009 From: jlsperanza at aol.com (jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2009 17:50:35 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Analytic Philosophy: Oxonian Varieties In-Reply-To: <8CBE4EFDEDDD64A-E18-184D@WEBMAIL-MA03.sysops.aol.com> References: <8CBE4EFDEDDD64A-E18-184D@WEBMAIL-MA03.sysops.aol.com> Message-ID: <8CBE4F7103476D6-E18-1AD0@WEBMAIL-MA03.sysops.aol.com> In his interesting post on Carnap, R. B. Jones goes autobiographical and writes: "My own first introduction to this [logicist] conception of philosophy was in "Language Truth and Logic" in which Ayer gives his Oxonian interpretation of Logical Positivism." and goes on to quote a vivid passage from Gollancz's vintage of 1946 fresh from his tidily kept notes at http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/history/aaq001.htm#Q002 AYER: "In other words, the propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character - that is, they do not describe the behaviour of physical, or even mental, objects; they express definitions, or the formal consequences of definitions. Accordingly we may say that philosophy is a department of logic*2. For we will see that the characteristic mark of a purely logical enquiry, is that it is concerned with the formal consequences of our definitions and not with questions of empirical fact." Jones comments: "It was to Ayer's advantage as a propagandist that he was not so interested as Carnap was in the technical details. Consequently, he does make the plain statements (...)." Exactly, It should perhaps, but not to nitpick, noted that by 1946 Ayer had stopped being (cfr. beating one's wife) an Oxonian philosopher? (Interesting that his extremist views had been held while an undergrad at Oxon, but did he ever form a school?). Having read his auto-bios I felt that he never perhaps fit in Oxford. He was a Londoner born and bred and teaching at London by the time the Gollancz book was published? (I have to review the dates, and this new mailer I'm using make things all very clumsy to me!) But back to the quote by Ayer. He is saying that propositions of philosophy are 'linguistic'. Seeing that this is a rather clumsy thing to say -- try to express a proposition that is NOT linguistic -- he feels the need to add that they are 'logical'. The issue of 'logical construction' may be what he is having in mind? As when Grice, in 1941, predating Ayer, defines "I" as a logical construction (via Broad) in terms of mnemic states. The issue of 'definition', that Ayer also plays with, would need a Robinson (before you can say Robinson) for Oxford to feel quaintly satisfied with the notion (His classic for the Clarendon Press, Definition -- Robinson a fellow of Oriel). While Grice's "I" may be said to define "I" (in terms of mnemic states), it may be argued that the speech act, as it were, underlying the collective act of collective philosophers is not just DEFINE. The philosophical gamut may cover: commend, show, testify, express, impress, or what have you! (In fact, in our best moments, philosophers just philosophize, which should be viewed, as SOMETHING indeed alla Ayer playing with definitions and logical entailments, where the focus is on the yielding of a conclusion analytically from its premises) Jones is very right later on to distinguish the branches of philosophy. Since Ayer was, after all, Oxonian in essentialist spirit or not, a Lit. Hum. (was he? His tutors must have been overwhelmed, but then Ryle wanted a change), one wonders what conception of philosophy as taught by the Lit. Hum. programme Ayer was rejecting. Indeed psychologia rationalis, ontologia, metaphysica, ontologia specialis, and the rest of it. And THEN there was 'dialectica' or logic. This the Classics considered notably vis a vis ethika. The logika propositions were later schematised by the schoolers (as I prefer to spell the scholars) as 'trivial' (as in trivial) pursuit -- along with Chomsky's grammar -- and this makes for a charming triviality in a dictum by Russell that Grice adored: grammar as a "pretty good guide to logical form". So all this must be resonating in Ayer's mind with a vengeance. Especially in validating the empiricist positions of Hume and Locke: with all the minutiae for impressions, ideas, etc. they were after all just defining terms and playing symbolically with them. I still think that nobody can beat Grice ("Conceptual analysis and the province of philosophy", delivered for, of all audience, the girls at Wellesey), He is so clear as to what analytic philosophy, Oxonian style, did look like -- the fact that he kept files (Chapman tells us), entitled, "Oxford philosophy" suggests that he was feeling the burden of responsibility of a self-appointed annalist of Oxonian analyticity, as it were. (Recall the marketing thing too: he was lecturing mainly the USA as proponent of "Oxonian philosophy" and he had to keep the right tracks). (What charms me about Grice on analysis -- vis a vis eg Hare or Hampshire -- is that he is never one for generalising, and speaks just for hisself (as it were) and the bite that the motivation of one conceptual issue in need for analysis would have for him) Grice mentions Ayer's Language, truth and logic in his Prejudices and predilections (the original title of his life and opinions) and his sentiment seems to be that Ayer had gone too far? (He had, after all, blatanlty crossed the Channel and come back with an attitude after his sojourn at Vienna -- and not precisely humming The Merry Widow). Urmson (Philosophical analysis betweeen the wars) and Warnock (English philosophy since 1900) have expressed similar views on what they felt was the 'crudity' of Ayer's approach (but then you HAVE to be an Oxon don in postwar Oxford to find that quaint book crude!). As if Ayer's tenets were found too extreme for a philosophy don to digest. True, Ayer concocted his views while still an undergrad at Oxford, not a 'don' proper -- but, back to the Oxonianism of his views, can you claim to be truly Oxonian when you've been appointed Grote prof. of philosophy of mind at London? Can you have your cake and eat it, or hunt with the hounds and run with the hare? (Perhaps Ayer finally gained Oxford status when rebuking the American boxer, "You may be an international boxing star, but I'm the former Wykeham professor of Logic"), The topic of Oxonian analysis fascinates me and P. M. S. Hacker, who succeeded Grice (in a second degree, after Baker) as tutor at St. John's, I'm pleased to learn, has undertaken the description of Oxonian and other varieties of analysis to a nice level of detail that should prove useful to the historiographer of philosophy. It would seem that, you count the members of the playgroup that Grice belonged to, and there are as many varieties of analysis as there were varieties of, say, taste for different blends of tobacco (not infinite, though). Cheers, J. L. Speranza From rbj at rbjones.com Sat Aug 8 12:09:25 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Sat, 8 Aug 2009 17:09:25 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Carnap on Philosophy In-Reply-To: <219173233.7896881249127142004.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <219173233.7896881249127142004.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <200908081709.25417.rbj@rbjones.com> Steve's recent message raised a number of points in relation to Carnap and Russell, particularly in relation to their conception of philosophy as logic. I'm going to mount a defence of this conception of philosophy (though my own conception is very much wider than that). First a few words about the phrase "the propositions of philosophy". This should be thought of along the same lines as the phrase "the propositions of mathematics" when thinking of the logicist thesis in relations to mathematics. The phrase is not intended to refer every proposition asserted by a mathematician, not even those which he asserts "qua mathematician". Nor is it to be presumed that the enunciation of "the propositions of mathematics" is the only or even the most important contribution which mathematicians make to our knowledge. Mathematicians propose definitions, describe methods, talk about the work of previous mathematicians, about the value of different parts of mathematics, sometimes address philosophical matters, and engage in politics and polemics. Some or all of these may be considered genuinely mathematical and important, but they do not consist in the discovery or enunciation of "the propositions of mathematics". The propositions of mathematics are those whose subject matter is properly mathematical and which have been proven by accepted methods. This is a crude characterisation, but probably good enough for present purposes. A more concise and precise modern approximation is: those mathematical propositions which can be rendered and proven in first order set theory. The phrase "the propositions of philosophy", when used by Russell, Carnap and Ayer should be understood in an analogous way. It may be, and in fact it probably is, that in Carnap's conception of philosophy the principle task of the philosopher is to make proposals about languages, about analytic methods, about conceptual schemes, or even about ostensibly metaphysical matters such as "what exists", but none of this consists in the enunciation of "propositions of philosophy" in the sense in which this phrase is used when these are asserted to be analytic. Most importantly one must be aware of the distinction between making a proposal, and making a claim, for so much of Carnap's philosophy must be understood as the former rather than the latter, even though in his youthful enthusiasm, like Ayer, he often uses language which sounds much more assertive and dogmatic than one would expect from someone merely making a proposal. This is particularly relevant to ontology and metaphysics. Carnap was happy to propose languages in which abstract entities can be proven to exist, but not happy to assert, except as propositions internal to such a language (and in that case analytic) that abstract entities exist. This extends arbitrarily to any apparently metaphysical claims which Carnap might consider of practical utility, e.g. talk about propositions. It might be useful to state my own position, which I intend to articulate in my volume on Metaphysical Positivism, since that is what I advocate, and my defence of Russell and Carnap is based on my belief that their position was similar in the most important features. Metaphysical Positivism is a variety of analytic philosophy based around a method of logical analysis, the intention of which is to make deductive arguments in philosophy as reliable as they are in mathematics. The method is illustrated by my document on Aristotle at: http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/pp/doc/t028.pdf in which I have used formal modelling with ProofPower in an attempt to analyse the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle. This document contains two parts, an informal part and a formal part, of which the latter consists in large part of definitions of various kinds, and of theorems proven in the context of those definitions. There is a clear distinction in this paper between propositions which have been formally proven and everything else. The former are marked by the turnstile symbol "|-", and are also listed separately in the appendices. In the appendices are theory listings which contain all the formal definitions and the theorems proven from them. These theorems are known to be necessary with a very high level of confidence, it is improbable that they will ever be refuted. Everything else in the document, including the question of whether the formal models have any relevance to the work of Aristotle, is highly speculative. The idea of the method is to ensure the rigour of deductive reasoning in philosophy, in a way which does not constrain the scope of philosophy. Now, I believe that Russell and Carnap sought by similar means (though lacking the technology) to establish philosophical reasoning on a similarly solid footing. They diverge from the neutrality of my method (which says nothing about scope of philosophy), in the addition of either or both of: 1. Claims about what philosophy is. 2. Claims about what philosophy should be. I don't in fact believe that either philosopher could credible be said to believe, despite their explicit statements appearing to assert it, that philosophy IS logic, and we can see when we read them that they are rather advocating that it should be. In this they are also to be understood in the manner suggested above, as talking only of a rather select number of the things which philosophers assert, and with that caveat I think we can say that there is very little between their position and my advocacy of formal methods. Let me now pass to some detailed responses on how I believe these philosophers should be understood. On Saturday 01 August 2009 12:45:42 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: >"Among the valid sentences some are analytic, namely >those which are valid on the basis of the L-rules alone" > >Now if philosophy is the search for analytical sentences then it is the > search for L-rules, I don't believe that Carnap would agree here, and nor do I. The L-rules constitute the definition of a language, and they are thus proposals rather than results. Insofar as philosophy is "the search for analytic truths" (I would not put it that way myself), these analytic truths are not the L-rules, which are implicit definitions rather than propositions, but in those sentences whose truth can be established by the use of the L-rules. > and if Carnap can be said to follow Russell remarks: >"Philosophy, if what has been said is correct, becomes indistinguishable > from logic as that word has now come to be used," > >the actual record of his work should show it. It does not. Yes, "indistinguishable from logic" is a bit strong, especially as that phrase might today be understood (given that logic is now largely meta-theoretic, and "logical truth" tends to be narrowly construed). However, I will try to defend Carnap's claim about the propositions of philosophy being analytic (in the context of his demarcation of philosophy). >I won't repeat what I've already said about Carnap's methodology. That > methodolgy consists in the construction of formal metalanguages that > translate from an object language into the "syntax language." The > "analyticity" of the analytical propositions is not in the sentences > translated into. The "analyticity" resides in translatability from one > language to another, that is capturing the meaning in the syntax language > that remains once the "dross" is removed from object language. But there is > a problem for Carnap's methodology. I'm afraid I don't accept this account of Carnap's philosophy. Semantic ascent does, unfortunately and unnecessarily, play a role in his method of logical syntax, but to say that his method consists in the construction of formal metalanguages to effect the translation seems to me incorrect. As far as his statement of method in "Philosophy and Logical Syntax" is concerned, he does not to my recollection even mention such formal languages, and it might be reasonable to criticise the method he describes in that book because it lacks any account of how this translation is to be effected. The languages which he talks about defining there are, I think, intended to be various languages for use in science. The analyticity of the analytic propositions does not reside in their translatability. This is simply the method proposed for demonstrating their analyticity. We take a sentence in some formally defined language which mentions "pseudo-object" and we demonstrate the analyticity of that sentence via translation into some sentence about syntax. However, if we look at the more precise statements in LSL about the translation we find, to my relief, that its role is largely one of explication. Carnap does not tell us, even in LSL, how the translation is to be accomplished, but he is quite precise about what it must deliver. It must deliver something which is "equipollent" with the original. So the method says, to prove a pseudo-object sentence, take the sentence and translate it into some equipollent sentence which is L-true, and then prove the translation using the L-rules. But "equipollence" is L-equivalence I believe, and in any reasonable logical system, all L-true sentences will be equipollent, and any sentence equipollent with an L-true sentence will be provable using the L-rules whether or not one proves it via an equivalence with some sentence which is about syntax. Carnap's stuff about translation is therefore inessential. You have to supply a complete set of L-rules in the definition of the language to fully capture the intended semantics, and if you do that then all the analytic sentences will be L-true, whether or not they mention objects. Carnap's talk about analytic sentences being "about syntax" (which I deprecate) can be seen to be a very minor defect, since the methods proposed work just as well if you delete all talk of semantic ascent. It is only Carnap's explanations which are damaged by the removal. >It is not always clear what kind of translation you want and what and why > you omit certain concepts is, also, subject to debate. Logic cannot resolve > these questions, even for Carnap. I hope I have now covered this. > The Schilpp is fine for an idea of > Carnap's final position on issues, but it is no substitute for approaching > the original sources if your interest is understanding where is coming > from. Yes, but if his final position is more tenable than the earlier ones, then a critique based too closely on the earlier work may not be a sound critique of the overall conception. > The problem for Carnap's methodology is that there are always > sentences that logic simply cannot resolve. If I am right these are the > philosophical questions. Let me give you an example. Carnap in Meaning and > Necessity says, > >"Some remarks may help toclarify the sensein which we intend to us theterm > 'proposition'. Like the term 'property', it is used neither for a > linguistic expression nor for a subjective mental occurrence, but rather > for something objective that may or may not be explemfied in nature." (MN. > p. 27) > >Lest there be any doubt that Carnap is talking about the world and not > logic, consider what he says just a bit later (after expressing > disagreement with Russell), > >"Any proposition must be regarded as a complex entity, consisting of > component entities, which, in their turn may be simple or again complex." > (MN. p. 30) > >These are not analytic statement! They probably are. Even for Russell, who understood a proposition as a logical fiction with real constituents, it is analytic that a proposition is complex. Carnap might well have taken the position that propositions are completely abstract, in which case any truth about them is going to be analytic. > They do not follow from logic alone; they > are not empirical claims. They are metaphysical CONCLUSIONS! But for Carnap any true claim which is not contingent is analytic and logical. L-true, Analytic, Logical, Necessary all mean the same thing. And you can't argue this, it is a proposal for use of language, and the entire philosophy has to be understood in relation to this proposal. You can reject then proposal if you like, but you can't adopt some other usage and then criticise Carnap's claims about analyticity of philosophy as if he meant by that term something other than he actually did mean. > The problem > for Carnap is that he must at some point exorcise these ontogical > commitments. Carnap has a well articulated position in relation to such things, both I think in relation to his syntactic and his semantic phases, though I think the latter stronger. This later one is of course that in "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology". >Take Russell. The guy quoted above identify logic with philosophy. NONE of > Russell's philosophical work of significance is pure logic. Take The > Analysis of Matter or even Our Knowledge of the External World or many of > those essays in Mysticism and Logic. Very little logic in these works. In > fact the best logic in the second cited is on continuity and I don't think > continuity is a logical notion as such. Russell, it seems to me, made less serious attempts to carry through his logicist conception of philosophy, partly I think because his appetite for formalism had been quenched by Principia. Also I think he actually had a rather less formal conception of the key features of Principia Mathematica (than Carnap). Russell had a conception of analysis. He begins with a kind of analysis which he inherited from Leibniz, in which complex predicates are analysable into simple predicates (which I think is questionable). His more original contribution is that of logical construction. In the Principia mathematical objects were logical constructions from individuals. Russell following ideas of Whitehead, wanted to show that mind and matter, and hence all else, could both be construed as logical constructions from individuals (events? sense data?). Now if talk about mind and matter is talk about logical constructions of this kind, then claims to that effect will be analytic elucidations of the meaning of the concepts and of conclusions inferred from those meanings. So I think there is a rationale here which might explain how Russell could conceive of at least some of his post Principia philosophy as logic (if not formal). I would draw an analogy here with theoretical physics. Theoretical physics might seem to be about material objects and hence to be making contingent claims. But a theoretical physicist is likely to be doing just mathematics. He makes no empirical claims, he simply takes some theory as given, e.g. general relativity, and works out the logical consequences of the theory (the mathematical consequences, which for logicists are logical). Russell's "analysis" of mind and matter is not intended to make contingent claims about mind and matter, it is intended to draw conclusions from the concepts. Possibly to be drawing conclusions from proposals about what the concepts should mean, but possibly not for Russell seemed to have a natural metaphysical dogmatism, which I agree is a bit at odds with his logicist conception of philosophy. Carnap seems to start out with that same conflict, but as he matures he realises that he must present himself as making proposals about languages and methods if his philosophy is to be self-consistent. >So my polint is: Carnap makes a lot of metaphysical claims; the metaphysical > work is done before constructing canonical languages. As Bergmann said: > there is a metaphysics to positivism! Carnap was such a metaphysician > during his most productive years. Carnap has to be construed as proposing or adopting a particular usage of "metaphysical" as well as of concepts like "analytic". In "Philosophy and Logical Syntax" he does explicitly exclude certain kinds of metaphysics from the scope of his critique. His account is on p15, he has a paragraph beginning: "I will call metaphysical..." and says: "I do not include in metaphysics those theories -- sometimes called metaphysical -- whose object is to arrange the most general propositions of the various regions of scientific knowledge in a well-ordered system." These he regards as empirical. To this one may add, certain non empirical claims about abstract objects, e.g. those of mathematics, which he regarded as analytic. When we progress to the later philosophy, when he adopts the principle of tolerance and writes about ontology in "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology", we find an enormous range of what might have been thought of as metaphysics, has now been slotted into Carnap's scheme of legitimacy. So to condemn Carnap of inconsistency it does not suffice to establish some proposition of metaphysics which he asserts. Usually when he does this he should be construed either as putting forward a proposal for usage, or as elaborating the consequences of such proposals. (I don't think he engages in the synthetic metaphysics which he finds acceptable, because that would not be philosophy). Too many words I'm afraid, but I have tried to explain why I do not myself think, on the basis of my rather limited reading of Carnap that his properly philosophical assertions violated his conception of philosophy as analytic. I do accept however, that there probably were such things, I think it would be a great achievement if he had been consistent about this in the course of trying to put together this conception of philosophy, it is normal for philosophers not to comply with their own conception of philosophy, but I think Carnap came closer than most, and that a similar conception of philosophy could be consistently adopted. i.e. whatever other faults it has, I don't think it is an incoherent conception of philosophy. RBJ From rbj at rbjones.com Sat Aug 8 15:52:14 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Sat, 8 Aug 2009 20:52:14 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Analytic Philosophy: Oxonian Varieties In-Reply-To: <8CBE4F7103476D6-E18-1AD0@WEBMAIL-MA03.sysops.aol.com> References: <8CBE4EFDEDDD64A-E18-184D@WEBMAIL-MA03.sysops.aol.com> <8CBE4F7103476D6-E18-1AD0@WEBMAIL-MA03.sysops.aol.com> Message-ID: <200908082052.14767.rbj@rbjones.com> On Thursday 06 August 2009 22:50:35 jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: >and goes on to quote a vivid passage from Gollancz's vintage of 1946 >fresh from his tidily kept notes at I think my web site is a bit confusing about this, but, the first edition was 1936, and I think the quotes probably all come from that edition. >Exactly, It should perhaps, but not to nitpick, noted that by 1946 Ayer >had >stopped being (cfr. beating one's wife) an Oxonian philosopher? >(Interesting that his extremist views had been held while an undergrad >at Oxon, but did he ever form a school?). Having >read his auto-bios I felt that he never perhaps fit in Oxford. He was a >Londoner born and bred and teaching at London by the time the Gollancz >book was published? (I have to review the dates, and this new mailer >I'm >using make things all very clumsy to me!) Until I came across you JL, I was sufficiently ignorant of Oxford philosophy to think Ayer the only logical positivist (empiricist) there. Only after your talk of all these playgroups and things did I get any sense that Ayer was not a complete loner. "Language Truth and Logic" does feel completely at odds with the general tenor of Oxford philosophy. >But back to the quote by Ayer. He is saying that propositions of >philosophy are 'linguistic'. Seeing >that this is a rather clumsy thing to say -- try to express a >proposition that is NOT linguistic -- he feels the need to add that >they are 'logical'. The issue of 'logical construction' may be what he >is having in mind? As when Grice, in 1941, predating Ayer, defines "I" >as a logical construction (via Broad) in terms of mnemic states. My guess is that he was not thinking of logical constructions. A good description of how analytic propositions may be construed as "linguistic" may be found in Quine's "Two Dogmas". "It is obvious that truth in general depends on both language and extra-linguistic fact. The statement 'Brutus killed Caesar' would be false if the world had been different in certain ways, but it would also be false if the word 'killed' happened rather to have the sense of 'begat'. Thus one is tempted to suppose in general that the truth of a statement is somehow analysable into a linguistic component and a factual component. Given this supposition it next seems reasonable that in some statements the factual component should be null; and that these are the analytic statements." I think this kind of consideration, principally the lack of empirical content leaving nothing but language to be considered, is probably what was driving Ayer. (logic is not considered a factor, perhaps because it is logic we are trying to explain) >(In fact, in our best moments, philosophers just philosophize, which >should be viewed, as SOMETHING indeed alla Ayer playing with >definitions and logical entailments, where the focus is on the yielding >of a conclusion analytically from its premises) Just philosophising could get a pass, if when we do this we are not making definite claims. If we just opine, or muse. On the question of what part of Oxonian philosophy Ayer thought himself to be rejecting, I can offer a bizarre kind of answer to what he should have been rejecting of the Oxonian philosophy which followed him, using your beloved Grice for fodder. Quoting from my own precis of Grice's account of his own variant of analysis: http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/bibliog/grice89.htm#PostwarOxfordPhilosophy "It is an important part of the philosopher's task to analyze, describe or characterize the ordinary uses of certain expressions. Grice particularly mentions that questions of linguisitic propriety may be of philosophical importance." Describing ordinary usage consists in the making of contingent claims, and belongs therefore from the point of view of the logical positivists, in the empirical sciences, linguistics possibly. Matters of propriety, may be even further from analyticity. For my own part, I make no contribution to the discussion of what should or should not count as philosophy, but I make prescriptions about what deductive reasoning should count as rigorous and conclusive. So long as Grice only _describes_, then my prescriptions are irrelevant. As soon as he makes a purported deduction, my prescriptions become applicable, and to meet my proposed standards of rigour he needs to be so precise about the premises from which his deductions proceed, and so careful to establish that his premises are logically consistent, that he would in effect (even if not formally) have constructed an abstract model of his subject matter (if he were close to compliance). His reasoning is then properly construed as about an abstract model, not about natural language, and its relevance to natural language will be moot. >The topic of Oxonian analysis fascinates me and P. M. S. Hacker, who >succeeded Grice (in a second degree, after Baker) as tutor at St. >John's, I'm pleased to learn, has undertaken the description of Oxonian >and other varieties of analysis to a nice level of detail that should >prove useful to the historiographer of philosophy. I searched in Google books for something like this but failed. Do you have a reference. Hackers "Wittgenstein's Place in 20th Century Analytic Philosophy" is an interesting source of info about varieties of analysis. (I shall soon have to rewrite my very lightweight page on that topic). >It would seem that, you count the members of the playgroup that Grice >belonged to, and there are as many varieties of analysis as there were >varieties of, say, taste for different blends of tobacco (not infinite, >though). From which we should perhaps conclude that the real contrast between Viennese and Oxonian philosophy is that the former aspires to be like science and the latter like art. RBJ From aune at philos.umass.edu Sun Aug 9 07:58:24 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2009 07:58:24 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Analytic Philosophy: Oxonian Varieties In-Reply-To: <200908082052.14767.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <8CBE4EFDEDDD64A-E18-184D@WEBMAIL-MA03.sysops.aol.com> <8CBE4F7103476D6-E18-1AD0@WEBMAIL-MA03.sysops.aol.com> <200908082052.14767.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <6F7724C4-1832-44CC-A018-86B7B372D45F@philos.umass.edu> Since Roger has directed interest to Rudolf Carnap, I thought that those following the discussion might be interested in my remarks about Carnap as a teacher, which I included in a philosophical memoir I have been writing. The remarks follow: Before climbing up on my soap box, I was describing the seminars I took at UCLA in the academic year 1957-58. In the semester following John Wisdom's seminar[1] I took Carnap's seminar in logical theory. This seminar was no more demanding than Wisdom's, but it was considerably more technical. The subject was Carnap's version of the logic of relations (he followed pretty much the exposition in Principia Mathematica but he used his lambda operator in place of the symbolism of class abstraction) and its extension to a non- quantitative treatment of space-time topology. Except (as I recall) for one report by David Kaplan, who appeared to be enrolled in the seminar although he was probably engaged in preparing exercises for the volume in which the seminar material was later published,[2] Carnap himself presented material in the seminar sessions. His procedure was to hand out mimeographed sheets containing the formulas he proceeded to discuss. He would read a formula, explain its meaning if its meaning were not obvious, sometimes indicate how it could be proved if it were a theorem, and then go on to the next formula. (In indicating how a theorem could be proved in the logic of relations, he liked to use arrow diagrams as heuristic aids. If a relation were transitive, say, it could be represented by a diagram in which an arrow would be drawn between points a and c if it connected points a and b and also points b and c.) Listening to him presenting such material was like reading a textbook. If he were a lesser person, the class might have seemed to be a waste of time; but I and the other students were so impressed by his intelligence, his learning, and his earnest, kindly personality that we felt fortunate to be in his presence. He was not teaching so much as presenting the results of his research. It was our job to understand him. In my experience philosophers who have achieved some distinction often possess large, unattractive egos, and it is not uncommon for them to speak ill of other philosophers, often equally distinguished, whom they consider rivals. Carnap was not like this at all--at least in my experience. He was obviously self-confident, but he was not in the least vain, self-important, or disparaging of those who disagreed with him. On one occasion he gently admonished me and another student when, no doubt hoping to impress him with our commitment to the tough- minded ideology he was noted for espousing, we expressed our utter contempt for some claim by Heidegger. His response was immediate: "Tolerance, boys, tolerance." It was clear that he didn't object to our being critical of Heidegger; he objected to our intolerant manner: We should treat others with respect even when we think they are wrong. He obviously felt we should be careful of tooting our own horn, too, for he was noticeably self-effacing in discussion. He often said such things as "We logical empiricists now think that ?," speaking as if he belonged to a team of investigators in which personal achievement is subordinate to a collective purpose of working out a mutually acceptable "scientific" philosophy. I have never felt that I belonged to an investigative team in philosophy, but in subsequent years it has always seemed to me that Carnap and his friends Herbert Feigl and Carl Hempel, who shared his kindness, tolerance, and lack of self-importance, were models of professorial behavior. Bruce Aune [1] John Wisdom was a visiting professor that semester. He had just retired from his professorship at Cambridge University. [2] Introduction to Symbolic Logic and its Applications (New York: Dover, 1958). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Sun Aug 9 15:50:15 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2009 20:50:15 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] The Character of Rudolf Carnap In-Reply-To: <6F7724C4-1832-44CC-A018-86B7B372D45F@philos.umass.edu> References: <8CBE4EFDEDDD64A-E18-184D@WEBMAIL-MA03.sysops.aol.com> <200908082052.14767.rbj@rbjones.com> <6F7724C4-1832-44CC-A018-86B7B372D45F@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: <200908092050.15765.rbj@rbjones.com> Its nice to have further testimony to Carnap's character, particularly in relation to his tolerance. For those interested in Carnap's character. Seth Sharpless has penned his own: Reminiscences about Carnap at Chicago (1945-51) Which is online at: http://www.sethsharpless.com/papers/Reminiscences.htm (curiously, if you google "Carnap reiniscences" you get only two pages, Seth's page, and my notes on "The Ways of Paradox" (presumably because that volume contains Quine's "Homage to Carnap")). The other obvious sources of insight into Carnap's character are the Schilpp volume and the Quine/Carnap correspondence, which latter also reveals something about Quine. RBJ From Baynesr at comcast.net Sun Aug 9 18:38:46 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2009 22:38:46 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Analytic Philosophy: Oxonian Varieties In-Reply-To: <1489394525.10109171249856738189.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <1501399845.10111201249857526542.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> A brief reply to Bruce and a reply to someone who raised some points on Carnap's philosophy of science, but who wishes not to post. Call him X. Bruce: These are very interesting reflections. I've had occasion to discuss Carnap with a couple of his students, and their estimate coincides with yours. I was especially interested in a couple of things. First, your report of his interest in Russell's theory of relations. He credits Russell, strongly, as I recall in the Aufbau, and I see the connection to toplogy as having broader implications for philosophy of science. Second, there is one troubling thing I've heard about Carnap while he was at Chicago. There was a dispute involving McKeon, with whom I've had some interesting discussion on Aristotle. It is said that Carnap would not approve a diss. on the ontological argument because the argument was fallacious. An argument ensued with McKeon who it is said left the department and became head of a new department, Ideas and Methods. If a guy can tolerate Heidegger, then he ought to tolerate a scholarly treatment of the Ontolotical Argument, or so its seems. Still, I've never really heard a bad word about Carnap; he has a reputation for saintliness. I love most of his work but have only recently discovered his later phil. of science. X: Russell's treatment of the theory of relations in Intro. Mathematical Philosophy had some influence I believe on Eddington, although there was, no doubt, an interactive relation. It relates to a question I raised earlier about defining spatial relations purely topologically without the introduction of of metric properties etc. We have to consider not only the topology of space, but the topology of a field which pervades space if we want to get at the bottom of the determinism mess from a scientific perspective. Can we characterize a field's properties without introducing the properties of a point and time in space? If not won't we be committed to metric properties, properties we don't need in giving a topological analysis of space, that is, a treatment in terms of open sets, alone? There is no set theoretically interesting treatment of questions related to that of the "structure" of a field, but aren't there certain, purely, topological features since we construe a field as continuous. Recall that for Russell space, unlike a field, need not be continuous and yet, given Russell's theory of causation - as it might now be challenged by recent experiments in photon entanglement, Bell inequalities, and, perhaps, the Aharonov?Bohm effect - it would appear that causation is a local phenomena. Carnap, I think, sees much of this. I haven't, sufficiently, examined his later philosophy of science, which looks very rich in content and may contain some of the answers. I've spent entirely too much time on Carnap as a builder of languages, a tedious exercise. Roger: I'm preparing a reply to you interesting, albeit lengthy post. I should mention that Carnap is at his best when NOT discussing the object languages in meta-languages. Also, I must apologize to another mathematically oriented friend. I DO believe mathematics is very important for philosophy. But I think this is not, necessarily, logic. There is a great deal of beauty and relevance to philosophy in, for example, the algebra of the real number system, or Dedekind continuity. Russell realized this; post-Tarski philosophers of logic seldom realize this. The culprit is formal semantics, which is simply "piddling out." Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: "Roger Bishop Jones" Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Sent: Sunday, August 9, 2009 7:58:24 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Analytic Philosophy: Oxonian Varieties Since Roger has directed interest to Rudolf Carnap, I thought that those following the discussion might be interested in my remarks about Carnap as a teacher, which I included in a philosophical memoir I have been writing. The remarks follow: Before climbing up on my soap box, I was describing the seminars I took at UCLA in the academic year 1957-58. In the semester following John Wisdom's seminar [1] I took Carnap's seminar in logical theory. This seminar was no more demanding than Wisdom's, but it was considerably more technical. The subject was Carnap's version of the logic of relations (he followed pretty much the exposition in Principia Mathematica but he used his lambda operator in place of the symbolism of class abstraction) and its extension to a non-quantitative treatment of space-time topology. Except (as I recall) for one report by David Kaplan, who appeared to be enrolled in the seminar although he was probably engaged in preparing exercises for the volume in which the seminar material was later published, [2] Carnap himself presented material in the seminar sessions. His procedure was to hand out mimeographed sheets containing the formulas he proceeded to discuss. He would read a formula, explain its meaning if its meaning were not obvious, sometimes indicate how it could be proved if it were a theorem, and then go on to the next formula. (In indicating how a theorem could be proved in the logic of relations, he liked to use arrow diagrams as heuristic aids. If a relation were transitive, say, it could be represented by a diagram in which an arrow would be drawn between points a and c if it connected points a and b and also points b and c. ) Listening to him presenting such material was like reading a textbook. If he were a lesser person, the class might have seemed to be a waste of time; but I and the other students were so impressed by his intelligence, his learning, and his earnest, kindly personality that we felt fortunate to be in his presence. He was not teaching so much as presenting the results of his research. It was our job to understand him. In my experience philosophers who have achieved some distinction often possess large, unattractive egos, and it is not uncommon for them to speak ill of other philosophers, often equally distinguished, whom they consider rivals. Carnap was not like this at all--at least in my experience. He was obviously self-confident, but he was not in the least vain, self-important, or disparaging of those who disagreed with him. On one occasion he gently admonished me and another student when, no doubt hoping to impress him with our commitment to the tough-minded ideology he was noted for espousing, we expressed our utter contempt for some claim by Heidegger. His response was immediate: "Tolerance, boys, tolerance." It was clear that he didn't object to our being critical of Heidegger; he objected to our intolerant manner: We should treat others with respect even when we think they are wrong. He obviously felt we should be careful of tooting our own horn, too, for he was noticeably self-effacing in discussion. He often said such things as "We logical empiricists now think that ?," speaking as if he belonged to a team of investigators in which personal achievement is subordinate to a collective purpose of working out a mutually acceptable "scientific" philosophy. I have never felt that I belonged to an investigative team in philosophy, but in subsequent years it has always seemed to me that Carnap and his friends Herbert Feigl and Carl Hempel, who shared his kindness, tolerance, and lack of self-importance, were models of professorial behavior. Bruce Aune [1] John Wisdom was a visiting professor that semester. He had just retired from his professorship at Cambridge University. [2] Introduction to Symbolic Logic and its Applications (New York: Dover, 1958). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Mon Aug 10 08:02:36 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2009 08:02:36 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Analytic Philosophy: Oxonian Varieties In-Reply-To: <1501399845.10111201249857526542.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <1501399845.10111201249857526542.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <2B93932D-A26E-4E31-98A2-D4AED14AF29F@philos.umass.edu> I never knew McKeon, though I saw him at Western Division APA meetings in the early 60's. I heard a lot about him, however, from people at Minnesota, who were very critical of him. I can imagine Carnap not wanting to approve a thesis on an argument that the thesis-writer could not competently evaluate. When I was a student of Carnap's and, indeed, throughout my teaching career, I was a strong advocate of making the history of philosophy a large component of philosophical education. I can still see its relevance to serious philosophical work, but I now regret that I spent so much time on it. I would have been better served, I think, if I had spent more time on mathematics and physics. In spite of this. I continue to spend an inordinate amount of time translating Plato's Greek! Bruce From Baynesr at comcast.net Mon Aug 10 09:22:12 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2009 13:22:12 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Analytic Philosophy: Oxonian Varieties In-Reply-To: <2B93932D-A26E-4E31-98A2-D4AED14AF29F@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: <1643047348.10213671249910532334.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Yes, McKeon went to all the Western Division meetings I went to, which was about five or so. He was often there with his daughter who kept watch over him in his later years. I've always been curious about this episode because it led to the Ideas and Methods Dept. at Chicago, so the story goes. The reports I've heard are always skewed towards Carnap, who reportedly had a command knowledge of Latin, at one point embarrassing McKeon; so the story goes. If McKeon had not started that other department, people like Hannah Arendt would never have gone to Chicago, I don't think. I was there only very briefly; I was a high school drop out (married at 17) and very political in those days. So I was an interloper at most of the colleges in the area. I thought Illinois at Chicago Circle was a superb school with a great department. There was a vitality there that, seemed, to equal any other school around. Those were days of enormoust energy and passion for philosophy. It was at Roosevelt University that I first picked up your first book. I had found Sellars opaque, eg. his formal stuff in Phil. Perspectives. But he and Bergmann were, along with Russell, my idols. Bergmann, of course, was "difficult," but he set very high standards. I'll have a piece in the book on a discussion I had with him concerning an exchange between Brodbeck and Anscombe. Brodbeck's indexes to Bergmann are models of near perfection. But McKeon had a reputation as a tough teacher. However, I once told him I was having difficulty with Greek and he offered the following slightly strange suggestion. He suggested that the amount of Greek philosophy was finite and that I could conceivably just learn the bare grammar, rely on Liddell-Scott, and plow through it. I thought to myself, "Yeah, in a thousand years!" But it was an interesting idea. I "dropped" to Latin where the verb is easier, for sure. Yes, I recall your doing translations; I think of Plato. I've always gone to Shorey for some things. Seems pretty literal, easy to follow etc. I've been thinking of putting up Cornford's translation etc. of Theatetus. I used to be very interested in science. When I was about 12 I won the Chicago Science fair in my division for an invention I had. Indeed it was a working model. I lost interest; went towards philosophy. People wanted me to do law, and maybe I should have, but then I read Plato's take on lawyers and sophists and went back to being a "truth seeker." Many years later I saw an implemented version of my invention. It was the monorail air train with magnetic support. Back in the fifties they were called "ground effect machines." I used magnets to achieve the lift required for a long train. I don't regret spending what most philosophers would call an inordinate amount of time on history. Sellars did a lot of work here and I think his careful reading of Kant payed dividends. One other thing on this. Philosophers who work vicariously in physics have really done very little. The two great physicists, in my opinion, who were actually good at philosophy were Weyl and Bohm. Shimony, also, is good. But for the most part, they are popularizers with a bit of a philosophical twist that depends on the latest fad in Physical Review, or so it seems. After this book project I intend to expend my last energies at exploring new areas in phil. science. It is a great field. Emile Meyerson and Bohm are, I think, accessible to philosophers who are not "pseudo-scientists." In fact, I think there are some interesting dualistic models that are entirely consistent with physical theory; more on that later. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: Baynesr at comcast.net Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Sent: Monday, August 10, 2009 8:02:36 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Analytic Philosophy: Oxonian Varieties I never knew McKeon, though I saw him at Western Division APA meetings in the early 60's. I heard a lot about him, however, from people at Minnesota, who were very critical of him. I can imagine Carnap not wanting to approve a thesis on an argument that the thesis-writer could not competently evaluate. When I was a student of Carnap's and, indeed, throughout my teaching career, I was a strong advocate of making the history of philosophy a large component of philosophical education. I can still see its relevance to serious philosophical work, but I now regret that I spent so much time on it. I would have been better served, I think, if I had spent more time on mathematics and physics. In spite of this. I continue to spend an inordinate amount of time translating Plato's Greek! Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Mon Aug 10 09:42:07 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2009 13:42:07 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Correction: Re: Analytic Philosophy: Oxonian Varieties In-Reply-To: <1643047348.10213671249910532334.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <2027661415.10218121249911727817.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I inadvertently gave the impression that Weyl, Bohm and Shimony were popularizers. NO! I meant the "other guys." Weyl's knowledge of philosophy is very impressive, and Shimony, as you probably know, got into the field via Carnap, his teacher. After some discussion with Carnap Shimony decided to do "sciency" stuff rather than logic. His papers are afroth with probability theory. I think Popper did this stuff because he had difficulty with calculus. I greatly admire Popper whose reputation has been attacked in some quarters owing to his Open Society, which I think along with the Poverty of Historicism is a brilliantly sane work; this is not Sorel, or Weber, or ... One figure I'm wondering whether you knew was Hempel. I've used his Aspects at almost every turn. I'll be discussing his exchange with Dray briefly in connection with reasoned explanation etc. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: Baynesr at comcast.net To: "Bruce Aune" Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Sent: Monday, August 10, 2009 9:22:12 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Analytic Philosophy: Oxonian Varieties Yes, McKeon went to all the Western Division meetings I went to, which was about five or so. He was often there with his daughter who kept watch over him in his later years. I've always been curious about this episode because it led to the Ideas and Methods Dept. at Chicago, so the story goes. The reports I've heard are always skewed towards Carnap, who reportedly had a command knowledge of Latin, at one point embarrassing McKeon; so the story goes. If McKeon had not started that other department, people like Hannah Arendt would never have gone to Chicago, I don't think. I was there only very briefly; I was a high school drop out (married at 17) and very political in those days. So I was an interloper at most of the colleges in the area. I thought Illinois at Chicago Circle was a superb school with a great department. There was a vitality there that, seemed, to equal any other school around. Those were days of enormoust energy and passion for philosophy. It was at Roosevelt University that I first picked up your first book. I had found Sellars opaque, eg. his formal stuff in Phil. Perspectives. But he and Bergmann were, along with Russell, my idols. Bergmann, of course, was "difficult," but he set very high standards. I'll have a piece in the book on a discussion I had with him concerning an exchange between Brodbeck and Anscombe. Brodbeck's indexes to Bergmann are models of near perfection. But McKeon had a reputation as a tough teacher. However, I once told him I was having difficulty with Greek and he offered the following slightly strange suggestion. He suggested that the amount of Greek philosophy was finite and that I could conceivably just learn the bare grammar, rely on Liddell-Scott, and plow through it. I thought to myself, "Yeah, in a thousand years!" But it was an interesting idea. I "dropped" to Latin where the verb is easier, for sure. Yes, I recall your doing translations; I think of Plato. I've always gone to Shorey for some things. Seems pretty literal, easy to follow etc. I've been thinking of putting up Cornford's translation etc. of Theatetus. I used to be very interested in science. When I was about 12 I won the Chicago Science fair in my division for an invention I had. Indeed it was a working model. I lost interest; went towards philosophy. People wanted me to do law, and maybe I should have, but then I read Plato's take on lawyers and sophists and went back to being a "truth seeker." Many years later I saw an implemented version of my invention. It was the monorail air train with magnetic support. Back in the fifties they were called "ground effect machines." I used magnets to achieve the lift required for a long train. I don't regret spending what most philosophers would call an inordinate amount of time on history. Sellars did a lot of work here and I think his careful reading of Kant payed dividends. One other thing on this. Philosophers who work vicariously in physics have really done very little. The two great physicists, in my opinion, who were actually good at philosophy were Weyl and Bohm. Shimony, also, is good. But for the most part, they are popularizers with a bit of a philosophical twist that depends on the latest fad in Physical Review, or so it seems. After this book project I intend to expend my last energies at exploring new areas in phil. science. It is a great field. Emile Meyerson and Bohm are, I think, accessible to philosophers who are not "pseudo-scientists." In fact, I think there are some interesting dualistic models that are entirely consistent with physical theory; more on that later. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: Baynesr at comcast.net Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Sent: Monday, August 10, 2009 8:02:36 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Analytic Philosophy: Oxonian Varieties I never knew McKeon, though I saw him at Western Division APA meetings in the early 60's. I heard a lot about him, however, from people at Minnesota, who were very critical of him. I can imagine Carnap not wanting to approve a thesis on an argument that the thesis-writer could not competently evaluate. When I was a student of Carnap's and, indeed, throughout my teaching career, I was a strong advocate of making the history of philosophy a large component of philosophical education. I can still see its relevance to serious philosophical work, but I now regret that I spent so much time on it. I would have been better served, I think, if I had spent more time on mathematics and physics. In spite of this. I continue to spend an inordinate amount of time translating Plato's Greek! Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Tue Aug 11 12:21:04 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2009 16:21:04 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Carnap on Philosophy In-Reply-To: <200908081709.25417.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <833709282.10644781250007664394.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> The very first thing I want to ask Roger is this: give me an example of the successful employment of the methodology he advocates in solving a philosophical problem. I once had a discussion with a prominent analytical philosopher whom I believe has some friends in the ?pomo? movement. He expressed sympathy, much to my puzzlement. I relinquished in the severity of my criticism out of deference to his past accomplishments as well as my personal respect for the man. After I quieted down, he did too. At one point he struck a note of compromise, saying, ?Well, I DO have just one question. I have never actually seen an example of a deconstruction. I think I need to see one they all agree on before rendering a final judgment.? Well, I feel the same way. If you are going to defend a method give me an example of its success, NOT in general terms, but input/output. Other minds? External world? The Self? Ethics? State the philosophical problem and then in a few words tell me how it?s solved. Russell could do it; Tarski did it. Ok? So now give us a philosophical problem that has been solved. Part of my point is that this business of constructing logical languages is an expository method. In this respect it differs from an axiomatic system as a method of proof, not exposition. So let?s look at an example. Got one? Ok now to go on. I think we have to distinguish between philosophy?s being analytic, philosophy?s being a set of analytical propositions, and Carnap's philosophy as distinguished from other forms of analytical philosophy. There are other forms of analytical philosophy that meets this test. For example I think what Austin, Ryle, Grice and others were doing were not much like what Carnap recommends, but they are all fine analytical philosophers. So the metaphilosophical question is not resolved. How do we resolve it? Roger suggests that we do it by analogy with how we would answer the same question in mathematics. He says, ?The propositions of mathematics are those whose subject matter is properly mathematical and which have been proven by accepted methods. ? Well, I think there are mathematical propositions which have yet to be proven, and the question of ?methods? is not beyond controversy, as historians of Cantor will recall from the reception of the diagonal argument. Nor is it very encouraging to be told that mathematical propositions are those whose subject matter is mathematical. So I can?t really buy in to this as clarifying matters. Roger brings up Ayer. I can?t help but recall Sellars?s criticism of Ayer?s use of Carnap in speaking of ?sense-data languages.? Ayer, following Carnap, defends a form of logical reconstruction wherein one translates from one language to another. I?ve mentioned the pitfalls etc. of this, and I?m a little disappointed that Roger hasn?t addressed them because they are at the heart of the issue. One examines the object language and talks about it in the metalanguage. If one wishes to create a nominalistic metalanguage, well that?s fine; the philosophical commitment is made. Similarly, if you are Ayer you might try translating the language of physical objects into the language of sense data; or, alternatively, if you are a realist you go the other direction. But by the time you?ve set out on the reconstruction you have made the commitment because FIRST you have to arrive at a commitment on the kind of translation you WANT. The philosophy is over; the rest is fiddling with superscripts, etc. Big deal! The problem with the logical positivist approach, if you take Carnap as a model, circa 1939-47, is that philosophical problems ARE the pseudo-problems, so Carnap comes out looking, as Bruce?s characterization suggests, a rather dull version of Hume with a formalist twist. But here?s the big problem. No problems are solved, or illuminated by the methodology of translation into a ?perspicuous logical language.? The problems have been solved by the time you get there, as reflected in the CHOICE of translation. So I have a challenge for Roger! Give me an example of a philosophical problem that can be solved using Carnap?s methods. I mean a philosophical problem such as the problem of the external world, the reality of the Self, the nature of choice, free-will, causation. Now clearly Carnap addresses some of these problems, but when he does his method of intension/extension or reconstruction into a logical ?perspicuous? language simply plays no role. And if Carnap hasn?t done this who has? D. Lewis was a great philosopher. I didn?t realize this as clearly as I should have during his lifetime. I regret this. I am making up for lost time. But take a look at his best work, say on causation ? say, ?Postscript to ?Causation?? There is nothing here on the order of what you find in Carnapian reconstructions. There is no ?reduction? to logic. Similarly for most others, even those in Carnap?s orbit. There is some of this in Kaplan, but Kaplan?s work (except for his paper on Russell?s theory of descriptions, which is a logical issue) is semantical and I don?t believe that outside of semantics he has addressed a single philosophical issue! Montague was closer to what you might want, but it?s drab and inconsequential unless you buy in to the program. Roger in commenting says, ?none of this consists in the enunciation of "propositions of philosophy" in the sense in which this phrase is used when these are? Well now, ?propositions of philosophy,? (in quotes). All philosophical problems appear to be pseudo-problems! Can you give me an example of a philosophical problem, distinctively philosophical (to mimic Bruce) that is not a pseudo problem by Carnap?s lights? His conception of philosophy is an exercise in explicating the language of science. I don?t see any legitimate philosophical problems, really. Cite me an example of what YOU consider to be a philosophical problem! Some of my reasoning here is ba sed on Bergmann?s _Metaphysics of Logical Positivism_ There are selections on Hist-Analytic that may interest you. For example, why prefer realism over phenomenalism? Say, in Carnap?s case. He looks like a phenomenalist to me in some places and not so much in others. How can logic cure us of this ?pseudo? issue. I don?t see it. I see very little similarity between Russell and Carnap after 1927. Where do you see it? Even though they remained interested in similar things (Russell had focused on developments in the ?new physics), they differed radically in approach. In Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, Russell even distances himself in stating his interests from Carnap. (p. 18) He even chides Carap: ?in the beginning was the word.? (p. 23). He goes further, citing differences in the point at which they start in applying their respective methodologies. (p. 311). I could cite other sources as well. We cannot shoot from the hip here. There is an historical record and if we are talking Carnap THAT is what we have to look at. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Saturday, August 8, 2009 12:09:25 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Carnap on Philosophy Steve's recent message raised a number of points in relation to Carnap and Russell, particularly in relation to their conception of philosophy as logic. I'm going to mount a defence of this conception of philosophy (though my own conception is very much wider than that). First a few words about the phrase "the propositions of philosophy". This should be thought of along the same lines as the phrase "the propositions of mathematics" when thinking of the logicist thesis in relations to mathematics. The phrase is not intended to refer every proposition asserted by a mathematician, not even those which he asserts "qua mathematician". Nor is it to be presumed that the enunciation of "the propositions of mathematics" is the only or even the most important contribution which mathematicians make to our knowledge. Mathematicians propose definitions, describe methods, talk about the work of previous mathematicians, about the value of different parts of mathematics, sometimes address philosophical matters, and engage in politics and polemics. Some or all of these may be considered genuinely mathematical and important, but they do not consist in the discovery or enunciation of "the propositions of mathematics". The propositions of mathematics are those whose subject matter is properly mathematical and which have been proven by accepted methods. This is a crude characterisation, but probably good enough for present purposes. A more concise and precise modern approximation is: those mathematical propositions which can be rendered and proven in first order set theory. The phrase "the propositions of philosophy", when used by Russell, Carnap and Ayer should be understood in an analogous way. It may be, and in fact it probably is, that in Carnap's conception of philosophy the principle task of the philosopher is to make proposals about languages, about analytic methods, about conceptual schemes, or even about ostensibly metaphysical matters such as "what exists", but none of this consists in the enunciation of "propositions of philosophy" in the sense in which this phrase is used when these are asserted to be analytic. Most importantly one must be aware of the distinction between making a proposal, and making a claim, for so much of Carnap's philosophy must be understood as the former rather than the latter, even though in his youthful enthusiasm, like Ayer, he often uses language which sounds much more assertive and dogmatic than one would expect from someone merely making a proposal. This is particularly relevant to ontology and metaphysics. Carnap was happy to propose languages in which abstract entities can be proven to exist, but not happy to assert, except as propositions internal to such a language (and in that case analytic) that abstract entities exist. This extends arbitrarily to any apparently metaphysical claims which Carnap might consider of practical utility, e.g. talk about propositions. It might be useful to state my own position, which I intend to articulate in my volume on Metaphysical Positivism, since that is what I advocate, and my defence of Russell and Carnap is based on my belief that their position was similar in the most important features. Metaphysical Positivism is a variety of analytic philosophy based around a method of logical analysis, the intention of which is to make deductive arguments in philosophy as reliable as they are in mathematics. The method is illustrated by my document on Aristotle at: http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/pp/doc/t028.pdf in which I have used formal modelling with ProofPower in an attempt to analyse the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle. This document contains two parts, an informal part and a formal part, of which the latter consists in large part of definitions of various kinds, and of theorems proven in the context of those definitions. There is a clear distinction in this paper between propositions which have been formally proven and everything else. The former are marked by the turnstile symbol "|-", and are also listed separately in the appendices. In the appendices are theory listings which contain all the formal definitions and the theorems proven from them. These theorems are known to be necessary with a very high level of confidence, it is improbable that they will ever be refuted. Everything else in the document, including the question of whether the formal models have any relevance to the work of Aristotle, is highly speculative. The idea of the method is to ensure the rigour of deductive reasoning in philosophy, in a way which does not constrain the scope of philosophy. Now, I believe that Russell and Carnap sought by similar means (though lacking the technology) to establish philosophical reasoning on a similarly solid footing. They diverge from the neutrality of my method (which says nothing about scope of philosophy), in the addition of either or both of: 1. Claims about what philosophy is. 2. Claims about what philosophy should be. I don't in fact believe that either philosopher could credible be said to believe, despite their explicit statements appearing to assert it, that philosophy IS logic, and we can see when we read them that they are rather advocating that it should be. In this they are also to be understood in the manner suggested above, as talking only of a rather select number of the things which philosophers assert, and with that caveat I think we can say that there is very little between their position and my advocacy of formal methods. Let me now pass to some detailed responses on how I believe these philosophers should be understood. On Saturday 01 August 2009 12:45:42 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: >"Among the valid sentences some are analytic, namely >those which are valid on the basis of the L-rules alone" > >Now if philosophy is the search for analytical sentences then it is the > search for L-rules, I don't believe that Carnap would agree here, and nor do I. The L-rules constitute the definition of a language, and they are thus proposals rather than results. Insofar as philosophy is "the search for analytic truths" (I would not put it that way myself), these analytic truths are not the L-rules, which are implicit definitions rather than propositions, but in those sentences whose truth can be established by the use of the L-rules. > and if Carnap can be said to follow Russell remarks: >"Philosophy, if what has been said is correct, becomes indistinguishable > from logic as that word has now come to be used," > >the actual record of his work should show it. It does not. Yes, "indistinguishable from logic" is a bit strong, especially as that phrase might today be understood (given that logic is now largely meta-theoretic, and "logical truth" tends to be narrowly construed). However, I will try to defend Carnap's claim about the propositions of philosophy being analytic (in the context of his demarcation of philosophy). >I won't repeat what I've already said about Carnap's methodology. That > methodolgy consists in the construction of formal metalanguages that > translate from an object language into the "syntax language." The > "analyticity" of the analytical propositions is not in the sentences > translated into. The "analyticity" resides in translatability from one > language to another, that is capturing the meaning in the syntax language > that remains once the "dross" is removed from object language. But there is > a problem for Carnap's methodology. I'm afraid I don't accept this account of Carnap's philosophy. Semantic ascent does, unfortunately and unnecessarily, play a role in his method of logical syntax, but to say that his method consists in the construction of formal metalanguages to effect the translation seems to me incorrect. As far as his statement of method in "Philosophy and Logical Syntax" is concerned, he does not to my recollection even mention such formal languages, and it might be reasonable to criticise the method he describes in that book because it lacks any account of how this translation is to be effected. The languages which he talks about defining there are, I think, intended to be various languages for use in science. The analyticity of the analytic propositions does not reside in their translatability. This is simply the method proposed for demonstrating their analyticity. We take a sentence in some formally defined language which mentions "pseudo-object" and we demonstrate the analyticity of that sentence via translation into some sentence about syntax. However, if we look at the more precise statements in LSL about the translation we find, to my relief, that its role is largely one of explication. Carnap does not tell us, even in LSL, how the translation is to be accomplished, but he is quite precise about what it must deliver. It must deliver something which is "equipollent" with the original. So the method says, to prove a pseudo-object sentence, take the sentence and translate it into some equipollent sentence which is L-true, and then prove the translation using the L-rules. But "equipollence" is L-equivalence I believe, and in any reasonable logical system, all L-true sentences will be equipollent, and any sentence equipollent with an L-true sentence will be provable using the L-rules whether or not one proves it via an equivalence with some sentence which is about syntax. Carnap's stuff about translation is therefore inessential. You have to supply a complete set of L-rules in the definition of the language to fully capture the intended semantics, and if you do that then all the analytic sentences will be L-true, whether or not they mention objects. Carnap's talk about analytic sentences being "about syntax" (which I deprecate) can be seen to be a very minor defect, since the methods proposed work just as well if you delete all talk of semantic ascent. It is only Carnap's explanations which are damaged by the removal. >It is not always clear what kind of translation you want and what and why > you omit certain concepts is, also, subject to debate. Logic cannot resolve > these questions, even for Carnap. I hope I have now covered this. > The Schilpp is fine for an idea of > Carnap's final position on issues, but it is no substitute for approaching > the original sources if your interest is understanding where is coming > from. Yes, but if his final position is more tenable than the earlier ones, then a critique based too closely on the earlier work may not be a sound critique of the overall conception. > The problem for Carnap's methodology is that there are always > sentences that logic simply cannot resolve. If I am right these are the > philosophical questions. Let me give you an example. Carnap in Meaning and > Necessity says, > >"Some remarks may help toclarify the sensein which we intend to us theterm > 'proposition'. Like the term 'property', it is used neither for a > linguistic expression nor for a subjective mental occurrence, but rather > for something objective that may or may not be explemfied in nature." (MN. > p. 27) > >Lest there be any doubt that Carnap is talking about the world and not > logic, consider what he says just a bit later (after expressing > disagreement with Russell), > >"Any proposition must be regarded as a complex entity, consisting of > component entities, which, in their turn may be simple or again complex." > (MN. p. 30) > >These are not analytic statement! They probably are. Even for Russell, who understood a proposition as a logical fiction with real constituents, it is analytic that a proposition is complex. Carnap might well have taken the position that propositions are completely abstract, in which case any truth about them is going to be analytic. > They do not follow from logic alone; they > are not empirical claims. They are metaphysical CONCLUSIONS! But for Carnap any true claim which is not contingent is analytic and logical. L-true, Analytic, Logical, Necessary all mean the same thing. And you can't argue this, it is a proposal for use of language, and the entire philosophy has to be understood in relation to this proposal. You can reject then proposal if you like, but you can't adopt some other usage and then criticise Carnap's claims about analyticity of philosophy as if he meant by that term something other than he actually did mean. > The problem > for Carnap is that he must at some point exorcise these ontogical > commitments. Carnap has a well articulated position in relation to such things, both I think in relation to his syntactic and his semantic phases, though I think the latter stronger. This later one is of course that in "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology". >Take Russell. The guy quoted above identify logic with philosophy. NONE of > Russell's philosophical work of significance is pure logic. Take The > Analysis of Matter or even Our Knowledge of the External World or many of > those essays in Mysticism and Logic. Very little logic in these works. In > fact the best logic in the second cited is on continuity and I don't think > continuity is a logical notion as such. Russell, it seems to me, made less serious attempts to carry through his logicist conception of philosophy, partly I think because his appetite for formalism had been quenched by Principia. Also I think he actually had a rather less formal conception of the key features of Principia Mathematica (than Carnap). Russell had a conception of analysis. He begins with a kind of analysis which he inherited from Leibniz, in which complex predicates are analysable into simple predicates (which I think is questionable). His more original contribution is that of logical construction. In the Principia mathematical objects were logical constructions from individuals. Russell following ideas of Whitehead, wanted to show that mind and matter, and hence all else, could both be construed as logical constructions from individuals (events? sense data?). Now if talk about mind and matter is talk about logical constructions of this kind, then claims to that effect will be analytic elucidations of the meaning of the concepts and of conclusions inferred from those meanings. So I think there is a rationale here which might explain how Russell could conceive of at least some of his post Principia philosophy as logic (if not formal). I would draw an analogy here with theoretical physics. Theoretical physics might seem to be about material objects and hence to be making contingent claims. But a theoretical physicist is likely to be doing just mathematics. He makes no empirical claims, he simply takes some theory as given, e.g. general relativity, and works out the logical consequences of the theory (the mathematical consequences, which for logicists are logical). Russell's "analysis" of mind and matter is not intended to make contingent claims about mind and matter, it is intended to draw conclusions from the concepts. Possibly to be drawing conclusions from proposals about what the concepts should mean, but possibly not for Russell seemed to have a natural metaphysical dogmatism, which I agree is a bit at odds with his logicist conception of philosophy. Carnap seems to start out with that same conflict, but as he matures he realises that he must present himself as making proposals about languages and methods if his philosophy is to be self-consistent. >So my polint is: Carnap makes a lot of metaphysical claims; the metaphysical > work is done before constructing canonical languages. As Bergmann said: > there is a metaphysics to positivism! Carnap was such a metaphysician > during his most productive years. Carnap has to be construed as proposing or adopting a particular usage of "metaphysical" as well as of concepts like "analytic". In "Philosophy and Logical Syntax" he does explicitly exclude certain kinds of metaphysics from the scope of his critique. His account is on p15, he has a paragraph beginning: "I will call metaphysical..." and says: "I do not include in metaphysics those theories -- sometimes called metaphysical -- whose object is to arrange the most general propositions of the various regions of scientific knowledge in a well-ordered system." These he regards as empirical. To this one may add, certain non empirical claims about abstract objects, e.g. those of mathematics, which he regarded as analytic. When we progress to the later philosophy, when he adopts the principle of tolerance and writes about ontology in "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology", we find an enormous range of what might have been thought of as metaphysics, has now been slotted into Carnap's scheme of legitimacy. So to condemn Carnap of inconsistency it does not suffice to establish some proposition of metaphysics which he asserts. Usually when he does this he should be construed either as putting forward a proposal for usage, or as elaborating the consequences of such proposals. (I don't think he engages in the synthetic metaphysics which he finds acceptable, because that would not be philosophy). Too many words I'm afraid, but I have tried to explain why I do not myself think, on the basis of my rather limited reading of Carnap that his properly philosophical assertions violated his conception of philosophy as analytic. I do accept however, that there probably were such things, I think it would be a great achievement if he had been consistent about this in the course of trying to put together this conception of philosophy, it is normal for philosophers not to comply with their own conception of philosophy, but I think Carnap came closer than most, and that a similar conception of philosophy could be consistently adopted. i.e. whatever other faults it has, I don't think it is an incoherent conception of philosophy. RBJ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Tue Aug 11 15:04:59 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2009 20:04:59 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Analytic Philosophy: Oxonian Varieties In-Reply-To: <1501399845.10111201249857526542.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <1501399845.10111201249857526542.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <200908112004.59816.rbj@rbjones.com> On Sunday 09 August 2009 23:38:46 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: > ... there is one > troubling thing I've heard about Carnap while he was at Chicago. There was > a dispute involving McKeon, with whom I've had some interesting discussion > on Aristotle. It is said that Carnap would not approve a diss. on the > ontological argument because the argument was fallacious. An argument > ensued with McKeon who it is said left the department and became head of a > new department, Ideas and Methods. If a guy can tolerate Heidegger, then he > ought to tolerate a scholarly treatment of the Ontolotical Argument, or so > its seems. This is discussed by Carnap in the Schilpp volume, I.I.4.B "The Situation of Philosophy in the United States", pp 39-43. He does not say that he declined to approve the dissertation, and I would ask you to check your facts on that. Nor does he have any problem with a scholarly treatment of the Ontological Argument. He has on p41 a long paragraph in which he is aknowledging the value of doing history of philosophy fully from the point of view of the historical figures being studied (he is stronger on this point than I could manage to be myself), before going on to describe the problem with the Ontological argument. In this his complaint seemed to be that the dissertation failed to fully aknowledge the significance of the results of modern logic, treating them as if they were just an alternative point of view. Those philosophers who are dissatisfied with the perpertual flux in received philosophical opinion (when viewed over the long term), and who seek to make philosophy, at least in part as rigorous as mathematics, will naturally deprecate unsound reasoning. Surely if analytic philosophers stand for anything they must stand for sound reasoning, and hence be to some extent intolerant of unsound reasoning, at the very least to the extent of showing its defects? RBJ From baynesrb at yahoo.com Tue Aug 11 16:48:22 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2009 13:48:22 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Analytic Philosophy: Oxonian Varieties In-Reply-To: <200908112004.59816.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <878785.42896.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Carnap on Carnap is going to be Carnapian. We have to get beyond Schilpp without neglecting its many good lessons. In discussion with someone who was in a position to know, or so I believe, Carnap and McKeon fought bitterly over this matter. Voices were raised and personal attacks that seemed more personal than academic were made against McKeon's philosophical orientation. Again, McKeon left this department and my sources have it that this was owing to the battle between Carnap and Mckeon which were by this account as I said bitter. I'm not absolving McKeon of any responsibility, only? raising skepticism of a non-contemptuous sort about the saintly?reputation of Carnap's tolerance in matters of Philosophy. ? Charles Hartshorne was a good philosopher. I don't agree with him but his work on this is respectably analytical; heaven forbit had it not been. Whoops, "I see the campus cops are comin', gotta split now" (The Fugs) ? ? Regards ? Steve ? Roger, you say: ? "Surely if analytic philosophers stand for anything they must stand for sound reasoning, and hence be to some extent intolerant of unsound reasoning, at the very least to the extent of showing its defects?" ? This line of reasoning has been the rationale for virtually every repressive academic regime since Pythogoras, whose lack of tolerance in the name of mathematics lacks the luster of Carnap but possesses the same "flare" for diminishing the significance of alternatives to *the* mathematical view of the world: the square root of 2 and all that. ? One might as well exclude theology from discussion or, perhaps, bar the door and close the departments, despite the historical connection between philosophy and "rational" theology. No, intolerance in the name of reason is still intolerance. Carnap has put a "spiin" on this; McKeon might have put a spin on this but the fact remains; tempers flared. ? Don't get me wrong. I love reading Carnap. No other analytical philosopher of his competence, except maybe Russell of his generation wrote as lucidly or was so generous in sharing his knowledge. But the ontological argument is no more doubtful than mechanistic determinism in the tradition of Lang and there are plenty of dissertations, papers, etc. devoted to defending one or another form of this point of view. No. It was not for Carnap to in any way attempt to reject this dissertation. ? --- On Tue, 8/11/09, Roger Bishop Jones wrote: From: Roger Bishop Jones Subject: Re: Analytic Philosophy: Oxonian Varieties To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Date: Tuesday, August 11, 2009, 3:04 PM On Sunday 09 August 2009 23:38:46 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: > ... there is one > troubling thing I've heard about Carnap while he was at Chicago. There was > a dispute involving McKeon, with whom I've had some interesting discussion > on Aristotle. It is said that Carnap would not approve a diss. on the > ontological argument because the argument was fallacious. An argument > ensued with McKeon who it is said left the department and became head of a > new department, Ideas and Methods. If a guy can tolerate Heidegger, then he > ought to tolerate a scholarly treatment of the Ontolotical Argument, or so > its seems. This is discussed by Carnap in the Schilpp volume, I.I.4.B "The Situation of Philosophy in the United States", pp 39-43. He does not say that he declined to approve the dissertation, and I would ask you to check your facts on that. Nor does he have any problem with a scholarly treatment of the Ontological Argument. He has on p41 a long paragraph in which he is aknowledging the value of doing history of philosophy fully from the point of view of the historical figures being studied (he is stronger on this point than I could manage to be myself), before going on to describe the problem with the Ontological argument. In this his complaint seemed to be that the dissertation failed to fully aknowledge the significance of the results of modern logic, treating them as if they were just an alternative point of view. Those philosophers who are dissatisfied with the perpertual flux in received philosophical opinion (when viewed over the long term), and who seek to make philosophy, at least in part as rigorous as mathematics, will naturally deprecate unsound reasoning. Surely if analytic philosophers stand for anything they must stand for sound reasoning, and hence be to some extent intolerant of unsound reasoning, at the very least to the extent of showing its defects? RBJ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Wed Aug 12 14:53:47 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2009 19:53:47 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] The Character of Rudolf Carnap In-Reply-To: <200908092050.15765.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <8CBE4EFDEDDD64A-E18-184D@WEBMAIL-MA03.sysops.aol.com> <200908082052.14767.rbj@rbjones.com> <6F7724C4-1832-44CC-A018-86B7B372D45F@philos.umass.edu> <200908092050.15765.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <249DBC2A14864EE9BD6F83317D259FB3@DFLVQC1J> At the risk of raining on the parade, I will draw your attention to a dissenting voice. The following is from W W Bartley, 'Unfathomed Knowledge, Unmeasured Wealth,' p.188: 'neither the obstruction nor the plagiarism began in the period of his [Popper's] fame, but go back to the early days of his career. The first can already be seen in Carnap's callous refusal in 1936 - when Popper [of Jewish descent] was attempting to escape Austria for America - even to provide an affidavit for Popper's US visa application, a refusal privately defended with the suggestion that Popper was not fit to teach in an American college or university. [A footnote refers to correspondence between Mrs Carnap and Mrs Hempel in the Carnap Archive at the University of Pittsburgh.]It is hardly a matter of there being real doubt - in the minds of Carnap or anyone else - about Popper's significance. For Herbert Feigl had already confessed to Popper, early in the 1930s, that it was unfortunate that the Vienna Circle had not known his work earlier - for they had by then committed themselves to Wittgenstein.' Of course, this is quite consistent with the testimonies to Carnap's good character: no one was saying he was perfect. We all have character blemishes because we all have to struggle with the defects of our common human nature. Carnap might still have been exemplary despite this stain (and others). Danny From jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Aug 12 16:22:49 2009 From: jlsperanza at aol.com (jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2009 16:22:49 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] The Proof of the Pudding: Analytic Philosophy, the Success of a Method Message-ID: <8CBE9A1CB93F12C-1260-952@WEBMAIL-DC10.sysops.aol.com> S. Bayne is challening R. Jones for an example of a 'solved philosophical puzzle' apres Carnapian methods. Ah, should the same challenge be asked about Grice (who, to echo Bayne, should be Gricean). Consider his analysis of 'meaning'. It was the "Postwar Oxford Philosophy" that Grice delivered at Wellesey. His later thing in methodology was "Conceptual analysis and the province of philosophy", in Way of Words. It is pretty narrow. From reading it, I understood a lot of his attitude towards the counterexamples provided to his analysis. Unlike, say, Carnap, or perhaps Ayer, but not Austin, Grice's analysis are, he says, not reductionist. They are reductive. They hail from an attempt to analyse (or deconstruct, if you are Derridean) a concept in your mental baggage. It would be ridiculous to aspire to the ELIMINATION of a given concept. That would be semantic impoverishment, as it were. The item 'mean' is VERY English. Andreas Kemmerling, who knew Grice and studied this, confessed to never feeling the verb, "meinen", in German, to be in need of analysis. And he blatantly notes that what Grice analyses is the English lexeme "mean", not even its Germanic counterpart. For Romance speakers, it's even more dramatic, since, ment-, for example, the root that gives English 'mean' (cognate with 'mind') can derive polysemically into mentAre, to mean, or mentIre, to lie! The typical analysis is in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This is the paradox of analysis with a vengeance. For the philosopher is willing to provide a statement that is no more but no less informative than the original analysandum, "He means that the cat is on the mat". Grice proceeds in terms of 'intends', 'intends the addressee to believe', etc. The idea is that many of these notions are circularly connected. One may just as well provide an analysis of 'intend' in terms of 'mean'? I don't think so. Analysis can be asymmetrical, as I hope Grice was into. Mean and intend are on a different level. It's different with believe and intend, which are, qua verbs of propositional attitudes, on a same level. So there is some item of priority at hand. Conceptual priority. The serious analytic philosopher wants to analyse concepts into their prior constituents. Idiosyncrasy. Grice delivered the lecture "Meaning" at the Oxford Philosophical Society. This was a routine encounter, and had not been for Strawson who elaborated the essay into the published version in Philosophical Review, no Gricean programme! But Grice may be seen as not really recommending an analysis for the wider philosophical community or audience. And in "Postwar Oxford philosophy" he is very explicit, cannot say serious since he never was, bless his soul, that what COUNTS as a satisfactory analysis for him (i.e. one that HE promoted to discuss a puzzle he found philosophical) will do for others. He even goes on to suggest that he is game to help OTHERS in analysing concepts --. By which he means that he is collaborative enough to work with someone else (a tutee, or colleague springs to mind) in producing conditions that will just fit the analysandum at hand. Carnap, I wouldn't know! I fail to see how Mrs. Carnap could have evidence that Popper was not fit to teach in an American college. Chapman notes re Grice that he would (sometimes) never upload the grades for their students, and I can SEE that that may be disturbing --, so there are degrees in what counts as 'fit for an American college'. If the point was the religious extraction (the Jewishness of Popper) I would also be surprised, since by then American colleges were pretty tolerant and diverse? An analytic philosopher need NOT be doing philosophical analysis ALL The time. In fact, it's a scattered page in Grice's opus that actually works alla prongs of sufficiency and necessity. There's also the pleasure of the activity of philosophy itself, or the necessity of it. As someone said, To live is not necessary, to sail is. Mutatis mutandi philosophy. Cheers, J. L. Speranza From aune at philos.umass.edu Wed Aug 12 16:17:53 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2009 16:17:53 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] The Character of Rudolf Carnap In-Reply-To: <249DBC2A14864EE9BD6F83317D259FB3@DFLVQC1J> References: <8CBE4EFDEDDD64A-E18-184D@WEBMAIL-MA03.sysops.aol.com> <200908082052.14767.rbj@rbjones.com> <6F7724C4-1832-44CC-A018-86B7B372D45F@philos.umass.edu> <200908092050.15765.rbj@rbjones.com> <249DBC2A14864EE9BD6F83317D259FB3@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: I think Danny ought to provide more information in support of what (a) his change against Carnap is and (b) what his evidence is. Was Carnap supposed to be guilty of both "obstruction" and "plagiarism" in regard to Popper? The latter seems preposterous to me, and I don't understand what the other entails. Is there is suggestion that Carnap was anti-Semitic? If so, the charge is off the wall. And just what is the evidence Danny has in mind? What was said in the letter between Mrs Carnap and Mrws Hempel? And why did Carnap supposedly say that Popper was not "fit to teach in an American university"? To what did the fitness pertain? I'd like to know a lot more about all this. Bruce From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Wed Aug 12 16:36:35 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2009 21:36:35 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] The Character of Rudolf Carnap In-Reply-To: References: <8CBE4EFDEDDD64A-E18-184D@WEBMAIL-MA03.sysops.aol.com> <200908082052.14767.rbj@rbjones.com> <6F7724C4-1832-44CC-A018-86B7B372D45F@philos.umass.edu> <200908092050.15765.rbj@rbjones.com> <249DBC2A14864EE9BD6F83317D259FB3@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <40C6D455014D4267BC66D0E4D0BAD858@DFLVQC1J> Hi Bruce, I am afraid I can offer no more, except a word of interpretation. Bartley says no more about the issue in the book I referred to. But I think it is clear from the quotation that he is accusing Carnap of obstruction, not plagiarism ('The first can already be seen...'); and that the obstruction took the form of a refusal to aid Popper's escape from Nazism. Bartley does not quote from the wives' correspondence, he just refers to it. I am not endorsing what Bartley says. As I said, I was merely presenting a dissenting view. But I am an admirer of Bartley's work and I am trusting him to give an honest report of what is in the relevant correspondence (to which I do not have access). I'd like to know more about it too! Cheers, Danny From rbj at rbjones.com Thu Aug 20 16:53:47 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2009 21:53:47 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Carnap on Philosophy In-Reply-To: <833709282.10644781250007664394.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <833709282.10644781250007664394.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <200908202153.47564.rbj@rbjones.com> This is a rather selective response to Steve's last rather challenging message on Carnap. First I must clarify a little the extent to which I am defending Carnap's philosophy. I have asserted in the first instance that Carnap "was clear" that the propositions of philosophy are analytic, and in response to Steve's scepticism on this I supplied some citations. I hope that I have satisfied Steve on that point. In response, Steve has expressed doubts about the consistency of that claim of Carnap's with Carnap's own philosophical writings. On that point I have disagreed with Steve (and continue to do so). I propose for the time being to stick at that, i.e. to stick to the defence of Carnap against the claim that his philosophy was inconsistent with his claim that the propositions of philosophy are analytic. I do not intend to offer any general defence of his philosophy. For example, his methodological position in "Philosophy and Logical Syntax" is more specific than that, it describes how one should go about formally establishing such propositions, and, though he does do a considerable amount of technical work which is clearly intended to facilitate that kind of demonstration, it is not the case that he proves all his philosophical propositions in the manner which he recommends. Further to my accepting that Carnap falls short of his own ideals in that respect, I would not myself recommend the methods he proposes. Now, on the point which I am still prepared to defend, viz. that the philosophical propositions which Carnap asserts either are or are believed by him to be (usually the former) analytic, I have a couple of further points of clarification to offer before responding in detail to some of Steve's points. First I must clarify the purpose of the analogy I drew between mathematics and philosophy. The point of this was simply that many things that mathematicians and philosophers assert are not properly construed as "propositions of" mathematics and philosophy respectively. So I am not claiming that every assertion which Carnap makes is analytic, and I am asserting that when Carnap says that the propositions of philosophy are analytic he is not saying that everything which he asserts is analytic. Obvious examples of propositions which he asserts but would not claim in the required sense to be propositions of philosophy, are his claims about the views of other philosophers. Further to this, a great deal of what Carnap writes are not "propositions" at all, they are definitions or proposals, either of for languages or concepts. This is a large part of what he conceives of as the purpose of philosophy when he describes philosophy as "the logical syntax of science". The use of the term "logical" in this phrase is intended to exclude the descriptive analysis of existing scientific language (let alone "ordinary" language), which he does not see as falling under his method, and does not see as properly philosophical (he would classify this as empirical science, possibly linguistics). He sees philosophy as proposing languages for use in the empirical science, in the same way as he sees Principia Mathematica as offering and demonstrating the use of a language for mathematics. In this context, it would be consistent with Carnap's philosophy if Carnap asserted no philosophical propositions whatever, but exclusively concerned himself with the construction of formal languages for various branches of science and the discussion of the pragmatic considerations which are relevant to the adoption of such languages. I don't believe he does this, I think he does actually assert propositions which he believes to be both philosophical and analytic, though from my limited reading of Carnap I am not actually aware of cases where he has demonstrated such propositions in a manner consistent with his syntactic method (I would however be rather surprised if there were no examples in "Logical Syntax of Language"). It is worth noting here, that for Carnap to be consistent on this point, his assertions only have to be analytic according to his own conception of analyticity, they need not be analytic in Kant's or in Kripke's usage of that term. Furthermore, insofar as Carnap condemns metaphysics, for consistency he has only to avoid asserting propositions which comply with his own description of proscribed metaphysics, and this is greatly different from Kripke's conception of metaphysics (and I would say almost everyone else's). This is particularly relevant for those many people who look at Carnap's writing and immediately see lots of metaphysics, most especially if they see this in a volume like "Meaning and Necessity" which benefits from the very considerable widening in Carnap's conception of acceptable (not metaphysical in the proscribed sense) language. In particular, any apparently metaphysical language can be rendered acceptable to Carnap once it is incorporated into the definition of a language, for then the apparently metaphysical claims are given meaning by the language, the internal questions become respectable, and the external questions can be passed over so long as the language passes some pragmatic criteria. On Tuesday 11 August 2009 17:21:04 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: >The very first thing I want to ask Roger is this: give me an example of the > successful employment of the methodology he advocates in solving a > philosophical problem. ... > If you are going to defend a method > give me an example of its success, NOT in general terms, but input/output. > Other minds? External world? The Self? Ethics? State the philosophical > problem and then in a few words tell me how it?s solved. Russell could do > it; Tarski did it. Ok? So now give us a philosophical problem that has been > solved. The kind of problem you are looking for here seems to me not to be characteristic of Carnap's philosophy, for two reasons, one positive and one negative. On the positive side, the kind of problem which interested Carnap was typically one of devising the best language for some scientific purpose, or of devising the best method for the conduct of science or philosophy. The result of solving such problems are not "propositions". On the negative side, very many of the "traditional problems" of philosophy are in Carnap's scheme of things trivialised by Carnap's method. Take for example, the question, "Are there numbers?" which is discussed by Carnap who make this point about it. Carnap's recommended method for doing arithmetic proceeds as follows. First you devise a language for talking about numbers and define its semantics, for this purpose simply assuming the existence of numbers (though taking reasonable steps to ensure that the assumptions on which the semantics is based are logically consistent). Questions about the existence of numbers are then expressible in this new language for arithmetic, and will often be settled be demonstration using the inference rules of the language. However, the general question "are there numbers" is in this context a trivial problem. There remains a question about the legitimacy of the language, and this might be thought to involve the "external question" of the existence of numbers. This external question Carnap regards as meaningless and therefore as irrelevant to the acceptability of the language, which is to be determined by pragmatic considerations. Many of the traditional questions are philosophy are resolved by Carnap's philosophical methods by proposals about the use of language. Thus, the question "What is a proposition" will be resolved by Carnap (if at all), by a proposed usage for the term proposition, together with any theoretical claims about propositions which follow from the proposed usage (which will be analytic). I appreciate that I have not answered your question. >I think we have to distinguish between philosophy?s being > >analytic, philosophy?s being a set of analytical propositions, > >and Carnap's philosophy as distinguished from other forms > >of analytical philosophy. Yes. Carnap's position is specifically about the kind of philosophy which he recommends, not a claim about the propositions affirmed by other philosophers. He does not say that philosophy is a set of analytic propositions. >There are other forms of analytical philosophy that meets >this test. For example I think what Austin, Ryle, Grice and others were > doing were not much like what Carnap recommends, but they are all fine > analytical philosophers. So the metaphilosophical question is not resolved. > How do we resolve it? Roger suggests that we do it by analogy with how we > would answer the same question in mathematics. He says, I don't understand what you mean here by "the metaphilosophical question", and I doubt that my analogy between maths and philosophy is intended to address it. >?The propositions of mathematics are those whose > >subject matter is properly mathematical and which have > >been proven by accepted methods. ? > > > >Well, I think there are mathematical propositions which have yet to be > proven, and the question of ?methods? is not beyond controversy, as > historians of Cantor will recall from the reception of the diagonal > argument. Nor is it very encouraging to be told that mathematical > propositions are those whose subject matter is mathematical. So I can?t > really buy in to this as clarifying matters. Roger brings up Ayer. It was not my aim to give in a sentence a watertight definition of the propositions of mathematics. Merely to point out that very many propositions truthfully uttered by mathematicians in the course of doing mathematics are not properly considered among "the propositions of mathematics". This is not just for certain philosophers, there is a distinction here which is a part of the culture of mathematics. >I can?t help but recall Sellars?s criticism of Ayer?s use of Carnap in > speaking of ?sense-data languages.? Ayer, following Carnap, defends a form > of logical reconstruction wherein one translates from one language to > another. I?ve mentioned the pitfalls etc. of this, and I?m a little > disappointed that Roger hasn?t addressed them because they are at the heart > of the issue. I am not defending Carnap's use of translations. >So I have a challenge for Roger! Give me an example of a philosophical > problem that can be solved using Carnap?s methods. Carnap is primarily concerned with the problems of science. So he is aiming to provide languages for use in science. The methods he describes in "Meaning and Necessity" are for defining the semantics of such languages. The philosophical problem then is "how to define a language" and the result is a description of methods, not one or more propositions. > I mean a philosophical > problem such as the problem of the external world, the reality of the Self, > the nature of choice, free-will, causation. Now clearly Carnap addresses > some of these problems, but when he does his method of intension/extension > or reconstruction into a logical ?perspicuous? language simply plays no > role. Does he? If you have among them a counterexample to his assertion that philosophical propositions are analytic then I would be happy to discuss it. >Well now, ?propositions of philosophy,? (in quotes). All philosophical > problems appear to be pseudo-problems! Can you give me an example of a > philosophical problem, distinctively philosophical (to mimic Bruce) that is > not a pseudo problem by Carnap?s lights? His conception of philosophy is an > exercise in explicating the language of science. I don?t see any legitimate > philosophical problems, really. Cite me an example of what YOU consider to > be a philosophical problem! It is entirely possible that there might be a complete disjunction between what you count as a proposition of philosophy and what Carnap counted as one. But that in itself would not render Carnap inconsistent in the sense we are considering. Let me give you >Some of my reasoning here is ba sed on Bergmann?s _Metaphysics of Logical > Positivism_ There are selections on Hist-Analytic that may interest you. > For example, why prefer realism over phenomenalism? Say, in Carnap?s case. > He looks like a phenomenalist to me in some places and not so much in > others. How can logic cure us of this ?pseudo? issue. I don?t see it. Well of course Carnap's position did change quite a lot over his lifetime. But he is immediately misrepresented if he is held to be denying realism, for I don't think he ever did that, and once we get through his "liberalisation of empiricism" he embraces "theoretical languages" which are just the same as a realistic physicist might use. Does Bergman argue that the points which he considers metaphysical would be so regarded by Carnap? >I see very little similarity between Russell and Carnap after 1927. Where do > you see it? I don't see much similarity between Carnap's philosophy and Russell's. Carnap explicitly describes the way in which his own conception of philosophy is based on Russell's and his program consists (in my words) in doing for science what Russell had done for mathematics. This kind of high level influence is in my opinion enormously important, and my support for Carnap's position is at a similar level. I applaud aspects of the general thrust of Carnap's philosophy but am inclined to retain very little of the detail. I have not found a nice example of a "proposition of philosophy". perhaps one will come to me. If you have counterexamples I would be happy to consider them. I will mention two little points. Firstly, it does seem to me that the claim that Hume's fork identifies a fundamental and objective partition of some kind is one which I would count as metaphysical. I don't think Carnap did, and in his scheme of things, this is just an aspect of his conceptual scheme which he can reasonably consider to be justified by pragmatic considerations. When stated in an appropriate language, Hume's fork is analytic. Secondly the question whether there are necessary synthetic truths is often considered to be a metaphysical question closely related to metaphysics. For Carnap its denial is analytic, and is trivially so. In some places Carnap defines both "analytic" and "necessary" as "L-true", in others he defines necessity in terms of analyticity. Probably there are other variations with similar effects, viz the analyticity of there being no necessary synthetic truths. The supposed refutation of Carnap by Kripke is pure equivocation. Perhaps Kripke's conceptions of analyticity and necessity are better than Carnap's, but they cannot serve to refute Carnap in this matter. I appreciate that I probably have not met your challenge. However, technically, it is not necessary for me to do so to sustain my support of Carnap in the matter on which I am supporting him. For you to refute this position, you must offer a counterexample, for Carnap's position would be consistent if he had never tabled a proposition of philosophy. You talk as if this were easy, lets just take one example. RBJ From Baynesr at comcast.net Sat Aug 22 12:31:04 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sat, 22 Aug 2009 16:31:04 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Carnap on Philosophy In-Reply-To: <1295717549.2319111250958414041.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <32675523.2319901250958664408.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I asked Roger for an example of a philosophical problem Carnap solves, or attempts to solve. He says the problems I identify are not the problems that interest Carnap. Moreover, he appears to confirm my point that philosophical problems are pseudo-problems for Carnap. If this is so then Carnap is simply not a philosopher; the problems he raises may be interesting semantical problems related to formalizations of the language of science, but the judgment that they are philosophical is fiat, neither historical nor substantial. He points to the problem of the status of proposition as one problem Carnap resolved. The problem is that he didn?t resolve it. It remains a subject of considerable controversy. Why? Not because those pursuing the problem have read Carnap but because the method of intension and extension etc. simply assumes a solution by accepting Fregean arguments for senses. Indeed, senses are entities and they are strange one?s in my opinion. Where in a canonical language do we find them. Was Church, one of Carnap?s most effective critics wrong to posit a need for abstract entities in semantics? If so, what ARE these propositions? Call them properties if you will, but that just moves the problem in a different direction: the ontological status of abstract entities. Again, I have to emphasize that Carnap?s phases are more numerous than the moon?s. So when he speaks of Carnap?s ?position? it?s unclear what Roger means. I think the Auf ba u is a grand work in metaphysical reconstruction. I think much of Carnap?s other work is vacuous, e.g. much of what is in Introduction to Semantics. The metaphilosphical question is: what are the aims of philosophy and what should be the methodology in achieving those objectives. Constructing formalized languages just doesn?t seem to be the way to go. Lots of superscripts that do no work, really; a lot of formalities that lend the appearance of precision to some more or less unimaginative proposals. That?s why I wanted some examples of successful or arguably viable solutions to problems, not the rejection of the problems couched in what is in fact a vacuous formalism. Now Roger says he?s not defending Carnap?s use of translations, but as long as the construction of canonical languages is his method and these languages are metalanguages you won?t be able to escape the role of translation in logical reconstruction. By the way, the best thing about Meaning and Necessity is his treatment of modality, in my opinion. It has nothing to do with science. In fact there is nothing much at all about science in Meaning and Necessity. It?s a fine little book. I won?t slight it; but it is a statement of one view of semantics, not really very philosophical unless you think of philosophy as a branch of, say, model theory. You mention Bergmann and how he would regard Carnap with respect to metaphysics. That would be a long story. It is told on a file on Hist-Analytic by Bergmann on ?Reconstruction in Philosophy.? Bergmann was a member of the Vienna Circle , a mathematician, and a friend of Carnap?s until either Bergmann alleged a metaphysics of logical positivism or went nuts. Opinions vary. I like Bergmann; he was always nice to me and he was a genius, of that there can be no doubt. But I will enter one word. When the positivists like Neurath relied on ?protocol sentences? as constituting the ?atoms? of their epistemology they took the subject of such sentences as either sense-data or physical objects. There was no unanimity. The distinction is metaphysical. Since I no more believe in physical objects than the Greek gods, I?m inclined to side with the sense-data people, but I reject the methodology not only for philosophical reasons but for reasons having to do with the objectives of modern science, another topic. You pro ba bly don?t see muc similarity between Russell?s philosophy and Carnap?s because they are vastly different after about 1927; before that year they are pretty close. Tarski changed that by making philosophy a sort of boring subject. Russell was never boring. Actually, Carnap is never boring but less boring in the Auf ba u, a much maligned and brilliant work. Carnap followed Russell?s lead in his regard for the place of logic even though Carnap had been a student of Frege?s. I?m going to defer comments on Hume or his much celebrated fork. Much has to do with my rejection of his views on causation. The ?partition? for Hume between causal relations and other relations is not ?objective.? It is subjective. His ontology is essentially phenomenalist etc. which moves him closer to idealism than some would care to admit. If Carnap believes in physical objects, then he is a metaphysician in my opinion, but as Bergmann suggested he is on one prong of the phenomenalist/realist fork. Carnap is a pragmatist, but that is symptomatic of mere expedience in many cases. One can?t reject all pragmatism has to offer, but its use as a convenient tool in rejecting certain problems as relevant is an artless dodge. Kripke is a philosopher much in the Carnapian traidition. Before Kripke ceases doing philosophy, I would wager that he will publish something major on Carnap. I discuss Kripke to some extent in my forthcoming book. One metaphysical concern is his reliance on ?epistemic counterparts.? I talk about these and will defer discussing them until the book?s out. You offer a challenge in your message at the very end. It?s the only ungrammatical sentence in seven pages! What da ?? Let me put together an example not necessarily a counterexample of what I think you want. The problem with all such approaches as Carnap?s is that the philosophy, if there is any, comes before the methodology of logical reconstruction. There is a difference between reconstruction and the use of logic in solving philosophical problems. Too often the problems are forgotten or lost in a wad of lamda operators and other gizmos. Let me put together an example, intended mainly as illustrative of the right way of applying logic to a philosophical problem that does not depend on a priori arguments designed to reject rather than solve the problem. Rejecting the problem is indicative of the onset of a realization that one does not live forever. It is to be resisted. By the way, if anyone knows offhand where in PrincipiaRussell and Whitehead discuss the ancestral, please let me know. Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2009 4:53:47 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Carnap on Philosophy This is a rather selective response to Steve's last rather challenging message on Carnap. First I must clarify a little the extent to which I am defending Carnap's philosophy. I have asserted in the first instance that Carnap "was clear" that the propositions of philosophy are analytic, and in response to Steve's scepticism on this I supplied some citations. I hope that I have satisfied Steve on that point. In response, Steve has expressed doubts about the consistency of that claim of Carnap's with Carnap's own philosophical writings. On that point I have disagreed with Steve (and continue to do so). I propose for the time being to stick at that, i.e. to stick to the defence of Carnap against the claim that his philosophy was inconsistent with his claim that the propositions of philosophy are analytic. I do not intend to offer any general defence of his philosophy. For example, his methodological position in "Philosophy and Logical Syntax" is more specific than that, it describes how one should go about formally establishing such propositions, and, though he does do a considerable amount of technical work which is clearly intended to facilitate that kind of demonstration, it is not the case that he proves all his philosophical propositions in the manner which he recommends. Further to my accepting that Carnap falls short of his own ideals in that respect, I would not myself recommend the methods he proposes. Now, on the point which I am still prepared to defend, viz. that the philosophical propositions which Carnap asserts either are or are believed by him to be (usually the former) analytic, I have a couple of further points of clarification to offer before responding in detail to some of Steve's points. First I must clarify the purpose of the analogy I drew between mathematics and philosophy. The point of this was simply that many things that mathematicians and philosophers assert are not properly construed as "propositions of" mathematics and philosophy respectively. So I am not claiming that every assertion which Carnap makes is analytic, and I am asserting that when Carnap says that the propositions of philosophy are analytic he is not saying that everything which he asserts is analytic. Obvious examples of propositions which he asserts but would not claim in the required sense to be propositions of philosophy, are his claims about the views of other philosophers. Further to this, a great deal of what Carnap writes are not "propositions" at all, they are definitions or proposals, either of for languages or concepts. This is a large part of what he conceives of as the purpose of philosophy when he describes philosophy as "the logical syntax of science". The use of the term "logical" in this phrase is intended to exclude the descriptive analysis of existing scientific language (let alone "ordinary" language), which he does not see as falling under his method, and does not see as properly philosophical (he would classify this as empirical science, possibly linguistics). He sees philosophy as proposing languages for use in the empirical science, in the same way as he sees Principia Mathematica as offering and demonstrating the use of a language for mathematics. In this context, it would be consistent with Carnap's philosophy if Carnap asserted no philosophical propositions whatever, but exclusively concerned himself with the construction of formal languages for various branches of science and the discussion of the pragmatic considerations which are relevant to the adoption of such languages. I don't believe he does this, I think he does actually assert propositions which he believes to be both philosophical and analytic, though from my limited reading of Carnap I am not actually aware of cases where he has demonstrated such propositions in a manner consistent with his syntactic method (I would however be rather surprised if there were no examples in "Logical Syntax of Language"). It is worth noting here, that for Carnap to be consistent on this point, his assertions only have to be analytic according to his own conception of analyticity, they need not be analytic in Kant's or in Kripke's usage of that term. Furthermore, insofar as Carnap condemns metaphysics, for consistency he has only to avoid asserting propositions which comply with his own description of proscribed metaphysics, and this is greatly different from Kripke's conception of metaphysics (and I would say almost everyone else's). This is particularly relevant for those many people who look at Carnap's writing and immediately see lots of metaphysics, most especially if they see this in a volume like "Meaning and Necessity" which benefits from the very considerable widening in Carnap's conception of acceptable (not metaphysical in the proscribed sense) language. In particular, any apparently metaphysical language can be rendered acceptable to Carnap once it is incorporated into the definition of a language, for then the apparently metaphysical claims are given meaning by the language, the internal questions become respectable, and the external questions can be passed over so long as the language passes some pragmatic criteria. On Tuesday 11 August 2009 17:21:04 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: >The very first thing I want to ask Roger is this: give me an example of the > successful employment of the methodology he advocates in solving a > philosophical problem. ... > If you are going to defend a method > give me an example of its success, NOT in general terms, but input/output. > Other minds? External world? The Self? Ethics? State the philosophical > problem and then in a few words tell me how it?s solved. Russell could do > it; Tarski did it. Ok? So now give us a philosophical problem that has been > solved. The kind of problem you are looking for here seems to me not to be characteristic of Carnap's philosophy, for two reasons, one positive and one negative. On the positive side, the kind of problem which interested Carnap was typically one of devising the best language for some scientific purpose, or of devising the best method for the conduct of science or philosophy. The result of solving such problems are not "propositions". On the negative side, very many of the "traditional problems" of philosophy are in Carnap's scheme of things trivialised by Carnap's method. Take for example, the question, "Are there numbers?" which is discussed by Carnap who make this point about it. Carnap's recommended method for doing arithmetic proceeds as follows. First you devise a language for talking about numbers and define its semantics, for this purpose simply assuming the existence of numbers (though taking reasonable steps to ensure that the assumptions on which the semantics is based are logically consistent). Questions about the existence of numbers are then expressible in this new language for arithmetic, and will often be settled be demonstration using the inference rules of the language. However, the general question "are there numbers" is in this context a trivial problem. There remains a question about the legitimacy of the language, and this might be thought to involve the "external question" of the existence of numbers. This external question Carnap regards as meaningless and therefore as irrelevant to the acceptability of the language, which is to be determined by pragmatic considerations. Many of the traditional questions are philosophy are resolved by Carnap's philosophical methods by proposals about the use of language. Thus, the question "What is a proposition" will be resolved by Carnap (if at all), by a proposed usage for the term proposition, together with any theoretical claims about propositions which follow from the proposed usage (which will be analytic). I appreciate that I have not answered your question. >I think we have to distinguish between philosophy?s being > >analytic, philosophy?s being a set of analytical propositions, > >and Carnap's philosophy as distinguished from other forms > >of analytical philosophy. Yes. Carnap's position is specifically about the kind of philosophy which he recommends, not a claim about the propositions affirmed by other philosophers. He does not say that philosophy is a set of analytic propositions. >There are other forms of analytical philosophy that meets >this test. For example I think what Austin, Ryle, Grice and others were > doing were not much like what Carnap recommends, but they are all fine > analytical philosophers. So the metaphilosophical question is not resolved. > How do we resolve it? Roger suggests that we do it by analogy with how we > would answer the same question in mathematics. He says, I don't understand what you mean here by "the metaphilosophical question", and I doubt that my analogy between maths and philosophy is intended to address it. >?The propositions of mathematics are those whose > >subject matter is properly mathematical and which have > >been proven by accepted methods. ? > > > >Well, I think there are mathematical propositions which have yet to be > proven, and the question of ?methods? is not beyond controversy, as > historians of Cantor will recall from the reception of the diagonal > argument. Nor is it very encouraging to be told that mathematical > propositions are those whose subject matter is mathematical. So I can?t > really buy in to this as clarifying matters. Roger brings up Ayer. It was not my aim to give in a sentence a watertight definition of the propositions of mathematics. Merely to point out that very many propositions truthfully uttered by mathematicians in the course of doing mathematics are not properly considered among "the propositions of mathematics". This is not just for certain philosophers, there is a distinction here which is a part of the culture of mathematics. >I can?t help but recall Sellars?s criticism of Ayer?s use of Carnap in > speaking of ?sense-data languages.? Ayer, following Carnap, defends a form > of logical reconstruction wherein one translates from one language to > another. I?ve mentioned the pitfalls etc. of this, and I?m a little > disappointed that Roger hasn?t addressed them because they are at the heart > of the issue. I am not defending Carnap's use of translations. >So I have a challenge for Roger! Give me an example of a philosophical > problem that can be solved using Carnap?s methods. Carnap is primarily concerned with the problems of science. So he is aiming to provide languages for use in science. The methods he describes in "Meaning and Necessity" are for defining the semantics of such languages. The philosophical problem then is "how to define a language" and the result is a description of methods, not one or more propositions. > I mean a philosophical > problem such as the problem of the external world, the reality of the Self, > the nature of choice, free-will, causation. Now clearly Carnap addresses > some of these problems, but when he does his method of intension/extension > or reconstruction into a logical ?perspicuous? language simply plays no > role. Does he? If you have among them a counterexample to his assertion that philosophical propositions are analytic then I would be happy to discuss it. >Well now, ?propositions of philosophy,? (in quotes). All philosophical > problems appear to be pseudo-problems! Can you give me an example of a > philosophical problem, distinctively philosophical (to mimic Bruce) that is > not a pseudo problem by Carnap?s lights? His conception of philosophy is an > exercise in explicating the language of science. I don?t see any legitimate > philosophical problems, really. Cite me an example of what YOU consider to > be a philosophical problem! It is entirely possible that there might be a complete disjunction between what you count as a proposition of philosophy and what Carnap counted as one. But that in itself would not render Carnap inconsistent in the sense we are considering. Let me give you >Some of my reasoning here is ba sed on Bergmann?s _Metaphysics of Logical > Positivism_ There are selections on Hist-Analytic that may interest you. > For example, why prefer realism over phenomenalism? Say, in Carnap?s case. > He looks like a phenomenalist to me in some places and not so much in > others. How can logic cure us of this ?pseudo? issue. I don?t see it. Well of course Carnap's position did change quite a lot over his lifetime. But he is immediately misrepresented if he is held to be denying realism, for I don't think he ever did that, and once we get through his "liberalisation of empiricism" he embraces "theoretical languages" which are just the same as a realistic physicist might use. Does Bergman argue that the points which he considers metaphysical would be so regarded by Carnap? >I see very little similarity between Russell and Carnap after 1927. Where do > you see it? I don't see much similarity between Carnap's philosophy and Russell's. Carnap explicitly describes the way in which his own conception of philosophy is based on Russell's and his program consists (in my words) in doing for science what Russell had done for mathematics. This kind of high level influence is in my opinion enormously important, and my support for Carnap's position is at a similar level. I applaud aspects of the general thrust of Carnap's philosophy but am inclined to retain very little of the detail. I have not found a nice example of a "proposition of philosophy". perhaps one will come to me. If you have counterexamples I would be happy to consider them. I will mention two little points. Firstly, it does seem to me that the claim that Hume's fork identifies a fundamental and objective partition of some kind is one which I would count as metaphysical. I don't think Carnap did, and in his scheme of things, this is just an aspect of his conceptual scheme which he can reasonably consider to be justified by pragmatic considerations. When stated in an appropriate language, Hume's fork is analytic. Secondly the question whether there are necessary synthetic truths is often considered to be a metaphysical question closely related to metaphysics. For Carnap its denial is analytic, and is trivially so. In some places Carnap defines both "analytic" and "necessary" as "L-true", in others he defines necessity in terms of analyticity. Probably there are other variations with similar effects, viz the analyticity of there being no necessary synthetic truths. The supposed refutation of Carnap by Kripke is pure equivocation. Perhaps Kripke's conceptions of analyticity and necessity are better than Carnap's, but they cannot serve to refute Carnap in this matter. I appreciate that I probably have not met your challenge. However, technically, it is not necessary for me to do so to sustain my support of Carnap in the matter on which I am supporting him. For you to refute this position, you must offer a counterexample, for Carnap's position would be consistent if he had never tabled a proposition of philosophy. You talk as if this were easy, lets just take one example. RBJ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Sat Aug 22 12:41:46 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sat, 22 Aug 2009 16:41:46 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Carnap on Philosophy In-Reply-To: <200908202153.47564.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <1228216655.2321731250959306730.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> For some reason the last half of my message was not sent. Here it is, sorry. You mention Bergmann and how he would regard Carnap with respect to metaphysics. That would be a long story. It is told on a file on Hist-Analytic by Bergmann on ?Reconstruction in Philosophy.? Bergmann was a member of the Vienna Circle , a mathematician, and a friend of Carnap?s until either Bergmann alleged a metaphysics of logical positivism or went nuts. Opinions vary. I like Bergmann; he was always nice to me and he was a genius, of that there can be no doubt. But I will enter one word. When the positivists like Neurath relied on ?protocol sentences? as constituting the ?atoms? of their epistemology they took the subject of such sentences as either sense-data or physical objects. There was no unanimity. The distinction is metaphysical. Since I no more believe in physical objects than the Greek gods, I?m inclined to side with the sense-data people, but I reject the methodology not only for philosophical reasons but for reasons having to do with the objectives of modern science, another topic. . You mention You pro ba bly don?t see muc similarity between Russell?s philosophy and Carnap?s because they are vastly different after about 1927; before that year they are pretty close. Tarski changed that by making philosophy a sort of boring subject. Russell was never boring. Actually, Carnap is never boring but less boring in the Auf ba u, a much maligned and brilliant work. Carnap followed Russell?s lead in his regard for the place of logic even though Carnap had been a student of Frege?s. I?m going to defer comments on Hume or his much celebrated fork. Much has to do with my rejection of his views on causation. The ?patrician? for Hume between causal relations and other relations is not ?objective.? It is subjective. His ontology is essentially phenomenalist etc. which makes moves him closer to idealism than some would care to admit. If Carnap believes in physical objects, then he is a metaphysician in my opinion, but as Bergmann suggested he on one prong of the phenomenalist/realist fork. Carnap is a pragmatist, but that is symptomatic of mere expedience in many cases. One can?t reject all pragmatism has to offer, but its use as a convenient tool in rejecting certain problems as relevant is an artless dodge. Kripke is a philosopher much in the Carnapian traidition. Before Kripke ceases doing philosophy, I would wager that he will publish something major on Carnap. I discuss Kripke to some extent in my forthcoming book. One metaphysical concern is his reliance on ?epistemic counterparts.? I talk about these and will defer discussing them until the book?s out. You offer a challenge in your message at the very end. It?s the only ungrammatical sentence in seven pages! What da ?? Let me put together an example not necessarily a counterexample of what I think you want. The problem with all such approaches as Carnap?s is that the philosophy, if there is any, comes before the methodology of logical reconstruction. There is a difference between reconstruction and the use of logic in solving philosophical problems. Too often the problems are forgotten or lost in a wad of lamda operators and other gizmos. Let me put together an example, intended mainly as illustrative of the right way of applying logic to a philosophical problem that does not depend on a priori arguments designed to reject rather than solve the problem. Rejecting the problem is indicative of the onset of a realization that one does not live forever. It is to be resisted. By the way, if anyone knows offhand where in Principia Russell and Whitehead discuss the ancestral, please let me know. Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2009 4:53:47 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Carnap on Philosophy This is a rather selective response to Steve's last rather challenging message on Carnap. First I must clarify a little the extent to which I am defending Carnap's philosophy. I have asserted in the first instance that Carnap "was clear" that the propositions of philosophy are analytic, and in response to Steve's scepticism on this I supplied some citations. I hope that I have satisfied Steve on that point. In response, Steve has expressed doubts about the consistency of that claim of Carnap's with Carnap's own philosophical writings. On that point I have disagreed with Steve (and continue to do so). I propose for the time being to stick at that, i.e. to stick to the defence of Carnap against the claim that his philosophy was inconsistent with his claim that the propositions of philosophy are analytic. I do not intend to offer any general defence of his philosophy. For example, his methodological position in "Philosophy and Logical Syntax" is more specific than that, it describes how one should go about formally establishing such propositions, and, though he does do a considerable amount of technical work which is clearly intended to facilitate that kind of demonstration, it is not the case that he proves all his philosophical propositions in the manner which he recommends. Further to my accepting that Carnap falls short of his own ideals in that respect, I would not myself recommend the methods he proposes. Now, on the point which I am still prepared to defend, viz. that the philosophical propositions which Carnap asserts either are or are believed by him to be (usually the former) analytic, I have a couple of further points of clarification to offer before responding in detail to some of Steve's points. First I must clarify the purpose of the analogy I drew between mathematics and philosophy. The point of this was simply that many things that mathematicians and philosophers assert are not properly construed as "propositions of" mathematics and philosophy respectively. So I am not claiming that every assertion which Carnap makes is analytic, and I am asserting that when Carnap says that the propositions of philosophy are analytic he is not saying that everything which he asserts is analytic. Obvious examples of propositions which he asserts but would not claim in the required sense to be propositions of philosophy, are his claims about the views of other philosophers. Further to this, a great deal of what Carnap writes are not "propositions" at all, they are definitions or proposals, either of for languages or concepts. This is a large part of what he conceives of as the purpose of philosophy when he describes philosophy as "the logical syntax of science". The use of the term "logical" in this phrase is intended to exclude the descriptive analysis of existing scientific language (let alone "ordinary" language), which he does not see as falling under his method, and does not see as properly philosophical (he would classify this as empirical science, possibly linguistics). He sees philosophy as proposing languages for use in the empirical science, in the same way as he sees Principia Mathematica as offering and demonstrating the use of a language for mathematics. In this context, it would be consistent with Carnap's philosophy if Carnap asserted no philosophical propositions whatever, but exclusively concerned himself with the construction of formal languages for various branches of science and the discussion of the pragmatic considerations which are relevant to the adoption of such languages. I don't believe he does this, I think he does actually assert propositions which he believes to be both philosophical and analytic, though from my limited reading of Carnap I am not actually aware of cases where he has demonstrated such propositions in a manner consistent with his syntactic method (I would however be rather surprised if there were no examples in "Logical Syntax of Language"). It is worth noting here, that for Carnap to be consistent on this point, his assertions only have to be analytic according to his own conception of analyticity, they need not be analytic in Kant's or in Kripke's usage of that term. Furthermore, insofar as Carnap condemns metaphysics, for consistency he has only to avoid asserting propositions which comply with his own description of proscribed metaphysics, and this is greatly different from Kripke's conception of metaphysics (and I would say almost everyone else's). This is particularly relevant for those many people who look at Carnap's writing and immediately see lots of metaphysics, most especially if they see this in a volume like "Meaning and Necessity" which benefits from the very considerable widening in Carnap's conception of acceptable (not metaphysical in the proscribed sense) language. In particular, any apparently metaphysical language can be rendered acceptable to Carnap once it is incorporated into the definition of a language, for then the apparently metaphysical claims are given meaning by the language, the internal questions become respectable, and the external questions can be passed over so long as the language passes some pragmatic criteria. On Tuesday 11 August 2009 17:21:04 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: >The very first thing I want to ask Roger is this: give me an example of the > successful employment of the methodology he advocates in solving a > philosophical problem. ... > If you are going to defend a method > give me an example of its success, NOT in general terms, but input/output. > Other minds? External world? The Self? Ethics? State the philosophical > problem and then in a few words tell me how it?s solved. Russell could do > it; Tarski did it. Ok? So now give us a philosophical problem that has been > solved. The kind of problem you are looking for here seems to me not to be characteristic of Carnap's philosophy, for two reasons, one positive and one negative. On the positive side, the kind of problem which interested Carnap was typically one of devising the best language for some scientific purpose, or of devising the best method for the conduct of science or philosophy. The result of solving such problems are not "propositions". On the negative side, very many of the "traditional problems" of philosophy are in Carnap's scheme of things trivialised by Carnap's method. Take for example, the question, "Are there numbers?" which is discussed by Carnap who make this point about it. Carnap's recommended method for doing arithmetic proceeds as follows. First you devise a language for talking about numbers and define its semantics, for this purpose simply assuming the existence of numbers (though taking reasonable steps to ensure that the assumptions on which the semantics is based are logically consistent). Questions about the existence of numbers are then expressible in this new language for arithmetic, and will often be settled be demonstration using the inference rules of the language. However, the general question "are there numbers" is in this context a trivial problem. There remains a question about the legitimacy of the language, and this might be thought to involve the "external question" of the existence of numbers. This external question Carnap regards as meaningless and therefore as irrelevant to the acceptability of the language, which is to be determined by pragmatic considerations. Many of the traditional questions are philosophy are resolved by Carnap's philosophical methods by proposals about the use of language. Thus, the question "What is a proposition" will be resolved by Carnap (if at all), by a proposed usage for the term proposition, together with any theoretical claims about propositions which follow from the proposed usage (which will be analytic). I appreciate that I have not answered your question. >I think we have to distinguish between philosophy?s being > >analytic, philosophy?s being a set of analytical propositions, > >and Carnap's philosophy as distinguished from other forms > >of analytical philosophy. Yes. Carnap's position is specifically about the kind of philosophy which he recommends, not a claim about the propositions affirmed by other philosophers. He does not say that philosophy is a set of analytic propositions. >There are other forms of analytical philosophy that meets >this test. For example I think what Austin, Ryle, Grice and others were > doing were not much like what Carnap recommends, but they are all fine > analytical philosophers. So the metaphilosophical question is not resolved. > How do we resolve it? Roger suggests that we do it by analogy with how we > would answer the same question in mathematics. He says, I don't understand what you mean here by "the metaphilosophical question", and I doubt that my analogy between maths and philosophy is intended to address it. >?The propositions of mathematics are those whose > >subject matter is properly mathematical and which have > >been proven by accepted methods. ? > > > >Well, I think there are mathematical propositions which have yet to be > proven, and the question of ?methods? is not beyond controversy, as > historians of Cantor will recall from the reception of the diagonal > argument. Nor is it very encouraging to be told that mathematical > propositions are those whose subject matter is mathematical. So I can?t > really buy in to this as clarifying matters. Roger brings up Ayer. It was not my aim to give in a sentence a watertight definition of the propositions of mathematics. Merely to point out that very many propositions truthfully uttered by mathematicians in the course of doing mathematics are not properly considered among "the propositions of mathematics". This is not just for certain philosophers, there is a distinction here which is a part of the culture of mathematics. >I can?t help but recall Sellars?s criticism of Ayer?s use of Carnap in > speaking of ?sense-data languages.? Ayer, following Carnap, defends a form > of logical reconstruction wherein one translates from one language to > another. I?ve mentioned the pitfalls etc. of this, and I?m a little > disappointed that Roger hasn?t addressed them because they are at the heart > of the issue. I am not defending Carnap's use of translations. >So I have a challenge for Roger! Give me an example of a philosophical > problem that can be solved using Carnap?s methods. Carnap is primarily concerned with the problems of science. So he is aiming to provide languages for use in science. The methods he describes in "Meaning and Necessity" are for defining the semantics of such languages. The philosophical problem then is "how to define a language" and the result is a description of methods, not one or more propositions. > I mean a philosophical > problem such as the problem of the external world, the reality of the Self, > the nature of choice, free-will, causation. Now clearly Carnap addresses > some of these problems, but when he does his method of intension/extension > or reconstruction into a logical ?perspicuous? language simply plays no > role. Does he? If you have among them a counterexample to his assertion that philosophical propositions are analytic then I would be happy to discuss it. >Well now, ?propositions of philosophy,? (in quotes). All philosophical > problems appear to be pseudo-problems! Can you give me an example of a > philosophical problem, distinctively philosophical (to mimic Bruce) that is > not a pseudo problem by Carnap?s lights? His conception of philosophy is an > exercise in explicating the language of science. I don?t see any legitimate > philosophical problems, really. Cite me an example of what YOU consider to > be a philosophical problem! It is entirely possible that there might be a complete disjunction between what you count as a proposition of philosophy and what Carnap counted as one. But that in itself would not render Carnap inconsistent in the sense we are considering. Let me give you >Some of my reasoning here is ba sed on Bergmann?s _Metaphysics of Logical > Positivism_ There are selections on Hist-Analytic that may interest you. > For example, why prefer realism over phenomenalism? Say, in Carnap?s case. > He looks like a phenomenalist to me in some places and not so much in > others. How can logic cure us of this ?pseudo? issue. I don?t see it. Well of course Carnap's position did change quite a lot over his lifetime. But he is immediately misrepresented if he is held to be denying realism, for I don't think he ever did that, and once we get through his "liberalisation of empiricism" he embraces "theoretical languages" which are just the same as a realistic physicist might use. Does Bergman argue that the points which he considers metaphysical would be so regarded by Carnap? >I see very little similarity between Russell and Carnap after 1927. Where do > you see it? I don't see much similarity between Carnap's philosophy and Russell's. Carnap explicitly describes the way in which his own conception of philosophy is based on Russell's and his program consists (in my words) in doing for science what Russell had done for mathematics. This kind of high level influence is in my opinion enormously important, and my support for Carnap's position is at a similar level. I applaud aspects of the general thrust of Carnap's philosophy but am inclined to retain very little of the detail. I have not found a nice example of a "proposition of philosophy". perhaps one will come to me. If you have counterexamples I would be happy to consider them. I will mention two little points. Firstly, it does seem to me that the claim that Hume's fork identifies a fundamental and objective partition of some kind is one which I would count as metaphysical. I don't think Carnap did, and in his scheme of things, this is just an aspect of his conceptual scheme which he can reasonably consider to be justified by pragmatic considerations. When stated in an appropriate language, Hume's fork is analytic. Secondly the question whether there are necessary synthetic truths is often considered to be a metaphysical question closely related to metaphysics. For Carnap its denial is analytic, and is trivially so. In some places Carnap defines both "analytic" and "necessary" as "L-true", in others he defines necessity in terms of analyticity. Probably there are other variations with similar effects, viz the analyticity of there being no necessary synthetic truths. The supposed refutation of Carnap by Kripke is pure equivocation. Perhaps Kripke's conceptions of analyticity and necessity are better than Carnap's, but they cannot serve to refute Carnap in this matter. I appreciate that I probably have not met your challenge. However, technically, it is not necessary for me to do so to sustain my support of Carnap in the matter on which I am supporting him. For you to refute this position, you must offer a counterexample, for Carnap's position would be consistent if he had never tabled a proposition of philosophy. You talk as if this were easy, lets just take one example. RBJ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Sun Aug 23 06:24:37 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Sun, 23 Aug 2009 06:24:37 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Carnap on Philosophy In-Reply-To: <1228216655.2321731250959306730.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <1228216655.2321731250959306730.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: I wonder if Steve would answer a question I put to him weeks ago: How, by what method or procedure, are true metaphysical propositions ascertained? What shows them to be true? Bruce From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sun Aug 23 17:38:21 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sun, 23 Aug 2009 14:38:21 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Hist-Analytic: H. H. Price's Hume's Theory of the External World Message-ID: <441324.98954.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Hist-Analytic is pleased to announce an addition to its existing data-base. This time we add one of the most lucid and imaginative discussions of Hume ever. It is: HUME'S THEORY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD (1940) by H. H. Price Introduction and Constancy and Coherence http://www.hist-analytic.org/Price1.pdf The Effects of Constancy and Coherence http://www.hist-analytic.org/Price2.pdf The Existence of Unsensed Sensibilia http://www.hist-analytic.org/Price3.pdf The As-If Theory http://www.hist-analytic.org/Price4.pdf The Expressive Theory; Conclusion, and Index http://www.hist-analytic.org/Price5.pdf This book speaks for itself. It is a fundamental work in the History of Philosophy but it is a remarkable book in general philosophy as well. Regards Steven R. Bayne www.hist-analytic.org -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Mon Aug 24 12:52:08 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2009 16:52:08 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Carnap on Philosophy In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <286439659.2738231251132728822.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Bruce ? Much depends on where you place epistemology in philosophy. Metaphysical positions are taken not because they possess the mark of truth or evidence but because one position is better than another. Take nominalism. There is no empirical evidence that can be adduced that will decide whether nominalism is preferable to realism. It is not an empirical issue. It is a matter of which position is most "productive" with respect to "fitting" all that needs to be considered in getting the "big picture" (the point of metaphysics). On my position, and that of others, epistemology is subsumed under metaphysics, rather than the other way around, which would be the case if epistemology ("How do you know") had veto power of metaphysics ("What is there?"). In addition there is a certain ambiguity in what the point of asking the "How do you know?" question. It has to do with the nature of epistemology, which is not of a uniform cloth, so to speak. We can consider the question "What is knowledge?" That I take to be a secondary question, comparable to "What is explanation in science?" The debates over this latter question do not have what I've called a veto over what scientists might come up with. Similarly with metaphysics. These "meta-epistemological questions" fail to constain metaphysics. The metaphysician will often say that "metaepistemology" concerns what we should call 'knowledge' and what knowledge is; this is of some linguistic and semantical interest but the linguistic turn need not be taken. Few metaphysicians take the "linguistic turn." C. D. Broad investigated the "perceptual situation" in search of an analysis of perceptual knowledge; he did not, as for exampel Dretske did in his excellent work Seeing, analyse the senses of 'see'. So when Bruce asks about how we ascertain the truth of metaphysical sentences I sense a sort of epistemologist trap, as if to say that metaphysics is to be placed on an epistemological leash. But if your interest is not "meta-epistemology" or if you are like the philospher of science not particularly taken with how to formalize a scientific explanation then the right question is a metaphysical one concerning epistemology, not an epistemological question about metaphysics. The question then is: "What is the metaphysics of perception?" Now you can reject this entirely, but if you don't then you will end up doing metaphysics of epistemology (the phrase is Sellars's). Descartes lives in the heart and souls of many meta-epistemologists. Descartes looked for some mark of certainty. This was the general approach: find something about true propositions that carries the "mark" of truth. The argument moves towards "criteria" or some "criterion." Similarly in debates over truth. Those who took the linguistic turn found the "mark" of truth in a meta-linguistic concept, a semantic concept, a concept which is language relative. But I reject these approaches. I side with philosophers who say that epistemology is about knowledge and knowledge is, properly, viewes as a relationship between mind and the world. "Ascertaining" the "truth" of metaphysical sentences is a side issue, just as ascertaining what constitutes the logical form of a scientific explanation is an important side issue in philosophy of science. A metaphysical issue in philosophy of science would be something like whether causation can be treated in terms of laws, say using either inductive statistical or deductive nomological forms of explanation. There is no empirical determination of the outcome of these issues. Whether, for example, causation is singular or a matter treated within the compass of regularity views will not be decided on an evidential basis, nor is it a pseudo-question. I am not dismissing meta-epistemology or the need for models of explanation in science; I am saying that epistemology will not resolve metaphysical questions, once you admit their legitimacy. I don't want to move any closer to pragmatism than I am now, but there are what in economics called "decision variables." You can codify interesting "laws" in macroeconomics but when you introduce a variable like 'interest rate' then you introduce something that suggests that characterizations of laws in terms of truth must be carefully constructed. Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: Baynesr at comcast.net Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Sunday, August 23, 2009 6:24:37 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Carnap on Philosophy I wonder if Steve would answer a question I put to him weeks ago: ? How, by what method or procedure, are true metaphysical propositions ? ascertained? ?What shows them to be true? Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Mon Aug 24 14:58:51 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2009 19:58:51 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Carnap on Philosophy In-Reply-To: <286439659.2738231251132728822.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <286439659.2738231251132728822.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: Hi Steve/Bruce, I do not think there is any sharp distinction between physics and metaphysics. It seems pretty clear that the two of you regard metaphysical theories as being ones which are not empirically testable. But whether a theory is empirically testable depends not just on the logical content of the theory (i.e., what it says) but also on what other theories we conjoin with it and on what technology we have developed. In ancient times, for example, atomism was a metaphysical theory, being completely untestable. But with the development of further theories and models, like the kinetic theory of heat, and with the development of microscopes, atomism became empirically testable. It passed from metaphysics into physics. Bruce asks (and Steve accepts the questions): 'by what method or procedure, are true metaphysical propositions ascertained? What shows them to be true?' But the questions are misplaced. There is no method or procedure by which the truth of ANY proposition may be ascertained or shown. We can test theories; but even if they survive refutation, that does not show them to be true. You may say: but how do we test metaphysical theories? I have just given the answer: we develop them, or develop auxiliary theories, and we develop experimental techniques, which may eventually enable us to test them. Grand new scientific theories often start out as untestable metaphysics. Relativity theory had to wait fourteen years before it could be tested. Steve says: 'Metaphysical positions are taken not because they possess the mark of truth or evidence but because one position is better than another.' This is true in that no position possesses the mark of truth. But for many metaphysicians AND SCIENTISTS metaphysical positions have been adopted because the theorist concerned DID think that it possessed the mark of truth. Kepler was a Pythagorean mystic for whom the sun was symbolic of the deity, so it just had to occupy the centre of the universe (not just the solar system). Descartes' physics was based on metaphysical intuition, as was Leibniz's rejection of it in favour of fields of force (see Popper's 'Philosophy and Physics,' in which he shows how metaphysical disputes inspired scientific theories; it is in his 'The Myth of the Framework'). Steve says: 'Whether, for example, causation is singular or a matter treated within the compass of regularity views will not be decided on an evidential basis.' Why not? Someone may develop a theory involving singular causation during the course of scientific progress, and the theory may survive testing. Admittedly, at first glance any theory postulating singular causes looks as if it would be merely an ad hoc way of explaining away some difficulty with another theory. But there seems to be no reason why such a claim of singular causality should not, in combination with other theories about the marks of causes, for example, turn out to be testable. When the motions of Uranus refuted Newton's theory, the scientists said there must be another planet with just the properties required to explain Uranus' divergences from Newtonian predictions. It may seem totally ad hoc. But in fact, a planet with the required properties would have been observable at certain times. So they looked for it. And they found it: they called it 'Neptune.' Science often progresses via untestable ('metaphysical') stop-gaps that eventually turn out to be testable. For various examples see Feyerabend's 'Against Method' and Lakatos' 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.' I am currently reading, bit by bit, chapter 3 of Bruce's book available on this site. It is a very pleasant and worthwhile read; but as should be evident from some of my statements above, I disagree with it. I reject the notion of analytic truth entirely (but not for Quinean reasons). I will post some criticisms in a message to the list later (I hope by the end of this week). Best wishes, Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Mon Aug 24 16:11:06 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2009 20:11:06 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Carnap on Philosophy In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <2108682098.2814631251144666468.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Some good stuff here, but to give a useful reply I need to know why you think singular causation vs. regularity theories can be empirically tested against one another. A few more specifics are, perhaps, required for a reply. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Danny Frederick" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Monday, August 24, 2009 2:58:51 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: RE: Carnap on Philosophy Hi Steve/Bruce, I do not think there is any sharp distinction between physics and metaphysics. It seems pretty clear that the two of you regard metaphysical theories as being ones which are not empirically testable. But whether a theory is empirically testable depends not just on the logical content of the theory (i.e., what it says) but also on what other theories we conjoin with it and on what technology we have developed. In ancient times, for example, atomism was a metaphysical theory, being completely untestable. But with the development of further theories and models, like the kinetic theory of heat, and with the development of microscopes, atomism became empirically testable. It passed from metaphysics into physics. Bruce asks (and Steve accepts the questions): ?by what method or procedure, are true metaphysical propositions ascertained? What shows them to be true?? But the questions are misplaced. There is no method or procedure by which the truth of ANY proposition may be ascertained or shown. We can test theories; but even if they survive refutation, that does not show them to be true. You may say: but how do we test metaphysical theories? I have just given the answer: we develop them, or develop auxiliary theories, and we develop experimental techniques, which may eventually enable us to test them. Grand new scientific theories often start out as untestable metaphysics. Relativity theory had to wait fourteen years before it could be tested. Steve says: ?Metaphysical positions are taken not because they possess the mark of truth or evidence but because one position is better than another.? This is true in that no position possesses the mark of truth. But for many metaphysicians AND SCIENTISTS metaphysical positions have been adopted because the theorist concerned DID think that it possessed the mark of truth. Kepler was a Pythagorean mystic for whom the sun was symbolic of the deity, so it just had to occupy the centre of the universe (not just the solar system). Descartes? physics was based on metaphysical intuition, as was Leibniz?s rejection of it in favour of fields of force (see Popper?s ?Philosophy and Physics,? in which he shows how metaphysical disputes inspired scientific theories; it is in his ?The Myth of the Framework?). Steve says: ?Whether, for example, causation is singular or a matter treated within the compass of regularity views will not be decided on an evidential basis.? Why not? Someone may develop a theory involving singular causation during the course of scientific progress, and the theory may survive testing. Admittedly, at first glance any theory postulating singular causes looks as if it would be merely an ad hoc way of explaining away some difficulty with another theory. But there seems to be no reason why such a claim of singular causality should not, in combination with other theories about the marks of causes, for example, turn out to be testable. When the motions of Uranus refuted Newton?s theory, the scientists said there must be another planet with just the properties required to explain Uranus? divergences from Newtonian predictions. It may seem totally ad hoc. But in fact, a planet with the required properties would have been observable at certain times. So they looked for it. And they found it: they called it ?Neptune.? Science often progresses via untestable (?metaphysical?) stop-gaps that eventually turn out to be testable. For various examples see Feyerabend?s ?Against Method? and Lakatos? ?Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.? I am currently reading, bit by bit, chapter 3 of Bruce?s book available on this site. It is a very pleasant and worthwhile read; but as should be evident from some of my statements above, I disagree with it. I reject the notion of analytic truth entirely (but not for Quinean reasons). I will post some criticisms in a message to the list later (I hope by the end of this week). Best wishes, Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Tue Aug 25 10:59:30 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2009 10:59:30 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] My response Message-ID: Steve?s latest contribution to our ongoing discussion contained his answer to a question I asked him, namely, ?How [in your view], [that is,] by what method or procedure, is the truth of metaphysical propositions ascertained? What shows them to be true?? I have here revised this question slightly, putting ?the truth of? in place of the original ?are true,? and in view of Danny?s response I should have added ?or probably true? to the end of my second sentence. I asked Steve essentially this question because I felt that the issue I raised on my contribution (or memo) of July 29 was becoming lost in the shuffle of subsequent discussion and I was genuinely interested in hearing Steve?s view of how the truth or probable truth of distinctively philosophical assertions, if indeed they have a truth value, could be rationally ascertained. 2. It appears that Steve was unwilling to answer my question: instead of writing about the truth of ?distinctively philosophical assertions,? he spoke about ?metaphysical positions? that philosophers take. I would never deny that there are metaphysical ?positions,? but I was not concerned with such things. One reason why I was not concerned with such things is that their nature is quite unclear. What is nominalism, as Steve understands it? Is it an assertion about what exists, an assertion that existing things are invariably concrete and particular, or that rationally acceptable discourse ostensibly about abstracta (properties, propositions, and possibly sets) must be equivalent, or reducible, to discourse about linguistically items? Or is nominalism something else entirely? Is it some kind of proposal or resolve to speak in a certain way. Or what? 3. In my memo of July 29 I was specifically concerned with true assertions of a ?distinctively philosophical? kind. [For my use of ?distinctively philosophical? see my July 29 memo.] As I observed in a note to another philosopher, the object of this concern was essentially hypothetical, for I was prepared to concede that distinctively philosophical assertions may [= might possibly] never, in fact, be true, or be false. Many empiricists regarded such assertions as cognitively meaningless, and others might consider them proposals or conventions of some kind. 4. Steve?s response left me in some doubt whether he regards any distinctly philosophical assertions as actually true. He says that nominalism is a ?position? that may or may not be ?most productive? with respect to ?fitting all that needs to be considered in getting the big picture.? Does the big picture he speaks of represent the nature or actual character of reality? Is the big picture propositional? Does it contain or consist of propositions that are actually true? If so, can those propositions be known to be true, probably true, or more likely true than not? Or are they essentially matters of faith, like typical religious claims? It is up to Steve to answer these questions. If he doesn?t, we won?t know what his position actually is. 5. Steve does make some claims about epistemology, but they are so abstract or high-level that they are hard to deal with. He dismisses the claim that epistemology has ?veto power? over metaphysics. But if a philosopher makes a determinate claim that such and such is the case, I would want to know why we should believe him or her. Why should we take such a claim seriously? I would want to evaluate it by reference to reasonable epistemic standards, the sort of standards I defend in my recent book. 6. There is a lot more to say here, but saying more may not be useful. The discussion needs clarification. I think Roger has made useful remarks on this (I think I am in general agreement with him) but more needs to be said. Bruce PS: I think this is an appropriate response to Danny, also. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Tue Aug 25 12:47:47 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2009 16:47:47 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Reply to Aune's "My response" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <1486363052.3104331251218867375.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Since some of my answers overlap some of Bruce's questions, I'll not be replying to each of his points in order, but instead reply to a couple of things he returns to one or more times in the course of his enumerated objections. Let me first address nominalism and truth in philosophy. I mention these two together because, nominalism, illustrates a point pertinent to the matter of truth in philosophical theorizing. But before I do let's consider the question whether there are other possible worlds. Let's take a realist's view of worlds. When such a philosopher says there are worlds where some ravens are white he is not uttering an assertion that can be verified. This does not mean that it cannot be "true" or viable in some sense; or is philosophically unacceptable. It is a question of making sense of other things, e.g. about counterfactuals. So if I make a philosophical claim, I am claiming that making sense of the world requires that we acknowledge other worlds. I am not claiming, even if I am a realist, that powerful telescopes reveal worlds. (I think Kripke puts it this way, although he is not a realist on worlds, like say Lewis). So when I accept a philosophical point of view I am saying that it must be accepted in order to make sense of the world. Now this moves the issue into territory that first appears to be more murky: "making sense of the world." But that is subject for further metaphysical speculation not pointer readings on galvanometers etc. What I've just given is a sort of conservative answer. Let's look at this position from a different angle. Bruce asks what I take nominalism to be. I take it to be the position that a metaphysical account of the way the world is need include nothing more than individuals. Here I would say that by 'individual' I mean what substitutes for bound variables in first order logic; but I could have said what subsitutes for variables for first order predicates. The order is not so important as whether all entities are of one type. So on one take belief in concrete particulars is a form of nominalism, although it recognizes entities besides tables and chairs etc. But there is something going on here I should mention as to how philosophical issues like truth and nominalism are related. When I say universals exist, or the idea of a golden mountain, perhaps, I am not saying that they exist as does this old can sitting out in the back yard. I am not saying that to know it to be true I must look, as I would look to see if that old can is still there. In other words 'exists' may not be analyzable in terms of the existential quantifier. But this is not the main point here. The main point I would make here is that just as there may some equivocation over 'exists' the same may be said of 'true'; so the truth of nominalism may not be the same as the "truth" of "This is a rusty can." Some things are so different that saying that both "exist" creates difficulty, such as when I say that number exist or that classes exist. The situation is not entirely like questions of logical asymmetry. What makes a relation asymmetrical? Well, the things in the domain are so different (in some way) that we cannot permute the domains and the range. This is *analogous* to 'exist' and 'true;' there are some facts so different from cans and chairs that to use the same word, EVEN if were logically justified in doing so would not clarify matters to say that universals "exist" just like this can. Someone says "Objects exist" what can such a sentence "mean" and yet it is meaningful and we know the meaning of 'meaning' (more or less). This presents another sort of philosophical, not linguistic question. If I understand "Objects exist" then I should understand "connections between objects exist." But is "exist" being used the same way? I'm not so sure of this OR whether to speak of existence is philosophically productive any more than the question "How does the truth of a philosophical proposal differ from one in, say, automechanics." There are other analogies to this this predicament: such as using the word 'knowing' to describe knowing how, or knowing that, or knowing the meaning of 'how'. 'True' may presents similar difficulties. 'True' may turn out to be no more important for philosophy than 'cause' is to physics in a Russellian ontology. Kant had a good idea when he suggested that in a way epistemology should be positioned to veto metaphysics. Kant was anti-metaphysical, in a way; at least he argues so - as we all know. But once his synthetic a priori was rejected we are faced witht three options, going Humean - philosophy ultimately becomes a dead end, in my opinion; we reject metaphysics, another dead end where we talk about things like the Prisoner's Dilemma, e.g.; or we seek an alternative to the idea that reason adds nothing to our scientific understanding of nature, where 'reason' requires detailed discussion I can't enter into in this post. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: "hist-analytic" Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2009 10:59:30 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: My response 1. Steve?s latest contribution to our ongoing discussion contained his answer to a question I asked him, namely, ?How [in your view], [that is,] by what method or procedure, is the truth of metaphysical propositions ascertained? What shows them to be true?? I have here revised this question slightly, putting ?the truth of? in place of the original ?are true,? and in view of Danny?s response I should have added ?or probably true? to the end of my second sentence. I asked Steve essentially this question because I felt that the issue I raised on my contribution (or memo) of July 29 was becoming lost in the shuffle of subsequent discussion and I was genuinely interested in hearing Steve?s view of how the truth or probable truth of distinctively philosophical assertions, if indeed they have a truth value, could be rationally ascertained. 2. It appears that Steve was unwilling to answer my question: instead of writing about the truth of ?distinctively philosophical assertions,? he spoke about ?metaphysical positions? that philosophers take. I would never deny that there are metaphysical ?positions,? but I was not concerned with such things. One reason why I was not concerned with such things is that their nature is quite unclear. What is nominalism, as Steve understands it? Is it an assertion about what exists, an assertion that existing things are invariably concrete and particular, or that rationally acceptable discourse ostensibly about abstracta (properties, propositions, and possibly sets) must be equivalent, or reducible, to discourse about linguistically items? Or is nominalism something else entirely? Is it some kind of proposal or resolve to speak in a certain way. Or what? 3. In my memo of July 29 I was specifically concerned with true assertions of a ?distinctively philosophical? kind. [For my use of ?distinctively philosophical? see my July 29 memo.] As I observed in a note to another philosopher, the object of this concern was essentially hypothetical, for I was prepared to concede that distinctively philosophical assertions may [= might possibly] never, in fact, be true, or be false. Many empiricists regarded such assertions as cognitively meaningless, and others might consider them proposals or conventions of some kind. 4. Steve?s response left me in some doubt whether he regards any distinctly philosophical assertions as actually true. He says that nominalism is a ?position? that may or may not be ?most productive? with respect to ?fitting all that needs to be considered in getting the big picture.? Does the big picture he speaks of represent the nature or actual character of reality? Is the big picture propositional? Does it contain or consist of propositions that are actually true? If so, can those propositions be known to be true, probably true, or more likely true than not? Or are they essentially matters of faith, like typical religious claims? It is up to Steve to answer these questions. If he doesn?t, we won?t know what his position actually is. 5. Steve does make some claims about epistemology, but they are so abstract or high-level that they are hard to deal with. He dismisses the claim that epistemology has ?veto power? over metaphysics. But if a philosopher makes a determinate claim that such and such is the case, I would want to know why we should believe him or her. Why should we take such a claim seriously? I would want to evaluate it by reference to reasonable epistemic standards, the sort of standards I defend in my recent book. 6. There is a lot more to say here, but saying more may not be useful. The discussion needs clarification. I think Roger has made useful remarks on this (I think I am in general agreement with him) but more needs to be said. Bruce PS: I think this is an appropriate response to Danny, also. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Wed Aug 26 09:51:08 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2009 14:51:08 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] My response In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Bruce, I do not think the addition of "or probably true" makes any difference. There is no method or procedure by which any proposition can be known to be probably true. The probability calculus is like a logical calculus. Just as in the latter we can derive truths from other truths, PROVIDED WE ARE GIVEN SOME TRUTHS TO START WITH, so in the former we can calculate probabilities from other probabilities, PROVIDED WE ARE GIVEN SOME (PRIOR) PROBABILITIES TO START WITH. But in each case, the starting point is problematic. Whatever axioms we adopt can be questioned; and it seems odds-on that every proposed axiom will eventually be questioned by some competent people, if they have not all been impugned already. And the prior probabilities of Bayesian progic are assigned arbitrarily. Thus the best we have are methods of ascribing truth or probability to propositions ASSUMING the truth or probability of others. The regress can be stopped only arbitrarily. This does not mean that rational debate is impossible. For, we can evaluate rival theories according to how well they solve theoretical problems. In the sciences, an essential part of this evaluation is consistency with accepted observation statements and prediction of novel facts. In philosophy, this often plays a role too, at least insofar as consistency with accepted scientific theory can count in favour of a philosophical theory. But even in the sciences, explanation and prediction of observation statements is not the only means of assessment: considerations such as inherent simplicity and coherence with other parts of our knowledge play an important role, and these can play a role in the assessment of philosophical problem-solutions too. Also, as I have said before, the dividing line between philosophy and science is a shifting one. You ask: 'if a philosopher makes a determinate claim that such and such is the case, I would want to know why we should believe him or her. Why should we take such a claim seriously?' I have no interest in the question of belief: I am not inclined to believe any philosophical or scientific theory. They are all guesses to be improved upon. But we can take the philosopher's claim seriously if it is proposed as a solution to a problem. For then we can evaluate it, compared to rival solutions, in terms of how good a solution it is: does it solve the problem or leave it unsolved? does it give a merely verbal solution that provides no illumination? is it consistent with itself and with other theories that we currently accept? And so on. For further discussion of this, see Popper, 'On the Status of Science and of Metaphysics' in his 'Conjectures and Refutations.' Cheers, Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Wed Aug 26 09:18:42 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2009 14:18:42 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Steve's and Roger's recent interchange In-Reply-To: <1486363052.3104331251218867375.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <1486363052.3104331251218867375.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <41EC2A2993634BA18614C32603EF24BD@DFLVQC1J> Hi Bruce, Here is the promised criticism of your chapter 3. It is a bit hastily put together because of practical demands on my time at the moment, so please forgive any infelicities. As I understand it, you claim that: (i) there are a priori truths; (ii) all a priori truths are analytic; (iii) all analytic truths are true by convention; (iv) conventions may be either explicit (including explicit 'implicit definitions') or they may be implicit in the linguistic practices of a community or cult. I can accept (ii) and (iii), but only because I think the class of analytic truths and the class of a priori truths are empty. I can accept (iv) as a statement about kinds of conventions. But (i) is false. I will go straight to the main point: it is impossible for any convention to guarantee a truth, because truth depends on objective fact. Let's take an explicit stipulative definition: by 'bachelor' I mean an unmarried man. It might be thought that this guarantees the truth of 'all bachelors are unmarried,' since 'all unmarried men are unmarried' is a logical truth. But that thought would be mistaken. It assumes that substitution of synonyms for synonyms can be made salva veritate. This has been disputed by Kripke and others. More importantly, it assumes that the so-called logical truth is guaranteed to be true. But it is not. There are two prongs to this objection. First, if we understand the logical words in 'all unmarried men are unmarried' ('all' and 'are') in their ordinary senses, then some people (Aristotelian types, for example) will maintain that 'all' has existential import, making 'all unmarried men are unmarried' contingent. Second, if we regard the logical words as having their meaning specified in a particular formal logical system, the necessary truth of 'all unmarried men are unmarried' will depend upon the logical system being consistent. But we can never know that a logical system is consistent. Apparent self-evidence is no guide: Russell's paradox showed that Frege's 'self-evident' fifth axiom was inconsistent. And consistency proofs are question-begging. A proof of consistency of a logical system requires logical principles (premises and rules of inference, or at least the latter). These principle are either the same as (some of) those used in the system, in which case the proof is circular, or they are different, in which case the question of consistency arises for them. Now let's look at an explicit 'implicit definition:' by '&' I mean whatever makes inferences of the following forms valid p&q, therefore p p&q, therefore q p, q, therefore p&q. We cannot know whether '&,' so defined, picks out a coherent notion for the reason already given: for all we can know, a logical system in which such inferences can be made may be inconsistent. Indeed, advocates of connexive logics do deny the validity of the rule of conjunction elimination. They might be mistaken; but they might not be. We cannot make propositions true or inferences valid by stipulation. But it also, almost obviously, follows that we cannot make propositions true or inferences valid by means of our practices either. The way we use words may lead to inconsistency: our linguistic practices may be incoherent, even demonstrably so (recall Frege's fifth axiom). If our 'linguistic behaviour' involves the tacit assumption of a rule of inference, it may still be the case that the rule is unsound. Indeed, this should be obvious. For millennia our linguistic practices committed us to inferring 'A is simultaneous with B' from 'B is simultaneous with A' whether or not the co-ordinate system changed between the two utterances; but we nowadays reject such inferences as invalid. Let me illustrate. On p.62 you say: 'words, phrases, clauses and constructions in existing dialects of natural languages have implications so vital to the meaning of what they are used to say that any alert and attentive speakers of a relevant dialect would find it odd, puzzling, or paradoxical to question them. When this condition is satisfied by a word or symbol, it seems to me that a sentence of the dialect clearly and unambiguously expressing an appropriate implication can reasonably be regarded as analytically true for those alert and attentive speakers.' It does not seem so to me. I would guess that, even today, the vast majority of people, whatever language they speak, would find it odd, puzzling, or paradoxical to question absolute simultaneity or the axiom of parallels. Yet Einstein questioned both; and negations of each have become a part of accepted physical science. Far from the absoluteness of simultaneity or the axiom of parallels being analytic truths, they are regarded by experts as being factually false. Let me comment on a different, though connected, point. You say: 'We consider a determinate color A to be the same as a determinate color B just when A and B are indistinguishable' (p.61). Who is 'we'? I certainly do not consider that. The problem with it is that it mixes up subjective and objective. Talk of determinate colours belongs to the realm of objective fact. Distinguishability is relative to a subject. This is obvious if we understand 'distinguishable' phenomenologically: our powers of visual discrimination are limited, so different determinate colours are often indistinguishable by us by sight. But it is also the case if we understand 'distinguishable' conceptually. When we talk of different determinate colours being indistinguishable by sight, we are probably thinking of the colours as different wavelengths of light, in which case we are distinguishing them conceptually. But, of course, it is possible that our theories of light are mistaken and that our classification of light in terms of wavelength fails to distinguish objectively different colours. What we can distinguish depends on our limited and fallible powers, but how things actually are does not. Nothing I have said above is original. The sources are: Whitehead and Russell, 'Principia Mathematica,' Vol 1, second edition, p.59. A N Prior, 'The Runabout Inference-ticket,' and N D Belnap 'Tonk, Plonk and Plink,' both in 'Philosophical Logic' ed. P F Strawson. W W Bartley, 'The Retreat to Commitment,' second edition. I Lakatos, 'Infinite Regress and Foundations of Mathematics,' and 'A Renaissance of Empiricism in the Recent Philosophy of Mathematics?' both in his 'Mathematics, Science and Epistemology,' ed. J. Worrall and G. Currie. S Kripke, 'A Puzzle about Belief.' Priest and Thomason, '60% Proof,' Australasian Journal of Logic, 2007, available here http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2007/2007_7.pdf T Williamson, 'Conceptual Truth,' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 80 (2006), available here http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/1303/Conceptual.p df Best wishes, Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Wed Aug 26 11:01:22 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2009 16:01:22 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Carnap on Philosophy In-Reply-To: <2108682098.2814631251144666468.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <2108682098.2814631251144666468.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <597028EB9A2A47AE94C33D6FEBF0A4C6@DFLVQC1J> Hi Steve, I was not maintaining that the claim that there is singular causation can be empirically tested. I was maintaining that it might become testable if our theories developed in a particular direction. Here is what I had in mind: it is no doubt an off-the-wall possibility, and it will be very simplistically stated, but it might be sufficient to give my claim some plausibility. Suppose someone conjectures that causes, no matter how different they may be, have an identifying mark, something which signifies 'the causality of the cause' (to use Kant's expression). Let's suppose that he analyses our current stock of well-tested causal laws, 'events of type A1 cause events of type B1,' 'events of type A2 cause events of type B2,' etc., and he finds that events of types A1-An share a common attribute, F (not necessarily an observable one), it being a part of accepted knowledge for each of the Ai up to An that it has F. He then investigates, empirically, events of type An+1 onwards, to test his hypothesis that they all have F. Suppose his hypothesis survives these tests: not only is it consistent with what we previously knew, but it has also predicted novel facts. So we then end up with an accepted universal law about causes: an event is a cause if and only if it has feature F. Of course, WHAT it causes depends on its other features. Suppose we know that it is not a law that events of type D cause events of type E. In fact events of these two types rarely occur together. But on one occasion when we find an event of type D followed by an event of type E, facts about the circumstances make it plausible that the former caused the latter. We form the hypothesis that this particular D-type event caused this particular E-type event. The hypothesis is falsifiable because we have a standard test for the presence or absence of feature F. We apply the test and discover that the event of type D had feature F. This is the only time an event of type D is known to have had feature F. Isn't this evidence for singular causation? This doubtless raises a lot of questions, in particular, about the acceptability of the test result given that the experiment is not repeatable (by hypotheses the causal relationship between this D-type and E-type event is singular). But perhaps further ingenuity could answer these questions; or, perhaps more likely, maybe this half-assed example may inspire someone else to come up with a better one. That's all for now! Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Wed Aug 26 12:39:24 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2009 16:39:24 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Applying the Ancestral with Classes to Causation Message-ID: <310978581.3480531251304764020.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> To define ?b is an ancestor of c?: ?~(b=c) & (x){ c mem x & ((y)(z)((z mem x & Parent yz) ->?y mem x)?-> b mem x} (Goodman and Quine "Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism" JSL, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1947. p. 108) I am going to simplify the discussion, somewhat, by at first using a predicative approach rather than a class theoretic approach. I will do this only in order to establish the transitivity of the ancestral. I will then proceed to examine an option which dispenses with the class notation. My point here is going to be that whereas there at first appears to be a draw back to treating the ancestral in terms of classes there is an advantage in doing so, particularly, in applying the concept to the issue of causation. The main objection to the class theoretic approach is that in the above formulation our only constraint on the classes is the class, x, contains the parents of all members of x. So anything else can be included as long as this is not disturbed. With respect to ?x? as Quine puts it, much else may be included: "ancestors, and neckties; for, neckties being parentless, their inclusion does not disturb the fact that that all parents of members are member." (Methods of Logic, 1972, p. 238) ? Fc & (Fx & (Hyx --> Fy) --> Fb (cRb) Fb & (Fx & (Hyx --> Fy) --> Fd (bRd) Therefore, Fc & (Fx & (Hyx --> Fy) --> Fd (cRd) Proof: 1. Fc & (Fx & (Hyx --> Fy) --> Fb??????????? Assumption 2. Fb & (Fx & (Hyx --> Fy) --> Fd??????????? Assumption 3. Fc & (Fx & (Hyx --> Fy)??????????????????????? Assumption for C.P. 4. Fb??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????1,3 MP 5. (Fx & (Hyx --> Fy)???????????????????????????????? 3, Simp. 6. Fb & (Fx & (Hyx --> Fy)?????????????????????? Conj. 4, 5 7. Fd????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? MP 6,2 8. Fc & (Fx & (Hyx --> Fy) --> Fd????????????CP 3-7 Having established transitivity, now, go back to Quine?s class treatment and recall the additional elements, like neckties. Is there an advantage to formulating the ancestral relation in order to avoid such dross? There are proposals. Let?s take a look at one suggested by Kenneth C. Lucey (Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, Vol. xx. No. 2, April 1979). Lucey will formulate the ancestral in terms of "generational removal." Now we cannot be, entirely, satisfied inasmuch as the approach requires a distinction between "direct generational removal" ("DG") and "indirect generational removal ("NDG"). I will set this aside. In a nutshell the proposal is to build into the "proper ancestral" the idea of triadic, rather than a dyadic relation: "(En) DG(n, w, z)." Suppose we want to formulate "w is the great grandfather of z." In this case we would have DG (3, w, z). So far so good, but introducing a triadic relation like this raises questions about interpreting the concept of an ancestor. The problem is that transitivity is affected.. Consider that from G(1, x, y) and G(1, y, z) we can?t infer G(1, x,z). (x and z are not one generatio removed, rather G(3, x, z) Transitivity fails, but transitivity is part of what is usually part of what is meant by the ancestral relation. So here is my claim: If we "squeeze" out the dross introduced by a class approach to the ancestral, the we lose transitivity. Now this may be a reason to jettison the analysis. I don?t know; I think so, but I?m not going to commit to this. Instead, I want to point out?an application of the following fact: If we squeeze out the dross introduced by the class interpretation, then we sacrifice transitivity. At this point I want to move everything in the direction of the logical treatment of causation. I am going to assume familiarity with the distinction between singularity and regularity theories of causation. Russell is paradigmatically a regularity theorist?s view; Ducasse is a paradigmatic singularist view. In treating causation counterfactually D. Lewis introduced the concept of "fragility." Fragility will is understood, here, as the property which an event has if it could not have taken place differently or at a different time. (Lewis [1986] p. 196). Elsewhere I defend the view that the more closely two events occur in time the more fragile they become, but for now I want to make a different point. Singularity theorists trade in a concept of causation where the events are fragile at the limit. I would prefer saying that for the singularist events are completely "inelastic." On the view I defend, singular causation is indicated by the relation which is analogous to the proper ancestral of ?ancestor?, viz. ?parent?. Notice that this is a dyadic relation and intransitive. What I do is reconcile the singularist and regularity approaches by taking causation in the singularist sense as the proper ancestral of ?cause? in the regularity sense. At this point the "dross" fits in nicely and the usual approach, contra Lucey, is preserved. Without the "dross" the events held in the causal relation will be inelastic. The class view accommodates, quite nicely, the elasticity of causation and relates deductively the transitivity of the causal relation to elasticity. One possible consequence is this: we?ve heard a lot about how probability is part of nature and that causation so conceived as probabilistic is consistent with "mechanism." (D. Bohm 1957). But I would make the following point (which coheres well with Bohm?s project): only in the sense that causation is transitive does probability or chance or randomness enter into a description of causation or lack of it. It is only the transitive sense of ?cause? that fits the regularity theory, and this relates to the elasticity of the events in the causal relation . Using the ancestral relation to illustrate the differences between singular and regularity theories helps demonstrate the consistence of these two approaches. Steve Bayne ? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Thu Aug 27 05:13:19 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2009 10:13:19 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Hist-Analytic: H. H. Price's Hume's Theory of the External World In-Reply-To: <441324.98954.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <441324.98954.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <200908271013.19730.rbj@rbjones.com> I have just come back to hist-analytic after some distractions, to discover: On Sunday 23 August 2009 22:38:21 steve bayne wrote: >Hist-Analytic is pleased to announce an addition to its existing data-base. > >This time we add one of the most lucid and imaginative discussions of Hume > ever. It is: > >HUME'S THEORY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD (1940) >by H. H. Price I am not aware of having read Price at all, but after only a couple of pages I am delighted by his attitude to the history of philosophy. I commend to hist-analytic subscribers that attitude towards Carnap which Price suggests in relation to Hume. RBJ From baynesrb at yahoo.com Thu Aug 27 08:48:47 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2009 05:48:47 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Hist-Analytic: H. H. Price's Hume's Theory of the External World In-Reply-To: <200908271013.19730.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <176394.34215.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Thanks Roger! ? I should make clear that I owe a great deal to Carnap and Price. I bad mouthed Hume a bit, and that was not doing justice to one of the most creative thinkers in philosophy ever. ? Carnap has always sort of like my appendix: I don't know what I'd do, or?not do,?without it. ? Price's comments on Russell are also good. His work Perception may come on Hist-Analytic if I can get copyright and publication data. ? Regards ? Steve --- On Thu, 8/27/09, Roger Bishop Jones wrote: From: Roger Bishop Jones Subject: Re: Hist-Analytic: H. H. Price's Hume's Theory of the External World To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Thursday, August 27, 2009, 5:13 AM I have just come back to hist-analytic after some distractions, to discover: On Sunday 23 August 2009 22:38:21 steve bayne wrote: >Hist-Analytic is pleased to announce an addition to its existing data-base From aune at philos.umass.edu Fri Aug 28 09:40:49 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Fri, 28 Aug 2009 09:40:49 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Response to Danny Frederick Message-ID: <25F527D1-AB63-4A40-B263-41A91F620EF7@philos.umass.edu> This is my response to Danny Fredrick?s criticism of my account of analyticity in my book, An Empiricist Theory of Knowledge. Danny: If you are going to criticize someone?s views on a certain topic, you ought to have a clear idea of what those views are. But your comments make it plain that you gave my chapter only a swift and careless reading. I say this because your principal objections completely ignore the central issue I discuss near the beginning of my section, ?Analyticity, Logic, and Everyday Language,? where I raise the question, ?How could we possibly know that the schematic formulas [the logical ?laws?] that are supposed to hold true for all statements corresponding to them do not, in fact, have a single falsifying instance?? I made it clear that if the class of such statements is not restricted in ways I discuss, falsifying instances (and therefore inconsistencies) can actually be found. My discussion of the appropriate restrictions was a crucial part of my general position on logical truths, but you completely ignore it even though it explicitly addresses the subject of your principal objections. Before moving on to comments you make about specific passages in my chapter, I must say that some of your criticisms involve logical difficulties that render them ineffective. First, the derivation you mention for ?All bachelors are unmarried? does not depend on the assumption that the substitution of synonyms for synonyms can always be made salva veritate. It is well known that there are contexts (Quine called them ?opaque?) in which such substitutions cannot be validly made, but ?All bachelors are bachelors? is not one of them. In a context like this, which Quine called ?referentially transparent,? the relevant substitution is known to preserve truth. Second, the fact that the vernacular word ?all? can, as you say, be interpreted differently by different people does not show that a use of ?all? in a given sense (one rejected by Aristotelians) does not yield a logical truth. If I say ?I went to the bank? yesterday, meaning I went to a financial institution, I cannot be refuted by the observation that some people apply the word (or inscription) ?bank? to the strip of land running along a river. For a similar reason, logicians who reject a principle of conjunction elimination in favor of a different principle do not, strictly speaking, contradict the classical principle of conjunction elimination. They provide an alternative to it, because their conjunction operator has a different meaning, a different semantical interpretation. [I discuss this point explicitly in my Appendix 3.] Third, if the meaning of certain logical words is associated with an inconsistent system of rules, it does not follow that an assertion, ?All unmarried men are unmarried,? formulated in that system, is not necessarily true. A system of rules is inconsistent if a contradiction is derivable from it, or if every formula is derivable from it, but his does not imply that nothing derivable from it is true or necessary. Finally, standard consistency proofs are not, in fact, question begging. A proof that the rules R applied to the formulas of a system S do not yield a contradiction in S does not presuppose that the rules used in the proof do not yield a contradiction in S; in fact, the rules used in the proof are metalinguistic, and they apply to an entirely different class of formulas. As I emphasize in several places in my book, it is an error to suppose that logical rules and principles can be assessed independently of their application. If a system allows formulas that, owing to vagueness, do not satisfy the principle of bivalence, the system will not satisfy the axioms of classical logic. This failure would be owing to the formulas allowed in the system, not the axioms themselves. I now turn to the two places in your comments where you consider specific remarks I made in my book. The first concerns a remark I made on p. 62. The complete remark was ?The examples I gave in the last paragraph make it obvious that words, phrases, clauses and constructions in existing dialects of natural languages [often] have implications so vital to the meaning of what they are used to say that any alert and attentive speakers of a relevant dialect would find it odd, puzzling, or paradoxical to question them. When this condition is satisfied by a word or symbol, it seems to me that a sentence of the dialect clearly and unambiguously expressing an appropriate implication can reasonably be regarded as analytically true for those alert and attentive speakers.? My examples did not concern beliefs people have about various subjects; they concerned implications of ?words, phrases, clauses and constructions in existing dialects of natural languages,? implications that are particularly vital to the meaning of these linguistic items. I am utterly confident that anyone who speaks the dialect of English that I do would not find them questionable. Could something be a fake duck and at the same time a real one? Could Nero fiddle while Rome burned but Rome not burn while he is fiddling? And could the statement, ?Lacking an umbrella, she hit him with a shoe? be true when the person referred to had an umbrella (in the relevant sense) or didn?t hit the relevant other person or animal with a shoe? The examples you gave to refute my claim but were too sketchy to prove much of anything. If the one about the axiom of parallels is transformed into a conditional representing an implication, is it reasonable to suppose that anyone would consider it true by virtue of meaning? Since Kant, the axiom of parallels (applied to physical space) has been a paradigm example of a synthetic truth. Your example about simultaneity is equally dubious. Are ?the vast majority of people? supposed to believe that if a is simultaneous with b in an inertial frame A, then b is simultaneous with a in some different frame B? I think not. If ?simultaneous? is understood as a relative notion, it does not have the pre-relativistic meaning. And if that pre-relativistic meaning were rejected on scientific purposes, a relevant conditional involving it would not then be falsified on scientific grounds; it would be viewed as having a false antecedent. Nothing would then be considered simultaneous in a pre-relativistic, ?absolute? sense, and conditionals with false antecedents are vacuously true. As for my remark, ?we do in fact identify specific colors in a way that assumes indiscernibility as an identity condition for them,? the we I was speaking of are people willing to concede (as philosophers almost always do) that nothing can have two different determinate colors at the same time?colors being understood in an ordinary, nontechnical way. If, on reflection, you are not willing to concede this, you won?t mean what philosophers usually mean by ?determinate colors? when they discus the impossibility of a thing having two such colors at the same time. And if, to repeat, you attempt to falsify an assertion by fixing on unintended meanings of an ingredient word (by taking ?color? to apply to light of various wavelengths) your falsifying attempt will fail because it will involve what can rightly be called a fallacy of equivocation. At the end of my book I include two appendices that disarm other objections that you raised against me. Appendix 2 includes (a) my criticism and rejection of Boghossian?s use of the the kind of implicit definition that you mentioned (I show that it leads to absurdity) and (b) a criticism of the hackneyed claim that consistency proofs are circular (they are not). Appendix 3 defends the idea that a priori truths can be created by stipulation; it explicitly opposes the well-known criticism offered by Paul Horwich, who uses Prior?s example of the runabout inference ticket. I think both appendices will show, as indeed my chapters two and three should have already, that I don?t need to make use of the little bibliography you attached to your comments. Nothing in your comments was new to me, and nothing you said casts doubt on the position I actually took in my new book. Best regards, Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Fri Aug 28 16:12:17 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Fri, 28 Aug 2009 21:12:17 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Response to Danny Frederick In-Reply-To: <25F527D1-AB63-4A40-B263-41A91F620EF7@philos.umass.edu> References: <25F527D1-AB63-4A40-B263-41A91F620EF7@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: <2D6364613AC14DA9AA5E43ED70EBD628@DFLVQC1J> Hi Bruce, Thanks for your criticisms of my criticisms. Once again, I think you are mistaken. I will explain why in a later message, though I will mention here that much of the ground is covered by Williamson in his 'Conceptual Truth' and some is covered by Kuhn in various places (e.g. 'Second Thoughts on Paradigms' in his 'The Essential Tension'). But I will take up here the issue about colours, since it can be dealt with largely independently of the other stuff. You said: 'We consider a determinate color A to be the same as a determinate color B just when A and B are indistinguishable' (p.61). I objected that determinate colours belong to the realm of objective fact but distinguishability is relative to a subject. I went on to talk of determinate colours in terms of wavelengths of light, but I needn't have done so. Suppose (unrealistically) that my lawn is a uniform shade of green: it has one determinate colour all over. But suppose I have some trees that cast shadows over patches of the lawn. The bits of the lawn in shadow may look dark green (or even grey) to me, while the bits in strong sunlight may look light green (or even yellow). That is, I can distinguish the colours of the two patches even though the two patches have the same determinate colour. Another type of case is known as the 'spreading effect'. Have a uniform shade of green painted in a straight line on a white piece of paper. On one half of the line, paint thin black lines on either side of it. We see this half of the line as being a darker green that the other half. Again, colour A is (objectively) the same as colour B, but we can distinguish one from the other. And the opposite happens too, as is well known: in poor light different determinate colours may be indistinguishable. In your last message you say that philosophers are almost always willing to concede that nothing can have two different determinate colours [all over] at the same time, colours being understood in an ordinary, nontechnical way. You say that if, on reflection, I am not willing to concede this, I won't mean what philosophers usually mean by 'determinate colours.' I am willing to concede that nothing can be red all over and green all over (using colour words in their ordinary non-technical senses). But if someone denies it, that does not mean that he is changing the subject or using words with a different meaning. Indeed if he IS denying it, then he must be using words in the very same sense as I do yet entertaining something that I find, at the moment, to be inconceivable. He may be able to show me that it is possible by means of some novel thought experiment, in which case I will no longer concede that nothing can be red and green all over. What we can conceive at a particular time is a very poor guide to what is possible; it just shows the limits of our imagination. I am afraid I did not read your Appendices 2 and 3. I did intend to, but there is a glitch on the site which means that the Appendices cannot be downloaded (I notified Steve a few days ago). However, I have just discovered that your whole book (including the Appendices) can be downloaded in one go, by clicking on the title link. I never tried that until now. I will re-read your chapter 3 and read your chapter 2 and the two Appendices before I respond further. Best wishes, Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Sat Aug 29 07:20:20 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Sat, 29 Aug 2009 07:20:20 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Response to Danny Frederick In-Reply-To: <2D6364613AC14DA9AA5E43ED70EBD628@DFLVQC1J> References: <25F527D1-AB63-4A40-B263-41A91F620EF7@philos.umass.edu> <2D6364613AC14DA9AA5E43ED70EBD628@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: Danny, your objections are wide of the mark. When I say that two determinate colors are the same (that is, the determinate color of something A is the same as the determinate color of something B) just when they are indistinguishable in color, I don't mean that things having them will look to have the same color in any circumstances whatever. I mean that no color difference will be detected when they are both observed under conditions where their true color is visually apparent to good observers. How do we decide whether something is really green? By observation, ultimately. (I say "ultimately" avoid the obtuse response that we decide this by using a spectrograph to determine the wavelengh of the light reflected from the object under optimum conditions. We know what kind of light green objects emit by testing the light reflected from objects we know to be green by direct observation.) And to determine, ultimately, whether two objects have exactly the same color, we see if a color difference can be discerned by the best observers under the best conditions of observation. People who are colorblind are generally useless for this purpose, as are tests carried out in darkness. Why do you keep giving me bibliographical references? You are ostensibly offering objections to my account of analyticity. If you have objections, give them; if you don't, don't refer me to others whose works may or may not apply to my account. You are the critic, not someone else. And you are not my dissertation diector. I am perfectly aware that many people disagree with me. I am also aware of their reasons. And I wouldn't have written about analyticity if I didn't think my account eludes the objections they have. Objections to analyticity that don't apply specifically to what I say--and general expressions of what you believe about analyticity or any other subject--are not pertinent in the discussion we are having. Best, Bruce From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Sat Aug 29 15:08:09 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Sat, 29 Aug 2009 20:08:09 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Response to Danny Frederick In-Reply-To: References: <25F527D1-AB63-4A40-B263-41A91F620EF7@philos.umass.edu> <2D6364613AC14DA9AA5E43ED70EBD628@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <2B3247BB610F49EF985751C2242F5A40@DFLVQC1J> Hi Bruce, I do not think you have disposed of the objections I raised to what you say about determinate colours and discernibility. You now say that two determinate colours are the same just when no colour difference will be detected when they are both observed under conditions where their true colour is visually apparent to good observers. That seems empty: of course no colour difference will be detected if the TRUE colour is visually apparent and the colours are the same. But I doubt that we can make much sense of 'the true colour.' Are we ever in conditions in which we can identify the true colour? Consider my example of same colour/discernible difference that concerned the effects of light and shade: the bit of the lawn in bright sunlight looks yellow, the bit in the shade of the tree looks grey, even though they are (by hypothesis) the same shade of green. You object that the lighting conditions should be the same. But which lighting conditions give us the 'true colour'? Can there be such a thing? We can make an arbitrary selection of lighting conditions and call that 'true;' but that is just arbitrary. There is another problem too. What shade of colour we perceive seems likely to depend upon our mood. We know from studies of pathology that mood influences perception. I do not know what evidence there is that colour perception is influenced by mood, but I feel sure there will be such evidence if relevant experiments have been done. Why? I went through a period of depression some years ago during which the whole world looked grey to me. I could still distinguish colours, but they all looked grey. Yes, the cup looked red; but it looked grey too. It may be that nothing can be red all over and grey all over; but it can LOOK red all over and grey all over. The shade of red I saw on the cup, i.e., that which was 'visually apparent,' must have been different to the shade I was used to seeing; otherwise I could not have thought it looked grey. You object that the 'true colour' is the one 'visually apparent' to 'good observers.' Depressed people clearly will not count as good observers. Okay; but which observers do we select as the good ones? Depression will not be the only thing that makes a difference. Again, it seems, the selection will ultimately be arbitrary, which impugns the notion of 'the true colour.' Let's drop the notion of the true colour of a thing (using 'colour' in its ordinary non-technical sense). What you intend to say, I think, is something like this: for any person in state A, under environmental conditions B, he can distinguish two shades of colour if and only if the two shades are of different determinate colours. Some work will have to go into spelling out A and B, but let's be generous and assume that can be done. Even so, my objection from the spreading effect still stands because the effect occurs under conditions of good lighting for all observers. What shade we see a particular colour depends on the shades surrounding it. By changing those contextual shades, we change the visual appearance of the colour even though the determinate colour itself does not change. The observer distinguishes two shades even though he is observing the very same determinate colour. For a discussion of this, and examples that you can view, see E Gombrich, 'Art and Illusion,' fifth edition, p.260 and plate IV, which is just before p.51. (Incidentally, I give bibliographical references so that anyone interested in pursuing the matter further can do so. It is intended to be helpful, not an insult.) I think this may throw some light on my depressive period. Nothing relevant had changed in the external world. But the personal context (my mental environment) in which my colour perceptions took place had changed: all the colours of the world were surrounded by the gloom inside me and that had the effect of changing the colours that were 'visually apparent' to me. And I noticed the difference: the cup that looked a bright red in the past now looked a duller red. Do 'happy-go-lucky' people see the world as more brightly coloured? It seems plausible to me, though probably untestable. To summarise so far: two instances of the same determinate colour will be distinguishable if the surrounding context has changed in relevant ways. Therefore, discernibility does not imply difference. This depends purely on the spreading effect. The third example I gave, of poor lighting, was intended to show that colour difference does not imply discernibility. Your response to this is to invoke standard lighting conditions. My reply is to wonder, again, whether this is not arbitrary. When the lighting is poor, I might not be able to distinguish green and blue. Improve the lighting and I can. Suppose that under these conditions I cannot distinguish two blue surfaces (with regard to colour). But if we add more light, or if we make the light purer in some way, perhaps I will. It seems it will always be possible that, if we improved the light in some way (perhaps by using a technique not yet invented), the two patches of apparently identical colour would become distinguishable. If so, then whatever stage we are at, it may be the case that different colours are indistinguishable. There is a fourth example that I omitted, probably because it is so familiar. This is the failure of transitivity of indiscernibility. I cannot distinguish A from B, and I cannot distinguish B from C, but I can distinguish A from C. If we combine this with 'distinguishable if and only if distinct,' we get a contradiction. At the moment I am in the process of buying a house and preparing to move. On top of that we have finally got some good weather, so I will be spending as much time as I can outdoors. So it may be a week or two before I respond on the matter of analyticity. Cheers, Danny From aune at philos.umass.edu Sat Aug 29 16:43:16 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Sat, 29 Aug 2009 16:43:16 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Response to Danny Frederick In-Reply-To: <2B3247BB610F49EF985751C2242F5A40@DFLVQC1J> References: <25F527D1-AB63-4A40-B263-41A91F620EF7@philos.umass.edu> <2D6364613AC14DA9AA5E43ED70EBD628@DFLVQC1J> <2B3247BB610F49EF985751C2242F5A40@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: Danny, What you now say "seems empty" (namely, two determinate colours are the same just when no colour difference will be detected when they are both observed under conditions where their true color is visually apparent to good observers) is all that I meant to assert, because the truth of "Nothing can have two different determinate colors at the same time" is inferable from this trivial truth (as I show in the little proof I give in a footnote). The issues you raise in you last email have no bearing on the matters that concerned me. Best, Bruce From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Sat Aug 29 17:18:48 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Sat, 29 Aug 2009 22:18:48 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Response to Danny Frederick In-Reply-To: References: <25F527D1-AB63-4A40-B263-41A91F620EF7@philos.umass.edu> <2D6364613AC14DA9AA5E43ED70EBD628@DFLVQC1J> <2B3247BB610F49EF985751C2242F5A40@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <82DC618D15D642F2B209636474D395C1@DFLVQC1J> Hi Bruce, If all you meant to assert was the empty statement, and if that is all you need for your arguments, then SOME of the issues I raise might have no bearing on the matters that concerned you. But others will; namely, all those that cast doubt on the notion of 'true colour' (in the ordinary non-technical sense of colour), since that notion appears in the empty statement and is what makes it empty. But my comments were made on what you did assert, rather than on what you might have intended to assert. And what you did assert was an equivalence between colour identity and colour indiscernibility. Here is what you say (p.61): 'If something is green-yellow in Harry's sense or yellowish-green in Mary's sense, it cannot at that time also have any other determinate shade of color. This incompatibility is not a matter of ontological fact that is independent of classificatory conventions; it is a consequence of how we individuate a thing's specific color at a time. We could restrict ourselves to a purely generic means of attributing colors, calling things either yellow, green, red, or blue, and so on; and if we did so, there would be no definite error in our describing something with Harry's green-yellow shade (which we would not then distinguish as such) as both green and yellow at the same time. 'In discussing color incompatibility in the last chapter, I said that we do in fact identify specific colors in a way that assumes indiscernibility as an identity condition for them. We consider a determinate color A to be the same as a determinate color B just when A and B are indistinguishable.' And in footnote 36 on the same page: 'A more satisfactory [way] of expressing this is to say that x and y (or regions on their surfaces) have the same determinate color just when they are indistinguishable in color.' For the reasons I gave (and perhaps others too), I think this is untenable, whether or not you meant or needed to say it. Best wishes, Danny From rbj at rbjones.com Mon Aug 31 03:39:59 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2009 08:39:59 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Support for Carnap from Chalmers Message-ID: <200908310839.59667.rbj@rbjones.com> Perhaps considering Carnap in the spirit advocated by Price, I see that David Chalmers has written an essay entitled "Verbal Disputes and Philosophical Progress" which, he concludes, provides a partial vindication of some of Carnap's projects. http://consc.net/papers/verbal.pdf RBJ From Baynesr at comcast.net Tue Sep 1 14:35:58 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2009 18:35:58 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] The "Analytic A Posteriori" Message-ID: <262967060.871461251830158726.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Sometimes identities, when true, are described as true ?analytic a posteriori ? propositions. This is not, always an altogether easy determination. The sentence ?a=b? may be a posteriori and true, but even if we concede the force of the Barcan principle and it follows that ?necessarily (a=b)? it does not follow from this that ?necessarily (a=b)? is a posteriori . That is, empirical knowledge, knowledge that is possible "only?through experience." (Kant First Critique B3). It is true that, traditionally, the sole alternative to a posteriori is a priori , and that to be known a priori is to be known "absolutely independently of all experience." (ibid) This would suggest to some that ?necessarily (a=b)? cannot be a priori because it is from the identity ?a=b? that we come to know ?necessarily (a=b)? and, ?a=b" can be known only through experience, rendering ?necessarily (a=b)? a posteriori . But the proposition ?necessarily (a=b)? does not follow from anything but the Barcan Principle applied to some proposition asserting identity. We ought no more consider ?necessarily (a=b)? a posteriori than we would consider ?The cat has two heads or the cat does not have two heads? as a posterior i. Both follow from logic, alone, applied to propositions, which are not propositions of logic, viz. ?a=b? and ?The cat has two heads or the cat does not have two heads?, both of which may be a posteriori. Schematically the similarity can be represented thusly, (?or ~?) /

(nec ?) /

Where an I going with this? Short answer: Hume and Descartes reason analogously from the independence in thought of certain concepts; bodies and souls; causes and effects. Pursing that analogy is productive; disposing of the analytic a posteriori is essential to one aspect of what I have to say on these, separate, but related lines of reasoning. Steve Bayne -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Tue Sep 1 14:25:20 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2009 19:25:20 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Response to Danny Frederick Message-ID: Hi Bruce, I need to correct one thing I said last time. Here is what I said: "Until Kripke's 'puzzle about belief' it was (I think generally) assumed that synonyms could be swapped salva veritate in any context, including opaque ones." I should have excluded contexts of quotation! One other point that might not be exactly wrong but might appear so is worth expanding upon. Here is what I said: 'your conventional account is not just an account of logical truth but is also an account of how we know logical truth. Your conventions are supposed to explain not just why it is true that p, but also why any 'alert and attentive speaker' will know that it is true that p; and 'know that' creates an opaque context. You need inter-substitutivity of synonyms in opaque contexts.' It would have been better if I had talked of your account of analytic truth rather than your account of logical truth, for the former clearly requires the substitution of synonyms. But it is arguable that an account of logical truth does too. For, from the logical truth of 'p v ~p' we can infer the logical truth of 'It rains v ~it rains,' but we cannot infer the logical truth of 'It rains v ~it snows.' Why not? Because where the letter is the same we must substitute the same - what? Not the same sentence, since the same sentence may be ambiguous and have a different interpretation in each occurrence. It must be the same proposition. Can we talk of uniform substitution without (at least implicitly) talking of the substitution of synonyms? I don't know. This point comes from Strawson ('Propositions, Concepts and Logical Truth,' in his 'Logico-Linguistic Papers'). It was raised as an objection to Quine's objections to meanings. In at least one place, Quine says that he does not have an answer to this objection. I have been looking for the reference but cannot find it. Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Tue Sep 1 16:33:35 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2009 20:33:35 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] The "Analytic A Posteriori" In-Reply-To: <262967060.871461251830158726.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <272429255.924311251837215846.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I remarked: "Both follow from logic, alone, applied to propositions, which are not propositions of logic, viz. ?a=b? and ?The cat has two heads or the cat does not have two heads? , both of which may be a posteriori. Schematically the similarity can be represented thusly, (?or ~?) /

(nec ?) /

" i ought to have said: Both follow from logic, alone, applied to propositions, which are not propositions of logic, viz. ?a=b? and ?The cat has two heads' .? both of which may be a posteriori. Schematically the similarity can be represented thusly, (?or ~?) /

(nec ?) /

Steve Bayne ----- Original Message ----- From: Baynesr at comcast.net To: "hist-analytic" Sent: Tuesday, September 1, 2009 2:35:58 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: The "Analytic A Posteriori" Sometimes identities, when true, are described as true ?analytic a posteriori ? propositions. This is not, always an altogether easy determination. The sentence ?a=b? may be a posteriori and true, but even if we concede the force of the Barcan principle and it follows that ?necessarily (a=b)? it does not follow from this that ?necessarily (a=b)? is a posteriori . That is, empirical knowledge, knowledge that is possible "only?through experience." (Kant First Critique B3). It is true that, traditionally, the sole alternative to a posteriori is a priori , and that to be known a priori is to be known "absolutely independently of all experience." (ibid) This would suggest to some that ?necessarily (a=b)? cannot be a priori because it is from the identity ?a=b? that we come to know ?necessarily (a=b)? and, ?a=b" can be known only through experience, rendering ?necessarily (a=b)? a posteriori . But the proposition ?necessarily (a=b)? does not follow from anything but the Barcan Principle applied to some proposition asserting identity. We ought no more consider ?necessarily (a=b)? a posteriori than we would consider ?The cat has two heads or the cat does not have two heads? as a posterior i. Both follow from logic, alone, applied to propositions, which are not propositions of logic, viz. ?a=b? and ?The cat has two heads or the cat does not have two heads?, both of which may be a posteriori. Schematically the similarity can be represented thusly, (?or ~?) /

(nec ?) /

Where an I going with this? Short answer: Hume and Descartes reason analogously from the independence in thought of certain concepts; bodies and souls; causes and effects. Pursing that analogy is productive; disposing of the analytic a posteriori is essential to one aspect of what I have to say on these, separate, but related lines of reasoning. Steve Bayne -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Tue Sep 1 18:56:30 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2009 22:56:30 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] "Necessary a posteriori" not "Analytic A Posteriori"? Message-ID: <746393484.977291251845790693.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> A couple of people have indicated?skepticism (sorta) that anyone has ever described what is best described as "necessary a posteriori" as "analytic a posteriori." Well, the fact was that when asked I didn't have a source at hand. I came by one however. Here is a quote from the author of the Wiki essay. 'Kripke's controversial analysis of naming as contingent and a priori would best fit into Kant's epistemological framework by calling it "analytic a posteriori".' http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_priori_and_a_posteriori . For the purpose at hand what is important is that someone in print has used it. This characterization?comes from: Stephen Palmquist: "A Priori Knowledge in Perspective: (II) Naming, Necessity and the Analytic A Posteriori", The Review of Metaphysics 41:2 (December 1987), pp.255-282. I have heard and seen it. I used it in the subject header because it is one view of modality and epistemology taken to excess. That excess may be what Palmquist has in mind. He may have a good case with respect to Kant's view. Other views are generally the invention of philosophers who eschew traditional distinctions. By the way, earlier when I mentioned the "Barcan Principle" I meant that from 'x=y'?'Nec(x=y)' follows. Notice this makes no assumptions about rigidity of designators. I've never been happy about including what are, essentially quantifiers (over worlds) in predicates etc. Why. Oh I can't recall; it may have something to do with certain metaphysical biases that might be built into treating modal operators ('possible' and 'necessary') as interdefinable like ordinary quantifiers. Can't recall. Regards Steve Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Tue Sep 1 07:33:06 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2009 12:33:06 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Response to Danny Frederick In-Reply-To: <25F527D1-AB63-4A40-B263-41A91F620EF7@philos.umass.edu> References: <25F527D1-AB63-4A40-B263-41A91F620EF7@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: <028A4FF33A6144809213CDA489EF8DA9@DFLVQC1J> Hi Bruce, Unfortunately, the fine weather didn't hold up as expected. Our weather has become Popperian: it sets out to refute whatever forecast the meteorological office gives; and it usually succeeds. So I have now read your chapter 2 and Appendices 2 and 3. I have also, prompted by your protests, re-read your chapter 3; though it seems to me that I fully understood it the first time. I admit that my previous summary of your position, in four bullet-points, was crude; but in the criticisms I raised I took account of the relevant aspects of your view that I did not state in the bullet points. I agree, though, that I could have spelt this out better, and I try to do that in this message. I think your responses to my criticisms (I reproduce your email below) miss the point. In this message I will rebut your responses one by one, though I will change the order for expository convenience. You say: 'if the class of such statements [i.e., those that may be substituted for the schematic letters of propositional logic] is not restricted in ways I discuss, falsifying instances (and therefore inconsistencies) can actually be found. My discussion of the appropriate restrictions was a crucial part of my general position on logical truths.' You expand: 'If a system allows formulas that, owing to vagueness, do not satisfy the principle of bivalence, the system will not satisfy the axioms of classical logic. This failure would be owing to the formulas allowed in the system, not the axioms themselves.' My response: There are two problems with this approach. The first is that it is ad hoc: it amounts to saying that classical logic is necessarily true for all those propositions for which it is necessarily true. It thus ceases to talk about necessary truth or validity and talks instead about the things which make the theory true, if indeed there are any such things. Imagine a Newtonian physicist who, in response to the objection that the precession of the perihelion of Mercury is inconsistent with his theory, replied that Newtonian theory only applies to Newtonian worlds, and thus applies only to those planets whose motions actually conform to the theory; and, therefore, the actual motions of the planet Mercury do not refute the theory because the theory was never talking about non-Newtonian objects. He would rightly be a laughing stock: he would be ejected from the company of scientists and have to find a new home amongst astrologers, Marxists or other pseudo-scientific humbugs. A classical logician who responds in the way you recommend should, I suggest, be treated in the same way. He has given up on truth and consoles himself with his own little fantasy world in which everything runs according to the rules he lays down. If logic is to be taken seriously, it must be a theory of validity, not just a description of what validity would be in a particular theorist's fictional world. The second problem with the approach is that there is no guarantee that his restricted theory actually applies to anything at all: it might be inconsistent. For there can be no way of proving that any logical theory, or any other theory, is consistent, as I pointed out last time. But you raise an objection to this. You say: 'standard consistency proofs are not, in fact, question begging. A proof that the rules R applied to the formulas of a system S do not yield a contradiction in S does not presuppose that the rules used in the proof do not yield a contradiction in S; in fact, the rules used in the proof are metalinguistic, and they apply to an entirely different class of formulas.' My response: The rules used in the consistency proof are the same apart from the fact that they are metalinguistic. We have a choice here. We can acknowledge the object-language/meta-language distinction but say that, despite this, the underlying rules of inference are the same. In this case we have a circularity: the proof of the consistency of the object-language system uses rules of inference of that system. Or, we can insist that the rules are different, in which case the consistency proof uses a different logic that has not been shown to be consistent, which leads us to a vicious infinite regress. We are out of the frying pan, but into the fire. Either way the question of consistency is begged: we assume the consistency of some logical system without proof. There can be no way around this. You say: 'some of your criticisms involve logical difficulties that render them ineffective. First, the derivation you mention for "All bachelors are unmarried" does not depend on the assumption that the substitution of synonyms for synonyms can always be made salva veritate. It is well known that there are contexts (Quine called them "opaque") in which such substitutions cannot be validly made, but "All bachelors are bachelors" is not one of them. In a context like this, which Quine called "referentially transparent," the relevant substitution is known to preserve truth.' My response: Referentially transparent contexts are those in which co-designative terms can be swapped salva veritate; and opaque contexts are those in which this is not so (Quine, 'Word and Object,' section 30). Until Kripke's 'puzzle about belief' it was (I think generally) assumed that synonyms could be swapped salva veritate in any context, including opaque ones. Kripke's puzzle and related work by others, which impugns this, raises a problem for you. For, your conventional account is not just an account of logical truth but is also an account of how we know logical truth. Your conventions are supposed to explain not just why it is true that p, but also why any 'alert and attentive speaker' will know that it is true that p; and 'know that' creates an opaque context. You need inter-substitutivity of synonyms in opaque contexts. You say: 'the fact that the vernacular word "all" can, as you say, be interpreted differently by different people does not show that a use of "all" in a given sense (one rejected by Aristotelians) does not yield a logical truth. If I say "I went to the bank" yesterday, meaning I went to a financial institution, I cannot be refuted by the observation that some people apply the word (or inscription) "bank" to the strip of land running along a river.' My response: The word 'bank' is straightforwardly ambiguous. I do not know of even a philosopher who denies this ambiguity (though there probably is one). It is not at all clear that the word 'all' when used as a quantifier is ambiguous. If two logicians disagree about whether 'all' has existential import, they are disagreeing about what arguments containing 'all' are logically valid. This disagreement presupposes their linguistic competence in the use of the word 'all.' It is not the case that one of them has a poor command of the language. It is also not the case that one or both of them is simply proposing a new definition for the word 'all.' A grasp of the meaning of 'all' does not settle the question of what inferences containing it are valid; and to assume that it does settle it in favour of your preferred system of logic is simply dogmatic. You go on: 'For a similar reason, logicians who reject a principle of conjunction elimination in favor of a different principle do not, strictly speaking, contradict the classical principle of conjunction elimination. They provide an alternative to it, because their conjunction operator has a different meaning.' My response: These logicians say that they contradict the principle of conjunction elimination. And they say they reject it in order to provide an acceptable account of validity. Their assumption is that logic should give an account of validity, i.e., actual validity, not just an exposition of the arbitrary way in which someone likes to talk of validity. They argue that conjunction elimination is invalid. I am not saying that they are right. I am just saying that their contentions are substantial. And they should not be dismissed as merely introducing a novel meaning for an old expression. There is a paper on connexive logic available here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-connexive/ You say: 'if the meaning of certain logical words is associated with an inconsistent system of rules, it does not follow that an assertion, "All unmarried men are unmarried," formulated in that system, is not necessarily true.' My response: Nothing I said should have suggested that it does follow. You say: 'Could something be a fake duck and at the same time a real one? Could Nero fiddle while Rome burned but Rome not burn while he is fiddling? And could the statement, "Lacking an umbrella, she hit him with a shoe" be true when the person referred to had an umbrella (in the relevant sense) or didn't hit the relevant other person or animal with a shoe? My response: What about a genetically engineered duck? Perhaps Nero's fiddling and Rome's burning are simultaneous in one co-ordinate system but not in another. This might not be possible in relativity theory as so far developed, but who knows what the future holds? In dialetheic logic, some propositions are such that they true even though their negations are the case (dialetheic logic permits the truth of some contradictions). Notice that I am not endorsing any of these claims; I am just pointing out that some linguistically competent and intelligent people may (or do) intelligibly make them (so there is no linguistic convention which rules them out). You say: 'If the [example] about the axiom of parallels is transformed into a conditional representing an implication, is it reasonable to suppose that anyone would consider it true by virtue of meaning?' My response: I am not sure what conditional you have in mind. Let's just state the axiom of parallels: through any point not on a given line just one line parallel to the given line may be drawn. My claim was that the vast majority of speakers of English who understand the sentence would find its denial 'odd, puzzling, or paradoxical.' If they are dogmatic, they might even dismiss the denial as altering the customary meaning of words. But they would be wrong. You say: 'Are "the vast majority of people" supposed to believe that if a is simultaneous with b in an inertial frame A, then b is simultaneous with a in some different frame B? I think not.' My response: I agree with you. The vast majority of people know nothing of Einstein's denial of absolute simultaneity. My point was that before Einstein, almost everyone would have regarded as valid the inference of 'A is simultaneous with B' from 'B is simultaneous with A.' It would not have occurred to them to ask whether the co-ordinate system was the same in the two statements. It is only in the light of relativity that we question the validity of the inference. In my initial message I said: 'For millennia our linguistic practices committed us to inferring "A is simultaneous with B" from "B is simultaneous with A" whether or not the co-ordinate system changed between the two utterances.' That was very badly expressed: our linguistic practices committed us to no such thing. What I meant was that, on your view, according to which the way we use words settles questions of analyticity, relativity theory would have seemed analytically false, because the denial of absolute simultaneity would have been just as 'odd, puzzling, or paradoxical' as the denial of any of your supposed analytic truths. You say: 'If "simultaneous" is understood as a relative notion, it does not have the pre-relativistic meaning. And if that pre-relativistic meaning were rejected on scientific purposes, a relevant conditional involving it would not then be falsified on scientific grounds; it would be viewed as having a false antecedent. Nothing would then be considered simultaneous in a pre-relativistic, "absolute" sense, and conditionals with false antecedents are vacuously true.' My response: I think this is significantly wrong. From what you say, it sounds as if you are endorsing the pseudo-scientific manoeuvre criticised above: Newtonian theory is true of Newtonian worlds, Einsteinian theory is true of Einsteinian worlds. That abandons science in favour of self-indulgent fantasy. Perhaps it is more likely that you mean that Newtonian theory consists of two parts, roughly as follows: a definition of a Newtonian world as whatever world would make Newton's theory true (where Newton's theory is itself an implicit definition of the theoretical terms employed in the theory); and a statement that the actual world is Newtonian. And similarly for Einsteinian theory. The problem with this is that it breaks the connection between Newtonian and Einsteinian theory and the connection of each with our ordinary thought and talk about the world. Newton and Einstein were talking about simultaneity, the same simultaneity that pre-Newtonians spoke about. But Newton and Einstein said incompatible things about it. Their theories are not implicit definitions of otherwise undefined terms which just happen to be homophonic ('simultaneous,' 'force,' 'mass,' etc.). Einstein's theories grew out of a criticism of Newtonian theory: he worked with Newtonian concepts and he struggled to solve the problems that had arisen in Newtonian physics. But his modifications to pre-existing theory were so significant that the resulting theory was revolutionary. Still, he would never have come up with it if he had not been immersed in the theoretical problems and theoretical concepts of Newtonian theory. When we say he modified the concepts of Newtonian theory all we are saying is that he rejected some previously accepted fundamental statements involving those concepts; but this need not commit us to any concept of analyticity. For related discussion see Popper, 'The Logic of Scientific Discovery,' sections 17 and 20; Kuhn, 'Second thoughts on Paradigms' and 'A Function for Thought Experiments,' both in his 'The Essential Tension;' also even Quine 'Success and Limits of Mathematization' in his 'Theories and Things.' If you still think I am mistaken, please come back with further criticism. Best wishes, Danny _____ From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of Bruce Aune Sent: 28 August 2009 14:41 To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Subject: Response to Danny Frederick This is my response to Danny Fredrick's criticism of my account of analyticity in my book, An Empiricist Theory of Knowledge. Danny: If you are going to criticize someone's views on a certain topic, you ought to have a clear idea of what those views are. But your comments make it plain that you gave my chapter only a swift and careless reading. I say this because your principal objections completely ignore the central issue I discuss near the beginning of my section, "Analyticity, Logic, and Everyday Language," where I raise the question, "How could we possibly know that the schematic formulas [the logical "laws"] that are supposed to hold true for all statements corresponding to them do not, in fact, have a single falsifying instance?" I made it clear that if the class of such statements is not restricted in ways I discuss, falsifying instances (and therefore inconsistencies) can actually be found. My discussion of the appropriate restrictions was a crucial part of my general position on logical truths, but you completely ignore it even though it explicitly addresses the subject of your principal objections. Before moving on to comments you make about specific passages in my chapter, I must say that some of your criticisms involve logical difficulties that render them ineffective. First, the derivation you mention for "All bachelors are unmarried" does not depend on the assumption that the substitution of synonyms for synonyms can always be made salva veritate. It is well known that there are contexts (Quine called them "opaque") in which such substitutions cannot be validly made, but "All bachelors are bachelors" is not one of them. In a context like this, which Quine called "referentially transparent," the relevant substitution is known to preserve truth. Second, the fact that the vernacular word "all" can, as you say, be interpreted differently by different people does not show that a use of "all" in a given sense (one rejected by Aristotelians) does not yield a logical truth. If I say "I went to the bank" yesterday, meaning I went to a financial institution, I cannot be refuted by the observation that some people apply the word (or inscription) "bank" to the strip of land running along a river. For a similar reason, logicians who reject a principle of conjunction elimination in favor of a different principle do not, strictly speaking, contradict the classical principle of conjunction elimination. They provide an alternative to it, because their conjunction operator has a different meaning, a different semantical interpretation. [I discuss this point explicitly in my Appendix 3.] Third, if the meaning of certain logical words is associated with an inconsistent system of rules, it does not follow that an assertion, "All unmarried men are unmarried," formulated in that system, is not necessarily true. A system of rules is inconsistent if a contradiction is derivable from it, or if every formula is derivable from it, but his does not imply that nothing derivable from it is true or necessary. Finally, standard consistency proofs are not, in fact, question begging. A proof that the rules R applied to the formulas of a system S do not yield a contradiction in S does not presuppose that the rules used in the proof do not yield a contradiction in S; in fact, the rules used in the proof are metalinguistic, and they apply to an entirely different class of formulas. As I emphasize in several places in my book, it is an error to suppose that logical rules and principles can be assessed independently of their application. If a system allows formulas that, owing to vagueness, do not satisfy the principle of bivalence, the system will not satisfy the axioms of classical logic. This failure would be owing to the formulas allowed in the system, not the axioms themselves. I now turn to the two places in your comments where you consider specific remarks I made in my book. The first concerns a remark I made on p. 62. The complete remark was "The examples I gave in the last paragraph make it obvious that words, phrases, clauses and constructions in existing dialects of natural languages [often] have implications so vital to the meaning of what they are used to say that any alert and attentive speakers of a relevant dialect would find it odd, puzzling, or paradoxical to question them. When this condition is satisfied by a word or symbol, it seems to me that a sentence of the dialect clearly and unambiguously expressing an appropriate implication can reasonably be regarded as analytically true for those alert and attentive speakers." My examples did not concern beliefs people have about various subjects; they concerned implications of "words, phrases, clauses and constructions in existing dialects of natural languages," implications that are particularly vital to the meaning of these linguistic items. I am utterly confident that anyone who speaks the dialect of English that I do would not find them questionable. Could something be a fake duck and at the same time a real one? Could Nero fiddle while Rome burned but Rome not burn while he is fiddling? And could the statement, "Lacking an umbrella, she hit him with a shoe" be true when the person referred to had an umbrella (in the relevant sense) or didn't hit the relevant other person or animal with a shoe? The examples you gave to refute my claim but were too sketchy to prove much of anything. If the one about the axiom of parallels is transformed into a conditional representing an implication, is it reasonable to suppose that anyone would consider it true by virtue of meaning? Since Kant, the axiom of parallels (applied to physical space) has been a paradigm example of a synthetic truth. Your example about simultaneity is equally dubious. Are "the vast majority of people" supposed to believe that if a is simultaneous with b in an inertial frame A, then b is simultaneous with a in some different frame B? I think not. If "simultaneous" is understood as a relative notion, it does not have the pre-relativistic meaning. And if that pre-relativistic meaning were rejected on scientific purposes, a relevant conditional involving it would not then be falsified on scientific grounds; it would be viewed as having a false antecedent. Nothing would then be considered simultaneous in a pre-relativistic, "absolute" sense, and conditionals with false antecedents are vacuously true. As for my remark, "we do in fact identify specific colors in a way that assumes indiscernibility as an identity condition for them," the we I was speaking of are people willing to concede (as philosophers almost always do) that nothing can have two different determinate colors at the same time-colors being understood in an ordinary, nontechnical way. If, on reflection, you are not willing to concede this, you won't mean what philosophers usually mean by "determinate colors" when they discus the impossibility of a thing having two such colors at the same time. And if, to repeat, you attempt to falsify an assertion by fixing on unintended meanings of an ingredient word (by taking "color" to apply to light of various wavelengths) your falsifying attempt will fail because it will involve what can rightly be called a fallacy of equivocation. At the end of my book I include two appendices that disarm other objections that you raised against me. Appendix 2 includes (a) my criticism and rejection of Boghossian's use of the the kind of implicit definition that you mentioned (I show that it leads to absurdity) and (b) a criticism of the hackneyed claim that consistency proofs are circular (they are not). Appendix 3 defends the idea that a priori truths can be created by stipulation; it explicitly opposes the well-known criticism offered by Paul Horwich, who uses Prior's example of the runabout inference ticket. I think both appendices will show, as indeed my chapters two and three should have already, that I don't need to make use of the little bibliography you attached to your comments. Nothing in your comments was new to me, and nothing you said casts doubt on the position I actually took in my new book. Best regards, Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Wed Sep 2 08:06:01 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2009 08:06:01 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] The "Analytic A Posteriori" In-Reply-To: <272429255.924311251837215846.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <272429255.924311251837215846.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: Your seem a little confused on this, Steve. If 'a' and 'b' are different terms understood rigidly--that is, if, unlike a typical use of 'the inventor of bifocals', they refer to the same individuals in all contexts of reference--then then only way 'N(a = b)' can be known to be true is by inference from 'a = b', which, in the case of things in the physical world, is an empirical statement. 'N(a = b)' is therefore a clear case of something that, if known at all, is known a posteriori. The other cases you mention are knowable a priori even though they could equally be known by inference from an empirical premise. I won't be replying to Danny Frederick's latest comments on my chapter in the near future. At the moment I am busy doing some work on my house, and I don't have time to get involved with another encounter with Danny. I count six messages from Danny, at least four of which were concerned with one issue that should not have provoked a response at all. I mean the issue about my claim that two things have the same specific (non generic color) just when their specific colors [their actual colors] are indiscernible. Danny couldn't seem to grasp what I was saying, because he continued to offer irrelevant "counterexamples" in which objects of the same specific colors are made to look different because of being seen in different circumstances. If you got some paint chips at a paint store to ascertain the color of your kitchen wall, you would not learn that the wall does not have the color of one chip if the colors of the two things looked different when viewed under different light, nor would you learn that a chip and the wall were of the same color if, viewed in poor light, the colors of the two things looked the same. This "issue" didn't require discussion at all, I would say. Danny's latest comments cover a number of different points, some of which I have already responded to. The prospect of dealing with them all is not encouraging. Best to all, Bruce From Baynesr at comcast.net Wed Sep 2 08:55:00 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2009 12:55:00 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] The "Analytic A Posteriori" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <521414525.1123521251896100652.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> No Bruce, I'm not "confused." I think you have failed to follow the argument, carefully. I deliberately avoided need to?talk of rigid designators, whence the Barcan formula. My point concerned the statement 'Nec(a=b)' and its epistemic status regardless of whether the identity sign is flanked by rigid designators. Even if the designators are not rigid 'Nec(a=b)' follows from first order logic by substitution of predicates. Rigidity is not a requirment. Again, I may know 'a=b' by experience, but I do NOT know 'Nec(a=b)' by experience. So how DO I know? You said it yourself "then the only way 'N(a=b)' can be known is by inference from 'a=b'." Note: "by inference." Bruce, inference is not experience! 'N(a=b)' is not an empirical statement; 'a=b' IS an empirical statement. 'Tom is tall' is an empirical statement; 'Tom is tall or Tom is not Tall' is not an emprical statement, even though I may infer it from 'Tom is tall'. There is a tendency to say "well I know p, say, by experience; logic adds nothing, so 'Np" must be known by experience." But that is precisely what I am challenging I don't believe it. Give me an argument and I'd be very happy to see it before I commit to print; but repeating the ideas I'm challlenging is not an argument. Knowing that p is necessary is not to *know* merely that p. Two very different things. But I'm open to considering any argument that knowledge by inference is knowledge by experience. ? Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: Baynesr at comcast.net Cc: "hist-analytic" Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2009 8:06:01 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: The "Analytic A Posteriori" Your seem a little confused on this, Steve. ?If 'a' and 'b' are ? different terms understood rigidly--that is, if, unlike a typical use ? of 'the inventor of bifocals', they refer to the same individuals in ? all contexts of reference--then then only way 'N(a = b)' can be known ? to be true is by inference from 'a = b', which, in the case of things ? in the physical world, is an empirical statement. ?'N(a = b)' ?is ? therefore a clear case of something that, if known at all, is known a ? posteriori. ?The other cases you mention are knowable a priori even ? though they could equally be known by inference from an empirical ? premise. I won't be replying to Danny Frederick's latest comments on my chapter ? in the near future. ?At the moment I am busy doing some work on my ? house, and I don't have time to get involved with another encounter ? with Danny. ?I count six messages from Danny, at least four ?of which ? were concerned with one issue that should not have provoked a response ? at all. ?I mean the issue about my claim that two things have the same ? specific (non generic color) just when their specific colors [their ? actual colors] are indiscernible. ?Danny couldn't seem to grasp what I ? was saying, because he continued to offer irrelevant "counterexamples" ? in which objects of the same specific colors are made to look ? different because of being seen in different circumstances. ?If you ? got some paint chips at a paint store to ascertain the color of your ? kitchen wall, you would not learn that the wall does not have the ? color of one chip if the colors of the two things looked different ? when viewed under different light, nor would you learn that a chip and ? the wall were of the same color if, viewed in poor light, the colors ? of the two things looked the same. ?This "issue" didn't require ? discussion at all, I would say. ?Danny's latest comments cover a ? number of different points, some of which I have already responded ? to. ?The prospect of dealing with them all is not encouraging. Best to all, Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Wed Sep 2 16:12:32 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2009 21:12:32 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] The "Analytic A Posteriori" In-Reply-To: References: <272429255.924311251837215846.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <8B46C7761B624FA387AB99A2EFB288F3@DFLVQC1J> Hi Bruce, Just a few comments. <> I find a little disturbing the idea that in philosophy, or in the pursuit of knowledge in general, there are issues that are so unchallengeable that they should not provoke a response at all. <> As I have said before, it seems to me that you have missed the point of the counterexamples. In the 'spreading effect,' for which see here http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bezold_effect the same shade viewed by the same observer under the same conditions will be distinguished by the observer as two different shades. Does this represent non-optimal conditions merely because the one colour has two appearances? But which appearance is the non-optimal one? Are they both? And how do we know that there are not other effects that bring it about that when we distinguish two colours there is really only one? We don't. So how can you maintain that colour distinguishability implies colour difference? I also gave two counterexamples to the other half of your biconditional, that indiscernibility under optimal conditions implies no difference. The first example was a standard one in the literature: under optimal conditions, I cannot distinguish A from B, and I cannot distinguish B from C, but I can distinguish A from C. The other example was this: whatever conditions we specify as optimal, it is possible we can find other (even better) conditions under which we can distinguish between shades which were indiscernible under the (old) optimal conditions. What we can discern depends upon our limited powers, so an enhancement of these powers would produce such a change of conditions. If anyone can show me that these counterexamples are invalid, I will be grateful. <> Should anyone else want to defend your position, or attack mine, or just make a comment, I will be pleased to hear from them. I think the issues about logic and analyticity are important, not just in themselves, but particularly because wrong answers about them have been assumed and have become entrenched as dogmas in most analytical philosophy. Cheers. Danny From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Wed Sep 2 17:03:19 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2009 22:03:19 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] The "Analytic A Posteriori" In-Reply-To: <521414525.1123521251896100652.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <521414525.1123521251896100652.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <1A365A4972414D19AF0369294813C909@DFLVQC1J> Hi Steve, Excuse me if I have got it wrong, but it seems to me that what you want to say is that 'a=b' is empirical and 'if a=b, then Nec a=b' is a priori. When you combine the two you get the conclusion 'Nec a=b,' which therefore combines empirical and a priori. A view of this kind is espoused by Peacocke here: http://www.columbia.edu/~cp2161/Online_Papers/TheAPriori.pdf If my memory is correct (it might not be), Gareth Evans put forward a similar view ('Varieties of Reference' I would guess - but I've not read it for more than 20 years). I don't accept the view myself, of course. I also do not accept the principle 'if a=b, then Nec a=b,' UNLESS a and b are necessary existents. My assumption here is that 'a=b' is false (or, at least, not true) if a or b does not exist. So if a or b is a contingent existent, a=b must be contingent. I think Bruce made a valid point. 'The cat is fat v ~the cat is fat' is necessarily true, quite independently of the truth or falsity of 'the cat is fat.' But 'Nec a=b' has no chance of being true if a=b is false (even ignoring the issue about contingent existence). I think you are mistaken in affirming that even if the designators are not rigid 'Nec(a=b)' follows from a=b by first order logic by substitution of predicates. Consider a specific example. The inventor of bifocals = the first postmaster general. This says (according to Russell) that there is just one person who both invented bifocals and was the first postmaster general. Even supposing it is true, it does not follow that it is necessarily true that just one person did these two things; in fact it seems plainly possible that two different people might have invented bifocals and been the first postmaster general, even if ion fact one person did both. Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Thu Sep 3 07:44:14 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 07:44:14 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] The "Analytic A Posteriori" In-Reply-To: <8B46C7761B624FA387AB99A2EFB288F3@DFLVQC1J> References: <272429255.924311251837215846.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> <8B46C7761B624FA387AB99A2EFB288F3@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: OK, Danny, one more response on the color issue. Again, I say that your alleged counterexamples are not inconsistent with what I say. The most they show is that we may be wrong in thinking that we are dealing with the very same color. But I never doubted this or implied that it is any way doubtful. 1. The spreading effect. If we mask the adjoining colors of the red strip with a neutral color, we can see that the red strip is uniformly the same. We can discern no difference. (Of course, of course, we could make an error here; errors are always possible.) If we remove the masking material, the part of the strip adjoining the black line looks darker. We know the color did not actually change. We know we are dealing with an illusion. (Who doubts this?) The spreading effect is presented as an illusion. Optimal conditions are conditions in which things (in this case colors) look the way they really are to people with optimal vision, i.e. who have the visual capacity to discern the colors things actually have in optimal conditions. Don't tell me there is a circularity here. Our conceptions of optimal perceptual conditions and optimal perceptual capacities are closely interrelated. As time goes by we learn more and more about both kinds of optimality. We learn to recognize more and more conditions (such as the spreading effect) that produce deceptive appearances. We also learn more and more about optimal perceptual abilities. We learn to devise tests by which to identify perceptual abnormalities. None of this shows my principle to be false. 2. Transitivity/intransitivity. Suppose we can discern no difference in color between a and b and b and c but we can discern a difference between a and c. What do we conclude? Assuming we are dealing with perceivers with keen vision, we will conclude that either (i) the three things are not being perceived in equally optimal conditions, or (b) there is some difference in the colors of a, b, and c that we are not discerning in these conditions. So, if the matter is important, we continue to investigate the objects and the conditions. Do we conclude the principle I gave is false? NO. We have indirectly discerned a difference that exists either in the relevant perceptual conditions or in one of the perceived colors. We haven't located that difference, but we know it exists. 3. Your third case: "whatever conditions we specify as optimal, it is possible we can find other (even better) conditions under which we can distinguish between shades which were indiscernible under the (old) optimal conditions." Yes, this is possible. Errors are always possible. But this doesn't mean the principle is false. You say "What we can discern depends upon our limited powers, so an enhancement of these powers would produce such a change of conditions.." Yes, our powers can in principle be enhanced, and we can continue to learn about external conditions that can effect what we perceive. But none of this shows that the principle is false. Yes, yes, yes, mistakes are always possible. But whoever doubted this? I will comment on other things you say abut analyticity in another installment. But please, no more about the color case. I can imagine further things you might say, but let's leave the matter here. Other readers can judge the matter on the basis of what we have already said. Best, Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Thu Sep 3 08:05:42 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 08:05:42 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] The "Analytic A Posteriori" In-Reply-To: <272429255.924311251837215846.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <272429255.924311251837215846.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <1A8272C7-D901-4DFD-8ED1-669389F4EC64@philos.umass.edu> Steve, A posteriori knowledge is not just knowledge by experience in your sense; if it were, only observational knowledge and possibly memory knowledge would be a posteriori knowledge. But many things we know about the world are known inferentially; and what is thus known has always been considered a posteriori knowledge. When you say "'Nec(a = b)' follows from first order knowledge by substitution of predicates, what do you mean. What predicates are substituted? Are you supposing 'Nec(a = b)' is a logical truth? I have neve understood your attitude towards rigid designators. The whole idea of such designators was introduced to deflect objections that commit a fallacy of equivocation. Some people objected to the theorem on the ground that if a = the F, it may yet be false that N(a = the F) because it is possible that (there are possible situations in which) someone other than a = the F. But if "the F" is being used to single out a particular person, the fact that someone else might satisfy the description "the F" would not show that the person singled out might possibly be different from the person a. Could there be a situation in which I am different from myself or anyone is different from him- or herself? NO. There is nothing problematic, I think, about using a definite description to refer to a particular thing as opposed to anything that might satisfy that description. Bruce From Baynesr at comcast.net Thu Sep 3 08:47:07 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 12:47:07 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] The "Analytic A Posteriori" In-Reply-To: <1A8272C7-D901-4DFD-8ED1-669389F4EC64@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: <1633372429.1513961251982027571.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Bruce asks: ? "Are you supposing 'Nec(a = b)' is a logical truth?" and ? "When you say "'Nec(a = b)' follows from first order knowledge by substitution of predicates, what do you mean. What predicates are substituted?" I'm a little surprised. I'm sure you've heard of the proof etc. But here is the proof in one form. ? 1. x=y --> (P)(Px iff Py)???????????????????????? Substitutivity of identicals 2 x=y --> (N(x=x) iff N(x=y))?????????????????? U.I. 1 3. N(x=x)????????????????????????????????????????????? Assumption 4. x=y????????????????????????????????????????????????? Assumption for C.P 5. N(x=x) iff N(x=y)?????????????????????????????? M.P. 4, 2 6. N(x=x) --> N(x=y)?????????????????????????????5, df 'iff' 7. N(x=y)???????????????????????????????????????????? M.P. 3, 6 8. x=y --> N(x=y)????????????????????????????????? C.P. 4-7 Although I believe similar proofs had been suggested earlier, the proof procedure is found in "Modalities and Intentional Languages" by Ruth Barcan Marcus (then Ruth Marcus).Synthese xiii, 4, 1961. It is also to be found in her "A Functional Calculus of First Order Based on Strict Implication," theorem XIX. Bruce is curious about my "attitude" towards rigid designation. Well, in one form or another it (or something very much like it) has been suggest by Kaplan, Hintikka, Marcus (I am told) and in a weak form without worlds, Russell. When I see a common name, I know it; when I see a definite article I know it; but when I see a word that looks like a common name, and I am told that it is a rigid designator I ask "What is the basis for this." Also, this and the "necessary a posteriori" have become sacred cows. I've never been a believer is sacred cows. I would answer the other question Bruce raises, about the "theorem"; but the only theorem I was talking about was the one above, viz. x=y --> N(x=y), which doesn't make ANY assumptions about rigid designators. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: Baynesr at comcast.net Cc: "hist-analytic" Sent: Thursday, September 3, 2009 8:05:42 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: The "Analytic A Posteriori" Steve, A posteriori knowledge is not just knowledge by experience in your ? sense; if it were, only observational knowledge and possibly memory ? knowledge would be a posteriori knowledge. ?But many things we know ? about the world are known inferentially; and what is thus known has ? always been considered a posteriori knowledge. When you say "'Nec(a = b)' follows from first order knowledge by ? substitution of predicates, what do you mean. ?What predicates are ? substituted? ?Are you supposing 'Nec(a = b)' is a logical truth? I have neve understood your attitude towards rigid designators. ?The ? whole idea of such designators was introduced to deflect objections ? that commit a fallacy of equivocation. ?Some people objected to the ? theorem on the ground that if a = the F, it may yet be false that N(a ? = the F) because it is possible that (there are possible situations in ? which) someone other than a = the F. ?But if "the F" is being used to ? single out a particular person, the fact that someone else might ? satisfy the description "the F" would not show that the person singled ? out might possibly be different from the person a. ?Could there be a ? situation in which I am different from myself or anyone is different ? from him- or herself? ?NO. ?There is nothing problematic, I think, ? about using a definite description to refer to a particular thing as ? opposed to anything that might satisfy that description. Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Thu Sep 3 07:34:12 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 12:34:12 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] The "Analytic A Posteriori" In-Reply-To: <310978581.3480531251304764020.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <310978581.3480531251304764020.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: Hi Steve, I thought it might be worth expanding on something I said last time. You claimed that even if the designators are not rigid 'Nec a=b' follows from a=b by first order logic by substitution of predicates. This claim is an expression of what is sometimes known as 'the Frege Argument.' The argument is supposed to show that any referentially transparent context in which logical equivalents (sentences or predicates) are intersubstitutable must be truth-functional. The argument is used in Quine's 'Word and Object' (197-98) to 'obliterate modal distinctions' and in Davidson's 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences' ('Essays on Actions and Events,' 1982, 115-18) to show that all facts are identical. The argument is invalid, as I will now explain. Here is a version of the argument. (1) The context 'K()' permits the substitution salva veritate of co-designative singular terms. [Assumption] (2) The context 'K()' permits the substitution salva veritate of logically equivalent sentences. [Assumption] (3) The letters 'p' and 'q' represent any arbitrary sentences with the same truth value. [Assumption] (4) 'The x such that [(x=1 and p) v (x=0 & ~p)] = 1' is logically equivalent to 'p.' (5) 'The x such that [(x=1 and q) v (x=0 & ~q)] = 1' is logically equivalent to 'q.' (6) 'The x such that [(x=1 and p) v (x=0 & ~p)]' has the same reference as 'The x such that [(x=1 and q) v (x=0 & ~q)].' [From (3)] (7) 'K(p)' has the same truth value as 'K(The x such that [(x=1 and p) v (x=0 & ~p)] = 1).' [From (2) and (4)] (8) 'K(The x such that [(x=1 and p) v (x=0 & ~p)] = 1)' has the same truth value as 'K(The x such that [(x=1 and q) v (x=0 & ~q)] = 1).' [From (1) and (6)] (9) 'K(p)' has the same truth value as 'K(The x such that [(x=1 and q) v (x=0 & ~q)] = 1).' [From (7) and (8)] (10) 'K(The x such that [(x=1 and q) v (x=0 & ~q)] = 1)' has the same truth value as 'K(q)' [From (2) and (5)] (11) 'K(p)' has the same truth value as 'K(q).' [From (9) and (10)] We can now discharge the three assumptions to get the required conclusion: since 'p' and 'q' represent any arbitrary sentences with the same truth value, then any context of which (1) and (2) hold must be truth-functional. The fault in the argument concerns the inference of (8) from (1) and (6). This involves a confusion about singular terms and definite descriptions, or rigid and non-rigid designators. In any extensional context, both rigid and non-rigid designators are substitutable salva veritate. But in modal contexts only rigid designators (singular terms proper) are inter-substitutable salva veritate. This may also be so in some other intensional contexts, such as talk about facts or propositions. Thus, the argument is valid only if (1) is interpreted so that definite descriptions are singular terms; but that restricts the argument to extensional contexts, which makes the conclusion unsurprising. The surprising conclusion requires that (1) be interpreted as concerning singular terms proper; but then the argument is invalid. The argument shows no more than that extensional contexts are extensional. It sucks. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Thu Sep 3 11:37:39 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 16:37:39 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] The "Analytic A Posteriori" In-Reply-To: <1A8272C7-D901-4DFD-8ED1-669389F4EC64@philos.umass.edu> References: <272429255.924311251837215846.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> <1A8272C7-D901-4DFD-8ED1-669389F4EC64@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: Hi Bruce, You object to Steve: 'A posteriori knowledge is not just knowledge by experience in your sense; if it were, only observational knowledge and possibly memory knowledge would be a posteriori knowledge. But many things we know about the world are known inferentially; and what is thus known has always been considered a posteriori knowledge.' I don't think you are entitled to say this. I will suppress for the moment my scruples about the possibility of a priori knowledge. You want to say that a priori knowledge arises from knowledge of conventions and deductive inferences from items of knowledge known in this way. Thus you are committed to saying that things known by inference may be a priori. Further, given you're view of the a priori nature of logic, the application of deductive inference to an item of empirical knowledge will yield a priori additions to what we know empirically. These additions will be relatively a priori: they depend on empirical knowledge as premises, but they require no more experience than that (they are a priori given the premises). I would guess this is Steve's point: we know some stuff by experience; we know other stuff by a priori inference from experience; and we know some stuff a priori without inference [but God knows how! - sorry, I couldn't suppress it]. Further still, I think it is plain false that we can acquire new empirical knowledge inferentially (by 'new' I mean knowledge not deductively implied by what we already know). There is no valid method of non-deductive inference. What we do in acquiring new empirical knowledge is make a guess and then test it. Cheers. Danny From Baynesr at comcast.net Thu Sep 3 09:15:13 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 13:15:13 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] The "Analytic A Posteriori" In-Reply-To: <1A365A4972414D19AF0369294813C909@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <1284123057.1520361251983713286.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I think the proof sketch I sent from Marcus should suffice to answer most of your questions. As for the rest, my point is, simply, this: knowing the truth of 'Nec(x=y)' may entail empirical knowledge of 'x=y'; but empirical knowledge that x=y is not sufficient for knowing 'Nec(x=y). The difference is made up by drawing the inference, logically from one to the other. Keep in mind we are speaking of knowledge not truth. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Danny Frederick" To: "hist-analytic" Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2009 5:03:19 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: RE: The "Analytic A Posteriori" Hi Steve, Excuse me if I have got it wrong, but it seems to me that what you want to say is that ?a=b? is empirical and ?if a=b, then Nec a=b? is a priori. When you combine the two you get the conclusion ?Nec a=b,? which therefore combines empirical and a priori. A view of this kind is espoused by Peacocke here: http://www.columbia.edu/~cp2161/Online_Papers/TheAPriori.pdf If my memory is correct (it might not be), Gareth Evans put forward a similar view (?Varieties of Reference? I would guess ? but I?ve not read it for more than 20 years). I don?t accept the view myself, of course. I also do not accept the principle ?if a=b, then Nec a=b,? UNLESS a and b are necessary existents. My assumption here is that ?a=b? is false (or, at least, not true) if a or b does not exist. So if a or b is a contingent existent, a=b must be contingent. I think Bruce made a valid point. ?The cat is fat v ~the cat is fat? is necessarily true, quite independently of the truth or falsity of ?the cat is fat.? But ?Nec a=b? has no chance of being true if a=b is false (even ignoring the issue about contingent existence). I think you are mistaken in affirming that even if the designators are not rigid 'Nec(a=b)' follows from a=b by first order logic by substitution of predicates. Consider a specific example. The inventor of bifocals = the first postmaster general. This says (according to Russell) that there is just one person who both invented bifocals and was the first postmaster general. Even supposing it is true, it does not follow that it is necessarily true that just one person did these two things; in fact it seems plainly possible that two different people might have invented bifocals and been the first postmaster general, even if ion fact one person did both. Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Fri Sep 4 10:11:21 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2009 14:11:21 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] "Intentions, Entrainment, and Pseudo-Processes" Message-ID: <742966161.1880271252073481368.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> List, About a year ago when I decided to focus most of my energy on the Anscombe book, I set aside a larger ms in progress on the metaphysics and ontology of mental actions, volitions, and intentions. I had finished what was in effect an introduction to the topic I was investigating. I've decided to put this up on the list. It is dated in the sense that the comments on Davidson have become much more closely argued but clearer, and the nature of pseudo-processes has now become sharper also, particularly in light of some thoughts I've had on David Bohm and Pribram; Bohm in particular. When the Anscombe is finished (and I am now doing the text editing) this larger ms will be put together. So if you are interested in: "Intentions, Entrainment, and Pseudo-Processes" go to: http://www.hist-analytic.org/EntrainedIntentions.pdf Regards STeve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Fri Sep 4 11:52:54 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2009 16:52:54 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] The "Analytic A Posteriori" In-Reply-To: <261153.89893.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <261153.89893.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Hi Bruce, Thanks for the response on colour. I am afraid I must make a further response (I can resist the urge no longer). Your position seems to me to be inconsistent. You maintain: (a) if two patches are of different determinate colours, then we can distinguish their colours under optimal conditions; (b) if two patches are of identical determinate colour, then we cannot distinguish their colours under optimal conditions; (c) we can make mistakes such that (i) sometimes under optimal conditions we cannot distinguish the colours of two patches which have different determinate colours, and (ii) sometimes under optimal conditions we can distinguish the colours of two patches which have the same determinate colour. But (c)(i) flatly contradicts (a); and (c)(ii) flatly contradicts (b). It seems to me that the only way, consistent with your aims, of extricating yourself from these contradictions is to distinguish different senses of 'optimal conditions.' Thus in (c), 'optimal conditions' will be taken to mean 'conditions that we think are optimal.' The trouble with this is that it renders your (a) and (b) either wholly empty, or both empirically empty and wholly arbitrary. Let's take the second disjunct first. Your (a) and (b) affirm the existence of optimal conditions under which identity is equivalent to indiscernibility. But this sort of purely existential statement is unfalisifable and thus empirically empty: no matter how long and actively we have searched for such optimal conditions without success, it is always possible that there are such conditions. Further, it is an arbitrary stipulation: why should the world be so organised that there will be perceptual conditions (if only we could find them) under which we cannot be mistaken about colour identity/difference? You can avoid this commitment to empty and arbitrary empirical claims by saying that (a) and (b) define what optimal conditions are but leave it an open question as to whether there are any such optimal conditions. But this reduces (a) and (b) to pointless verbal play. Your position is therefore either self-contradictory, or empirical but arbitrary and untestable, or a merely stipulative definition that does no work. Although this is not a reductio ad absurdum of it, one must wonder why anyone would hold it. Best wishes, Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune1 at verizon.net Sat Sep 5 07:32:35 2009 From: aune1 at verizon.net (Bruce Aune) Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2009 07:32:35 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Danny's Latest Message-ID: I can't take the time to deal with this. We do identify actual colors (conceived commonsensically) this way. Yes, it is always possible, epistemically, for us to be in error in a particular case. We know this inductively. (Yes, I know you will object.) But it doesn't follow from this that we are in error in a particular case. How do you think about actual color? How do you discover whether the actual color of a wall, say, is the same as the color in one of the color chips in a paint store's catalogue? Don't you know that skeptical doubts can be raised almost everywhere? Ask yourself these questions; don't try to answer them for me. I am tired of discussing this issue with you. Let's stop. Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Sat Sep 5 10:19:32 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2009 15:19:32 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Danny's Latest In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4BFD1F5CAB3C4254B51E7DAE530BFD7F@DFLVQC1J> Hi Bruce, Okay, you need not respond. But the things you assert here are some of the things I am impugning. You assert: 'we do identify actual colors (conceived commonsensically) this way' But the thrust of my last message was that the most you are entitled to say is that some of us think we do. Further (this is a separate point), as I said in an earlier mail, the considerations I have raised seem to me to cast doubt on whether there can be such a thing as the actual colour (conceived commonsensically). We can talk of actual wavelengths of light, etc. but the notion of an object's actual colour (as 'colour' is pre-scientifically understood), seems to lead us into paradoxes. You say: 'it is always possible, epistemically, for us to be in error in a particular case___But it doesn't follow from this that we are in error in a particular case.' I agree. But it does raise the question of whether we can know that we are in error in a particular case. It is in our answers to that question (amongst others) that we disagree. You ask: 'How do you discover whether the actual color of a wall, say, is the same as the color in one of the color chips in a paint store's catalogue?' >From what I said a moment ago it should be clear that I do not think that I (or anyone else) can discover that. I will decide whether the two colours are close enough for my purposes by comparing them and by asking other people to do the same (I will not trust to my judgement alone, unless I have to). You ask: 'Don't you know that skeptical doubts can be raised almost everywhere?' Actually, I think they can be raised EVERYWHERE. But that is just a fact. We should try to come to terms with facts, not pretend that they are not there. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Tue Sep 8 09:56:44 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2009 06:56:44 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Philosophy and Pay Scale Message-ID: <61567.24204.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com> People might be interested in the rankings for graduates from certain programs with respect to income. I was very surprised to see how well philosophy did, actually. Here is the list. http://www.payscale.com/best-colleges/degrees.asp Regards Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Fri Sep 11 12:48:38 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2009 16:48:38 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Nomologicality and Reichenbach Message-ID: <313961062.103311252687718097.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Something happened to the debate over the nature of scientific laws. It was high-jacked by modal semantics, in my opinion. It was off to a good start in early discussions of Hume and Russell on the status of laws in explanation, but when it became "semanticized" the issue became one of counterfactuals. I think the issue of counterfactuals is a good one, and in particular the relation of counterfactuals to lawlikenss etc. But a glance at the history is disheartening. It went from brilliance in the work of Goodman and, then, to slightly lesser brilliance, I believe, in D. Lewis on Counterfactuals, and then sunk into tedious irrelevance in approaches based on Bayesian analysis, a graveyard of irrelevant ideas from the philosopher's point of view; and here I don't mean philosophers whose interests lie strictly within probability theory. I am reminded of a comment Einstein made to someone that the Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen began as a insightful and intuitive discussion of the completeness of quantum theory but the other authors ended up makiing it into a formal exercise (Chopin on a harpsichord). Isn't this the way it goes. But I would suggest a bit of back tracking. Before Goodman's Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Reichenbach tackled the issue of nomologicality. He started out with the chapter in Elements of Symbolic Logic "Connective Operations and Modality" and his last important statement was Nomological Statements and Admissible Operations. Many will view his effort as dated; I judge it as buried by the onslaught of developments in modal logic which tended to gobble everything up, leaving us with just about nothing. So as I complete this book on action theory I'd like to take a hard look at Reichenbach on this matter. He was a furiously opposed to the synthetic a priori; perhaps more so than any of the positivists with the exception of Russell. Indeed in correpsondence with Russell he makes this a point of agreement. I bring this up because I am now moving towards the issue of synthetic a priori which was earlier under discussion. I'll move incrementally back to things like colors, but first the status of scientific laws and the nature of time may be addressed. For my money the most neglected philosopher of great merit of the last century was Reichenbach. Regards Steve Bayne -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Thu Sep 17 03:54:10 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2009 08:54:10 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Metaphysical Positivism v. Critical Rationalism (Jones v. Frederick) Message-ID: <200909170854.11020.rbj@rbjones.com> I have a page on my web-site comparing metaphysical and logical positivism (Jones v. Carnap) at: http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/x003.html This was written a long time ago and I need to review it and update it, so if anyone has any comments on it I would be glad to have them so I can take them into account. I don't think there is anything on my site about Critical Rationalism, and I think its time I remedied that by writing a page comparing Metaphysical Positivism with Critical Rationalism. So I am also interested to hear what anyone thinks on that topic. My recent exposure to Critical Rationalism has mainly been in brief engagements with Danny Frederick. These have been brief, because I have not found Danny willing to entertain what I mean rather than to criticise what he would have meant by my words if he had uttered them. This I consider to be a manifestation of what I now call "terminological dogmatism". It seems from some of the things Danny has written on hist-analytic that he considers himself to be a sceptic. I also consider myself to be a sceptic, but find most scepticism, including that of Danny, to be tainted by negative dogmas. My other recent exposure to Critical Rationalism has been through a partial reading of material by W W Bartley from: CRITICAL STUDY THE PHILOSOPHY OF KARL POPPER Part III. Rationality, Criticism, and Logic My outstanding impression of this work is that it is too rationalistic. Bartley seems to me to make sustained attempts to establish conclusively by apparently deductive means conclusions which cannot in principle be so established. If this were typical of critical rationalism then it would show a weak appreciation of some of the important insights on the limitations of deduction which are exposed at the root of positivism in the writings of David Hume. As well as having some kind of scepticism in common with critical rationalists (a very tenuous connection), I share an appreciation of some kind of rationality. David Hume's philosophy was useful to romantics opposed to the rationalism of the enlightenment and it seems to me that a positivistically acceptable rationalism must be founded in an acute appreciation of the limits of deduction, which I suspect may be deficient in Critical Rationalism. Roger Jones From Baynesr at comcast.net Fri Sep 18 07:50:46 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2009 11:50:46 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Metaphysical Positivism v. Critical Rationalism (Jones v. Frederick) In-Reply-To: <200909170854.11020.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <1679309605.2199711253274646355.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I'm just finishing the section on the 'private language argument' and its significance to the theory of action. So I can't comment on the details of your page, although I took a good look. However, I thought that in view of the fact that the topic is rationalism, of a sort, you might be amused by the following quote. "It may be regarded, afdter a fashion, as a modern fulfillment of Descartes' quest for an absolutely certain basis of science; and indeed Carnap's theory is reminiscent of Descartes' rationalism in more wayst than one. Reichenbach ("Linguistic Empiricism in Germany and the Present State of the Problems" in JP. xxxiii, no. 6. March 1936, p.149." There was no one who displayed more logical or mathematical rigour at philosophy than Reichenbach. No one supported Reichenbach more strongly than Reichenbach. In fact, Carnap had to modify some of his views owing to Reichenbach just as he had to modify his views in light of Neurath's criticisms regarding "protocol" sentences. Just thought you might be amused: Carnap and Descartes; two peas in a pod? So much for Hume! Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2009 3:54:10 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Metaphysical Positivism v. Critical Rationalism (Jones v. Frederick) I have a page on my web-site comparing metaphysical and logical positivism (Jones v. Carnap) at: http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/x003.html This was written a long time ago and I need to review it and update it, so if anyone has any comments on it I would be glad to have them so I can take them into account. I don't think there is anything on my site about Critical Rationalism, and I think its time I remedied that by writing a page comparing Metaphysical Positivism with Critical Rationalism. So I am also interested to hear what anyone thinks on that topic. My recent exposure to Critical Rationalism has mainly been in brief engagements with Danny Frederick. These have been brief, because I have not found Danny willing to entertain what I mean rather than to criticise what he would have meant by my words if he had uttered them. This I consider to be a manifestation of what I now call "terminological dogmatism". It seems from some of the things Danny has written on hist-analytic that he considers himself to be a sceptic. I also consider myself to be a sceptic, but find most scepticism, including that of Danny, to be tainted by negative dogmas. My other recent exposure to Critical Rationalism has been through a partial reading of material by W W Bartley from: CRITICAL STUDY THE PHILOSOPHY OF KARL POPPER Part III. Rationality, Criticism, and Logic My outstanding impression of this work is that it is too rationalistic. Bartley seems to me to make sustained attempts to establish conclusively by apparently deductive means conclusions which cannot in principle be so established. If this were typical of critical rationalism then it would show a weak appreciation of some of the important insights on the limitations of deduction which are exposed at the root of positivism in the writings of David Hume. As well as having some kind of scepticism in common with critical rationalists (a very tenuous connection), I share an appreciation of some kind of rationality. David Hume's philosophy was useful to romantics opposed to the rationalism of the enlightenment and it seems to me that a positivistically acceptable rationalism must be founded in an acute appreciation of the limits of deduction, which I suspect may be deficient in Critical Rationalism. Roger Jones -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Fri Sep 18 16:36:00 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2009 21:36:00 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Metaphysical Positivism v. Critical Rationalism (Jones v. Frederick) In-Reply-To: <1679309605.2199711253274646355.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <1679309605.2199711253274646355.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <200909182136.00886.rbj@rbjones.com> On Friday 18 September 2009 12:50:46 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: > I thought that in view of > the fact that the topic is rationalism, of a sort, you might be amused by > the following quote. > >"It may be regarded, afdter a fashion, as a modern fulfillment of Descartes' > quest for an absolutely certain basis of science; and indeed Carnap's > theory is reminiscent of Descartes' rationalism in more wayst than one. > Reichenbach ("Linguistic Empiricism in Germany and the Present State of the > Problems" in JP. xxxiii, no. 6. March 1936, p.149." It would be interesting to know which of Carnap's theories he was talking about. The Aufbau? >There was no one who displayed more logical or mathematical rigour at > philosophy than Reichenbach. No one supported Reichenbach more strongly > than Reichenbach. In fact, Carnap had to modify some of his views owing to > Reichenbach just as he had to modify his views in light of Neurath's > criticisms regarding "protocol" sentences. Your phrase "had to modify" suggests that he did so reluctantly, but reverting to a previous topic, it seems to me that he was always eager to adapt his philosophy as a result of what he learned from others. >Just thought you might be amused: Carnap and Descartes; two peas in a pod? > So much for Hume! Personally I would not liken Carnap to Descartes, because Carnap, like Hume and even like Plato, had a better grip on the scope of reason. If you want an interesting comparison between Carnap and rationalist, then the comparison with Plato works much better, but I think the parallel is clearer still between Hume and Plato, and of course, though Carnap made little of it, Wittgenstein I believe observed that the things which Carnap thought he had takem from the Tractatus he could have found in Hume. Hume's fork, which is "essentially" the same as the analytic/synthetic which was very important to Carnap, was pretty much the same distinction as that in Plato between the "real" word of Platonic forms and the shadowy world of appearances. They disagree about which of these two is "real" (or for Hume, factual), but they agree first in drawing a fundamental distinction on the basis of the subject matter, and secondly that knowledge is confined to that of platonic forms (relations between ideas), and that our beliefs about matters of fact (the world of appearances) are mere opinion (epistemically unjustified habits for Hume). So Hume had this extremely positive opinion of deductive methods, and negative view of induction (or any other way of obtaining factual conclusions), which seems odd for an empiricist. With not quite the same scepticism this is echoed in Carnap. This is why I view Hume and positivism as having been a first attempt at a synthesis between rationalism and empiricism (even though one can also see positivism as a specially radical form of empiricism). Logical Positivism is another attempt at such a synthesis, in which necessary/analytic judgements have a greater role than in Hume as a result of the advances in logic. The shift from Hume to Carnap is also one from a philosopher who (despite his scepticism) modelled philosophy on the empirical (natiural) sciences, to one who modelled philosophy on demonstrative science, so from this point of view it is a second attempt at sythesis between rationalism and empiricism. Metaphysical Positivism is another attempt at finding the right analysis of the respective roles of deduction and of empirical observation in the establishment of knowledge. So far as I understand it, Critical Rationalism, seems to me a regression to the kind of rationalism of which Descartes is an example, in which there is no clear conception of the scope of reason, and hence a tendency to approach by deductive arguments conclusions which cannot properly be demonstrated. RBJ From Baynesr at comcast.net Sat Sep 19 09:49:11 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sat, 19 Sep 2009 13:49:11 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Metaphysical Positivism v. Critical Rationalism (Jones v. Frederick) In-Reply-To: <200909182136.00886.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <403273103.2501431253368151811.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> "It would be interesting to know which of Carnap's theories he was talking about. The Aufbau?" ? In all likelihood, Reichenbach was talking about Carnap's view that the protocol language consisted of statements about sense-data and that these sense-data are immediately given and, so, in some sense incorrigible. This incorrigibility throughout the history of philosophy has been compared to Descartes's grounding science in the incorrigibility deriving from "I think therefore I am." Historically, I don't believe there can be any question about this. Reichenbach by contrast with the logical positivists averred that instead of talking about truth we talk about probability. This would rule out certainty with respect to the protocol language, whence the need to revise the doctrine. Interestingly, Reichenbach notes that it was the issue of probability that distanced the Berlin logical positivists from the Viennese logical positivists. The Berlin people thought that *prediction* could not be addressed within the framework of a logic that reduced to tautologies. What Reichenbach did not appreciate, in my opinion, was that not only are statements of the future at issue, but so are statements about the past; and once you attempt to deal philosophically with the study of history you are no longer in the realm of strict causation. There are symptoms of that? which the positivists glided over. One symptom is that contexts of discovery and contexts of justification were sharply distinguihed. The former became a purely psychological matter. Discoveries could not in principle be predicted and might be arrived at in dreams etc. But I think this is symptomatic of a weakness in positivism as providing us with a world view. When we construct a theory we give reasons for making certain moves. This is particularly evident in "miniature" when an investigator constructs a theory as to how a crime occurred. He gives reason for why a person MIGHT have done such and such. Coming up with a prediction of the investrigator's inferences does not fall within the purview of physical science, whence the need for the positivists to jettison the signficance of the context of discovery. Herein lies the real substance of what I am after; it cannot be artlessly dismissed without great loss. According to Reichenbach, Carnap accepted the criticisms of the protocol language and made it a subdomain of the physical language; "logical positivism" became "logical materialism," just another variant of an old idea. I don't think Carnap was "eager" to do this; he was just being honest. In their later years, I think both Russell's and Carnap's philosophies became a wee bit sterile owing to their faith in materialism. I'm going to defer comment on the synthetic/analytic distinction. I'm not sure how important it actually is. What is important to philosophy is the alleged nonexistence of the synthetic a priori. Retaining or rejecting the synthetic/analytic distinction is not as important as, say, definining numbers in terms of classes etc. inmy opinion. Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: Baynesr at comcast.net Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Friday, September 18, 2009 4:36:00 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Metaphysical Positivism v. Critical Rationalism (Jones v. Frederick) On Friday 18 September 2009 12:50:46 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: > I thought that in view of > the fact that the topic is rationalism, of a sort, you might be amused by > the following quote. > >"It may be regarded, afdter a fashion, as a modern fulfillment of Descartes' > quest for an absolutely certain basis of science; and indeed Carnap's > theory is reminiscent of Descartes' rationalism in more wayst than one. > Reichenbach ("Linguistic Empiricism in Germany and the Present State of the > Problems" in JP. xxxiii, no. 6. March 1936, p.149." It would be interesting to know which of Carnap's theories he was talking about. ?The Aufbau? >There was no one who displayed more logical or mathematical rigour at > philosophy than Reichenbach. No one supported Reichenbach more strongly > than Reichenbach. In fact, Carnap had to modify some of his views owing to > Reichenbach just as he had to modify his views in light of Neurath's > criticisms regarding "protocol" sentences. Your phrase "had to modify" suggests that he did so reluctantly, but reverting to a previous topic, it seems to me that he was always eager to adapt his philosophy as a result of what he learned from others. >Just thought you might be amused: Carnap and Descartes; two peas in a pod? > So much for Hume! Personally I would not liken Carnap to Descartes, because Carnap, like Hume and even like Plato, had a better grip on the scope of reason. If you want an interesting comparison between Carnap and rationalist, then the comparison with Plato works much better, but I think the parallel is clearer still between Hume and Plato, and of course, though Carnap made little of it, Wittgenstein I believe observed that the things which Carnap thought he had takem from the Tractatus he could have found in Hume. Hume's fork, which is "essentially" the same as the analytic/synthetic which was very important to Carnap, was pretty much the same distinction as that in Plato between the "real" word of Platonic forms and the shadowy world of appearances. ?They disagree about which of these two is "real" (or for Hume, factual), but they agree first in drawing a fundamental distinction on the basis of the subject matter, and secondly that knowledge is confined to that of platonic forms (relations between ideas), and that our beliefs about matters of fact (the world of appearances) are mere opinion (epistemically unjustified habits for Hume). So Hume had this extremely positive opinion of deductive methods, and negative view of induction (or any other way of obtaining factual conclusions), which seems odd for an empiricist. With not quite the same scepticism this is echoed in Carnap. This is why I view Hume and positivism as having been a first attempt at a synthesis between rationalism and empiricism (even though one can also see positivism as a specially radical form of empiricism). Logical Positivism is another attempt at such a synthesis, in which necessary/analytic judgements have a greater role than in Hume as a result of the advances in logic. The shift from Hume to Carnap is also one from a philosopher who (despite his scepticism) modelled philosophy on the empirical (natiural) sciences, to one who modelled philosophy on demonstrative science, so from this point of view it is a second attempt at sythesis between rationalism and empiricism. Metaphysical Positivism is another attempt at finding the right analysis of the respective roles of deduction and of empirical observation in the establishment of knowledge. So far as I understand it, Critical Rationalism, seems to me a regression to the kind of rationalism of which Descartes is an example, in which there is no clear conception of the scope of reason, and hence a tendency to approach by deductive arguments conclusions which cannot properly be demonstrated. RBJ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Sun Sep 20 04:01:11 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Sun, 20 Sep 2009 09:01:11 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism In-Reply-To: <403273103.2501431253368151811.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <403273103.2501431253368151811.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <200909200901.12305.rbj@rbjones.com> On Saturday 19 September 2009 14:49:11 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: [RBJ] >"It would be interesting to know which of Carnap's theories he was >talking about. The Aufbau?" > >In all likelihood, Reichenbach was talking about Carnap's view that the > protocol language consisted of statements about sense-data and that these > sense-data are immediately given and, so, in some sense incorrigible. This > incorrigibility throughout the history of philosophy has been compared to > Descartes's grounding science in the incorrigibility deriving from "I think > therefore I am." The comparison seems pretty weak to me. I would much more readily embrace a theory of perception in which sense data are incorrigible (I think such a theory is tenable, if you get the details right) than accept the Cartesian cogito. > Historically, I don't believe there can be any question > about this. About what? > Reichenbach by contrast with the logical positivists averred > that instead of talking about truth we talk about probability. This would > rule out certainty with respect to the protocol language, whence the need > to revise the doctrine. I don't see that it necessarily would. Even if sense data are incorrigible, the inference to the external objects or to future sense data is not logical, and so one might wish to retreat on these to probabilistic statements, though as Hume observed, this doesn't solve the problem that the inference is not sound. The inference to probability claims isn't sound either, unless they are just claims about the observed sense data rather than claims about external objects or future sense data. Whether or not you prefer probability statements for conclusions you do not have to treat sense data as probabilistic, and I can't see the merit in doing so. >Interestingly, Reichenbach notes that it was the issue of probability that > distanced the Berlin logical positivists from the Viennese logical > positivists. The Berlin people thought that *prediction* could not be > addressed within the framework of a logic that reduced to tautologies. I think this is a mistake, and I would guess that this is a point which Carnap never conceded. > What > Reichenbach did not appreciate, in my opinion, was that not only are > statements of the future at issue, but so are statements about the past; > and once you attempt to deal philosophically with the study of history you > are no longer in the realm of strict causation. There are symptoms of that? > which the positivists glided over. But even if you were "in the realm of strict causation", causal inference is not logical inference. >One symptom is that contexts of discovery and contexts of justification were > sharply distinguihed. Sounds like a good idea to me! > The former became a purely psychological matter. > Discoveries could not in principle be predicted and might be arrived at in > dreams etc. Which surely is in fact the case? > But I think this is symptomatic of a weakness in positivism as > providing us with a world view. What is the weakness? > When we construct a theory we give reasons for making certain moves. Which presumably belong to the context of justification? > This is particularly evident in "miniature" when > an investigator constructs a theory as to how a crime occurred. He gives > reason for why a person MIGHT have done such and such. Coming up with a > prediction of the investrigator's inferences does not fall within the > purview of physical science, whence the need for the positivists to > jettison the signficance of the context of discovery. Herein lies the real > substance of what I am after; it cannot be artlessly dismissed without > great loss. I'm afraid I don't understand the point here. I don't understand what you mean when you say that positivists "jettisoned" the significance of the context of discovery, possibly because I don't know what you think its significance is. What is this "real substance" that you are after? >According to Reichenbach, Carnap accepted the criticisms of the protocol > language and made it a subdomain of the physical language; "logical > positivism" became "logical materialism," just another variant of an old > idea. I would not myself think Carnap a materialist. Even if his physicalistic language was purely materialistic, it was for him just one way of talking among many. He also endorsed a "theoretical" language, and had a well articulated position admitting talk about abstract entities. To the question of whether Carnap's mature philosophy should be called positivism I have given some thought, since I have taken up the term in my own philosophy even though my own views are on their face even less positivistic than Carnap. It is a topic I intend to address in some detail, and have started a web page at: http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/x026.html Which, does not yet say much useful, but perhaps give a hint of direction. I decided to give the name "Liberal Positivism" to what you get be stripping negative dogmas out of the less liberal kind of positivism, and this then provides an account of the positivistic elements in Metaphysical Positivism. However, I have yet to come up with a description of what you have left when you do that, and why it is worth having. > I don't think Carnap was "eager" to do this; he was just being > honest. I think he was pretty eager to get things right, and to fix any problems in his philosophy whoever discovered them. > In their later years, I think both Russell's and Carnap's > philosophies became a wee bit sterile owing to their faith in materialism. Can't speak for Russell here, but I can't see the legitimacy of this criticism of Carnap. >I'm going to defer comment on the synthetic/analytic distinction. I'm not > sure how important it actually is. What is important to philosophy is the > alleged nonexistence of the synthetic a priori. Retaining or rejecting the > synthetic/analytic distinction is not as important as, say, definining > numbers in terms of classes etc. inmy opinion. How can you regard the synthetic/a priori as an important problem without recognising the importance of the analytic/synthetic distinction? Roger From landspeedrecord at gmail.com Sun Sep 20 17:43:52 2009 From: landspeedrecord at gmail.com (Landspeedrecord) Date: Sun, 20 Sep 2009 17:43:52 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism In-Reply-To: <200909200901.12305.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <403273103.2501431253368151811.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> <200909200901.12305.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/arxiv/24124/ http://arxiv.org/abs/0909.2789 I found this article and thought some here might be interested - It isn't directly related to analytic philosophy but I thought it had bearing on meta-normative assumptions that must be made in order to have a cohesive analytic position. From Baynesr at comcast.net Mon Sep 21 09:36:50 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2009 13:36:50 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism In-Reply-To: <331616507.2878691253540132253.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <1299800379.2879371253540210842.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I think the article is relevant. I can't say I agree, but it is worth considering. Something else that might interest you if this did. That is the work of David Bohm. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SvyD2o7w24g His views on the "implicate order" and the relation of probability to field theory are philosophically interesting in my opinion. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Landspeedrecord" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Sunday, September 20, 2009 5:43:52 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/arxiv/24124/ http://arxiv.org/abs/0909.2789 I found this article and thought some here might be interested - It isn't directly related to analytic philosophy but I thought it had bearing on meta-normative assumptions that must be made in order to have a cohesive analytic position. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Mon Sep 21 09:32:15 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2009 13:32:15 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism In-Reply-To: <200909200901.12305.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <1224881399.2877101253539935410.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> The connection between Descartes and the early protocol language advocates was certainty. In each case, you were dealing with a contingent fact that was known with certainty: that I exist is a contingent fact and, yet, I know this with greater certainty than I know the truth of the multiplication tables; similarly, 'Red, here, now' is a contingent fact I know with certainty. That was the reasoning, anyway. The comparison is quite strong, actually. I've never been completely convinced that the Cogito is a bad argument. In fact, it is a better argument in some ways than the idea that we have certainty with respect to knowledgeo of our sense data. So I'm more inclined to go with Descartes. Is there something specific about Descartes argument that you think is wrong. I'm unclear on what your point is with respect to probability. What motivated Reichenbach, and the Berlin positivists, was the idea that truth is not a very good concept for science to work with. Nothing is known withe certainty to be true. What is known is what is probably true. The merit is in the simple fact that science is not a body of propositions known to be true; it is a body of propositions thought to be probable. This will effect the logic of science. Truth values will be infinite between 0 and 1. There won't be two truth values. Much of this was supported by the Heisenberg business. By the way, the sense data program as an theory of ontology is very different from the sense data "program" of the positivists. Some positivists were realists, others were phenomenalists. In the early going, when Mach was a major player, phenomenalism was preferred because it linked up with verificationism and operationalism in physics. There were actually two historical strands: one dealing with the aftermath of the Special Theory and the other having to do with criteria of meaningfulness and the status of metaphysics - pseudo-problems and all that. "I think this is a mistake, and I would guess that this is a point which Carnap never conceded." First off, I think he should have conceded. In a way he did. The protocol language became a physicalist language. But this threatened the relevance of the two language approach. All we really need is the physical language. The rest is "inventory." I don't think the historians have figured out what was in the back of Reichenbach ingenious mind. As I see it, here is the situation. Reichenbach had seen that in dealing with the alternative views of space available, Riemannian, etc, that what you had was basically a vacuous formalism UNTIL you selected a definition of 'congruence'. Without this no geometry was testable, but more importantly the concept of 'distance' without congruence was meaningless. So you had these "analytical" truths of geometry that had no physical significance whatsover as long as this notion was not clearly defined. Now in the case of analytic sentences understood in the narrow sense as a bunch of tautologies you had much the same situation: sentences that tell us nothing about the world. So how do you get these sentences to be relevant without falling into the synthetic a priori? Answer: you say that what is essential is linking the tautologies to the world by way of the semantics of sentences at the basis of science: predictions being the most obvious. So, if I'm right, tautologies stood to predictions as geometry stood to congruence, to Reichenbach's way of thinking. Again, he was driven to much of this by way of a rejection of synthetic a priori. This is why I said this idea and not analyticity was what was important. Not much hangs on analyticity, in my opinion. Much hangs on the synthetic a priori, especially in physics. On contexts of justification and discovery, my view is this; to dismiss the circumstances of discovery is a "cop out." The history of science is an appropriate object of scientific investigation. So on my view saying: "Oh, I just dreamed this whole thing up in a nightmare" (something like Kekule with the carbon ring) that is just to defer investigation of possibly the most interesting types of events known to science: scientific theorizing itself. This is just more "sweep it under the rug" methodology; the sort that was encouraged by the verificationist theory of meaning. "What is this "real substance" that you are after?" Reality. On Carnap's materialism: As long as the language of science is physicalistic, which for Carnap it was, and as long as you believe that science investigates reality, it is physicalistic, to that extent Carnap was a physicalist. Indeed, if you probe more deeply his 'intensions' may prove to be physical, although I think that you are right to point out the possibility of an 'anamoly' in his thinking. By the way, his "theoretical language" IS a physicalistic language! Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: Baynesr at comcast.net Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Sunday, September 20, 2009 4:01:11 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism On Saturday 19 September 2009 14:49:11 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: [RBJ] >"It would be interesting to know which of Carnap's theories he was >talking about. The Aufbau?" > >In all likelihood, Reichenbach was talking about Carnap's view that the > protocol language consisted of statements about sense-data and that these > sense-data are immediately given and, so, in some sense incorrigible. This > incorrigibility throughout the history of philosophy has been compared to > Descartes's grounding science in the incorrigibility deriving from "I think > therefore I am." The comparison seems pretty weak to me. I would much more readily embrace a theory of perception in which sense data are incorrigible (I think such a theory is tenable, if you ?get the details right) than accept the Cartesian cogito. > Historically, I don't believe there can be any question > about this. About what? > Reichenbach by contrast with the logical positivists averred > that instead of talking about truth we talk about probability. This would > rule out certainty with respect to the protocol language, whence the need > to revise the doctrine. I don't see that it necessarily would. Even if sense data are incorrigible, the inference to the external objects or to future sense data is not logical, and so one might wish to retreat on these to probabilistic statements, though as Hume observed, this doesn't solve the problem that the inference is not sound. ?The inference to probability claims isn't sound either, unless they are just claims about the observed sense data rather than claims about external objects or future sense data. Whether or not you prefer probability statements for conclusions you do not have to treat sense data as probabilistic, and I can't see the merit in doing so. >Interestingly, Reichenbach notes that it was the issue of probability that > distanced the Berlin logical positivists from the Viennese logical > positivists. The Berlin people thought that *prediction* could not be > addressed within the framework of a logic that reduced to tautologies. I think this is a mistake, and I would guess that this is a point which Carnap never conceded. > What > Reichenbach did not appreciate, in my opinion, was that not only are > statements of the future at issue, but so are statements about the past; > and once you attempt to deal philosophically with the study of history you > are no longer in the realm of strict causation. There are symptoms of that? > which the positivists glided over. But even if you were "in the realm of strict causation", causal inference is not logical inference. >One symptom is that contexts of discovery and contexts of justification were > sharply distinguihed. Sounds like a good idea to me! > The former became a purely psychological matter. > Discoveries could not in principle be predicted and might be arrived at in > dreams etc. Which surely is in fact the case? > But I think this is symptomatic of a weakness in positivism as > providing us with a world view. What is the weakness? > When we construct a theory we give reasons for making certain moves. Which presumably belong to the context of justification? > This is particularly evident in "miniature" when > an investigator constructs a theory as to how a crime occurred. He gives > reason for why a person MIGHT have done such and such. Coming up with a > prediction of the investrigator's inferences does not fall within the > purview of physical science, whence the need for the positivists to > jettison the signficance of the context of discovery. Herein lies the real > substance of what I am after; it cannot be artlessly dismissed without > great loss. I'm afraid I don't understand the point here. I don't understand what you mean when you say that positivists "jettisoned" the significance of the context of discovery, possibly because I don't know what you think its significance is. What is this "real substance" that you are after? >According to Reichenbach, Carnap accepted the criticisms of the protocol > language and made it a subdomain of the physical language; "logical > positivism" became "logical materialism," just another variant of an old > idea. I would not myself think Carnap a materialist. Even if his physicalistic language was purely materialistic, it was for him just one way of talking among many. He also endorsed a "theoretical" language, and had a well articulated position admitting talk about abstract entities. To the question of whether Carnap's mature philosophy should be called positivism I have given some thought, since I have taken up the term in my own philosophy even though my own views are on their face even less positivistic than Carnap. It is a topic I intend to address in some detail, and have started a web page at: http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/x026.html Which, does not yet say much useful, but perhaps give a hint of direction. I decided to give the name "Liberal Positivism" to what you get be stripping negative dogmas out of the less liberal kind of positivism, and this then provides an account of the positivistic elements in Metaphysical Positivism. However, I have yet to come up with a description of what you have left when you do that, and why it is worth having. > I don't think Carnap was "eager" to do this; he was just being > honest. I think he was pretty eager to get things right, and to fix any problems in his philosophy whoever discovered them. > In their later years, I think both Russell's and Carnap's > philosophies became a wee bit sterile owing to their faith in materialism. Can't speak for Russell here, but I can't see the legitimacy of this criticism of Carnap. >I'm going to defer comment on the synthetic/analytic distinction. I'm not > sure how important it actually is. What is important to philosophy is the > alleged nonexistence of the synthetic a priori. Retaining or rejecting the > synthetic/analytic distinction is not as important as, say, definining > numbers in terms of classes etc. inmy opinion. How can you regard the synthetic/a priori as an important problem without recognising the importance of the analytic/synthetic distinction? Roger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Fri Sep 25 07:43:09 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2009 11:43:09 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Russell's Early View on Meaning Message-ID: <1781722063.4383701253878989322.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> In my book I devote a few pages to the use of the private language argument. Along the way, I became curioius about the origin of the idea that meaning is what an expression has in common with its translation. One finds this idea throughout the literature in semantics. Few state the thesis explicitly but do accept it at least implicitly. Quine is explicit on this in Word and Object (p. 32). However I notice it is, also, explicit in Russell's very early work, circa 1904. I'm wondering if this originates with Russell. I think it does. I don't think it is anywhere in Frege but it has been a long time since I looked at Frege seriously. Does anyone know of an earlier statement of this position? By the way, this position leads Russell to regard meaning as an abstract entity, a position he later abandons; but when he abandoned it later what became of his view of the idea of a meta-language as a result if anything? Regards Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From altkorho at mappi.helsinki.fi Fri Sep 25 08:17:37 2009 From: altkorho at mappi.helsinki.fi (altkorho at mappi.helsinki.fi) Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2009 15:17:37 +0300 Subject: [hist-analytic] Russell's Early View on Meaning In-Reply-To: <1781722063.4383701253878989322.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <1781722063.4383701253878989322.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <20090925151737.11876krxkmu5g3xd@webmail.helsinki.fi> Steve, You can certainly find the idea in Frege. For example, a quick look at Frege's "Logic" of 1897 yielded the following sentence: "the thought must be preserved if we are to speak of a translation at all" (p. 231 in the Frege Reader, edited by M. Beaney). No doubt, you can find quotations where Frege makes the point quite explicitly. In Frege you quite often find the idea that the thought is what gets communicated via language, and no doubt the step from here to the thesis you're interested in is not a very long one. Sorry I cannot give you a list of references, as I am supposed the lecture about the ontological argument on next Monday's metaphysics class. Anssi Lainaus Baynesr at comcast.net: > > > In my book I devote a few pages to the use of the private language > argument. Along the way, I became curioius about the origin of the > idea that meaning is what an expression has in common with its > translation. One finds this idea throughout the literature in > semantics. Few state the thesis explicitly but do accept it at least > implicitly. Quine is explicit on this in Word and Object (p. 32). > > > > However I notice it is, also, explicit in Russell's very early work, > circa 1904. I'm wondering if this originates with Russell. I think > it does. I don't think it is anywhere in Frege but it has been a > long time since I looked at Frege seriously. Does anyone know of an > earlier statement of this position? By the way, this position leads > Russell to regard meaning as an abstract entity, a position he later > abandons; but when he abandoned it later what became of his view of > the idea of a meta-language as a result if anything? > > > > Regards > > > > Steve > From Baynesr at comcast.net Fri Sep 25 09:21:30 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2009 13:21:30 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Russell's Early View on Meaning In-Reply-To: <20090925151737.11876krxkmu5g3xd@webmail.helsinki.fi> Message-ID: <99992902.4401071253884890522.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Anssi, Thanks! This helps a great deal. A thought just occurred to me: what, then does an abbreviation have in common with what it abbreviates? In the translation case we might consider that we are moving from one language to another; definitions occurring, say, in th metalanguage, but in the case of abbreviation we have something within a given language. As I recall in PM Russel regards definite descriptions as abbreviations. Again, thanks for this. Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: altkorho at mappi.helsinki.fi To: Baynesr at comcast.net Cc: "hist-analytic" Sent: Friday, September 25, 2009 8:17:37 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Russell's Early View on Meaning Steve, You can certainly find the idea in Frege. For example, a quick look at ? Frege's "Logic" of 1897 yielded the following sentence: "the thought ? must be preserved if we are to speak of a translation at all" (p. 231 ? in the Frege Reader, edited by M. Beaney). No doubt, you can find ? quotations where Frege makes the point quite explicitly. In Frege you ? quite often find the idea that the thought is what gets communicated ? via language, and no doubt the step from here to the thesis you're ? interested in is not a very long one. Sorry I cannot give you a list ? of references, as I am supposed the lecture about the ontological ? argument on next Monday's metaphysics class. Anssi Lainaus Baynesr at comcast.net: > > > In my book I devote a few pages to the use of the private language ? > argument. Along the way, I became curioius about the origin of the ? > idea that meaning is what an expression has in common with its ? > translation. One finds this idea throughout the literature in ? > semantics. Few state the thesis explicitly but do accept it at least ? > implicitly. Quine is explicit on this in Word and Object (p. 32). > > > > However I notice it is, also, explicit in Russell's very early work, ? > circa 1904. I'm wondering if this originates with Russell. I think ? > it does. I don't think it is anywhere in Frege but it has been a ? > long time since I looked at Frege seriously. Does anyone know of an ? > earlier statement of this position? By the way, this position leads ? > Russell to regard meaning as an abstract entity, a position he later ? > abandons; but when he abandoned it later what became of his view of ? > the idea of a meta-language as a result if anything? > > > > Regards > > > > Steve > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Fri Sep 25 16:02:44 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2009 21:02:44 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism In-Reply-To: <1224881399.2877101253539935410.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <1224881399.2877101253539935410.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <200909252102.44521.rbj@rbjones.com> My last message was written in too great a haste so there are some points of retraction here. On Monday 21 September 2009 14:32:15 you wrote: >The connection between Descartes and the early protocol language advocates > was certainty. In each case, you were dealing with a contingent fact that > was known with certainty: that I exist is a contingent fact and, yet, I > know this with greater certainty than I know the truth of the > multiplication tables; similarly, 'Red, here, now' is a contingent fact I > know with certainty. That was the reasoning, anyway. The comparison is > quite strong, actually. I've never been completely convinced that the > Cogito is a bad argument. Actually, I don't have a problem with the cogito. It is as you suggest, a sound argument from a contingent premise, (except perhaps for Leibniz, who would regard the premise as necessary but the conclusion contingent). We might possibly disagree about whether it is a priori. The premise is pretty close to indubitable for the "I" involved, but not for anyone else. > In fact, it is a better argument in some ways > than the idea that we have certainty with respect to knowledgeo of our > sense data. So I'm more inclined to go with Descartes. Is there something > specific about Descartes argument that you think is wrong. The cogito is OK. Please disregard my objection. Also, I am not now inclined to say that we have knowledge of sense data, I think we just have the sense data. In the kind of theory of perception which I might be inclined to support, sense data are just that, data, rather than propositions. They are evidence on which our "inferences" about the external world are based, and they are incorrigible simply because they are what they are, and are not actually propositions. As soon as you attempt to describe the sense data you will introduce the possibility of error, but this is not a part of the process of perception, so this kind of error is arguably epistemically irrelevant. I think this means that I am disinclined to say that sense data are corrigible, but also that it is not quite right to say that they are incorrigible either. They are what they are. (this is like the skeptics "appearances appear") >I'm unclear on what your point is with respect to probability. Looking back, I think I spoke too hastily on this (as well). You didn't say enough about why Reichenbach decided that we should talk about probability rather than truth. I am not sympathetic to that proposal, but don't know enough to go further than that. I am generally not in favour of resort to talk about probability as a remedy for uncertainty, or the various other similar stratagems (such as confirmation theory). > What > motivated Reichenbach, and the Berlin positivists, was the idea that truth > is not a very good concept for science to work with. Nothing is known withe > certainty to be true. What is known is what is probably true. It certainly was my intention to challenge this proposition. If the doubt about certain knowledge of truth is Humean (in which case I think it would be more accurate to say that no contingent proposition can be known demonstratively to be true), then Hume argues correctly that the same can be said about probability claims. In your words, nothing is known with certainty to be probably true. In my explication of Hume, claims about the probability of contingent propositions are not demonstrative either. > The merit is > in the simple fact that science is not a body of propositions known to be > true; it is a body of propositions thought to be probable. If you weaken it to "thought" then you can probably forget the "probable" for I think most people do think that the propositions of science are true. > This will effect > the logic of science. Truth values will be infinite between 0 and 1. There > won't be two truth values. Much of this was supported by the Heisenberg > business. I think this is a bad idea. >By the way, the sense data program as an theory of ontology is very > different from the sense data "program" of the positivists. I don't understand what you mean by "theory of ontology" here. (Or how the sense data program can be one). > Some positivists were realists, others were phenomenalists. And Carnap was neither. > In the early going, > when Mach was a major player, phenomenalism was preferred because it linked > up with verificationism and operationalism in physics. There were actually > two historical strands: one dealing with the aftermath of the Special > Theory and the other having to do with criteria of meaningfulness and the > status of metaphysics - pseudo-problems and all that. >"I think this is a mistake, and I would guess that this is a point >which Carnap never conceded." I think you should have included a bit more context there. That sentence (of mine) was a response to: [SB] >>Interestingly, Reichenbach notes that it was the issue of probability that >> distanced the Berlin logical positivists from the Viennese logical >> positivists. The Berlin people thought that *prediction* could not be >> addressed within the framework of a logic that reduced to tautologies. >First off, I think he should have conceded. In a way he did. The protocol > language became a physicalist language. But this threatened the relevance > of the two language approach. All we really need is the physical language. > The rest is "inventory." I don't really understand what you refer to here as "the two language approach". Is this a reference to his persistent interest in relating the languages of science (in some way) to observation statements? Carnap was a pragmatic pluralist, and this doctrine is articulated in his "principle of tolerance". This meant that he was prepared to accept physics using the language of physicists (or a formalisation of it), and sought to understand the relationship between such languages and observational descriptions. >I don't think the historians have figured out what was in the back of > Reichenbach ingenious mind. As I see it, here is the situation. Reichenbach > had seen that in dealing with the alternative views of space available, > Riemannian, etc, that what you had was basically a vacuous formalism UNTIL > you selected a definition of 'congruence'. Without this no geometry was > testable, but more importantly the concept of 'distance' without congruence > was meaningless. So you had these "analytical" truths of geometry that had > no physical significance whatsover as long as this notion was not clearly > defined. Now in the case of analytic sentences understood in the narrow > sense as a bunch of tautologies you had much the same situation: sentences > that tell us nothing about the world. So how do you get these sentences to > be relevant without falling into the synthetic a priori? Answer: you say > that what is essential is linking the tautologies to the world by way of > the semantics of sentences at the basis of science: predictions being the > most obvious. So, if I'm right, tautologies stood to predictions as > geometry stood to congruence, to Reichenbach's way of thinking. Again, he > was driven to much of this by way of a rejection of synthetic a priori. > This is why I said this idea and not analyticity was what was important. > Not much hangs on analyticity, in my opinion. Much hangs on the synthetic a > priori, especially in physics. That sounds rather different to Carnap's position, as I understand it. I'm afraid it doesn't make a lot of sense to me. I don't see why there is a problem in analytic sentences not telling us anything about the real world (at least in the sense of not excluding any possible world), and I'm not at all clear why you want to link tautologies to the real world or what you mean by that. On the matter of the synthetic a priori being more important than the notion of analyticity I am also a bit baffled. The whole discussion presupposes the concept of analyticity. >On contexts of justification and discovery, my view is this; to dismiss the > circumstances of discovery is a "cop out." I don't think I would advocate dismissing the circumstance of discovery. > The history of science is an > appropriate object of scientific investigation. So on my view saying: "Oh, > I just dreamed this whole thing up in a nightmare" (something like Kekule > with the carbon ring) that is just to defer investigation of possibly the > most interesting types of events known to science: scientific theorizing > itself. This is just more "sweep it under the rug" methodology; the sort > that was encouraged by the verificationist theory of meaning. But surely, this kind of thing really does happen? Though not out of context. A mathematician may come up with a solution to his problem in a dream. What is swept under the rug in admitting this? Tell me also how this connects with the verificationist theory of meaning. (I don't endorse it, but it does seem to me a constructive idea rather than a "sweeping under the rug"). >On Carnap's materialism: As long as the language of science is > physicalistic, which for Carnap it was, and as long as you believe that > science investigates reality, it is physicalistic, to that extent Carnap > was a physicalist. That sounds rather more definite to me than Carnap. Carnap thought that the "theoretical" language was the one closest to the language of science (physics), not the physicalistic language. In any case he admitted all these languages. Someone is surely a materialist only if he asserts that only matter exists, and Carnap did not do that. To call him a physicalist I think you would have to establish that he has some definite preference for physicalistic language, but I have seen no sign of this. > Indeed, if you probe more deeply his 'intensions' may > prove to be physical, although I think that you are right to point out the > possibility of an 'anamoly' in his thinking. By the way, his "theoretical > language" IS a physicalistic language! I don't know what you mean by that, it seems clear that Carnap considered physicalistic and theoretical language distinct, though quite possibly the latter is an extension of the former. I know of these different languages only what he says in his intellectual autobiography, which is very little. Roger From rbj at rbjones.com Fri Sep 25 17:23:34 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2009 22:23:34 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Russell's Early View on Meaning In-Reply-To: <1781722063.4383701253878989322.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <1781722063.4383701253878989322.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <200909252223.34446.rbj@rbjones.com> On Friday 25 September 2009 12:43:09 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: >In my book I devote a few pages to the use of the private language argument. > Along the way, I became curioius about the origin of the idea that meaning > is what an expression has in common with its translation. One finds this > idea throughout the literature in semantics. Few state the thesis > explicitly but do accept it at least implicitly. Quine is explicit on this > in Word and Object (p. 32). > >However I notice it is, also, explicit in Russell's very early work, circa > 1904. I'm wondering if this originates with Russell. I think it does. I > don't think it is anywhere in Frege but it has been a long time since I > looked at Frege seriously. There is an analogy with the notion of cardinal number here, which is a model for a general technique of abstraction used in set theory (though awkward in well-founded set theories). Frege's definition of cardinal number, also adopted by Russell, is an equivalence class under equipollence. i.e. a class of sets all of which are related by one-one correspondences. Following this pattern it is possible to define a meaning as an equivalence class of synonymous expressions. I suppose this does go one step further, representing a common notion by an equivalence class. (I think the first bit came from Cantor, but I don't know whether he identified the cardinal number with the equivalence class, he might have realised that it would be an inconsistent totality.) Generally, if you don't know what kind of thing some characteristic is, but you do know the identity conditions for the characteristic, then you can identify the characteristic with an equivalence class. In mathematics this is fine, because you generally don't care exactly what something is, you just care how it behaves, and you just chose a kind of set over which you can define the operations you need to get the desired mathematical structure. This also points out a weakness in the simple formulation "meaning is what an expression has in common with its translation". If you just take a single translation then the sentence and its translation may have things in common which are not part of the meaning of the sentence. For example, it is possible that some sentence may have a translation which has the same number of words, so we might then imagine incorrectly that the number of words in the sentence is part of its meaning. For something to be part of the meaning it would have to be common to all translations, and that would probably have to include into possible languages as well as actual languages. However, this seems to me to be less profound (or useful) than you might imagine. Its really just an odd way of saying that translation is a mapping between languages which preserves meaning. Neither of these ways of talking about the relationship between meaing and translation really helps a great deal in understanding semantics. > Does anyone know of an earlier statement of this > position? By the way, this position leads Russell to regard meaning as an > abstract entity, a position he later abandons; but when he abandoned it > later what became of his view of the idea of a meta-language as a result if > anything? I'm interested to know when and how he abandoned the idea that meanings are abstract. (or indeed exactly what that means) In "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" he talks of propositions, which I'm guessing he takes to be the meanings of sentences, as complex entities which will include concrete elements, (e.g. the objects named in the proposition). So they are neither purely abstract nor concrete. I would guess in his metaphysics they are logical fictions (logical constructions). I'm not acquainted with "the idea of meta-language" you speak of above. Roger Jones From Baynesr at comcast.net Fri Sep 25 17:40:52 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2009 21:40:52 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Russell's Early View on Meaning In-Reply-To: <200909252223.34446.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <999606934.4590071253914852907.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Yes, I am familiar with most of the points you raise. One question: what do you think is the most significant philosophical consequence of the relation of meaning and translation? On Russell's abandonment of meaning: in the sense that what is preserved in translation are Fregean "senses" it really occurs in full bloom in his 1905 paper "On Denoting," a paper well worthy reading because many seem to forget the lessons, I think, he could teach Fregeans.?Later in the twenties, largely under the influence of J. B. Watson, he is essentially a behaviorist. But philosophically signficant is his move towards empiricism with respect to meaning, jettisoning intensions, as he does. On the other hand, in An. of Mind (p. 179) he speaks of images having "meaning" conferred upon them. I don't think meanings should be thought of as abstract entities. There are semantical "features" associated with words. If "features" are abstract entities in semantics, then so be it, but he issue goes much further than reference. Can't go into all this right now; I've been away from it for? a long time. Regards Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: Baynesr at comcast.net Cc: "hist-analytic" Sent: Friday, September 25, 2009 5:23:34 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Russell's Early View on Meaning On Friday 25 September 2009 12:43:09 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: >In my book I devote a few pages to the use of the private language argument. > Along the way, I became curioius about the origin of the idea that meaning > is what an expression has in common with its translation. One finds this > idea throughout the literature in semantics. Few state the thesis > explicitly but do accept it at least implicitly. Quine is explicit on this > in Word and Object (p. 32). > >However I notice it is, also, explicit in Russell's very early work, circa > 1904. I'm wondering if this originates with Russell. I think it does. I > don't think it is anywhere in Frege but it has been a long time since I > looked at Frege seriously. There is an analogy with the notion of cardinal number here, which is a model for a general technique of abstraction used in set theory (though awkward in well-founded set theories). Frege's definition of cardinal number, also adopted by Russell, is an equivalence class under equipollence. i.e. a class of sets all of which are related by one-one correspondences. Following this pattern it is possible to define a meaning as an equivalence class of synonymous expressions. I suppose this does go one step further, representing a common notion by an equivalence class. (I think the first bit came from Cantor, but I don't know whether he identified the cardinal number with the equivalence class, he might have realised that it would be an inconsistent totality.) Generally, if you don't know what kind of thing some characteristic is, but you do know the identity conditions for the characteristic, then you can identify the characteristic with an equivalence class. In mathematics this is fine, because you generally don't care exactly what something is, you just care how it behaves, and you just chose a kind of set over which you can define the operations you need to get the desired mathematical structure. This also points out a weakness in the simple formulation ?? ? "meaning is what an expression has in common with its translation". If you just take a single translation then the sentence and its translation may have things in common which are not part of the meaning of the sentence. For example, it is possible that some sentence may have a translation which has the same number of words, so we might then imagine incorrectly that the number of words in the sentence is part of its meaning. For something to be part of the meaning it would have to be common to all translations, and that would probably have to include into possible languages as well as actual languages. However, this seems to me to be less profound (or useful) than you might imagine. Its really just an odd way of saying that translation is a mapping between languages which preserves meaning. Neither of these ways of talking about the relationship between meaing and translation really helps a great deal in understanding semantics. > Does anyone know of an earlier statement of this > position? By the way, this position leads Russell to regard meaning as an > abstract entity, a position he later abandons; but when he abandoned it > later what became of his view of the idea of a meta-language as a result if > anything? I'm interested to know when and how he abandoned the idea that meanings are abstract. (or indeed exactly what that means) In "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" he talks of propositions, which I'm guessing he takes to be the meanings of sentences, as complex entities which will include concrete elements, (e.g. the objects named in the proposition). So they are neither purely abstract nor concrete. I would guess in his metaphysics they are logical fictions (logical constructions). I'm not acquainted with "the idea of meta-language" you speak of above. Roger Jones -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Sat Sep 26 11:55:56 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sat, 26 Sep 2009 15:55:56 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism In-Reply-To: <200909252102.44521.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <2093429319.4740251253980556026.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> "As soon as you attempt to describe the sense data you will introduce the possibility of error," So I can be in error in describing them, say thinking the hen sense datum has five instead of its in fact four speckles? How about being in error in believing there is a datum? If you can have one sort of error, why not the existential? "(this is like the skeptics "appearances appear")" Some would hold, following Plato in the Sophist, that there are no appearances because there is no reality; there is just the way we describe our experiences; "reality" need not apply. There are a number of places where you, rightly, point out I haven't said enough; but these posts as you can see are very long. I think you should take a look at some of this stuff, time permitting. "I am generally not in favour of resort to talk about probability as a remedy for uncertainty, or the various other similar stratagems (such as confirmation theory)." Some deny there IS truth, only that there are degrees of likelihood of being true; or something close to this. A cynical comment on my part on Hume: If Hume is right, there are a few conventions having to do with arithemetic or vacuous tautologies at best, and then there is the psychology of belief. There is no real need for philosophy, unless we think of it as a way of describing psychological facts of experience. An overstatement? Just a little, perhaps. > This will effect > the logic of science. Truth values will be infinite between 0 and 1. There > won't be two truth values. Much of this was supported by the Heisenberg > business. I think this is a bad idea. Cmon Roger. First you say I don't say enough and then on an idea that prevails from Reichebach to Zedeh you say its a bad idea. I think it is a pretty darn good one, especially if it allows us to exit the domination of trivial problems raised by the Tarskians. What I mean by a "theory of ontology" is a theory as to how to answer the question "What is there?" in the sense that epistemology answers the question: "How do I know?" (in a broad sense of 'how', including what is knowledge etc In the Aufbau, Carnap is pretty much a phenomenalist. I think you are relying too much on Schilpp, but I may be wrong. By the two language approach, I mean Carnap's reliance on the protocol language on the one hand and the language of science on the other. I can't answer your "I don't understand" questions. I need to know what exactly I say that you don't understand. You quote a long paragraph. I am reluctant to write another one of greater length for fear of not being undestood. I need more specificity. If mathematics is a bunch of tautologies and explanations are of the sort Carnap accepts (the sort of thing Hempel had in mind, i.e. deductive nomological explanations etc) then the question is what is the basis for thinking these empty sentences relate to the world? Reichenbach's answer is that this is owing to their use in making predictions. Otherwise they say nothing of value. I'm not sure what you mean by a possible world. I never been to one. "Someone is surely a materialist only if he asserts that only matter exists," Yes, and a physicalist who believes what is physical is material is a physicalist just the same, and conversely a materialist who believes that matter is physical is a materialist just the same. No problem here. Language has little to do with it. A language containing theoretical terms is "reducible" through operational definition to the physicalist language, so physical language and theoretical language differ only in the descriptive constants being in the one case terms that refer to unobservables. So there is no difference in languages, especially once the protocol language, via Neurath, is reduced to a physical language. I missed a couple of questions. They would require new books to anwer thoroughly and I'm still trying to read the old ones. Regards ? Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: Baynesr at comcast.net, hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Friday, September 25, 2009 4:02:44 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism My last message was written in too great a haste so there are some points of retraction here. On Monday 21 September 2009 14:32:15 you wrote: >The connection between Descartes and the early protocol language advocates > was certainty. In each case, you were dealing with a contingent fact that > was known with certainty: that I exist is a contingent fact and, yet, I > know this with greater certainty than I know the truth of the > multiplication tables; similarly, 'Red, here, now' is a contingent fact I > know with certainty. That was the reasoning, anyway. The comparison is > quite strong, actually. I've never been completely convinced that the > Cogito is a bad argument. Actually, I don't have a problem with the cogito. It is as you suggest, a sound argument from a contingent premise, (except perhaps for Leibniz, who would regard the premise as necessary but the conclusion contingent). We might possibly disagree about whether it is a priori. The premise is pretty close to indubitable for the "I" involved, but not for anyone else. > In fact, it is a better argument in some ways > than the idea that we have certainty with respect to knowledgeo of our > sense data. So I'm more inclined to go with Descartes. Is there something > specific about Descartes argument that you think is wrong. The cogito is OK. ?Please disregard my objection. Also, I am not now inclined to say that we have knowledge of sense data, I think we just have the sense data. In the kind of theory of perception which I might be inclined to support, sense data are just that, data, rather than propositions. They are evidence on which our "inferences" about the external world are based, and they are incorrigible simply because they are what they are, and are not actually propositions. As soon as you attempt to describe the sense data you will introduce the possibility of error, but this is not a part of the process of perception, so this kind of error is arguably epistemically irrelevant. I think this means that I am disinclined to say that sense data are corrigible, but also that it is not quite right to say that they are incorrigible either. ?They are what they are. (this is like the skeptics "appearances appear") >I'm unclear on what your point is with respect to probability. Looking back, I think I spoke too hastily on this (as well). You didn't say enough about why Reichenbach decided that we should talk about probability rather than truth. I am not sympathetic to that proposal, but don't know enough to go further than that. I am generally not in favour of resort to talk about probability as a remedy for uncertainty, or the various other similar stratagems (such as confirmation theory). > What > motivated Reichenbach, and the Berlin positivists, was the idea that truth > is not a very good concept for science to work with. Nothing is known withe > certainty to be true. What is known is what is probably true. It certainly was my intention to challenge this proposition. If the doubt about certain knowledge of truth is Humean (in which case I think it would be more accurate to say that no contingent proposition can be known demonstratively to be true), then Hume argues correctly that the same can be said about probability claims. ?In your words, nothing is known with certainty to be probably true. ?In my explication of Hume, claims about the probability of contingent propositions are not demonstrative either. > The merit is > in the simple fact that science is not a body of propositions known to be > true; it is a body of propositions thought to be probable. If you weaken it to "thought" then you can probably forget the "probable" for I think most people do think that the propositions of science are true. > This will effect > the logic of science. Truth values will be infinite between 0 and 1. There > won't be two truth values. Much of this was supported by the Heisenberg > business. I think this is a bad idea. >By the way, the sense data program as an theory of ontology is very > different from the sense data "program" of the positivists. I don't understand what you mean by "theory of ontology" here. (Or how the sense data program can be one). > Some positivists were realists, others were phenomenalists. And Carnap was neither. > In the early going, > when Mach was a major player, phenomenalism was preferred because it linked > up with verificationism and operationalism in physics. There were actually > two historical strands: one dealing with the aftermath of the Special > Theory and the other having to do with criteria of meaningfulness and the > status of metaphysics - pseudo-problems and all that. >"I think this is a mistake, and I would guess that this is a point >which Carnap never conceded." I think you should have included a bit more context there. That sentence (of mine) was a response to: [SB] >>Interestingly, Reichenbach notes that it was the issue of probability that >> distanced the Berlin logical positivists from the Viennese logical >> positivists. The Berlin people thought that *prediction* could not be >> addressed within the framework of a logic that reduced to tautologies. >First off, I think he should have conceded. In a way he did. The protocol > language became a physicalist language. But this threatened the relevance > of the two language approach. All we really need is the physical language. > The rest is "inventory." I don't really understand what you refer to here as "the two language approach". Is this a reference to his persistent interest in relating the languages of science (in some way) to observation statements? Carnap was a pragmatic pluralist, and this doctrine is articulated in his "principle of tolerance". This meant that he was prepared to accept physics using the language of physicists (or a formalisation of it), and sought to understand the relationship between such languages and observational descriptions. >I don't think the historians have figured out what was in the back of > Reichenbach ingenious mind. As I see it, here is the situation. Reichenbach > had seen that in dealing with the alternative views of space available, > Riemannian, etc, that what you had was basically a vacuous formalism UNTIL > you selected a definition of 'congruence'. Without this no geometry was > testable, but more importantly the concept of 'distance' without congruence > was meaningless. So you had these "analytical" truths of geometry that had > no physical significance whatsover as long as this notion was not clearly > defined. Now in the case of analytic sentences understood in the narrow > sense as a bunch of tautologies you had much the same situation: sentences > that tell us nothing about the world. So how do you get these sentences to > be relevant without falling into the synthetic a priori? Answer: you say > that what is essential is linking the tautologies to the world by way of > the semantics of sentences at the basis of science: predictions being the > most obvious. So, if I'm right, tautologies stood to predictions as > geometry stood to congruence, to Reichenbach's way of thinking. Again, he > was driven to much of this by way of a rejection of synthetic a priori. > This is why I said this idea and not analyticity was what was important. > Not much hangs on analyticity, in my opinion. Much hangs on the synthetic a > priori, especially in physics. That sounds rather different to Carnap's position, as I understand it. I'm afraid it doesn't make a lot of sense to me. I don't see why there is a problem in analytic sentences not telling us anything about the real world (at least in the sense of not excluding any possible world), and I'm not at all clear why you want to link tautologies to the real world or what you mean by that. On the matter of the synthetic a priori being more important than the notion of analyticity I am also a bit baffled. The whole discussion presupposes the concept of analyticity. >On contexts of justification and discovery, my view is this; to dismiss the > circumstances of discovery is a "cop out." I don't think I would advocate dismissing the circumstance of discovery. > The history of science is an > appropriate object of scientific investigation. So on my view saying: "Oh, > I just dreamed this whole thing up in a nightmare" (something like Kekule > with the carbon ring) that is just to defer investigation of possibly the > most interesting types of events known to science: scientific theorizing > itself. This is just more "sweep it under the rug" methodology; the sort > that was encouraged by the verificationist theory of meaning. But surely, this kind of thing really does happen? Though not out of context. A mathematician may come up with a solution to his problem in a dream. What is swept under the rug in admitting this? Tell me also how this connects with the verificationist theory of meaning. ?(I don't endorse it, but it does seem to me a constructive idea rather than a "sweeping under the rug"). >On Carnap's materialism: As long as the language of science is > physicalistic, which for Carnap it was, and as long as you believe that > science investigates reality, it is physicalistic, to that extent Carnap > was a physicalist. That sounds rather more definite to me than Carnap. Carnap thought that the "theoretical" language was the one closest to the language of science (physics), not the physicalistic language. In any case he admitted all these languages. Someone is surely a materialist only if he asserts that only matter exists, and Carnap did not do that. To call him a physicalist I think you would have to establish that he has some definite preference for physicalistic language, but I have seen no sign of this. > Indeed, if you probe more deeply his 'intensions' may > prove to be physical, although I think that you are right to point out the > possibility of an 'anamoly' in his thinking. By the way, his "theoretical > language" IS a physicalistic language! I don't know what you mean by that, it seems clear that Carnap considered physicalistic and theoretical language distinct, though quite possibly the latter is an extension of the former. I know of these different languages only what he says in his intellectual autobiography, which is very little. Roger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Mon Sep 28 11:42:49 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2009 15:42:49 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Aune's Latest in paperback: Discussion Soon Message-ID: <1781019098.5163461254152569184.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Bruce Aune An Empiricist Theory of knowledge is now in paperback! It can be viewed and purchased at: http://www.amazon.com/Empiricist-Theory-Knowledge-Bruce-Aune/dp/1439236003/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1254152073&sr=8-4 This may seem like an ad, but it isn't. I'll be discussing Aune's book very soon. I'm about finished with the first chapter but have to write stuff up. Take note of Aune treatment of David Lewis on knowledge. Don't worry about reading the Lewis article if you haven't already. Bruce's account is much better than Lewis's of Lewis's theory. However there is one thing I would suggest upon first reflection. The way Lewis defines knowledge looks to me to rely heavily on Kripke's notion of an epistemic counterpart. Ask yourself the following question: Can I be said to know p iff all epistemic counterparts of p in which p is false are ruled out. This "ruling out" is the heart of the issue; but let me look a bit more before stating my view. Also, there is much to discuss of a metaphilosophical nature w.r.t 'knows'. More later. Regards Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Sep 28 11:56:49 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2009 11:56:49 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Haas on meaning and translation Message-ID: In a message dated 9/25/2009 5:28:07 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, rbj at rbjones.com writes: it is possible that some sentence may have a translation which has the same number of words, so we might then imagine incorrectly that the number of words in the sentence is part of its meaning. For something to be part of the meaning it would have to be common to all translations, and that would probably have to include into possible languages as well as actual languages. However, this seems to me to be less profound (or useful) than you might imagine. Its really just an odd way of saying that translation is a mapping between languages which preserves meaning. Neither of these ways of talking about the relationship between meaing and translation really helps a great deal in understanding semantics. ----- I don't have the reference to hand, but I recall from browing (even reading, bah) Parkinson, The Theories of Meaning (Warnock, Readers in Philosophy, Oxford) that there is this essay (possibly PAS symposium with at least Haas, from Manchester) on translation and meaning, which I found naive in a Mancunian sort of way. R. B. Jones is right about possibly more than just meaning that two utterances share. Also we should consider what Grice jocularly calls timeless meaning (a category mistake if ever there was one, as if meaning and time would overlap!). It's only with timeless meaning of a TYPE that perhaps Russell was interested in. In meaning of utterer's tokens, surely elements which are not part of what is meant timelessly may and should be kept in translation. I'm speaking loosely --. I recall a conference I gave in Buenos Aires. "I haven't been mugged yet" (Searle was in attendance). My point was that that possibly means, "Buenos Aires is not as not dangerous as you may think it should be): At the congress: How do you like Buenos Aires? Oh, it's fantastic; the architecture is so palladial, the people are friendly in a sort of soft Italian way, and I haven't been mugged yet. Provided there IS an implicature to that (Alchourron, who attended the conference, denied that: Having been exiled in Stockholm for ages, he added, "Then you CAN always get mugged in Stockholm, too"), we would have: "I haven't been mugged yet" ---> "Buenos Aires is potentially dangerous" Cfr. Grice, "He hasn't been to prison yet" A: How is Smith getting on in his new job at the bank? B: Oh, just fine; he likes his colleagues and he hasn't been to prison yet (Grice 1967) (Smith is potentially dishonest, but aren't we all? -- cfr. This glass is breakable as funkily dispositional). Now, suppose we translate "I haven't been mugged" to Japanese. If we FAIL to convey the implicature, then just fine, for it's not part of the meaning. In a serious lecture at Yale I attended with Tim Williamson on philosophy of language, I was amused that he dedicated the whole appointed time to the semantic of pejoratives (what he called 'colouring'). "Bog" is a word I think he used. Cfr. Frege was a Hun. Hun has possibly some derogatory side to it. For one, Germans are NOT Huns. Now if we get that into Japanese as a clean translation of "Frege is a German" without the derogatory side to it, it's translation getting lost with the baby in the tub water, as the Anglo says. People tell me, "You should get offended by Brits calling Argentines argies", but forgive me, I don't! I just see it as an affectionate diminutive (cfr. Brit). Now, the n- word, in USA, is another matter. So, insults, slurs, gossip, politeness issues (cfr. French "Tu" versus "Vous" as conventional implicature) all should get a say in translation (even if it's not part of what is SAID). Which leaves the Lord of Monmouthshire (Russell) as aristocratically naive! Cheers J L Speranza -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sgimbel at gettysburg.edu Mon Sep 28 14:40:01 2009 From: sgimbel at gettysburg.edu (Steven Gimbel) Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2009 14:40:01 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism In-Reply-To: <2093429319.4740251253980556026.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <200909252102.44521.rbj@rbjones.com> <2093429319.4740251253980556026.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <1CB36644AE84DD41AF45F1BF1947BF4AA6B57D@exchacd.ms.gettysburg.edu> ?What motivated Reichenbach, and the Berlin positivists, was the idea that truth is not a very good concept for science to work with. Nothing is known with certainty to be true. What is known is what is probably true.? I think this is partially right, but there?s more to the story ? more in two parts: Part I: While Reichenbach and Carnap are both interested in rational reconstruction of scientific theories, what this reconstruction consists of differs importantly between them. Reichenbach is much more interested in theory change, in theories as part of an historical process, and wanting to show the development in terms of axiomatizations. I think the best way to interpret his first two books is attempts to model epistemological change on change in physical theory. The move from Newtonian to Einsteinian mechanics not only presents us with an opportunity to rethink epistemic foundations, but also provides us with the template through which to understand not only this theory change, but the process in general. Just as Newton?s results are first order approximations of Einstein?s, so too the concepts ought to be seen as ?first order epistemic approximations.? In the place of Taylor series expansions, we put a sort of neo-Kantian analysis that differs from Kant in that the synthetic a priori propositions are constitutive, but not apodictic. We need theory to make sense of the raw manifold of perception, but these theoretical postulates are revisable in light of observations. This is scientific progress ? replacing one sets of axiomatic assertions with another whose empirical basis is more inclusive. When we do revise them, when we have a new theory take over for an old one, we start from the old concepts as our starting point, we cannot rebuild from pure observations in a protocol language. As such, the new theory is still pregnant with the old to some degree. In this way, the process is cumulative and progressive, but not completely revolutionary. We know that the new theory?s axiom set with its basic concepts will also be replaced eventually. This, I believe, was one of Reichenbach?s motivations ? he saw the error of Kant not only as tying his epistemology to Newtonian mechanics which was overthrown, but more generally tying it to any given theory. He wanted to draw out the lessons of the rise of relativity theory without binding his view to the dictates of the theory in the same way. Thus, talk of truth was a throwback to the Kantian apoctic claims ? exactly what did in Kantianism in his view ? and must be avoided. Rather, scientific theories in the move from Newton to Einstein are getting better, and hence we need to speak in terms of degrees, shades. This requires abandoning talk of truth for talk of probabilities. Part II: Here, I?m pulling from the wonderful work of Flavia Padovani, whose scholarship on probability and causality in Reichenbach?s early writings is well worth the time. Reichenbach?s pre-relativity work (especially his dissertation of 1915) focuses on the relationship between probability and physics. He was an engineer before turning philosopher and so he appreciated the pragmatic as much as the theoretical. As such, the advances in statistical mechanics fascinated him. Here the theoretical instrument of statistics turned into the generator of actual physical laws. That?s weird and seemed to indicate something deeper. Independent of statistical mechanics, though, the same lack of absolute determination was at play in anything that required measurement, and all scientific theories begin with measurement. There is therefore a probabilistic element underlying all scientific investigation. How to relate the principles of probability and the principle of causality within an intellectual framework that supports laws of nature became the central question of epistemology for him. As such, the move away from truth to something necessary. If you combine his early interest in the role of probability with his interest in concept change from Einstein?s seminar at Berlin, the rejection of truth talk for probability talk seems quite natural. Well, to some degree? Steve Steve Gimbel Chair, Department of Philosophy Gettysburg College blog: Philosophers' Playground From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of Baynesr at comcast.net Sent: Saturday, September 26, 2009 11:56 AM To: Roger Bishop Jones Cc: hist-analytic Subject: Re: Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism "As soon as you attempt to describe the sense data you will introduce the possibility of error," So I can be in error in describing them, say thinking the hen sense datum has five instead of its in fact four speckles? How about being in error in believing there is a datum? If you can have one sort of error, why not the existential? "(this is like the skeptics "appearances appear")" Some would hold, following Plato in the Sophist, that there are no appearances because there is no reality; there is just the way we describe our experiences; "reality" need not apply. There are a number of places where you, rightly, point out I haven't said enough; but these posts as you can see are very long. I think you should take a look at some of this stuff, time permitting. "I am generally not in favour of resort to talk about probability as a remedy for uncertainty, or the various other similar stratagems (such as confirmation theory)." Some deny there IS truth, only that there are degrees of likelihood of being true; or something close to this. A cynical comment on my part on Hume: If Hume is right, there are a few conventions having to do with arithemetic or vacuous tautologies at best, and then there is the psychology of belief. There is no real need for philosophy, unless we think of it as a way of describing psychological facts of experience. An overstatement? Just a little, perhaps. > This will effect > the logic of science. Truth values will be infinite between 0 and 1. There > won't be two truth values. Much of this was supported by the Heisenberg > business. I think this is a bad idea. Cmon Roger. First you say I don't say enough and then on an idea that prevails from Reichebach to Zedeh you say its a bad idea. I think it is a pretty darn good one, especially if it allows us to exit the domination of trivial problems raised by the Tarskians. What I mean by a "theory of ontology" is a theory as to how to answer the question "What is there?" in the sense that epistemology answers the question: "How do I know?" (in a broad sense of 'how', including what is knowledge etc In the Aufbau, Carnap is pretty much a phenomenalist. I think you are relying too much on Schilpp, but I may be wrong. By the two language approach, I mean Carnap's reliance on the protocol language on the one hand and the language of science on the other. I can't answer your "I don't understand" questions. I need to know what exactly I say that you don't understand. You quote a long paragraph. I am reluctant to write another one of greater length for fear of not being undestood. I need more specificity. If mathematics is a bunch of tautologies and explanations are of the sort Carnap accepts (the sort of thing Hempel had in mind, i.e. deductive nomological explanations etc) then the question is what is the basis for thinking these empty sentences relate to the world? Reichenbach's answer is that this is owing to their use in making predictions. Otherwise they say nothing of value. I'm not sure what you mean by a possible world. I never been to one. "Someone is surely a materialist only if he asserts that only matter exists," Yes, and a physicalist who believes what is physical is material is a physicalist just the same, and conversely a materialist who believes that matter is physical is a materialist just the same. No problem here. Language has little to do with it. A language containing theoretical terms is "reducible" through operational definition to the physicalist language, so physical language and theoretical language differ only in the descriptive constants being in the one case terms that refer to unobservables. So there is no difference in languages, especially once the protocol language, via Neurath, is reduced to a physical language. I missed a couple of questions. They would require new books to anwer thoroughly and I'm still trying to read the old ones. Regards ? Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: Baynesr at comcast.net, hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Friday, September 25, 2009 4:02:44 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism My last message was written in too great a haste so there are some points of retraction here. On Monday 21 September 2009 14:32:15 you wrote: >The connection between Descartes and the early protocol language advocates > was certainty. In each case, you were dealing with a contingent fact that > was known with certainty: that I exist is a contingent fact and, yet, I > know this with greater certainty than I know the truth of the > multiplication tables; similarly, 'Red, here, now' is a contingent fact I > know with certainty. That was the reasoning, anyway. The comparison is > quite strong, actually. I've never been completely convinced that the > Cogito is a bad argument. Actually, I don't have a problem with the cogito. It is as you suggest, a sound argument from a contingent premise, (except perhaps for Leibniz, who would regard the premise as necessary but the conclusion contingent). We might possibly disagree about whether it is a priori. The premise is pretty close to indubitable for the "I" involved, but not for anyone else. > In fact, it is a better argument in some ways > than the idea that we have certainty with respect to knowledgeo of our > sense data. So I'm more inclined to go with Descartes. Is there something > specific about Descartes argument that you think is wrong. The cogito is OK. Please disregard my objection. Also, I am not now inclined to say that we have knowledge of sense data, I think we just have the sense data. In the kind of theory of perception which I might be inclined to support, sense data are just that, data, rather than propositions. They are evidence on which our "inferences" about the external world are based, and they are incorrigible simply because they are what they are, and are not actually propositions. As soon as you attempt to describe the sense data you will introduce the possibility of error, but this is not a part of the process of perception, so this kind of error is arguably epistemically irrelevant. I think this means that I am disinclined to say that sense data are corrigible, but also that it is not quite right to say that they are incorrigible either. They are what they are. (this is like the skeptics "appearances appear") >I'm unclear on what your point is with respect to probability. Looking back, I think I spoke too hastily on this (as well). You didn't say enough about why Reichenbach decided that we should talk about probability rather than truth. I am not sympathetic to that proposal, but don't know enough to go further than that. I am generally not in favour of resort to talk about probability as a remedy for uncertainty, or the various other similar stratagems (such as confirmation theory). > What > motivated Reichenbach, and the Berlin positivists, was the idea that truth > is not a very good concept for science to work with. Nothing is known withe > certainty to be true. What is known is what is probably true. It certainly was my intention to challenge this proposition. If the doubt about certain knowledge of truth is Humean (in which case I think it would be more accurate to say that no contingent proposition can be known demonstratively to be true), then Hume argues correctly that the same can be said about probability claims. In your words, nothing is known with certainty to be probably true. In my explication of Hume, claims about the probability of contingent propositions are not demonstrative either. > The merit is > in the simple fact that science is not a body of propositions known to be > true; it is a body of propositions thought to be probable. If you weaken it to "thought" then you can probably forget the "probable" for I think most people do think that the propositions of science are true. > This will effect > the logic of science. Truth values will be infinite between 0 and 1. There > won't be two truth values. Much of this was supported by the Heisenberg > business. I think this is a bad idea. >By the way, the sense data program as an theory of ontology is very > different from the sense data "program" of the positivists. I don't understand what you mean by "theory of ontology" here. (Or how the sense data program can be one). > Some positivists were realists, others were phenomenalists. And Carnap was neither. > In the early going, > when Mach was a major player, phenomenalism was preferred because it linked > up with verificationism and operationalism in physics. There were actually > two historical strands: one dealing with the aftermath of the Special > Theory and the other having to do with criteria of meaningfulness and the > status of metaphysics - pseudo-problems and all that. >"I think this is a mistake, and I would guess that this is a point >which Carnap never conceded." I think you should have included a bit more context there. That sentence (of mine) was a response to: [SB] >>Interestingly, Reichenbach notes that it was the issue of probability that >> distanced the Berlin logical positivists from the Viennese logical >> positivists. The Berlin people thought that *prediction* could not be >> addressed within the framework of a logic that reduced to tautologies. >First off, I think he should have conceded. In a way he did. The protocol > language became a physicalist language. But this threatened the relevance > of the two language approach. All we really need is the physical language. > The rest is "inventory." I don't really understand what you refer to here as "the two language approach". Is this a reference to his persistent interest in relating the languages of science (in some way) to observation statements? Carnap was a pragmatic pluralist, and this doctrine is articulated in his "principle of tolerance". This meant that he was prepared to accept physics using the language of physicists (or a formalisation of it), and sought to understand the relationship between such languages and observational descriptions. >I don't think the historians have figured out what was in the back of > Reichenbach ingenious mind. As I see it, here is the situation. Reichenbach > had seen that in dealing with the alternative views of space available, > Riemannian, etc, that what you had was basically a vacuous formalism UNTIL > you selected a definition of 'congruence'. Without this no geometry was > testable, but more importantly the concept of 'distance' without congruence > was meaningless. So you had these "analytical" truths of geometry that had > no physical significance whatsover as long as this notion was not clearly > defined. Now in the case of analytic sentences understood in the narrow > sense as a bunch of tautologies you had much the same situation: sentences > that tell us nothing about the world. So how do you get these sentences to > be relevant without falling into the synthetic a priori? Answer: you say > that what is essential is linking the tautologies to the world by way of > the semantics of sentences at the basis of science: predictions being the > most obvious. So, if I'm right, tautologies stood to predictions as > geometry stood to congruence, to Reichenbach's way of thinking. Again, he > was driven to much of this by way of a rejection of synthetic a priori. > This is why I said this idea and not analyticity was what was important. > Not much hangs on analyticity, in my opinion. Much hangs on the synthetic a > priori, especially in physics. That sounds rather different to Carnap's position, as I understand it. I'm afraid it doesn't make a lot of sense to me. I don't see why there is a problem in analytic sentences not telling us anything about the real world (at least in the sense of not excluding any possible world), and I'm not at all clear why you want to link tautologies to the real world or what you mean by that. On the matter of the synthetic a priori being more important than the notion of analyticity I am also a bit baffled. The whole discussion presupposes the concept of analyticity. >On contexts of justification and discovery, my view is this; to dismiss the > circumstances of discovery is a "cop out." I don't think I would advocate dismissing the circumstance of discovery. > The history of science is an > appropriate object of scientific investigation. So on my view saying: "Oh, > I just dreamed this whole thing up in a nightmare" (something like Kekule > with the carbon ring) that is just to defer investigation of possibly the > most interesting types of events known to science: scientific theorizing > itself. This is just more "sweep it under the rug" methodology; the sort > that was encouraged by the verificationist theory of meaning. But surely, this kind of thing really does happen? Though not out of context. A mathematician may come up with a solution to his problem in a dream. What is swept under the rug in admitting this? Tell me also how this connects with the verificationist theory of meaning. (I don't endorse it, but it does seem to me a constructive idea rather than a "sweeping under the rug"). >On Carnap's materialism: As long as the language of science is > physicalistic, which for Carnap it was, and as long as you believe that > science investigates reality, it is physicalistic, to that extent Carnap > was a physicalist. That sounds rather more definite to me than Carnap. Carnap thought that the "theoretical" language was the one closest to the language of science (physics), not the physicalistic language. In any case he admitted all these languages. Someone is surely a materialist only if he asserts that only matter exists, and Carnap did not do that. To call him a physicalist I think you would have to establish that he has some definite preference for physicalistic language, but I have seen no sign of this. > Indeed, if you probe more deeply his 'intensions' may > prove to be physical, although I think that you are right to point out the > possibility of an 'anamoly' in his thinking. By the way, his "theoretical > language" IS a physicalistic language! I don't know what you mean by that, it seems clear that Carnap considered physicalistic and theoretical language distinct, though quite possibly the latter is an extension of the former. I know of these different languages only what he says in his intellectual autobiography, which is very little. Roger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Mon Sep 28 20:57:11 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2009 00:57:11 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism In-Reply-To: <1CB36644AE84DD41AF45F1BF1947BF4AA6B57D@exchacd.ms.gettysburg.edu> Message-ID: <899252715.5402791254185831749.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Steve, Thanks for these very interesting remarks. It's nice to hear a new?voice.?Allow me just a few brief comments of a general or exegetical nature. Let's start with Part 1. You say, "While Reichenbach and Carnap are both interested in rational reconstruction of scientific theories, what this reconstruction consists of differs importantly between them. Reichenbach is much more interested in theory change," I don't see much textual evidence for Reichenbach having an interest in theory change, as such,?except for considering the epistemological implications of moving from a Kantian to an Einsteinian view of space-time. Theory change, since Kuhn, has been quite the rage, but in Reichenbach's case I don't see it. I do, however, restrict myself to The Philosophy of Space and Time and The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge, and I think it's pretty clear that there is no discussion of this in his Experience and Prediction. You might be able to argue that there was an implicit historical agenda here, but that would require more evidence than has been forthcoming. So I'd have to see a couple of passages, preferably from one or more of these works to be convinced. Also, where do you see him make an effort to "show the development in terms of axiomatics," to take one example. On another matter, you remark, "analysis that differs from Kant in that the synthetic a priori propositions are constitutive, but not apodictic." Now I can find a lot of almost vicious comments on the synthetic apriori in his works, not to mention his letters to Russell housed at McMaster, so I have trouble figuring out how he might be regarded as offering synthetic a priori as "constitutive, but not apodictic." Now I think I understand why the "constitutive, but not apodictic" but in what way would he consider this "synthetic a priori "? Again, I've have to see some textual basis. I'm not that strongly opposed but it cuts against the grain of much of what I believe?he has said etc. Part II I don't disagree with much here. For example, I think talk of truth as a throwback to Kant can be understood the way you have it. It requires a bit of finesse but I think it can be done as you say. Your remarks relating to Flavia Padovani are very interesting and well worth pursuing; give a bit of time to give this a look. Best wishes Steve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Steven Gimbel" To: "hist-analytic" Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 2:40:01 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: RE: Reichenbach, Carnap, Positivism ?What motivated Reichenbach, and the Berlin positivists, was the idea that truth is not a very good concept for science to work with. Nothing is known with certainty to be true. What is known is what is probably true.? I think this is partially right, but there?s more to the story ? more in two parts: Part I: While Reichenbach and Carnap are both interested in rational reconstruction of scientific theories, what this reconstruction consists of differs importantly between them.? Reichenbach is much more interested in theory change, in theories as part of an historical process, and wanting to show the development in terms of axiomatizations. I think the best way to interpret his first two books is attempts to model epistemological change on change in physical theory.? The move from Newtonian to Einsteinian mechanics not only presents us with an opportunity to rethink epistemic foundations, but also provides us with the template through which to understand not only this theory change, but the process in general.? Just as Newton?s results are first order approximations of Einstein?s, so too the concepts ought to be seen as ?first order epistemic approximations.?? In the place of Taylor series expansions, we put a sort of neo-Kantian analysis that differs from Kant in that the synthetic a priori propositions are constitutive, but not apodictic.? We need theory to make sense of the raw manifold of perception, but these theoretical postulates are revisable in light of observations. This is scientific progress ? replacing one sets of axiomatic assertions with another whose empirical basis is more inclusive. When we do revise them, when we have a new theory take over for an old one, we start from the old concepts as our starting point, we cannot rebuild from pure observations in a protocol language.? As such, the new theory is still pregnant with the old to some degree.? In this way, the process is cumulative and progressive, but not completely revolutionary.? We know that the new theory?s axiom set with its basic concepts will also be replaced eventually. This, I believe, was one of Reichenbach?s motivations ? he saw the error of Kant not only as tying his epistemology to Newtonian mechanics which was overthrown, but more generally tying it to any given theory.? He wanted to draw out the lessons of the rise of relativity theory without binding his view to the dictates of the theory in the same way.? Thus, talk of truth was a throwback to the Kantian apoctic claims ? exactly what did in Kantianism in his view ? and must be avoided.? Rather, scientific theories in the move from Newton to Einstein are getting better, and hence we need to speak in terms of degrees, shades.? This requires abandoning talk of truth for talk of probabilities. Part II: Here, I?m pulling from the wonderful work of Flavia Padovani, whose scholarship on probability and causality in Reichenbach?s early writings is well worth the time.? Reichenbach?s pre-relativity work (especially his dissertation of 1915) focuses on the relationship between probability and physics.? He was an engineer before turning philosopher and so he appreciated the pragmatic as much as the theoretical.? As such, the advances in statistical mechanics fascinated him.? Here the theoretical instrument of statistics turned into the generator of actual physical laws.? That?s weird and seemed to indicate something deeper.? Independent of statistical mechanics, though, the same lack of absolute determination was at play in anything that required measurement, and all scientific theories begin with measurement.? There is therefore a probabilistic element underlying all scientific investigation.? How to relate the principles of probability and the principle of causality within an intellectual framework that supports laws of nature became the central question of epistemology for him.? As such, the move away from truth to something necessary. If you combine his early interest in the role of probability with his interest in concept change from Einstein?s seminar at Berlin, the rejection of truth talk for probability talk seems quite natural.? Well, to some degree? Steve Steve Gimbel Chair, Department of Philosophy Gettysburg College blog: Philosophers' Playground From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of Baynesr at comcast.net -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Tue Sep 29 16:25:33 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2009 20:25:33 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Reichenbach and Synthetic A Priori Message-ID: <690126102.218141254255933150.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I just want to clarify a question I raised. In an earlier post I alluded to what I take to be the fact that Reichenbach's understanding of the place of prediction and the place of congruence serve the purpose that Kant had in mind in requiring synthetic a priori principles in science, but my skepticism was in the suggestion that one can have synthetic a priori propositions which are constructive but not apodictic. This is, yet, another instance, where if I'm right, text is?important. So, e.g., we have Reichenbach saying: "...we must characterize the epistemological position of the principles of coordination. They are equivalent to Kant's synthetic a priori judgments." (The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge, U of California, 1965, p. 47. Note that it is the principles of coordination which are equivalent; their "position" epistemologically, as well, perhaps. This is what I was suggesting with the remarks on congruence and predication. I did not mean that "coordination" (congruence, prediction etc) were, themselves, synthetic a priori. If there is any disagreement here it is how we are to view Reichenbach. I regard him as logical empiricist of a very orthodox sort; original but orthodox in many ways, at least; whereas the alternative view is to see him as a theorizing about the history of science, after the fashion of Kuhn and those related to the historical approach. This can be read in, assuming a struggle, I suppose; but even if you can eek out a view of scientific progress it is minimal. Clearly, he was interested in the development of science but understanding this process is nothing about which I believe he had much interest as an independent pusuit or primary objective. Regards STeve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: