From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Wed Jan 28 05:42:00 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 10:42:00 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Roger's Questions about Anayticity In-Reply-To: <049D8078280244F6989FB5D27022B460@DFLVQC1J> References: <666442.79779.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <200901251532.01066.rbj@rbjones.com> <602ACAACD69245BE9E04F7D93E25C993@DFLVQC1J> <200901271551.27208.rbj@rbjones.com> <049D8078280244F6989FB5D27022B460@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <2DA250B6CC3346FB908EEF58640CAA27@DFLVQC1J> Hi Roger, I'd like to add three things to my last message. First, I gave as an example of a necessary truth 'Hesperus = Phosphorus.' That, of course, was a mistake: in worlds in which Hesperus does not exist, it is false that Hesperus = Phosphorus. But the mistake is easy to rectify. Just replace 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' with 'Hesperus exists if and only if Hesperus = Phosphorus.' Second, when I said that we should reject the a priori-empirical distinction for Duhemian reasons, I was not endorsing Quine's 'holism,' which I think is nonsense. Duhem ('The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory') showed that we need a large number of theories to derive an empirical prediction, so that, if the prediction is falsified, we have to decide which of these theories we are going to modify or replace; I think (from memory) that he also pointed out that replacement of one of these theories will in its turn typically require rejection or replacement of other parts of our background knowledge. But all of this falls very far short of the untenable claims that ALL our knowledge is involved whenever we test a theory and that consistency with a test report can be achieved by making changes ANYWHERE in our knowledge. In 'Two Dogmas' Quine seems to shift between the reasonable claims that Duhem made and the more extreme claims that I just said are untenable; or, perhaps, he MAKES the more modest claims but SUGGESTS the extreme ones. Third, I can suggest a text to consult about the issue of necessary truth and interpreted versus uninterpreted sentences, namely, Martin Davies, 'Meaning, Quantification, Necessity.' I do not have a copy, but I read it in 1986 and I thought it was excellent. I am only guessing, though, that it will contain a relevant discussion (I cannot check myself, as I do not have access to a library and even second-hand copies of the book sell for an exorbitant price). If you are able to consult the book, I should point out that there is a mistake in it. From memory, the mistake comes quite late. There is a complex formula which appears twice on the same page. The second occurrence is the mistake: a somewhat different formula should be there instead. If you have followed the book to that point, it should be obvious how to amend the printed formula. I brought this to the attention of Martin Davies in 1986: he confirmed the error, which he said was due to the printers. Best wishes, Danny From baynesrb at yahoo.com Wed Jan 28 07:29:56 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 04:29:56 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Hist-Analytic Archive Message-ID: <261153.89893.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> List, A number of times, people have queried me on the possibility of setting up an archive. Until now, there have been problems with this, including my lack of technical skills. But now we are have an archive! Thanks to Roger Bishop Jones we now have our messages archived and placed on a real archive. This way, if people try to steal your ideas there is a record with dates etc. Roger shares my belief that philosophy must extend itself beyond the academic institutions and reach out to a wider community, a community that, when you think about it, has the fate of our field in its hands. The website is at: http://rbjones.com/pipermail/hist-analytic_rbjones.com/ Thanks Roger for this act of generosity and interest. Steve Bayne (List Owner) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Jan 28 09:03:16 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 09:03:16 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] The Annals of Analysis Message-ID: Analytic Analysandum -- Analysans Sorry for the mouthful of philosopher's worst jargonese, but it does sound more 'pro' than "Davies and his ilk". "Analysandum", is that a word? That would suggest a Latin verb, "analysare'! Although not necessarily. We can assume that -andum and -ans are productive conjugational expressions that apply directly to the English verb, 'analyse'. The OED first cites Hodgson for 'analysans' in 1907. The first quote for analysans includes also analysans and is dated 1944 (_Mind_ article). All below. M. K. Davies, and his trend. In a message dated 1/28/2009 7:14:16 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk writes: >Third, I can suggest a text to consult about the issue of necessary truth >and interpreted versus uninterpreted sentences, namely, Martin Davies, >'Meaning, Quantification, Necessity.' ------ It is good of D. Frederick to recall M. K. Davies. I did some research on him, too -- for my PhD on Grice! Anyway, found out this Davies, most people think Australian; but from what I recall, he does his DPhil from Oxford herself, from what I recall. I tended to place Davies, and others (notably Loar, and Peacocke) within the same 'Gricean' category. Their readings shared to me a feature -- which I don't know who was the first to introduce. To me, this feature is best seen as a development out of Grice. If we recall, in 1948 ('Meaning'), Grice does distinguish between what we may call (i) _utterer_ meaning and what, for lack of a better expression, we can call, namely, (ii) _expression_ meaning. This _expression_ meaning is double in that, in Grice's parlance, it may be: "x meaning", i.e. meaning of a _token_ of an expression -- which for _me_ *is* an expression simpliciter, or "X meaning", i.e. meaning of a _type_ of an expression. What I saw in these authors -- we know Loar's thesis advisor at Oxford had been G. J. Warnock, colleague of Grice, and Peacocke had attended Grice's seminars at Berkeley) is the idea of a _population_. I am enough of a libertarian to avoid that word at all costs. For one, I cannot fail to imagine Grice having an immersion foam bubble bath, and 'designing a High Way Code', to use his example (WOW, ch. 6) --. This melts for me any idea of a 'population'. But Loar, Peacocke, and Davies, will speak of a _population_ of speakers, from what I recall. In the case of Loar (both his book and his contribution to the Truth and Meaning OUP ed. by Evans/McDowell) it is understandable that he wants to reach to the stage of specifying the meaning of a _special_ type of 'expression': the 'sentence'. Indeed, his D.Phil Oxon bears that title, "Sentence meaning". It may be thought that it is at _this_ level of 'sentence meaning' that the analytic/synthetic distinction starts to make sense. These authors then, would seem to follow some 'population-based', and thus _very_ 'synthetic', or contigent, if you wish, account of 'analytic' -- which looks very much like the line that R. B. Jones is essaying now (I failed to read with detail his firsts posts on this thread). The formulae like the one that D. Frederick seem to be pointing out may well have variables for "P" for population. "In a population of speakers P, such that they share Language L, a sentence of type Sigma will be analytic if and only if..." ------- My previous post on Grice's "Underdogma" contained what I may view as some historical development in my thinking about the history of analytic philosophy -- and I extend here my congratulations to both Bayne and Jones for allowing this forum to _exist_ and _continue_ --. In my earlier paper I made a reference to, I was commenting on J. F. Bennett's explanation. In his "Linguistic Behaviour" -- and my paper bears the subtitle to the effect, "the motivation of Grice", or something -- Bennett guesses what the motivation for Grice's intention-based analysis of meaning may have been. He considers that it is possibly no coincidence that Grice's Meaning appeared in print in 1957, one year after Grice/Strawson's defense of the analytic/synthetic distinction (1956) in reply to Quine's attack to the 'underdogma'. Bennett infers (but fails to mention that 'Meaning' had been written 9 years before and was only sent to the editors of "Philosophical Review" by Strawson, Grice not knowing) that Grice's motivation (but it turs out this is more like _Strawson's_ motivation, then) was to escape the 'intensional' circle. If there is a way to explain 'meaning' in non-semantic terms (belief, those were the days), then it's in terms of "...means..." that we can explain away (in a legitimate way) what "to be true in virtue of its meaning..." may mean. As it happens, I now see Grice's "Meaning" as being more on the 'semiotic' line of Peirce, and his "Defense of a dogma" as a mere exercise in paradigm-case-argument (alla Urmson). In my paper I brought Grice's "Reply to Richards" and specific comments on his 'valedictory' view, as it were, on the legitimacy of the analytic-synthetic distinction. It showed a pragmatist-bent Grice not really concerned as to whether a system has a necessary need to incorporate the distinction or not. For good measure, in my paper I did mention that this was a "pragmatist" (rather than 'pragmatic') view of analyticity and quoted D. E. Cooper on "Pragmatics and Pragmatism" to back my rather obtuse views up! Now for the history of analytic philosophy bit. The first cite for 'analysandum', the OED has it, is: 1907 S. H. HODGSON in Proc. Arist. Soc. VII. 117 "But in whichever way we define apperception.. we have by no means surmounted the difficulty of distinguishing, in that universal panorama which is our analysandum, what is due to conation from what is due to perception." Later cites include 1932 Proc. Arist. Soc. XXXIII. 77 "The kind of analysis that is possible..depends upon the kind of combination, or complex, which the analysandum is. 1944 Mind LIII. 73 "He suspects that the statement of an analysis must, in some sense, be about the expressions used for the analysandum and the analysans, as well as about these concepts.: 1956 J. O. URMSON Philos. Analysis iv. 53 "To say ?p is equivalent to q? where p is the analysis and q the analysandum is to utter a tautology if true." [This book above is interesting -- Grice makes use of some of the examples one finds in Urmson, "He took of his trousers and went to bed" as meaning the same as "He went to bed and took of his trousers", Grice, 'Further notes on logic and conversation', and 'Presupposition and Conversational Implicature', not in the WOW reprint)] Finally, 1960 in Concise Encycl. Western Philos. 18/1. "An analysis..is a sort of definition, a kind of equation with the puzzling expression, the analysandum, on the left-hand side and the new expression, sometimes called the analysis, sometimes the analysans, on the right." The cites for 'analysans' are two: the first the 1944 pasted above ("He suspects that the statement of an analysis must, in some sense, be about the expressions used for the analysandum and the analysans, as well as about these concepts") and the second the 1960 from the Encycl. Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1215855013x1201028747/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=De cemailfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Wed Jan 28 12:28:40 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 09:28:40 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Russell and Eddington on Structure Message-ID: <194631.97335.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com> I will be continuing to comment on Aune's _Reason and Action_. There is, presently, an impasse. I can't agree with some of his remarks on "Doing something with the intention..," but I can't find a way around some of them. So I need to think on this for a few days. In the meantime I will introduce a couple of comments on some work of mine, developing, on Russell's metaphysics and philosophy of science. Ever since M. H. A. Newman reviewed Russell's _Analysis of Matter_ there has been uncertainty over the exact source of Russell's proclamation that we can only know structure. ("Mr. Russell's 'Cauasal Theory of Perception'," _Mind_, April 1928) Russell would retract this statement in a letter to Newman (housed at the Russell Archives at McMaster University, Canada). But the mystery as to the source of Russell's views has been unresolved, although there are intimations of it elsewhere, including Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy and, elsewhere. But Russell scholars have failed to examine in any detail an important source drawn upon by Russell. What I will do, over time, is demonstrate the importance of Eddington in the development of Russell's metaphysics and in particular his treatment of causal structures in Human Knowledge Its Scope and Limits. Russell moved away fron logic in his middle/late years but he retained an interest in how to make use of his theory of relations which, as anyone who has read Carnap knows, was exercised considerable influence on the logical positivists' philosophy of science. I believe that the theory of relations interacts in Russell while he was under Eddington's influence. In particular, the application of group theory to physics (Weyl) possessed an allure Russell could not resist. Eddington was a regular "soldier" when it came to advocating this view, and it shows in his 1934 Messenger Lecture. This lecture comes well after the Russell/Newman exchange, but I believe its spirit and content were incorporated into Russell exapanded treatment of structure. When in his correspondence with Newman he rejects his claim (without citation) of the primacy of our knowledge of structure I think he was correcting only the error that comes with saying that ALL we know is structure. After all, knowledge by acquaintance need not be knowledge of structure. His emerging views on structure interface with his departure from his earlier views on neutral monism. But more on this latter. For now consider this interesting quotation from Eddington: "The knowledge we can acquire is knowledge of a structure or pattern contained in actions...But whatever is derived in the actual (highly difficult) study of the atom is knowledge of the same type, i.e., knowledge of structure of a set of unknown operators." ("The Theory of Groups" in _The World of Mathematics_ vol. I V. ed. James Newman. Simon and Schuster, 1956). I want to propose something a bit radical: heretofore, Russell's metaphysics has been pursued by way of his logic and, mainly his logic; but his logic as it relates to, say, proof theory, is not what moves him the most. What moved him were the ideas of people like Veblen, Hausdorff and Eddington. A new look at the way Russell studies is conducted must include a close look at Eddington. This is my intention. Steve Bayne From rbj at rbjones.com Wed Jan 28 12:14:06 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 17:14:06 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Roger's Questions about Anayticity In-Reply-To: <2DA250B6CC3346FB908EEF58640CAA27@DFLVQC1J> References: <666442.79779.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <049D8078280244F6989FB5D27022B460@DFLVQC1J> <2DA250B6CC3346FB908EEF58640CAA27@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <200901281714.06749.rbj@rbjones.com> Danny, Its clear from your last two messages that we are at present debating at the wrong level. You are "with Quine" in most respects, and it looks like you regard Kripke's ideas as beyond dispute. I, on the other hand, am with neither in any important respect. In particular you make clear that you are with Quine in dismissing the analytic/synthetic distinction, and so I can't see much point in our debating my allegation (which was not that attributions of analyticity are synthetic but rather that they are not all analytic). I suggest we abandon this thread and debate the larger issues. Roger From rbj at rbjones.com Wed Jan 28 12:35:07 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 17:35:07 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] The Annals of Analysis In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <200901281735.07964.rbj@rbjones.com> I have some "Historical Notes on Analyticity" (not touched for more than ten years now, certainly not complete, probably not entirely accurate) at: http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/epistem/rbj010.htm Perhaps I will update them since I am at present on this topic, though I'm sure that could be a never ending task. Roger Jones From Jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Jan 28 14:05:18 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 14:05:18 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] The Annals of Analysis Message-ID: Thanks to R. B. Jones for refreshing for us those notes. I recall having read and enjoyed them. Some running comments of a 'constructive' (if not downright analytic) nature: R. B. Jones writes: >This heritage spans over 2000 years and >includes works originally written in many >different languages, including Greek, Latin, >and German. English is really the only language >I know well. Well, for Italians, 'analitico' was anathema. I remember trying to read Italian 'filosofia' as they spell it, and failing: it's all Abbagnano with them. I'm less sure about French 'analytique'. I would think that since Port-Royal (philosophers and linguistics teachers love to roll the 'r's on that one -- it's so Parisian), the French mind has shown some analytic trends. >It may be helpful to distinguish three periods in the use of the word as follows: >Ancient - analysis as a method of proof I loved that. Indeed, if one just goes by "Liddell/Scott" (he of Alice Hargreaves fame), we encounter a few considerations. I believe we should, as a token to Aristotle, basically focus on the Stagirite's use of the neuter plural, abbreviated by scholars (or 'schoolers' as I prefer) "Anal." -- priora and posteriora, of course. Liddell/Scott read: "ta analutika" [are the] principles of analysis, Then there's the Greek sentence fragment: "apaideusia t?n a. Arist.Metaph.1005b4" and a reference to ["analutica"] [being] "[the] title of A.'s treatises [two, to date] on this subject." --- I note that the reference is indeed to Book IV of the Metaphysics, which Perseus allows us to browse. It reads: [1005b][1]. So indeed we do find the sentence fragment: "apaideusian ton analutikon touto drosin" ("Esti de sophia tis kai h? phusik?, all' ou pr?t?. hosa d' encheirousi t?n legont?n tines peri t?s al?theias hon tropon dei apodechesthai, di' apaideusian [4] t?n analutik?n touto dr?sin") Perhaps oddly, W. Ross does not use 'analytic' at all in the translation, which goes, smoothly, for the opening passage: "Natural philosophy is a kind of Wisdom, but not the primary kind. As for the attempts of some of those who discuss how the truth should be received, they are due to lack of training in logic" So, it would seem this is odd, of sorts. The 'attempts' are due to 'lack of training', and it's this "in logic" that Aristotle calls "ton analutikon", i.e. a genitive plural neuter. Hence his idea, one guesses of presenting to the students his brilliant "Analytica" priora and posteriora. (I say students, because when it came to teach the general population, Aristotle preferred the dialogue format, and I see why). R. B. Jones continues one step earlier in the analysis -- which reminds me of A. N. Whitehead's brilliant quip, "All philosophy is footnotes to Plato". >Plato is credited (by Proclus) with the invention >of a method of proof known as analysis. Jones rightly notes: >Since this method is observed in earlier Greek mathematics >it is doubtful that it does originate with Plato. Exactly. Here I found of use Thomas's Loeb "Greek mathematics" volumes. I believe Proclus is indeed the second volume. I would think it is indeed a pre-socratic (i.e. pre-Platonic) thing. I for one would relate it perhaps to the 'reductio ad absurdum' proof of sorts. The problem with the presocratic philosophers is, alas, the lack of 'quote' signs. Thus we read, "Thales wrote refutations". And it's not clear whether he wrote refutations or he wrote a treatise by the name, "Refutations". It becomes more annoying when we read things like "In his refutations, Thales used this method"; where, for lack of proper orthography, that could well mean, "In his treatise entitled, 'refutations', Thales used this method". Etc. I'm pleased that RBJ notes the connection with "reductio ad absurdum" and the asymmetry, as it were, between analysis as a backward proof and 'synthesis' as a forward proof. Jones then uses 'orthogonal': >this ancient distinction between analytic and synthetic proofs >is orthogonal to the more modern distinction between analytic >and synthetic statements. which is a refreshing lexical dose. Oddly, the OED does not recognise between 'lit.' and 'fig.' uses of this thing. For one, the cite below seems otiose to me! "Psychopathology should be viewed in terms of a continuum of difficulties, rather than in terms of discrete, orthogonally unrelated states." Journal of General Psychology, 1970, p. 73 But I tangentially disgress. Arriving at Aristotle, RBJ notes: >Aristotle distinguises analytic and dialectical proof. ------ It may do here to analyse not so much 'analytic' (or as I prefer, the neuter plural -- this escapes complications. For example, my surname, means "Hope" in English, but it's from _vulgar_ Latin, 'sperantia' -- things to be hoped for. Although we don't find the _things_: it's merely neuter plural. What annoys me even is that in iconographical representations, this neuter plural becomes _feminine_: in Spenser's Faerie Queane, for example, Speranza [sic] is represented as a Lady Cute and True with an Anchor in her Lilywhite Hand. 'Proof' sometimes Aristotle uses 'semeion' -- and this is a favourite of mine. A disciple of Umberto Eco has written extensively on the Greek use of 'semeion' (or even 'sema') as proof. And thus 'analytic' signs, if one wishes, are of the sort, I wish to think, like Grice's "The present budget MEANS [i.e. is an analytic proof, almost] that we will have a hard year". RBJ turns to the Moderns: >Leibniz claims that necessary truths >can be established by analysis. By this time, I would assume it's the mathematical sense, as when an engineer student will make me lose my face by saying, "I'm currently attending a class in analysis". Since Leibniz is credited with the 'infinitesimal analysis', this may be the case. Cfr. Cartesius for his brilliant considerations on orthogonal geometrical projections of basic algebra. RBJ rightly notes that Locke does not use 'analytic'. He "talks [instead] Of Trivial Propositions." Indeed. Also 'trifle'? If 'trivial', I am amused. In "Aspects of Reason" Grice speaks of 'trivial' reasoning -- which the OED has as "woman's reason". "p, because p". A trifle, or to use Cartesian, 'orthogono-analytic' (what Hume would possibly have as 'a piece of cake'). We reach "Ariskant": >Kant certainly does use the words ... speaking >Of The Difference between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements. Grice I'm never sure what Kant translation he used. The standard one that Harvard U. P. uses in Kant-in-English. I would assume that the distinction of opposing 'analytic' _versus_ 'synthetic' (never mind Kant's pretentious 'judgement') is due to Bauman. Kant hardly travelled (unless you call 'go to the grocer's' a kind of travel) but apparently Bauman and others taught him -- into the schoolers' jargon. >Analytic philosophy emerged at the beginning of this century from two revolutions in philosophy both of which had their epicentre at the University of >Cambridge. This above R. B. Jones writes just to annoy _me_: an Oxonian of Oxonian sorts! He goes on: "The origin begins with the rejection by [one] young Cambridge philosopher[...] G.E.Moore" "This lead to some of the most influential work by English speaking philosophers in this century, e.g. ... work by Oxford philosophers such as J.L.Austin and G.Ryle." "This trend in contemporary philosophy has been labelled by some "linguistic philosophy" and has provoked acerbic criticism from outsiders (e.g. Gellner), as well as sustained opposition from other philosophical camps." Gellner is indeed an outsider. He was born in Paris, but taught in London. My favourite outsider is Bergmann, though. Grice recalls how sad he felt when Bergmann refused an invitation to the Saturday morning group. It was too early for him and he would rather be seen slept than wasting his busy morning with "some bunch of English futilitarians". ---- But my thesis advisor -- he tr., can you believe it, "How to do things with words" into the vernacular, E. A. Rabossi -- would tremble at the idea of the Moore --> Oxford connection. I would not. Conservatives (like Rabossi) want to see Oxford philosophy as _Oxford_ indeed, and so they quote from J. C. Wilson and other "Aristotelians" as the sort of thing that led to Ryle and Austin. Grice, as we know, does dedicate a few of his early essays (i.e. time) to Moore and in his reprint ("WOW", Way of Words) there are some perhaps dated essays on Moore and 'common sense'. When I reviewed this for a vernacular journal, I noted that the connection can, though, be made in terms of Grice on 'meaning'. He would say, for example, that what _we_ mean by 'cause' is not what the Hegelian _means_ by 'cause'. R. B. Jones then refers to Russell's "theory of descriptions". There is a reference, "in England, A.J.Ayer." This may connect with Ryle. I, being Ayer, would have found it annoying if I'm a post-grad student at Oxford. Go to my tutor for advice, Ryle. And he says, "You go to Vienna". Rude, in fact. Good ole Freddie did go, and that's where he met his anglo-friend, Quine. Apparently, and I can see why, they were the two who could not hold natural conversations with 'the Hun'! In "Part of my life" Ayer recalls how he wrote (typed, actually) his Gollancz book in, say, four weeks? His use of 'analytic' became indeed _crucial_. I especially loved how he dismissed all ethics and aesthetics not as analytic but as 'inspirational' ("Ouch", "Ohh!"). When I was researching into art-theory, I came across a reference to Ayer by, of all people, NY-based conceptual artist Joseph Kosuth. Kosuth wanted to say, against Ayer, that "This is art" _is_ analytic! A footnote reads: >Unfortunately this little sketch of the Russellian side of >analytic philosophy doesn't hang together properly for me, --- a book that clarified things for me was Ayer, "Moore and Russell: the analytic heritage" (Macmillan). That man spent his life explaining Russell. >since I haven't found enough evidence of any systematic method in Russell's philosophy which he or anyone else could tag with this analytic label. Well, I would think that theory of descriptions does a pretty good job. In any case, Russell was Grice's reactionary reply to Strawson. As Strawson was growing tiresome with his _ordinary-language_ thing, Grice was provoked to write things like "Definite descriptions in Russell and in the Vernacular" Basically, this is the idea behind "Presupposition and Conversational Implicature". Grice shows via analysis that Strawson is wrong in embracing truth-value gaps (the term is Quine's) when a simpler square-bracket formalisation does: [(Ex)Kx &] ~Bx i.e. it is common ground that there is a king of France, and what we _state_ is that he is not bald. Grice thought the square-bracket device was a contesting of the 'modernists' against the 'neotraditionalists' like Strawson. And a good thing about his square-bracket device thing, Grice notes, is that it is to be 'discarded' if that's the word ("what the eye no longer sees, the eye no longer grieves for", he writes in his valedictory 'Retrospective Epilogue'). R. B. J. concludes his interesting 'historical' notes: >Unfortunately there really havn't been any philosophers who stuck to analytic pronouncements, so that's not a very plausible explanation of the term, even from the logical side. Well, there's _Analysis_, the celebrated journal still doing the rounds. Must say it bores me. Articles so short and, well, hardly 'humanitarian', as I call them (i.e. not along the Humanities line). Rabossi was another one! He always felt a bit of an outsider in academia, so he _bought_ a house (Calle Bulnes, Buenos Aires) and he founded a Society, of which I belong -- He founded it as: Argentine Society for "Philosophical Analysis"! -- In Buenos Aires, one has to be careful because if you don't use the adj. 'philosophical' it _will_ mean "Freud"! The Argentine Society for Philosophical Analysis (SADAF in the Vernacular) publishes a 'publication' that goes by the name of "Philosophical Analysis" and it's, let's say, less boring than the _Analysis_ Blackwell one. Cheers, J. L. now at the Swimming-Pool Library Villa Speranza, Bordighera **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1215855013x1201028747/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=De cemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Jan 28 15:44:18 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 15:44:18 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] "Moore's my man" Message-ID: Lancaster's View on Analyticity In a message dated 1/28/2009 12:48:14 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, rbj at rbjones.com writes: Quine in dismissing the analytic/synthetic distinction, and so I can't see much point in our debating my allegation (which was not that attributions of analyticity are synthetic but rather that they are not all analytic). ----- What this reminds me, too, is a reference I once came across in G. R. Sampson's book on semantics (not that I loved the book, but found it in _the_ only philosophical bookshop in a city I was staying, and bought it!). Sampson --he was teaching in Lancaster then, I believe) refers to a Master's thesis on 'analyticity'. Elsewhere I have repeated his excellent examples. I believe there were six of them, along the lines: Spring follows Winter. ---- I have used those examples in some of my classes (at the Swimming-Pool Library) to some jocular results. Sampson cites from the author of the dissertation. Apparently, he or she conducted the research very carefully, with observational constraints, etc. I forget what conclusions they reached. But it may relate to R. B. Jones's and D. Frederick's ideas of grasping "the analytic". It's not just "What is analytic to me may not be analytic to you" (or 'Tit for Tat', as I prefer) but that, as rational beings, we are still able to conceptualise: "This _is_ analytic-to-you, I see it; at least today". There is this idea, that 'analytic' means 'dissolvent'. The recently inaugurated president of the U. S. A., in a sentence meaning to be provocative, I hope, during his inauguration speech, said, x, to the effect: "You shall be accountable for what you construct, not for what you destruct." I shuddered to think! I mean, there we are, analytics -- or analytic philosophers -- _always_ dissolving pseudo-problems into Moorean trifles. Not in vain Austin was heard (by Grice) to say, "Some like Witters, but _Moore_'s my man" **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1215855013x1201028747/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=De cemailfooterNO62) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Jan 28 16:38:10 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 16:38:10 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Eddington's Two Tables Message-ID: Eddington, and his outreaching his knowledge of the wavicle. -- Dinner's ready! (Eddington): _Where_? -- and this is _Paul_ Eddington! In a message dated 1/28/2009 12:29:37 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: For now consider this interesting quotation from Eddington: "The knowledge we can acquire is knowledge of a structure or pattern contained in actions...But whatever is derived in the actual (highly difficult) study of the atom is knowledge of the same type, i.e., knowledge of structure of a set of unknown operators." ("The Theory of Groups" in _The World of Mathematics_ vol. I V. ed. James Newman. Simon and Schuster, 1956). I want to propose something a bit radical: heretofore, Russell's metaphysics has been pursued by way of his logic and, mainly his logic; but his logic as it relates to, say, proof theory, is not what moves him the most. What moved him were the ideas of people like Veblen, Hausdorff and Eddington. A new look at the way Russell studies is conducted must include a close look at Eddington. This is my intention. ---- This is _very_ good. I think, and would further generalise: "A new look at the way [insert your favourite philosopher here] studies is conducted must include a close look at Eddington." -- This reminds me of some jocular exchange with Dan Frederick. "You cannot blame Rawls here". He replied, as I recall, "Yes, I can; I blame him for anything". Ditto, mutatis mutandis, Eddington. In one article that I've only seen cited in the 'literature' _once_ -- by Warner in a footnote to his edition of _Aspects of reason_ -- (and this is Grice, "Actions and Events", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1988), Grice does refer to the classical "Eddington's two tables", I think he has it. Let's see if the Eddington quote provided by S. Bayne relates: "The knowledge we can acquire is knowledge of a structure or pattern contained in actions...But whatever is derived in the actual (highly difficult) study of the atom is knowledge of the same type, i.e., knowledge of structure of a set of unknown operators." ("The Theory of Groups" in _The World of Mathematics_ vol. I V. ed. James Newman. Simon and Schuster, 1956). We should check if the date here can be earlier? analysis, running bit by bit: >the knowledge we can acquire is there a supposition here, perhaps, or is he leaving room for some _knowledge_ which we do NOT acquire, because, as Chomsky would have it, we _already_ possess? I for one tremble at the abuse of words like 'acquisition' by professionals in so-called 'language teaching methodology'! (R. B. Jones said, "English I know well" -- and M. Davies has I think discussed this, 'is knowledge of a language', "knowledge" at _all_!) >is knowledge of a structure >or pattern contained in actions ... Considering what follows, what he has in mind is "knowledge of an atom". And the actions, I would assume, are those undertaken by lab physicists in 'isolating' the atom -- Heisenberg's 'observational' vs. 'theoretical' paradoxes?) Eddington continues: >But whatever is derived >in the actual (highly difficult) study of the atom is knowledge >of the same type, --- question: same as _what_? It seems the previous scenario is hardly described to allow us now to compare it to something else. Unless I'm misled by S. B.'s use of "..."! Eddington: >[the same type of knowledge] >i.e., knowledge of structure of a set of >unknown operators." Oh, my God. So it transpires that we know we don't know! I mean, Eddington is reducing 'knowledge' _of a certain type_ to ... er, operations with the _unknown_! And to Platonically erupt it, he has them as "sets"! As I'll not always will have access to the OED, I'll spend some time in it. Searching Eddington I retrieve 113 cites. Let's see if they shed light on these things. As physicians go, he seems to have been, shall we say, lexically creative. Must say my favourites are under 'least', 'man' and his unique 'wavicle'! For 'least' "The law of gravitation, the laws of mechanics, and the laws of the electromagnetic field have all been summed up in a single Principle of Least Action. For the most part this unification was accomplished before the advent of the relativity theory, and it is only the addition of gravitation to the scheme which is novel." For 'man': "We must describe the amount of humanity in it [sc. Great Britain] as 400 million man-years." For 'wavicle': "We can scarcely describe such an entity as a wave or as a particle; perhaps as a compromise we had better call it a ?wavicle.?" The first _use_ rather than mention of this Eddingtonism comes from "The New Scientist", 1976: "To think that a particle or wavicle or whatever, is small for us, therefore it is small for the Universe, is to be biased or homo-centred." (Aug. 26) --- Speaking of wavicles, I'm sure Grice found this of interest as he gave those lectures on "As if" -- Nancy Cartwright has recollected them. Below the complete checklist of Eddington hits. Alas, it includes one on _Paul_ Eddington, and another on one Eddington author of a book on boating (under 'saddle'). Must rush -- sorry couldn't edit. And good night! Cheers, J. L. ---- absolute 1914 Stellar Movements -- affine 1923 Math. Theory of Relativit -- aleph 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation -- angular: Prof. Eddington .. made an estimate of th -- atomicity 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation -- beta 1922 Theory of Relativity 19 T -- cepheid 1927 Stars & Atoms 93 In 1924 -- classical 1928 Nature Physical World ix -- connectivity 1928 Nature Phys. World xii. 2 -- conventionalism the physicist Eddington. -- correspondence 1928 Nat. Physical World ix. 1 -- cosmic 1927 Stars & Atoms 67 This -- curvature 1920 Space Time & Gravit. x. 1 -- doppler 1927 Stars & Atoms 75 Owing to -- drift 1906 Monthly Notices R. Ast eigenvalue 1939 Philos. Phys. Sci. 162 In -- Einstein 1927 Stars & Atoms 52 The Eins -- electric charge 1927 Stars & Atoms 99 The elec 19 electromagnetic, adj. 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation 20 e?tv?s 1920 Space Time & Gravit. vii. 21 equivalence 1918 Rep. Relativity Theory Gr 22 ether 1935 New Pathways in Sci. ii. 23 event 1920 Space Time & Gravit. iii. 24 evolution, n. 1933 Expanding Universe i. 8 P 25 expanding, ppl. a. of Sir Arthur Eddington's presidential address to 26 field, n. 1928 Nature Physical World vii 27 fine structure 1935 New Pathways in Sci. xi. 28 FitzGerald 1920 Space, Time & Gravit. i 29 flat 1922 Theory of Relativity 26 T 30 frame 1928 Nature Physical World iii 31 furnace 1922 Encycl. Brit. XXX. 298 32 galactic, a. 1914 Stellar Movements viii. 1 33 Galilean, a.2 (and n.2) 1918 Rep. Relativity Theory Gr 34 gauge, gage, n. 1920 Space, Time & Gravit. xi. 35 gravitational, a. 1918 Rep. Relativity Theory Gr 36 idempotent, a. and n. truth is that Eddington, in spite of all that he 37 indeterminacy 1928 Nature Physical World x. 38 inertial, a. 1918 Rep. Relativity Theory Gr interstellar, a. 1926 Internal Constitution of 40 interval, n. 1918 Rep. Relativity Theory Gr 41 ionization2 1926 Internal Constitution of least 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation light, n. 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation 44 linkage 1928 Nature Physical World xiv loop, v.1 1922 Theory of Relativity 3 Th main, adj.2 ested by Prof. Eddington), for which the luminosit 47 Malmquist, n. st correction ( Eddington, 1914; Malmquist, 1921) h man 1928 Nature Physical World ix. 49 mappable, adj. 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation 50 mass, n.2 1926 Internal Constitution of mathematical, adj. and n. 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation 52 mesh, n. (and adj.) 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation 53 momentum, n. 1928 Nature Physical World xi. 54 motus peculiaris, n. 1914 Stellar Movements & Struc 55 moving cluster, n. 1914 Stellar Movements & Struc natural, adj. and adv. 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation 57 nebulium, n. 1928 Stars & Atoms 55 A terres Newton 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation 59 non-, prefix 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation 60 non-physical, adj. 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation non-technical, adj. 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation 62 non-uniform 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation 63 nowness 1928 Nature Physical World iii nubilate, adj. seudo-science, Eddington, McTaggart: their measure O 1926 Internal Constit. of Star 66 observational, adj. 1939 Philos. Physical Sci. iii 67 observationally 1930 Rotation of Galaxy 13 The observer, n. 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation 69 one-way, adj. and n. 1928 Nature Physical World 295 open, adj. 1933 Expanding Universe ii. 61 71 optically 1933 Expanding Universe iii. 1 72 orbit, n. 1914 Stellar Movements & Struc pageant, n. and adj. 1929 Nature of Physical World parallax 1914 Stellar Movements & Struc 75 periodically, adv. 1933 Expanding Universe i. 10 -- plummy Paul Eddington .. plays the analyst with 77 point, n.1 1918 Rep. Relativity Theory Gr 78 pointer, n. 1928 Nature Physical World xii 79 polytrope, n. and adj. 1926 Internal Constitution of 80 polytropic, adj. (and n.) 1926 Internal Constitution of 81 populate, v.2 1933 Expanding Universe iii. 1 82 pre-, prefix 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation 83 primordial 1946 A. Eddington Expanding Universe ii. 51 84 projection, n. 1933 Expanding Universe ii. 85 85 proper motion, n. 1929 Nature of Physical World proton 1933 Expanding Universe i. 8 P 87 quantum, n. and adj. 1927 Stars & Atoms 68 The prop 88 R, n. 1933 Expanding Universe iii. 1 89 radial 1933 Expanding Universe i. 9 I 90 radiative, adj. 1916 Monthly Notices Royal 91 radius, n. 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation 92 red shift 1923 Math. Theory Relativity v 93 reinterpret, v. 1920 Space, Time & Gravit. ix. 94 relativist, n. (and a.) 1922 Theory of Relativity 16 T 95 Riemann-Christoffel 1918 Rep. Relativity Theory of 96 Riemannian 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation rigidify, v. 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation 98 road, n. 1918 Rep. Relativity Theory Gr 99 saddle 1943 W. J. Eddington Gloss. Shipbuilding & Out 100 Schwarzschild been known to Eddington, certainly by the early 1 101 sense 1920 Space, Time & Gravit. ii. shadowgraph, n. 1928 Nature of Physical World 103 sight, n.1 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation 104 slithy 1928 Nature of Physical World spinar d the thermal ( Eddington-limited) component. 106 spiral 1914 Stellar Movements & Struc star, n.1 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation 108 test, n.1 1920 Space, Time & Gravitation 109 thingless, adj. 1935 New Pathways in Sci. ii. time, n. 1922 Theory of Relativity 18 I 111 verificationist He [sc. Eddington] is as empirically 'verif 112 wavicle 1928 Nature Physical World x. world, n. 1920 Space, Time & Gravit. ix. **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1215855013x1201028747/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=De cemailfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Wed Jan 28 20:11:53 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 17:11:53 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Two Tables (Sloppy thoughts on Neutral Monism) Message-ID: <936757.61057.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Apologies for the brief reply, but consider one of a number of ways of ?thinking of two tables. Suppose one is phenomenal and mental; the other physical and unknown "in itself." So we might wish to say we have a mental thing and physical thing. But, perhaps, there are not two tables but one thing (thing with a table address) and two addresses ('mental table' and 'physical table'). In this case we might see a connection between neutral monism and Eddington's two tables,? But there is a more profound way of thinking of tables, and much here depends on ?how you speak the language of "individuation." Instead of speaking of particulars which require individuation, we speak of operations. Operations not particulars. Let's go one step further inspired at every step by Eddington (and Russell). Let's suppose that these operations can be argued to serve the purpose that individuals did for Moore and Russell (circa 1899-1914). Ok? Well if we do this then we ask about the properties of these operations when the groups to which they apply are phenomena and material things. If we frame the neutral monist these a different way than it has been formulated in the past, we might want to say that if the operations that select material things and phenomenal things constitute a "mixture" that cannot in principle be separated ?then we have the makings of a formulation of neutral monism in terms of operations. Consider an expression for an operation 'S^x' where 'x' is a variable for a class and 'S' is an operation of selecting a class, x.? We can iterate operations; so we can say 'S^xS^x' stands ?for the result of selecting x's and then from the x's selecting x's. Suppose we take some operation, S^p, and an operation, S^m, then should it turn out that these operations are such that they have the following relation: S^pS^p = S^p and ~(S^pS^m = 0) then I think we shall have it that the aggregate class combining both m and p is such that neither m nor p can be separated from each other. This might be one way of formulating the thesis ?that mental things and physical things cannot be separated in principle.? What makes this any good, assuming the formal details are straight? The advantage is that you needn't speak of ?the nature of individual things which are mental or physical, only groups upon which operations are performed. Now this might not work. But I might remain undaunted. Why? Because there may be a way of individuating by operators (I think Castenada actually suggested this)l but then jettisoning ?the individals. We might then keep operators as tools for ?expressing the properties of groups instead of individuals. Another nice thing. We dispense with talking of the properties of individual, if we do the relation of universal and particulars might be looked at just a bit differently. The asymmetry of subject and predicate if construed ontologically may receive a different ?formulation. Not sure; but if so the issue of universals might differ, for example, between phenomenalist and nonphenomenalist ontologies. Thus nominalism and neutral monism have something of a family tie. Or do they. This is an open question. Steve Bayne --- On Wed, 1/28/09, Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: From: Jlsperanza at aol.com Subject: Eddington's Two Tables To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Date: Wednesday, January 28, 2009, 4:38 PM Eddington, and his outreaching his knowledge of the wavicle. -- Dinner's ready! (Eddington): _Where_? -- and this is _Paul_ Eddington! In a message dated 1/28/2009 12:29:37 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: For now consider this interesting quotation from Eddington: "The knowledge we can acquire is knowledge of a structure or pattern contained in actions...But whatever is derived in the actual (highly difficult) study of the atom is knowledge of the same type, i.e., knowledge of structure of a set of unknown operators." ("The Theory of Groups" in _The World of Mathematics_ vol. I V. ed. James Newman. Simon and Schuster, 1956). I want to propose something a bit radical: heretofore, Russell's metaphysics has been pursued by way of his logic and, mainly his logic; but his logic as it relates to, say, proof theory, is not what moves him the most. What moved him were the ideas of people like Veblen, Hausdorff and Eddington. A new look at the way Russell studies is conducted must include a close look at Eddington. This is my intention. ---- This is _very_ good. I think, and would further generalise: "A new look at the way [insert your favourite philosopher here] studies is conducted must include a close look at Eddington." -- This reminds me of some jocular exchange with Dan Frederick. "You cannot blame Rawls here". He replied, as I recall, "Yes, I can; I blame him for anything". Ditto, mutatis mutandis, Eddington. In one article that I've only seen cited in the 'literature' _once_ -- by Warner in a footnote to his edition of _Aspects of reason_ -- (and this is Grice, "Actions and Events", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1988), Grice does refer to the classical "Eddington's two tables", I think he has it. Let's see if the Eddington quote provided by S. Bayne relates: "The knowledge we can acquire is knowledge of a structure or pattern contained in actions...But whatever is derived in the actual (highly difficult) study of the atom is knowledge of the same type, i.e., knowledge of structure of a set of unknown operators." ("The Theory of Groups" in _The World of Mathematics_ vol. I V. ed. James Newman. Simon and Schuster, 1956). We should check if the date here can be earlier? analysis, running bit by bit: >the knowledge we can acquire is there a supposition here, perhaps, or is he leaving room for some _knowledge_ which we do NOT acquire, because, as Chomsky would have it, we _already_ possess? I for one tremble at the abuse of words like 'acquisition' by professionals in so-called 'language teaching methodology'! (R. B. Jones said, "English I know well" -- and M. Davies has I think discussed this, 'is knowledge of a language', "knowledge" at _all_!) >is knowledge of a structure >or pattern contained in actions ... Considering what follows, what he has in mind is "knowledge of an atom". And the actions, I would assume, are those undertaken by lab physicists in 'isolating' the atom -- Heisenberg's 'observational' vs. 'theoretical' paradoxes?) Eddington continues: >But whatever is derived >in the actual (highly difficult) study of the atom is knowledge >of the same type, --- question: same as _what_? It seems the previous scenario is hardly described to allow us now to compare it to something else. Unless I'm misled by S. B.'s use of "..."! Eddington: >[the same type of knowledge] >i.e., knowledge of structure of a set of >unknown operators." Oh, my God. So it transpires that we know we don't know! I mean, Eddington is reducing 'knowledge' _of a certain type_ to ... er, operations with the _unknown_! And to Platonically erupt it, he has them as "sets"! As I'll not always will have access to the OED, I'll spend some time in it. Searching Eddington I retrieve 113 cites. Let's see if they shed light on these things. As physicians go, he seems to have been, shall we say, lexically creative. Must say my favourites are under 'least', 'man' and his unique 'wavicle'! For 'least' "The law of gravitation, the laws of mechanics, and the laws of the electromagnetic field have all been summed up in a single Principle of Least Action. For the most part this unification was accomplished before the advent of the relativity theory, and it is only the addition of gravitation to the scheme which is novel." For 'man': "We must describe the amount of humanity in it [sc. Great Britain] as 400 million man-years." For 'wavicle': "We can scarcely describe such an entity as a wave or as a particle; perhaps as a compromise we had better call it a ?wavicle.?" The first _use_ rather than mention of this Eddingtonism comes from "The New Scientist", 1976: "To think that a particle or wavicle or whatever, is small for us, therefore it is small for the Universe, is to be biased or homo-centred." (Aug. 26) --- Speaking of wavicles, I'm sure Grice found this of interest as he gave those lectures on "As if" -- Nancy Cartwright has recollected them. Below the complete checklist of Eddington hits. Alas, it includes one on _Paul_ Eddington, and another on one Eddington author of a book on boating (under 'saddle'). Must rush -- sorry couldn't edit. And good night! Cheers, J. L. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Jan 28 21:42:42 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 21:42:42 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Waynflete Message-ID: Or the Vagaries of Metaphysical Philosophy -- and her Detractors; or, The Importance of Being Plumian -- on the Cam Thanks to Steve B. for his thoughts. Will go back to bed soon, but couldn't resist! These Brits are _unique_. Led by S. B.'s comments, did a hasty search, learned that Eddington 'graduated' from Trinity (same as Russell's college) some 10 years after Russell. Etc. And of course there's the overlap. More from Russell's side who kept reviewing Eddington's books -- at least two of them, available from google.books. Apparently, Eddington disagreed, being a Quaker, with Russell's (or pre-Russellian) ideas on 'mind'. Eddington's word is 'spiritual'. Apparently, Susan Stebbing 'destroyed' (but she had an awful sense of humour, apparently) 'Stanley' (as he was called by his mother)'s naive approach to the 'two tables'. Apparently, Eddington did not have much of a sense of humour himself. Or so a socialite in Los Angeles remembers him. (In another google.book -- She recalls how Eddington told her that he would swim on the Cam _every day_, come rain/shine/snow --). He was, also, a conscientious objector, etc. The gist of this note is to remember Plume. Eddington was _for years_, and you have to be Cantab. to enjoy this, I assume, "Plumian Professor of Astronomy AND EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY". He was elected to this post early in 1913. Wiki has an article on each of the two astronomy chairs at Cambridge: one is the 'astronomy AND GEOMETRY' (not Plumian) and the other is this one held by Eddington. One would be curious as to the use of 'experimental philosophy' way back -- when the chair was created. (I'm MORE familiar with the identically mediavelist titles of some of the Oxonian chairs, like the Waynflete Chair of Metaphysical Philosophy -- as opposed to _experimental_? Anyway, the chair was created -- and Eddington, being a traditionalist, would rejoice in this -- in 1704 by one Thomas Plume, with a specific mission (wiki says there was an Eddington mission too no longer valid), viz. "[a] to erect an Observatory and [b] to maintain a studious and learned Professor of Astronomy and Experimental Philosophy." -- and studious and learned Eddington was. On a hasty reading, I first read the second aim above as being 'to maintain a studious and learned astronomy and experimental philosophy", but it is to maintain a professor. Talk of tenure! Anyway, the hits for 'experimental philosophy' in the OED are not 113, but just 8. [To wit, under 1 1608 evince, v. ived Errors in Experimental Philosophy .. shall be evinced b 2 c1449 experimental, a. and n. b. experimental philosophy: (a) the philosophy w 3 1663 materia medica, n. athematics and experimental philosophy. 4 a1398 natural, adj. and adv. ics, medicine, experimental philosophy, or occasionally natu 5 a1393 natural philosophy, n. n, Natural and Experimental Philosophy, the Mathematics, and 6 c1487 physics, n. of physics, or experimental philosophy. 7 a1616 preformed, adj. he progress of experimental philosophy will show you that it 8 1384 promoter, n. ed promoter of experimental philosophy, Dr. Wilkins.] The most interesting one, apparently, under 'philosophy', where the OED provides the following cites for the collocation, 'experimental philosophy': 1651 G. THOMSON (title), A vindication of Lord Bacon, the Auctor of Experimental Philosophy. 1665 GLANVILL Sceps. Sci. 68 All experimental philosophers have been needlessly imployed. 1706 S. CLARKE On the Evidences Pref. Aiij, "Robert Boyle was..diligent and successful in improving experimental philosophy." 1809 Med. Jrnl. XXI. 175 Lectures..at Guy's Hospital..[on] Experimental Philosophy. 1819 Pantologia, Experimental Philosophy is an investigation of the wisdom of God in the works and laws of nature. 1887 J. THOMAS Dict. Biog. I. 421 Boyle..a celebrated chemist and experimental philosopher. 1957 G. RYLE in C. A. Mace Brit. Philos. in Mid-Century 258 A not very ancient Oxford Chair of Physics still retains its old label, the Chair of Experimental Philosophy. 1796 BURKE Let. Noble Ld. Wks. VIII. 55 As speculatists he [the Duke of Bedford] is a glorious subject for their experimental philosophy. Must say my favourite is Ryle's! On a hasty reading of it, I thought he was referring to Cantab. but -- no. I wish I were more familiar with Oxford _physical_ chairs, and I would locate where this "not very ancient Oxford chair" is located. Note that Oxonians, being perhaps 'more of a philosophical talent' than Cantab. men, dropped "Astronomy and..." altogether! (* The ref. to 'philosophical temperament' refers to Russell's characterisation of Eddington: "Like most men of a philosophical temperament, Eddington finds brute facts hateful", or words to that effect). If the Oxford chair, "Professor of Experimental Philosophy", was created in 1865 with the appointment of Clifton (and the decision of Savilian professors) then indeed, philosophically speaking, it's not that _ancient_. Since I suppose we should be more metaphysical, I have titled this post, "Waynflete". And have you noticed that, as things are, we have now two 'implicatures': "He is the holder of the Oxford Chair of Experimental Philosophy" -- uttered today, 2009 +> He's no philosopher, he is a physicist. "He is the holder of the Oxford Chair of Metaphysical Philosophy" -- uttered today, 2009 +> He's not just a metaphysician; he's a (full-blown) philosopher _simpliciter_. Odd, but as Riley would say, _true_! -- Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1215855013x1201028747/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=De cemailfooterNO62) From rbj at rbjones.com Thu Jan 29 04:26:03 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 09:26:03 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] The Annals of Analysis In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <200901290926.04589.rbj@rbjones.com> J.L., On Wednesday 28 January 2009 19:05:18 Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: > RBJ turns to the Moderns: > >Leibniz claims that necessary truths can be established by analysis. > > By this time, I would assume it's the mathematical sense, as when an > engineer student will make me lose my face by saying, "I'm currently > attending a class in analysis". Since Leibniz is credited with the > 'infinitesimal analysis', this may be the case. Cfr. Cartesius for his > brilliant considerations on orthogonal geometrical projections of basic > algebra. I doubt this "analysis" of Leibniz's usage in this case.. This was a big topic for Leibniz because of his ideas on the lingua characteristica and calculus ratiocinator, which are only very remotely connected with his work on the differential and integral calculus. (of course the topics are both about "calculi" and the calculus ratiocinator would have to encompass the other calculi since it was expected to be universal). I think It is fairly clear from his writings that the kind of analysis which Leibniz had in mind here was logical rather than infinitesimal or mathematical. > He goes on: > > "The origin begins with the rejection by [one] young Cambridge > philosopher[...] G.E.Moore" Of course, Dummet disagreed rather radically with this. > "This lead to some of the most influential work by English speaking > philosophers in this century, e.g. ... work by Oxford philosophers such as > J.L.Austin and G.Ryle." I suspect that when I wrote this that I had not even heard of (or least properly registered) Grice, who I would now be inclined to rank higher than Austin or Ryle (Wittgenstein is incomparable). > A footnote reads: > >Unfortunately this little sketch of the Russellian side of > >analytic philosophy doesn't hang together properly for me, > > --- a book that clarified things for me was Ayer, "Moore and Russell: the > analytic heritage" (Macmillan). That man spent his life explaining Russell. > > >since I haven't found enough evidence of any systematic method in > > Russell's > > philosophy which > he or anyone else could tag with this analytic label. This is a curious footnote since in retrospect the paragraph it is attached to does contain a reasonable description of a kind of logical analysis, not however one that Russell actually employed, except perhaps in Principia. Probably my writing of this footnote was connected with my writing a page on "Varieties of Philosophical Analysis" http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/history/his003.htm (now linked to from the footnote) which happened later than year. However, looking at this analysis of analysis I see that there is omitted from it what I now believe to be "the method" which Russell himself thought crucial and passed to Carnap, viz the idea that one should systematically eliminate ontological excess by logical construction. (This I am not impressed by, being motivated primarily by Occam's razor, to which I am a conscientious objector. I think I must be the most radical (or only?) anti-nominalist who denies being a Platonist, though I suppose Carnap was as bad). I don't think I had at that time read Hylton on Russell, from which one *ought* perhaps to, come away with a clear idea of what kind of analysis Russell advocated (though I don't think I did). Roger From Jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Jan 29 08:52:31 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 08:52:31 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] The Annals of Analysis Message-ID: In a message dated 1/29/2009 4:26:08 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, rbj at rbjones.com writes: I doubt this "analysis" of Leibniz's usage in this case.. This was a big topic for Leibniz because of his ideas on the lingua characteristica and calculus ratiocinator, which are only very remotely connected with his work on the differential and integral calculus. (of course the topics are both about "calculi" and the calculus ratiocinator would have to encompass the other calculi since it was expected to be universal). I think It is fairly clear from his writings that the kind of analysis which Leibniz had in mind here was logical rather than infinitesimal or mathematical. ---- I stand corrected. I have read quite a bit on this 'characteristica universalis'. For some reason, I always was interested in its developments in England (rather than Scotland, say) and centred around the "Royal Academy": Wilkins on top. (J. L. Borges was fascinated by this). I was able to read some of the reprints in the so-called "Scolar Press", based in Marston, Yorkshire -- fascimiles of the originals. And, to say the least, I was disappointed. At least the English authors on 'characteristica universalis' were: -- too much into 'phonetics' to my taste. They were interested in how things got pronounced. -- too arbitrary, and scholastic. I mean, hardly 'experimental' philosophy. They would start with very general, 'eschatological' even (in Grice's sense, "Philosophical Eschatology" in his WOW], usually Aristotelian. So, say, the would have a term for 'res cogitans' versus 'res extensa', and so on. Their idea of 'necessity', or 'analytic', perhaps derived from Aristotle's considerations on essence and specific difference. Thus, 'homo' would be 'retranslated' into this characteristica as 'rationalis animal', or something. I think W. C. Kneale develops quite at some length Leibniz's views on the topic (in his "Growth of Logic" lectures at Oxford, later published as "Development of Logic"). The Oxford scene was never too wedded, for better or worse, to Leibniz. I seem to recall that G. H. R. Parkinson (editor of "Meaning" for the Oxford Readings in Philosophy, super-edited by Warnock) has something on Leibniz. More vernacularly, I recall when one of my teachers -- way back down under -- was celebrated (Ezequiel de Olaso, his name) for having made popular Leibniz's philosophical writings to the wider population of ... Buenos Aires! work by Oxford philosophers such as > J.L.Austin and G.Ryle." I suspect that when I wrote this that I had not even heard of (or least properly registered) Grice, who I would now be inclined to rank higher than Austin or Ryle (Wittgenstein is incomparable). ----- Indeed he is. But we should analyse the logic of such statements! In "Prolegomena", Grice uses a similar example, "Heidegger is incomparable". This was possibly a joke, but the result is that Heidegger did make it to the name index of that prestigious publication! As a joke: -- Wittgenstein cannot be compared -- Wittgenstein _has_ been compared, but all comparisons (so far) has been _odious_. etc. ----- Well, I doubt Grice would rank himself (or hisself, as I prefer) than Austin. The man (Grice) _needed_ a sense of tradition. I know because I felt precisely the same in my environs -- and thus _looked_ for Rabossi as my 'mentor'. It's surprising, to some, not to me, that in his "Valedictory" (i.e. Retrospective Epilogue) but notably in his "The Life and Times of Paul Grice" (actually 'Life and Opinions', now in "Reply to Richards', in Warner/Grandy, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends -- Clarendon Press -- the title acronym for P.G.R.I.C.E. -- the man expands so delightfully or charmingly, shall I say, on J. L. Austin. Austin died of cancer when , ... well, when he died of cancer. Grice and Austin were never _personal_ friends; but those "Saturday Mornings" could not have been _without_ Austin. As G. E. L. Owens notes in his obit. of Ryle, the mornings were further organised by Grice after Austin's demise, but it wasn't really the same, and by 1967 Grice was gone for good to the California S. F. Bay. As S. R. Chapman notes in her book on "Grice" (Macmillan Palgrave), Grice was mainly concerned with the development of his own self; and the meeting of J. L. Austin just fell at the right place. If we summarise Grice's career we would have: -- Grice as 'witness' of the 'first' play group, as I call it. This was the Thursday evenings playgroup organised by I. Berlin. Attendees were Austin, Hampshire, ... -- but not Grice Chapman writes, "He had been born on the wrong side of the tracks". The result is that pre-'Phoney' War, Grice was just a 'post-verificationist'; his essays at the time attempt to provide 'logical' constructions (for notions like "I" or personal identity) in part in terms of experiential content, while not being necessarily samples of _reductionist_ analysis. (In his "Valedictory Essay" he distinguishes, almost pedantically, between an analysis being 'reductive' -- but not eliminationist, and 'reductionist' -- all the way). -- Grice during the Phoney War. Was was in Intelligence at Admiralty. (His "Meaning" gets published by Mind in 1941) -- 'post-war Oxford philosophy' Grice was possibly the master here. For reasons of publicity, it was indeed Austin that got all the press. But this period saw the presentation, within Oxford, of Grice's "Meaning" (1948), and other papers, notably for the Oxford Philosophical Society. -- The 'published' canon. With 'Meaning' published in 1957, a flurry of responses appear (but the big wave came ten years later). 1956 had seen his "Defense of a dogma" that (with Strawson) was usually listed in analytic-philosophy compilations on an 'ordinary-language' reply to Quine. -- The oral Grice. In 1961 he provided his Cambridge lecture on The Causal Theory of Perception (Arist. Soc.) that got published in the proceedings, and was pretty well cited -- notably in terms of his early theory of 'implication'. Butler managed to publish his "Remarks about the senses" (1965) in a Blackwell volume on _Analytic Philosophy_ -- -- And then came the Grand William James -- which made Grice a sort of grand name and philosopher's philosopher. His 1967 ms was only partially published in the coming decades: ii in Davidson/Harman 1975, iii in Cole. His 1970 conference on 'Presupposition' in Cole 1981. As a student of Grice it had been an adventure for me. All the different publications I had access highlighted one aspect of his productions, and it took me longer to find the underlying general picture. The more I studied him, I saw the consistency: and was delighted, for example, to discover that 1971 "Intention and Uncertainty" British Academy Lecture where he expands on his other love: action theory. His later publications for PPQ, 1988, saw him at a stage where he knew his health was precarious. But he left things pretty well organised for executors to have see the light things like "Conception of Value" and "Aspects of Reason". Unfortunately, as things are in consumer-oriented society, a book by a dead philosopher does not really sell as hot cakes. Mind, I'm not sure one by a living one does, unless you sell your full frontals to the New York Times Sunday magazine, as S. Pinker has! (and that means I'm _not_ buying his book!). The qualification, 'analytic philosophy' as applied to Grice is perhaps restrictive but good. The blurb for _WOW_, written by Putnam, does use the sobriquet. In England, he would just be considered a philosopher, and notably his obit. in Times saw him just as well as a 'cricketer' -- and a good amateur (i.e. gentleman) one at that! Few studies in the history of analytic philosophy have made justice to Grice in the proper historical context (and I'm basically interested in his Oxford years, only). One would have expected so much from P. M. S. Hacker in his long history of 20th century philosophy. But the man _is_ wedded to "Witters". What slightly pains me is that Hacker (with Baker) were the successors of Grice's post at St. John's ("the feast of reason" -- Pope). ------ R. B. Jones continues: >This is a curious footnote since in retrospect the paragraph it is attached to >does contain a reasonable description of a kind of logical analysis, not >however one that Russell actually employed, except perhaps in Principia. And indeed it's _Principia_ that people like Grice honoured as being the 'modernist' credo. One is not sure what _Principia_ they did read. My guess is that Grice, for one, did with Strawson's _formalisations_ of the modernist credo in "Introduction to Logical Theory", only to attach his 'neo-traditionalist' variances! >Probably my writing of this footnote was connected with my writing a page >on "Varieties of Philosophical Analysis" >http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/history/his003.htm >(now linked to from the footnote) >which happened later tha[t] year. >However, looking at this analysis of analysis I see that there is omitted from >it what I now believe to be "the method" which Russell himself thought >crucial and passed to Carnap, viz the idea that one should systematically >eliminate ontological excess by logical construction. >(This I am not impressed by, being motivated primarily by Occam's razor, to >which I am a conscientious objector. >I think I must be the most radical (or only?) anti-nominalist who denies being >a Platonist, though I suppose Carnap was as bad). >I don't think I had at that time read Hylton on Russell, from which one >*ought* perhaps to, come away with a clear idea of what kind of analysis >Russell advocated (though I don't think I did). ---- Well, the idea of 'logical construction' was indeed Cantab. and much the fashion in Cambridge and Oxford. In his "Concepts and Categories", by the very Oxonian Russia-born I. Berlin, there's this logical-construction of 'material-object' in terms of 'phenomenalist' experience which I think set the Oxford trend. Grice's "Personal Identity" (Mind 1941) makes extensive use of the idea of 'logical construction' -- relying on Cambridge author Broad. As it transpires, Grice provides a 'logical construction' he calls it, of thinks like "his" in "The cricket ball hit Jone's head" (his head). "His" in this case is 'physical' -- hit his cranium and brain. In other cases, it's mixed, "The concert hit Jones's sensibilities" -- his 'sensibilities'. Possibly 'mind' and 'soul' are involved here. Grice wants to reduce all to 'mnemonic' states (Perry repr. this as late as 1975 with a good intro). I recall a sort of funny passage in Grice's 1941. He comes up with a LOOONG analysis of "I" in terms of 'mnemonic states" and comments: "Some will say this is too long a logical construction to be true -- how can a simple analysandum as "I" get such a mouthful of an analysandum". He immediately notes, "But this is too stupid an objection to merit my time"! When it comes to parsimony, Grice was a case. He indeed made sort of famous his "Modified Occam Razor" (although Vendler, I believe had done similar things earlier on) -- but this alludes to reduction of 'sense' proliferation, as it were. In his "presidential inauguration" (for the APA Pacific Division), "Method in philosophical psychology", now repr. in Conception of Value, Clarendon, he introduces what he calls 'ontological Marxism': they work; therefore, they exist -- for any given entity. Rather classicist, he compares those entities as the 'servants' about to do the house work. If they are efficient, let them be! In this context, he has grown sceptical, perhaps, of 'post-verificationist' 'logical constructions' and, in the case of 'theoretical' concepts like 'belief' he does not feel the same urgency he may have felt before to _eliminate_ them -- but rather 'ramsify' them, as he says. S. R. Chapman has it just right in a passage that reminded me of P. Suppes's contribution to the PGRICE. While Chomsky and Searle did see the 'middle' Grice as a sort of 'analytic behaviourist' alla Ryle (with all the clauses introducing intensional contexts, like 'believes that desires that believes...') it's best to regard Grice as an 'intentionalist'. Suppes is being jocular, but Chapman is not. Having studied in part the phenomenological continental tradition of, say Husserl, Brentano, and others, even Merleau Ponty, I see the connection. Grice, like perhaps Hampshire (in Thought and Action), wants to defend the 'irreducibility' and richness of _experience_. It is evident in Grice's prose which is notably, 'first-person', as he elaborates on what he fells when he says that, say, he shall do this _or_ that! (He was saddened that the 'shall' idiom was losing adherents across the pond). Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1215855013x1201028747/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=De cemailfooterNO62) From rpsevero at gmail.com Fri Jan 30 04:57:43 2009 From: rpsevero at gmail.com (=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Rog=E9rio_Passos_Severo?=) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 07:57:43 -0200 Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine's "two dogmas" In-Reply-To: <200901282154.02002.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <185971.21214.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <200901211755.26526.rbj@rbjones.com> <86c7bd2d0901241629r7c884e92pd7433c4a87d645e1@mail.gmail.com> <200901282154.02002.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <86c7bd2d0901300157o6699011dle7f374755b6e0fc1@mail.gmail.com> Dear Roger and others interested in Quine: I have recently written a review of Peter Hylton's book on Quine, which should be coming out in the Phil Quarterly later this year. In case you're interested, here it is. Best wishes, --Rog?rio Book Review*: Quine*. By Peter Hylton. (Routledge, 2007. Pp. x + 405, hardcover. Price ?50.00) The latest volume of the *Arguments of the Philosophers* series is on Quine. The author is a leading Russell and Quine scholar, and this particular book has been keenly anticipated over the last few years. Hylton's earlier book on Russell is widely acknowledged as one of the best currently available.1 <#sdfootnote1sym> So it's natural to expect high-quality material in this case too. Readers will not be disappointed. But there is an important difference to bear in mind. Whereas the one on Russell contains analysis and historical reconstruction, this one offers "a unified, sympathetic, and comprehensive treatment" (p. 1) of Quine's philosophy. The first half of the book dwells mostly on Quine's epistemology (chapters 4 ?7), whereas the second half is mostly on metaphysics, or the "the structure of reality" (chapters 9?13). The book begins with three introductory chapters: the first with an overview of Quine's naturalism, the second on his historical background, and the third on the analytic-synthetic distinction. There is also chapter 8 on indeterminacy of translation, and a concluding section at the very end. The book as a whole covers nearly all of Quine's work; the only major topic left out is Quine's more technical contributions to logic. The book has been elegantly written and presents Quine's philosophy in terms that are favorable and reasonable; the author renders Quine's arguments as cogent as possible, and in this regard it's hard to find another book quite like this one. But apart from these matters of style and intent, the book also stands out in more substantive ways. I'll briefly comment on three topics on which Hylton is particularly incisive and differs most from other authors. 1. Oftentimes Quine is portrayed as a negative thinker whose main purpose is to destroy traditional doctrines, especially those associated with meaning, modalities, and analyticity. Against that kind of approach, Hylton construes Quine as a systematic philosopher whose take on traditional notions can only be properly understood within the context of his positive philosophical project. Quine's philosophy, according to Hylton, contains two main strands, which he dubs "epistemic" and "metaphysical". Both are set out by Quine's naturalism: "the recognition that it is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described" (Quine, *Theories and Things*, p. 21). Quine's epistemology is an attempt to explain how we have come to acquire the sophisticated theories of the world that we now have. Hylton call this a "genetic project". As with anything else in Quine's philosophy, this project is to be carried out within natural science: it is natural science (broadly construed) investigating its origins. Because the project is undertaken at a very high-level of abstraction and generality, it's called "philosophical", and that's all there is to the distinction between science and philosophy on this view. Quine's metaphysics is an attempt at "limning of the true and ultimate structure of reality" (*Word and Object*, p. 221). Again, this is to be carried out from within the confines of our current best theories of the world, or natural science broadly speaking. According to Hylton, this is a project of systematization and clarification, hence the goal of finding the simplest and clearest framework (or "canonical notation") for science. As in the case of the genetic project, the philosophical nature of Quine's contributions here lie not in any peculiarity of method or goal, but in their high level of systematicness, abstraction, and generality. That Quine's philosophy is to be conceived as having a metaphysical strand alongside its epistemology is something of a novelty in the literature. Hylton himself calls attention to this, by contrasting his reading with that of another important author (Roger Gibson Jr.) who construes Quine's philosophy as centered predominantly on epistemology (p. 370, n. 3). Sure enough, this is not metaphysics of the traditional kind, but rather "metaphysics naturalized" (p. 367). 2. In a paper published 25 years before the book, Hylton argued that Quine's qualms about the analytic-synthetic distinction should be set apart from his indeterminacy of translation arguments.2 <#sdfootnote2sym> This was new at the time, and it is restated in the book. Discussion of the two topics is spaced four chapters apart from each other (chapters 3 and 8). This purports to show that the two topics can be treated independently. Hylton's view in this regard is not shared by some other authors.3<#sdfootnote3sym>Indeed, indeterminacy of translation is often thought to affect nearly all of Quine's philosophy. Hylton argues that it "is of relatively little significance": If translation were determinate then we could use that fact to define a notion of synonymy, and hence of meaning. But *that* kind of notion of meaning would play neither of the roles which have chiefly led philosophers to invoke the term "meaning". It would not explain language-acquisition or language-mastery. It would not underpin a notion of truth by meaning which would play a fundamental epistemological role... (p. 230) 3. Hylton also stresses that there is no argument in Quine *against *the analytic-synthetic distinction. This is a point often misread.4<#sdfootnote4sym>Quine himself traces the distinction in * Roots of Reference *(pp. 78-80) and elsewhere. His criticisms have to do not with it being drawn, but with the use that Carnap and others tried to make of it. What Quine rejects is the idea of a set of epistemologically privileged sentences that are not justified empirically. Even if one grants that there are sentences true in virtue of meaning (analytic), their truth-values will still hinge on how the world is, and in this sense they will not be epistemologically privileged. Ultimately their justification will be empirical, just like that of any other any sentence. This is because the way we use each word (what it means) is tied up to the overall theory of the world we happen to have. That whales are mammals and not fish is not just a matter of meaning, but an empirical fact about the world. That energy and matter can be inter-defined is an empirical claim of the theory of relativity, and not just a terminological stipulation. The main reason supporting Quine's view is holism: the thesis that sentences are not in general justified one at a time, but as a "corporate body" (large sets of sentences at a time). This is a thesis which Quine takes to be trivial and obvious (see *Pursuit of Truth*, p. 16), but that has deep consequences. Because sentences are in general justified collectively, any reason one might have for accepting an individual sentence must depend on whatever reasons one has for accepting the portions of the theory to which it belongs. This is true even of analytic sentences: a choice of vocabulary (a taxonomy) is part of what contributes to the empirical success of a theory as a whole. Recently Michael Friedman has put forth a neo-Carnapian view in which some sentences are *constitutive* the meanings of other sentences.5<#sdfootnote5sym>Friedman argues that scientific practice is more structured than Quine suggests, and that different sentences play different roles. But on Hylton's reading Quine's account is just set at a higher level of generality and abstraction than Friedman's, and does not deny any structuring of the sentences within a theory. The point is merely all sentences, including Friedman's constitutive sentences, are subject to empirical justification insofar as the overall theory of which they are part is subject to confirmation by observations. I'd like to finish this review with something that might be seen as a drawback to the book. While providing a detailed and sympathetic treatment of Quine's philosophy, the author chose to avoid nearly all comparisons with other philosophies. The concluding chapter does have a short but very interesting discussion of three ways in which Quine's philosophy may be found wanting (pp. 365?369). But the discussion is abstract and does not to engage directly with other philosophers. No names are mentioned. This a trait that runs through most of the book: the actual debates in which Quine figures so prominently are mostly left out. There is also not much on Quine's general influence on contemporary philosophy, or what his legacy might be. In other words, this is mostly an insider's account of the arguments; reckoning how they fare relative to others was not the author's goal. The main achievement of the book is to show the force of Quine's philosophy when it is understood systematically.6 <#sdfootnote6sym> Rog?rio Passos Severo (*Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul*) 1 <#sdfootnote1anc>*Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy *(Oxford UP, 1990). 2 <#sdfootnote2anc>"Analyticity and the Indeterminacy of Translation", *Synthese *52 (1982): 167-184. 3 <#sdfootnote3anc>E.g., Gary Ebbs, *Rule-Following and Realism* (Harvard UP, 1997), p. 338, n. 56. 4 <#sdfootnote4anc>See Hylton's criticism of Boghossian in "Holism and Analyticity in Quine's Thought", *Harvard Review of Philosophy 10 *(2002): 11-26. 5 <#sdfootnote5anc>Friedman, *Dynamics of Reason* (CSLI, 2001). 6 <#sdfootnote6anc>For comments and criticisms, I'd like to thank Andrew Blom, B?rbara Vianna, David Harker, Giovani Felice, and Mauro Engelmann. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Jan 30 07:48:57 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 07:48:57 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Rosebushes and Cherry-Trees Message-ID: "In favour of minimalism, we might hear, an appeal, echoing Quine, to the beauty of 'desert landscapes'. But such an appeal I would regard as inappropriate; we are not being asked by a Minimalist to give our vote to a special, and no doubt very fine, type of landscape; we are being asked to express our preference for an ordinary sort of lanscape, to rosebushes and cherry-trees in midwinter, rather than in spring or summer. To change the image somewhat, what bothers me about what I'm being offered is not that it is bare, but that it has been systematically and relentlessly _undressed_" Grice, "The Life and Opinions of Paul Grice", in PGRICE, p. 68 (This is Grice's expansion on _Strawson_'s imagery in his review of Quine, I understand) Severo on Hylton on Quine Excellent to have the review in hist-analytic. Some running comments: In a message dated 1/30/2009 7:03:31 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, rpsevero at gmail.com writes: The latest volume of the Arguments of the Philosophers series is on Quine. ---- I love that series. I believe Warnock wrote on Grice for it. That's what we need for Grice! But fear Honderich will not find it sellable enough! ---- The author is a leading Russell and Quine scholar, and this particular book has been keenly anticipated over the last few years. Hylton's earlier book on Russell is widely acknowledged as one of the best currently available. ---- The footnote refers to the title which includes "the emergence of analytic philosophy". I suppose I like the idea of 'emergence'. Hardly 'supervenience'. As a philosopher who once tried to understand (and failed) philosophy of biology, I _never_, personally, use 'emergence'. So metaphysical. But the title mentions, 'idealism' and the _emergence_ of analytic philosophy. In Chora we are discussing 'causes' and effects. It's like saying, "Idealism was a good thing" (alla '1006 and all that') since it was the Cause of Analytic Philosophy... --- So it's natural to expect high-quality material in this case too. Readers will not be disappointed. But there is an important difference to bear in mind. Whereas the one on Russell contains analysis and historical reconstruction, this one offers "a unified, sympathetic, and comprehensive treatment" (p. 1) of Quine's philosophy. ---- Which is very good. My thesis advisor (friend, too) Edoardo Antonio Rabossi, was once asked, in a public seminar, as to his 'mentors' ever: he said, "Chomsky and Quine". Surprisingly, when I read "Life and Opinions of Paul Grice" he goes, Paul Grice. "My mentors? Chomsky and Quine". In the case of Chomsky it's chronologically important, and I was always amused that Chomsky's famous _Aspects of the theory of syntax_ acknowledges "A. P. Grice" (!). Quine is more of a expectable figure. Older than Grice, met him in Oxford, and as Danny Frederick notes, had (Quine did) an excellent sense of humour. I will add a little comment on Grice on "Heidegger" and his later style. In 'Prolegomena' he indeed uses jocularly the phrase, "Heidegger is the greatest living philosopher". This I thought provocative in that the Harvard lectures were open, and who knows if there's no visiting continental person in the room! In PPQ he refers (Chapman was somewhat offended by this) the 'rednecks of the Vienna Circle' by which one assumes he means Carnap. So it seems that while Heidegger (whom Ryle reviewed in 1929 for _Mind_) could be the butt of a joke, by 1988 the circle had grown full: it was Carnap (and perhaps "Quine" who after all, was a Vienna Circle member, too) who had laughed derisively at Heidegger's "Nothing Noths" who get the second laugh. It's also amusing that while Grice (who contributed to "Words and Objections", the Quine festschrift) mentions Quine in so laudatory tones, he goes on immediately to say he never shared _one_ tenet with him. And goes on to cite the metaphor of the desert landscapes, suggesting that Grice will change his "California bay" landscape for _nothing_! ---- Severo continues that he'll dwell on 'controversial' items: 1. Oftentimes Quine is portrayed as a negative thinker whose main purpose is to destroy traditional doctrines, especially those associated with meaning, "": Quine's metaphysics is an attempt at "limning of the true and ultimate structure of reality" (Word and Object, p. 221). --- Must say I loved the 'limning'. A bit like 'taming of the true' if you wish? Well, not quite, and count me on 'taming' her rather. OED notes of 'limn': "Now literary and arch. [Altered form of LUMINE v.]". Archaic in Quine means "Manx". Severo continues: "That Quine's philosophy is to be conceived as having a metaphysical strand alongside its epistemology is something of a novelty in the literature." Perhaps because we tend to assume that 'anti-metaphysical' naturalism and physicalism (what Grice calls one of the seven betes noires in his road to the Holly of Hollies) do not count, but they do! They are just as metaphysical as their opponents. Severo then brings attention to an interesting paper by Quine on "Analyticity" (1982). "indeterminacy of translation is often thought to affect nearly all of Quine's philosophy. Hylton argues that it "is of relatively little significance"" I'd go with Hylton. I always understood -- but mainly after long conversations with this with M. J. Murphy and others -- that it's the "gavagai" complex. I think it's Quine's idea to say things relevant for the linguist (of the Bloomfield school) that got him into 'indeterminacy' thing. "Ultimately their justification will be empirical, just like that of any other any sentence." When, for Rabossi, I had to undertake the rather dull task of going through Mill's System of Logic, came across his views that "one, two, buckle my shoe, three four, open the door", etc. are all _empirically_ aquired. It turns out, to use Baumgarten-Kant's example, "7 + 5 = 12" is indeed synthetic a posteriori. Not that I really care. It shows how much of scholasticism behind the distinction there is! "That whales are mammals and not fish is not just a matter of meaning, but an empirical fact about the world." Well, it amuses me to read in my Loeb Aristotle, that he has indeed whales (in Greek, though) as fish (in Greek). Again here we should distinguish alla Chomsky between descriptive adequacy (Aristotle's fishy cetaceous may be adequate descriptive) from explanatory adequacy (where the presence of mammary glands in the whale will provide a counterexample or exception to your 'regular' fish). "That energy and matter can be inter-defined is an empirical claim of the theory of relativity, and not just a terminological stipulation." And what about Eddington's 'wavicle'. Terminological stipulation if ever there was one! I note Eddington is also cited in the OED under 'slithy'! "the author chose to avoid nearly all comparisons with other philosophies." Perhaps he was of his own. Recall his background was 'mathematics', so he didn't really belong to a philosophy club or anything. When in Oxford, he socialised, slightly, with Grice and Strawson. Irritably, Quine focuses on the lack of hygiene and teeth (if I recall him alright) in Grice _while in USA_, while he was so _surprised_ to see him wearing a white tie for the St. John's inauguration party. I'm not familiar with Quine's socialising in Harvard. I believe he was, despite what Dan Frederick says about his sense of humour, a pretty private person, and not one that would look, as Grice did, for 'conviviality' in philosophy _every_ other step. " No names are mentioned. This a trait that runs through most of the book: the actual debates in which Quine figures so prominently are mostly left out." Maybe a matter of temperament. I for one followed _one_ debate: the Grice/Quine. Grice wrote a charming "Vacuous Names" which was submitted at a rather late stage for the festschrift, but made it. In his reply, "Reply to Grice", Quine is so terse that bores people. He notes that for all Grice's love for detail and his absolutely supercalifragilisticous subscript device -- a variant of his square-bracket device -- for which he acknowledges the help from Boolos and Parsons -- just to tease Quine -- what Grice does, in Quine's view, is _otiose_ if not redundant. His reply is 'half' a page! Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1215855013x1201028747/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=De cemailfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sat Jan 31 08:04:03 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2009 05:04:03 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine's "two dogmas" In-Reply-To: <86c7bd2d0901300157o6699011dle7f374755b6e0fc1@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <957463.4193.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Thanks for the review Rogerio! If it weren't for the fact that I've heard Quine reject the analytic/synthetic distinction from his own lips I would be more receptive, maybe. But the idea that Hylton understood Quine better than Quine strikes me as ludicrous. The alternative is a secret philosophy held by Quine. I can find no instance where Quine clarifies his position, as one would expect if Hylton were right. There is a crucial asymmetry between scientific theories and theories of language. Where analytical hypotheses are analogous to theories the difference remains that the former do not reflect "a fact of the matter." Physical theory does. This is what sharply distinguished Chomsky and Quine on indeterminacy, with Putnam (on this rare occasion) siding with Chomsky. The notion of a fact of the matter is NOT epistemological: The intended notion of matter of fact is not transcendental *nor yet epistemological*, not even a question of evidence; it is ontological, a question of reality. (Theories and Things p. 23). Note: here we are NOT talking about the inscructability of reference! But even if we were it would make little difference. Consider Quine's employment of Lowenheim/Skolem or for that matter even Putnam's use of the theorem. This is not epistemological. It is ontological! No. Quine rejects the analytic/synthetic distinction. It was never an epistemological distinction; that distinction belonged to the a priori and the a posteriori which some who defended the linguistic theory of logical necessity confused. I think Hylton may be trying something sensationalist; but it is a sensational mistake, if reports of his views are accurate, which they probably are. Thanks bunches for this review. Steve Steve --- On Fri, 1/30/09, Rog?rio Passos Severo wrote: From: Rog?rio Passos Severo Subject: Re: Quine's "two dogmas" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Friday, January 30, 2009, 4:57 AM #yiv2035651957 _filtered #yiv2035651957 {margin:2cm;} #yiv2035651957 P.sdfootnote-western {margin-left:0.5cm;margin-bottom:0cm;font-size:10pt;} #yiv2035651957 P.sdfootnote-cjk {margin-left:0.5cm;margin-bottom:0cm;font-size:10pt;} #yiv2035651957 P.sdfootnote-ctl {margin-left:0.5cm;margin-bottom:0cm;font-size:10pt;} #yiv2035651957 P {margin-bottom:0.21cm;} #yiv2035651957 A.sdfootnoteanc {font-size:57%;} #yiv2035651957 Dear Roger and others interested in Quine: I have recently written a review of Peter Hylton's book on Quine, which should be coming out in the Phil Quarterly later this year. In case you're interested, here it is. Best wishes, --Rog?rio Book Review: Quine. By Peter Hylton. (Routledge, 2007. Pp. x + 405, hardcover. Price ?50.00) The latest volume of the Arguments of the Philosophers series is on Quine. The author is a leading Russell and Quine scholar, and this particular book has been keenly anticipated over the last few years. Hylton's earlier book on Russell is widely acknowledged as one of the best currently available.1 So it's natural to expect high-quality material in this case too. Readers will not be disappointed. But there is an important difference to bear in mind. Whereas the one on Russell contains analysis and historical reconstruction, this one offers "a unified, sympathetic, and comprehensive treatment" (p. 1) of Quine's philosophy.? The first half of the book dwells mostly on Quine's epistemology (chapters 4?7), whereas the second half is mostly on metaphysics, or the "the structure of reality" (chapters 9?13). The book begins with three introductory chapters: the first with an overview of Quine's naturalism, the second on his historical background, and the third on the analytic-synthetic distinction. There is also chapter 8 on indeterminacy of translation, and a concluding section at the very end. The book as a whole covers nearly all of Quine's work; the only major topic left out is Quine's more technical contributions to logic. The book has been elegantly written and presents Quine's philosophy in terms that are favorable and reasonable; the author renders Quine's arguments as cogent as possible, and in this regard it's hard to find another book quite like this one. But apart from these matters of style and intent, the book also stands out in more substantive ways. I'll briefly comment on three topics on which Hylton is particularly incisive and differs most from other authors. 1. Oftentimes Quine is portrayed as a negative thinker whose main purpose is to destroy traditional doctrines, especially those associated with meaning, modalities, and analyticity. Against that kind of approach, Hylton construes Quine as a systematic philosopher whose take on traditional notions can only be properly understood within the context of his positive philosophical project. Quine's philosophy, according to Hylton, contains two main strands, which he dubs "epistemic" and "metaphysical". Both are set out by Quine's naturalism: "the recognition that it is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described" (Quine, Theories and Things, p. 21). Quine's epistemology is an attempt to explain how we have come to acquire the sophisticated theories of the world that we now have. Hylton call this a "genetic project". As with anything else in Quine's philosophy, this project is to be carried out within natural science: it is natural science (broadly construed) investigating its origins. Because the project is undertaken at a very high-level of abstraction and generality, it's called "philosophical", and that's all there is to the distinction between science and philosophy on this view. Quine's metaphysics is an attempt at "limning of the true and ultimate structure of reality" (Word and Object, p. 221). Again, this is to be carried out from within the confines of our current best theories of the world, or natural science broadly speaking. According to Hylton, this is a project of systematization and clarification, hence the goal of finding the simplest and clearest framework (or "canonical notation") for science. As in the case of the genetic project, the philosophical nature of Quine's contributions here lie not in any peculiarity of method or goal, but in their high level of systematicness, abstraction, and generality. That Quine's philosophy is to be conceived as having a metaphysical strand alongside its epistemology is something of a novelty in the literature. Hylton himself calls attention to this, by contrasting his reading with that of another important author (Roger Gibson Jr.) who construes Quine's philosophy as centered predominantly on epistemology (p. 370, n. 3). Sure enough, this is not metaphysics of the traditional kind, but rather "metaphysics naturalized" (p. 367). 2. In a paper published 25 years before the book, Hylton argued that Quine's qualms about the analytic-synthetic distinction should be set apart from his indeterminacy of translation arguments.2 This was new at the time, and it is restated in the book. Discussion of the two topics is spaced four chapters apart from each other (chapters 3 and 8). This purports to show that the two topics can be treated independently. Hylton's view in this regard is not shared by some other authors.3 Indeed, indeterminacy of translation is often thought to affect nearly all of Quine's philosophy. Hylton argues that it "is of relatively little significance": If translation were determinate then we could use that fact to define a notion of synonymy, and hence of meaning. But that kind of notion of meaning would play neither of the roles which have chiefly led philosophers to invoke the term "meaning". It would not explain language-acquisition or language-mastery. It would not underpin a notion of truth by meaning which would play a fundamental epistemological role... (p. 230) 3. Hylton also stresses that there is no argument in Quine against the analytic-synthetic distinction. This is a point often misread.4 Quine himself traces the distinction in Roots of Reference (pp. 78-80) and elsewhere. His criticisms have to do not with it being drawn, but with the use that Carnap and others tried to make of it. What Quine rejects is the idea of a set of epistemologically privileged sentences that are not justified empirically. Even if one grants that there are sentences true in virtue of meaning (analytic), their truth-values will still hinge on how the world is, and in this sense they will not be epistemologically privileged. Ultimately their justification will be empirical, just like that of any other any sentence. This is because the way we use each word (what it means) is tied up to the overall theory of the world we happen to have. That whales are mammals and not fish is not just a matter of meaning, but an empirical fact about the world. That energy and matter can be inter-defined is an empirical claim of the theory of relativity, and not just a terminological stipulation. The main reason supporting Quine's view is holism: the thesis that sentences are not in general justified one at a time, but as a "corporate body" (large sets of sentences at a time). This is a thesis which Quine takes to be trivial and obvious (see Pursuit of Truth, p. 16), but that has deep consequences. Because sentences are in general justified collectively, any reason one might have for accepting an individual sentence must depend on whatever reasons one has for accepting the portions of the theory to which it belongs. This is true even of analytic sentences: a choice of vocabulary (a taxonomy) is part of what contributes to the empirical success of a theory as a whole. Recently Michael Friedman has put forth a neo-Carnapian view in which some sentences are constitutive the meanings of other sentences.5 Friedman argues that scientific practice is more structured than Quine suggests, and that different sentences play different roles. But on Hylton's reading Quine's account is just set at a higher level of generality and abstraction than Friedman's, and does not deny any structuring of the sentences within a theory. The point is merely all sentences, including Friedman's constitutive sentences, are subject to empirical justification insofar as the overall theory of which they are part is subject to confirmation by observations. I'd like to finish this review with something that might be seen as a drawback to the book. While providing a detailed and sympathetic treatment of Quine's philosophy, the author chose to avoid nearly all comparisons with other philosophies. The concluding chapter does have a short but very interesting discussion of three ways in which Quine's philosophy may be found wanting (pp. 365?369). But the discussion is abstract and does not to engage directly with other philosophers. No names are mentioned. This a trait that runs through most of the book: the actual debates in which Quine figures so prominently are mostly left out. There is also not much on Quine's general influence on contemporary philosophy, or what his legacy might be. In other words, this is mostly an insider's account of the arguments; reckoning how they fare relative to others was not the author's goal. The main achievement of the book is to show the force of Quine's philosophy when it is understood systematically.6 Rog?rio Passos Severo (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul) 1Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford UP, 1990). 2"Analyticity and the Indeterminacy of Translation", Synthese 52 (1982): 167-184. 3E.g., Gary Ebbs, Rule-Following and Realism (Harvard UP, 1997), p. 338, n. 56. 4See Hylton's criticism of Boghossian in "Holism and Analyticity in Quine's Thought", Harvard Review of Philosophy 10 (2002): 11-26. 5Friedman, Dynamics of Reason (CSLI, 2001). 6For comments and criticisms, I'd like to thank Andrew Blom, B?rbara Vianna, David Harker, Giovani Felice, and Mauro Engelmann. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Sat Jan 31 12:29:42 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2009 17:29:42 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine's "two dogmas" In-Reply-To: <957463.4193.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <957463.4193.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <200901311729.43029.rbj@rbjones.com> On Saturday 31 January 2009 13:04:03 steve bayne wrote: > If it weren't for the fact that I've heard Quine reject the > analytic/synthetic distinction from his own lips I would be more receptive, > maybe. But the idea that Hylton understood Quine better than Quine strikes > me as ludicrous. The alternative is a secret philosophy held by Quine. I > can find no instance where Quine clarifies his position, as one would > expect if Hylton were right. Hylton says (Chapter 3 p 52): "Some of Quine's writings from the early 50s encourage the idea that he wholly rejects anything that might be called a version of the analytic-synthetic distinction. This is especially true of 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' the wide currency of that essay is no doubt responsible for the impression that Quine wholly rejects any version of the distinction. But even in that essay he leaves some room for a distinction which he gives the name, and by the time of 'Roots of Reference' (1974) he is explicitly endorsing one. (Whether it is worthy of the name is another question, but not an important one.)" Hylton says that in his later philosophy Quine backed off denying the distinction in favour of denying it any possible philosophical significance. Hunting for specific references, I see that he says that in "Two Dogmas Reconsidered" (p270) (and in Word and Object section 12) Quine accepts explicitly that "all batchelors are unmarried" is analtyic. Roger Jones From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sat Jan 31 13:00:21 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2009 10:00:21 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Davidson's 'Under a description' Trick Message-ID: <58404.65750.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Davidson says, When I tie my shoelaces, there is on the one? hand the movement of my fingers, and on the other, the movement of the laces. But is it possible to separate these events by calling the first, alone, my action? What makes the separation a problem is that I do not seem able to describe or think how I move my fingers, apart from moving the laces. (AE p. 51) But if I cannot describe how I move my fingers, then it can never be the case that I move them intentionally under one description but not another. We might argue, as Davidson does, that the intentionality of Hamlet?s killing Polonius is relative to a description, and so not an event of a natural kind, but we cannot argue that moving our fingers in such and such a way is not of a natural kind for the same reason, simply because there is no description available for substitution! So in the case of the most fundamental of actions, by Davidson?s own admission, relativity to a description is not a signature fact of attributions of intentionality. Steve Bayne -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sat Jan 31 13:11:08 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2009 10:11:08 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine's "two dogmas" In-Reply-To: <200901311729.43029.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <992025.99720.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> I heard him say he rejected the distinction. This was in 1999! We are, I believe, experiencing a crisis in philosophy, relying on "ponies" rather than thoroughbreds. A student ought not pony his way through Quine. Read Quine; then, re-read Quine. Then when you are finished with that read Quine again. Every time I read "Two Dogmas" I get something new out of it. That is what makes it a classic. Same way with Sellars's "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind." Read and re-read. Is there a senior philosopher (and there are many lurking about) on this list who would deny this? Then, after all this, pick through the mistakes of the majority of commentators. I want to apologize to people for not sending a copy to their email addresses. I used to do this but once I didn't notice that it was not on list; very embarrassing. Regards Steve --- On Sat, 1/31/09, Roger Bishop Jones wrote: From: Roger Bishop Jones Subject: Re: Quine's "two dogmas" To: baynesrb at yahoo.com Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Saturday, January 31, 2009, 12:29 PM On Saturday 31 January 2009 13:04:03 steve bayne wrote: > If it weren't for the fact that I've heard Quine reject the > analytic/synthetic distinction from his own lips I would be more receptive, > maybe. But the idea that Hylton understood Quine better than Quine strikes > me as ludicrous. The alternative is a secret philosophy held by Quine. I > can find no instance where Quine clarifies his position, as one would > expect if Hylton were right. Hylton says (Chapter 3 p 52): "Some of Quine's writings from the early 50s encourage the idea that he wholly rejects anything that might be called a version of the analytic-synthetic distinction. This is especially true of 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' the wide currency of that essay is no doubt responsible for the impression that Quine wholly rejects any version of the distinction. But even in that essay he leaves some room for a distinction which he gives the name, and by the time of 'Roots of Reference' (1974) he is explicitly endorsing one. (Whether it is worthy of the name is another question, but not an important one.)" Hylton says that in his later philosophy Quine backed off denying the distinction in favour of denying it any possible philosophical significance. Hunting for specific references, I see that he says that in "Two Dogmas Reconsidered" (p270) (and in Word and Object section 12) Quine accepts explicitly that "all batchelors are unmarried" is analtyic. Roger Jones -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Sat Jan 31 13:51:17 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2009 18:51:17 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Davidson's 'Under a description' Trick In-Reply-To: <58404.65750.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <58404.65750.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1690212F8B2940E28F63ADC4A1BF4BA6@DFLVQC1J> Hi Steve, <> I think there are two errors here. First, 'I perform action x under description d' does not entail 'I can articulate description d.' There are all sorts of complex movements that we do intentionally but which are such that we cannot supply an individuating description of them. I am just moving my arm in that old familiar way, familiar to me and familiar to onlookers, though none of us may be articulate enough to be able to put into words what the movement is. Yet the movement can, in principle, be described, for example if it is filmed and analysed by people who have a rich enough vocabulary. Second, in Davidson's example, we do have a description that the agent can supply, namely, 'I move my fingers in the usual way that I do when I tie my shoelaces.' Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mail.2 at borishennig.de Sat Jan 31 13:37:29 2009 From: mail.2 at borishennig.de (Boris Hennig) Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2009 19:37:29 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] Davidson's 'Under a description' Trick In-Reply-To: <58404.65750.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <58404.65750.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <3435e8890901311037s6dacb0ccl4eebc264e730b09d@mail.gmail.com> I don't understand. Davidson says that there is a way to describe the finger movements: "moving the laces." Boris > But if I cannot describe how I move my fingers, then it can never be the ... > the same reason, simply because there is no description available for From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sat Jan 31 15:09:33 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2009 12:09:33 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Davidson's 'Under a description' Trick In-Reply-To: <3435e8890901311037s6dacb0ccl4eebc264e730b09d@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <116206.64887.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> A description of moving the laces is 'moving the laces', but how do we describe the? movement of the hands that move the laces without describing the laces? We can describe killing Polonius using an alternative description; there is no alternative even to "moving the laces in such and such a way." In addition: and what way is "such a way"? How do I describe moving my limbs when I am NOT doing anything with them; and, yet, I can do so intentionally. So where, in such a case, is the description under which the action is intentional and how might it distinguish the same actions when they are not? That is Davidson's problem in that case. Regards Steve --- On Sat, 1/31/09, Boris Hennig wrote: From: Boris Hennig Subject: Re: Davidson's 'Under a description' Trick To: "hist-analytic list" Date: Saturday, January 31, 2009, 1:37 PM I don't understand. Davidson says that there is a way to describe the finger movements: "moving the laces." Boris > But if I cannot describe how I move my fingers, then it can never be the ... > the same reason, simply because there is no description available for -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sat Jan 31 15:03:19 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2009 12:03:19 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Davidson's 'Under a description' Trick In-Reply-To: <1690212F8B2940E28F63ADC4A1BF4BA6@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <705212.78017.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> I think there are two errors here. First, ?I perform action x under description d? does not entail ?I can articulate description d.? If you cannot articulate the description, how do you know it exists? Faith won't do. ? "Second, in Davidson?s example, we do have a description that the agent can supply, namely, ?I move my fingers in the usual way that I do when I tie my shoelaces.?" Problem with this is that it is describes any one of a number of actions.? Notice that you have conveniently (?) altered the description, substituting 'the usual way' for 'in just the way *required*', So by altering Davidson's position you move to a different issue. Moreover, consider the case of untying a knot in the dark, a knot unfamiliar to you. Here there is no usual way. The same problem surfaces again. So I don't think I made any mistakes. It pays to read Davidson VERY closely! Regards Steve --- On Sat, 1/31/09, Danny Frederick wrote: From: Danny Frederick Subject: RE: Davidson's 'Under a description' Trick To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Cc: baynesrb at yahoo.com Date: Saturday, January 31, 2009, 1:51 PM Hi Steve, ? ? <> ? ? I think there are two errors here. First, ?I perform action x under description d? does not entail ?I can articulate description d.? There are all sorts of complex movements that we do intentionally but which are such that we cannot supply an individuating description of them. I am just moving my arm in that old familiar way, familiar to me and familiar to onlookers, though none of us may be articulate enough to be able to put into words what the movement is. Yet the movement can, in principle, be described, for example if it is filmed and analysed by people who have a rich enough vocabulary. ? Second, in Davidson?s example, we do have a description that the agent can supply, namely, ?I move my fingers in the usual way that I do when I tie my shoelaces.? ? Cheers. ? Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Sat Jan 31 15:35:55 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2009 20:35:55 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Davidson's 'Under a description' Trick In-Reply-To: <705212.78017.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <1690212F8B2940E28F63ADC4A1BF4BA6@DFLVQC1J> <705212.78017.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <6DF09DE13D294202B71042948E8FB894@DFLVQC1J> Hi Steve, <> My answer would be that there was something I was trying to do, so to that extent I had an idea of what I was trying to do; and if I succeeded in doing it, then the action exemplified that idea. And this is so whether or not I can articulate that idea. I agree that Davidson would probably regard this response as unwelcome, since he does not like intensions, so I acknowledge that you may indeed have raised a problem for Davidson (I would have to check his writings to be sure). But the problem for Davidson is not necessarily a problem for one who follows the principles of his analysis but substitutes ideas for descriptions. <> Yes, I did, didn't I? Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sat Jan 31 15:53:33 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2009 15:53:33 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Bootstrap Message-ID: In a message dated 1/31/2009 1:01:49 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: When I tie my shoelaces, there is on the one hand the movement of my fingers, and on the other, the movement of the laces. But is it possible to separate these events by calling the first, alone, my action? What makes the separation a problem --- This reminded me of Grice's _Bootstrap_, although it's the other end of the problem, I guess. I would distinguish: -- move my finger -- move the lace Personally, I would find it otiose to move my finger without moving the lace -- but: 1. Since it's quite a task, one can imagine a child learning to tie his shoe by moving his finger (without actually moving the lace) 2. Similarly, some singers somplained that Bellini did not write 'songs' for the 'human' voice. I take it that the score shows some 'movement of finger' that when meant to accompany the voice is _unnatural_. 3. Philosophers should be well concerned, as Davidson taught us, that co-relations between 'actions' are a trick -- and I'm not sure S. Baynes means 'trick' in a bad way in the header 4. I once read that Prince Charles never had (literally) to brush his teeth. He would have a butler doing that for him, i.e. put the paste on the brush, and all Charles had to do is moving the head. But we do distinguish, "Who cut your hair?" from "I don't like the way you cut your hair" ('It wasn't me, it was the coiffeur; I've just had the (i.e. my) hair done. Sorry for changing the header -- feel free to ignore! Grice's _bootstrap_ is meant to illustrate the problems perhaps pointed out by D. Frederick: a neurologist's description of the physical even underlying my moving the fingers may be -- at what Grice calls Level L1 -- in "Method in philosophical psychology" -- _irrelevant_ when it comes to my _explaining_ why I moved them (Level 2). There's no sense of introducing a Level 1 that will not allow us, later to pull ourselves, yes, by our own bootstraps? Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1215855013x1201028747/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=De cemailfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sat Jan 31 16:31:19 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2009 13:31:19 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Davidson's 'Under a description' Trick In-Reply-To: <6DF09DE13D294202B71042948E8FB894@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <877091.40344.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Danny, As a friend you understand my position vis a vis postings better than my fiends. So although some may misunderstand when you say I'm "mistaken" about something, it doesn't? affect me in the least. Davidson was, and is, a fine philosopher. Austin and Grice were among the best in their domain; Davidson and Quine were the best of the now dead philosophers who wrote on a, relatively, narrow segment of philosophy. By this I mean they were not like Broad or Stout - gifted at General Philosophy. So, yes, Davidson's approach is "clean" and to the point. But here is a facet of the discussion I didn't touch on that I discuss at length in my book. All this talk about descriptions in connection with action theory is what happens when you dispense with "ideas" in action. What I want to do is go back to James's theory; and Bradley's theory and see what can be done by treating philosophy of mind as a branch of psychology, rather than philosophy of mind as a brand of linguistic analysis. Meinong, early Russell, Bradley; these, in my opinion were the great geniuses of this last century or so. I include Sellars here. Carnap? is the "bad guy." But he dominates the century in my opinion and by the accounts of most (a couple at least lurking in the background) he was a delightful human being. But when philosophy became absorbed into semantics and Tarksi type semantics, at that, it took a different sort of turn, a "linguistic turn" (to use Bergmann's expression). Indeed, I "cut my teeth" on Bergmann and the Austrian school. Never fully recovered. That is why I'm impatient with all this business about 'under a description'. Davidson even admits that we now are to get hung up on opacity; which is interesting in itself (L. Linsky is best on this topic in my opinion) but evades much relevant philosophy In a nutshell the relevant metaphilosophical view of mine is that no ideal language, no "therapy" will suffice for hard philosophical thinking. Even when it "goes linguistic"; if you retain a felt need to "hug the earth" you can do this stuff productively, as did Sellars, for example, in "Being and Being Known," one of my favorite papers. I look forward to your posting and read most of them, even on the other lists. Best wishes Steve --- On Sat, 1/31/09, Danny Frederick wrote: From: Danny Frederick Subject: RE: Davidson's 'Under a description' Trick To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Cc: baynesrb at yahoo.com Date: Saturday, January 31, 2009, 3:35 PM Hi Steve, ? ? <> ? ? My answer would be that there was something I was trying to do, so to that extent I had an idea of what I was trying to do; and if I succeeded in doing it, then the action exemplified that idea. And this is so whether or not I can articulate that idea. I agree that Davidson would probably regard this response as unwelcome, since he does not like intensions, so I acknowledge that you may indeed have raised a problem for Davidson (I would have to check his writings to be sure). But the problem for Davidson is not necessarily a problem for one who follows the principles of his analysis but substitutes ideas for descriptions. ? ? <> ? ? Yes, I did, didn?t I? ? Cheers. ? Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sat Jan 31 16:39:37 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2009 13:39:37 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Bootstrap In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <160901.42021.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> I am so far behind, I hope you don't confuse the brevity of my reply etc. as impertinence. I address your points in order. 1. Compare James on how a child learns to move its hands with Skinner. The connection is, in my opinion, amazing. Ideo-motor behavior requires memory of ideas acquired from what is, essentially, Skinner's operant behavior. I stopped reading about babies after a few hours with Alexander Shand. Something about the arm wavings of babies...I left. 2. Bellini may not have written for the voice, but it seems to me that most "classical" is written with the voice only slightly in the background. I can think with any kind of music on except where there is a voice. The voice is THE musical instrument in some way. 3. Yeah, I meant 'trick' in a bad way. Anscombe does the same thing and she, along with Kenny are full of tricks. I used to play chess with a brilliant Czech player, whom I NEVER beat. He would ask after my move "No trrricks??" He say every one of them. 4. As for the topic of teeth and hair: both escape me! By the way, it may interest you to know that I once had a ms on Grice; ran about two hundred pages, working through every detail I could as Grice refined his meaning of 'meaning'. I had no security software. Someone got in. Stole it and locked me out of my computer. Since then I have become more aware of security, such being my many Internet fiends. Best wishes Steve --- On Sat, 1/31/09, Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: From: Jlsperanza at aol.com Subject: Bootstrap To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Date: Saturday, January 31, 2009, 3:53 PM In a message dated 1/31/2009 1:01:49 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: When I tie my shoelaces, there is on the one hand the movement of my fingers, and on the other, the movement of the laces. But is it possible to separate these events by calling the first, alone, my action? What makes the separation a problem --- This reminded me of Grice's _Bootstrap_, although it's the other end of the problem, I guess. I would distinguish: -- move my finger -- move the lace Personally, I would find it otiose to move my finger without moving the lace -- but: 1. Since it's quite a task, one can imagine a child learning to tie his shoe by moving his finger (without actually moving the lace) 2. Similarly, some singers somplained that Bellini did not write 'songs' for the 'human' voice. I take it that the score shows some 'movement of finger' that when meant to accompany the voice is _unnatural_. 3. Philosophers should be well concerned, as Davidson taught us, that co-relations between 'actions' are a trick -- and I'm not sure S. Baynes means 'trick' in a bad way in the header 4. I once read that Prince Charles never had (literally) to brush his teeth. He would have a butler doing that for him, i.e. put the paste on the brush, and all Charles had to do is moving the head. But we do distinguish, "Who cut your hair?" from "I don't like the way you cut your hair" ('It wasn't me, it was the coiffeur; I've just had the (i.e. my) hair done. Sorry for changing the header -- feel free to ignore! Grice's _bootstrap_ is meant to illustrate the problems perhaps pointed out by D. Frederick: a neurologist's description of the physical even underlying my moving the fingers may be -- at what Grice calls Level L1 -- in "Method in philosophical psychology" -- _irrelevant_ when it comes to my _explaining_ why I moved them (Level 2). There's no sense of introducing a Level 1 that will not allow us, later to pull ourselves, yes, by our own bootstraps? Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1215855013x1201028747/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=De cemailfooterNO62) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Feb 1 15:15:15 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2009 15:15:15 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] sub specie Message-ID: In a message dated 1/31/2009 4:41:28 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes in "Davidson's 'Under a Description' trick: All this talk about descriptions in connection with action theory is what happens when you dispense with "ideas" in action. ---- For the historical record, perhaps he was trying (with Anscombe) to reproduce some 'scholastic' terminology. It would be as "under a ..." would be the Latin "sub ..." Now the phrase I found in the OED is Spinoza's "sub specie" which are of two types, 'eternity' and 'temporality' (There is a third use, 'under the ... [species] of 'death''). I would think that 'specie' here as the OED notes is related to 'spec-', to see. To it's under a "guide", to use Hector Neri Castaneda's jargon, which S. R. Bayne has elsewhere used. sub specie ?ternitatis, ?under the aspect of eternity?, i.e. viewed in relation to the eternal; in a universal perspective. [Cf. Spinoza Ethices (a 1677), in Opera Posthuma, 1677, v. xxix. 254.] Hence sub specie temporis, viewed in relation to time rather than eternity. 1896 W. CALDWELL Schopenhauer's System v. 268 Art enables us somehow to see things sub specie aeternitatis. Ultimately, it must be lawyers' talk. The death of Caesar, the crossing by Caesar of the Rubicon, the killing of Polonius, the tying of my shoes. It's _one_ action 'sub' many different 'specie'. Which one is _basic_? It seems like a not too obdurate or obtuse point for a philosopher to consider! Of course the question is opened as to whether all you can _view_ ('specie') you can _describe ("under a description"), and more importantly, even as an agent! Since it's difficult to find a genitive form ('aeternitatis', 'mortis', etc.) for all we mean, I would think that 'sub specie S1', under one description, 'sub specie S2', under another, should do. Not that illuminates anything, but perhaps brings a link to an earlier stage of philosophy, should we wanted that. Cheers, J. L. **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://www.dell.com/co ntent/products/features.aspx/laptops_great_deals?c=us%26cs=19%26l=en%26s=d hs%26~ck=anavml) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Feb 1 15:23:03 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2009 15:23:03 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Diva Goes Through The Motions Message-ID: Almost --- Re-reading S. R. Bayne's quote from Davidson (AE, p. 51): When I tie my shoelaces, there is on the one hand the movement of my fingers, and on the other, the movement of the laces. ---- I am amused that it seems to be always _motions_ this, _motions_ that. Like a level of physical description (what Grice has as Level 1, say) is mandatory. Of course, a description of an action could be: "Stay quiet" (i.e. do not stand up -- provided all the members of the jury are seated). By staying quiet (i.e. not going through any motion), the agent A _convicted_ the convict. ---- A perhaps more amusing example. I was reading an interview to La Stupenda, Joan Sutherland. The interviewer, in the typical bitchy way, asked her, "I guess you have to practise a lot -- everyday" The Dame, with all the dame-dignity, replied, "Actually, a lot of my rehearsals are _mental_." It's like an actor (a mime) going through the motions, to use Davidson's example, of tying his shoe. Surely he can do that without moving the lace (which is nonexistent, in this case). Perhaps the mime learns to do this because we, as humans, can do things _as if_ (als ob -- Weininger). But in any case, not always _motions_ are required. And we should allow that even for actions whose 'sub specie' is physical: like Dame Joan's singing -- we should allow for 'going through the motions' (rehearsing mentally, in a sort of vocal-thinking). The other day I was reading this history of Opera and there's a fascimile of a letter Wagner wrote to the Director of the Covent Garden (an Italian at that time): "I have no intention to have my opera translated into Italian" Wagner wrote. The fascimile shows, however, and the caption reads, that the handwriting is _his_ secretary. So _who_ is being rude? Cheers, JL **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://www.dell.com/co ntent/products/features.aspx/laptops_great_deals?c=us%26cs=19%26l=en%26s=d hs%26~ck=anavml) From rpsevero at gmail.com Sun Feb 1 17:49:18 2009 From: rpsevero at gmail.com (=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Rog=E9rio_Passos_Severo?=) Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2009 20:49:18 -0200 Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine's "two dogmas" In-Reply-To: <992025.99720.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <200901311729.43029.rbj@rbjones.com> <992025.99720.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <86c7bd2d0902011449q587d96f5m4d29fc501eacbe0f@mail.gmail.com> Dear Steve, Roger, JL, and others interested in this thread, When Quine says that he is rejecting the analytic/synthetic distinction, what does he mean? A straightforward interpretation says that he is rejecting the possibility of making the distinction. But this interpretation is untenable, because Quine himself draws the distinction in Roots of Reference (pp. 78-80) and elsewhere. So we have to find an alternative interpretation, which is what Hylton did: Quine was rejecting not the possibility of drawing the distinction, but the claim that there is an epistemically significant analytic/synthetic distinction. We can still draw the distinction, but it will not do the job that Carnap and others assigned to it. Quine is not rejecting the distinction, but the idea that there is a distinction which can do the job Carnap assigned to it (namely: explaining the justification of a priori sentences by saying they are true in virtue of meaning). Steve said in a previous message that Quine's distinction is not the same as Carnap's, because Quine's is based on the notion of stimulus-meaning whereas Carnap's is based on a full fledged notion of meaning. From a Quinean point of view, however, this reasoning relies on a notion of sameness of distinction which is just as untenable (for the Quinean) as the notion of sameness of meaning. The sentences that fall on under Quine's notion of analyticity are the same that fall under Carnap's, regardless of what they mean. Carnap's distinction and Quine's are extensionally interchangeable. Best wishes, --Rog?rio From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Feb 1 17:53:20 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2009 17:53:20 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Understandable! Message-ID: In a message dated 1/31/2009 1:01:44 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, rbj at rbjones.com writes in "Re: Quine's "two dogmas"": Hunting for specific references, I see that he says that in "Two Dogmas Reconsidered" (p270) (and in Word and Object section 12) Quine accepts explicitly that "all batchelors are unmarried" is analtyic. ----- Very good. It may do, here, to reconsider Grice/Strawson's two examples (in "In defense of a dogma" -- Strawson had the courtesy of _never_ reprinting this essay, although the (c) is indeed Strawson/Grice). Anyway, their two examples involve descriptions rather than 'terms' proper, and are pretty convoluted. We will see that they are not interested in the sentences themselves ('theirselves'? :)) but in the replies they elicit from addressees: i. My three-year old daughter is an adult ii. And she understands Russell's Theory of Types --- The addressee, as he interrupts the utterer goes: "My three-year old daughter is an adult" --- UNUNDERSTANDABLE! "... and she understands Russell's Theory of Types." --- UNBELIEVABLE! So it boils down, in G/S's picture that the good reply for an analytically TRUE (now) utterance, now would be as per the subject-header, "Understandable!", while "Believable!" we can keep for synthetically true (now) utterance. I fail to see if this is an advancement: It could be hard to sustain that analytically true sentences we _don't_ believe, but that's just as well. But back to the unmarried bachelor. I fail to see if I am one. But I once saw this American film, with a woman I then loved, Jill Clayborough (she of the Blackwell list of "ill-dressed"). The title, and it was with Alan Bates, was "An Unmarried Woman". I don't think "Bachelorette" would do. But a man who is divorced (or has gone through a divorce) may be said to re-become a 'bachelor'. Of course we shouldn't be concerned with etymologies, since I would be surprised if that sentence, in Latin, say, makes _sense_ (analytic or other!). It's not a 'bachelor of arts', for example. And we are not talking of 'civil unions' here, either. "All bachelors are unmarried" Since this is, in the Grice/Strawson diagnosis, meant to be analytically true, the elicitation is, "Understandable!". I.e. it's not something we may come to _believe_. Why? The reason may have to do with 'meaning postulates' -- the only bit in Carnap (nice guy, ultimately), Introduction to Semantics, I guess I still keep at the Swimming-Pool Library. He uses "M" for Married, "U" for 'unmarried', and "B" for bachelor. So, we then need the "horseshoe" for entailment. We need a predicate calculus, and we need something we don't have, a predicate calculus which is _decidable_. I.e. one that for each utterance or sentence it tells us, alla Turing, or algorithmically, if it is a theorem or not. So the idea behind the meaning-postulate is that we, qua designers of the System -- let's call it System Q, alla Quine, as Grice did --, postulate: It will be assigned the truth-value "1" for the following material 'implication' "If B, U" Or better for "(x) Bx ) Ux" -- where ")" is the horseshoe we are postulating, as 'meaning', i.e. as an _interpretation_ of the relevant fragment of System Q, that the class of married bachelors is _null_, and more, that it _has_ to be null. The sense of necessity coming from making it a 'theorem', i.e. true under every interpretation. I don't know about Quine, but I'd analyse 'unmarried' as involving the "~". This is controversial. A. Zwicky for example, the lingust, thinks that 'isn't' has a different logical form from "is not". And it has been said that "The king of France is unbald" is pretty believable, too. If we use 'married' though we could simplify the formula "(x) Bx ) Ux" or provide a more basic structure: ~(Ex)Bx & Mx --- but I fear that Carnap requires meaning postulates to be of the '(x)' type. There's a further problem with 'all', as Strawson notes in "Introduction to logical theory" -- and any account of Quine's reception in England should pay some detail to his "A Logician's Landscape" for the PQ? --. "All" fails to provide 'substitutional' quantification in most cases. We need "every", which apparently does. "Every bachelor is unmarried", or "It is not the case that there is at least one bachelor who is married". Now you are speaking sense, I hear Humpty Dumpty say as he pats me on my shoulder. bachelor. And I wish philosophers in the twentieth century (but then they didn't have online access to it -- and I fear mine is not eternal either) could quote more from the OED (Davidson does in "On saying that"). The OED notes about 'bachelor': "The original meaning being uncertain, the sense-development is also doubtful." which is a Duhemite good start for the underdogma! The OED continues: The "baccalarius" "applied in 8th c. to rustics male and female who worked for the colonus or tenant of a mansus. (See Deloche, Cartulaire de Beaulieu Introd. ?clairc. xxii.) -- But life, some will say, is too short to see the eclairc. xxii -- I trust them. As for the 'bacca' bit there are two theories. On one it would be cognate with 'vaccine' and meaning 'cow-boy' or 'cow-girl'. The OED has it: "bacca, late L. and Romanic for vacca cow, through *baccalis (cf. ovilis from ovis sheep), in which case it might be ?grazing farm,? and baccalarius one employed on it." The other theory has the baccalarius as the holder of the bacculum or stick: "Littr? (without accounting for the sense) suggests Celtic bachall stick (a. L. baculus)". I've accounted for the sense, 'the holder of the stick', male or female. The first recorded OED cite is "Syre ong bacheler..ow art strong & corageus." R. Glouc. 453, 1297. As for 'married' the OED is not too promising: "of uncertain origin." The OED being 'anglos' they discard Priscian: "The first element is **probably** [my emphasis. JLS] not, as proposed by Priscian and many subsequent etymologists, mari-, mas ?man, male?". Although it states that "[[mari] may be cognate with a number of words for young men and women" (in languages other than Latin). As for the history, they attest Italian 'maritare' (1250). Abd the first attested cite being: "He lete hure marie to is sone at was is eir." 1325 11000 Virgins (Corpus Cambr.) 14 in C. D'Evelyn & A. J. Mill S. Eng. Legendary (1956) 443 Cheers, JL **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://www.dell.com/co ntent/products/features.aspx/laptops_great_deals?c=us%26cs=19%26l=en%26s=d hs%26~ck=anavml) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Feb 1 18:52:08 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2009 18:52:08 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine's "two dogmas" Message-ID: In a message dated 2/1/2009 5:54:56 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, rpsevero at gmail.com writes: Quine was rejecting not the possibility of drawing the distinction, but the claim that there is an epistemically significant analytic/synthetic distinction. We can still draw the distinction, but it will not do the job that Carnap and others assigned to it. Quine is not rejecting the distinction, but the idea that there is a distinction which can do the job Carnap assigned to it (namely: explaining the justification of a priori sentences by saying they are true in virtue of meaning). ----- This would, I hope, coincide with Grice's latter thoughts on 'analyticity' in his "Life and Opinions" (pp. 54ff). Grice suggests that the distinction has to be made within a _theory_ and that, as methodological decisions go, comes along with a pragmatist ring to it. Will it _do_. I like this idea of connecting Carnap's distinction with Carnap's _aim_ and Quine's observation that the distinction will not fulfill Carnap's aim. I'll try to look for the more specific reference. Thanks, J. L. Speranza **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://www.dell.com/co ntent/products/features.aspx/laptops_great_deals?c=us%26cs=19%26l=en%26s=d hs%26~ck=anavml) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Feb 1 20:05:29 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2009 20:05:29 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] In Defense of an Underdog Message-ID: "I started as under-dog and came out top-dog." "There is an indefinable expression in his face and figure of having been vanquished, of having succumbed, of having been ?under-dog? as the saying is. Daily Tel. 30 Apr. 3 1887. underdog: the dog in a fight beaten by the top-dog. top dog, lit. the dog uppermost or ?on top? in a fight. Oddly, 'top-dog' would seem linguistically a retronym. The quote OED registers post-dates 'underdog': The most popular argument in favour of the war is that it will make the individual Briton top dog in South Africa. Speaker, 28 Apr. 1900 (cf. 1906 P. WHITE Eight Guests (Tauchn.) I. 66 Marcus had never had a tussle yet without coming out ?top dog!? 1906 Daily Chron. 26 Mar. 6/4, I recall..many in which I started as under-dog and came out top-dog. In a message dated 2/1/2009 5:54:56 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, rpsevero at gmail.com writes in "Re: Quine's 'two dogmas': Quine is not rejecting the distinction, but the idea that there is a distinction which can do the job Carnap assigned to it (namely: explaining the justification of a priori sentences by saying they are true in virtue of meaning). ---- This is good. And sometimes we tend to forget, "of empiricism". Two dogmas OF EMPIRICISM. Grice/Strawson, "We'll only be concerned with _one_ dogma [of empiricism]". I'm not too familiar with Carnap's views but Coffa was, and that may help. I will revise Grice's ideas in "Life and Opinions", pp. 54ff, but it seems that the focus EMPIRICISM may be the key. Obviously, when G/S replied to Quine, they were not really concerned with what _Quine_ was replying to. Philosophy is like that. You can take someone's rejecting a distinction out of context somehow. I wouldn't call G/S 'empiricists' for one. Who would? I mean who would I call 'empiricist'? J. S. Mill and _he_ apparently denied the distinction too in that he would claim that _all_ notions are 'empirical', or, shall we say, 'synthetical'. Unfortunately, while Mill was mandatory reading in Oxford (I was browing at some old catalogues...) his position was never mainstream! And then you have Ayer in his Gollancz book _talking_ of the analytic-synthetic distinction which _became_ kind of the 'dogma' for the 'analytic' movement at least as far as Oxford was concerned (They loved to hate him). From an online essay by A. Sullivan: "There do not exist two distinct types of reality in the world which require two distinct modes of expression. This leads Quine to conclude that the analytic-synthetic distinction is a purely logical convention that is ontologically unnecessary and empirically superfluous. In this respect, Quine agrees with the radical empiricism of Mill, with its claim that there is no a priori knowledge. The fact that something is the case, or even the fact that something seems to be necessarily the case, does not imply the reality of a priori truths. Quine goes so far a to refer to the notion of a priori knowledge as a "metaphysical article of faith." ----- By 1956, Millian radical empiricism had become a bit of an underdogma (to use R. Grandy's pun) for Grice (and Strawson) to feel they could be trusted to run to its defense. What surprised me about G/S, is -- how much is G's, how much is S's? I for one would not think it was Sir Peter's idea to necessarily defend the underdog. In fact, one of the most hateful passages in philosophy comes from his otherwise delightful "Autobiographical Essay" in "The library of living philosophers". He was I think in Hungary. Someone in the audience says, "But you look like a perfect petit-burgeoise". "Well," he replied, calmly, that's what I am". When he was in Argentina (brought by Rabossi) many met him. I didn't but my teacher would say, "If you want to have an idea of how P. F. Strawson looks like, think of the actor playing the older detective in "The professionals"". Of course he was wrong. Sir Peter could be handsomER than that. Cheers, JL author of "Let sleeping topdogs sleep" **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://www.dell.com/co ntent/products/features.aspx/laptops_great_deals?c=us%26cs=19%26l=en%26s=d hs%26~ck=anavml) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Feb 1 20:36:17 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2009 20:36:17 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] In Defense of an Underdogma Message-ID: --- I think this way it's edited for the better. And the original reference is from Grice, "Meaning Revisited" (originally in N. Smith, "Mutual Knowledge", Academic Press, 1981), repr. in WOW (Way of Words). JLS Now Dan Frederick will think if he can defend the topdog. A lot of Quine's humor comes from this 'article of faith' thing --. Indeed, if Empiricism is like a credo, it _should_ have a few articles of faith. So one is not sure how the 'metaphor' works there. Empiricism without Dogmas? It's like Husserl's "Philosophy Without Presuppositions". As an Anglican, I cannot say. Grice was sometimes confused about dogmas. He said (WOW, iii) that he remains an Anglican C. of E., and he is committed to the 31 Articles, even if he doesn't know what they mean or say... "In defense of the underdogma" rather than "an underdogma", I realise, sounds better, and I think that's the way Grice uses in "Meaning Revisited" above and not necessarily in reference to his 1956 joint article. Cheers, JL **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://www.dell.com/co ntent/products/features.aspx/laptops_great_deals?c=us%26cs=19%26l=en%26s=d hs%26~ck=anavml) From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Mon Feb 2 09:46:09 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2009 14:46:09 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine's "two dogmas" In-Reply-To: <86c7bd2d0902011449q587d96f5m4d29fc501eacbe0f@mail.gmail.com> References: <200901311729.43029.rbj@rbjones.com> <992025.99720.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <86c7bd2d0902011449q587d96f5m4d29fc501eacbe0f@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <8379DC6AD80B41AF9259B90EFD8197E3@DFLVQC1J> Hi Rog?rio, Just a couple of points. While it is in general a good policy to try to interpret a philosopher in a way that does not attribute inconsistency to him, we have to recognise that people who devote their lives to learning will, at times, actually learn something and as a consequence revise their earlier views. So the fact that Quine says something in 1951 which he appears to contradict in 1973 (and even in 1960) could just show that he has changed his mind. I?ve not studied Quine in a long while, so I am very unsure what his view is. But if, as you say, he was (at least in his later writings) rejecting not the possibility of drawing the analytic/synthetic distinction, but just the claim that there is an epistemically significant analytic/synthetic distinction, then I think he may be right. This is, I think, the view I put forward myself in a recent response to Roger. Cheers. Danny From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Feb 2 09:46:32 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2009 09:46:32 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] "Analytically" Message-ID: Yesterday I was watching this silly film on TV, about a cheerleader -- set in the USA. At one point one of the characters, getting angry, says: "eff why you, you're out" or words to that effect, where the first clause is the oral equivalent of "f. y. i.", which if Grice is right in his teleological justification of the cooperative principle, should preface _all_ our conversational moves (For Grice, even moves of the "!" force are basically attempts at _informing_ -- the symmetrical view that all moves are attempts at _influencing_ is just as valid, if not more -- see Grice, "Method" for the reduction of "Belief" to "Desire" -- and similar attempts by others -- JP, 1979, footnote, ... :)). Anyway, when Grice dealt with irony he noted (moved by comments of Albritton -- who had invited him to deliver the William James, incidentally) that "He's a scoundrel" can be used _ironically_; but, Grice suggests, to say, "Ironically, he is a scoundrel", _kills_, as it were, the purpose of "irony". "Tautologically" works similarly. Grice's examples are two: War is war Women are women -- These could be taken as 'analytic' and so you know where I'm heading to. It would be otiose to say, "Tautologically, war is war" "Tautologically, women are women." What about 'analytic'. Many -- e.g. G. N. Leech -- have suggested that so-called analytic sentences like Bachelors are unmarried men Occulists are eye-doctors etc. can have a _didactic_ purpose: they explain about the rules of the language. If they are within the class of _tautologies_, they are uninformative, though at the 'f. y. i.' level -- unless of course we include 'didactic' under 'informative' (and why wouldn't we). The point I'm trying to make -- in a rush as usual -- is that there's little (job-wise) analytic sentences do for us. "War is war", or "Bachelors _are_ unmarried, you know" seem to work best at the level of the 'implicature'. For this to happen we have to wed to the idea of a calculus as the one Grice describes at the beginning of "Logic and Conversation" and define, strictly, a tautology and an analytic sentence within a system. Provided this works, _then_ we can extend the scope of what an Utterer may _mean_ by uttering an analytic sentence. I was amused one to note that "Women are women" and "War is war" can be answers to the same question: A: So you would condone the policies undertaken by Margaret Thatcher during the Falklands War? B (Gurkha): (a) Well, war is war (b) Well, [amused], women are women. The implicatures _differ_. There may be other uses for 'analytically' as this sort of parenthetical alla Urmson (see his "Parentheticals" repr. in Caton). Symmetrically, "Synthetically" would seem just as otiose, "Synthetically, f. y. i., my cat has grown quite fat". Which leads you to think that perhaps the analytic-synthetic distinction, a top-dogma at that, should after all be best left for the _rationalists_ (at heart). Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://www.dell.com/co ntent/products/features.aspx/laptops_great_deals?c=us%26cs=19%26l=en%26s=d hs%26~ck=anavml) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Mon Feb 2 17:27:15 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2009 14:27:15 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] From BRUCE AUNE: Quine and "the" a/s distinction Message-ID: <70348.10332.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Steve, Recent discussion among your group on "the" A/S distintion and Quine have prompted the following remarks. ?Can you make them available to your group?Best, Bruce It seems to me that the contributors?in your recent exchanges on analyticity?miss key points in Quine?s thought, early and late, about analyticity.? I offer some comments of my own.As I see it, Quine?s negative attitude toward an analytic/synthetic distinction rested on two basis sorts of considerations, (1) the inadequacy of known attempts to draw such a distinction, and (2) general considerations about meaning and what it is reasonable to accept as true. ?Re (1).? Quine thought that, for philosophical purpose, a conception of analytic truth as truth by virtue of meaning was too vague to be taken seriously.? In ?Two Dogmas? (1953) he criticized three post-Kantian definitions of analytic truth that purport to be reasonably precise. The first one he criticized was essentially Frege?s, though he did not identify it as such. (Frege claimed in his Foundations of Arithmetic that his conception was an attempt to update Kant?s and to make an a/s distinction applicable to complex statements having the logical structures that can be specified by means of his new mathematical logic.) Quine?s criticism was focused on the class of supposed analytic truths that, like ?No bachelor is married,? are not logically true.? According to Frege, statements of this kind are analytic just when they can be proved to be true by general logical laws and definitions.? Quine described these statements a little differently, saying that they can be turned into logical truths by ?putting synonyms for synonyms,? the synonyms being expressions (words, phrases) appearing in the definiens and definiendum of the relevant definitions.? If the definitions are acceptable, these expressions must be ?cognitively synonymous?: with the exception of poetic quality and psychological associations, their meaning must be the same.? Quine?s criticism of this means of drawing an a/s distinction is based essentially on what he said about synonymy. Quine considered two further definitions, or groups of them, but neither, as he understood them, appeared to work for all cases or provide the desired understanding.? One definition was Carnap?s, which Carnap explicitly applied to artificial, formal languages, the idea being that a statement of such a language is analytic if its truth is a consequence of the semantical rules laid down for that language.? The other definition was based on the notion of empirical confirmation, although Quine related it to the Verification Theory of Meaning: An analytic statement is one that is ?confirmed no matter what.?The philosopher Quine admired most and took most seriously at the time of Two Dogmas was Carnap; he made this clear later in the memorial remarks he made about Carnap on the occasion of Carnap?s death and published in the 1970 Proceedings of the AAPS.? As I explain in my chapter on analyticity in my recent book, Carnap agreed with Quine that a worthwhile a/s distinction could not be drawn for a natural language.Forty years after he published ?Two Dogmas..,? Quine published ?Two Dogmas in Retrospect.? In this later paper he summarized the more generous attitude toward analyticity that he had expressed in some of his later work.? According to this more generous attitude, ?analyticity undeniably has a place at a common-sense level?? It is intelligible and often useful in discussions,? he said, ?to point out that some disagreement is purely a matter of words rather than of fact.?? A paraphrase that avoids a troublesome word can often resolve the disagreement.? Also, in talking with a foreigner we can sometimes recognize ?some impasse as due to his having mislearned an English word rather than to his having a bizarre view of the subject matter.? To deal with such cases, Quine offered what he called a ?rough definition of analyticity.?? According to this rough definition, a sentence is analytic for a native speaker if he learned its truth by ?learning the use of one or more of its words.?? He improved on this rough definition by ?providing,? he said, ?for deductive closure, so that truths deducible from analytic ones by analytic steps would count as analytic in turn.?Quine claimed that the augmented definition accommodates such sentences as ?No bachelor is married? and also the basic laws of logic.? ?Anyone who goes counter to modus ponens,? he said, or anyone ?who affirms a conjunction and denies one of its components, is simply flouting what he learned in learning to use ?if? and ?and.??? (He limits this to native speakers, he said, because a foreigner could have learned our words indirectly by translation.)? Given the deductive closure qualification, he concluded that all logical truths in his sense??that is, the logic of truth functions, quantification, and identity?would then perhaps qualify as analytic, in view of G?del?s completeness proof.?A little later in ?Two Dogmas in Retrospect,? after expressing his generous attitude toward analyticity, Quine becomes more negative, saying ?In fact my reservations over analyticity are the same as ever, and they concern the tracing of any demarcation, even a vague and approximate one, across the domain of sentences in general.?? By ?sentences in general? he means all sentences, not just the ones expressing logical laws and truths such as ?No bachelors are married.? He supports this generally negative attitude with two reasons.? The first is that ?we don?t in general know how we learned a word, nor what truths were learned in the process.?? The second is that we have no reason to expect uniformity in this matter of learning from speaker to speaker? (p. 271).If the only truths we can reasonably claim to be analytic are those of elementary logic and trivialities such as ?Bachelors are unmarried males,? then the concept of analytic truth does not have the importance that empiricists take it to have.? This is Quine?s position, and of course it is right. Re (2).??In ?Two Dogmas? Quine claimed that empirical considerations might require us to ?give up? any statement, even a supposed logical truth such as excluded middle.??But as he acknowledged in ?Two Dogmas in Retrospect,? giving up a statement may amount to changing its meaning rather than a falsifying it.??(The learned community ?gave up? talking about lunatics as people suffering from lunar madness not because they encountered counter instances but because they became convinced that the term ?lunatic? didn?t apply to anything: it became useless for scientific purposes.)??In view of this I find it very doubtful that by the time of ?Two Dogmas in Retrospect (1991),? Quine's continued opposition to a useful a/s distinction had anything to do with his holism.??I believe that his attitude rested mostly on the idea that the notion of cognitive meaning was inherently unclear and that he could think of no promising way of drawing a philosophically useful distinction.??In opposition to him, I try to draw one myself in my book,?An Empiricist Theory of Knowledge.??As I see it, the worthwhile questions to discuss in relation to an a/s distinction are: "How, in detail, is it to be drawn?" and "Can it be defended?" ?Bruce Aune hasEML = false; -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Feb 2 19:48:12 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2009 19:48:12 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] From BRUCE AUNE: Quine and "the" a/s distinction Message-ID: Thanks to S. R. Baynes for forwarding the comments by B. Aune, and thanks to B. Aune for making them! Good to have his commentary in the annals of analytics. Some running comments, for the record: B. Aune writes: >As I see it, Quine?s negative attitude toward an analytic/synthetic >distinction rested on two basis sorts of considerations, (1) >the inadequacy of known attempts to draw such a distinction, >and (2) general considerations about meaning and what >it is reasonable to accept as true. --- Re: (2), as I mentioned in my exchange with R. B. Jones, and I _have_ to find this paper, J. F. Bennett ("Linguistic Behaviour") makes a similar claim. For those who came to the defense of the dogma (like Strawson and Grice) it was in a way to come to the defense, of, say, a top-dog for them, 'meaning'. Indeed the _reductio_ would be: no analytic, no meaningful. Vice versa: meaningful, hence analytic. Bennett shows that _that_ is the connection one can make between Grice's "In defense of a dogma" (1965) and his one-year-later, "Meaning" (1957). In my essay, I noted this is perhaps historically inaccurate, since "Meaning" was written already in (1948) and Grice never felt like the analytic-synthetic distinction was a matter of life or death ('Life and Opinions', pp. 54ff). B. Aune continues by noting that one of Quine's targets of attacks could be Frege: "Frege claimed in his Foundations of Arithmetic that his conception was an attempt to update Kant?s" --- incidentally, perhaps we should give more of a consideration -- I'm thinking of R. B. Jones's historical remarks on analytic -- to Kant's "subject-predicate" view, which is perhaps Leibnizian in nature. The way _I_ think I learned to teach 'analytic' was in fact in terms of the subject-and-predicate jargon ("an analytically true sentence is one whose predicate that does not affirm of the subject anything that was not alrady contained therein"). I'm not sure Grice would regard this as serious, but Strawson (who was _wedded_ to the idea of a subject and a predicate) may have. B. A.: "and to make an a/s distinction applicable to complex statements having the logical structures that can be specified by means of his new mathematical logic.)" The other point one could perhaps make historical that J. L. Austin had translated for Blackwell Frege's Arithmetic, so by defending the topdogma went underdogma in Quine, Grice and Strawson were also coming to the defense, if not of Frege, of Frege's translator? B. A.: "with the exception of poetic quality and psychological associations, their meaning must be the same. Quine?s criticism of this means of drawing an a/s distinction is based essentially on what he said about synonymy." Oddly, I recently heard Timothy Williamson give a talk, if I recall alright, on _synonymy_ of 'emotional' terms (the semantics of derogation, I think he calls it). I for one, have never been able to find _one_ synonym. I think it _is_ a metaphysical ghost, this idea of a synonym. To me, what Frege called "colour" (farbung), which includes the 'poetic quality' and 'psychological association', _always_ comes in the way (for me) to even _try_ to get at the alleged 'cognitively synonymy'. B. A.: "The other definition was based on the notion of empirical confirmation, although Quine related it to the Verification Theory of Meaning: An analytic statement is one that is ?confirmed no matter what.?" --- This could have been a nod to Ayer, whom Quine possibly met in Vienna (the two 'anglos', and _only_ two anglos). I'm less sure I understand Ayer's idea of analytic in "Language, Truth and Logic". It seems that he is taking a pre-verificationist account, more alla the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus or early Russell: where 'analytic' means 'does not talk about the world', and is just plain symbolic vacuity (mathematics being the epitome). B. A. quotes from Quine's later 'more generous' (or charitable) view on 'analytic' (Although the problem seemed to be with the 'analytic-synthetic' DISTINCTION, it seems Quine was biased in weighing the _analytic_ side as being philosophically more problematic): B. A. quotes from Quine: "It is intelligible and often useful in discussions to point out that some disagreement is purely a matter of words rather than of fact.? ("[learned its truth by] ?learning the use of one or more of its words.? Well, that _is_ an article of faith, and back to Quine's play on the idea of a _dogma_. For _what_ is a dogma, religiously? I don't think (but then I _am_ a furriner) I've _ever_ learned the truth of a sentence "by learning the use of one or more of its words"! To start with, I don't count _sentences_ by words, but by _ideas_! B. A. continues quoting from Quine: ?Anyone who affirms a conjunction and denies one of its components, is simply flouting what he learned in learning to use [...] ?and.?? If I may, I would confess to having learned to use 'and' from R. M. Harnish! He notes that (1) Whitehead and Russell wrote _Principia_ does not _entail_ (it does for me, but I _am_ a furriner) (2) Russell wrote _Principia_. So we need to restrict to _some_ uses of 'and', I guess (I'm a total truth-functionalist when it comes to 'and'; but with Strawson -- and Grice -- and I refer here to Strawson's 'Introduction' to his "Philosophical Logic" collection -- Oxford Readings in Philosophy --, the whole point of their venture (Grice's and Strawson's) was to _challenge_ some of Quine's presuppositions on what 'the meaning of 'and'' versus 'the use of 'and' _is_! B. A.: "He limits this to native speakers, he said, because a foreigner could have learned our words indirectly by translation." Or an anglo may have learned English as a foreign language. I think Max Mueller would be a good case. Etymologically, 'and' means 'against' (as in andswear, answer), so the conjunctional nature of Latin 'et', or Greek 'kai', should not necessarily reflect what we mean by the ampersand ("p & q")? B. A.: "Given the deductive closure qualification, he concluded that all logical truths in his sense??that is, the logic of truth functions, quantification, and identity?would then perhaps qualify as analytic, in view of G?del?s completeness proof.? I'm glad to hear from B. A. Quine's less generous views on the phylogenesis of language! ?we don?t in general know how we learned a word, nor what truths were learned in the process.? (p. 271). ---- Well, it would be good to find a good example of disagreement over 'and' other than the 'implicit conjunction' of the Harnish type. One could be: (1) The Lone Ranger rode away and jumped on his horse. (2) The Lone Ranger jumped on his horse and rode away Given the commutability of 'and', they would be 'cognitively synonymous' but not, perhaps to one's regular aunt. This involves not the conjunction-elimination rule mentioned earlier by Quine (':anyone who affirms a conjunction and denies one of its components, is simply flouting what he learned in learning to use [...] ?and") but the standard generalised conversational implicature of 'and' +> 'and then'. B. A.: If the only truths we can reasonably claim to be analytic are [...] trivialities such as ?Bachelors are unmarried males,? then the concept of analytic truth does not have the importance that empiricists take it to have. This is Quine?s position, and of course it is right. --- In this respect R. B. Jones's online copy of the Essay by Locke is illuminating, as are his historical notes, that remind us that Locke indeed speak of 'trivialities' here (a memorial on the old 'trivium' which _included_ logica/dialectica). ---- Re (2). In ?Two Dogmas? Quine claimed that empirical considerations might require us to ?give up? any statement, even a supposed logical truth such as excluded middle. ----- It is interesting to acknowledge here Quine's (or one of his) claim to OED fame: "truth-value gap". Strawson fell in love with it (Grice was more of a faithful one, as he was already wedded to Aristotle). I tend to regard Strawson's adultery with truth-value gaps as an affront to the Excluded Middle. ---- B. A. refers to 'lunatic': "lunatics as people suffering from lunar madness" and in this case, I would wonder if rather than a flouting of analyticity, it's not a flout of 'circularity'; for we are using 'madness' to define 'lunatic'. "people suffering from lunar ill-guided, socially disastrous, psychologically unrealistic, influences" may be a better paraphrase? "not because they encountered counter instances" ---- "but because they became convinced that the term ?lunatic? didn?t apply to anything" --- In a way, I would think a counter-instance _was_ found: someone who is ill-guided, socially disastrous, psychologically unrealistic' has not been proved to have received _lunar_ influences. B. A. concludes: " I believe that his attitude rested mostly on the idea that the notion of cognitive meaning was inherently unclear" --- and so perhaps, in retrospect, J. F. Bennett _is_ right, and that it's Quine's anti-semanticism that takes the lead (but I'm expressing myself vaguely and confusedly). As a final note, and one with which I thoroughly agree, B. A. writes: "As I see it, the worthwhile questions to discuss in relation to an a/s distinction are: "How, in detail, is it to be drawn?" and "Can it be defended?"" But must leave that for a longer day. In a rush, Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://ad.doubleclick. net/clk;211531132;33070124;e) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Feb 2 21:05:05 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2009 21:05:05 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Topdogma Attacked Message-ID: "... that I can always be relied on the defense of the underdogma" Grice, "Meaning Revisited' WOW. Deviant Logics I will select [in my mind] a few passages from B. Aune's message forwarded by S. Bayne, as they relate to 'and'; since I have written extensively on that (to little avail, so far, but hey, such is the history of analytic philosophy). I'm not sure I follow Quine in joining truth-functional operators with 'quantification' and 'identity' in terms of Goedel on completeness. I draw quite a boundary between truth-functionality (as far as my thought-processes are concerned) _and_ quantification _and_ identity. Quine mentions 'if' and 'and', but I'm far less sure (than perhaps he was) that I understand 'if', so I'll stick with 'and'. Plus, I should stick to "&", since, well, natural languages, if I may be analytic, _are_ natural languages! ----- Quine makes a reference to something like &-intro and &-elim. ?anyone who affirms a conjunction and denies one of its components, is simply flouting what he learned in learning to use ... ?and.?? To review: &, + p ... q __________ "p & q" &, ~ p & q ___________ p "anyone who affirs a conjunction ("p & q") and denies one of the conjunts ("p") is ..." _not_ abiding by "&, ~". But what *is* "&, ~"? When it comes to "not" (Quine's reference here to "Excluded Middle" seems relevant) I feel we are treading trickier ground as it were. For ~ is not really a truth-connector, but a truth-functor, and I hold that "Excluded Middle" is a law about ~, rather than, say "or" ( p v q). Thus "The king of France is not bald" would be _true_ (rather than truth-value gappy) if 'the king of France' fails to refer (I'm here with Grice, WOW, "Presupposition and Conversational Implicature"). But back to "&". I take "&, +" and "&, -" (and Grice formalised them exactly like that in his contribution to the Quine festschrift, Words and Objections, ed. Hintikka/Davidson) are _natural_ deduction rules (Gentzen) -- but are they _syntactic_ or _semantic_? I take they are _syntactic_ and thus do not really _concern_ *meaning* (so Quineean anti-semanticists should not worry). It takes an interpretation (I under a system S) to provide truth-tables for, say, "&" p & q 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 ------ Now, I think it was via Susan Haak I learned about these things. Not only her "Philosophy of logics" but her Dutch-published book, "Deviant logics" -- relying heavily, as I recall, on Quine. So, it would seem that Quine was in fact responsible to bring into the analytical forum, as it were, the very possibility of a _deviant_ (the expression is perhaps not too happy) logics, where, ... er, things _get_ defined *differently*. Now, if Quine is right that Carnap was wrong about 'semantical rules' about 'truths which are not logical yet true by virtue of the meaning of its components" (I'm expressing vaguely), I'm less sure about what kind of _claim_ is it that we make when we just deal with the consistency or lack thereof of our truth-functional operators. Perhaps the pragmatist direction along the right lines is something like Gazdar's work on implicature (PhD, Reading -- book for Academic Press). He would reason along 'transcendental' lines. Why is it that we _need_ something like an "&" operator with such a _truth_ table? Is it conceivable that some 'foreign' community can do _without_ 'and'? What about _mere_ conjunction, as when Russell & Whitead suggest "pq" as formalisation for "p and q". What kind of claim is our claim about 'and'. Grice has a charming fragment about this in, I think, "Further notes" or "Presupposition" (but not I think in the WOW reprint version). He suggests, it's not a matter of our use of the vernacular 'and'. Even if we start using the ampersand sign, "&" -- as I may do in hanwriting a letter -- that does not mean that the 'implicature(s)' of 'and' will _detach_; '&' will, in spite of the logicists, retain what he calls 'metaphysical excrescences'! --- But what would philosophy _be_ if not a gate for us to _be allowed_ to contemplate 'deviant' logics, if only to criticise them? Or is it because we call them 'logics' (and yet 'deviant') that they are _beyond_ criticism!? Cheers, JL **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://ad.doubleclick. net/clk;211531132;33070124;e) From aune at philos.umass.edu Tue Feb 3 11:00:18 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 11:00:18 -0500 Subject: [hist-analytic] Notes on Conjunction, etc. Message-ID: <99B6CC2B-75AC-44B2-8D4B-2830970DD04E@philos.umass.edu> JL Speranza?s latest note, partly in response to an earlier note of mine, contains some observations on Quine?s and other logicians treatments of ?and.? I agree with many of JL?s observations, but I want to call attention to the fact that knowledgeable logicians are well aware of the fact that the truth-functional conjunction, often represented by an upside-down 'v' but sometimes by ?&?, is a sentence or clause connective, not a true counterpart to the English ?and.? The latter, unlike the former, can properly connect expressions from many categories other than clauses. It can connect noun phrases, as in ?Tom?s dog and Mary?s cat,? verb phrases, as in ?slipping and falling,? adjectival phrases, as in ?powerful and threatening,? and adverbial phrases, such as ?cautiously and prudently.? (I speak of phrases here, instead of simply nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs, because longer verbal, adverbial, etc. units can also be joined by ?and,? ?or,? ?neither,? ?nor,? and other vernacular conjunctions.) To say this is not to criticize the logician?s familiar symbols. Sometimes ?and? and so forth are used as clause connectives for which operations such as commutation holds, as in ?2 + 2 = 4 and 3 + 2 = 5.? Of course, as J.L. observed, commutation sometimes fails for the truth-functional ?and,? as in ?Tom sat down and started to eat,? which might be written more perspicuously as ?Tom sat down and then he started to eat.? G.H. Von Wright once had a little calculus featuring an ?and then? connective. A moral of my observations here is that, to avoid error, we have to be very careful when putting vernacular inferences into symbolic notation. If an 'or' isn't used as a truth-functional clause-connective, it should not be represented by a logician's '&'. J.L. also comments on Excluded Middle, saying he thinks it is really a law about the tilde rather than ?or? (or ?v?). I think it is ?about? both symbols if it is about either. Actually, it uses both and mentions neither. But Excluded Middle holds only for sentences (or clauses) that have a determinate meaning and satisfy the principle of Bivalence: when they are either true or false but not both. Sentences containing vague predicates such as ?fat? don?t (without regimentation) satisfy bivalence and so provide counter instances to Excluded Middle. Jack Sprat is clearly thin and his wife is clearly fat, but if Jack?s brother is a borderline case, neither clearly fat nor clearly thin, then the sentence ?Jack?s brother is fat? is (without regimentation) neither true nor false, and ?Jack?s brother is fat v ~( Jack?s brother is fat)? is not true and so is an exception to Excluded Middle. For various reasons, Carnap thought that the meaning of some predicates, including vague ones, can usefully be clarified incompletely by ?A-Postulates.? If I wish to use the predicate ?fat? in a discussion where I want my meaning to be relatively clear, I might offer a partial clarification of its meaning by offering two A- postulates: 1) (x)(x is fat -> ~(x is thin)) 2) (x)(x is obese -> x is fat). Carnap regarded A-postulates as semantical rules, so the two formulas I have just given could be considered true by virtue of the semantical rules of a certain system. As such they would count as analytic truths of that system. I defend Carnap on this matter in chapter 3 of my recent book; I can think of no enable objection to his procedure. My thanks to JL for the comments. Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Tue Feb 3 16:49:11 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 16:49:11 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] The Old Wykehamites Message-ID: Here in fond memory of Wykeham! ---- Thanks to B. Aune for his comments in "Notes on Conjunction", etc. Don't feel like pressurising anyone, if that's the word, but (have some time in my hands -- don't expect a reply, please note*) but have these notes that I composed this morning and have been burning with me since!) * (this caveat, "Don't feel obliged to reply or event comment on this" was a typical turn of phrase in Verdi's and Boito's correspondence, I read) ** Hopefully, D. Frederick will jum in, too. I enjoy his fresh approach to the history of analytic philosophy! In a message dated 2/3/2009, Bruce Aune writes in "Notes on Conjunction, etc." >JL Speranza?s latest note, partly in response to >an earlier note of mine, contains some observations on >Quine?s and other logicians treatments of 'and.' >I agree with many of JL?s observations, but I want to >call attention to the fact that knowledgeable logicians are >well aware of the fact that the *truth-functional* conjunction, >often represented by an upside-down 'v' but sometimes by ?&?, >is a sentence or [truth-evaluable] *clause* connective, >not a true counterpart to the English ?and.? >The latter, unlike the former, can properly >connect expressions from many categories other >than clauses. It can connect noun phrases, as in >?Tom?s dog and Mary?s cat,? >verb phrases, as in >?slipping and falling,? >adjectival phrases, as in ?powerful and threatening,? >and adverbial phrases, such as ?cautiously and prudently.? >(I speak of phrases here, instead of simply nouns, verbs, >adjectives, and adverbs, because longer verbal, adverbial, >etc. units can also be joined by ?and,? ?or,? ?neither,? ?nor,? >and other vernacular conjunctions.) >To say this is not to criticize the logician?s familiar symbols. >Sometimes ?and? and so forth are used as *clause* connectives >for which operations such as commutation holds, as in >?2 + 2 = 4 and 3 + 2 = 5.? >Of course, as J.L. observed, commutation sometimes >fails for the truth-functional ?and,? ---- Is 'fail' the right word? I think the whole point of Grice's _programme_ so called, is that it's _speakers_ who 'fail'! :) More on this below (on on another post, I hope!). I know it's pedantic to focus on a turn of phrase in a post meant for a discussion internet forum (D. Frederick got into some little trouble on another list for just using a colloquial expression -- but one cannot spend the eternity re-reading for editorial improvements! :). >as in >?Tom sat down and started to eat,? >which might be written more perspicuously as >?Tom sat down *and then* he started to eat.? >G.H. Von Wright once had a little calculus featuring an >?and then? connective. ---- I believe Grice (and he loved von Wright's neologisms, not just 'alethic', but 'prothetic' -- _Aspects of Reason_) and this temporal-sequence one, which I think Grice uses in his 'traditionalist' critique of Davidson's actions-and-events theory in the perhaps not too originally entitled (knowing Grice) essay, "Actions and Events" in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1988. I want to say that von Wright was perhaps into something more than the search for a 'and then' operator? I think he used "p / q" -- where, I think, he would read, "q, as brought about by p" -- but I may be confused. There seems to be an element of 'causality' brought into the picture, too. Oddly, Urmson -- who's sticking to Wittgenstein (the early) and Russell, rather, uses in "Philosophical Analysis": "He went to bed and took off his trousers" which is _temporal_ alright. On the other hand, I think it was Ryle (Dilemmas) who used, "He died and he swallowed the pill" -- which is, naturally, _temporal_ *and* causal. And I agree that most uses of 'and' _are_ confused. I wish we could go back to the old Latin lingo, where they merely appended '-que' at the end of things. Ditto for Greeks, and the 'men'/'de', enclitics if ever there were some. B. Aune continues: >A moral of my observations here is that, >to avoid error, we have to be very careful >when putting vernacular inferences >into symbolic notation. If an 'or' *isn't* >used as a *truth-functional* _clause_-connective, >it should not be represented by a logician's '&'. --- Well, I'm glad I have seldom occasion, if that's the expression, to use 'or'. I recall Jennings's noting (in "Genealogy of Disjunction") that the original _sense_ as it were, is 'other', as in "every other day". I realise that the Latins here were a bit otiose in having sive _and_ vel, but I'm glad the logician's 'wedge' is supposed to represent the 'vel' only. Oddly, Grice apparently never discussed the inclusive 'or' +> exclusive 'or' -- where '+>', after Levinson, I use for 'conversationally implicates'. He (Grice) rather focused on the implicature of 'or' to the effect that the utterer does not have not-truth-functional evidence for the disjunction). Similarly, it's odd Grice did not discuss the so-called 'if' +> 'iff' -- as Pears does, in "Ifs and Cans"; Grice focusing merely again on a correlative implicature, that the utterer does not have non-truth-functional evidence for either antecedent or consequent. B. Aune writes: >J.L. also comments on Excluded Middle, >saying he thinks it is really a law about the tilde --- Oddly, P. Smith (in his "Logic", CUP) calls it, and I guess I liked it, the 'squiggle'. I read the 'tilde' is actually the Spanish 'grandee' sign for the thing that goes above the "n". Odd. >rather than ?or? (or ?v?). I think it is ?about? both >symbols if it is about either. That was a good one, in trying to formalise: p v ~p / v, ~ ---> "p v ~p" / v, ~ if "p or not p" is about 'or' or 'not', it's about 'or' _and_ 'not'. :). >Actually, it uses both and mentions neither. Good! I guess I was trying to think of Russell-Grice's view on "The King of France's baldness" versus Strawson. For some reason, Strawson discusses the King's _wisdom_, but let that be. In a formalisation of, "There is a unique king of France and he is not bald", I wouldn't use 'or', yet the whole paraphernalia of truth-value gaps spring. Although it is true that a corollary would be that, For Strawson, "Either the King of France is bald or he is not" would bear a truth-value gap (_contra_ Russell-Quine-Grice). As Russell would add, in a _triple_ disjunction, " ... or else he is wearing (since a Hegelian likes a synthesis) a wig." (Incidentally, I have read Dummett's discussing the similarly monarchic statement, to a different purpose, of "Queen Elizabeth II wore a wig -- as she was bald" -- as an example of 'unverifiable by evidence', since it's quite a remote, anti-intuitionistic thing. Oddly, my mother who likes opera was commenting yesterday on how impressed she was by this version of "Roberto Devereux" (by Donizetti), when, in the final scene, Elizabeth II throws away her wig. But I'm disgressing). B. Aune: >But Excluded Middle holds only for >sentences (or clauses) that have a >determinate meaning --- and 'bald', alas, is not one of them. But I'm using in an absolute sense to mean, 'no hair whatsoever' >and satisfy the principle of Bivalence: >when they are either true or false >but not both. >Sentences containing vague predicates >such as ?fat? -- or indeed 'bald' some say. >don?t (without regimentation) >satisfy bivalence and so provide counter >instances to Excluded Middle. >Jack Sprat is clearly thin and his wife is >clearly fat, but if Jack?s brother is a borderline case, >neither clearly fat nor clearly thin, then >the sentence ?Jack?s brother is fat? is >(without regimentation) neither true nor false, >and >?Jack?s brother is fat v ~( Jack?s brother is fat)? >is not true and so is an exception to Excluded Middle. -- also if he doesn't exist, I guess. >For various reasons, Carnap thought that >the meaning of some predicates, including >vague ones, can usefully be clarified incompletely >by ?A-Postulates.? Some say he was a charming man, but this 'usefully clarify incompletely' beats me! :) >If I wish to use the predicate ?fat? in a discussion >where I want my meaning to be relatively clear, I >might offer a partial clarification of its meaning by >offering two A-postulates: >(x)(x is fat -> ~(x is thin)) >(x)(x is obese -> x is fat). I would think Julia Hirschberg would disagree. She invented what she called, I think, 'rank-implicatures'. As much as the Sargent-Major (who tucked me in my little woden bed) is _not_ a private, she wouldn't say (most ordinary speakers would say) an obese person is fat. But surely we can keep the true conditional as a true semantical rule, and treat the 'rank' phenomenon as clearly _implicatural_. B. Aune: >Carnap regarded A-postulates as semantical rules, >so the two formulas I have just given could be considered true >by virtue of the semantical rules of a certain system. It dawns on me that Geach's pleonetetic may also play a role here, but I'm _not_ good at grading gradual predicates! It would entail considerations on 'many' (fats), and even "too many". So a fat person would be one who has a body who has too many cells with too many fats. An obese person would be a fat person who has _far_ too many cells with _far_ too many fats in them. And so on. Apparently, the way doctors judge it is easily in terms of a _ratio_: if Jack's brother is x high and weighs y, then provided x/y is within the range of a bound variable (to quote Quine), he would be, if not _thin_, _okay_. B. Aune: >As such they would count as analytic truths >of that system. I defend Carnap on this matter in >chapter 3 of my recent book; >I can think of no enable objection to >his procedure. >My thanks to JL for the comments. No, no enable objection, no noble objection, either! Only perhaps what I called "Highly Powerful System G". You see, Grice, since he was _kind_, called his system, "System Q" (in "Words and Objections"). George Myro, in some unpublished work, but notably in his contribution to "P.G.R.I.C.E.", ed. Grandy/Warner, speaks of "System G", rather. I speak of "System G(sub h-p)" i.e. highly powrful, if not hopefully plausible" system G. Now, a system -- should it stop at syntactic and semantic rules? I would think, perhaps no, and that _pragmatic_ considerations may enter, as in connection with cancelling implicatures of the type "The king of France is not bald; he died many years ago and _never_ was seen with a wig, or with a bare cranium". Or of the type, "Well, he is fat; he is obese". "Well, I do have three children; I have fifty children", etc. The larger picture would relate to B. Aune's concluding remarks in his post on "the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction". I said I'd dedicate a longer day. He says (words to the effect): "How precisely can it be drawn? Can it be defended?" I would transfer those questions to the topic that fascinated Grice (_only_ after Strawson had to put it 'in his mouth' by saying that there _are_ differences in _sense_ between the vernacular 'devices' ('and', 'or', --- Grice indeed lists seven: 'not', 'and', 'or', 'if', 'all', 'some' and 'the') and their _formal_ counterparts. How precisely their connection should be described, if at all? I know that when I talk to some logicians (or pretend to talk, as when I browse through George Myro's posthumous, _Rudiments of Logic_) I have to pretend there's _no_ connection! As for _can_ the lack of connection be defended? I guess it can! I used to call this the C. P. Snow's "Two cultures" war. B. Aune speaks of 'knowledgeable logicians'. But Grice speaks rather of 'philosophy of logic'. While the online dictionary (Merriam-Webster, I think) defines Grice as "British logician", I think he is being underdescribed. (But then, can you believe it, the current OED3 has him as a "British _linguist_"! Please mailto:oed.co.uk, my messages _bounce!)). LARGER HISTORICAL PICTURE. I note that as far as Oxford is concerned there are now _two_ chairs of Logic! One the usual one, Merton-college bound, Wykeham chair of Ayer fame ("You may be a boxer, but I'm the former Wykeham professor of logic"). The other is, across the road, in something called "The Department of Mathematics", I think, and it's called "Mathematical Logic", I think. Now _they_ have a right to disassociate things like that, but we good ole Wykehamites just _can't_! Cheers, J. L. **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://ad.doubleclick. net/clk;211531132;33070124;e) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Tue Feb 3 17:08:19 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 14:08:19 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Analyticity, Russell, Eddington Message-ID: <601373.40266.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com> An enormous debt of gratitude to Bruce Aune for showing me "how it is to be done." Thanks, also, to other participants on this topic. I have a number of things to say but I need to think on them a bit more. I have been thinking on them, a bit. When I take up my response to the posters I will have in mind two things. First, I will have in mind Russell's commentary on logical form and how his views appear to stand opposed to Eddington's. In preparing my thoughts, I thought I would "share with you" (".od" I hate the expression) two items I've added to Hist-Analytic. The first is Russell's contribution to the Encyclopedia of Unified Science (1938). It can be reached at: http://www.hist-analytic.org/RussellForm.pdf The other is Eddington's statement on "Two Tables." it can be had at: http://www.hist-analytic.org/EddingtonNature.pdf Before closing a hurried remark: if analyticity fails, and it is understood one way, then given that reductionism drops out, then there is no physicalistic language in the sense Carnap conceived it. But there is a consequence, I believe of equally generality. There is a sense in which we can construe "structure" as in some sense what remains constant over transformations between analytically equivalent, intertranslataable, languages. This is analogous to what Russell is talking about with respect to physics and topology. Note the tension on the subject of measured quantities we find in Russell and those we find (see the underlined part in the selection). If analyticity evaporates, there is a sense in which structure may, as well. What would be analogous to topologically equivalent geometries in the area of translation. Wouldn't we consider "meaning"? Regards Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Tue Feb 3 19:13:31 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 19:13:31 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Eddington's Two Tables Message-ID: -- and its place in the history of analytic philosophy. "Forty Years On" (hardly [just] forty, but that's the title of a play by Bennett, I believe). In a message dated 2/3/2009 5:16:25 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: In preparing my thoughts, I thought I would "share with you" (".od" I hate the expression) two items I've added to Hist-Analytic. [...] The other is Eddington's statement on "Two Tables." it can be had at: http://www.hist-analytic.org/EddingtonNature.pdf ----- Thanks. I'll try to retrieve Grice's commentary on this, a commentary in passing, as it were, in "Actions and Events" (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly). Some brief (I hope) commentary on Eddington's way of putting things (I note a pdf. document by R. E. Grandy refers to Eddington's 'regret' as well). Eddington writes (as he prepares to _write_ his Gifford -- I'm surprised how these Brits unashamedly _say_ they _write_ things. I for one was _never_ able to _read_ as I delivered a _lecture_. Indeed, the idea of 'lecture' seems mediaeval to me!) Eddington writes: >[I] have drawn up my chairs to >my two tables. Two tables! So, he _is_ expecting to surprise. There is a blogger, out there, who thinks, rightly, that Eddington's 'intuition' is dated: this blogger _never_ grew to get used to the idea of a 'substantial' table. I would _love_ to agree, but my nanny _was_ possibly more old-fashioned. >Yes; there are duplicates of every object about me >- two tables. I see there is an online article also with the sarcastically aimed at wittiness, "Can Eddington's two tables be _identical_?" I for one would think _so_, but I'm unamused by Eddington's talk of 'object', which to me is so Kantian it _hurts_. "Thing" is the word! Eddington: >whenever I begin to scratch the first thing >I strike is my two tables. This is a good 'equative', I think linguists call them. "What I love about Mendoza (a region in Argentina) is the wines". Shouldn't that be "_are_ the wines"? Consider Eddington's possible rephrasings, all ungrammatical: (b) The first TWO thingS I strike _are_ my two tables. Or consider the symmetry of "=", to get: (c) My two tables IS the first thing I strike. A feature of English, no doubt. Eddington continues: >One of them has been familiar to me from earliest years. It is a >commonplace object of that environment --- Not to be pedantic, but isn't 'commonplace' more like a literary thing, 'topos koinos', locus communis. How can an "object" but commonplace? Eddington gets more seriously Kantian when he slips from 'objekt' to 'ding-an-sich': >It [sc. the table] is a thing. He goes on in a possibly anti-Aristotelian manner: >I do not think substantiality can be described better >than by saying that it is the kind of nature exemplified by >an ordinary table. I wish the Ancient Greeks _had_ tables. It seems to me (and my Aristotle is totally pervaded by having it through Code's code) that for Aristotle the prote ousia is a _person_? In any case, 'sub-stantia' is possibly what I call a 'bad Ciceronianism'. This man, Cicero, thought that the Romans were _lacking_ in philosophical terminology and spoiled the language (the Latin language) for us! There are the Greeks with their "hupokheimenon" and "hupousia", but that's _their_ problem! Eddington: >you will be confident that you >understand the nature of an ordinary table. Personally, I think that bringing in _natura_ (Gk. phusis) can only confuse. But then, I _had_ been previously confused by Aristotle's "hulo-morphismos"! (Oddly than in the Romance languages, Latin _materia_ gave 'wood'). >Table No. 2 is my scientific table. It is a more recent acquaintance. Of course this is jocular. "Table" does not figure in the language of _science_ at all. It's a, to use D. Frederick's inspiration here, a functioneme: a word used to describe something that serves for something: e.g. put things on it. Latin 'tabula'. >My scientific table is mostly emptiness. Sparsely scattered >in that emptiness are numerous electric charges rushing >about with great speed; >but their combined bulk amounts to less than a billionth of >the bulk of the table itself. So why not call it the 'decompressed' versus the 'compressed' table? As a pedantic scholastic, I'm not sure I would use _vacuum_ (nihilo) here ('emptiness'). >If the house catches fire my scientific table will >dissolve quite naturally into scientific smoke, whereas my >familiar table undergoes a metamorphosis of its >substantial nature which I can only regard as miraculous. I'm slightly confused here, but I should blame George Myro and his 'ship' example (in PGRICE). If the wooden table burns it becomes nothing to me via "miraculous" metamorphosis. It's just the same chemical element, after some chemical reaction: combustion. And it wouldn't be _just_ scientific smoke: it would be _scientific_ ashes too. As every schoolboy knows, there's nothing magical (although there is perhaps something alchemic) about chemistry but that's what keeps it fun. >There is nothing substantial about my second table. >It is nearly all empty space - space pervaded, it is true, >by fields of force, but these are assigned to the category of >"influences", not of "things". So, in Aristotelian parlance it would be ...? qualia? Don't think so. It looks to me like any old 'ousia'. >The whole trend of modern scientific views is to break >down the separate categories of "things", "influences", "forms", etc., >and to substitute a common background of all experience. -- which is ...? what I call "lab" (as when we say, "We have physics class in the lab today"). >Whether we are studying a material object, a magnetic field, >a geometrical figure, or a duration of time, our scientific information >is summed up in measures ... I note here the collocation, for the record, 'material object'. My _second_ paper on meaning (my first was on Grice on Kratyl) was on Grice on Sextus Empiricus (using, again the Loeb). Sextus wants to argue that there are two operators, which I called "n" for noumenal (but I would today call 'thingy') and 'ph' for 'phenomenal. For some philosophers, including Grice (not in his best days), 'noumenal' or 'thing'-level is material-object level; phenomenalist language we all know what it is, though. To me, as a Kantian scholar of sorts, the phrase 'material object' _pains_ (or aches me) -- no doubt because it pained my teacher when he caught us unawares using it! --- Eddington goes on that "by delicate test" one should rest 'assured' that "Table No. 2" is >the only one which is really there - wherever "there" may be. --- Must say I liked this. So English. I don't think it would translate to _German_ ('es gibt')! Eddington waxes truly philosophical at a later stage: >the process by which the external world ... is transformed >into a world of familiar acquaintance in human >consciousness is outside the scope of physics. This reminds me so much of "Philosophy 4", a short story I read while in Harvard (only visiting!). The text is available online, and it's a gem, in that includes how Philosophy was viewed way back then. I particularly liked the questionnaire: I reproduce it for the sake of it, as they say, and to focus on the 'more difficult' questions, which do mention, I believe 'consciousness' or at least 'mind': >PHILOSOPHY 4 >1. Thales, Zeno, Parmenides, Heracleitos, Anaxagoras. State briefly the doctrine of each. >2. Phenomenon, noumenon. Discuss these terms. Name their modern descendants. >3. Thought=Being. Assuming this, state the difference, if any, between (1) memory and anticipation; (2) sleep and waking. >4. Democritus, Pythagoras, Bacon. State the relation between them. In what terms must the objective world ultimately be stated? Why? >5. Experience is the result of time and space being included in the nature of mind. Discuss this. >6. Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensibus. Whose doctrine? Discuss it. >7. What is the inherent limitation in all ancient philosophy? Who first removed it? >8. Mind is expressed through what? Matter through what? Is speech the result or the cause of thought? >9. Discuss the nature of the ego. >10. According to Plato, Locke, Berkeley, where would the sweetness of a honeycomb reside? Where would its shape? its weight? Where do you think these properties reside? ---- end of quote. Eddington continues, and, amusingly (in a good way) uses 'material' metaphorically. The scientist he says has as >his raw materials >aether, electrons, quanta, potentials, >Hamiltonian functions, etc., --- this is _not_ Mill's tutor! >there is no familiar electron, >quantum or potential parallel to the >scientific electron, quantum or potential. >We do not even desire to manufacture a familiar counterpart to >these things or, as we should commonly say, to "explain" the electron. This reminds me, jocularly, of the wedge, and the squidgly and the horseshoe of ... Strawson! He'd caricature the 'formal' logician thus: There _should_ not be a a familiar 'and', 'or', 'if' _parallel_ ['isomorphic' is the word I heard] to the logician's dot, wedge and horseshoe. We do not even desire to _think_ a vernacular counterpart to these 'things' [clause connectives!] or to 'explain' validity! Ah, for the old Wykehamites! (And back to 'and', I believe Grice was on top mighty right in retrieving Cook Wilson: we "do" need a vernacular counterpart to explain "&". Famously, we need 'and' not so much to conjoin things, but to be able to _negate_ a conjoined clause: "That's not true". "What isn't?" "That it is raining and that it is cold"). Eddington: >After the physicist has quite finished his world-building a linkage or identification >is allowed; but premature attempts at linkage have been found to be entirely mischievous. So full of "metaphysical excrescences" to echo Grice, mutatis mutandis, in his first three minutes of "Logic and Conversation" (the lecture-talk). Eddington then indulges in some 'phonetic' talk. I'm not sure if David Jones had 'isolated' the 'phoneme' by then, but what Eddington says about /a/ is not precisely what I call "nominalist" (cfr. O'Connor, _Phonetics_, Penguin): >The letters [e.g. for the sound-type /a/] are >abstract. But "Table No. 2" is _not_ abstract in that _sense_, is it? A good passage of prose, I find, becomes at the end: >their restless agitation [of electrons] >becomes, 'the warmth of summer'; >the octave of aethereal vibrations >becomes, > 'a gorgeous rainbow'. Strawson, Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar, take notice! A further passage evokes Grice on the vernacular/formal counterpart debate: >unless we confine ourselves altogether >to mathematical symbolism >it is hard to avoid dressing our symbols >in deceitful clothing. so perhaps Quine _should_ be condones he chose Department of Matemathics rather than Philosophy to graduate from! (Oddly, where I come from, "Mathematical Logic" is taught in the Department of Mathematics _and_ Physics!) Eddington: >But I should be untrue to >science if I did not insist that its study is an end in itself. The path of science must be pursued for its own sake, irrespective of the views it may afford of a >wider landscape... Logician's landscape -- familiar anyone? Desert versus rosebushes and cherry-trees. >in this spirit we must follow the path whether it leads to the hill of vision or the tunnel of obscurity. >Therefore till the last stage of the course is reached you must be content to >follow with me the beaten track of science, nor scold me too severely for loitering among its >wayside flowers. That is to be the understanding between us. Shall we set forth? Sure! Odd the mention of flowers and 'the tunnel'. E. Sabato, PhD in Physics has a novel, "The Tunnel" which seems to express some of the deepest Eddingtonianisms into the shadow's shadow that Eddington thought science would prosper! (Oddly, he was a Quaker -- and it's very good to recall that the Gifford were _so_, well, religious --. No surprise Ayer, in his _own_ Gifford basically resumes Eddinton's 'two' tables argument! Cheers, JL **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://ad.doubleclick. net/clk;211531132;33070124;e) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Tue Feb 3 23:08:52 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 23:08:52 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Eddington's Two Tables Message-ID: What _is_ the scientist talking about?! Nonsense: ""The slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe; eight in the oxygen wave, seven in nitrogen." apres Eddington. I now realise the magnitude of S. Bayne's point when drawing the analogy between Eddington and Russell's neutral monism. In fact, Eddington's views on the interface between ontology and epistemology (if we may call them thus) seem slightly misguided vis a vis the best of the 'empiricist' tradition represented by Russell. I was revising my previous post on Eddington when I review under which entries he is quoted in the OED. Some may amuse or interest S. Bayne (I've just come across his (S. Bayne's) 'eliminationist' account of Eddington on 'chairs' in the hist-analytic website). One such entry then is 'event', and the quote 1920 A. S. EDDINGTON Space Time & Gravit. iii. 45 "A point in this space-time, that is to say a given instant at a given place, is called an ?event?. An event in its customary meaning would be the physical happening which occurs at and identifies a particular place and time. However, we shall use the word in both senses." A. S. Eddington, "Space Time & Gravit., 1920, p. 45 -- I don't think Grice's monosemy ("do not multiply senses beyond necessity") would allow _that_! Then under 'field': 1928 A. S. EDDINGTON Nature Physical World vii. 153 "It is usually considered that when we use these [sc. magnets, electroscopes, etc.] we are exploring not space, but a *field* in _space_." Eddington, Nature Physical World, 1928, p. 153. Under 'indeterminacy' (but not of translation, necessarily!): "It was Heisenberg again who set in motion the new development in the summer of 1927, and the consequences were further elucidated by Bohr. The outcome of it is a fundamental general principle which seems to rank in importance with the principle of relativity. I shall here call it the ?principle of indeterminacy?. The gist of it can be stated as follows: a particle may have position or it may have velocity b ut it cannot in any exact sense have both." Eddington, "Nature PHysical World", 1928, p. 220 Under 'non-physical', which I guess is as extreme an adj. for a physicist to use as 'non-philosophical' for _me_! "The matter..can only differ in a mysterious non-physical qualitythat of identity." Eddington, Space, Time, Gravitation, 1920, p. 194. Under 'quantum property': 1927 A. S. EDDINGTON Stars & Atoms 68 "The property here referred to (the quantum property) is the deepest mystery of light." Eddington, Stars and Atoms, 1927, p. 68 -- (Grosseteste would be impressed :-)). Under 'sense' for the phrase, 'sense-picture' (Wittgenstein echo about it -- Bildung, and Sensibilia) "It would be unreasonable to limit our thought of nature to what can be comprised in sense-pictures." under (Carrollian) 'slithy': "Eight slithy toves gyre and gimble in the oxygen wabe; seven in nitrogen." Eddington, Nature of Physical World, 1928, p. 291. An interesting one is under 'thingless': "You cannot have space without things or things without space; and the adoption of thingless space (vacuum) as a standard in most of our current physical thought is a definite hindrance to the progress of physics." Eddington, New Pathways in Science, 1935, p. 48. And I did notice in my reading "Two Tables" (courtesy of S. Bayne) that there was this reference to 'emptiness' that struck me -- in fact reminded me, on second thoughts, of Lucretius, De rerum natura (Loeb Classical Library) and all _he_ says (alla Atomic Theory -- Democritean) about _vacuum_ between atoms. Oddly, I did some googling to get more philosophical references for Eddington, and one confused me. Apparently it's a book in google.books that makes a connection between Virginia Woolf's The Waves and Eddington's The Wavicles! (But I thought it was by Strawson, and it's not). I would think that in terms of more recent (than Eddington's) analytic philosophy, it all resolves around Strawson's 'revisionary' metaphysics, and in general, his 'analysis' of Aristotelian categories. Grice himself was wildly aware that this was the central topic of philosophy, and did not leave this world (to use Eddington's phrase, 'world'), without leaving a word for us, "philosophical eschatology", or the metaphysical examination of transcategorial epithets (he would love a mouthful). And now to the 'scientific' bed! (so soft). Cheers, JL **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://ad.doubleclick. net/clk;211531132;33070124;e) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Wed Feb 4 17:02:35 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2009 14:02:35 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Wittgenstein, Russell and 'Series' Message-ID: <671085.1170.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> We need to consider why analyticity is important. To do justice to Aune, I have to read the relevant sections in Empirical Theory of Knowledge, which can be accessed on the hist-analtyic website. For now I want to make a couple of historical points that I think are related, although there is room for skepticism. I think the issue is related to translation in such a way that it, too, becomes relevant to Wittgenstein's "private language argument." (PLA) Kripke takes on certain questions related to series as fundamental to understanding both. But a close look at wittgenstein may suggest otherwise, at least when one considers the philosophical significance attached to it by the extremist Wittgensteinians who have tormented Cartesians for a few decades. Notice Wittgenstein's insistence (PI 143): "Do not balk at the expression "series of numbers"; it is not being used wrongly here." Well, maybe not "here" but what about elsehwere in PI. Besides, Wittgenstein can no longer silence his audience by the weight of his well deserved respectability. So we ask: "The series of natural numbers in decimal notation"? Ok, That seems to refer to a series. But now jump forward towards the fun stuff. Wittgenstein says, "Suppose the pupil now writes the series 0 to 0 to our satisfaction..." (PI 145) Using Wittgenstein's technique (?) we ask: Is 'series' here in its natural home? And what is THAT? Later, he says "...A writes series of numbers down...tries to find a law for the sequence..." (PI 151. I think we need to ask the question he poses about the grammar of 'know' to the grammar of series. I don't think we are justified in saying that the pupil writes down a *series* of numbers unless it is indeed a series. But what makes it a "series" if there is no "law"? Well, that is an interesting use of "law" when we might wish to look for a function. There is every possibility that the "series" of the pupil is simply a series in time; it is not inconceivable that this is the only series there is; and, if it is, then it may turn out that we are talking about arriving at a "law" by induction (which is, of course, not there). Here is an interesting remark by Russell written prior to the Investigations. Keep in mind that when we speak of series, we can speak, alternatively, of a function. Indeed it is a function we seek, and if Kripkenstein is right there is none. But consider Russell: "We have to find a set of integers and a corresponding number of corresponding times...there will still remain an infinite number of possible formulas, each might claim to be a law.." Later, "Every finite set of observations is compatible with a number of mutually inconsistent laws, all of which have exactly the same inductive evidence in their favor. Therefore pure induction is invalid..." But what of the validity of inferring a series from what some kid put on the board. Why should we even begin, lest we be beguiled by our love of arithemetic? Notice the business of a number of inconssitent laws. Now think 'translation' (analytical hypotheses) instead of laws. Think of the same inductive evidence as say stimulaus synonomy or some such. There is a connection here. I'm not sure what, but there is equivocation in W's use of 'series'. Moreover, we may in W's case be actually taking about a function as an inductive hypothesis. What consequences to this are there, and will one consequence be enough to save the "phenomena." Steve Bayne -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Wed Feb 4 17:13:02 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2009 14:13:02 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Correction: Wittgenstein, Russell, and 'Series' Message-ID: <624473.68623.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> ?I quoted Wittgenstein as "Suppose the pupil now writes the series 0 to 0 to our satisfaction..." (PI 145) What he said was: "Suppose the pupil now writes the series 0 to 9 to our satisfaction..." (PI 145) Also, the Russell quotes come from Human Knowledge Its Scope and Limits. Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rpsevero at gmail.com Fri Feb 6 05:33:11 2009 From: rpsevero at gmail.com (=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Rog=E9rio_Passos_Severo?=) Date: Fri, 6 Feb 2009 08:33:11 -0200 Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine's "two dogmas" In-Reply-To: <8379DC6AD80B41AF9259B90EFD8197E3@DFLVQC1J> References: <200901311729.43029.rbj@rbjones.com> <992025.99720.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <86c7bd2d0902011449q587d96f5m4d29fc501eacbe0f@mail.gmail.com> <8379DC6AD80B41AF9259B90EFD8197E3@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <86c7bd2d0902060233t14e1bfd6gde85b88f20e2f8b8@mail.gmail.com> Hi Danny, Yes, Quine could have changed his mind about the possibility of drawing the a/s distinction after Two Dogmas was published (1951). But in his own writings, he suggests that he didn't. In "Two Dogmas in Retrospect" (1991) he says: "my reservations over analyticity are the same as ever" (p. 271). Some people say that Quine was not too keen in acknowledging changes in his views. This may be an instance of just that. So I think we have a choice here. We can either say there was a change in his views, or go with Quine and say things merely became clearer without undergoing substantial changes. The latter, I think is the more charitable interpretation. It agrees with what Quine wrote in retrospect (1991), and it also agrees with what Quine did in Two Dogmas (1951). In Two Dogmas there is no proof that the a/s distinction cannot be drawn or is not objective. It contains merely a case by case analysis of known attempts at drawing the distinction. Quine rejects those attempts not because they are inconsistent or unintelligible, but because each of them fails to do the job that Carnap and others wanted for them (namely, adequately explaining the truths of math and logic). If you want to insist that Quine did change his mind, and that in Two Dogmas (1951) he was in fact rejecting the distinction itself (the possibility of drawing it altogether), then I will not say you're wrong. But I would still prefer the more charitable interpretation. This is a matter of interpretation, I think. There's room here for both views. Best wishes, Rog?rio From rpsevero at gmail.com Fri Feb 6 06:12:24 2009 From: rpsevero at gmail.com (=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Rog=E9rio_Passos_Severo?=) Date: Fri, 6 Feb 2009 09:12:24 -0200 Subject: [hist-analytic] From BRUCE AUNE: Quine and "the" a/s distinction In-Reply-To: <70348.10332.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <70348.10332.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <86c7bd2d0902060312v34fe082ar6e9b020d19949657@mail.gmail.com> Dear Bruce, Thank you for your interesting message! Near the end of your comments you wrote: "I find it very doubtful that by the time of 'Two Dogmas in Retrospect (1991),' Quine's continued opposition to a useful a/s distinction had anything to do with his holism." But in that essay, Quine wrote: "In short, I recognize the notion of analyticity in its obvious and useful but epistemologically insignificant applications. The needs that Carnap felt for the notion in connection with mathematical truth are better met through holism..." (p. 271) So I'm afraid I have to take exception to what you wrote in your message. In 1991 Quine presents holism as an alternative to analyticity. If known attempts at drawing the a/s distinction are inadequate, then one has two choices: (1) to keep on searching for an adequate distinction, or (2) to ditch the distinction and find an alternative. Quine's negative attitude toward analyticity stem not only from the fact that he thought known attempts at drawing the distinction were inadequate ("epistemologically insignificant"), but also from the fact that he thought he had a better alternative, which is holism. If he had no alternative, do you think his attitude toward the a/s distinction would be as negative as they are? Best wishes, --Rog?rio > Re (2). In "Two Dogmas" Quine claimed that empirical considerations might > require us to "give up" any statement, even a supposed logical truth such as > excluded middle. But as he acknowledged in "Two Dogmas in Retrospect," > giving up a statement may amount to changing its meaning rather than a > falsifying it. (The learned community "gave up" talking about lunatics as > people suffering from lunar madness not because they encountered counter > instances but because they became convinced that the term "lunatic" didn't > apply to anything: it became useless for scientific purposes.) In view of > this I find it very doubtful that by the time of "Two Dogmas in Retrospect > (1991)," Quine's continued opposition to a useful a/s distinction had > anything to do with his holism. I believe that his attitude rested mostly > on the idea that the notion of cognitive meaning was inherently unclear and > that he could think of no promising way of drawing a philosophically useful > distinction. In opposition to him, I try to draw one myself in my book, An > Empiricist Theory of Knowledge. As I see it, the worthwhile questions to > discuss in relation to an a/s distinction are: "How, in detail, is it to be > drawn?" and "Can it be defended?" > > Bruce Aune From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 6 08:32:05 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 6 Feb 2009 08:32:05 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] A 'Series' of Anscombianisms! Message-ID: I'm pleased with S. Bayne's careful reading of "Philosophical Investigations". He writes down a 'series' of Wittgenstein quotes: 143, 145, 151: To wit: 143: >Do not balk at the expression >"series of numbers"; it >is not being used wrongly here." 'balk' is not part of my repertoire, and it's not a germane German word, so I'll blame that one on Anscombe! 145: >Suppose the pupil now writes >the series 0 to 9 to >our satisfaction" Oddly, while my mother (a teacher of the old school) does use 'pupil' in ways that irritate me, I _always_ used 'student' and 'instructee' if I must! I associate 'pupils' with boarding schools in cold climates! It's amusing how Wittgenstein seems to be more concerned with 'emotional' factors than anything else: "don't balk!" "not used _wrong_!", "our satisfaction". Finally, 151: >[he] writes series of numbers down... >tries to find a law for the sequence" Indeed, there seems to be two 'actions' here: writing down a series, and finding the 'law' for the sequence. This relates to some wrong uses of 'period' (my mother pointed out to me that one!) as used by journalists! as in the otiose: long periods of time It is true that a 'period', mathematically, is like a series. But it also means 'lapse'. And local journalists have been heard to use 'short lapse of time', as if it could be a short lapse of something other than time. Anyway, back to series. Is it true that a series _entails_ a 'law' or 'rule'? It's one of those trick of Latin names, like 'species' (cfr. speciesism) that one wonders what gender they are, and the presence of final 's' is confusing, and in that the plural identifies the singular. Enough reasons, I find, to contradict Grice! GRICE (to Austin), I don't care what the dictionary says AUSTIN: And _that_'s where you make your big mistake. The Short/Lewis is not strictly enlightening, but it notes: -- it can be synonymous with 'ordo' which brings me to another petpeeve, "in no particular order". I thought this was _logically contradictory_. Surely there _is_ a particular order, even if it is a _random_ one! One cite in Latin refers, Short/Lewis think, to "the connection of words" which is a good one, "Colourless ideas furiously sleep green" "tantum series juncturaque pollet" and comes from Horatius, A. P. 242 . It relates the etymology to 'serere'. This in turn they make cognate with (via root sa-) with Greek sa?, s?th?, to sift) and it's related to 'to beget': a series being, say what is _beget_ (sp?) by a rule, or ruler, rather, since it can mean line of descendants. The OED brings the Romantic side to us: Italian! English 'series' is from Latin L. series row, chain, series, f. serere to join, connect. Cf. F. s?rie, It., Sp., Pg. serie.] Are there any quotes worth spreading ('diseminare')? Yes: 1812 MISS MITFORD in L'Estrange Life (1870) I. 191 In Oxfordshire, where I saw a landscape, or rather a series of landscapes, of singular beauty. 1709 FELTON Diss. Classics (1718) 188 The worst Province an Historian can fall upon, is a Series of barren Times, in which nothing remarkable happeneth. 1886 Act 49 & 50 Vict. c. 44 ?13 That the repayment of the money to be borrowed should be spread over a series of years. (ordered sequence, succession. JLS) 1656 EARL OF MONMOUTH tr. Boccalini's Advts. fr. Parnass. I. lxxx. (1674) 108 [They] made a long and exact Series of many abuses which reigned in that State. (In no particular order, I hope! JLS) 1748 Anson's Voy. I. x. 98 We had a series of as favourable weather, as could well be expected. 1779 JOHNSON L.P., Watts (1868) 450 The series of his works I am not able to deduce. I am, typically, in a rush, so I'll end this with (luckily) what I think is the relevant 'use', which the OED has as "Math." and defines (I don't usually do OED for definitions, but here you are) as a set of terms in succession (finite or infinite in number) [*not* _pace_ Dummett!] the value of each of which is determined by its ordinal position according to a definite rule known as the law of the series; [Latin 'lex', don't think so. I was examining that English 'law' has not really Latin cognates. JLS] esp. a set of such terms continuously added together. See ARITHMETICAL, GEOMETRICAL, RECURRING, etc. 1671 J. GREGORY in Rigaud Corr. Sci. Men (1841) II. 224 Reducing all of them [sc. equations] to infinite serieses. 1736 Gentl. Mag. VI. 739/1 Any one who is conversant in Series. 1750 Phil. Trans. XLVII. 20 The operation, by having two or more series's to multiply into one another, becomes very troublesome. 1791 Ibid. LXXXI. 148 The serieses deduced should converge. 1839 R. MURPHY Algebr. Equat. 92 Recurring Series have been much used..in the solution of algebraical equations. 1874 GROSS Algebra II. 153 Summation of Series. Also, the OED has it, used allusively (in that use, one expects): 1836 J. GILBERT Chr. Atonem. ii. 59 To examine in detail the series, of which the computed sum betrays at once somewhere in the calculation so gross an error. 1853 [WHEWELL] Plural. Worlds v. 76 We have here to build a theory without materials;to sum a series of which every term, so far as we know, is nothing. This Whewell last should be interesting. Cheers, JL **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://ad.doubleclick. net/clk;211531132;33070124;e) From rbj at rbjones.com Fri Feb 6 10:07:17 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Fri, 6 Feb 2009 15:07:17 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine's Holism Message-ID: <200902061507.18236.rbj@rbjones.com> I am aware of no example of a proposition of mathematics which has been proven and subsequently held to be false as a result of some empirical observation (without a flaw being discovered in the proof). In fact I would find such a thing quite astonishing, and I would guess that an extremely high proportion of professional mathematicans would be of like mind. Did Quine (or anyone else) offer any examples? In default of such examples Quine's Holism seems to me untenable, and to have no relevance to the analytic/synthetic distinction. Roger Jones From rbj at rbjones.com Fri Feb 6 11:26:14 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Fri, 6 Feb 2009 16:26:14 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] A 'Series' of Anscombianisms! In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <200902061626.14900.rbj@rbjones.com> On Friday 06 February 2009 13:32:05 Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: <...> Is Wittgenstein using the "terms" sequence and series interchangeably? > I am, typically, in a rush, so I'll end this with (luckily) what I think is > the relevant 'use', which the OED has as "Math." and defines (I don't > usually do OED for definitions, but here you are) as > > a set of terms in succession > (finite or infinite in number) > > [*not* _pace_ Dummett!] > > > the value of each of which is determined > by its ordinal position according to a > definite rule known as the > > law > > of the series; [Latin 'lex', don't think so. I was > examining that English 'law' has not really > Latin cognates. JLS] > esp. a set of such terms continuously > added together. My impression of mathematical usage is that "sequence" is the "set of terms in succession" (though they need not actually be "terms") and then a series is a (possible) value expressed as a sequence of summands (it will only be an actual value if the series "converges"). Contrary to the OED, I don't think in either case that the sequence has to be "lawlike", it might not comply with any rule, though the ones mathematicians study usually are lawlike since that kind of sequence is generally more useful. However, when quantifying over these things you have to take into account the uninteresting ones too. For example if a mathematician says something like "if there exists a sequence" he will very rarely mean law-like, since that is not a very precise term, and if he did want to say something like that he would have to stipulate what "lawlike" meant, e.g. "if there exists a recursively enumerable sequence", where the notion of law involved is quite definite. I don't know much about Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics, but since he is alleged to have been rabidly opposed to set theory, it is probable that he did not acknowledge the existence of infinite sequences which do not follow some rule, however in this he differs from most contemporary mathematicians. Roger Jones From rpsevero at gmail.com Fri Feb 6 14:03:52 2009 From: rpsevero at gmail.com (=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Rog=E9rio_Passos_Severo?=) Date: Fri, 6 Feb 2009 17:03:52 -0200 Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine's Holism In-Reply-To: <200902061507.18236.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <200902061507.18236.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <86c7bd2d0902061103m652e0b45t8504a3a6e8e73ddd@mail.gmail.com> Dear Roger, Geometry is traditionally sorted as branch of mathematics. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the axioms of Euclidean geometry were thought to be true of physical space. Nowadays physicists say space is non-Euclidean. General relativity is now thought to better explain observations than Newtonian physics. So here we have an instance of changes in physics coming along hand-in-hand with changes in mathematics. This is exactly what Quine's holism says: the sentences of a theory are not accepted/rejected one by one, but as "a corporate body". Here's another example: Descartes and others argued that negative numbers were absurd. They thought the idea made no sense at all. And indeed, for a long time math had no negative numbers. But then people began to use them "instrumentally", so to speak. People began to try them out, and see what they could do with them. Later it became clear that math with negative numbers was much more useful (for science) than without them. And so negative numbers were incorporated. This was a significant change in mathematics brought about by empirical considerations (what you could do with them in the empirical sciences). But I see your point: inside mathematics there is a justification system in place which is more or less impervious to what goes on outside (in the natural sciences). This is ok by Quine. He acknowledges that in several places. His point was a more general and abstract one: no sentences are justified in isolation, and mathematics as a whole is not justified independently of the rest of science. Changes in the other disciplines may have effects on mathematics. Best wishes, --Rog?rio -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Fri Feb 6 16:52:09 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Fri, 6 Feb 2009 21:52:09 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine's Holism In-Reply-To: <86c7bd2d0902061103m652e0b45t8504a3a6e8e73ddd@mail.gmail.com> References: <200902061507.18236.rbj@rbjones.com> <86c7bd2d0902061103m652e0b45t8504a3a6e8e73ddd@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <200902062152.10128.rbj@rbjones.com> Dear Rog?rio, Thanks for your response on my question. I'm afraid I don't see what I was asking for, but you do present Quine's case without supplying what I consider essential to Quine's purpose. We are not really talking about the analytic/synthetic distinction, but the a priori/a posteriori distinction, but I think that what I was asking for is particular to what is needed for disputing the accepted epistemic difference between mathematics and empirical science. I shall respond to your arguments and explain why I don't find them convincing. On Friday 06 February 2009 19:03:52 Rog?rio Passos Severo wrote: > Geometry is traditionally sorted as branch of mathematics. In the > eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the axioms of Euclidean geometry were > thought to be true of physical space. But surely the belief that physical space is Euclidean is not mathematics even though Euclidean geometry is a branch of mathematics. > Nowadays physicists say space is non-Euclidean. > General relativity is now thought to better explain > observations than Newtonian physics. So here we have an instance of changes > in physics coming along hand-in-hand with changes in mathematics. This is > exactly what Quine's holism says: the sentences of a theory are not > accepted/rejected one by one, but as "a corporate body". I don't see that there is any relevant kind of "rejection" of mathematics here. We still teach Euclidean geometry, we still regard its theorems as true. It seems to me to be a stretch to say that Euclidean geometry was rejected in any sense, I doubt that Einstein would have agreed with that way of describing things. When physicists change their theories the mathematics they use in the new theory may not be the same as the mathematics used in the new theory, but no changes take place to what mathematical propositions are considered true. So if this is a prime exemplar of what constitues Quine's holism then it is hard to see how it is relevant to the epistemological distinction which is under dispute. > Here's another example: Descartes and others argued that negative numbers > were absurd. They thought the idea made no sense at all. And indeed, for a > long time math had no negative numbers. But then people began to use them > "instrumentally", so to speak. People began to try them out, and see what > they could do with them. Later it became clear that math with negative > numbers was much more useful (for science) than without them. And so > negative numbers were incorporated. This was a significant change in > mathematics brought about by empirical considerations (what you could do > with them in the empirical sciences). There is no question that changes take place in mathematics as a result of developments in empirical science. However, these are the development of new kinds of mathematics, not the discovery that accepted mathematical propositions are in fact false. New parts of mathematics stimulated in such ways make no reference to the stimulus in the justification of mathematical propositions. Even if a mathematical fallacy was discovered in the course of experimental research it would not be accepted until flaws had been located in the accepted proofs of the relevant mathematical propositions, since mathematicians do not accept empirical claims either in proofs or in refutations. As far as the development of number systems are concerned, there remain to this day, as accepted and rigourous parts of mathematics: 1. the theory of natural numbers (which is known as arithmetic) 2. the theory of integers (obtained by adding negative numbers) 3. the theory of rationals (integers and their ratios) 4. the theory of real numbers (analysis) 5. non-standard analysis (reals + infinitesimals) 6. the theory of complex numbers (pairs of reals) Developments in our number concepts do not involve the discovery that some previously accepted mathematical propositions are in fact false, and if such a mathematical discovery were prompted by empirical considerations, it would not be accepted until a flaw had been found in previous a priori justifications and a priori justifications (i.e. mathematical proofs) had been supplied for any new results. > But I see your point: inside mathematics there is a justification system in > place which is more or less impervious to what goes on outside (in the > natural sciences). This is ok by Quine. He acknowledges that in several > places. His point was a more general and abstract one: no sentences are > justified in isolation, and mathematics as a whole is not justified > independently of the rest of science. Changes in the other disciplines may > have effects on mathematics. But what world is Quine living in? Mathematicians have very precise knowledge of what propositions are involved in the justification of each mathematical theorem, and they NEVER include proposition of empirical science. That other disciplines may affect the development of mathematics is not relevant to the epistemic status of mathematical propositions. Quine knew this of course! (the first sentence if not the second) regards, Roger Jones From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 6 18:01:46 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 6 Feb 2009 18:01:46 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] A Priori/A Posteriori _Of What_? Message-ID: In a message dated 2/6/2009 4:54:04 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, rbj at rbjones.com writes: We are not really talking about the analytic/synthetic distinction, but the a priori/a posteriori distinction, ----- I guess I missed the earlier bits of this conversation; but I'm too fascinated by the a priori/a posteriori. I recall Kripke's showing us (i.e. showing my teacher, who showed _me_) how there's more to philosophy than a two-entry diagramme of the type Kant conceived: justification end/bit A priori a posteriori subject/ synthetic analytic predicate considerations a priori a posteriori analytic synthetic It seems philosophers realised that 'a priori analytic' is possibly redundant; ditto for 'a posteriori synthetic'. A posteriori-analytic God knows what it amounts to (perhaps Mill on numbers), and a priori-synthetic was, to use Strawson's phrase*, Kant's nightmare. -- this is _not_ P. F. Strawson. --- The word to use for "of what" cannot be 'experience' (Gk. empereia). It _should_ have to do with 'justification'; but Danny Frederick has recently started to convince me, "There's no justification" (for anything) so I'm less sure it's about, or _should_ be about 'justification', then. I agree with R. B. Jones that mathematicians cared a fig (Fig. No. 1 -- in Eddington's parlance) about the _physical_ world; mind, most _physicists_ *I*'ve talked to seemed also to care the same fig (Fig. No. 2 -- let's concede Eddington) about the physical world, or its nature (to use the title of Eddington's Gifford Lectures in Natural Theology). Eddington says, perhaps trying to amuse, that there's no beauty or purpose with Figs No. 2 -- but of course I disagree. He goes on to say that to describe Fig No. 2 we should need powerful mathematical symbolisms, and that to inquire too much about them is misguided. On the other hand, the mathematicians I've talked to (who followed Burbaki) are _very_ much into *beauty*. I mean, if what they are going to say is per se analytic, and let's say a priori too, I can't see why at least they should not have fun in inventing _nice_ theories. There's _beauty_, as I think Roger Jones will agree, about Riemann spaces, etc., and of course mathematicians (applied mathematicians) will have fun in finding postulates, theorems, and corollaries for these, too. I once thought that it was _Cartesius's_ discovery that arithmetics and pure mathematical geometry _agree_: but of course, for the Greeks they never diverged in the first place. Ivor Thomas's two volumes for the Loeb Classical Library make for some fascinating reading there. Especially as he manages to combine how much (or how little at parts) of the mathematical terminology comes from Philosophy and vice versa. Surely mathematics predates Philosophy; so it's very possible that philosophical reflections on the analytic, the 'a priori', etc. -- as in Aristotle, say -- (his views on axioms, first principles, proof, etc.) are modelled after what he saw successfully being used (for fun) by Pythagoras, Thales and all the Old Sages. And recall Plato's motto to his Academy, "You better be accountable for your mathematics before you _enter_ here". Cheers, J. L. **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://ad.doubleclick. net/clk;211531132;33070124;e) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 6 20:27:30 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 6 Feb 2009 20:27:30 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Mathematics and Lakatos's Research Programme Degeneracy Message-ID: In a message dated 2/6/2009 4:54:04 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, rbj at rbjones.com writes: There is no question that changes take place in mathematics as a result of developments in empirical science. However, these are the development of new kinds of mathematics, not the discovery that accepted mathematical propositions are in fact false. ----- I don't think alas, Roger, I do have to hand a case of a mathematical 'progress' of any kind -- if that's what we are looking (Yes, strictly we are supposed to be discussing Quine's Holism). But reading your original post, Quine's Holism and your reply to Rogerio, I was reminded of Lakatos. It seems the only people who progress are "scientists" (or factual scientists) and not even _them_, but "Science", with a capital S. Philosophers had been discussing same thingos for ages! And ditto mathematicians! I would not know if 'research programmes', as coined by Lakatos, would apply -- but I do think someone must have thought about the 'development', 'progress' or what have you, of Mathematics -- or "Mathematical Science". Lakatos thought, I think, that research programmes either progenerate, or 'degenerate'. In Factual or Empirical Sciences (Mario Bunge speaks of formal vs. factical sciences), Lakatos viewed, it was more of the nature of the research programme you were engaged (rather than matters of 'raw' empirical evidence) that determined a 'paradigm-switch' as it were. As you see, I think nothing has changed much, mathematically, since Thales -- or at least since Thomas edited those two volumes. Of course, if you delve (if that's the word) deeper, you'll find a reference to those Babylonians, and how ashamed the Greeks were to be reminded that _geometry_ predates arithmetics and that it had to do with the measurement of the floods on the Nile! So, I would not be surprised if some mathematician (who will _not_ have a lot of philosophy) would say that Experience _is_ Relevant to Mathematics. Mathematicians tend to be Kantians, to boot. And so it's even harder to get to admit that a programme of research they are involved in (notably if it's some state-funded university!) is degenerate already! They tend to think of themselves as "transcendental egos" on the bounds of sense, and dealing with possibilities of experience, maybe. While 'time' and 'space' are perhaps _empirical_ notions (but vide Kant), one should wonder about the very idea of _number_ -- since Roger has notably listed branches of _number_ theories. Has there been progress via, if not conjectures, 'refutations', in 'number' theory at all? God knows. The same God, incidentally who this German mathematician said, created the "natural numbers"! (the rest of the numbers being the offspring of human, evil, wicked minds!) Excellent question, Roger. Cheers, JL **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://ad.doubleclick. net/clk;211531132;33070124;e) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 6 20:52:33 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 6 Feb 2009 20:52:33 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] The Bride of Kripkenstein Message-ID: Wittgenstein: The Rule ('Gesetz') of the Series ('Reihe') Who _is_ the Bride of Kripkenstein? In a message dated 2/6/2009 1:02:06 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, rbj at rbjones.com writes: My impression of mathematical usage is that "sequence" is the "set of terms in succession" (though they need not actually be "terms") and then a series is a (possible) value expressed as a sequence of summands (it will only be an actual value if the series "converges"). --- Thanks. Contrary to the OED, I don't think in either case that the sequence has to be "lawlike", it might not comply with any rule, though the ones mathematicians study usually are lawlike since that kind of sequence is generally more useful. However, when quantifying over these things you have to take into account the uninteresting ones too. ---- Exactly. And I think what Wittgenstein is really interested in is what, in Chomsky's later parlance, we'd have as *rules _versus_ * representations and of course the diverse ideas behind -- knowing the rule -- knowing (or 'cognising' as Chomsky irritably prefers) the representation. ----- going down to M. Davies et al. ideas on 'tacit' knowledge, and Eddington on 'least' (cited in OED under 'least effort') and Grice's "Principle of the Minimisation of Rational Effort". "The fact," Grice would say, "that we do not appeal to the rule _explicitly_ should entail that we appeal to the rule _implicitly_: my ruly thoughts are hardly 'subterranean', neither are my unruly ones!" R. B. Jones continues: For example if a mathematician says something like "if there exists a sequence" he will very rarely mean law-like, since that is not a very precise term, and if he did want to say something like that he would have to stipulate what "lawlike" meant, e.g. "if there exists a recursively enumerable sequence", where the notion of law involved is quite definite. --- I see. Wittgenstein uses, then, 'Reihe' (I've just checked) for 'series', and "Gesatz" for 'rule' or law (I think I consulted the _new_ English translation!). Then there's 'infinite', for which Wittgenstein uses the rather poetic, 'endless'. He does speak of 'series' of numbers only (Zahlen) and he uses 'algebraic formula', but I think it's Algebraisch Einsdruck' in German which looks more like 'expression' than formula to me. I forget what he uses for 'pupil'! --- I don't know much about Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics, but since he is alleged to have been rabidly opposed to set theory, it is probable that he did not acknowledge the existence of infinite sequences which do not follow some rule, however in this he differs from most contemporary mathematicians. --- Yes, I noted a bit in the relevant passages (that S. Bayne quoted) and neighbouring ones. He does use 'infinite', as I say, 'endlessly' (but wasn't the mathematical infinite mainly a progress by the German school of Cantor, etc.?) At this point, Wittgenstein was possibly rabidly opposed to Aristotle as well. So I don't think he would acknowledge anything having to do with 'potential' versus 'actual' (infinites). He seems to suggest, perhaps common-sensically, that what a pupil (or 'kid' as S. R. Bayne has it) does draw is _finite_. But students nowadays have perhaps grown wittier: As in recent "Doubt" with Meryl Streep: (set in the 1950s middle school in the Bronx): "You go and write a hundred times, "I should stay silent in class" Nowadays the student would just provide the 'algebraic' rule -- they are not even required to _write_ anymore; just type! And with cutting and pasting it's never clear if they did write the thing '100' times. If it's a mathematical torture, I would think it _is_ ridiculous for a teacher to impose on a student an 'infinite' task, but it is notably _not_ unfair (or ridiculous) to have the student use that fabulous sign of the mathematicians, for 'infinite'. the inclined "8" and so I can explicitly ask my pupil to bring for the next day _five_ statements involving the 'infinite' (i.e. the inclined "8"). Borges wrote, incidentally, "An Abridged Short of the Infinite" (or eternity) and he was prone to remind that he got it all that from his father playing with him on Zeno -- the Eleatic -- and his paradoxes! Cheers, JL **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://ad.doubleclick. net/clk;211531132;33070124;e) From rbj at rbjones.com Sat Feb 7 03:50:35 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 08:50:35 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Mathematics and Lakatos's Research Programme Degeneracy In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <200902070850.35446.rbj@rbjones.com> J.L., On Saturday 07 February 2009 01:27:30 Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: > I don't think alas, Roger, I do have to hand a case of a mathematical > 'progress' of any kind -- if that's what we are looking (Yes, strictly we > are supposed to be discussing Quine's Holism). "of any kind"! I don't actually recall talking about 'progress' but your scepticism about progress in mathematics is a bit severe. Here are two different kinds of progress which seem to me conspicuous in mathematics: 1. There is continuous (possibly even execessive) increase in the number of proven mathematical theorems. (insofar as discovering and demonstrating mathematical truth may be considered the main objective of pure mathematics this is surely a kind of progress) 2. There have been considerable (recent) improvements in the rigour with which pure mathematics is conducted, and improvements in the rigour with which it is possible to conduct mathematical proofs. For example, Bishop Berkeley's complaints against the infinitesimal calculus have been addressed several times over. We have even seen improvements in the rigour of that paradigm "Euclidean" geometry eliminating defects in Euclid's system. Of course, you may not think these constitute "real" progress, but I submit that they are progress of a kind. > But reading your original post, Quine's Holism and your reply to Rogerio, > I was reminded of Lakatos. I'm afraid I am not a fan of Lakatos (I'm not really the kind of person to be a fan of anyone, but, more to the point, I disagree with a lot of what he seems to be saying) and it looks to me as if he has lead you astray, but you are not specific enough for me to understand what points from Lakatos you are making (and I don't think I have read what he had to say about "research programs"). If you want to debate Lakatos I would be happy to, if only I could get a grip on the issue at stake. Roger From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sat Feb 7 08:31:54 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 08:31:54 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Mathematics and Lakatos's Research Programme Degeneracy Message-ID: Thank you, Roger, for your comments on the two aspects which you'd view as 'progress' in mathematics: -- number of theorems proved 'truth' -- rigour in that. I think it may be connected to your comments on analytic/synthetic, where, -- and I'd disagree there, but with most philosophers, then -- of defining 'analytic' as 'true in virtue of its meaning'. You see, I don't _do_ 'true'. When teaching logic, I always had my students sequencing 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1. A student or two would like to challenge my Excluded Middle, so I'd say, well introduce 0 1 2 ---. I would not be a fan of introducing 0.5 for the middle value, but perhaps I should. Incidentally, this leads to the infinity of the continuum, for literally (or potentially, rather) there's an infinite series that can hold the 'true' predicate. Sorry to blow his horn, but Grice has a charming section on "Truth" in WOW, iii. He ends up _translating_ the adjective into: FACTUAL SATISFACTORINESS! If one reads _Aspects of Reason_ you see the point. Although he does not use 'factual satisfactoriness', he uses 'satisfactoriness' as it applies to theorems (Oddly the 'theorem' sign in logic equates Frege's assertion sign). So Grice would say, hoping to bridge the gap between the is and the ought, that there is another type of satisfactoriness, too, which he calls 'boulemaic', or 'practical', etc -- with "!" as the prefix, rather. These two classes he finds isomorphic. But truth has been left behind. In particular, I think he is abiding by "then _enfant-terrible_ of Oxford philosophy", Ayer (never mind Vienna Circle for now). In "Language, Truth, and Logic" he is a strict proponent of the view that mathematics do not speak about the world, so that the word 'true' should be otiose. It _is_ confusing that 'p v ~p' should not speak about the world and yet get 1 1 1 1 as a truth table. But if I have to chose a philosophical description, I'd go with the 'does not talk about the world' rather than it is true by virtue of its meaning! ---- Now as for Lakatos: In a message dated 2/7/2009 7:09:15 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, rbj at rbjones.com writes: you are not specific enough for me to understand what points from Lakatos you are making (and I don't think I have read what he had to say about "research programs"). If you want to debate Lakatos I would be happy to, if only I could get a grip on the issue at stake. ---- Well, here some selections from wiki, which I'll comment as I paste them. >From the wiki's first sentence on the man (he looks aristocratic -- in a middle European kind of way) >most famous today worldwide for his thesis of >the fallibility of mathematics which if what I've saying above holds water, is _not_ falsification, because neither 'false' nor 'true' would apply to a mere calculus of symbols! And if you say it refers to _space_ or a model of space (geometry, the plane), or it refers to quantity in its most abstract terms (the idea of 'number') then I would not know why you don't go the whole hog and call the thing 'empirical', even if 'two-generations removed' as it were. (The Greeks' idea of number is funny: '1' was not one, since it was the name of the unity (Wittgenstein uses 'Unit' in the passages we've been reading re: the Reihe and the Gesatz). Of course it was not 'zero' -- since Arabic, etc. -- Apparently, it started with '2'. >Lakatos received a degree in mathematics (1944) >In 1960 he was appointed to a position in the London School of Economics, >where he wrote on the philosophy of mathematics. And taught I hope. Fancy becoming a teacher and just _writing_! >It was Agassi who first introduced Lakatos to Popper >under the rubric of his applying a fallibilist methodology >of conjectures and refutations to mathematics in his Cambridge PhD thesis. Should revisit my Agassi. >Lakatos' philosophy of mathematics was inspired by both Hegel's >and Marx' dialectic, Popper's theory of knowledge, >and the work of mathematician Polya. >"Proofs and Refutations" is based on his doctoral thesis. >It is largely taken up by a fictional dialogue set in a mathematics class. >The students are attempting to prove the formula for the Euler >characteristic in algebraic topology, which is a theorem >about the properties of polyhedra. The dialogue is meant >to represent the actual series of attempted proofs which >mathematicians historically offered for the conjecture, >only to be repeatedly refuted by counterexamples. >Often the students 'quote' famous mathematicians such as Cauchy. >What Lakatos tried to establish was that no theorem of >INFORMAL [my emphasis. JLS] mathematics is final or perfect. I guess I would _never_ have used that word, 'informal'. It qualifies all _so_. >This means that we should not think that a theorem is >ultimately true, only that no counterexample has yet been found. and I would not take side with 'true' in the first place. But 'mathematically satisfactory' if you wish (I know you _won't -- wish). >Once a counterexample, i.e. an entity contradicting/not explained >by the theorem is found, we adjust the theorem, >possibly extending the domain of its validity. validity? or satisfactoriness? I apply 'validity' to _sequences_ of sentences only, i.e. arguments. It's true that if p p ) q _____ q is valid (B. Aune discusses modus ponens at length in ch. iii of his Empiricism book), then the theorem: . (assertion sign) . ((p & (p ) q)) ) q will receive a 1 1 1 1 truth-table. But that's stylistically different from saying an assertion (or meta-assertion? see Hunter, "Meta-logic") is valid. Wiki continues: >This is a continuous way our knowledge accumulates, >through the logic and process of proofs and refutations. >If axioms are given for a branch of mathematics, however, >Lakatos claimed that proofs from those axioms were >tautological, i.e. logically true.) Or some would say 'analytic', and it's back to 'logical truth'. So perhaps if Grice did talk about 'factual satisfactoriness', one _could_ talk of 'logical' or 'formal' satisfactoriness here. Wiki continues: >Lakatos proposed an account of mathematical knowledge >based on the idea of heuristics. In Proofs and Refutations >the concept of 'heuristic' was not well developed, although >Lakatos gave several basic rules for finding proofs and >counterexamples to conjectures. He thought that >mathematical 'thought EXPERIMENTS' [emphasis mine. JLS -- loved that!] >are a valid way to discover mathematical conjectures and proofs, >and sometimes called his philosophy only as a tribute to Quine, I'd add! >'quasi-empiricism'. (or "How to Quasi a Meta Quine: Lakatos on two dogmas of mathematics". Wiki continues: >However, he also conceived of the mathematical community >as carrying on a kind of dialectic to decide which >mathematical proofs are valid and which are not. at the cocktails, I assume. I'm _never_ invited. >Therefore he fundamentally disagreed with the 'formalist' >conception of proof which prevailed in Frege's and Russell's >logicism, which defines proof simply in terms of formal validity. Yes, 'formal' seems to be the word we are looking rather than 'logical truth'. And it's something more 'formal satisfactory in virtue of its _form_ rather than meaning. For 'meaning' is merely an extra manipulation of symbols: 1 and 0" -- they don't have to _look_ at the "extension" of a class (out there) to _decide_ whether something is 1 or 0. And if they do, it's factual, not formal! >On its publication in 1976, Proofs and Refutations became >highly influential on new work in the philosophy of mathematics, >although few agreed with Lakatos' strong disapproval of formal proof. >Before his death he had been planning to return to the philosophy of >mathematics and apply his theory of research programmes to it. But then he thought, "Well, Speranza will do it for me" and he left this world in peace. Wiki continues: >One of the major problems perceived by critics is that the pattern of >mathematical research depicted in Proofs and Refutations does >not faithfully represent most of the actual activity of contemporary >mathematicians. who holiday in Florida, text their friends every other three seconds, grow big moustaches, speak Russian to non-Russian speakers, and allow students to use 'calculators'! References from wiki: Kampis, Kvaz & Stoltzner (eds) APPRAISING LAKATOS: Mathematics, Methodology and the Man Vienna Circle Institute Library, Kluwer 2002 ISBN 1-4020-0226. Lakatos (1978). Mathematics, Science and Epistemology: Philosophical Papers Volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-21769-52 Teun Koetsier (1991). Lakatos' Philosophy of Mathematics: A Historical Approach. Amsterdam etc: North Holland. ISBN 0-444-88944-2 Cheers, J. L. **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://ad.doubleclick. net/clk;211531132;33070124;e) From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Sat Feb 7 10:30:02 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 15:30:02 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine's Holism In-Reply-To: <200902061507.18236.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <200902061507.18236.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: Hi Roger, Rog?rio & JL, I?m just catching up with posts, so please excuse me if I have missed one of the later ones. Roger?s question was a very good one, viz.: is there an example of a proposition of mathematics which has been proven and subsequently held to be false as a result of some empirical observation My initial response was similar to Rog?rio?s: Euclidean geometry. But the axiom of parallels was rejected by mathematicians before Einstein came along. I?ll come back to this in a moment after a brief digression. There seem to be many propositions which were held to be analytic which have later come to be rejected on empirical grounds. Descartes? physics was supposed to be an a priori system based on clear and distinct ideas. Does that make it analytic? Not necessarily. But some of it might have been regarded so, if the question had been put and the analytic/synthetic distinction accepted. Yet it was the empirical success of Newton?s theory that did for Descartes. Similarly, scientists like Kepler and Galileo developed their theories largely as a priori mathematical theories. Galileo often seemed to think that he was simply doing mathematics. No one asked these scientists which of their principles they regarded as analytic (if any), so we don?t know what they would have said. But it seems reasonable to assume that, in at least some cases, they would have claimed to be analytic something that has since been rejected in the course of the empirical progress of science. This sort of thing seems to happen regularly in the development of a scientific theory: some parts of the theory are regarded as true by definition or by self-evidence; yet these parts, as well as the rest, get rejected in the onward march of empirical science. A defender of the analytic/synthetic distinction can of course say that what this shows is that people are often mistaken about which truths are analytic, not that analytic truths can actually be refuted empirically. And the same strategy seems to occur in mathematics, to safeguard its non-empirical character. Thus, the fact that Einstein?s theory uses a non-Euclidean geometry does not show that Euclidean geometry has been rejected on empirical grounds. It shows only that Euclidean geometry has to be rejected IF it is interpreted as a theory of physical space. But it can instead be interpreted non-empirically as a theory of Euclidean space. Or, to consider a very simple example, suppose that someone says that it is false that 1 + 1 = 2 because one drop of water when added to another drop of water = one drop of water. The response is to say that what has been refuted is an empirical interpretation of the mathematical formula, but the maths itself is purely formal and cannot be refuted in such ways. The problem with this approach is that it makes empty the claim that mathematics is non-empirical: whenever an empirical refutation is produced, it can be dismissed as due to an empirical interpretation of the maths. This amounts to making maths ?true by convention? in Poincare?s sense. Roger is, of course, right that there has been a massive development of mathematics over the centuries (not just new theorems and new proofs but new branches of the subject); and Rog?rio is right that a good deal of this growth has been stimulated by the demands of physical science (as with Newton?s development of the calculus). JL is right to refer to Lakatos, who shows in his ?Proofs and Refutations? how many previously ?proven? mathematical truths have been refuted by quasi-empirical counterexamples. By ?quasi-empirical? I mean that the counterexamples came from thought-experiments which showed that what was previously taken for a mathematical truth was in fact false, so what was previously taken for a proof could not be a proof at all. The problem then was to locate the fault in the previously accepted proof. There could be disagreement about where the fault lay and different lines of research in consequence. To answer JL?s question, Lakatos did apply his methodology of research programmes to the history of mathematics. His Ph.D. thesis was called ?Essays in the Logic of Mathematical Discovery? and part of it is reproduced in ?Proofs and Refutations.? Lakatos? methodology of scientific research programmes is a development or variation of Popper?s approach set out in ?The Logic of Scientific Discovery? (plus the ?Metaphysical Epilogue? to Popper?s ?Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics,? where Popper spoke of ?metaphysical research programmes?). One final point: there can be no such thing as the justification of mathematical propositions. That idea was buried with Russell?s discovery of the logical paradoxes (see his ?My Philosophical Development? for an account of the history). Hilbert tried to revive the corpse with his meta-mathematics; but Godel put paid to that effort. For a discussion see Lakatos, ?Infinite Regress and the Foundations of Mathematics.? I have seen that JL has just sent a post which covers part of what I have said about Lakatos. But I must say that some of that wiki stuff sounds suspect to me. Best wishes, Danny From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sat Feb 7 11:15:33 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 11:15:33 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] The Polyhedron: From Plato to Euler -- and Back Message-ID: I love polyhedra. Came to love them by reading Thomas (Loeb Library -- two volumes). Indeed, the triangle is the first plane figure, but the prism is the first _corpse_ (to use Danny Frederick's phrase -- corpus). Apparently, Plato's Timmaeus is full of them, and my teachers always told me, "Avoid that -- hardly philosophical, and slightly _crazy_. Ah, tutors are the least type of person who should be allowed to have tuttees. Anyway, apparently Euler, topologically and characteristically, thought otherwise. So perhaps Lakatos, a star in our little mathematical firmament -- see below for his claim to fame in the EOD -- is echoing what Whitehead said of metaphysics, "footnotes to Plato". Ditto -- mathematics? Think so! "A Star in the Mathematical Firmament": a tribute to Imre Lakatos In a message dated 2/7/2009 10:30:19 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk writes in "Re: Quine's Holism" For a discussion see Lakatos, ?Infinite Regress and the Foundations of Mathematics.? I have seen that JL has just sent a post which covers part of what I have said about Lakatos. But I must say that some of that wiki stuff sounds suspect to me. --- or unclear for a non-native English speaker. Consider the passage: "It was Agassi who first introduced Lakatos to Popper under the rubric of his applying a fallibilist methodology of conjectures and refutations to mathematics in his Cambridge PhD thesis." I see it's Lakatos's own PhD Cantab, "Essays in the Logic of Mathematical Discovery" as D. Frederick quotes it. -- and I'm glad D. Frederick can quote from other stuff by Lakatos which looks interesting, like the above item, "Infinite regress...". I was confused by Agassi (born Jerusalem, 1927 -- lives in Boston, or Canada, or Tel Aviv). What confused me was the 'rubric' bit. If it was Agassi, I would assume he was his thesis-advisor, so-called. Glad to hear of 'metaphysical research programmes' from the lips of Popper. Apparently, this saw published light with Bartley (1983) in "Poscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery". The OED, not very imaginatively, uses 'research programme' but in nothing like a Kuhnian paradigm or a Lakatosian thing. "1950 N.Z. Jrnl. Agric. June 514 (caption) The Rukuhia Soil Research Station (Hamilton)..carries out a *research programme in soil physics. 1958 Bull. Amer. Assoc. Petroleum Geologists XLII. 701 Some years ago the Field Research Laboratory of the Magnolia Petroleum Company began a Recent sediments research program in the Gulf of Mexico. 1977 Sci. Amer. Dec. 15/1 He now..carries on a research program in the behavioral ecology of ants." For the record, there are only 5 hits for Lakatos in the OED -- so far -- cfr. OED3 and _mailto:oed3 at oup.co.uk_ (mailto:oed3 at oup.co.uk) . Under "maturation" --not really Lakatos but his Argentine philosopher, Mario Bunge, in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave Probl. Philos "mediate", again (c) M. Bunge in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave Probl. Philos "Popperian" -- a reference _to_ Lakatos, not by him: "Lakatos's studies, although nominal ..." "self-", again a reference _to_ "Lakatos's sophisticated methodological..." and finally, Lakatos -- the man!, under "stellated" "Take for instance the ?great stellated dodecahedron? (fig. 15). It consists, like the ?small stellated dodecahedron? of pentagrams, but differently arranged. It has 12 faces, 30 edges and 20 vertices, so that V - E + F = 2. I. Lakatos Proofs & Refutations, 1976, p. 62 under definition of 'stellated' as "[said] of a polygon, polyhedron, or polytope: capable of being generated from a convex polygon, etc., by extending the edges, etc., until they once more meet at a new set of vertices, etc. [The sense is due to L. Poinsot, who used F. ?toil? in Jrnl. de l'?cole Polytechn. (1810) IV. 41).]" of course from 'stella', Latin for 'star' Cheers, JL **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://ad.doubleclick. net/clk;211531132;33070124;e) From mdoctorow at ca.rr.com Sat Feb 7 12:45:02 2009 From: mdoctorow at ca.rr.com (mdoctorow at ca.rr.com) Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 12:45:02 -0500 Subject: [hist-analytic] Mathematics and Lakatos's Research Programme Degeneracy In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <20090207174502.9GNNM.43756.root@cdptpa-web06-z01> Yes, I think it is all a matter of what Conformity dictates as the dominant Agenda in mathematics and in physics for example. These are largely "fads", and remarkably short-sighted. My comments about yo-yo "evolution" apply just as much to mathematics and science as to politics. In Quantum Theory in physics, for example, a particular university gets obsessed with one approach (Loop Quantum Gravity, for example, especially in Canada and parts of the U.K.), and the tendency is for everything else to be either ignored or down-played. In another particular university, for example in much of the USA, there is an obsession with an alternative approach (M-theory or Superstring Theory "Quantum Gravity" or Unification theory, for example) and everything else tends to be ignored or down-played. In mathematics, some of the fads or "yo-yo trends" are far worse than in physics. In mathematical probability-statistics, for example, whether you prefer to divide or to subtract numbers will literally respectively separate you into almost physically fighting schools (conditional probability versus my school of Probable Causation/Influence (PI)). The former school is so powerful that they tend to utterly refuse to publish anything by the latter school, and they have remarkable influence in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and engineering and computers far beyond their merits or Wisdom. Osher Doctorow ---- Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: > of Mathematics -- or "Mathematical Science". > Lakatos thought, I think, that research programmes either progenerate, or > 'degenerate'. In Factual or Empirical Sciences (Mario Bunge speaks of formal > vs. factical sciences), Lakatos viewed, it was more of the nature of the > research programme you were engaged (rather than matters of 'raw' empirical > evidence) that determined a 'paradigm-switch' as it were. > As you see, I think nothing has changed much, mathematically, since Thales > -- or at least since Thomas edited those two volumes. From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sat Feb 7 13:41:30 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 13:41:30 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] "He is a _post_-analytic" Message-ID: -- he said, in French, using 'post-analytic' substantively. Are post-analytic philosophers said to be so with a straight face? Does it mean ... -- er, what? I once was so unamused by post-Griceans versus neo-Griceans that I coined the term, 'paleo-Gricean', well, to extend the relevant polemic to, hey, Grice hissself [sic] In a message dated 2/7/2009 1:22:17 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, mdoctorow at ca.rr.com writes in "Re: Mathematics and Lakatos's Research Programme Degeneracy". In mathematical probability-statistics, for example, whether you prefer to divide or to subtract numbers will literally respectively separate you into almost physically fighting schools (conditional probability versus [...] [p]robable [c]ausation/[i]nfluence. ---- Interesting, and I'll make it a shortie here! I see your programme has not degenerated at all, and indeed, was reading your amusing (in the good sense of 'amusing') discovery upon your son discovering that your theories had been minimized. When reading Malthus, I found it obtuse that he said that food grows arithmetically while people grow geometrically. But I thought he was proved to be _right_. It was an _empirical_ finding. (That's why a philosopher would defend controlled birth -- in an attempt to arithmetize populations, as it were; for I'm sure it's more difficult to geometrize food?). In any case, I love probability theory. Know next to zero about it. Some has to do with Jackson and Lewis (philosophers -- and one Mc) about 'conditional' or horseshoe operations (whether what Grice found as the divergence between the horseshoe and the 'if' vernacular was a matter of something that people who use 'if' conventionally implicate or conversationally implicate -- all jargon, but I recall D. S. M. Edgington -- my tutora here -- was pleased to follow my little tidbit on this). But of course mathematical probability-statistics, I hope, can also be a _formal_ (i.e. non empirical) science, as much as logic is. And I'm curious how what I call The Geometrical School (who like to 'divide') versus The Arithmetical School (who like to 'substract') (as I call _you_) could avoid physical fight -- between the lightweights and the heavyweights, shall I say -- not fair! --. If it's all _formal_, i.e. non-empirical, it would be a matter of "Charming by Convention" (I avoid Poincare's 'True by Convention' for this _extends_ truth in my opinion). I.e. a matter of _stipulative_ definitions that you either follow or don't. It's all pretty wicked, and I wish you good luck in showing the degeneracy of the other paradigm! Come to think of it, I've heard _hundreds_ saying that "Analytic Philosophy" has degenerated beyond repair (and some will speak of 'post-analytic'). The fact that this is hist-analytic saves us to lose too much face about it -- even when you can call me a reactionary irreverent conservative when I say I don't think the paradigm has degenerated _so_. Grice saved us, in a way, by saying that Philosophy has "Longitudinal Unity" (never mind "latitudinal") so that what Socrates said is still valid ('plus or minus one change of idiom or other', he added). Cheers, J. L. **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://ad.doubleclick. net/clk;211531132;33070124;e) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sat Feb 7 21:12:05 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 21:12:05 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] The analytic/postanalytic distinction Message-ID: Before I forget! Some remarks on 'post-analytic'. My previous post, commenting on O. Doctorow, was not perhaps clear. I meant to say that in French (also Italian) -- but, not really in English (as OED testifies), 'analitico' (to stick to Italian) can be used 'substantivized', as it were: e.g. -- some hits: "Ci troviamo, dunque, di fronte non a un filosofo "post-analitico", o a un analitico pentito e in fase di autocritica". This is an interesting one. A 'repented analytic (philosopher) going self-critical'. That is perhaps one non-charitable way of reading Grice. A more charitable view would be that philosophers like Grice did not cease to be 'analytic', even if they ceased being 'too formal' (In Grice's case, he confesses when Putnam -- "of all people" complained to Grice that he found him thus. Another Italian hit (_www.swif.uniba.it/lei/rassegna/010605d.htm_ (http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/rassegna/010605d.htm) ) refers to Rorty who "considera Rawls un filosofo post-analitico o anche non analitico." guide.supereva.it/giallo_e_noir/interventi/2004/09/177478.shtml refers to Dupin as being "un analitico" www.swif.uniba.it/lei/rassegna/010311c.htm seems to complain that while Marino Gentile is described as "un continentale", MacIntyre is being described as "un analitico". pantera90.blogspot.com/2008/10/un-oceano-di-folla.html is looking for people interested in philosophy, "almeno se e un analitico". There's also a description of "DFW ? un analitico (wittgenstein) che per? si diverte a complicarsi la vita e ha il gusto del paradosso" (profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=104588004) _www.portalefilosofia.com/materiali/pozzoni1.php_ (http://www.portalefilosofia.com/materiali/pozzoni1.php) refers to Calderoni as "un analitico mancato" While finally, www.ledonline.it/lededizioniallegati/mancuso365.pdf describes Liebmann as "un analitico piu misurato" than Eucken, who's more of a 'synthetic'. There is only _one_ relevant hit in the OED, so far, for 'post-analytical philosophy', from the "American Journal of International Law" (vol. 93 (1999), p. 355), by an author who defines himself as having become attached to French structuralism! ("n search I was trying to find something substantial on 'analytic' philosophy versus postanalytic, and came across a description of a website by Keith Burgess-Jackson, who describes himself as providing "analytic philosophy (and other stuff) in the an*l-retentive tradition!". Anyway, revising the OED I note the following definition of 'analytic philosophy' whose author I still have to check. "Analytic philosophy consists at least partly, in replacing a concept, or a set of concepts, by another concept, or set of concepts." (Mind, 1948 LVII, p. 292). The first quote that the OED chose to refer to 'analytic philosophy' is from E. Nagel in JP 33 (1936) 5, viz. "Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe" where he claims, "Analytic philosophy is ethically neutral formally." And now to compare this to O. Doctorow's comments, when he writes: "whether you prefer to divide or to subtract numbers will literally respectively separate you into almost physically fighting schools (conditional probability versus my school of Probable Causation/Influence (PI)). The former school is so powerful that they tend to utterly refuse to publish anything by the latter school" And there's also the 'institutional' side to it. I have been to universities where 'analytic' is _not_ in, and to others where 'non-analytic' is not in. In most cases, I've been to universities where nobody gives a fig! Professors (usually tenured) are locked in their office rooms and they hardly interact with others, even if both of them are analytic -- or perhaps _precisely_! In terms of 'raw evidence' and degenerate research programmes, there is of course an interface. Who the list is of the PhD committee may define whether your dissertation gets accepted for _sotto voce_ or not! (I was happy mine did). When I look back, I guess I chose the 'analytic' style just to tease my professors, continental, and rather too traditional for my test. I'm glad I'm not an anglo, for as things are, being pretty 'paradoxical' I would have become a total Diltheian in a truly 'analytic' university! When it comes to more serious stuff as to how an article is written 'in the analytic' vein... why is it that it can be tedious enough to have _created_ its own enemy, postanalytic philosophy? Critiques to analytical philosophy by 'post-analytics': ---- restricted narrowness of what a philosophical problem is. ---- restricted view of what 'philosophical method' amounts to: 'conceptual analysis in terms of other concepts'. ---- meta-neutral considerations. Post-analytics want to 'commit' themselves. ---- myopy. Some good post-analytic philosophers are pretty conversant in _both_ analytic philosophy *and* continental philosophy and they can make useful comparisons, if you are in the mood for them. Etc. Cheers, JL **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://ad.doubleclick. net/clk;211531132;33070124;e) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sun Feb 8 10:34:06 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2009 07:34:06 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Aune and the a/s distinction Message-ID: <476817.88724.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com> I want to thank Speranza, Danny, Roger, and Rogerio for their astute comments. i will be looking at them more carefully. I've been engaged in finishing the book I'm doing on Anscombe, which is about complete. I am considering not submitting this thing to the academic presses. ?I'm not sure I like the "cut," the demands, the groveling. I quit groveling a few decades ago and have no desire to return to the "game." Now some VERY half-baked comments on the a/s distinction. "Quine thought that, for philosophical purpose, a conception of analytic truth as truth by virtue of meaning was too vague to be taken seriously." ?- Bruce Aune If we reject the idea of truth in virtue of meaning, we might ask: "Truth, then, in virtue of what?" Powerful arguments (Davidson) have been adduced for being suspicious of facts, but if not facts what? Suppose we take a pragmatist view a fact is what makes a theory "work." Few, if any, pragmatists would accept this simplistic formulation, but despairing of his loss of facts, the philosopher will care to consider what distinguishes "I ate my breakfast before my dinner" or "I laughed at 6:00am" where their contradictories are "false." The pragmatist answer would be what? So truth in virtue of meaning is one way of viewing analyticity, it is NOT what Kant had in mind, and I think Kant understood the role of the a/s distinction better than Quine, as evidenced by the use he made of synthetic a priori, a category of *propositions*. Elsewhere Aune has indicated that as for what makes the a/s important we can say this: "To show the error of a wide range of claims by epistemological rationalists." I have deferred comment because I need to take a close look at an ETK, Aune's book on Hist-Analytic, before making a serious reply; but, for now, consider this: I, share, Aune's empiricist proclivities; still I remain skeptical about the a/s distinction. Central to the issue is whether there are facts; if there are no facts then ?the truths of algebra and the truths of physics are truths in the same sense of 'truth' differing only in some other property requiring the introduction of meaning, perhaps. My, immediate, concern is the place of probability in philosophy of science. If we look at the mathematical theory of probability, then I think we can establish a pretty clean connection between the propositions of science and two valued logic. But if there is no way of making this connection, "truth," in science may best be regarded outside the semantic web the Tarskians have weaved. This, I think, was pretty much Reichenbach's view and I am inclined to share it. What makes an analytic proposition true? We don't want to say that it is analytic because it has such and such resistance to revision, etc. and then go on to say that it resists revision because it is analytic. If there are no logical "facts" then the truths of logic are expressed as propositions which are "formal" truths lacking factual content. This in some quarters is orthodoxy. If there is no "factual"/"formal" divide then there is, ultimately, no distinction between the truths of science and the truths of mathematics. I find this unacceptable, but only because I don't regard the distinction as epistemological; nor do I believe that the most productive consequences of such a distinction are of interest to a belief that a conceptual framework is linguistic.The subject matter of science is the world; the subject matter of logic is not; logic lacks a subject matter. This is by no means obvious or clear. Is a thought a part of the world? Does ontology go beyond "atoms and the void"? These unresolved issues figure into all this and I don't have an opinion I would "go to the mats" to decide. When Carnap speaks of the "logic of the language of science" in the Logical Syntax of Language, the language of science must be understood as the "physical language." If, as Aune points out, Carnap agreed that there is no useful a/s distinction in natural language we can say, at least, one of two things. We can say the a/s distinction has nothing to do with language, and that it concerns concepts, alone (Kant) or we can say that the notion of meaning in a canonical language is not the same as in natural language. What then is the place of meaning in canonical languages? It is tied to reference, ala, Tarski. Once again the language of science is tied to truth in a formalized language, and where that language is science, and "facts," are no longer at issue, the position is untenable. Analyticity becomes a matter of decision in the construction of a "viable" canonical language. Not unrelated here is that in a three valued logic applied to probabilities, where probability is understood on the frequency theory, these laws of logic simply do not apply. If the world is best described on such a frequency theory then this is not a matter of decision or "interest."? Whether such a logic is employed is determined in large measure by the way the world is, not "meaning." It would be interesting to know what Quine/Carnap would have regarded as a "philosophically useful distinction." I think, for example, that Kant's treatment of the synthetic a priori marvelously relates ethics and mathematics! But I don't think either would be inclined to consider this application a "phiosophically useful distinction." A look at their ethical theory may explain why. Regards Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Feb 8 17:10:27 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2009 17:10:27 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] "The cat is on the mat" -- and other phrastics Message-ID: What the phrastic is about Some comments on S. R. Bayne's excellent recent post on the a/s distinction, bearing such weighty questions such as "Is a thought part of reality?", "Do facts exist?", "Does logic have a subject-matter", and more! Surely mandatory reading (if that's not too bad) for the serious historian of analytic philosophy, or at least mandatory questions he should feel mandated to provide an answer for (even "Dunno!"). Consider: The cat is on the mat. versus !(O, that the cat be on the mat) What is it that the 'sentence' refers to; why did the Cat On The Mat matter, to echo Hacking, to philosophy? Or did it not? In a message dated 2/8/2009 baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: (I'm trying to fit to a "In-Reply-To" mailer'; meanwhile, I can guess this post will not be viewed as developing S. R. Baynes's thread -- sorry about that) S. R. Bayne starts by citing from Aune (post to hist-analytic): >>Quine thought that, for philosophical purpose[s], >>a conception of analytic truth as truth by virtue of >>meaning was too vague to be taken seriously. Bayne comments: >If we reject the idea of truth in virtue of meaning, we might ask: >"Truth, then, in virtue of what?" Powerful arguments (Davidson) >have been adduced for being suspicious of facts, but >if not facts what? Suppose we take a pragmatist view >a fact is what makes a theory _work_. Few, if any, pragmatists >would accept this simplistic formulation, but despairing >of his loss of facts, the philosopher will care to consider >what distinguishes > > I ate my breakfast before my dinner. > >or > > I laughed at 6:00am. > >where their contradictories are >'false.' The pragmatist answer would be what? So truth >in virtue of meaning is one way of viewing analyticity, >it is NOT what Kant had in mind, and I think >Kant understood the role of the a/s distinction better >than Quine, as evidenced by the use he made of >synthetic a priori, a category of _propositions_. A second passage from Aune that Bayne quotes he prefaces: >Elsewhere Aune has indicated that as for what makes the a/s important we >can say this: The passage being one making a reference, >>[t]o show the error of a wide range of claims by >>epistemological rationalists. > Bayne comments: >I remain skeptical about the a/s distinction. >Central to the issue is whether there are facts; >if there are no facts >then the truths of algebra and the truths of physics >are truths in the same sense of 'truth' differing only >in some other property requiring the introduction of >meaning, perhaps. > > >My, immediate, concern is the place of probability in >philosophy of science. If we look at the mathematical >theory of probability, then >I think we can establish a pretty clean connection between the propositions >of science and two-valued logic. But if >there is no way of making this connection, >"truth," in science may best be regarded outside >the semantic web the Tarskians have weaved. >This, I think, was pretty much Reichenbach's view >and I am inclined to share it. > >What makes an analytic proposition true? >We don't want to say that it is analytic because >it has such and such resistance to >revision, etc. and then go on to say that it >resists revision because it is analytic. > >If there are no logical 'facts' then >the truths of logic are expressed as propositions >which are 'formal' truths lacking factual content. >This in some quarters is orthodoxy. > I'm reminded 'heterodoxy' is other people's doxies. >If there is no 'factual'/'formal' divide then >there is, ultimately, no distinction between >the truths of science and the truths of mathematics. >I find this unacceptable, but only because >I don't regard the distinction as epistemological; > >nor do I believe that >the most productive consequences of such a >distinction are of interest to a belief >that a conceptual framework is linguistic. >The subject matter of science is the world; >the subject matter of logic is not; >logic lacks a subject matter. >This is by no means obvious or clear. > Especially to students! I was browising the other day Steven Yablo's webpage (he is at MIT) and I think, as typically other philosophers say this in their webpages, that they have been involved in teaching logic, which I think they call "Minor League" or "Lower Divisions" -- versus, say, "metaphysics", which is, but Danny Frederick who taught _both_ logic and metaphysics will disagree, is high, higher oh so higher divisions! I must say I hate that attitude. I wonder what I would have thought as a mediaeval schooler in the trivium (grammatica, dialectica, rhetorica). Indeed, a London professor was so intrigued by this that he wrote a book on Mediaeval Logic called, "Barbara Celarent". Which I think sums up well what a mediaeval student of logic would remember from his trivial classes! With Aristotle is even worse! "Logica" was not really part of the trivium, since I believe the trivium was a _Latin_ or Roman thing. I don't think I recall reading a Plato dialogue (and these should epitomise what philosophy for the Greeks were) that makes the round _around_ a logical notion: it's always about virtue, or beauty, or the law, or love, or justice, or ... -- but hardly about Philonian material conditionals! ----- So I applaud Bayne's comment, "Logic lacks a subject-matter". --- Bayne continues: >Is a thought a part of the world? >Does ontology go beyond >"atoms >and the void"? >These unresolved issues figure into all this and >I don't have an opinion I would "go to the mats" to decide. Talking of mats, I was amusingly reminded of a lecture I once gave on Mill and Mentalism (students hated me for that). My example was, of course, "The cat is on the mat". And I used a photocopy of the _drawing_ that S. E. Toulmin has in his _The Uses of Arguments_. I loved that drawing because it went, as it were, 'to the mats', as to what _facts_ are! Later I learned 'the cat is on the mat' is an anglo thing to learn to _read_ (it rhymes). I particularly loved to _symbolise_ "The cat is on the mat" since it makes use of 'iota' operator, and it makes a reference to a substantial (Cat No. 1, in Eddington's parlance), a predicate, "to be on the mat", etc.). I recall, with amusement, how the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English made that sentence mean, "The prostitute is being punished by the pimp" ('cat', fig. prostitute; to be 'on the mat', to be punished). Very incorrect. >When Carnap speaks of the >"logic of the language of science" in >_The Logical Syntax of Language_, >the language of science must be understood as the >'physical language.' If, as Aune points out, >Carnap agreed that there is no >useful a/s distinction in natural language >we can say, at least, one of two things. >We can say the a/s distinction has nothing >to do with language, and that it >concerns concepts, alone (Kant) >or >we can say that the notion of meaning in a >canonical language is not the same as in natural language. >What then is the place of meaning in canonical >languages? It is tied to reference, ala, Tarski. >Once again the language of science is tied to >truth in a formalized language, >and where that language is science, >and "facts," are no longer at issue, the >position is untenable. Analyticity becomes >a matter of decision in the construction >of a 'viable' canonical language. If I may, I would bring the wider historical context. From my understanding of Carnap and his (literal) circle, it seems that Carnap is making a very strong point (alla "methinks the lady doth protest too much") regarding _phsyicalism_. From my experience, going through Ayer's excellent compilation on "Logical Positivism" _phenomenalism_ seems to have been the received 'logical' reply to what the Circle was looking for. Some further historical notes may help. Of the 'logical postivists', the only one that crossed the pond (and reached Dover) was F. Weismann -- and he was recognised as the mentor of 'texture' in language, etc. On the other hand, there's America! I was pleased to read online of B. Aune's personal recollections of H. Feigl's association with the development of analytic philosophy. And then there was Carnap, and Reichenbach, and I guess a few more. In _Philosophical Analysis_, I think it is, Urmson suggests that, at least as far as Oxford was concerned, they (the philosophical intelligentsia) would not let a bunch of neo-scienticists (no offense!) to _destroy_ the Humanities like that! And right he was. Logical Positivism became a _fad_, and it was particularly embraced by philosophers like Isaiah Berlin (in his earliest paper ever, now repr. in _Concepts and Categories_) or Grice (in his 'Personal Identity' or an early paper on 'Intention' that S. R. Chapman quotes from*) (*This paper, Chapman notes, is so _early_ that it still bears the address of Grice's _parents_, in Holborne, Warwickshire -- amazing that it's now deposited at UC/Berkeley!) And if Grice and others embraced 'phenomenalism' ('it seems to me as if the pillar box is red' +> "It's not!") it was only because it provided Oxonian philosophy with a root to their past (where Aristotelian scholasticism was the rule). It took Grice a couple of decades to _go back_ to Aristotle, or as he preferred, Ariskant. Bayne continues: >Not unrelated here is that in a three-valued logic >applied to probabilities, where probability is >understood on the frequency theory, >these laws of logic simply do not apply. >If the world is best described on such a frequency theory >then this is not a matter of decision or 'interest'. Exactly. Eddington's quote on the 'principle of indeterminacy' -- he coined the phrase apparently -- now in the OED shows his puzzlement here: Eddington writes: "It was Heisenberg again who set in motion the new development in the summer of 1927, and the consequences were further elucidated by Bohr. The outcome of it is a fundamental general principle which seems to rank in importance with the principle of relativity. I shall here call it the ?principle of indeterminacy?. The gist of it can be stated as follows: a particle may have position or it may have velocity but it cannot in any exact sense have both." (1928, p. 220). Recall too that the main problem for logical positivists was to get from 'observational' to 'theoretical'. Eddington (and it's good to quote him here, since he _was_ in the lab!) has a couple of quotes here, too: "It is never the task of the experimenter to devise the observational procedure which is the ultimate test of a scientific assertion." Philosophy of the Physical Sciences, 1939, p. 23 -- meaning??? While there's no quote from Eddington on 'theoretical' -- but he must have known of Ramsey's Ramsifications? -- there's two more quotes on related concepts to 'observation'. Under 'observer', a reference to "the observer and his measuring-appliances" Space, Time & Gravitation (1920), p. 69 and the adverb, 'observationally': "The effect on the apparent angular motion..remains always on the verge of what is detectable observationally." Rotation of Gallaxy, 1930, p. 13. I remember when I was studying philosophy of science -- with G. Ranea -- that I was embarrassed to ask if 'observation', for philosophers means just "see"? Not for Grice ('Remarks about the senses'). If not, the philosophical correct term would be _sensing_, rather than _observing_. The dichotomy is usual ('theoretical' vs. 'observational') but it can be otiose. The best way I found to understand it is via what Grice calls Ramsification in "Method in philosophical psychology". He is wanting to say that "... thinks ..." is _not_ observational predicate; it is _theoretical_. And the only way he found at that stage (1975) to deal with this is in terms of 'sensory input' and 'behavioural output' of a Turing machine: input --> (( black box )) --> output "... thinks ..." Bayne continues: >Whether such >a logic is employed is determined in large measure by >the way the world is, not "meaning." >It would be interesting to know what Quine/Carnap >would have regarded as a "philosophically useful distinction". > It would seem that 'philosophically', there is not, what Austin would refer to as 'the word wearing the trousers' (Grice's 'trouser-word') in any case! It feels as if for Carnap and Quine, if a distinction is useful it's _not_ 'philosophical' (or at least 'not' metaphysical!). >I think, for example, that Kant's treatment of >the synthetic a priori marvelously relates >ethics and mathematics! But I don't >think either would be inclined to consider this >application a "philosophically >useful distinction." A look at their ethical theory may explain why. Is theree one?! (Just joking!) The title of this post may be obscure but it's meant as a tribute to R. M. Hare's first subatomic particle of logic: the phrastic (he went on to identify the neustic, the tropic, and the clistic -- outdoing Grice in nice distinctions there!). The phrastic is the _content_ simpliciter of what I say, provided I do say something. "What is it about" wants to direct the attention not so much as to what the phrastic _is_ but as to what it is about! (Grice, similarly, spends quite a few pages in "Valedictory Essay" (or 'retrospective essay') in WOW on what he calls 'dictiveness' versus 'formality' -- but he is more into the distinction, "Hey, the big heads are boiling" versus "There is a meeting at the moment at the Department of Philosophy -- they are deciding issues about the curriculum": one is informal; the other, the secretary's formal report). Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1218550342x1201216770/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From aune at philos.umass.edu Sun Feb 8 17:03:57 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2009 17:03:57 -0500 Subject: [hist-analytic] Aune and the a/s distinction In-Reply-To: <476817.88724.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <476817.88724.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: These remarks are in response to Steve?s email, ?Aune and the a/s distinction.? First, Steve quotes my remark, ?"Quine thought that, for philosophical purpose, a conception of analytic truth as truth by virtue of meaning was too vague to be taken seriously." If we wish to speak loosely, ?truth by virtue of meaning? may be all right as a way of describing an analytic truth, but it doesn?t give us the information we need to decide whether a statement a given statement is analytic. How could considerations limited to meaning show us whether a given statement is true? Kant?s description of a true analytic judgment offered some help in the matter, but it applied only to a limited class of judgments ?namely, universally affirmative judgments of a subject/predicate form. It provided help because if a predicate ?is an A that is a B? is applicable to any individual i (so that i is an A that is a B) then the predicate ?is a B? is also applicable to i (so that i is a B). Thus, with just a little logical tinkering, we can conclude that ?All i?s that are As that are a B are I?s that are a B? or, more simply, ?All ABs are Bs.? But not all statements are of the ?All Bs are B? form. What about them? As I pointed out, Frege in his Foundations of Arithmetic tried to improve on Kant?s definition of an analytic truth; he tried to bring it up to date in a way we are all familiar with. But Frege did nothing to show that why logical truths should be considered analytically true, nor did he, as Quine objected, give us a means of recognizing synonymous expressions, which we must have if we can successfully apply Frege?s definition. If Quine was right in recognizing Frege?s means of drawing the distinction, How do we proceed? Well, I have offered a means of drawing the distinction, one that follows Carnap?s lead, in my new book, so anyone who is interested in what I think need only read my chapter 3. I could accept the vague characterization ?true by virtue of meaning? for very rough and ready purposes, but this characterization cannot be deemed helpful in an informed philosophical discussion. I said that Carnap said that no useful a/s distinctioncan be drawn for the sentences of a natural language. He held this, as I explained, because he thought the sentences of a natural language are insufficiently determinate in meaning to admit of such a distinction. He did think, though, that we can draw such a distinction if we make our meaning clear and determinate for purposes of discussion. I explain all of this in my chapter 3, though I add qualifications in my appendix Best, Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Feb 8 19:29:29 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2009 19:29:29 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] "A Pretty Good Guide To Logical Form" Message-ID: "By virtue of grammar". "By virtue of its form -- and form only"? -- Open the door. It's I, Tom! -- He's not Tom. He's the master! -- How do you know? -- Tom would never say, "It's I" -- How virtuous is the 'homo grammaticus'? -- or the abuses of 'the logical grammar of ...' in the annals of analytic philosophy (with a wink to C. W. K. Mundle, "A Critique of Linguistic Philosophy" -- Excellent book by this Welshman!) "Nein!" (Was: Frege) I enjoyed B. Aune's reply to S. R. Bayne. ("But not all statements ar of the 'All Bs are B' form", etc.) It motivated to re-read Frege! Anyway, two little points: * 'in virtue of', etc. It may amuse philosophers that this is all, of course, 'out of Africa', almost, and due to the equivocation in the Greek concept of 'arete'. Arete meant 'excellence' (as in The Age of Excellence). Cicero was not a noble, but a vulgus; and so, wiki tells us, he wanted to say that men were virtuous 'by virtue of 'virtue''! The phrase stuck, and as M. McDonnell notes in his "Roman manliness" (p 103) -- google books --, "The phrases 'by virtue of' and 'en vertu de' are both traceable to the effect of a cultic use of Greek 'arete' on Roman 'virtus' " * As for Frege; again from wiki: "Frege argues that without ever having any intuition toward any of the numbers in the following equation [*] we nevertheless can assert it as [analytischlig] true". Frege's example being: " 135664 + 37863 = 173527" The "Nein!" in the header comes from his typically German emphatic answer to "Could Kant be right that this is synthetic?" And I am amused that, if M. Gardner ("Annotated Alice") is right and Humpty Dumpty is Lewis Carroll's caricature of the Oxford philo-sophico-philo-logicus fella, then I'd say that, like to Humpty, to verify whether Frege is _right_ would take me a few! * By virtue of grammar? Now back to "All Bs are B" and B. Aune's commentary ("Frege in his Foundations of Arithmetic tried to improve on Kant?s definition of an analytic truth; he tried to bring it up to date in a way we are all familiar with" -- and again: "But not all statements are of the ?All Bs are B? form. What about them?"). I was recently reading (and discussing in CHORA-L) J. K. Jerome's Three men in a bummel. He is discussing German overuses of 'ought' (This is not what I want, but what I ought to want). Ditto, I can imagine Frege saying: -- But not all statements are of the "All Bs are B" form. -- Well, they *should*! If we use 'horseshoe' to formalise the above, indeed it seems like we can 'verify' it holds for 'all truth-conditions' (I'm speaking vaguely) for _any_ interpretation. (x) Fx ) Fx where ')' stands for ')'. So, it wouldn't be so much 'by virtue of its meaning -- _and meaning only_" [This closure to appease S. R. Bayne?] but, as Bayne also suggests, 'by virtue of its _logical_ form"? And here it is where Analytic Philosophy got interesting, I found. When it started to speak, albeit vaguely, but with some degree of impertinence, of 'the logical grammar of...': "You just can't say "The pillar box is red". 'Red' does not apply to 'material-objects' but to 'sense-datum'" "The logic of colour-words", "The logical grammar of ..." this and that. And as a pro-Oxonian, I would even go with Russell that grammar is a "pretty good guide" _to_ logical form (where grammar means ordinary-language, nicely fitting what Russell had as 'stone-age metaphysics"! Let Eddington play with quanta! -- Cheers, -- JL. Cheers, J. L. S. Author of "And now to bed", etc. * * Why did J. L. Austin ever feel the _need_ to *translate* Frege?! He's so transparent! (Just joking). **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1218550342x1201216770/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Feb 9 06:30:04 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 9 Feb 2009 06:30:04 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Elatically-Karulizing Pirots Karulize Elatically Message-ID: -- true by virtue of ...? "Not true"? Post-modern Grice (Was: The analytic-synthetic distinction A ps on Grice, short as I can make it. I did disucss Grice's two examples of 'tautology' in 'Logic and Conversation' (WOW, ii) War is war. Women is women. These are really of the form Frege would have as (x)Fx ) Fx. So it's not really 'tautology' as per truth-table. We need an interpretation, a class-overlap, class assignment, individual assignment, interpretation of ')', interpretation of '(x)' -- as substitutional, say. In any case what interests is is Grice's judgement: they are _uninformative_. This is a nudge (if that's the word) to Frege, Russell, and logicism -- not to _Quine_! To see why they are uninformative (they don't speak about the world) we need further to buy, perhaps, Grice's idea of conversation as the purposeful exchange of conversational moves that will _influence_ others by informing them about the 'state' of the world. The example of truly analytic, in Grice/Strawson is My three-year old son is an adult. They go to consider, "Avoid metaphorical interpretation here" and so they end up with the reply to this being "Inconceivable!". Since there _is_ a possible reply to an analytically _false_ sentence, they gather there could be a similar one ('Conceivable!') to an analytically true one. Ditto, the reply to synthetic sentences is either "I don't believe that!" in the case of false ones of "I do believe that!" in case of true ones (S. R. Bayne keeps 'In defense of a dogma' in the archives). Two more points, while I say that my views and this are formed by Grice's "Life and Opinions" as to the defense of the analytic/synthetic distinction. * -- IDIOLECTAL meaning. B. Aune discusses this when he notes that English is highly spoken in the world today (I mean spoken by a few). Grice saw this problem, and in 'Conceptual Analysis and the Province of Philosophy' but also in the more charming "Oxford philosophy" which he delivered at Wellesey (of all places) he speaks of a concept having 'extension' for one speaker only. Thus 'bachelors are unmarried males' may be analytically false to a student at Wellesey who is about to become a bachelor and she is not a male -- nor unmarried, as the case transpired. * -- Grice loved Carnap's "Pirots karulize elatically", and uses 'pirot' extensively. I would say that, 'by virtue of its form', it's not analytic. Of course if we go to define what types of pirots we are talking about, or defining the pirot in the subject-position, then it may become thus. But the change needed would amount rather to state, rather uninformatively: elatically karulizing pirots karulize elatically which again shows that 'analytic' can be shown to be thus 'by virtue of its (extended logical) form'. What about the other implicit sentences, of other forms. "Unless they are not given the proper expansion, treat them as _synthetic_. * Then there's really analytic sentences of the type Levinson discusses in _Pragmatics_: "Either he will be fired, or he won't" This is analytic by virtue of its logical form, and thus a correlate would be Either pirots karulize elatically, or they don't. (provided they exist? Not even) Again, these uninformative 'tautologies' get an implicature which is _different_ for each case. The expansion for "My three little year son is an adult" properly expanded does not speak about the world. But does it not at least express that the utterer has a child? With children like that! (*expansion: My three little year son-non adult is an adult). The child is what my aunt would call a 'contradiction' in terms! I think it's Harnish who considers expansion of analytic predicates to tease the addressee: "I met a female adult yesterday" in lieu of the shorter, "I met a woman". Implicature: "not really attractive, as women go". But "I met a female adult yesterday" _is_ synthetic (He could have stayed indoors and avoid the proceedings). A truly analytic of this kind will be sentece 3 in the second speaker's reply -- otiose if ever a sentence was). -- "Mary is not really a woman; she is an adult female" -- I disagree. Mary, who is an adult female, is an adult female, and thus a woman. In fact, all females are females, and all women are women. Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1218550342x1201216770/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Wed Feb 11 16:43:22 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2009 13:43:22 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Anscombe's Reference to Wittgenstein: "leaves." Message-ID: <677043.77931.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com> In Anscombe's _Intention_ there is reference to an account of a lecture by Wittgenstein. (_Intention_ (1957: 1963) Harvard. Section 3, p. 6.) I once saw some notes on a lecture by Wittgenstein in which he imagined some leaves being blown about by the wind... At first I thought this was in Moore's account of the lectures during the 30s. But I don't think it's there. I was going to spend a while looking through K. T. Fann, but that is laborious and maybe a waste of time. If anyone knows the source of Anscombe's remarks, please let me know. I have found a reference to a similar discussion of EVERY point raised by this analogy in Reichenbach! I will be more active on the list soon. Matters of business have been keeping me busy. My apologies. Regards STeve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Feb 11 19:34:57 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2009 19:34:57 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] How is fastidium to be avoided? Message-ID: -- "magisterial, fastidious" Hey, this is not _me_; but keep in mind this quote from Mrs. Ward: 1885 MRS. H. WARD tr. Amiel's Jrnl. (1889) 277 "How is fastidium to be avoided?" (translating Amiel's Journal, 1885 -- (1889, p. 277). First, the source: I was once discussing with L. M. Tapper on a choice of words by S. W. Blackburn (sometime of Pembroke, Oxford). It's the online blurb, as it were, for Grice's _WOW_: "Grice was a miniaturist who changed the way other people paint big canvases. The question of correct scale is ultimately one of intellectual judgment, and in this his magisterial, fastidious prose rebukes those of us who want to move faster." Times Literary Supplement ---- I want to consider the 'fastidium' vis a vis the history of analytic philosophy, but first a few etymological remarks. The OED does not really define the term, but it gives, I think, a good paraphrase: "over-niceness" -- As Mrs. Ward uses it, it's indeed Latin neuter, 'fastidium', which the OED has as 'loathing' and cognate with Fr. 'fastidieux'; although Ward is possibly translating Amiel's ennui. A few quotes in the OED, in no chronological order, seem to illustrate the concept well: * 1744 YOUNG Night Thoughts VI. 551 "Proud youth! fastidious of the lower world." --- I like that at least it's ascribed of a _youth_ and not your average Father William! * 1691 RAY Creation Pref. (1704) 7 "Fastidious Readers." --- This above is interesting; as it would require some fastidious Gricean analysis to make sense: "A reader is fastidious iff..." * 1624 GATAKER Transubst. 42 "Fastidiously and childishly..full of Logicke rules." --- Well, perhaps a sin of much of analytic philosophy. Rephrasing Occam's Razor, as modified by Grice, I would have: "Do not multiply logicke rules beyond fastidious necessity". 1784 J. BARRY Lect. Art vi. (1848) 207 "Fastidiousness, and a useless and too critical nicety, may be expected to increase." -- which relates the idea to 'over-niceness'. ----------------- I recall when I was introduced to "Epistemology" via Chisholm, and my tutor commenting, "Beware, it's in the analytic vein; so don't expect other than necessary and sufficient conditions, and it will be an altogether dry thing". (Ezequiel de Olaso my tutor was, and we did survive the Chisholm). ---- Let's revise the Blackburn: "in this [in what? deictic here? JLS] his magisterial [derogative, too, if you wish -- cf. 'ex cathedra'] fastidious prose [but I'll generalize to 'style'. JLS] rebukes those of us who want to move faster." I'm not sure I understand 'rebuke' but I'll take it as 'scold'. 'magisterial' reminds me of W. P. Robinson, the social psychologist. He is examining the scope of "Grice's maxims" ('avoid ambiguity', 'be relevant') as they apply to different societies, and makes a point that one should not expect considerations like these to be true _regardless_ and *ex cathedra*. ---- But the positive (for there _has_ to be something positive here, if amazon.com chose it to _advertise_ WOW) seems to be in the context of the place of some style of analytic philosophy over other ways of doing philosophy. I would think that this 'fastidiousness' _is_ the kernel of 'analytic' philosophy; but only: because the analytic philosopher is in the first place "fastidiated" [yes, it _is_ a verb] by ... what??? Different things: I would think B. Russell was fastidiated by, say, Bradley. Grice was fastidiated by ... Stevenson ("Ethics and Language")? Austin was fastidiated by ... Ayer, Warnock. ---- I may be using the word wrong, but I would think that an analytic philosopher may be triggered to _do_ philosophy because he comes across a view that he finds 'sloppy' --. This may apply to some _other_ analytic philosopher (e.g. when Austin criticises Warnock in _Sense and Sensibilia_). It would be as if the 'move faster' of Blackburn is indeed the analytic philosopher, "Not so fast!". I would think that 'fastidium' then may be one of the keywords to analyse 'analytic philosophy' in its proper historical context: as a reaction to 'sloppy' style by previous styles of philosophising ('grand philosophy' -- cfr. 'grand opera'), and as something that eventually will 'fastidiate' the post-analytics! To answer Amiel's question, "How is fastidium to be avoided?". Get a break. Ain't that what Witters did?! Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1218550342x1201216770/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Feb 12 12:50:35 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2009 12:50:35 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Reductive vs. Reductionist Analysis Message-ID: I would like to make a short one about this distinction, which some may dub 'fastidious' or 'over-nice' (recall that 'nice' _means_ 'non-scio', i.e. je ne sais quoi, almost!) The distinction, from what I recall, is appealed to by H. P. Grice in 'Valedictory Essay' ("Retrospective Epilogue" in the print version) in WOW. And it is made in reply to a philosopheress it took me ages to identify. Apparently, her maiden name is Rowntree. Anyway, Grice refers to her as "Mrs. Jack". It's Julie M. Rowntree Jack, I believe, of Somer(female-only)ville, Oxford. A nice college which is particularly nice since it's the last one one sees on the way to London! ---- Anyway, Mrs Jack circulated a paper that reached Grice's hands. "The rights and wrongs of Grice". Grice was charmed and indulged in considering the 'wrongs'. One wrong, Mrs Jack has, is that Grice is offering a REDUCTIONIST analysis Utterer U means that asterisk sub-psi p by uttering a token x of type X iff U intended ... etc. Grice protests: That's hardly 'reductionist'. It's what he calls: REDUCTIVE analysis Utterer U means that asterisk sub-psi p by uttering a token x of type X iff U intended ... etc. So what's the difference? Obvious, says Grice. _If_ in the analysans, the type of concept used for the elucidation of the 'problem' concept _belongs_ in the same category (and does not involve a 'transcategorial epithet of the philosophical eschatological kind', then the analysis is _reductive_. On the other hand, there's the Churches (Patricia and her husband): _if_ the analysans contains a concept which belongs in a _lower_ category (in a scale of transcategorial epithets of the eschatological kind), then the analysis is _reductionist_. S. R. Bayne refers to 'reductionist', naturally, as 'eliminationist', in hist-analytic when he traces a parallel between Eddington ("The Table No. 1 reduces to the Table No. 1") and the targets of Russell's "neutral monism" ("mind reduces to matter"). As Bayne notes, there is a distinction to be made here, which is neither fastidious nor too nice (in the bad sense of 'nice'). In Eddington's case, _both_ analysandum and analysans belong to the same, as it were, category; they do not a transcategorial eschatological movement -- both are 'physical', as it were -- Bayne's example is "There are no chairs"). In a neutral monism, one is possibly adjudicating a transcategorial epithet. Note that if we replace 'sense-data' by _mind_, then indeed the phenomenalist's account is one of providing an 'analysis' of _matter_ (or 'material-object' -- so-called -- level) in terms of _mind_! I would think that some attempt at some kind of 'analysis' qua _result_ of the activity of 'analysing' must be what was in the mind of 'analytic philosophers'. I recall discussing this with John I. Biro -- regarding his "Griceanism" in _Monist_. A whole generation (if not two or three) of readers (fastidious readers, I'll add) of Grice have taken him to be as propounding a 'reductionist analysis' of 'the semantic' into the 'psychological'. This is _triply_ obscure! (The fun thing is that at least one book with "Grice" in the subtitle: Avramides's MIT book -- is a clarification of this out of her D.Phil Oxon while she was at Somerville! -- Ain't this a small world?) I tend to see the triple obscurity in that, to me, 'the semantic' really belongs to _type_ expression meaning (x/X means p). An elucidation of "Utterer means ..." seems to me to be _pragmatic_ from the start. It _is_ true that Grice attempts an analysis of 'expression meaning' in terms of 'utterer's meaning' but I call that a 'minor' reduction -- a 'minor problem'. Indeed that is precisely Grice's label, "minor problem" in "Meaning Revisited"! Now, I'm not sure what Biro made of that distinction -- but I recall he was kind enough to let me have a TYPED copy of a REPLY he gave to SUPPES -- in PGRICE -- now in the files of "The Grice Club" -- somewhere, I suppose. And in any case, the status of the distinction 'reductive' vs. 'reductionist' analysis will not please _all_. One may find it superfluous, or uninteresting. They would claim that only an analysis which claims to be _reductionist_ is philosophically interesting _at all_. And there is some truth in this. Isn't the interpretation of an analysis as 'reductive' (but not reductionist) a sort of ad-hoc, non-committing way-out? Not necessarily. As far as Grice is concerned, in my view, he would see, alla Davidson, all 'psychological terms' as creating a sort of 'holistic' network. "means", "intends", "believes", ... -- A more serious, or deeper analysis would be to _reduce_ or 'analyse' (at least) these psychological states in terms of 'functional states'. Here the logic of the analysis is different. As Schiffer has made it clear (before he committed his apostasy!) it has to do with the 'logic' of _theoretical_ concepts. The philosopher who embraces a 'functionalist' theory of the mind is not claiming that the mental reduces to the physiological, or, in more functionalist terms, to sensory input and behavioural output. He is claiming rather, that is expects there is some Theory (of a Psychological Kind -- and this is important; it's _not_ a Theory of the PHYSICAL kind) which provides correlates -- pretty much alla Carnap A-postulates, but ceteris paribus. But eliminationists (if not supervenientists) will remain unconvinced. I recall me approaching, candidly and charmingly S. Stich at one symposium, with that quote by Grice (from "Method") to the effect that a psychological theory of this kind will still be insufficient: we need to argue that postulation of psychological states be motivated not just by our need to _explain_ behavioural output, but by our _concern_ for the welfare of others. I distinctly recall Stich's answer, "Preposterous!" -- But oprobium and animosity _within_ (or without) the history of analytic philosophy should be left for a longer day! Cheers, J. L. **************The year's hottest artists on the red carpet at the Grammy Awards. AOL Music takes you there. (http://music.aol.com/grammys?ncid=emlcntusmusi00000002) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 13 05:54:44 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2009 05:54:44 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Clarity Is Not Enough Message-ID: This motto rang in my brains all through my education as an analytic philosopher -- it rang in the corridors of power. Here we are trying at some sincere analysis of things, and we had on our backs, Lewis's patronising rebuke, "Clarity is not enough". The phrase is of course the title of a 1963 compilation (London: Allen -- Muirhead Library of Philosophy) ed. by H. D. Lewis, -- the long tirade being, "Clarity is not enough: essays in criticism of linguistic philosophy". The title essay is by H. H. Price, Welsh philosopher, sometime professor of logic at Oxford. He had indeed delivered this paper at the Joint Session, "Clarity is not enough" -- calmly and Britishly. No need for the exclamation mark, "Clarity is not enough!", as we sometimes come across the injunction. The fun thing, to me, in parts, was J. L. Austin's reply. Price was warning philosophers in _1945_: an inconvenient time if there ever was one. Austin was coming back from Intelligence, Grice from Admiralty, Strawson from -- the trenches?, Hampshire from dealing with French detainees, etc. They were coming back to where they _belonged_: the dreaming spires, and they were ready to _dream_. They were older and wiser. Their philosophical joys had been cut short by the bad experience of war. They wanted to go back and have fun, and meet friends. They were not into _grand_ schemes of things, such as writing a page in the History of Philosophy. Warnock of all saw this clearly, "We were parochial; we couldn't care less about what others were doing -- philosophy-wise in other parts". It is in this context that we interpret Austin's reply to Price: "[Granted], clarity [may] be not enough; but, perhaps, it will be time to go into this when we are within measurable distance of achieving clarity on some matter."! --------- The case of Austin is edifying. In philosophy proper he _never_ lost his critical attitude. And his pieces are short, public events -- not meant as chapters in a book. It's the fact that he died of cancer that we do have the Philosophical Papers (1961), and it's the fact that he criticised in a friendly way Warnock's book that Warnock managed to 'publish' Austin's "Sense and Sensibilia" --. Urmson is a different matter. The "How to do things with words" lectures _were_ programmatic and sketchy -- notwithstanding Nidditch's efforts with the analytic index or Marina Sbisa with further annotations using the Bodleian manuscript 'tradition'. But I take Grice's word there. He finds "Sense and sensibilia" not too entertaining; I disagree: I find it charming. But Grice seems to be on the right track (well, he lived with Austin for decades!) that Austin's constructive efforts _are_ in the "How to do things with words". It was perhaps _there_ that he wanted to achieve 'clarity' or at least "to be approaching the time to go into [Price's 'Clarity is not enough'] when we are within measurable distance of achieving clarity on some matter." Imagine the matter being the 'anatomy' of a speech act: 'perlocutionary effect' 'illocutionary force' locutionary act -- rhetic act phonic act phemic act Similarly, I would think we could view Grice's 'programme' in typical two stages: 1. provide an analysis of 'expression' meaning in terms of utterer's meaning 2. provide an analysis of 'utterer's meaning' in terms of 'utterer's intentions'. For all Grice did in that area, he was aware that his 'distinctions' would take time to digest. Why, the OED credits Pears (1971) as one of the earliest cites for 'implicature' -- quote provided by yours truly to OED3 --. But Grice was working on 'types' of 'implication' from at least 1961 -- "Proceedings of the Aristototelian Society". Indeed, S. R. Chapman is right in viewing Grice's early efforts as elucidating what many were into in terms of 'pragmatic' or 'contextual' implication (Nowell-Smith, 1955; Grant -- in his obscure essay in Philosophy, Isobel Hungerland in his longish essay for Inquiry, etc. -- all perhaps deriving from Moore's _very_ early remarks on 'it being raining but me not believing it'. Grice was aware that the distinctions to be made -- to achieve, as it were, 'clarity' -- were tiresome ones to make, if one goes to 'move fast'. In "Life and Opinions" he goes charmingly to admit that after all, his beloved 'implicature' (or pragmatic use of 'imply') is _never_ recognised by Witters, and 'seldom -- if at all -- by Austin himself. Grice continued his laborious efforts in tutorials. Furberg, for example, will publish a book-length study on meaning, saying, and implicating, that gets a warm acknowledgement to Grice's tutorials, and indeed, it was little by little, in the early 1960s, that, at least those who dreamed at the Spires, started quoting "Mr. H. P. Grice" on this and that. A little clarity -- surely not enough. But without which, honest, I wouldn't care, for one, for Grice's latter-day grand metaphysical transubstantiations! Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************Nothing says I love you like flowers! Find a florist near you now. (http://yellowpages.aol.com/search?query=florist&ncid=emlcntusyelp00000002) From rbj at rbjones.com Fri Feb 13 11:29:04 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2009 16:29:04 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <200902131629.04431.rbj@rbjones.com> Whether clarity is enough must surely be a very personal matter. This is analogous to the question whether pure mathematicians should care about the applicability of their work, the not caring having been vigorously defended by Hardy in his "A Mathematician's Apology". I have no problem with philosophers or mathematicians who are happy to pursue pure research without consideration of its applicability, but I am not among them. I am afflicted by various disabilities (quite a lot of them) which include needing to have a sense of the purpose of any work which I am doing, and not thinking that the analysis of ordinary language is for me sufficient purpose. For those of us with this problem, Austin's suggestion that we need only consider greater purposes once we have achieved clarity in some matters, is of little help. One thing which seems to me clear is that most worthwhile purposes depend upon secondary objectives which if conducted thoroughly on their own account will consume many lifetimes without finding an end, and which therefore, if they are not to completely divert attention from ones true purpose, must be conducted to the minimum extent sufficient for that purpose. I will happily coexist with people of different talents and temper. so long as they do not get in my way. Austin does. His book "Sense and Sensibilia" seems to me to be a sustained attempt to deny philosophers that flexibility in the use of language which is normal in any specialised undertaking. Roger Jones From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 13 11:55:10 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2009 11:55:10 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Reductive vs. Reductionist Analysis Message-ID: In Reply To: R. B. Jones, "Re: Reductive vs. Reductionist Analysis" In a message dated 2/13/2009 11:06:01 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, rbj at rbjones.com writes: >In response to Speranza pn the above twp questions come to my mind: >1. Is this a usage which Grice is coining? >2. Do we have any reason to believe that the distinction he > draws is absolute (objective) >The latter question because definite notions of type are confined >surely to certain formal languages, they differ on whether or how >types are assigned, and different formal translations of natural >languages in to formal languages are therefpre likely to yield >different answers to questions about whether an analysis is >reductionist or reductive. >Perhaps, as one deeply interested in the intricacies of natural >languages you might be able to comment on whether there is anything >like a rule for the use of the endings (or whatever they are called) >"tionist" and "tive" on the same root? ----- I am able to reply more or less in a rush, thanks to Dr. Dale's good idea of having his PhD (NYU -- under Schiffer) online! He quotes the excellent passage from Grice's 'Valediction': Dale notes: "Grice answers in the following way J. Jack who Grice reports as having "reproved" him for attempting reductive analyses of semantic notions." The passage: "But what *kind* of analysis is to be provided? What I think we cannot agree to allow her [J. Jack] to do is to pursue the goal of giving a *lax* REDUCTIVE ANALYSIS of meaning, [i.e.], a reductive analysis which is unhampered by the constraints which characteristically attach to reductive analysis, like the avoidance of circularity.... (In this connection I should perhaps observe that though my earlier endeavors in the theory of meaning were attempts to provide a REDUCTIVE ANALYSIS, I have never (*I think*) espoused reductionism, which to my mind involves the idea that semantic concepts are unsatisfactory or even unintelligible, *unless* they can be provided with interpretations in terms of some predetermined, privileged, and favored array of concepts; in this sense of "reductionism" a felt ad hoc need for REDUCTIVE ANALYSIS does not have to rest on a reductionist foundation. Reductive analysis might be called for to get away from unclarity not to get to some predesignated clarifiers" Dale is arguing with Avramides -- and Schiffer indeed read the book, Avramides's, in the galleys, as they put it --. Avramides wants to say that it's not 'clear' if Grice is providing a 'reduction' and if so, what kind. The "I think" which Grice brackets ("I have never (I think) espoused reductionism") leads Dale to recall a passage where pilgrim Grice finds himself in the road to the Holly of Hollies: "As I thread my way unsteadily along the tortuous mountain path which is supposed to lead, in the long distance, to the City of Eternal Truth, I find myself beset by a multitude of demons and perilous places, bearing names like Extensionalism, Nominalism, Positivism, Naturalism, Mechanism, Phenomenalism, Reductionism, Physicalism, Materialism, Empiricism, Scepticism, and Functionalism. ... After a more tolerant (permissive) middle age, I have come to entertain strong opposition to *all of them*, perhaps partly as a result of the strong connection between a number of them and the philosophical technologies which used to appeal to me a good deal more than they do now" ("The Life and Opinions of Paul Grice", by Paul Grice). Dale comments: "Though this passage does suggest that he, when writing it, was against some sort of reductionism, it also strongly suggests that earlier in his life he supported it." Now back to R. B. Jones's queries: >In response to Speranza pn the above twp questions come to my mind: >1. Is this a usage which Grice is coining? Revising his words we see that 'reductionist analysis' was indeed _my_ coining! Grice would go as far as to refer to a 'reductive analysis' (non-lax, if you wish) _simpliciter_ and one which 'rest[s] on a reductionist foundation'. >2. Do we have any reason to believe that the distinction he > draws is absolute (objective) Well, that _I_ draw, rather. Sorry about that! >The latter question because definite notions of type are confined >surely to certain formal languages, they differ on whether or how >types are assigned, and different formal translations of natural >languages in to formal languages are therefore likely to yield >different answers to questions about whether an analysis is >reductionist or reductive. Well, this is interesting; especially as it relates o connects to Grice's expansion on what kind of a non-lax reductive analysis which _does_ rest on a reductionist foundation would look like. Although he is talking of _semantic_ notions, allow me to apply the issue to the apparent divergence in _meaning_ (semantic notion, after all) between, say, the formal 'horseshoe' and 'if'. In the opening two paragraphs of "Logic and Conversation" he propounds a sort of caricature for what a 'formalist' would look like. He would claim that there _is_ a divergence between 'horseshoe' and 'if'. Plus, the divergence entails a surplus of meaning on the side of 'if'. Further, this surplus is dubbed, in the lips of Grice's 'formalist' as a "metaphysical excrescence". This is no good for the formalist, so he will _reduce_ 'if' to the 'horseshoe' --. It is under this reduction that the 'unless' clause in Grice's fragment applies, when he says: *unless* they can be provided with interpretations in terms of some predetermined, privileged, and favored array of concepts; In the case of 'horseshoe' the predetermined, privileged, favoured array of concept is the simple truth table! p ) q 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 So any idea that there's a 'semantic' notion beyond this -- a 'metaphysical excrescence' which we can define in terms of 'some obscure connection of some sort of causal type or other' -- is _eliminated_. When it comes to analysis of 'meaning' _per se_, it is harder to find an illustration, but surely those (or 'them', I'm tempted to say, to show off my provincialism) 'neutral monists' out there -- for which "meaning" _kaput_! R. B. comments: >Perhaps, as one deeply interested in the intricacies of natural >languages you might be able to comment on whether there is anything >like a rule for the use of the endings (or whatever they are called) >"tionist" and "tive" on the same root? ---- I wish! I could try the OED! I wish I could quote Cicero himself (or 'hisself', again), but I doubt he thought _that_ term (or pair of them) was philosophically relevant. Indeed, people overuse suffixes, and what's bad for a suffix is usually bad for the other. I dislike people who wish to say that while they 'discriminate', they are not 'discriminatory' but 'discriminating'. Same [four-letter-word], I say! reductio should be a formation from 're-' (prefix) plus some variant of 'duc-ere', which would be 'to lead' (I know this because Mussolini wanted to _lead_, il Duce). 'reductivus' sounds like a good adjective, I mean, well formed. 'reductivus, reductiva, reductivum', if you must. But 'reductionist'? I dislike '-isms'. I thought Grice referred to those perils as 'betes noires', and I think he does. But the problem is that they are -isms! I dislike _all_ isms, starting with Post-Modernism!* (*Oddly, just to tease my tutor, Gregorio Klimovsky, when I presented my views on Grice on the vernacular logic, I called Grice a 'post-modern' in that he wasn't really a Russellian 'modernist'; for Grice, indeed, Russellians do commit the mistake of thinking that _there_ is a divergence, while Grice saves the phenomena with the aid of Conversational Implicature, or "Miss Conversational Implicature" if you must. I am inclined to believe that '-ism' was in Old Latin, '-ismus'. So we need to trace 'Reductionismus', and then form 'reductionist'. Now 'reductionistus, reductionista, reductionistum' does not make sense -- it's ill-formed. So what can we do about that. Is '-ista' a good suffix? I'm in a rush now, but the OED notes that -ista is from the Greek, and indeed good Latin, but when it comes to forming Adjectives, it mainly lists, other -ist adjectives: devotionalist, externalist, fatalist, formalist, humanist, idealist, imperialist, loyalist, materialist, naturalist, nominalist, opportunist, pluralist, positivist, purist, rationalist, realist, royalist, socialist, universalist. So one would need to see in which way 'reductionist' relates to the activity of 'reducere'. About the English 'reduce' indeed, the OED has an interesting note that relates to R. B. Jones's notes on 'natural' versus 'formal' languages. Nothing procrustean about them: OED: "The original [Latin] sense of the word, [reducere] ?to bring back?, has now almost entirely disappeared, the prominent modern sense being ?to bring down? or ?to diminish?. [Grice would have enjoyed that!] "A clear arrangement of the various uses (many of them found only in the language of the 15-17th centuries) is rendered difficult by the extent to which the different shades of meaning tend to pass into or include each other." Cheers, J. L. **************Nothing says I love you like flowers! Find a florist near you now. (http://yellowpages.aol.com/search?query=florist&ncid=emlcntusyelp00000002) From rbj at rbjones.com Fri Feb 13 11:06:49 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2009 16:06:49 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Reductive vs. Reductionist Analysis In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <200902131606.49794.rbj@rbjones.com> In response to Speranza pn the above twp questions come to my mind: 1. Is this a usage which Grice is coining? 2. Do we have any reason to believe that the distinction he draws is absolute (objective) The latter question because definite notions of type are confined surely to certain formal languages, they differ on whether or how types are assigned, and different formal translations of natural languages in to formal languages are therefpre likely to yield different answers to questions about whether an analysis is reductionist or reductive. Perhaps, as one deeply interested in the intricacies of natural languages you might be able to comment on whether there is anything like a rule for the use of the endings (or whatever they are called) "tionist" and "tive" on the same root? regards, Roger Jones From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 13 12:33:18 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2009 12:33:18 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Clarity Is Not Enough Message-ID: In Reply To: R. B. Jones's post, "Re: Clarity Is Not Enough" [sorry until I get a proper mailer, this will not show as sub-thread] In a message dated 2/13/2009 12:04:38 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, rbj at rbjones.com writes: I will happily coexist with people of different talents and temper. so long as they do not get in my way. Austin does. His book "Sense and Sensibilia" seems to me to be a sustained attempt to deny philosophers that flexibility in the use of language which is normal in any specialised undertaking. ---- That was sort of sad to read! --- Again, I'm in a rush. But allow me some positive comments on that book that you may, or make not, take in! The thing was 'unpublished' manuscript -- note that the subtitle is "from the manuscript notes of ...". I always found it charming that Austin (or "J. Austin" as he was known) advertised his seminar: J. Austin Sense and Sensibilia I can imagine a colloquial language between undergraduates, "We're doing Austin's Sense and Sensibilia". "You mean, 'sensibility'". Etc. ---- I found the book double in that: the commentary on Ayer is a bit cold (the book was done and passed by, as it were). But Warnock was someone Austin was seeing _every Saturday_ (morning)! True it's not a serious book by Warnock, just his bio of Berkeley! But still! I found some of Austin's examples pretty good, clear, and reminiscent of the pre-socratics. I recall this pre-socratic philosopher who said, "Surely the sun is smaller than my finger" (as he compared both relative lenghts). -- For he was _saving_ phenomena. I tend to think that part of the problem with the English (language) is that _seems_ hardly translates 'to appear' (root of phenomenon) in Greek. In Italian I'm sure it's never as negative as in English -- cpr. the aria, "M'appari tutt'amor" -- it seemed to me that all my love; sounds negativistic, but if read, "all the love _appeared_, shone to me", does not. Similarly, Austin is considering "That speck in the horizon is a star", etc. He is not trying to regiment, I would think, but to play a bit on the different idioms that pertain to describe 'sense-data'. As for, is the analysis of ordinary language enough? Perhaps we shouldn't dichotomise things like that. After all, it's the same _brain_ who speaks a natural language and speaks a formal language. It's not like both are totally _dissociate_. Mind, some never master a _formal_ language (whether the reverse may be harder to prove). In terms of 'cognitive content', there's not much in which they differ. Consider 'if'. Okay, there's a lot of metaphysical excrescences there. Does Grice get in the way? He did for me. He notes that if you _want_ to use the metaphysical excrescence, add 'then' before the apodosis, "If p, _then_ q". If not, drop the 'then', and get along with Philo's paradoxes -- and I do! But you are very right that it's personal and one shouldn't let a supervenient or subservient purpose to overwhelm others. One may want to 'slow down' a bit (bring back things, bring them down -- 'reduce' -- 'clarificatory philosophy' in H. H. Price's word). But we _also_ have, they say, the _obligation_ to 'move on'! Do not _let_ Austin get in your way! It may remind one of Grice's not letting Dummett get in his way. His student Michael Wrigley, of UC/Berkeley was asking Grice for advice on interpretation of Frege: Wrigley: I hope, Professor Grice, you are familiar with the arguments in Dummett's Frege: Philosophy of Language. Grice: I have never read that book -- and I hope I *won't*! Cheers, JL **************Nothing says I love you like flowers! Find a florist near you now. (http://yellowpages.aol.com/search?query=florist&ncid=emlcntusyelp00000002) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Fri Feb 13 13:58:42 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2009 10:58:42 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Mind/Body Asymmetrries and Verificationism Old Style Message-ID: <351232.90608.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Both good and bad ideas come in a flash. Here is a "flash." I don't really know how to regard this. I thought it while asking myself: How do I know what I'm trying to do, and how do I know what you are trying to do when we are trying to do the same things. Suppose I want to know the temperature on a planet called Sigma 6. It is too far to measure it with a thermometer and so I infer it from reading off my instruments here on earth, based on laws of refraction, spectral distributions etc. Where the comparisons have already been made with earth's properties associated with temperature. Suppose this is all pretty much not controversial. Now suppose I want to get the temperature on earth. I go to the thermometer and take the reading. I surmise that earth's temperature is less than that of Sigma 6. Now if we take a very strict operationalist line, 'temperature' may mean something different in each case. Let's overlook this issue. But how do we relate the two values in arriving at the true comparative sentence regarding temperatures. It seems that there must be something - I will call it a "causal line" (following Russell) - that connects the temperature of earth and my earthly instrument, the thermometer, and a causal line linking Sigma 6 and my earthly instruments. Assuming the temperature on Sigma 6 is comparable to that of earth's, I might even be able to justify a couterfactual that if I were on Sigma 6 I could directly (observing a thermometer as on earth) get the temperature. Suppose I make a generalization: wherever comparatives of this sort are possible the only asymmetry in the methods of verification (direct vs. indirect) are owing to a difference in "causal lines," and that the property, temperature, on earth and that on Sigma 6 can be expressed in terms of causal properties that are fundamentally the same, i.e. we are talking about temperature in both cases. In other words, the asymmetry is eliminable under counterfactual circumstances. Here is my claim: The aysmmetry of first and third person attribution of psychological properties is not of that sort, and there is no counterfactual which if true would sustain the claim that the asymmetry could be overcome. If so, then, the strong claims of physicalists like Rorty, say, could not be justified. There would remain something different. We might want to say: "If I were you I would feel pain." But justifying this will involve third and not first person attributions. So there is a difference between attributions which are physically impossible, merely, and attributions made by first person reports that are neither physically possible nor logically impossible. This is the philosophically relevant asymmetry. Regards STeve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 13 14:05:49 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2009 14:05:49 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Gavagai Redux Message-ID: in memoriam J. Updike. Further to R. B. Jones's point re: -ive vs. ist, I see under 'reduce', defined in the OED, as "to resolve by analysis". One cite only: "I shall now endeavour to reduce the ripples to their mechanical elements (Tyndale (1860), Glac. II, p. 299). Incidentally, I was right about Cicero! He tried to lay his hand on his beloveds, the Stoics: You see, the stoics have talked of "proegmena kai apoproegmena". Cicero, without delay, has that as implying a tacit 'agatha' (neuter plural), rendered in Latin as 'bona' (neuter plural of 'bonum') and thus the phrase above rendered as "producta et reducta" (bona) -- which Short/Lewis (onli ne Latin dictionary, OUP) have as: the "things to be preferred" [pro-egmena; pro-ducta] versus those "things to be deferred" -- The collocation appearing in "De Finibus", 5, 30, 90. Browsing the Short/Lewis, I come across 'redux', which I've heard analytic philosophers use quite a bit, so went to OED and found two boring titles: (i) "Astraea Redux, being a poem on the happy restoration and return of His Sacred Majesty"(Dryden), (ii) "Phineas Redux" (Trollope) -- and one not so boring and by the recently late author: "Rabbit redux" (J. UPDIKE), which I just turned philosophical. Reduxes are of various types. From Grice's 'Valediction', it would _seem_ as he is objecting to some kind of 'holistic' (alla Davidson/Quine) accounts of 'meaning' -- at the same 'evidential' level than 'belief'. Indeed, Avramides's D. Phil -- I keep referring to it as a D. Phil for I'm surprised MIT found it commercial! -- has four longish chapters on 'symmetrical' versus 'asymmetrical' views of things. She concludes Davidson wins over Grice, in that what is proposed is something that goes 'both' ways: from belief to meaning and from meaning to belief. Grice would be _unimpressed_! Cheers, JL Cheers, JL **************Nothing says I love you like flowers! Find a florist near you now. (http://yellowpages.aol.com/search?query=florist&ncid=emlcntusyelp00000002) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 13 15:36:20 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2009 15:36:20 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Who-Don-It Message-ID: Again, I'm illustrated by R. B. Jones's 'historical' notes on his webpage on the history of analytic philosophy. He quotes from Grice's "Post-war Oxford philosophy" (the Wellesey talk, as I call it), where Grice writes: "To be looking for a conceptual analysis of a given expression E is to be in a position to apply or withold E in particular cases, but to be looking for a general characterization of the types of cases in which one would apply E rather than withold it." Jones comments: "Grice notes that only some concepts are of interest to philosophy, but attempts no characterization of those that are*. He also notes that when engaging in conceptual analysis it is his own use which is subject to the analysis [and] Grice himself does not claim that conceptual analysis is the whole of philosophy." --- As for *, I'd add that he possibly felt sceptical about any such regimentation. Indeed, he would be amused by I think it was Hampshire and Hare who were looking -- at a Saturday morning -- for an 'elucidation' of "philosophically interesting concept", and reached no consensus. I was also browsing this and that and found that S. Soames has indeed a lengthy chapter on "Grice and the death (as it were, my wording -- JLS) of Ordinary Language Philosophy" (in his two-volume, "Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century" -- reviewed by P. S. M. Hacker, inter alii --, and which B. Weatherson has criticised: "So the murder was at Emerson Hall!". On another internet source, I read: >Ordinary-language philosophy is sometimes called ?Oxford philosophy.? This is because >Ryle, Austin, Strawson and Grice were all Oxford dons. -- I'm amused by 'don', and am clumsily playing on it in the header -- but it's of course literally true! Cheers, JL * don. 1660 SOUTH Serm. 29 July (1843) II. 88 The raving insolence which those spiritual dons from the pulpit were wont to show [at Oxford]. 1681 THORESBY Diary (Hunter) I. 109 Sermons..against Arminianism, whereat many dons were offended. 1726 AMHERST Terr? Fil. v. 20 The reverend dons in Oxford are already alarm'd. 1882 BESANT Revolt of Man vii. (1883) 164 The few left were either the reading undergraduates or the dons. 1888 BURGON Lives 12 Gd. Men II. x. 242 An introduction to two Oxford dons. **************Nothing says I love you like flowers! Find a florist near you now. (http://yellowpages.aol.com/search?query=florist&ncid=emlcntusyelp00000002) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 13 16:11:56 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2009 16:11:56 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Mind/Body Asymmetrries and Verificationism Old Style Message-ID: In-Reply-To: <_351232.90608.qm at web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com_ (mailto:351232.90608.qm at web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com) > In a message dated 2/13/2009 2:00:49 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: >We might want >to say > > [(a)] If I were you I would feel pain. > >But justifying [(a)] will involve third and not first person >attributions. This [(a)], I think S. R. Bayne has as i. physically impossible ii. logical possible ("So there is a difference between attributions which are physically impossible, merely, and attributions made by first person reports that are neither physically possible nor logically impossible. This is the philosophically relevant asymmetry"). I'm not sure! Suppose I video-tape myself as I tumble and fall on a street. I see myself as recovering as if feeling no pain at all. So, I say: "If *I* --i.e. J. L. Speranza -- were _you_ -- i.e. the _past_ J. L. Speranza who has been video-taped tumbling and falling --, I would feel pain" -- but you apparently didn't. What's _wrong_ with you!? Fascinating subject. Subtheads: Grice wanted to say something about priviledged access and incorrigibility in "Method in philosophical psychology" It's a Cambridge time-honoured thing which _reminds_ me, in the best sense of 'remind' of Wisdom, and his "Other Minds" series! I may be undergoing an autistic phase (in a good sense): I find it clearer to discuss myself talking to myself ('voice of consciousness') rather than a _friend_! Indeed, I find much talk along the lines, "If I were in your shoes" pretty ridiculous. Both impossible logically _and_ physically! I think R. Paul has elsewhere referred to how vacuous it sometimes sounds to ask yourself, "What it would feel like to be an old woman dying of cancer" -- when you are not. "Verificationism" Old Style -- I like that. In "Personal Identity" (in hist-analytic), Grice indeed wonders, "The ball hit his head" vs. "The ball hit my head", etc. In some cases, the change of person (from first to second to third) seems immaterial, and there's always what I call 'illeists', which the OED define as 'those persons, usually self-important, who like to refer to theirselves (sic) in the _third_ person!" (my wording). This is just a flash on a flash, and to see if my 'In-Reply-To" thing works, too! Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 13 19:26:41 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2009 19:26:41 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] The Dawn of Analysis Message-ID: -- was the Dawn of Philosophy? >From S. Soames's webpage at USC. He describes one of his specialties as being: >the history of analytic philosophy. So this should concern us! The two volumes of his opus magnum are entitled, poetically, "The dawn of analysis" and "the age of meaning". In his webpage introduction he expands: >More recently I have developed interests in [...] the future of analytic philosophy. --- Ah well, here we are slightly more conservative (aren't we, Steve) and still interested in her past! Just joking! Weatherson informally criticises Soames as having looked, alla T. P. U. -- our Finnish correspondent on ANALYTIC -- into 'the strange death of ...' ordinary-language philosophy. Weatherson notes some of the similes, "Grice put the last nail in the coffin". And later, but where _is_ the corpse? What fascinates me about Grice is that he *changed*, and he never took himself (or 'his self', as he'd say) too seriously. He spent most of his life criticising his 'colleagues' ('hacks', I think he sometimes called them -- those he met face-to-face in the convivial thing he found philosophy to be). Apparently, Soames's book does not consider literature post-1975, and thus is not concerned with things like 'Valediction', by Grice, is to me is _very_ 20th century philosophy -- if not pure analytic! In "Life and Opinions", Grice jocularly seems to refer to Rorty's idea of a revolution in philosophy, a paradigm-shift and so on --. Grice does use 'revolution'; perhaps not so much to refer to Ayer and his 'playgroup' but _Ryle_ too. So, if a revolution took place (I think Grice is being slightly exaggerated here), you're bound to create your enemies! Soames seems to think that Grice's work on 'implicature' was the last nail. That's one way of reading him. As Bayne noted about _other_ philosophers: it's best to go directly to the sources, and not let exegeses guide you. One reads "Presupposition and Conversational Implicature" for example, and one hardly finds the spirit of a man nailing _anything_. On the contrary, one finds the spirit of a man who is concerned about the carefulness (on the part of the 'professionals') to take words seriously before we are going to have _fun_ doing philosophy. That same jocular attitude I see in Austin when he ends up _his_ William James saying, "the fun comes when we apply this to philosophy" but that for a longer day! This in connection with R. B. Jones's reservations about restraints not being so in 'any discipline worth her name'. But philosophers _seem_ to be different. I don't think those Oxford dons were into _instilling_ their tutees with more and more content. They saw philosophy as a way of arguing, and they would have been happy if their tutees left the dreaming spires with an extra-awareness on how sloppy and muddled the chat from the chattering classes those tuttees in their coming years will come across with! Must say there's something poetic about "The Dawn", rather than the "Sun-Set" of "Analysis". And one hopes one can contribute to S. Soames's research by noting that the dawn may perhaps be traced far _earlier_ than the 20th century? If 'analysis' is part and parcel of philosophy, perhaps it should enrich us to see how the antecedents can be found in, say "Socrates and his ilk"? (This is perhaps what Grice attempts in "Valediction", in a comparison that S. R. Chapman cannot but find a bit _pretentious_!). Cheers, J. L. **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Fri Feb 13 20:33:24 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2009 17:33:24 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Anscombe on 'Under the description d' Message-ID: <678473.14799.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com> I am preparing some brief remarks on Aune on analyticity. They will be brief, but central will be the special place of the principle ~(p & ~p) in analyticity in the broad sense, that is, where meaning is at issue and not, merely, substitution instances of laws of logic. In the mean time here are a couple of thoughts related to my work on Anscombe's theory of Action. If Speranza is out there, I would appreciate from him any reference he might provide on THIS topic in Grice. I have some criticisms to make of Anscombe on 'under a description'. I will begin with how she responds to one objection to her use of the expression in _Intention_. However, the text I am referring to in this post is "Under a Description" in _Nous_ (13) 1979 as well as in _Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: Collected Papers Volume III, pp. 208-219). There Anscombe identifies 'under the description d' with 'qua d'. In addition in 'x under the description d', she says that the subject of the sentence is 'x' not, ever, 'x under the description d'. If I say, ?I was allowed on stage under the description of ?stage manager??? This is ambiguous; this is the first claim I wish to make. ?If ?under the description of stage manager ? means ?being stage manager so-called,? that would be one reading where I am, merely referred to as such, that is as stage manager. I may not be the stage manager. In this case the sentence means one thing: I was allowed on stage as the so-called station manager. But suppose I mean by ?under the description of stage manager,? rather ?qua stage manager,? that would be something else. Then the sentence would mean that I was allowed onstage because I was the stage manager. One can imagine circumstances where, even though I was not the stage manager, I was allowed on stage only because I was the so-called stage manager. It gets a bit clearer if we take ?authority? instead of ?manager?, so that our sentence becomes: ?I was allowed on stage because I was the so-called staging authority,? as opposed to ?I was allowed on stage qua staging authority.? In addition, one cannot construct cases where I am on stage qua stage manager but I am not the stage manager. It may not even be the case that I am a so-called stage manager; no one may have ever understood me to be the stage manager. It may have been the case that my being let on stage qua stage manager implies that I was also called the stage manager, but to draw the conclusion that the cases were the same, and that there is no ambiguity, it would have to be added that one might in the very same sense be both the stage manager and the so-called stage manager. The reader will not experience the contrast unless the contrast between being a stage manager and being a so-called stage manager or even a stage manager so called belongs among one's linguistic intuitions (or part of one's idiolect, etc). So it would appear that there is a difference between two possible readings of ?under a description?. But now the important question: In the sense in which ?under a description? does not mean ?qua? is ?x under the description d? a subject term? If in ?Bob under the description ?stage manager Ved" we have it that? ?under the description ?stage manager?? can be read "as as the so called stage manager? then in ?Bob as the so called stage manager fired Ruddy? the subject is not ?Bob? but ?Bob as the so-called station master. Steven R. Bayne -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Fri Feb 13 20:54:29 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2009 17:54:29 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] 'Under a description' and passive constructions Message-ID: <383312.88843.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> I said that in ?Bob as the so called stage manager fired Ruddy? the subject is not ?Bob? but ?Bob as the so-called station master". But there is a syntactical argument that can be used to support this claim as well as the semantical ones I gave. If the subject is not 'Bob' but 'Bob as the so called stage manager' then we would expect the passive construction to be: 'Ruddy was fired by Bob as the so-called stage manager'. But even though this is a bit strained it sure is better than 'Ruddy as the so called stage manager was fired by Bob'. What makes this bad is that 'as the so called stage manager' must in fact occur under the NP (noun phrase, not the VP) where the comparative adjective 'as the so called stage manager'? is a modifier of Bob. Technically: 'as the so called stage manager' is right Chomsky-adjoined to the projection of the head, N, i.e. 'Bob'. Steven R. Bayne -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 13 21:46:01 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2009 21:46:01 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] =?iso-8859-1?q?qu=E2?= Message-ID: "qua is possibly one of the most important words, philosophically" J. L. S. -- bathroom graffito. Qua and the subject locus from the OED qua: [< classical Latin "qua", 'in so far as', use as adverb of ablative singular feminine of "qui", 'who' (see WHO pron.).] I'm not too happy with the header, but Bayne is considering phrases with 'qua' in subject-positions. In a message dated 2/13/2009 8:34:50 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes in "Anscombe on 'Under the description d'": >In the mean time here are a couple of thoughts related to >my work on Anscombe's theory of Action. If Speranza >is out there, I would appreciate from him any reference he might provide on THIS topic in Grice. ----- And now I'm confused. I hope you mean on "THIS" as per "Anscombe". The ambiguity was that the passage was about "THIS" about ~(p & ~p). So in case you wanted any reference on "~(p & ~p)" let me know; meanwhile I'll be awaiting your reflections. ---- If the 'this' is on Anscombe, here my running comments: Bayne: >I have some criticisms to make of Anscombe on 'under a description'. >I will begin with how she responds to one objection to her use of >the expression in _Intention_. However, the text I am referring to >in this post is "Under a Description" Nous_ as well as >_Metaphysics_ pp. 208ff. There Anscombe identifies >'under the description d' with "qu? d". In addition in >'x under the description d', she says that the subject of the >sentence is 'x' not, ever, 'x under the description d'. >If I say, ?I was allowed on stage under the description of ?stage manager?? ? >This is ambiguous; this is the first claim I wish to make. --- and a good claim it is too. Recall what Searle said about 'pragmatic ambiguity'! We want to be clear whether this is a distinction in _senses_ as I think it's not, or in scope, as I think it is. Grice allows to _use_ 'ambiguity' ('contextual ambiguity') in "Aristotle on the multiplicity of being" (final sections) PPQ 1988. (His example, the ambiguity between 'You cannot apply: it's a contest for best French poem' -- ambiguous between, 'poem supplied by a French citizen' versus 'poem supplied by anyone _in French_). Bayne: >if ?under the description of stage manager ? means >?being stage manager so-called,? that would be one reading >where I am, merely referred to as such, that is as stage manager. >I may not be the stage manager. In this case the sentence >means one thing: I was allowed on stage as the so-called sta[ge] >manager. But suppose I mean by ?under the description of stage >manager,? rather ?qu? 'stage manager'", ? that would be something >else. Then the sentence would mean that I was allowed >onstage because I was the stage manager. >One can imagine circumstances where, even though I was not >the stage manager, I was allowed on stage only because I >was the so-called stage manager. It gets a bit clearer >if we take ?authority? instead of ?manager?, ----- Sorry about this, but it may get _clearer_ if you choose another example. I was having in mind what you say about Miss Anscombe on 'the subject' of the sentence, and there the subject (logically speaking) is _them_, who are going to do some 'deeming' as Grice calls it, as to whether you are the stage manager, or not! ---- Bayne: >so that our sentence becomes: ?I was allowed on stage because > I was the so-called staging authority,? as opposed to >?I was allowed on stage qu? staging authority.? ---- I don't think I'd follow you regarding the so-called. This phrase, 'so-called' is hardly well used in English! In Italian it's even worse. Recall Pu ccini's aria in La Boheme: "Mi chiamano Mimi" I am Mimi, so-called. By _who_!? I never read "Scenes de la vie en boheme" to check who she really _is_! --- Bayne: >In addition, one cannot construct cases where I am on stage qua stage manager but I am not the stage manager. ---- Grice uses this in "Actions and Events" (PPQ, 1988 -- which I do not have to hand). What I recall, frivolously, is that he uses the circumflex over the 'a': qua thus becomes "qu?"! ---- Bayne continues: >It may not even be the case that I am a so-called >stage manager; no one may have ever understood me >to be the stage manager. Right. In "Vacuous Names" Grice plays a bit on Donnellan's 'descriptive' functors. If we remember them (a) vs. (b): 'attributive' 'referential' Grice is sceptical about the distinction, but he wants to keep a distinction. And he uses a 'technology' here as it were. The use of small print capitals would mean 'referential'. The use of a description in quotes would mean 'attributive'. Thus we distinguish: (a') vs. (b'): I was allowed qu? STAGE MANAGER. I was allowed qu? 'stage manager'. One would want to say that if we use the scare quotes, one _is_ paying special attention to the words as used in the 'descriptor' -- "I was referred to as the 'stage manager'. If one uses the small capital print ("I was allowed qu? STAGE MANAGER") one is using the descriptor not attributively, but referentially, even rigidly so; and one is displaying a commitment to the descriptor (or 'dossier' as Grice prefers) being _true_ of the descriptum. (Part of this section was reprinted in _Definite Descriptions_ (MIT)). Bayne continues: >It may have been the case that my being let on stage qua stage manager >implies that I was also called the stage manager, but to draw >the conclusion that the cases were the same, and that there is >no ambiguity, it would have to be added that one might in the very >same sense be both the stage manager and the so-called stage manager. >The reader will not experience the contrast unless the contrast between >being a stage manager and being a so-called stage manager or even >a stage manager so-called belongs among one's linguistic intuitions >(or part of one's idiolect, etc). So it would appear that there is a >difference between two possible readings of ?under a description?. Very good approach to a veritable ambiguity! Regarding a second point, Bayne writes about the 'subject' position: >But now the important question: In the sense in which > ?under a description? does *not* mean ?qua? is >?x under the description d? a subject term? If in Bob under the description ?stage manager' V-ed. >we have it that? ?under the description ?stage manager?? can be read "as the so-called stage manager? then in Bob as the so-called stage manager fired Ruddy. >the subject is not ?Bob? but ?Bob as the so-called >stage master."" ----- I see your point. Perhaps Anscombe is wanting to say that 'under a description' is a mere _guise_ (alla Castaneda), i.e. under the guise, 'stage manager'. This would presuppose the variable 'x' to be able to be referred to _without any guise whatsoever_ (hence, precisely, the use of 'x'). Where in symbols we would have something like: (Ex) SMx & F(x, b) i.e. There is an x such that x has the guise 'stage manager' and x did fire Ruddy. Now someone may ask, under what description did Ruddy get fired, that's what I want to know! ---- More tomorrow, after a good night sleep! Historically, it may do to relate Anscombe's considerations about 'subject' positions with the mediaeval views of her husband! I tried and tried to understand Geach's _Reference and Generality_ -- and I tried I tried to understand Grice's 'disciple', Strawson's _Subject and predicate in logic and grammar_, and in both cases, failed! These issues of referentiality, attributiveness, and qua-ness pervade the subject 'locus' but extend beyond it. I am reminded of Strawson on topic/comment and presupposition failure in: "the exhibition was visited by the so-called King of France". Strawson seems to have had the 'intuition' that the unique existence of 'the king of France' is not topical, and thus not crucial in the _understanding_ of the utterance. I never shared _that_ intuition! It seems pretty ad-hoc! Surely there must be more to subject and predicate than choice of ordering! At school we loved to do parsing, and I was good at that. The qua clauses were used, sometimes, 'appositiones'. And knowing a bit of Greek grammar, it became _very_ tricky when we had 'predicative' phrases that could work just as well as part of the subject or the predicate: "Achilles saw them unarmed" object: them. Unarmed? qua in the object position? Turn that into the passive and you don't know what to do with the 'unarmed'. They were seen, by Achilles, unarmed. Or consider, Achilles, unarmed, marched towards the wall of Troy. ---- Variants on Bayne's choice: "I was allowed onto the stage -- qua stage manager". There seems to be some intuition behind Anscombe's remark or regimentation, in that it's the 'bare' referent who is either allowed or isn't. It seems that to allow (to be repetitive) 'qua stage manager' to be in the subject locus or position is taking all the ontological weight (in Quine's parlance, even) out of the claim being made. The extra problem, and Anscombe was aware of this, is the "first person", or bare personal pronouns even. If one follows J. Perry following Grice (1941), on Personal Identity, it seems we _need_ to introduce *some* guise to 'you', 'I' and 'she'! Personally, "Steve R. Bayne was allowed onto the stage, qua stage manager" runs the risk of a regressus ad infinitum: "Steve R. Bayne, qua "Steve R. Bayne", so-called, was allowed onto the stage, but this happened not because "Steve R. Bayne" = "Steve R. Bayne" but because, rather, whoever did the allowing attributed to _him_ the property, 'being the stage manager'. ---- It seems to me that if we allow for symbols for "S" (subject) and "P" (predicate), then what we seem to be having is: (I) S1-qua-S2 is P1. But this may be a mere rewrite of the 'conjunction': (II) S1 is P1 (where S2 above becomes P1) & S1 is P2 (where P1 in (I) becomes 'P2' because there's a new 'P1' being introduced in the rewrite)) (*) And before the bed-qua-bed, the OED cites for 'qua'! 1647 N. WARD Simple Cobler Aggawam 56 "Every man was as good a man as your Selfe, qua man. 1649 A. ASCHAM Bounds Publique Obed. 21 "The Apostle commands Wives to submit to their Husbands, surely qu? Husbands, not qu? men." ---- good example that. I'm sure the Apostle would never command Wives to submit to bachelors -- 'unmarried males' -- like _that_! 1776 Claim Roy Rada Churn 17/1 A body corporate, qu? corporate, cannot make an affidavit. 1847 M. F. TUPPER in W. C. Armstrong Compl. Prose Wks. (1851) 490 The man, qu? man.. was nearer to his Creator, than the woman; who, qu? woman, proceeded out of man. --- Problem there is that woman qua woman is wife-man, i.e. qua woman she is a man! 1867 J. A. FROUDE Spinoza in Short Stud. (ed. 2) 232 Because things modally distinguished do not qu? substance differ from one another there cannot be more than one substance of the same attribute. --- Which may be Anscombe's point: to contradict Froude! Note the co-substantiality, almost, between talk of 'subject' (Greek, hupokheimenon) and 'substance'. 1885 Manch. Examiner 4 Apr. 4/6 Their censures are not directed against the Church qu? Church, but against the Church qu? Establishment. --- This is also interesting, and Soames would like it, alla Kripke. For any "a", feel free to allow the postulate, "a qua a = a qua a". By focusing on 'church' qua 'establishment' are we promoting an 'essential' attribution, a 'proper' attribution, or a mere 'accidental' one? I think the latter! --- 1965 G. GRANT Lament for Nation (1991) ii. 21 This failure to recognize the rights of French Canadians, qua community, was inconsistent with the roots of Canadian nationalism. --- This is intersting in that there is no strict 'grammatical' number agreement, "French canadians" is plural, 'community' is singular! So you see 'qua' can be not just be otiose, but 'lousy'! 1993 Guardian 21 Aug. (Weekend Suppl.) 6/2 Philip Larkin was unquestionably..better loved, qua poet, than John Betjeman, who was loved also for his charm. ---- I disagree! I don't think Philip Larkin was loved but by Barbara Pym! --- Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 13 22:06:43 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2009 22:06:43 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] =?iso-8859-1?q?qu=E2?= Message-ID: 1677 GALE Crt. Gent. II. IV. 516 The negation of it implies a contradiction in the Adject or an Opposite in an Apposite. In a message dated 2/13/2009 8:55:27 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes in "'Under a description' and passive constructions" >I said that in > > ?Bob as the so called stage manager fired Ruddy? > >the subject is not ?Bob? but ?Bob as the so-called [stage manager]". >But there is a syntactical argument that can be used to support this claim >as well as the semantical ones I gave. If the subject is not 'Bob' but >'Bob as the so called stage manager' then we would expect >the passive construction to be: > > 'Ruddy was fired by Bob as the so-called stage manager'. > >But even though this is a bit strained it sure is better than > > 'Ruddy as the so called stage manager was fired > by Bob'. > >What makes this bad is that 'as the so called stage manager' >must in fact occur under the NP (noun phrase, not the VP) where >the comparative adjective 'as the so called stage manager' >is a modifier of Bob. Technically: 'as the so called stage manager' >is right Chomsky-adjoined to the projection of the head, N, i.e. 'Bob'" ---- Although we should refine 'comparative' here. Are we really comparing. In fact, Classical Latin would have 'qua', apparently, not a comparative proper. There's also the question, syntactically interesting, of, if not quessertions, questions proper. Who fired Ruddy? -- I don't know. But whoever fired him, that person who did it -- if a person it was -- better be in the right 'authority' frame to do it; otherwise I'm not sure we can use 'fire' like that! ---- Things like these Grice referred to as 'strokes of the pen', or the tongue as I sometimes prefer. Evans discussed this in "Varieties of Reference" (just a footnote). A similar reference may be Urmson in "Intensions", his Aristotelian Society paper. He discusses 'appositeness' (his version of Grice, 'Be relevant'): Your husband just delivered the letter. What do you mean, 'your husband'. You mean the post-master? Well, he _is_ your husband, isn't he? I.e. sometimes we use 'qua husband', sometimes 'qua postmaster', and sometimes, if we have good memories, proper names proper! I was told a relevant, I hope, joke. (it's for real -- not really a joke). One absent minded person reminds the other, "Recall the good old days when we used to talk using 'proper names'??' (Seeing that they can no longer 'drop' names like that and must refer to more or less 'indefinite' descriptions, "That actress who plays naked in that film with that actor who does a third-rater wrestler" (i.e. Marisa Tomei and Mickey Rourke!). I'm glad S. Bayne mentions the question of the voice as it may relate to my guarded comments, if understood, re: Strawson's qualifications on 'topic' vs. 'comment'. Re: apposition, what the OED may be of some use: 'apposition', 6. Gram. The placing of a word beside, or in syntactic parallelism with, another; spec. the addition of one substantive to another, or to a noun clause, as an attribute or complement; the position of the substantive so added. c1440 Gesta Rom. (1879) 416 Young children that gone to the school have in here Donete this question, how many things fallen to apposition? 1591 PERCIVALL Span. Dict., A Preposition..either in Composition, as, "Contrahecho"..or in Apposition, as, "En la casa." 1657 J. SMITH Myst. Rhet. 191 Apposition is a figure..whereby one noun substantive is for declaration and distinction sake added unto another in the same case. 1860 JOWETT Ess. & Rev. 398 In the failure of syntactical power.. in various forms of apposition, especially that of the word to the sentence. 1841 LATHAM Eng. Lang. (1850) ?559 The appositional construction is, in reality, a matter of concord. 1865 N. DALGLEISH Gram. Anal. 13 The appositional complement. 1879 G. MACLEAR in Camb. Bible, Mark i. 5 River of Jordan: of is here redundant and appositional. ----- 1882 ROBERTSON M?ller's Heb. Synt. 60 [The words] could equally well stand appositionally in the absolute state after the word qualified. 1693 KNATCHBULL Annot. 42 The words in the parenthesis being only appositive to the words going immediately before. e.g. Bob (qua stage manager) fired Ruddy. 1847 A. CROSBY Grk. Gram. ?331 An appositive agrees in case with its [logical -- JLS] subject. 1883 H. M. KENNEDY Ten Brink's E.E. Lit. 20 The separation of appositive words. 1881 WHITNEY Mixt. in Lang. 23 Genitives of different kinds..those used more attributively and those used more appositively. 1883 H. M. KENNEDY Ten Brink's E.E. Lit. 19 Substantive expressions which..are put appositively beside the real designation. 1677 GALE Crt. Gent. II. IV. 516 The negation of it implies a contradiction in the Adject or an Opposite in an Apposite. Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sat Feb 14 19:21:16 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sat, 14 Feb 2009 16:21:16 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] =?iso-8859-1?q?qu=E2_=28Prior_Analytics_49a11-b2?= =?iso-8859-1?q?=29?= In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <941412.57624.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Speranza, There is some good stuff here. I am going to focus on 'qua'. In particular, IAristotle at Prior Analytics 49a11-b2. in connection with what I said earlier about Anscombe (Collected Papers vol. III. p. 208.) along with some of your remarks. I will argue that Anscombe has, apparently, misunderstood Aristotle's views which are restricted to the double occurrence of words in a syllogism. There is a sort of logical "forcing" of the modifier ('qua') to the Major premise in all forms of the syllogism he cites. I think they are all in Barbara. In any case, there is an appeal to reductio, that has no correlative in arguing for the constructions she discusses. I'm a little surprised, inasmuch as I seldom make the sort of error that would be required to misread Anscombe so radically; yet, respecting scholarship, I cannot? dismiss her, so, cavalierly. This business of 'under a description'? - in the way she is using it - is reminiscent of Quine on belief, but there is a twist that goes further back. If Davidson's approach to intention is, similarly, dependent on this consideration we would go some way to defeating broad claims of a linguistic methodology in this particular case by appeal to very particular syntactic facts. Anyway, ?while I won't be able to comment on everything you say here; it is all appreciated. So if you have a chance peek at the Prior Analytics (I:38, 49a11 etc), and I'll get back to "you'ns." Regards STeve --- On Fri, 2/13/09, Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: From: Jlsperanza at aol.com Subject: qu? To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Date: Friday, February 13, 2009, 9:46 PM "qua is possibly one of the most important words, philosophically" J. L. S. -- bathroom graffito. Qua and the subject locus from the OED qua: [< classical Latin "qua", 'in so far as', use as adverb of ablative singular feminine of "qui", 'who' (see WHO pron.).] I'm not too happy with the header, but Bayne is considering phrases with 'qua' in subject-positions. In a message dated 2/13/2009 8:34:50 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes in "Anscombe on 'Under the description d'": >In the mean time here are a couple of thoughts related to >my work on Anscombe's theory of Action. If Speranza >is out there, I would appreciate from him any reference he might provide on THIS topic in Grice. ----- And now I'm confused. I hope you mean on "THIS" as per "Anscombe". The ambiguity was that the passage was about "THIS" about ~(p & ~p). So in case you wanted any reference on "~(p & ~p)" let me know; meanwhile I'll be awaiting your reflections. ---- If the 'this' is on Anscombe, here my running comments: Bayne: >I have some criticisms to make of Anscombe on 'under a description'. >I will begin with how she responds to one objection to her use of >the expression in _Intention_. However, the text I am referring to >in this post is "Under a Description" Nous_ as well as >_Metaphysics_ pp. 208ff. There Anscombe identifies >'under the description d' with "qu? d". In addition in >'x under the description d', she says that the subject of the >sentence is 'x' not, ever, 'x under the description d'. >If I say, ?I was allowed on stage under the description of ?stage manager?? ? >This is ambiguous; this is the first claim I wish to make. --- and a good claim it is too. Recall what Searle said about 'pragmatic ambiguity'! We want to be clear whether this is a distinction in _senses_ as I think it's not, or in scope, as I think it is. Grice allows to _use_ 'ambiguity' ('contextual ambiguity') in "Aristotle on the multiplicity of being" (final sections) PPQ 1988. (His example, the ambiguity between 'You cannot apply: it's a contest for best French poem' -- ambiguous between, 'poem supplied by a French citizen' versus 'poem supplied by anyone _in French_). Bayne: >if ?under the description of stage manager ? means >?being stage manager so-called,? that would be one reading >where I am, merely referred to as such, that is as stage manager. >I may not be the stage manager. In this case the sentence >means one thing: I was allowed on stage as the so-called sta[ge] >manager. But suppose I mean by ?under the description of stage >manager,? rather ?qu? 'stage manager'", ? that would be something >else. Then the sentence would mean that I was allowed >onstage because I was the stage manager. >One can imagine circumstances where, even though I was not >the stage manager, I was allowed on stage only because I >was the so-called stage manager. It gets a bit clearer >if we take ?authority? instead of ?manager?, ----- Sorry about this, but it may get _clearer_ if you choose another example. I was having in mind what you say about Miss Anscombe on 'the subject' of the sentence, and there the subject (logically speaking) is _them_, who are going to do some 'deeming' as Grice calls it, as to whether you are the stage manager, or not! ---- Bayne: >so that our sentence becomes: ?I was allowed on stage because > I was the so-called staging authority,? as opposed to >?I was allowed on stage qu? staging authority.? ---- I don't think I'd follow you regarding the so-called. This phrase, 'so-called' is hardly well used in English! In Italian it's even worse. Recall Pu ccini's aria in La Boheme: "Mi chiamano Mimi" I am Mimi, so-called. By _who_!? I never read "Scenes de la vie en boheme" to check who she really _is_! --- Bayne: >In addition, one cannot construct cases where I am on stage qua stage manager but I am not the stage manager. ---- Grice uses this in "Actions and Events" (PPQ, 1988 -- which I do not have to hand). What I recall, frivolously, is that he uses the circumflex over the 'a': qua thus becomes "qu?"! ---- Bayne continues: >It may not even be the case that I am a so-called >stage manager; no one may have ever understood me >to be the stage manager. Right. In "Vacuous Names" Grice plays a bit on Donnellan's 'descriptive' functors. If we remember them (a) vs. (b): 'attributive' 'referential' Grice is sceptical about the distinction, but he wants to keep a distinction. And he uses a 'technology' here as it were. The use of small print capitals would mean 'referential'. The use of a description in quotes would mean 'attributive'. Thus we distinguish: (a') vs. (b'): I was allowed qu? STAGE MANAGER. I was allowed qu? 'stage manager'. One would want to say that if we use the scare quotes, one _is_ paying special attention to the words as used in the 'descriptor' -- "I was referred to as the 'stage manager'. If one uses the small capital print ("I was allowed qu? STAGE MANAGER") one is using the descriptor not attributively, but referentially, even rigidly so; and one is displaying a commitment to the descriptor (or 'dossier' as Grice prefers) being _true_ of the descriptum. (Part of this section was reprinted in _Definite Descriptions_ (MIT)). Bayne continues: >It may have been the case that my being let on stage qua stage manager >implies that I was also called the stage manager, but to draw >the conclusion that the cases were the same, and that there is >no ambiguity, it would have to be added that one might in the very >same sense be both the stage manager and the so-called stage manager. >The reader will not experience the contrast unless the contrast between >being a stage manager and being a so-called stage manager or even >a stage manager so-called belongs among one's linguistic intuitions >(or part of one's idiolect, etc). So it would appear that there is a >difference between two possible readings of ?under a description?. Very good approach to a veritable ambiguity! Regarding a second point, Bayne writes about the 'subject' position: >But now the important question: In the sense in which > ?under a description? does *not* mean ?qua? is >?x under the description d? a subject term? If in Bob under the description ?stage manager' V-ed. >we have it that? ?under the description ?stage manager?? can be read "as the so-called stage manager? then in Bob as the so-called stage manager fired Ruddy. >the subject is not ?Bob? but ?Bob as the so-called >stage master."" ----- I see your point. Perhaps Anscombe is wanting to say that 'under a description' is a mere _guise_ (alla Castaneda), i.e. under the guise, 'stage manager'. This would presuppose the variable 'x' to be able to be referred to _without any guise whatsoever_ (hence, precisely, the use of 'x'). Where in symbols we would have something like: (Ex) SMx & F(x, b) i.e. There is an x such that x has the guise 'stage manager' and x did fire Ruddy. Now someone may ask, under what description did Ruddy get fired, that's what I want to know! ---- More tomorrow, after a good night sleep! Historically, it may do to relate Anscombe's considerations about 'subject' positions with the mediaeval views of her husband! I tried and tried to understand Geach's _Reference and Generality_ -- and I tried I tried to understand Grice's 'disciple', Strawson's _Subject and predicate in logic and grammar_, and in both cases, failed! These issues of referentiality, attributiveness, and qua-ness pervade the subject 'locus' but extend beyond it. I am reminded of Strawson on topic/comment and presupposition failure in: "the exhibition was visited by the so-called King of France". Strawson seems to have had the 'intuition' that the unique existence of 'the king of France' is not topical, and thus not crucial in the _understanding_ of the utterance. I never shared _that_ intuition! It seems pretty ad-hoc! Surely there must be more to subject and predicate than choice of ordering! At school we loved to do parsing, and I was good at that. The qua clauses were used, sometimes, 'appositiones'. And knowing a bit of Greek grammar, it became _very_ tricky when we had 'predicative' phrases that could work just as well as part of the subject or the predicate: "Achilles saw them unarmed" object: them. Unarmed? qua in the object position? Turn that into the passive and you don't know what to do with the 'unarmed'. They were seen, by Achilles, unarmed. Or consider, Achilles, unarmed, marched towards the wall of Troy. ---- Variants on Bayne's choice: "I was allowed onto the stage -- qua stage manager". There seems to be some intuition behind Anscombe's remark or regimentation, in that it's the 'bare' referent who is either allowed or isn't. It seems that to allow (to be repetitive) 'qua stage manager' to be in the subject locus or position is taking all the ontological weight (in Quine's parlance, even) out of the claim being made. The extra problem, and Anscombe was aware of this, is the "first person", or bare personal pronouns even. If one follows J. Perry following Grice (1941), on Personal Identity, it seems we _need_ to introduce *some* guise to 'you', 'I' and 'she'! Personally, "Steve R. Bayne was allowed onto the stage, qua stage manager" runs the risk of a regressus ad infinitum: "Steve R. Bayne, qua "Steve R. Bayne", so-called, was allowed onto the stage, but this happened not because "Steve R. Bayne" = "Steve R. Bayne" but because, rather, whoever did the allowing attributed to _him_ the property, 'being the stage manager'. ---- It seems to me that if we allow for symbols for "S" (subject) and "P" (predicate), then what we seem to be having is: (I) S1-qua-S2 is P1. But this may be a mere rewrite of the 'conjunction': (II) S1 is P1 (where S2 above becomes P1) & S1 is P2 (where P1 in (I) becomes 'P2' because there's a new 'P1' being introduced in the rewrite)) (*) And before the bed-qua-bed, the OED cites for 'qua'! 1647 N. WARD Simple Cobler Aggawam 56 "Every man was as good a man as your Selfe, qua man. 1649 A. ASCHAM Bounds Publique Obed. 21 "The Apostle commands Wives to submit to their Husbands, surely qu? Husbands, not qu? men." ---- good example that. I'm sure the Apostle would never command Wives to submit to bachelors -- 'unmarried males' -- like _that_! 1776 Claim Roy Rada Churn 17/1 A body corporate, qu? corporate, cannot make an affidavit. 1847 M. F. TUPPER in W. C. Armstrong Compl. Prose Wks. (1851) 490 The man, qu? man.. was nearer to his Creator, than the woman; who, qu? woman, proceeded out of man. --- Problem there is that woman qua woman is wife-man, i.e. qua woman she is a man! 1867 J. A. FROUDE Spinoza in Short Stud. (ed. 2) 232 Because things modally distinguished do not qu? substance differ from one another there cannot be more than one substance of the same attribute. --- Which may be Anscombe's point: to contradict Froude! Note the co-substantiality, almost, between talk of 'subject' (Greek, hupokheimenon) and 'substance'. 1885 Manch. Examiner 4 Apr. 4/6 Their censures are not directed against the Church qu? Church, but against the Church qu? Establishment. --- This is also interesting, and Soames would like it, alla Kripke. For any "a", feel free to allow the postulate, "a qua a = a qua a". By focusing on 'church' qua 'establishment' are we promoting an 'essential' attribution, a 'proper' attribution, or a mere 'accidental' one? I think the latter! --- 1965 G. GRANT Lament for Nation (1991) ii. 21 This failure to recognize the rights of French Canadians, qua community, was inconsistent with the roots of Canadian nationalism. --- This is intersting in that there is no strict 'grammatical' number agreement, "French canadians" is plural, 'community' is singular! So you see 'qua' can be not just be otiose, but 'lousy'! 1993 Guardian 21 Aug. (Weekend Suppl.) 6/2 Philip Larkin was unquestionably..better loved, qua poet, than John Betjeman, who was loved also for his charm. ---- I disagree! I don't think Philip Larkin was loved but by Barbara Pym! --- Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sat Feb 14 22:07:40 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sat, 14 Feb 2009 22:07:40 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] The Dawn of Analysis Message-ID: Q: What's your opinion on the future of analytic philosophy? A: You mean _me_ qua analytic philosopher? -- in Aristotle's Prior Analytics! "h?i" (Pr.Anal. 49a11-b2, Met. Z 1003a21) -- No, reader, this is not a boring stretch on philology! It's about the DAWN of Analysis in Aristotle! Isn't Byrne (cited below) _right_ when he goes to the core of what Aristotle means by 'analyse' an argument in terms of 'muddled', 'enthymemic' premisses. And would it surprise you if an Aristotelian scholar like Anscombe mis-read him, too? ---- 'hei', qua, and "sub specie" S. R. B. In a message dated 2/14/2009 in "qua". >There is some good stuff here. I am going to focus on 'qua'. In particular, >Aristotle Pr. Anal. 49a11-b2. in connection with what I said earlier >about Anscombe (Collected Papers vol. III. p. 208.) along with some of >your remarks. >There is a sort of logical "forcing" of the modifier ('qua') to >the major premise > very particular syntactic facts. So here is Aristotle's text with my comments (by courtesy of R. B. Jones -- online available). My, it may be good stuff, but a bit dry for a Saturday night! (Just joking). I'm pleased Aristotle uses 'qua'. I enjoyed his example "man is perishable qua an object of sense" which I'd take to be equivalent to "man, qua an object of sense, is perishable" ----- so there _seems_ to be some 'syntactic freedom' of the qua, but as you say, Aristotle is clear that he wants the 'qualification' or expansion to be 'included' in the subject-term. I found this link below: an online book by Byrne on Analysis in Aristotle, that quotes the passage (found it googling for 'qua an object of sense' -- for surely that's an Aristotelian hapax legomenon, almost!): Analysis and Science in Aristotle - Google Books Result by Patrick Hugh Byrne - 1997 - Philosophy - 303 pages ... or goat-stag an object of knowledge qua not existing, or man perishable qua an object of sense: in every case in which an addition \qua . ... books.google.com/books?isbn=0791433218... ---- --- Of course I'm trying to trace the Greek for 'qua', for surely the ablative feminine (of Latin qua) _beats_ me! (I also notice that Anscombe Coll. Pap. 2, p. 208 is on the 'double effect', right? Found some online discussion of that, but it's _so_ catholic! :)). Byrne is right in finding this all Gricean! Aristotle, like Grice, is into 'enthymeme', 'implicit reasoning' made explicit! -- for what can be more explicit than adding 'qua this' and 'qua that'? If people were ever so careful! ---- Although the man being perishable qua an object of sense beats me! It's like reading one of the Mitfords (qua duchess of Devonshire), "I was annoyed by the review to the film -- 'sport' 'qua enjoyable activity'. For what other 'qua' can we think of? I cannot see how 'man' can NOT be perishable, -- 'object of sense' confuses me in that I wouldn't think the Greeks had a developed epistemology like _that_! ---- ---- "a term which is repeated in the premisses ought to be joined to the first extreme, not to the middle. I mean for example that if a syllogism should be made proving that There is knowledge of justice, that it is good. the expression 'that it is good' or 'qua good' should be joined to the first term. Let A stand for knowledge that it is good B for good, C for justice. It is true to predicate A of B. For of the good there is knowledge that it is good. Also it is true to predicate B of C. For justice is identical with a good. In this way an analysis of the argument can be made. But if the expression 'that it is good' were added to B, the conclusion will not follow: for A will be true of B, but B will not be true of C. For to predicate of justice the term 'good that it is good' is false and not intelligible. ************Byrne 'modernises' the syllogism as: 1. Of all good there is knowledge that it is good 2. All justice is good ----- 3. Therefore, of all justice there is knowledge that it is good. (Byrne, op. cit., p. 63). Byrne goes on to say that this is perhaps 'trickier in English' than Greek, and uses symbolism: B1, "good that it is good" B2 "good" ---- Byrne quotes from the other illustrations of this type of 'ambiguity' given by Aristotle. The illustrations concern -- 'healthy' -- goat-stag and my 'favourite' -- 'man' 'an object of sense', 'perishable'. "Similarly if it should be proved that the healthy is an ***************************** object of knowledge qua good, *************************** of goat-stag an ****************** object of knowledge qua non-existing ****************** or ************************ man perishable qua an object of sense: ************************************* in every case in which an addition is made to the predicate, the addition must be joined to the extreme. ----- Apparently, Prof. Baeck has written on these 'qua propositions', "in which Aristotelianism abounds" he notes! ----- the 'qua' is in Greek, apparently, 'hei', and this leads me to whom Grice calls 'the greatest living philosopher' in "Logic and Conversation, i": Martin Heidegger! On Heidegger and Language - Google Books Result by Joseph J. Kockelmans - 1980 - Philosophy - 380 pages ... expression commonly used in referring to beings as the subject matter of metaphysics : to on hei on. The expression is ambiguous in more than one sense. ... books.google.com/books?isbn=0810106124... This above in connection with theorei to on hei on (Met, Z, 1003a 21). metaphysics as 'the theory of being qua being'. ----- ------ The position of the terms is not the same when something is established without qualification and when it is qualified by some attribute or condition, e g. when the good is proved to be an object of knowledge and when it is proved to be an object of knowledge that it is good. If it has been proved to be an object of knowledge without qualification, we must put as middle term 'that which is', but if we add the qualification 'that it is good', the middle term must be 'that which is something'. Let A stand for 'knowledge that it is something', B stand for 'something', and C stand for 'good'. It is true to predicate A of B: for ex hypothesi there is a science of that which is something, that it is something. B too is true of C: for that which C represents is something. Consequently A is true of C: there will then be knowledge of the good, that it is good: for ex hypothesi the term 'something' indicates the thing's special nature. But if 'being' were taken as middle and 'being' simply were joined to the extreme, not 'being something', we should not have had a syllogism proving that there is knowledge of the good, that it is good, but that it is; e.g. let A stand for knowledge that it is, B for being, C for good. Clearly then in syllogisms which are thus limited we must take the terms in the way stated. ------------------- --- Well, one problem with Aristotle -- I've been told -- is that he tends to _murder_ the Greek (my intuitions are hardly native there, so how could I tell?). I wouldn't be surprised if this 'hei' is idiolectal. Although it is better, and more polite, as S. R. Bayne says, to see Aristotle as "forcing" things here and there! It has also been said that perhaps not so much 'idiolectal' but plain 'dialectal', as he is using a sort of Northern Greek dialect. Must say I _like_ the 'qua', though. Bayne is right that this may connect with Davidson -- D. Frederick has been defending Davidson's 'action-sentences'. If we follow a Davidsonian approach, then it seems to be _all_ about 'qua' if not 'intentions'? (I'm speaking loosely). Another phrase with the proper 'scholastic' tones is 'sub specie...'. If we treat primary substances, then it's things like _me_ or _you_ than can get qualified qua this or qua that: Steve, the stage manager, fired the employee, JL. But Anscombe seems to be wanting to apply the 'qua' to 'descriptions' not of this and that (primary substances, Aristotle, 'tode') but notably other categories (actions qua qualifications of primary substances). I must say that the goat-stage example puzzles me. Surely 'non-existent', but necessarily so? Don't think so. Look at modern genetics! It's odd, but understandable, that Aristotle was obsessed with 'qua' as it applied to especially _two_ words: the "good" (cfr. above Byrne for B1 and B2 -- and the alleged 'ambiguity' of 'good') and "is" -- for the latter, I am with Code and Grice in using, instead izzing and hazzing for whatever it was that Aristotle found ambiguous in Greek! Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sun Feb 15 10:01:13 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sun, 15 Feb 2009 07:01:13 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Eddington, Pseudo-Processes and Epiphenomenalism Message-ID: <917911.89581.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Wesley Salmon in _Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World_, Princeton 1984 incorporated the idea of a "pseudo-process" into his probabilistic theory of causation. He relies on Reichenbach (_The Direction of Time_) as his source on what pseudo-processes are, etc. The most accessible information on the topic is: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-process/ There is a lot here on Russell on causation. It's a good essay; not sure who wrote it. I've just completed an essay "Intention, Entrainment and Pseudo-Processes, which is an attenuated statement of my larger theory. Probably the most original aspect of the theory I propose is that a pseudo- process is not epiphenomenal. This, to the best of my knowledge has never been suggested before. I think the reason is that if a process has an effect, then that effect becomes incorporated into the causal process. But this is simply a mistake. Take any pseudo-process. Observe it, say a moving shadow. Your observation is the result of its effect on you, and yet it is not, itself a causal process. Part of the issue is the individuation of processes. But I want to set that aside to make an historical point. Reichenbach just might not be the guy to cite on this matter. Note the above essay out of Stanford cites Reichenbach, probably because its source is Salmon. But here is something I discovered only recently. The description of such processes as we find it reported by Salmon is almost exactly the description we find in Eddington (_Nature of the Physical World_ Ann Arbor, 1958). Actually, these are the Gifford Lectures. If you turn to pp. 56- 59 you will find a detailed account of what a pseudo-process is, one that fits Reichenbach perfectly. I know that these processes were controversial during the early years of relativity theory. I made the attempt to find what is probably the best scientific account, Milton Rothman ("Things that Go Faster Than Light" in Scientific American (July 1960). But someone had, as we used to say, "liberated it." Well, if anyone has good access to JSTOR or some such and it's easy to do, could you forward a copy. I'll find it sometime soon, since SA is a popular journal. It is interesting that Eddington would never receive any credit here. Steve Bayne -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sun Feb 15 11:08:20 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sun, 15 Feb 2009 08:08:20 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] =?iso-8859-1?q?qu=E2?= In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <205922.33912.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Consider the syllogisms (as I have reconstructed them from Aristotle's description) from Posterior Analytics (1:38). Of the good there is knowledge (qua good) Justice is good Justice is knowledge (qua good) Of some particular thing there is knowledge (qua some particular thing) The good is some particular thing Of the good there is knowledge (qua some particular thing). Ignore the, apparent, invalidity of the second syllogism. 'Qua' sets out a qualification. Aristotle is making a proposal concerning where, in the first, syllogism, to put the second occurrence of 'good'. He puts it with the Major term, because if he puts it with the middle, then the predicate of the conclusion will not hold of the minor term. Further, if you put it with the minor term then you get pointless redundancy (good (qua good)). So it goes with the major. Anscombe claims that Aristotle puts 'qua' with the subject rather than the predicate, and, then, draws the conclusion that there are no things, A, such that they are "A qua B." In the first place, Aristotle is not making a general claim in the passage cited for believing that 'qua' always goes with the predicate, only that when there are two occurrences of the term, one as modifier that modifier must in the context of a syllogism belong to the Major term. This is misleading. Speranza remarks: "Steve R. Bayne was allowed onto the stage, qua stage manager" runs the? risk of a regressus ad infinitum:"Steve R. Bayne, qua "Steve R. Bayne", so-called,... But as a description we might require 'being Steven R. Bayne' rather than 'Steven R. Bayne'. If you follow the consequences of this, the picture changes. Note that 'qua' is identified as 'heta' in Greek. This is far more controversial, but there are Greek scholars around here who would be more worth the time hearing. So I pass it by. Your Searle point is well taken, but possibly there is another distinction at work here, what Chomsky described in _Aspects of the Theory of Syntax_ as the performance/competence distinction. These ambiguities run a fine line between these two, typically. Or so it seems. On so called: consider 'Gargantua was so-called because of his size'. That is the sense of 'so-called' intended. As for the screaming Mimi, what can I say. Just kidding, good opera. In fact, La Boheme is my favorite opera; maybe Turandot. Enough of that! I've been unable to access Grice "Actions and Events." This might prove very important. Nor can I locate Sellars on volitions, later in his career. So I pass, once again. Your point on Grice and Donnellan is worth pursuing. Let me do so, albeit, briefly. "I sat the AA meeting qua the man with the martini in his hand." Now here the description 'the man with the martini in his hand' can be either descriptive or referential. If the AA folks don't know it's a martini etc, then it is probably referential not descriptive. I may have a reputation for defiance and nonconformity, so I want them to be shocked, but if it just water then the sentence is descriptive and false. Gosh! Maybe it's the other way around. No. The important thing is the distinction works. I think Donnellan's distinction, notwithstanding Kripke's remarks on the topic, is very close to the distinction between rigid designators and non-rigid designators. I think this is consistent with your point on Grice. I want to stay away from guise-theory (Castenada). Partly, because I am a bit skeptical, although it is very appealing. Brief point: in an unsubmitted paper I argue a relation between what Castenada says about "The logic of He" (is that the title?) and quasi-indicators. There is is an interesting connection between 'he' and anaphora, vis a vis quasi-indicators, so I want to leave this alone just now. I've had no time to edit my old paper, never released to the masses, but it has so many damned superscripts that I'll let it sit. It's actually based on Evans and Donkey Sentences. More later, perhaps. Regards STeve Bayne --- On Fri, 2/13/09, Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: From: Jlsperanza at aol.com Subject: qu? To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Date: Friday, February 13, 2009, 9:46 PM "qua is possibly one of the most important words, philosophically" J. L. S. -- bathroom graffito. Qua and the subject locus from the OED qua: [< classical Latin "qua", 'in so far as', use as adverb of ablative singular feminine of "qui", 'who' (see WHO pron.).] I'm not too happy with the header, but Bayne is considering phrases with 'qua' in subject-positions. In a message dated 2/13/2009 8:34:50 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes in "Anscombe on 'Under the description d'": >In the mean time here are a couple of thoughts related to >my work on Anscombe's theory of Action. If Speranza >is out there, I would appreciate from him any reference he might provide on THIS topic in Grice. ----- And now I'm confused. I hope you mean on "THIS" as per "Anscombe". The ambiguity was that the passage was about "THIS" about ~(p & ~p). So in case you wanted any reference on "~(p & ~p)" let me know; meanwhile I'll be awaiting your reflections. ---- If the 'this' is on Anscombe, here my running comments: Bayne: >I have some criticisms to make of Anscombe on 'under a description'. >I will begin with how she responds to one objection to her use of >the expression in _Intention_. However, the text I am referring to >in this post is "Under a Description" Nous_ as well as >_Metaphysics_ pp. 208ff. There Anscombe identifies >'under the description d' with "qu? d". In addition in >'x under the description d', she says that the subject of the >sentence is 'x' not, ever, 'x under the description d'. >If I say, ?I was allowed on stage under the description of ?stage manager?? ? >This is ambiguous; this is the first claim I wish to make. --- and a good claim it is too. Recall what Searle said about 'pragmatic ambiguity'! We want to be clear whether this is a distinction in _senses_ as I think it's not, or in scope, as I think it is. Grice allows to _use_ 'ambiguity' ('contextual ambiguity') in "Aristotle on the multiplicity of being" (final sections) PPQ 1988. (His example, the ambiguity between 'You cannot apply: it's a contest for best French poem' -- ambiguous between, 'poem supplied by a French citizen' versus 'poem supplied by anyone _in French_). Bayne: >if ?under the description of stage manager ? means >?being stage manager so-called,? that would be one reading >where I am, merely referred to as such, that is as stage manager. >I may not be the stage manager. In this case the sentence >means one thing: I was allowed on stage as the so-called sta[ge] >manager. But suppose I mean by ?under the description of stage >manager,? rather ?qu? 'stage manager'", ? that would be something >else. Then the sentence would mean that I was allowed >onstage because I was the stage manager. >One can imagine circumstances where, even though I was not >the stage manager, I was allowed on stage only because I >was the so-called stage manager. It gets a bit clearer >if we take ?authority? instead of ?manager?, ----- Sorry about this, but it may get _clearer_ if you choose another example. I was having in mind what you say about Miss Anscombe on 'the subject' of the sentence, and there the subject (logically speaking) is _them_, who are going to do some 'deeming' as Grice calls it, as to whether you are the stage manager, or not! ---- Bayne: >so that our sentence becomes: ?I was allowed on stage because > I was the so-called staging authority,? as opposed to >?I was allowed on stage qu? staging authority.? ---- I don't think I'd follow you regarding the so-called. This phrase, 'so-called' is hardly well used in English! In Italian it's even worse. Recall Pu ccini's aria in La Boheme: "Mi chiamano Mimi" I am Mimi, so-called. By _who_!? I never read "Scenes de la vie en boheme" to check who she really _is_! --- Bayne: >In addition, one cannot construct cases where I am on stage qua stage manager but I am not the stage manager. ---- Grice uses this in "Actions and Events" (PPQ, 1988 -- which I do not have to hand). What I recall, frivolously, is that he uses the circumflex over the 'a': qua thus becomes "qu?"! ---- Bayne continues: >It may not even be the case that I am a so-called >stage manager; no one may have ever understood me >to be the stage manager. Right. In "Vacuous Names" Grice plays a bit on Donnellan's 'descriptive' functors. If we remember them (a) vs. (b): 'attributive' 'referential' Grice is sceptical about the distinction, but he wants to keep a distinction. And he uses a 'technology' here as it were. The use of small print capitals would mean 'referential'. The use of a description in quotes would mean 'attributive'. Thus we distinguish: (a') vs. (b'): I was allowed qu? STAGE MANAGER. I was allowed qu? 'stage manager'. One would want to say that if we use the scare quotes, one _is_ paying special attention to the words as used in the 'descriptor' -- "I was referred to as the 'stage manager'. If one uses the small capital print ("I was allowed qu? STAGE MANAGER") one is using the descriptor not attributively, but referentially, even rigidly so; and one is displaying a commitment to the descriptor (or 'dossier' as Grice prefers) being _true_ of the descriptum. (Part of this section was reprinted in _Definite Descriptions_ (MIT)). Bayne continues: >It may have been the case that my being let on stage qua stage manager >implies that I was also called the stage manager, but to draw >the conclusion that the cases were the same, and that there is >no ambiguity, it would have to be added that one might in the very >same sense be both the stage manager and the so-called stage manager. >The reader will not experience the contrast unless the contrast between >being a stage manager and being a so-called stage manager or even >a stage manager so-called belongs among one's linguistic intuitions >(or part of one's idiolect, etc). So it would appear that there is a >difference between two possible readings of ?under a description?. Very good approach to a veritable ambiguity! Regarding a second point, Bayne writes about the 'subject' position: >But now the important question: In the sense in which > ?under a description? does *not* mean ?qua? is >?x under the description d? a subject term? If in Bob under the description ?stage manager' V-ed. >we have it that? ?under the description ?stage manager?? can be read "as the so-called stage manager? then in Bob as the so-called stage manager fired Ruddy. >the subject is not ?Bob? but ?Bob as the so-called >stage master."" ----- I see your point. Perhaps Anscombe is wanting to say that 'under a description' is a mere _guise_ (alla Castaneda), i.e. under the guise, 'stage manager'. This would presuppose the variable 'x' to be able to be referred to _without any guise whatsoever_ (hence, precisely, the use of 'x'). Where in symbols we would have something like: (Ex) SMx & F(x, b) i.e. There is an x such that x has the guise 'stage manager' and x did fire Ruddy. Now someone may ask, under what description did Ruddy get fired, that's what I want to know! ---- More tomorrow, after a good night sleep! Historically, it may do to relate Anscombe's considerations about 'subject' positions with the mediaeval views of her husband! I tried and tried to understand Geach's _Reference and Generality_ -- and I tried I tried to understand Grice's 'disciple', Strawson's _Subject and predicate in logic and grammar_, and in both cases, failed! These issues of referentiality, attributiveness, and qua-ness pervade the subject 'locus' but extend beyond it. I am reminded of Strawson on topic/comment and presupposition failure in: "the exhibition was visited by the so-called King of France". Strawson seems to have had the 'intuition' that the unique existence of 'the king of France' is not topical, and thus not crucial in the _understanding_ of the utterance. I never shared _that_ intuition! It seems pretty ad-hoc! Surely there must be more to subject and predicate than choice of ordering! At school we loved to do parsing, and I was good at that. The qua clauses were used, sometimes, 'appositiones'. And knowing a bit of Greek grammar, it became _very_ tricky when we had 'predicative' phrases that could work just as well as part of the subject or the predicate: "Achilles saw them unarmed" object: them. Unarmed? qua in the object position? Turn that into the passive and you don't know what to do with the 'unarmed'. They were seen, by Achilles, unarmed. Or consider, Achilles, unarmed, marched towards the wall of Troy. ---- Variants on Bayne's choice: "I was allowed onto the stage -- qua stage manager". There seems to be some intuition behind Anscombe's remark or regimentation, in that it's the 'bare' referent who is either allowed or isn't. It seems that to allow (to be repetitive) 'qua stage manager' to be in the subject locus or position is taking all the ontological weight (in Quine's parlance, even) out of the claim being made. The extra problem, and Anscombe was aware of this, is the "first person", or bare personal pronouns even. If one follows J. Perry following Grice (1941), on Personal Identity, it seems we _need_ to introduce *some* guise to 'you', 'I' and 'she'! Personally, "Steve R. Bayne was allowed onto the stage, qua stage manager" runs the risk of a regressus ad infinitum: "Steve R. Bayne, qua "Steve R. Bayne", so-called, was allowed onto the stage, but this happened not because "Steve R. Bayne" = "Steve R. Bayne" but because, rather, whoever did the allowing attributed to _him_ the property, 'being the stage manager'. ---- It seems to me that if we allow for symbols for "S" (subject) and "P" (predicate), then what we seem to be having is: (I) S1-qua-S2 is P1. But this may be a mere rewrite of the 'conjunction': (II) S1 is P1 (where S2 above becomes P1) & S1 is P2 (where P1 in (I) becomes 'P2' because there's a new 'P1' being introduced in the rewrite)) (*) And before the bed-qua-bed, the OED cites for 'qua'! 1647 N. WARD Simple Cobler Aggawam 56 "Every man was as good a man as your Selfe, qua man. 1649 A. ASCHAM Bounds Publique Obed. 21 "The Apostle commands Wives to submit to their Husbands, surely qu? Husbands, not qu? men." ---- good example that. I'm sure the Apostle would never command Wives to submit to bachelors -- 'unmarried males' -- like _that_! 1776 Claim Roy Rada Churn 17/1 A body corporate, qu? corporate, cannot make an affidavit. 1847 M. F. TUPPER in W. C. Armstrong Compl. Prose Wks. (1851) 490 The man, qu? man.. was nearer to his Creator, than the woman; who, qu? woman, proceeded out of man. --- Problem there is that woman qua woman is wife-man, i.e. qua woman she is a man! 1867 J. A. FROUDE Spinoza in Short Stud. (ed. 2) 232 Because things modally distinguished do not qu? substance differ from one another there cannot be more than one substance of the same attribute. --- Which may be Anscombe's point: to contradict Froude! Note the co-substantiality, almost, between talk of 'subject' (Greek, hupokheimenon) and 'substance'. 1885 Manch. Examiner 4 Apr. 4/6 Their censures are not directed against the Church qu? Church, but against the Church qu? Establishment. --- This is also interesting, and Soames would like it, alla Kripke. For any "a", feel free to allow the postulate, "a qua a = a qua a". By focusing on 'church' qua 'establishment' are we promoting an 'essential' attribution, a 'proper' attribution, or a mere 'accidental' one? I think the latter! --- 1965 G. GRANT Lament for Nation (1991) ii. 21 This failure to recognize the rights of French Canadians, qua community, was inconsistent with the roots of Canadian nationalism. --- This is intersting in that there is no strict 'grammatical' number agreement, "French canadians" is plural, 'community' is singular! So you see 'qua' can be not just be otiose, but 'lousy'! 1993 Guardian 21 Aug. (Weekend Suppl.) 6/2 Philip Larkin was unquestionably..better loved, qua poet, than John Betjeman, who was loved also for his charm. ---- I disagree! I don't think Philip Larkin was loved but by Barbara Pym! --- Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Feb 15 12:35:51 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 15 Feb 2009 12:35:51 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] To On Hei On; Or: Why Analysis *Is* Metaphysical Message-ID: ---- Note that if we are dealing with 'transcategorial' epithets here, it does seem like some metaphysical outlook pervades even the driest of syllogisms! ------- And what do you think of Aristotle's 'healthy'. What's healthy in the first place? Surely no cows, or grass, or oats. But things (ens) like you and me! ---- I'll reply your comments on 'qua' now so that if you have a chance to see my "Re: The Dawn of Analysis" with further qua-qua, as I call it, you'll get an exegesis, as it were, into the bargain! In a message dated 2/15/2009 11:09:09 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes in "Re: qua" >Consider the syllogisms (as I have reconstructed them >from Aristotle's description) from Posterior Analytics 1 49a > Call me naive, but I ignored your "38" thing and I took me _some_ to identify the Greek "49a". I finally did it via an online version of the GERMAN text "Analytica priori". It's odd that some online versions (I'm not referring to R. B. Jones's) have the chapter, but not the versicle, as it were! >MP Of the good there is knowledge (qua good) >mP Justice is good >C Ergo: Justice is knowledge (qua good) >MP Of some particular thing there is knowledge (qua some particular thing) >mPThe good is some particular thing >C: Ergo: Of the good there is knowledge (qua some particular thing). >Ignore the, apparent, invalidity of the second syllogism. >'Qua' sets out a qualification. Right. It's odd that it _seems_ cognate with 'qua-lity', but recall that 'quality' from what I understand, is _qualitas_ which is a translation of Aristotle's very own _poiotes_. You mention below the 'heta', but if I may, I think it's the _letter_, 'eta', so-called, i.e. the long /e/. But with the aspirated accent, hence /he/. Plus, it's, not in the ablative of the Latin, qua, since the Greek does not have ablative, so it would be plain 'dative'. I have transcribed that as 'hei'. But I'd have to check if the transliteration 'he', plainly, is also used. This may be to the fact that the 'i', the iota, becomes subscripted, as it were, in Greek, and sometimes it defies transliteration. (I'm in a rush, too, as someone else has to use my computer today!) Bayne: >Aristotle is making a >proposal concerning where, in the first, syllogism, to put >the second occurrence of 'good'. He puts it with the Major >term, because if he puts it with the middle, then the >predicate of the conclusion will not hold of the minor >term. Further, if you put it with the minor term then >you get pointless redundancy (good (qua good)). Wow: I'm surprised you were able to decipher his 'coine' (Just joking)! I was wondering about the 'pointless redundancy'. A. Baeck (or Back with umlaut if you google him -- he is an American philosopher, despite his name, apparently) calls them 'reduplicative PREPOSITIONS'. In some cases the reduplication is obvious, but I'm not sure when it comes to the genus summum, 'being qua being' (to on hei on). Now here, I would object to the use of 'being'. It's mere "ens", an individual _ens_. I would think, in Latin "ens qua ens". It may be redundant, but a reminder of the type of syllogisms one is bound to meet when engaging in metaphysical discourse! (Grice was right it's the most difficult thing in the world -- Aristotle's Metaphysics -- and he was surprised that his seminars at UC/Berkeley were not totally _vacuous_!). Bayne: >So it >goes with the major. Anscombe claims that Aristotle >puts 'qua' with the subject rather than the predicate, >and, then, draws the conclusion that there are no things, A, >such that they are "A qua B." -- and if that would be on p. 208, wonder if it's the 'double effect' paper. The list of contents for that volume has the 'double effect' paper starting on p. 207, I think. Bayne: >In the first place, Aristotle >is not making a general claim in the passage cited for >believing that 'qua' always goes with the predicate, only >that when there are two occurrences of the term, one as >modifier that modifier must in the context of a syllogism >belong to the Major term. This is misleading. Yes, poor Anscombe _got_ misled, and who knows how many hundreds before her. Note that Aphrodisias has a commentary on the Pr. Ana., and then there's commentary on the commentary. As Borges recalled I think, "Byron". "Your explication is good, but it would require another explication". Byrne makes a point that Aristotle is forcing everything into the three figures. And it's odd that seeing the Greeks were so derogatory towards the 'barbaroi', it's all, as you note, in BArbArA. Bayne: >Speranza remarks: >"Steve R. Bayne was allowed onto the stage, qua stage manager" runs the risk >of a regressus ad infinitum:"Steve R. Bayne, qua "Steve R. Bayne", so-called,... >But as a description we might require 'being Steven R. Bayne' rather than >'Steven R. Bayne'. If you follow the consequences of this, the picture >changes. Yes, it does change. But we have to agree with Aristotle that some uses of 'qua' are 'redudant'. Incidentally, in the syllogism you recover, Aristotle has a qualification as being "false and not intelligible". I read that three times. I was reading it alla Meinong: surely I was expecting something false yet intelligible. For if it's not intelligible, how can it be false? But a lot of this would depend on translation. The 'object of sense' that Aristotle says man qua is perishable (now that's coine!) is possible "sentient being". I.e. qua sentient being, man is perishable. This is good, but a bit atheistic to my mind. For it would entail that God cannot be sentient if he is not perishable. And perhaps he is not, for Aristotle, since it's just noesis noeseos, a thought that think thoughs. Also 'perishable' reminded of B. Aune's clever discussion of 'dispositional' terms like 'fragile'. "This is a dead parrot. She is no longer perishable. She is _perished_". --- (I'm starting to use nouns like 'parrot' etc. using the gender those words have in the Romance language -- this is my attempt to bring a bit more liveliness to the English language. Just joking. But why should a parrot be 'it'?) Bayne: >Note that 'qua' is identified as 'heta' in Greek. This is far more >controversial, but there are Greek scholars around here who would be >more worth the time hearing. So I pass it by. Apparently it's the 'he', with a subscripted iota, 'hei'. This goes for 'to on he on', but I have not been able to check the An. Pr. 49a passage to see if he uses the 'hei' thing in 'man qua an object of sense'. The online Liddell/Scott is very good. I typed Short/Lewis 'qua', and it gives Greek transliteration, 'hei', so I did that. The entry for 'hei' is of course 'ho', since it's the masculine demonstrative. Oddly, I could not see in Liddell/Scott any use of 'hei' as 'qua'! In any case, the change of case is puzzling. What puzzles me to is that _AFTER_ the 'hei' you get again to the nominative: ens qua ens to on hei on (Met. Z) anthropos hei zoon homo qua animal etc. So it's _not_ a prEposition, but the article, definite or demonstrative, used as a particle. Pretty odd, and perhaps not the best Greek form. But Anscombe revived it, and we should pay her respects! >Your Searle point is well taken, but possibly there is another >distinction at work here, what Chomsky described in _Aspects of the >Theory of Syntax_ as the performance/competence distinction. Odd that you should mention that book. S. Soames, of course, studied under Chomsky (professor of philosophy and linguistics -- this is good for conjunction reduction, "Is a professor of philosophy and linguistics, so-called, a professor of philosophy?) and that book has a mistaken reference in the index to "A. P. Grice", without the proper aspiration of the 'h' in "Herbert"! >These >ambiguities run a fine line between these two, typically. Or so it seems. Yes, and I recall discussing with you elsewhere as to your idea that indeed there may be ambiguity at the level of the _intention_, 'linguistic' intention. Bayne: >On so called: consider 'Gargantua was so-called because of his size'. That is >the sense of 'so-called' intended. As for the screaming Mimi, what can >I say. Just kidding, good opera. In fact, La Boheme is my favorite opera; >maybe Turandot. Enough of that! Yes, and a stage manager is so-called because he manages the stage. So, if we are into reducing quas, we do deal with a reduplicated proposition. What looks like _one_ proposition, is actually two. You are right about Noun Phrases, but it may be worth considering the 'qua' construction as a relative clause: Steven Bayne qua stage manager fired the (so-called) tenor, J. L. Speranza Steven Bayne fired Speranza While "who is the stage manager" is a clause within the scope of the NP, even in appositional style: Steven Bayne, the stage manager, fired Speranza it _does_ seem to involve a _predication_. But Aristotle _must_ have his figures three and tidy! and his three things, two premises and one conclusion! I cannot object, without him -- no dawn of analysis! The dawn of analysis, re. Is really a commentary on further 'qua', as I say. Have a look when you have the time (<----- this is an Austin 'biscuit' conditional). Bayne: "I've been unable to access Grice "Actions and Events." This might prove very important. Nor can I locate Sellars on volitions, later in his career. So I pass, once again. Your point on Grice and Donnellan is worth pursuing. Let me do so, albeit, briefly. "I sat the AA meeting qua the man with the martini in his hand." Now here the description 'the man with the martini in his hand' can be either descriptive or referential. If the AA folks don't know it's a martini etc, then it is probably referential not descriptive. I may have a reputation for defiance and nonconformity, so I want them to be shocked, but if it just water then the sentence is descriptive and false. Gosh! Maybe it's the other way around. No. The important thing is the distinction works. I think Donnellan's distinction, notwithstanding Kripke's remarks on the topic, is very close to the distinction between rigid designators and non-rigid designators. I think this is consistent with your point on Grice." Yes, on top of this, to start a new fashion (never caught up) Grice uses 'identificatory' versus 'non-identificatory'. I believe D. E. Over (of Sunderland Poly, on the North Sea) has a good essay on that in "Mind and Language" or "Linguistics and Philosophy". There's also: Qua participant in the AA meeting, I was bored. Qua audience, I found the AA meeting boring. Qua participant, I found the AA meeting a delight. Qua AA meeting, I found the AA meeting parochial. Qua martini, I found your martini wishy-washy. Qua lecture, I found Soames's lecture not too long. Qua innovative, I found Avramides's lecture not a re-hash at all! Qua _room_ the place where the AA meeting plenary took place was _dirty_. Qua trend-setter, Grice was not at his best. Qua meeting, the AA meeting was a misnomer! Etc. Bayne: >I want to stay away from guise-theory (Castenada). Partly, because I >am a bit skeptical, although it is very appealing. Brief point: in an >unsubmitted paper I argue a relation between what Castenada says about >"The logic of He" (is that the title?) and quasi-indicators. There is >is an interesting connection between 'he' and anaphora, vis a vis >quasi-indicators, so I want to leave this alone just now. I've had no >time to edit my old paper, never released to the masses, but it has so >many damned superscripts that I'll let it sit. It's actually based on >Evans and Donkey Sentences. More later, perhaps. Yes. Perhaps maybe on donkey and goat-stag. That would make an interesting one. I thought 'hei' (not 'he') could be anaphoric. Liddell Scott mentions that Aristotle uses "Socrates" when he wants to talk about Socrates, but he uses "ho Socrates" (Italian, "Il Socrate") when he wants to refer to Plato's _book_. Reminiscent of Russell, "the author of _Waverley_ lived on a hill" "the creator of Waverley lived on a hill" "the creator of Harry Potter liveS on a hill". etc. I tend to find personal pronouns pretty redundant, most of the case. What I am charmed with is the vocative use of the first person plural possessive, very North of England thing: "Our Doris, thee shouldn't spend so long at the marketplace!". Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Feb 15 14:59:54 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 15 Feb 2009 14:59:54 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] "A Shadow's Shadow"; Or, What Eddington Saw Message-ID: Or, What Eddington Saw. Pseudo-processes versus aletho- ones. Have you noticed how people 'mis-use' 'pseudo-'? I don't know about Salmon, but if the world were so tidy, then we should be appending 'aletho-', as I prefer, to anything that it's not pseudo-. I was recently confused by English poetry. Keats's rymes, for example, are called 'pseudo-rhyme', which in Italian is _not_ ryme! So far so good. But then there's the use, pseudo-Apollodorus. I mean, the man wasn't even _trying_ to pass _qua_ Apollodorus, the Alethos! --- We are looking for 'irreal' process rather than a false one, aren't we? HAMLET Why, then, 'tis none to you; for there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so: to me it is a prison. ROSENCRANTZ Why then, your ambition makes it one; 'tis too narrow for your mind. HAMLET O God, I could be bounded in a nut shell and count myself a king of infinite space, were it not that I have bad dreams. GUILDENSTERN Which dreams indeed are ambition, for the very substance of the ambitious is merely the shadow of a dream. HAMLET A dream itself is but a shadow. ROSENCRANTZ Truly, and I hold ambition of so airy and light a quality that it is but a shadow's shadow. HAMLET 'Sblood, there is something in this more than natural, if philosophy could find it out. In a message dated 2/15/2009 10:04:59 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes in "Eddington, pseudo-processes, and epiphenomenalism" >Salmon in _Explanation_, incorporate[S] >"pseudo-process" >into his probabilistic theory of causation. He relies on Reichenbach (_The Direction of Time_) as his source on what pseudo-processes are, etc. The most accessible information on the topic is: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-process/ There is a lot here on Russell on causation. It's >a good essay; not sure who wrote it. --- Apparently, it's _pdowe at uq.edu.au_ (mailto:pdowe at uq.edu.au) (Phil Dowe, 'down under' that is, -- look who's talking!) The format of those entries is confusing in that it's with a dark brown background, rather alla Encyclopedia Britannica old style, in brackets at the end of the article itself. He notes it's (c) 2007, though. :-( Bayne continues: "I've just completed an essay "Intention, Entrainment and Pseudo-Processes, which is an attenuated statement of my larger theory. Probably the most original aspect of the theory I propose is that a pseudo- process is not epiphenomenal. This, to the best of my knowledge has never been suggested before. I think the reason is that if a process has an effect, then that effect becomes incorporated into the causal process. But this is simply a mistake. Take any pseudo-process. Observe it, say a moving shadow. Your observation is the result of its effect on you, and yet it is not, itself a causal process." Oh, my god, do philosophers are saying those things now. With the funky dispositions, what the world has come to! Surely a 'shadow's shadow' (let's be Shakespearian, if we must) can be _causal_ alla that magisterially kept archive by Grice in hist-analytic, "Causal Theory of Perception". In fact, my dog reacts much more to epiphenomena (the shadow of a rat) than to phenomena itself! ---- "Part of the issue is the individuation of processes. But I want to set that aside to make an historical point. Reichenbach just might not be the guy to cite on this matter. Note the above essay out of Stanford cites Reichenbach, probably because its source is Salmon. But here is something I discovered only recently. The description of such processes as we find it reported by Salmon is almost exactly the description we find in Eddington (_Nature of the Physical World_ Ann Arbor, 1958)." Just a historical point: recall it's, I think, 1928, London: Macmillan, or 1929, right? "Actually, these are the Gifford Lectures." Exactly, which he apparently _wrote_ before delivery circa even earlier, 1927, apparently. "If you turn to pp. 56- 59 you will find a detailed account of what a pseudo-process is, one that fits Reichenbach perfectly. I know that these processes were controversial during the early years of relativity theory. I made the attempt to find what is probably the best scientific account, Milton Rothman ("Things that Go Faster Than Light" in Scientific American (July 1960). But someone had, as we used to say, "liberated it." Well, if anyone has good access to JSTOR or some such and it's easy to do, could you forward a copy. I'll find it sometime soon, since SA is a popular journal." ----- Okay. And I'll keep an eye on Grice, "Intentions and Events" (PPQ 1988). I do not have an electronic copy I could forward, just a photocopy _somewhere there_. I'm using 'there' as Edington does in his masterpiece, "Are there atoms out there -- wherever there is". I loved him for that. Bayne: "t is interesting that Eddington would never receive any credit here." Now he _has_; now he _has_. Excellent historical note, Bayne. Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd =febemailfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sun Feb 15 18:41:54 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sun, 15 Feb 2009 15:41:54 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: <200902131629.04431.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <420359.78243.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com> I agree with much of what you say, Roger. But I would mention this: that since Aristotle, more or less, the idea among philosophers is that philosophy, like "the good," is to be pursued for its own sake. Where you might agree with these same people is that the supreme "application" is in how we live our lives. Remember what Plato once said? I think it was in the Republic but I'm not sure. Socrates is asked the following question: "How can you say bad people are not happy? They sure look happy to me!" Some such thing; and then Socrates says something very wise. He says something like: "The price they pay is the life they lead." Now I think the philosophical life, if there is such a thing in this world, brings happiness born out of the practice of its methods of inquiry and deliberation. Here Aristotle was right, and Spinoza (even though he is only? _something_ of an Aristotelian, was right as well), in saying that this sort of activity, to which one's mortal life approximates, has this application: to bring about happiness. The happy life and the good life are conceived in the same "flesh." A happy life may not be a significant life, but the importance of philosophy is not in the significance of its application, but in the perfection of the character of those pursuing it for its own sake. The alternative, which is very commonly accepted these days, is to say that philosophy is a form of instruction, to be applied in making a better world. There may, here, be a difference in emphasis only. By the way, EVERYONE: Look at Roger has done with the archives at: http://rbjones.com/pipermail/hist-analytic_rbjones.com/ Click those blue "jiggers." This is the best single improvement in Hist-Analytic since it inception. Thanks, again, Roger Bishop Jones! Steve Bayne --- On Fri, 2/13/09, Roger Bishop Jones wrote: From: Roger Bishop Jones Subject: Re: Clarity Is Not Enough To: Jlsperanza at aol.com Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Date: Friday, February 13, 2009, 11:29 AM Whether clarity is enough must surely be a very personal matter. This is analogous to the question whether pure mathematicians should care about the applicability of their work, the not caring having been vigorously defended by Hardy in his "A Mathematician's Apology". I have no problem with philosophers or mathematicians who are happy to pursue pure research without consideration of its applicability, but I am not among them. I am afflicted by various disabilities (quite a lot of them) which include needing to have a sense of the purpose of any work which I am doing, and not thinking that the analysis of ordinary language is for me sufficient purpose. For those of us with this problem, Austin's suggestion that we need only consider greater purposes once we have achieved clarity in some matters, is of little help. One thing which seems to me clear is that most worthwhile purposes depend upon secondary objectives which if conducted thoroughly on their own account will consume many lifetimes without finding an end, and which therefore, if they are not to completely divert attention from ones true purpose, must be conducted to the minimum extent sufficient for that purpose. I will happily coexist with people of different talents and temper. so long as they do not get in my way. Austin does. His book "Sense and Sensibilia" seems to me to be a sustained attempt to deny philosophers that flexibility in the use of language which is normal in any specialised undertaking. Roger Jones -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Feb 15 19:53:19 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 15 Feb 2009 19:53:19 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Clarity Is Not Enough Message-ID: Indeed, R. B. Jones's files _very_ impressive, and I'm 'in the train of', as the French say, see if I can get a mailer which allows me to sub-thread things. This in reply to Bayne in reply to Jones: In a message dated 2/15/2009 6:43:45 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: in saying that this sort of activity, to which one's mortal life approximates, has this application: to bring about happiness. ---- It should also pay to revisit what H. H. Price was _meaning_ when he said, "Clarity is not enough". Lewis used that as title of his compilation, whose contents I have not been able to see. Apparently, it has Price's reprinted. The quote by J. L. Austin I found elsewhere. ---- Compilers to the Lewis book include: H H Price, C. D. Broad, B. Blanshard, W. V.Quine, William Calvert Keale, A.C.Ewing, Max Black, Peter Heath, E.Harris, ... The Price piece is "Joint Session" Mind/Aristotelian Society, for 1945 -- just when the dons were coming from the trenches! --- And Austin's quote is from "A plea for excuses" (Aristotelian, 1956) -- after ten fruitful years, some say, of linguistic botanising... In his online notes on "Plea for Excuses" Jones writes: "In particular, since I doubt there is any limit to how long one can continue this kind of investigation, I would be looking for some clues about how much is enough, and when and how we reap the rewards. Austin shows no signs of caring. He seems so fascinated by this kind of investigation that I doubt he would ever stop to ask whether there is any benefit beyond the discovery of further subtleties in language." I love Jones's concerns about the 'enough'. As my aunt would say, "More than enough is too much". And surely some say the Austinians overdid it a bit! "Enough" is a concept that needs pleonetetic (I think it's the word Geach coined) treatment. We need a 'standard', or 'measure'. So 'clarity is enough' _is_ problematic, but so is 'clarity is _not_ enough'. Before I review Jones's considerations, I was thinking that perhaps Price would be annoyed by someone going: A: Do you believe in the immortality of the soul? Is there a life after life? B: Define your terms! That's hardly clear! A: It _is_ pretty clear. Do you believe that the mind is immortal? B: You said soul! A: mind, say. Do you believe that when your body rots, there's a soul that --- oops --- goes above and joins the featherly choir? B: Don't be disrespectful -- A discussion like that may be a matter of 'clarity', but it seems that the philosopher who is only an 'elucidator' may try to 'wash his hands' from this one, and keep on focusing on clearing off the ground as a way to _avoid_ giving the philosophical answer: (i) Yes, the soul is immortal, or (ii) the soul is not immortal. Grice had a student at Oxford, called 'Shropshire". Shropshire claimed to have proved the immortality of the soul (Grice retells in "Aspects of Reasoning") by means of a syllogistic: "if you cut off a chicken's head, the chicken will run round the yard for a quarter of an hour before dropping". ---- As Grice notes, there are various appeals for clarity here: 1. soul-dependency on the body. 2. soul-dependency on the _part_ of the body in which soul is 'located'. 3. Assumption -- false? that the soul is located in the 'head'. 4. assumption that the soul is 'destroyed' if head rendered inoperative by removal from the rest of the body. 5. What if the soul is _not_ located in the 'head'? 6. In fact, the fact that the chicken 'runs round the yard' _means_ the chicken is 'animated' by an 'anima', soul. There are further problems that need some further 'clarification': 7. Why assume that the chicken's soul is _immortal_ though, just because it is not located in the body? 8. Why assume that what's good for the chicken applies to _humans_ too? Grice notes that Shropshire was a 'drop-out' from Oxford. And I wouldn't be surprised if it was people like H. H. Price who dropped him! ---- Back to Jones: "In particular, since I doubt there is any limit to how long one can continue this kind of investigation, ..." I fear to state this, because I do not be on Roger's _way_, but one anecdote that fascinated from reading Warnock's "Saturday Mornings" (these dons smoked so much during those mornings -- Warnock died of lung cancer, and Grice of emphysema). Warnock recalls, "Yes, it was a matter of temperament; we could be _hours_ to no end doing the linguistic botanising; these were informal meetings. Meeting with Austin for a _serious_ seminar was an altogether 'harder' experience!" -- but there is also the idea of 'personal loyalty about yourself'. Grice did change, but Warnock remained the linguistic botaniser to his latest! Jones: "I would be looking for some clues about how much is enough" Good point. More than enough is too much. So much I can tell. In _my_ case, I'm never tired, because this is conducted in some sort of English! Would find it pretty boring in my vernacular! ---- Jones: "and when and how we reap the rewards. Austin shows no signs of caring. He seems so fascinated by this kind of investigation that I doubt he would ever stop to ask whether there is any benefit beyond the discovery of further subtleties in language." ----- Well, behind that facade, there was a suffering man! He too died of cancer! And he would not any other _don_ know about it. It really _was_ a shock to them all. But apparently, Austin dreamed of a 'science of language' (as fragments of "Plea" testifies). Recall this is _ages_ ago! It was a parochial attitude. We should also recall that Austin was "White's professor of moral Philosophy", so perhaps he thought that _that_ office (the higher ever held by a member of the playgroup) was more than 'enough', and that he could dedicate the rest of his time to enjoyable linguistic botanising. I'm not familiar as to how Chairs Work in Oxford. Apparently, you don't have to _attend_ them! But I would think he was enough of a 'bureaucrat' to see himself as just that! The papers for the magazines (if magazines they can be called) were more for the _fun_ of it. Grice was not a professor at Oxford, just a 'university lecturer', and whatever they thought was _enough_ or not enough could vary with each student or tutee they had. I could imagine they having some 'thick' ones who could do with some 'clarity' in sufficient quantities! Cheers, J. L. **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Feb 15 23:55:09 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 15 Feb 2009 23:55:09 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Clarity Is Not Enough Message-ID: What a volume. Still unable to check the original contents. But contributors, with closure, appear to be: H. H. Price Wykeham professor of Logic, Oxford. b. Wales. "Clarity is not enough" (originally PAS, 1945). C. D. Broad Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge -- views cited by Grice, 'Personal Identity'. Brand Blanshard Willard Van Orman Quine Professor of Philosophy, Harvard -- visited Grice/Strawson while in Oxford, but won't let pass one opportunity to publish his views against Austin! William Calvert Kneale Are necessary truths true by convention. Apparently his paper is. Which is good, to elaborate what Poincare was meaning! A. C. Ewing Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge. Max Black Son of a British expatriate diplomat in Russia. Very intelligent. Will publish on "Grice on meaning" -- later criticised by Martinich: "Black on Grice on Meaning", Dialectica. Peter Heath, Professor of Philosophy, Bristol? -- wrote on Alice in Wonderland. Apparently, born in Italy! (Firenze) E. E. Harris C. A Campbell W. F. R. Hardie Grice's tutor -- lovingly recollected in "The life and opinions of Paul Grice". I wish all tutors were so lovingly recollected as Hardie was. Hardie taught Grice many things, like to play golf. He was only tutor at Corpus Christi, were Grice was the undergrad. Besides Hardying, Grice joined the Pelicans -- the Corpus Christi football team; he also found time to edit the undergrad philo magazine, called, 'The Pelican'. Urmson published in "The Pelican" a review of Hardie's book ever: Aristotle's Ethical Theory. C. K. Grant Excellent author. Obscure. Wrote "Pragmatic Implication" for _Philosophy_. Taught at Durham, I think. J. N. Findlay South-African born philosopher. Very witty. Sir Stuart Newton Hampshire, born Lincolnshire -- did attend some of the 'playgroup' meetings, but not a lot (he wanted to 'move on'). Was a member of an earlier playgroup that met at Berlin's rooms in All Souls, before the war -- see Berlin, "Austin and the early beginnings of Oxford philosophy", in "Essays on Austin", ed. Fann. Discussed with Grice methodological issues of 'analytic philosophy' or 'linguistic philosophy' in APA symposiums. Married to Nancy Cartwright whom she met at Stanford? H. D. Lewis compiler A. J. Ayer 'enfant terrible' of Oxford during the 1930s, attended playgroup meetings with Austin, Ayer, McNabb, etc in All Souls with Berlin. Left Oxford for London, where he became Grote professor of the philosophy of mind. Came back to Oxford with a vengeance to become Wkyeham professor of Logic. Charming fellow -- and verificationist to the day of his death! -------- Another thing to consider, Price, "Clarity is not enough" ----- implicature: but it _is_ necessary. Post-modern reaction: "Clarity is not enough, _nor_ necessary": 'leave the student with the obscurities he wants to keep'. If my account is too much 'student-centred', it should not be. I do not think Price is thinking that _clarity_ *is* necessary/sufficient analysis of a concept. But I would think that is what people like Grice would think it is. When Grice attempts analysis of 'I', he however notes: "Critics may think my analysis is wrong since it hardly _clarifies_ on a pretty intuitive notion such as "I", in fact, provides an analysans which is so long that it reeks of _wrong_. But I think this objection is too silly to be taken seriously. Now the next..." Finally, Austin's rebuke reconsidered (PAS, 1956) -- repr. in Philosophical Papers: "[Granted], clarity [may] be not enough; but, perhaps, it will be time to go into this when [and if -- JLS] we are within measurable distance of achieving clarity on some matter." So perhaps it's not fair to see Austin's playing with 'excuses' here, because the man was not really directing his efforts to _clarity_ there: it was a brainstorm session, as it were, meant to show the complexity of the problems and the thorny terrain to be dealing with. I think Austin wanting to be 'achieving clarity on some matter' is when he analyses, say, a speech act into the locutionary act proper -- phatic phemic rhetic from the perlocutionary effect and the illocutionary force. That he was _not_ within measurable distance, poor chap, has been shown inter alii by Cohen ("Do illocutionary forces exist") and in a grand manner by D. Holdcroft (of Leeds), "Problems in the theory of speech acts". I would think his sense and sensibilia is perhaps not too constructive or theory-constructive. But I think there is a book by Grahame, which considers all of Austin's substantive views on issues such as 'knowledge', 'free will', 'action', 'meaning', 'perception', etc. that shows that in the long run, he did contribute to something like philosophical theory. Of course one has, as R. B. Jones has, to read him sympathetically. And not like Ayer, who wrote, "Has Austin refuted the theory of sense data?" with the wrong implicature: "Nay -- only confused it for us a bit further"! Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Feb 16 06:52:15 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2009 06:52:15 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Analysis and Deflation Message-ID: Further to remarks about the place of these 'revolutionaries' -- as I call the playgroup led by senior J. L. Austin [b. 1911- he would _not_ admit anyone older in the playgroup -- talk of 'bossy'] -- one (me) sometimes hear 'deflationary' used perhaps in connection to their views. They don't look deflationary to me, but a search in the OED brings me face to face with this quote (was this R. Hall?) from a delightful little book by the (as he then wasn't) Vice-Chancellor of Oxford: "The contemporary philosopher's eye is characteristically cold and his pen, perhaps, apt to be employed as an instrument of deflation." G. J. Warnock, English Philosophy since 1900, 1958, p. 173. I see I don't necessarily buy this low-value coin! If anything Grice seems to _inflate_ meaning-constitutive utterer's intentions to the _limit_! -- Geoffrey James Warnock, born Leeds, 1924, was perhaps one of the youngest in the group. They did have to be 'full-time' (I think) tutors employed by the university to qualify as 'Saturday morningers'. Pears was perhaps younger, though. Note that Warnock wrote this before he would engage with Urmson in the publication of Austin's philosophical papers that would make a _difference_ in the reception of this type of analytic philosophy world-wide (for who subscribes to Arist. Society?) and still before he would edit the Sense and Sensibilia out of the manuscript notes. It seems, following "The strange death of ordinary-language philosophy", it was already dead (with Austin, d. 1960) before it was born to, to echo S. Bayne, 'the masses'! -- Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Feb 16 09:01:09 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2009 09:01:09 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] "It is not a revolt, it is a revolution" Message-ID: The Futilitarian Turn I _do_ think Grice does use 'revolution' in "Life and Opinions of Paul Grice" but I'd need to check. In any case, I thought there _was_ a book by someone called "The linguistic revolution", but apparently there isn't. I was provoked to find more about this vis a vis our discussion of Lakatos and paradgim-shift. Three notes on 'revolution' in the OED may amuse: 1685 EVELYN Diary 22 May, I chanced to pass just as execution was doing on Oates. A strange revolution! 1837 CARLYLE Fr. Rev. V. vii. (1872) I. 174 ?Sire?, answered Liancourt, ?it is not a revolt, it is a revolution?. 1892 Speaker 3 Sept. 278/1 In Uruguay it is said that revolution is kept down only by the army. ---- O. T. O. H., there's Rorty and his 'linguistic turn'. Now, re-reading his thing, I note he is borrowing the 'coinage' (he calls it) from Gustav Spare-me-them-English-futilitarians Bergmann, p. 177 of his 1964 book published by University of Wisconsin Press at Madison, "Logic and Reality". Bergmann, "the movement is futilitarian". "the futility and the futilitarianism" In this case, apparently not a coinage: 1827 SOUTHEY in C. C. Southey Life & Corr. V. 290 If the Utilitarians would reason and write like you, they would no longer deserve to be called Futilitarians. Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Feb 16 12:34:17 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2009 12:34:17 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] The Many and the Wise Message-ID: S. R. Bayne is considering the 'scope' of 'qua' mentioned by Anscombe in her expansion of 'under a description', in particular in terms of subject or predicate scope in terms of Aristotle's syllogistics in Analytica Priora, 49a. A not so irrelevant excursus, I hope. One point of agreement or overlap between what Grice calls "Oxonian dialectics" and "Athenian dialectics" -- in his 'Valediction' in WOW -- concerns the distinction, often made between i and ii i. the many (hoi polloi) ii. the wise Ordinary-language philosophers are not, Grice seems to be stating, necessarily concerned _only_ with 'the many', or more specifically with 'ta legomena' (the sayings, what is being said' of or by the Many. The purpose of the activity should be an elucidation of the 'legomenon' -- at least one, let's say -- of the 'wise'! In this respect, in "Life and Opinions of [myself]", Grice notes that Austin was sometimes not fully _consistent_: philosophically, he was into the legomena of the many, as it were -- which you need to be armed with the right type of patience, as R. B. Jones testify. On the other hand, meta-philosoph ically, or _methodologically_, Austin was known to include the technical (i.e. not a legomenon by hoi polloi) term every now and then (witness his 'per-locution', 'il-locution', 'phatic' act, etc. Nothing extra-ordinary, but perhaps _so_. (Incidentally, I once came across reading Cicero, in the Loeb for the Latin for 'extra-ordinary' versus, say, _ordinary_ language -- what has _order_ to do with anything?). The same, Grice seems to be saying, ditto for Aristotle. The problem is that perhaps we shouldn't be wasting our time on a technical legomenon when there are so many 'ordinary' ones that provide so much more pleasure. And I refer to the 'qua' of Aristotle! For what is worth, Allan Back -- as summarised his views in formalontology web pages -- seem to go with Anscombe: Baeck writes: I offer truth conditions for [qua] propositions in Aristotle. I show that in general Aristotle views expressions of the form "qua S" in i or ii S qua S is P S is P qua S as making a claim not about the subject "S", but about the *predication* of "P" of "S". I develop necessary and sufficient truth conditions for propositions of the form "S qua S is P". A. B?ck in Idealization: Historical Studies on Abstraction and Idealization. Ed. F. Coniglione et al. Amsterdam: Rodopi 2004. pp. 37-58 But of course we are not just interested in the somewhat vacuous S qua S but in A qua B --- I was thinking indeed in Porphyry's tree. For an Aristotelian, there is indeed a chain of being. For 'man' there are not so many infinite things we can say, 'man qua rational', 'man qua animal', man qua 'being', etc. Aquinas apparently does use 'qua' but also 'in quantum' ('ens inquantum ens' say). The idea being indeed, perhaps that it's a _formal_ examination, not a _material_ one. But my point remains: i. if it _is_ a turn of phrase coined by Aristotle, that no ordinary Greek speaker need to have recourse to, ii. Can it be _basic_ philosophically speaking? iii. Or we would need to trust Aristotle and the other wise, that here we have a case where it's not what the many say or fail to say, but what the wise are trying to teach them! Cheers, JL Refs: Code, Alan. Aristotle, in PGRICE Grice, Multiplicity of being in Aristotle, PPQ 1989 Owen, The snares of ontology (reviewed by Grice above) **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Mon Feb 16 16:04:46 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2009 13:04:46 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Compiling an Anthology Message-ID: <465169.11124.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com> I've been thinking about putting together an anthology. Why not? This would be on the history of analytical philosophy. When I first started thinking about it it seemed like an easy thing to do. But now I'm not even sure of my goals. The most gratifying thing about Hist-Analytic has been the number of countries served. They come from every U.N. member country, with only a few exceptions, usually where the cite is blocked. The system is globally viable and now with an Archive things are even better. So I don't want to "screw up" Hist-Analytic by putting the stuff on it in an anthology. The book would sell and Hist-Analytic would be redundant. I figured on two options: a comprehensive anthology or a specialized anthology on action theory, bringing in James, Bradley, Shand, etc, up to Davidson. But then I got to thinking about a more ambitious anthology being more useful etc. Here there are two options, at least, within this option. One is to include few long essays with greater generality of content; or, second, to have many shorter essays spanning a wider field, also. For example, on the one hand Chpt. 2 of Word and Object would be good, but it's long. But what about an anthology that includes short, seldom read papers. Take "Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers." Much fuss has resulted from Lowenheim/Skolem in Putnam and Quine and others. But in this little essay there is, I think, the basis for a firm intuitive understanding of what is at issue (the "proxy function" etc) If anyone has any suggestions on content, length, marketability, etc. let me know. Regards Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Mon Feb 16 17:17:51 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2009 22:17:51 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: <420359.78243.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <420359.78243.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <200902162217.51490.rbj@rbjones.com> Steve, On Sunday 15 February 2009 23:41:54 steve bayne wrote: > I agree with much of what you say, Roger. But I would mention this: > that since Aristotle, more or less, the idea among philosophers is > that philosophy, like "the good," is to be pursued for its own sake. Actually, when it comes to "clarity is enough" I would be happy to accept "applications" in philosophy. I would add however, that making language precise is something which is most often done with some purpose in mind (i.e. the purpose of the language in question), that purpose usually being the advancement of our knowledge of the matters which the language enables us to talk about. The evolution of language goes hand in hand with advances in knowledge. In this process however, the increase in clarity and precision does not consist in a better understanding of how the relevant language works. It consists in the evolution of language so that the kinds of thing which one needs to talk about in the present day research dialogue can be clearly expressed. It is the exception rather than the rule, that there is merit in clarification of old rather than of some preferred new usage. This seems to me to undermine the value of the attitude towards language which Austin presents. To understand perception, we need extra-ordinary language. Austin seemed to me to be standing against such developments in language for philosophical purposes (at least sofar as "Sense and Sensibilia" testifies, though Austin did pay lip service to a more liberal viewpoint elsewhere). > Where you might agree with these same people is that the supreme > "application" is in how we live our lives. This I agree with, but I'm not so sure that the enunciation of a "philosophical way of life" is the way to go. I'm also inclined to aknowledge that philosophical contributions to "how we live" mostly come from philosophical ideas which don't strictly belong to "analytic" philosophy. Roger From baynesrb at yahoo.com Mon Feb 16 20:44:44 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2009 17:44:44 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: <200902162217.51490.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <323441.93790.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Roger (and all others, of course), If you can find an application for philosophy, that would be very good. But, generally, in my opinion when it has been used as a tool for some other interest than itself it has resulted in a great deal of harm. A lot depends on what you take philosophy to be. This area of interest is sometimes called, inappropriately, "metaphilosophy." Again, it is only part of my experience and, maybe, not others that those who are quickest to apply it understand it least. This isn't always the case, but it more often than not seems to be the case. It is not an argument against applying philosophy that it is usually done by folks who use the name "philosophy" for reasons of their own interest, but which they believe everyone else ought to be interested in, even though it is not, itself, philsophical: philosophy as providing a veneer of respectability for ideas that, typically, lack merit. This I think is the history. A related point is one I brought up to a young person trained in physics who was deciding on whether to do philosophy of science, and here you might think of this as "applied" philosophy in some sense. I told him that it seemed to me that he might be gifted at both philosophy and physics, but that he ought not attempt to do physics vicariously through philosophy; nor should he do philosophy by pretending that ideas in physics were, actually, ideas in philosophy. I am bias here. I think, for example, that if you can do the basics of, for example, the special and general theory of relativity, some probability, and a dash of logic, you can probably do all you need or can do in one lifetime in philosophy of science. But I, as was Gustav Bergmann, am suspicioius of these philosophies "of": philosophy of science; philosophy of mind; philosophy of art, etc. But I respect the other point of view. It's just my own position. I agree with you on much of what you say about language, with the following qualifications. Looking at a linguistic construction and getting clear on its logical properties can be quite valuable as well as interesting. I often harp about propositional attitudes ("what a waste; what a waste") but the logical and semantical issues these construction to be uncovered can be intensely interesting. (See L. Linsky's last couple of books, all worth reading). But the semantics of the attitudes is just one instance. Grice's notion of "doubt or denial" in his essay on perception is very useful; quite ingenious and puts the issue in a different framework, as do his remarks on "detachability" and "cancellability." I can't go into these in an email; but if you look carefully, you will see a lot of interesting things here. Same way with Austin. Austin's ideas on performatives and constatives; his changing views on these matters, and his careful dissection of the speech act has led to some good insights, although Austin is, while most likely one of the best of the "ordinary language" philosophers of little interest to me. However, his methodology of looking at the possibilities of reasonable combination and permutation of modifiers etc. is rewarding. I was quite surprised one day in discussion with Hintikka to find him more "tolerant" of Derrida than speech act theory. I would have reacted but preferred continued amusement. Hintikka by the way is a philosopher of great fecundity, as I've said before. His views on language and logic are very interesting and besides, he's a "cool guy." Making language precise require certain decision, when language is spoken of as Chomsky would say in terms of performance. With respect to competence, I'm not so sure. But it is performance that interests the clarifiers, at least for the most part and that is why they are not uncommonly speech act theorists. I do take exception to what you say about "old usage." New usage? I'm not sure, actually, what you mean. But anyone, and here I include the "down the road to the bitter end" speech act theorists (to paraphrase Sellars on another topic) that if you want a good look under the hood of "usage" then take a look at Curme's _Syntax_. 1926. Conditionals, counterfactuals, modifiers, are all treated with great thoroughness. Chomsky is a scientist; he is doing something just a bit different, so I pass this by. Finally an important point. This is a sociological conjecture, which I think is true. Those of us who have spent a lot of time thinking about analytic philosophy do not justify our lives in terms of what we can say about, e.g., the semantics of the progressive in terms of Montague grammar -just to take one example (here begin with Cresswell). These very same people would point you in the general direction of Plato. Whatever else may be said about analytical "types," most of us hold the Phaedo very close to our hearts. Therein lies the hope of philosophy beyond application or social relevance etc. Best wishes Steve --- On Mon, 2/16/09, Roger Bishop Jones wrote: From: Roger Bishop Jones Subject: Re: Clarity Is Not Enough To: baynesrb at yahoo.com Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Date: Monday, February 16, 2009, 5:17 PM Steve, On Sunday 15 February 2009 23:41:54 steve bayne wrote: > I agree with much of what you say, Roger. But I would mention this: > that since Aristotle, more or less, the idea among philosophers is > that philosophy, like "the good," is to be pursued for its own sake. Actually, when it comes to "clarity is enough" I would be happy to accept "applications" in philosophy. I would add however, that making language precise is something which is most often done with some purpose in mind (i.e. the purpose of the language in question), that purpose usually being the advancement of our knowledge of the matters which the language enables us to talk about. The evolution of language goes hand in hand with advances in knowledge. In this process however, the increase in clarity and precision does not consist in a better understanding of how the relevant language works. It consists in the evolution of language so that the kinds of thing which one needs to talk about in the present day research dialogue can be clearly expressed. It is the exception rather than the rule, that there is merit in clarification of old rather than of some preferred new usage. This seems to me to undermine the value of the attitude towards language which Austin presents. To understand perception, we need extra-ordinary language. Austin seemed to me to be standing against such developments in language for philosophical purposes (at least sofar as "Sense and Sensibilia" testifies, though Austin did pay lip service to a more liberal viewpoint elsewhere). > Where you might agree with these same people is that the supreme > "application" is in how we live our lives. This I agree with, but I'm not so sure that the enunciation of a "philosophical way of life" is the way to go. I'm also inclined to aknowledge that philosophical contributions to "how we live" mostly come from philosophical ideas which don't strictly belong to "analytic" philosophy. Roger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Feb 16 22:04:37 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2009 22:04:37 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] The History of Analytic *Meta-*Philosophy! Message-ID: In a message dated 2/16/2009 8:54:41 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: A lot depends on what you take philosophy to be. This area of interest is sometimes called, inappropriately, "metaphilosophy." --- I too agree: inappropriately. A. Marsoobian (whom I met) edits the Metaphilosophy for Blackwell. The phrase is ambiguous, perhaps in a good way, in that it could include, in theory: -- psychological/sociological views on what philosophy is. The prefix 'meta-' is of course Greek, but we never know what Aristotelians meant by that ('ta meta ta physika' the things beyond the physical things, or as my tutor preferred, 'them books next to the physics books'?). Russell does use 'meta-language' as 'language of language', so in that sense, 'metaphilosophy' would be 'philosophy of philosophy'. God knows! But metaphilosophical considerations of analytic philosophy does not sound _so_ bad! Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Feb 16 22:08:05 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2009 22:08:05 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Analytic Philosophy Lacks A Subject Matter Message-ID: And a jolly good thing that is, too! In a message dated 2/16/2009 8:54:41 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: But I, as was Gustav Bergmann, am suspicioius of these philosophies "of": philosophy of science; philosophy of mind; philosophy of art, etc. But I respect the other point of view. It's just my own position. ---- and mine. If I may quote your earlier remark, "Logic lacks a subject matter" I'd say: ditto philosophy! (I qualify 'analytic' because with Sartreans you never know!) Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Feb 16 22:00:14 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2009 22:00:14 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Extra-Ordinary Language Philosophy Message-ID: In a message dated 2/16/2009 8:54:41 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes in "Re: Clarity Is Not Enough", in reply to R. B. Jones's apt confessions as to what a 'research group' needs in terms of the processes brought about by the analysis of the language the group employs. Bayne: Roger (and all others, of course), --- Must say I loved Roger stating: >To understand perception, we need extra-ordinary language. I _must_ find how Cicero would say that in Latin! But more seriously, in Bayne's pages, there's by courtesy of Aristotelian Society that big great paper by Grice, "Causal Theory of Perception". Omitting the excursus on implicature, Grice gets serious about perception in Part III, then. But what he says will not convince Snowdon (apparently the only serious philosopher taking Grice seriously then). Grice is concerned with the 'causal link' between the sense-datum and whatever triggered the sense-datum. Fortunately, that bit did get reprinted in WOW (he thought the excursus would be redundant vis a vis "Logic and Conversation"). He writes to the effect: the philosopher just needs a _filler_: something that states that there _is_ a causal link. He should not go into details. If this is accepted (i.e. that philosophy of perception is different from _science_ of perception) then I'd like to be illuminated as to what other extra-ordinary language we need! I find 'sense-datum' pretty extra-ordinary myself! Not to mention 'sensibilia'! Bayne was wondering about a compilation. Good ordinary-language philosophy compilation is of course Chappell. But who else did take the expression 'ordinary language' seriously? I don't think Austin did. It was, like "Oxford philosophy", or 'linguistic philosophy' more of a publicity label. And I'm sure that those dons _loved_ to hear what the previous generation (Hardie, etc.) or the extramurals were saying about them! I know _I_ would, time permitting! Cheers, J. L. **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Feb 16 22:18:43 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2009 22:18:43 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Footnotes to Plato Message-ID: In a message dated 2/16/2009 8:54:41 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: Those of us who have spent a lot of time thinking about analytic philosophy do not justify our lives in terms of what we can say about, e.g., the semantics of the progressive in terms of Montague grammar -just to take one example (here begin with Cresswell). These very same people would point you in the general direction of Plato. Whatever else may be said about analytical "types," most of us hold the Phaedo very close to our hearts. ---- So well said. Couldn't but smile (or laugh, even at your Montague grammar example -- plus the biographical advice as to start with Cresswell. But indeed Alfred North Whitehead had it perfect when he said it, "Metaphysics -- Philosophy. What is it but mere footnotes to Plato". And we don't want it _any_ different! Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Feb 16 22:14:51 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2009 22:14:51 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Analysis at Royaumont Message-ID: In a message dated 2/16/2009 8:54:41 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: Same way with Austin. Austin's ideas on performatives and constatives; his changing views on these matters, and his careful dissection of the speech act has led to some good insights, ---- I was doing this thing on 'analytic philosophy' history and came across this quote on the Royaumont (sp?) colloquium, where Anglos and French philosophers talked passed their noses if that's the expression. But the evolution in Austin that Bayne notes is mighty interesting. I was very amused by the details of it all. When Warnock included "Performative Utterances" in Philosophical Papers, he discussed the thing with Urmson, and perhaps had talked about it with Austin himself. Apparently this was a lecture to be delivered in French. By that time, Austin had already changed completely his views on performatives and had arrived at the conclusion that _all_ speech acts had a performative side to it ("I hereby state that the moon is made of cheese"). Yet, he uttered words to the effect: "That as it may be, I think the French may do well in digesting this, my early view -- I don't think they would be too prepared for my "General Theory of Speech Acts" if they didn't have a sprinkle of the "Special Theory of the Performative"! Apparently anybody who was anybody (is this analytic?) in philosophy was there at Royaumont... Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Feb 16 22:32:08 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2009 22:32:08 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] "A Horse -- Does it Look Like A Horse?" Message-ID: In a message dated 2/16/2009 8:54:41 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: Grice's notion of "doubt or denial" in his essay on perception is very useful; quite ingenious and puts the issue in a different framework, as do his remarks on "detachability" and "cancellability." I can't go into these in an email; but if you look carefully, you will see a lot of interesting things here. ---- So true. And one wonders the source of it all. I'm prepared to think it was Witters's solution: "A horse does not look like a horse; he _is_ a horse". In "Valediction" Grice does mention that his motivation for implicature was the examination of some pragmatic vs. logical aspects of sense-datum sentences. The rest is red-pillar box theory! >Grice's notion of "doubt or denial" in his essay on perception is >very useful; quite ingenious and puts the issue in a different >framework, --- Exactly. Because it does seem that when anglos use 'seem' there's that 'doubt or denial' implicated! I tend to believe that it was not like that for the Greeks with their overemphasis on phenomena, phantasmagorias, etc. 'phainetai' was how things appeared, how they shone. Grice is also crucial in considering the very copula: The S is P (the cat is on the mat) The S _seems_ P The S seems to be P Note that 'seems' replaces a 'copula' and basically ranges over _any_ sensorial modality. Quite a trick of a verb if you ask me. It's not like the cat is _seen_ on the mat. Just _seems to be on the mat_. Grice discusses colours which is even trickier. I always thought that the red pillar box Must Seem Red. To be red does not even make sense to me! My professor in philosophy of science (yes I had one) I recall for having introduced me to Tweety: "I believe there seems to be a nice little cat" "There seems to be a cat" "Oh, oh! There is a cat" ----- I think it's Warnock who discusses similar cases of guardedness in "Logic and metaphysics" repr. in Flew, (Blackwell). An excellent essay by Warnock. "There is a lion behind that bush" is bound to trigger different reactions from "There seems to be a lion behind that bush". >Grice's notion of "doubt or denial" in his essay on perception is >very useful; quite ingenious and puts the issue in a different >framework, Because he seems to be targetting Witters: That looks like a horse +> It's not a horse I doubt it's one. Surely that's implicatural! Bayne: >as do his remarks on "detachability" and "cancellability." Exactly. For if the excursus is long, he wants it to be applied to the casus in point, the 'doubt or denial. It is 'detachable' (the implicature is) for there are, fortunately, an open gamut of possibilities of expressing that doubt or denial. Not just 'seem', but 'believe', think, passive voice, parentheticals, etc. So it's not about the _sense_ and reference (alla Frege) of _one_ expression. And it is _cancellable_ in philosophical circumstances mainly: "That horse does look like a horse" When I was watching "Million Dollar Baby" with Hilary Swank and Clint Eastwood, I was being an Austinian-Gricean-Warnockian bit of audience, when I heard the line in the libretto: HILARY: Puajjjj! That smells like bleach! EASTWOOD (calmly) Yes. bleach smells like bleach. Where no implicature is cancelled. It's not cancelled, either, in Valley Girl Speak ("Then we saw, like, a horse, in the field, it was, er, like, a horse" and looked like, like, a horse -- like". "But it _was_ a horse". "Well, like, yes". Old Usage? Ultra-Modern, rather! Cheers, JL -- a friend of mine, no disrespect, used to say that Prince Anne looks like a horse. (I recall we were botanising as to whether you'd say a female is handsome. "Yes, Prince Anne is".). (And she is into horses, so no wonder). ---- as do his remarks on "detachability" and "cancellability." I can't go into these in an email; but if you look carefully, you will see a lot of interesting things here. ---- **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Tue Feb 17 07:51:08 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2009 07:51:08 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Analytic Philosophy Should Be *Entire* Message-ID: Ye, budding analytic philosoher, do not let specialty give you the myopy! I know analytic philosophy being _synthetic_ sounds like a contradictio, but just in terms, not in reality! My last today -- but listers, keep contributing! We need a detailed history of analytic philosophy! (And I'll impose myself a limit of 3 a day -- if no less!) In a message dated 2/16/2009 10:08:05 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, bayne writes in "Clarity is not enough" in reply to Jones: >am suspicioius of these >philosophies "of": philosophy of science; philosophy of mind; >philosophy of art, etc. ---- A simile Grice liked to use here is one that I trust will appeal Bayne: "Philosophy, like virtue, is entire". Grice is concerned with disqualification brought by overqualification! "Meet Mr. Poodle -- our man in nineteeth century aesthetics" or "early modern philosophy" (as the case may be) The moment I'm introduced to a man like that -- at a Philosophy Department -- I know (i) Poodle is being underdescribed and thus maligned (ii) Poddle is _not_ the *good* man for the job! One should also consider different colocations: philosophy of language philosophical linguistics --- ditto Grice would not speak of 'philosophy of mind' but 'philosophical psychology'. His point that this _is_ psychology, and that it should not be focused on just the 'cognitive' as the word 'mind' suggests. For 'morals' it's more difficult! Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Feb 18 09:09:27 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2009 09:09:27 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] A Chronology of 20th Century Analytic Philosophy Message-ID: "Philosophy is entire -- Poodles described as 'our man in early modern philosophy' is maligned: you cannot specialise in one period like that. He being described as 'our man in aesthetics' is equally malignifying. Without our belief (which may be religious in nature) that there _is_, especially, a _longitudinal unity_ of philosophy -- why bother??! "The Years In Between" Is there a _date_ in the history of twentieth century analytic philosophy that you deem _crucial_? Tarski? Lukasiewicz? Geach? Anscombe? Wittgenstein? In the process of compiling a chronology we should be aware that date of publication should be expanded, in a sort of 'catalogue raisonee', to include tidbits about what lapse the publication covers. In the case of Wittgenstein this is particularly noteworthy. Feel free to contribute! In a message dated 2/16/2009 4:06:04 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes in "Compiling an anthology" >Here there are two options, at least, >within this option. One is to include few long essays with greater >generality of content; or, second, to have many shorter essays >spanning a wider field, also. For example, on the one hand >Chpt. 2 of Word and Object would be good, but it's long. But what >about an anthology that includes short, seldom read papers. >Take "Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers." Much >fuss has resulted from Lowenheim/Skolem in Putnam and Quine >and others. But in this little essay there is, I think, the basis for a >firm intuitive understanding of what is at issue (the "proxy function" >etc) >If anyone has any suggestions on content, length, marketability, >etc. let me know. Chronologies are bad! I am just reading bio of Verdi by Boden, and he has this 'chronological table' (events in Verdi's life, other events, etc.) which can make for hard reading! But I was thinking of a chronology of analytic philosophy. Personally, I'd do Aristotle and scholastics -- isn't 'analytic philosophy' dubbed for many, 'the new scholastic'? :)) but inspired by Soames ("Philosophical Analysis in the 20th Century" Princeton) I guess listers for a change can focus on the 20th century! I look at myself and see that all I can provide is a list or checklist as they say, of Grice! So here it goes, bits of it * * * * * The 1940s. Grice was active philosophically in Oxford since the 1930s, and some of his unpublications date from the 1930s. He was impressed by what he 'saw and heard' about Vienna, he recalls in "Life and Opinions". He was a disciplined student with Hardie. 1941. Personal Identity, by Grice. Mind. This was when Mind was edited by Moore and had I think the subtitle, a review of psychology and philosophy", hence the title: 'mind'. 1948. date Grice gives for 'Meaning' in WOW. * * * * * The 1950s 1956. In defense of a dogma (Grice/Strawson) PR -- a reply to Quine's two dogmas of empiricism. 1957. Meaning. PR. By Grice (dated 1948, apparently submitted to PR by Strawson!) 1957. "Metaphysics" (with Pears and Strawson): a rather 'for-the-masses' bit compiled in Pears, "The nature of metaphysics" (London, Macmillan) -- originally one of those 'boring' (my aunt called them) 'third' programmes * * * * * The 1960s * * * * * 1961. Causal theory of perception. Grice. Aristotelian Society. This was a symposium with White (the Australian philosopher) and chaired by Braithwaite in Cambridge. Warnock seems to have been the only one who cared to publish White's reply, poor thing. Austin gets his posthumous "Philosophical Papers" published. 1966. Some remarks about the senses. Grice In R. J. Butler, "Analytic Philosophy". Butler was an Oxonian. And this was a Blackwell title, I think. There's little by way of editorial or introduction. And Grice makes a passing footnote reference to Albritton and O. P. Wood -- the latter of Hereford College. * * * * * * Grice had been appointed Professor of Philosophy at UC/Berkeley in 1967. The 1970s 1971. Intention and uncertainty. Grice. He became a FBA, and this is the annual Henriette Herz (sp?) philosophical trust lecture. Published both in Proceedings and as a separatum by Clarendon Press. Grice makes passing reference to Anscombe, Kenny, Pears, Prichard. Meant to be a sort of reply to the more influential essay Hart/Hampshire on "Intention and _certainty_", Mind. 1975. Logic and conversation, ii. Published in Davidson/Harman (what I call a two-column book, in terms of format). Grice would quote from this rather than the Cole/Morgan same year reprint. 1975b. From the banal to the bizarre: method in philosophical psychology. Addresses APA (Pacific Division -- Presidential Address), now repr. in "Conception of Value". Grice makes passing reference to Ramsey, Ryle, Aristotle, Myro, and Wittgenstein ("No psychological predicates without behaviour"). 1978. Further notes on logic and conversation. iii. In Cole, Pragmatics. Academic Press. * * * * * The 1980s. 1981. Presupposition and conversational implicature. In Cole, Radical Pragmatics. Academic Press. 1982. Meaning revisited. In N. Smith, "Mutual knowledge" a symposium held in Sussex. Academic Press. Repr. in WOW. 1986. 'Life and Opinions of Paul Grice', part of 'Reply to Richards'. 1987. Lot of stuff: "Valediction" etc. 1988. Actions and Events, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 1988. Grice dies in August. * * * * * * posthumous, for another day! I guess a more complete chronology would have dates for _Books_ by Strawson, Hampshire, Austin, Warnock, Hare, Pears, Nowell-Smith, Urmson, Thomson, (etc.). That would restrict us to the 'playgroup' of Saturday morningers. A more complete chronology would add stuff by members of the "other" group, led by Ryle, 'the seniors'. Few of them were 'analytic' in the broad sense, though. "Ordinary language", or "Oxford philosophy" being more appropriate labels. Another chronology would have what I call 'Grice-influential': books by Schiffer ("Meaning", 1972), Fodor, Dennett, ... -------- Then someone would have to provide key dates for Quine and the Quineans, Davidson and the Davidsonians, Dummett and the Dummettians, and some Cambridge stuff, too! ---- Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From sgimbel at gettysburg.edu Wed Feb 18 09:36:46 2009 From: sgimbel at gettysburg.edu (Steven Gimbel) Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2009 09:36:46 -0500 Subject: [hist-analytic] A Chronology of 20th Century Analytic Philosophy In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <9857EBA1D2E32440862737D2C5D0E448084B1FD9@exchacd.ms.gettysburg.edu> Brouwer's lecture at Vienna which had significant tangible effects on the works of at least Godel, Wittgenstein, and Carnap -- all of whom were likely in the room (we know Carnap and Wittgenstein, although there is scholarly debate about whether Godel was present or merely got the notes). -----Original Message----- From: hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com [mailto:hist-analytic-manager at simplelists.com] On Behalf Of Jlsperanza at aol.com Sent: Wednesday, February 18, 2009 9:09 AM To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Subject: A Chronology of 20th Century Analytic Philosophy "Philosophy is entire -- Poodles described as 'our man in early modern philosophy' is maligned: you cannot specialise in one period like that. He being described as 'our man in aesthetics' is equally malignifying. Without our belief (which may be religious in nature) that there _is_, especially, a _longitudinal unity_ of philosophy -- why bother??! "The Years In Between" Is there a _date_ in the history of twentieth century analytic philosophy that you deem _crucial_? Tarski? Lukasiewicz? Geach? Anscombe? Wittgenstein? In the process of compiling a chronology we should be aware that date of publication should be expanded, in a sort of 'catalogue raisonee', to include tidbits about what lapse the publication covers. In the case of Wittgenstein this is particularly noteworthy. Feel free to contribute! In a message dated 2/16/2009 4:06:04 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes in "Compiling an anthology" >Here there are two options, at least, >within this option. One is to include few long essays with greater >generality of content; or, second, to have many shorter essays >spanning a wider field, also. For example, on the one hand >Chpt. 2 of Word and Object would be good, but it's long. But what >about an anthology that includes short, seldom read papers. >Take "Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers." Much >fuss has resulted from Lowenheim/Skolem in Putnam and Quine >and others. But in this little essay there is, I think, the basis for a >firm intuitive understanding of what is at issue (the "proxy function" >etc) >If anyone has any suggestions on content, length, marketability, >etc. let me know. Chronologies are bad! I am just reading bio of Verdi by Boden, and he has this 'chronological table' (events in Verdi's life, other events, etc.) which can make for hard reading! But I was thinking of a chronology of analytic philosophy. Personally, I'd do Aristotle and scholastics -- isn't 'analytic philosophy' dubbed for many, 'the new scholastic'? :)) but inspired by Soames ("Philosophical Analysis in the 20th Century" Princeton) I guess listers for a change can focus on the 20th century! I look at myself and see that all I can provide is a list or checklist as they say, of Grice! So here it goes, bits of it * * * * * The 1940s. Grice was active philosophically in Oxford since the 1930s, and some of his unpublications date from the 1930s. He was impressed by what he 'saw and heard' about Vienna, he recalls in "Life and Opinions". He was a disciplined student with Hardie. 1941. Personal Identity, by Grice. Mind. This was when Mind was edited by Moore and had I think the subtitle, a review of psychology and philosophy", hence the title: 'mind'. 1948. date Grice gives for 'Meaning' in WOW. * * * * * The 1950s 1956. In defense of a dogma (Grice/Strawson) PR -- a reply to Quine's two dogmas of empiricism. 1957. Meaning. PR. By Grice (dated 1948, apparently submitted to PR by Strawson!) 1957. "Metaphysics" (with Pears and Strawson): a rather 'for-the-masses' bit compiled in Pears, "The nature of metaphysics" (London, Macmillan) -- originally one of those 'boring' (my aunt called them) 'third' programmes * * * * * The 1960s * * * * * 1961. Causal theory of perception. Grice. Aristotelian Society. This was a symposium with White (the Australian philosopher) and chaired by Braithwaite in Cambridge. Warnock seems to have been the only one who cared to publish White's reply, poor thing. Austin gets his posthumous "Philosophical Papers" published. 1966. Some remarks about the senses. Grice In R. J. Butler, "Analytic Philosophy". Butler was an Oxonian. And this was a Blackwell title, I think. There's little by way of editorial or introduction. And Grice makes a passing footnote reference to Albritton and O. P. Wood -- the latter of Hereford College. * * * * * * Grice had been appointed Professor of Philosophy at UC/Berkeley in 1967. The 1970s 1971. Intention and uncertainty. Grice. He became a FBA, and this is the annual Henriette Herz (sp?) philosophical trust lecture. Published both in Proceedings and as a separatum by Clarendon Press. Grice makes passing reference to Anscombe, Kenny, Pears, Prichard. Meant to be a sort of reply to the more influential essay Hart/Hampshire on "Intention and _certainty_", Mind. 1975. Logic and conversation, ii. Published in Davidson/Harman (what I call a two-column book, in terms of format). Grice would quote from this rather than the Cole/Morgan same year reprint. 1975b. From the banal to the bizarre: method in philosophical psychology. Addresses APA (Pacific Division -- Presidential Address), now repr. in "Conception of Value". Grice makes passing reference to Ramsey, Ryle, Aristotle, Myro, and Wittgenstein ("No psychological predicates without behaviour"). 1978. Further notes on logic and conversation. iii. In Cole, Pragmatics. Academic Press. * * * * * The 1980s. 1981. Presupposition and conversational implicature. In Cole, Radical Pragmatics. Academic Press. 1982. Meaning revisited. In N. Smith, "Mutual knowledge" a symposium held in Sussex. Academic Press. Repr. in WOW. 1986. 'Life and Opinions of Paul Grice', part of 'Reply to Richards'. 1987. Lot of stuff: "Valediction" etc. 1988. Actions and Events, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 1988. Grice dies in August. * * * * * * posthumous, for another day! I guess a more complete chronology would have dates for _Books_ by Strawson, Hampshire, Austin, Warnock, Hare, Pears, Nowell-Smith, Urmson, Thomson, (etc.). That would restrict us to the 'playgroup' of Saturday morningers. A more complete chronology would add stuff by members of the "other" group, led by Ryle, 'the seniors'. Few of them were 'analytic' in the broad sense, though. "Ordinary language", or "Oxford philosophy" being more appropriate labels. Another chronology would have what I call 'Grice-influential': books by Schiffer ("Meaning", 1972), Fodor, Dennett, ... -------- Then someone would have to provide key dates for Quine and the Quineans, Davidson and the Davidsonians, Dummett and the Dummettians, and some Cambridge stuff, too! ---- Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir =http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%2 6bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Feb 18 10:09:27 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2009 10:09:27 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] A Chronology of 20th Century Analytic Philosophy Message-ID: In reply to S. J. Gimbel's post. Excellent to have S. J. Gimbel's date added: That would be! ... 1928. March 10. (6-7 pm) -- Vienna Hoch Strasse, 34. Brouwer gives a lecture on "Mathematik, Wissenschaft, und Sprache" (now in P. M., OUP, "foundations of mathematics in the 1920s". Gimbel does mention Witt... ("Witters" as L. M. Tapper calls him!) And isn't this a small world. Aune has his delightful 'alumni' talk on Feigl, and I read down: Approaches to Wittgenstein: Collected Papers - Google Books Result by Brian McGuinness - 2002 - Philosophy - 299 pages But on one occasion the eminent Dutch mathematician Brouwer gave a lecture at Vienna and Waismann and Feigl managed to coax Wittgenstein to join them at it. ... books.google.com/books?isbn=041503261X... The debate ensues as to whether Goedel _was_ in the room, or whether he wasn't? Can we prove a negative? Just teasing. Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=fe bemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Feb 19 11:57:02 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2009 11:57:02 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Ground-Breaking Lectures in 20th Century Analytic Philosophy Message-ID: In a message dated 2/18/2009 9:37:14 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, sgimbel at gettysburg.edu writes: Brouwer's lecture at Vienna which had significant tangible effects on the works of at least Godel, Wittgenstein, and Carnap -- all of whom were likely in the room (we know Carnap and Wittgenstein, although there is scholarly debate about whether Godel was present or merely got the notes). ---- As I noted, that would be March 28, 1928. Carnap, Feigl, Waissman, Wittgenstein, in attendance. Brouwer's lecture now available in English (originally German, "Mathematik, Wissenschaft, und Sprache") in P. M., "The foundations of mathematics in the 1920s", Oxford University Press (compilation). Another lecture would be: 1951. "Truth" -- symposium, rather, at Bristol, on 'Truth' -- Austin and Strawson symposiasts. (1951). I never paid much attention to the fact that it was _Bristol_, until I heard one of those analytic philosophers talking of "Bristol, Revisited". 1973. "Truth" "Bristol Revisited" was another symposium now by Leeds-born G. J. Warnock and C. J. F. Williams, (Christopher John Fards W., if you must) Aristotelian Society. -- actually Williams was _first_ symposiast. (1973) Warnock's contribution reprinted in his collection _Language and Morality_: a gem in unashamed Oxford philosophy! But I do not think we do have that many of those "[toponym], Revisited" (which must be punning on Evelyn Waugh), do we? Also, Bristol, we have to admit, is _picturesque_. When Ayer and Cohen did "The Causal Theory of Perception" (Aristotelian, 1978), it would have been otiose to call it, "Cambridge, Revisited", wouldn't it? What _is_ to break the ground? -- Kasher says Grice's theory is a breakthrough, but that's _also_ subjective, if slightly less hateful, right? Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Feb 19 19:20:29 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2009 19:20:29 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] A Dry Martini: Analytic Philosophy -- Method _and_ Content Message-ID: "Suppose I say I attend the APA, to tease the intelligentsia, with a glass of a dry martini in my right hand" apres S. R. B. ---- I was browsing a list of publications and came across one by Chomsky repr. in a book entitled something to the effect, "Inference, Explanation, and other frustrations" (UC/Berkeley, 1992 ed. Earman. And 'frustration' kept me thinking. So I'd post to the forum: ... and _then_ there's the idea that 'analytic philosophy' (so-called) is not to do with "content" but with "method". Ain't _that_ frustrating?! But it's the post-analytic credo! In a way, the 'post-analytic' [sic -- I use the term as a noun] is right. He says that any theory about the _content_ is laden ('theory-laden', even) by a theory about _methodology_. While people like Grice (as R. B. Jones reports in his webpages -- specifically his commentary on Grice on 'conceptual analysis and the province of philosophy' now in WOW) would say that they are ever so willing to engage in the conceptual elucidation of _any_ concept you name, how many _actual_ cases of such generosity of spirit do we have in the literature!? The one I can think of is Grice's engaging description of what Shropshire may have meant when he said, "Hey, the soul is immortal -- a chicken runs around after the head's chopped off, no?" Grice's elaboration on this may be viewed as an analysis of the concept, 'the soul is immortal'. It involves: --- analysis of what we mean by 'soul'? Not necessarily. Operational replacement: 'animation': ability to move. --- anaysis of what we mean by 'generation' and corruption? Not necessarily. Operational replacement: the 'body' as _placement_ of the soul. etc. I wish I could paste Shropshire's reasoning, but it's pdf and I guess I'm too lazy today to copy it out! But I'd be curious as to what other notions one may think as 'not really _received_' philosophically speaking, but which _have_ received a sort of 'philosophical analysis'. On the other hand, it may be said -- and Grice was proud in saying this -- that, you get together a bunch of talented philosophers (like Grice, Austin, Strawson, Warnock, Urmson, Nowell-Smith, Hare, Hart, Pears, -- to name the ones he lists in 'Reply to Richards') and you'll _bound_ (Grice uses words to this effect) to find some _diversity_ of views. By this he was opposing to the typically 'Continental' (he thought -- :-)) view that "Oxford philosophy" was _monolithic_. And he _is_ right: we have within view the determinist, the libertarian, the mechanist, the causalist, the ... and this variety for any "philosophy of" you can name! ---- If 'method' and 'content' are indeed _separable_ then perhaps as historians of analytic philosophy we should also be able to separate ourselves from the 'dogmas' not of empiricism but of the Middle Class! I think it was somewhere I read (but then I'm reading too much about verista opera) that it's the middle class or burgeoisie that is to blame. New sensitivities, realism, positivism, etc. This was okay au fin de siecle. But then came the Vienna Circlers and not happy what with Comte had _said_ about 'positivism' came with a "new", 'logical' one! Unfortunately, 'verificationism' fares none any better! Why, look at what Popper says about the _priority_ of *falsificationism* rather! (But then he would rather be seen dead than described as one 'engaged in philosophical [i.e. conceptual] analysis'! Fascinating history, analytic philosophy -- who said it was _dry_? (Not Bayne, although he did mention a dry martini, no?) Cheer, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Thu Feb 19 20:04:07 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2009 17:04:07 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] A Dry Martini: Analytic Philosophy -- Method _and_ Content In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <122748.87649.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Yes, I may have said this, but the last time I went to an APA meeting I needed a lot of martinis to forget what I'd seen! Good grief, even in St. Louis meetings it wasn't uncommon to hear Kaplan, Castenada, Lewis, Sellars, Chisholm, Bergmann, Marcus,? Findlay, and a couple of list subscribers to this list etc. The last time I went to what was called the Western Division, which was in fact in the midwest the topics were just terrible, in my opinion. By night's end I was seeking stimulation among for the personalists (some weird group that was always around but no one seemed to know what they believed) but would have settled with the "process philosophers," which I now count myself as being among. I might add that the Bertrand Russell Society from time to time has some good speakers on philosophical topics. A smart grad student would best turn in the direction of the "unofficial" groups like this, perhaps, than muck in with the mass of flesh crowding the guys who write the recommendations. Don't think they don't love it. I don't want to sound too cynical. There is a great deal to admire in a young person who pursues philosophy not knowing where his next meal is coming. One thing the "old guard" had was passion, real passion. Another thing, was that there were "characters." I think Anscombe was one of the last "characters." Castenada, maybe (who had about as much passion for the field as Plato) Most worthwhile philosophers these days APPEAR ?to be in it because they "happen to be good at it." By the way, verificationism has a terrific intellectual history, going back a good way further than Ayer. The ties to pragmatism, the link to Russell's priniciple of acquaintance are, also,? rich and well worth the effort to study. Sorry about not answering more posts. I'm in a "full run" to finish the Anscombe book. Her "On Sensations of Positions" _Analysis_ 1962 is thought provoking. The more I look how she set her sites on Descartes the more I'm puzzled. She and Kenny and others view the private language argument in Witt as an attack on Descartes. I don't recall a single citation in Wittgenstein, even the minor works, of Descartes. One may be there, but I don' t think so. Funny, Strawson in his review of Phil Investigation remarks something like "all roads lead to the private language argument." And no one reference to Descartes in Wittgenstein. He argues against Descartes through Russell and the notion of direct acquaintance. Look at the paper by Anscombe on sensations. There are tensions within the corpus of work that seeks amity with the later Wittgenstein. I may regret my rhetorical excess to a degree in some of my above remarks, but It's great not having to answer to anyone! In academia. The "fear" is always there no matter how high up the greasy pole you climb, or so it seems - sometimes. Regards --- On Thu, 2/19/09, Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: From: Jlsperanza at aol.com Subject: A Dry Martini: Analytic Philosophy -- Method _and_ Content To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Date: Thursday, February 19, 2009, 7:20 PM "Suppose I say I attend the APA, to tease the intelligentsia, with a glass of a dry martini in my right hand" apres S. R. B. ---- I was browsing a list of publications and came across one by Chomsky repr. in a book entitled something to the effect, "Inference, Explanation, and other frustrations" (UC/Berkeley, 1992 ed. Earman. And 'frustration' kept me thinking. So I'd post to the forum: ... and _then_ there's the idea that 'analytic philosophy' (so-called) is not to do with "content" but with "method". Ain't _that_ frustrating?! But it's the post-analytic credo! In a way, the 'post-analytic' [sic -- I use the term as a noun] is right. He says that any theory about the _content_ is laden ('theory-laden', even) by a theory about _methodology_. While people like Grice (as R. B. Jones reports in his webpages -- specifically his commentary on Grice on 'conceptual analysis and the province of philosophy' now in WOW) would say that they are ever so willing to engage in the conceptual elucidation of _any_ concept you name, how many _actual_ cases of such generosity of spirit do we have in the literature!? The one I can think of is Grice's engaging description of what Shropshire may have meant when he said, "Hey, the soul is immortal -- a chicken runs around after the head's chopped off, no?" Grice's elaboration on this may be viewed as an analysis of the concept, 'the soul is immortal'. It involves: --- analysis of what we mean by 'soul'? Not necessarily. Operational replacement: 'animation': ability to move. --- anaysis of what we mean by 'generation' and corruption? Not necessarily. Operational replacement: the 'body' as _placement_ of the soul. etc. I wish I could paste Shropshire's reasoning, but it's pdf and I guess I'm too lazy today to copy it out! But I'd be curious as to what other notions one may think as 'not really _received_' philosophically speaking, but which _have_ received a sort of 'philosophical analysis'. On the other hand, it may be said -- and Grice was proud in saying this -- that, you get together a bunch of talented philosophers (like Grice, Austin, Strawson, Warnock, Urmson, Nowell-Smith, Hare, Hart, Pears, -- to name the ones he lists in 'Reply to Richards') and you'll _bound_ (Grice uses words to this effect) to find some _diversity_ of views. By this he was opposing to the typically 'Continental' (he thought -- :-)) view that "Oxford philosophy" was _monolithic_. And he _is_ right: we have within view the determinist, the libertarian, the mechanist, the causalist, the ... and this variety for any "philosophy of" you can name! ---- If 'method' and 'content' are indeed _separable_ then perhaps as historians of analytic philosophy we should also be able to separate ourselves from the 'dogmas' not of empiricism but of the Middle Class! I think it was somewhere I read (but then I'm reading too much about verista opera) that it's the middle class or burgeoisie that is to blame. New sensitivities, realism, positivism, etc. This was okay au fin de siecle. But then came the Vienna Circlers and not happy what with Comte had _said_ about 'positivism' came with a "new", 'logical' one! Unfortunately, 'verificationism' fares none any better! Why, look at what Popper says about the _priority_ of *falsificationism* rather! (But then he would rather be seen dead than described as one 'engaged in philosophical [i.e. conceptual] analysis'! Fascinating history, analytic philosophy -- who said it was _dry_? (Not Bayne, although he did mention a dry martini, no?) Cheer, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Feb 19 21:04:24 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2009 21:04:24 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] The problem with Molyneux Message-ID: -- is that he was French, like Descartes (just joking!) -- and he was Irish, rather! Or some remarks about the senses. "if a man born blind can feel the differences between shapes such as spheres and cubes, could he similarly distinguish those objects by sight if given the ability to see?" cited by Grice, Some remarks about the senses. The Smell of Onions: Some Historical References in the Philosophy Literature. Have you noticed that onions do not smell the way they used to? In a message dated 2/19/2009 8:05:29 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes in "Re: A Dry Martini" Look at the paper by Anscombe on sensations. ---- I did! Oh my God! Actually, not the paper, but some online notes I found on pdf. by someone who took the trouble to copy out each example by Anscombe replying this person criticising her _Intention_. Anscombe focuses on 'legs crossed'. I hardly cross my legs. I think it's a feminine thing. Have you noticed how _unfeminine_ females look when they _don't_? I enjoyed Anscombe's discussion of 'sensation of X'. This predates Grice, "Some remarks about the senses" -- it was, as Bayne notes, Analysis 1961 --. But Grice kept ringing in my brain. In "Some remarks about the senses" he has some examples which I found of interest. The Molineaux problem is one of them. Indeed, most of our talk about _sensing_ this or that is *biased*. I enjoyed it (what's the sensation of _it_?) when I learned that his "Causal Theory of Perception" for example was reprinted in Schwartz, "Sensing" philosophy compilation. For some reason, I love that verb, _to sense_. It *is* intense. Yes, Anscombe must be having in mind the language-problem argument. She does mention 'pain' (if _not_ 'pain in the neck'). And she does say that a fact (of the matter, as Bayne would expand) needs to be _shareable_ (unlike my pain in the neck, I would say). The online notes I was reading were pretty inconclusive, alas. ------ Yes, I think Descartes was to blame. Witters may not have quoted him, but he does quote Augustine, no? Same thing! (just joking). I think it was via McGinn (in his contribution to Andrew Woodfield, on representation, Oxford University Press) that I learned of 'methodological solipsism' --. I _have_ read Augustine's passage (that Wittgenstein cites in Philosophical Investigations) and in Latin too, but I forget if Augustine is being a mentalist, a Cartesian _avant la lettre_, or what! ---- I was revising a bibl. list recently and came across a nice motto with Cartesian resonances -- if only that: "I think; therefore I err"! -- talk of _akrasia_ in the theoretical realm! ------ Grice does have a pretty specific "Descartes on clear and distinct perception", but I don't think he was too serious (Grice) about him, as he should. Grice is primarily concerned with the fact that we _do_ use 'certain' (or more commonly, 'Certainly!' -- said _smugly_) even when we don't _know_! I enjoyed Anscombe's description of what it feels to be in a vat, er, ... no. Rather: what it feels to go down an elevator. She says, 'your stomach goes up'. _This_ she says is the 'internal' description. "Going down an elevator" does not really _describe_ anything; it's the trick of thinking of it 'under a description' only. Funny, I would never described the sensation of _vertigo_ as I call it as having to do with my stomach. For one, I think _my_ sensation of vertigo is located (or placed) slightly _higher_ than my stomach. In this same bibl. list I came across another essay with a nice title: "Like me" -- the subtitle: empathy and the knowledge of other minds. The problem is that here we seem to be discussing other people's _stomachs_ rather than minds. Anscombe discusses 'the sky is blue' -- the blue patch of the sensation, and the sensum. I don't _do_ colours. I find them _very_ complicated *philosophically*. My philosophical world is complex enough in black and white! -- but my antipathy for colour problems may have been triggered by having heard Barry Stroud dedicate three hours of my time talking about them! (and citing Hume). On the other hand, in one second, Grice dismisses the problem. In 'Logic and Conversation', ii, or iii, he recalls an example discussed with G. J. Warnock: A: I want to buy a blue tie for Richard. B: This looks like a nice blue tie. A: Blue? That's _green_! --- Grice says (words to the effect): it _is_ okay (and not just sloppy) to say that the tie is green under this light but blue under this other light -- "when there is no question of a real change of colour". Anscombe does go quite a bit on linguistic botanising. I wouldn't say, she says, say "I believed that", but rather, "I would have thought that perhaps...", etc. She notes that 'the sensation of flying' is not realistic, and that the 'sensation of being told a fairy tale' is _otiose_. This reminds me that Warnock was so _happy_ when _he_ thought (Chapman tells us) that, with Grice, they had found a lexical gap in the English language. The gap was filled with a word they brought back from the Latin: the visum This connects with Anscombe. Anscombe speaks of the 'smell of onions' (but what if onions lose their smell -- surely the description is otiose and never as necessary as 'bitter'). And what about the 'visum'. Grice and Warnock thought that if we can say that we smell the smell of onions, surely we can say that we see the visum of onions. Ultimately, Grice and Warnock thought that what they thought was a discovery was a _red_ herring! The smell of onions, the visum of a cow, -- and, it's back to a bitter, dry ("try to describe the aroma of coffee") ... martini. No need to reply to this, S. R. -- relax, and continue with your book. I can telepathise! Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 20 07:27:12 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 07:27:12 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Prof. Strumpell's Wonderful Anaesthetic Boy Message-ID: Verificationism Verified. Wonder is the source of philosophy -- Socrates. William James's anaesthetic boy -- And what he _can_ verify or fail to. "Professor A. Strumpell of his wonderful anaesthetic boy, whose only sources of feeling..." W. James In a message dated 2/19/2009 8:05:29 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: By the way, verificationism has a terrific intellectual history, going back a good way further than Ayer. The ties to pragmatism, the link to Russell's priniciple of acquaintance are, also, rich and well worth the effort to study. ---- Yep. And I forgot to mention in yesterday's post that I was also impressed by Anscombe's reference to 'the anaesthetic boy' in William James (the reviewer cites from p. 769 of the one-volume edition. >verificationism has a terrific ... history. or about the dry martini > I may have said that. But did you _mean_ it? 'Terrific' _now_ means 'excellent', but ask Kripkenstein for a private-language option! I know S. R. Bayne is our resident _expert_ in Americana (American philosophy). Have a close look at the name-drop in the martini post: >Kaplan, Castenada, Lewis, Sellars, >Chisholm, Bergmann, Marcus, Findlay, Impressive! And now he drops for good measure (talking of martinis), >the ties [of verificationism] to pragmatism. By which we mean William James. Indeed, if truth is the useful, I guess they would be interested in 'verify' as almost synonymous with 'to live'! ------ Two quotes from the OED pre-dating Ayer: 1932 M. SCHLICK Gesammelte Aufs?tze (1938) viii. 181 "The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification." 1934 C. I. LEWIS in Philos. Rev. XLIII. 131 "Suppose it maintained that no issue is meaningful unless it can be put to the test of decisive verification." -- this must have been pinched by R. Hall. And some for the quotation of pragmatism with the true: 1898 W. JAMES Philos. Concept. & Pract. Results 5 The principle of practicalism or pragmatism, as he [sc. C. S. Peirce] called it, when I first heard him enunciate it at Cambridge [Mass.] in the early '70s, is the clue..by following which..we may keep our feet upon the proper trail. ---- 1906 Academy 4 Aug. 106/1 The most recent and (philosophically speaking) fashionable ?ism? that the new century has producedknown, by some as Humanism, and by others as Pragmatism. a1914 C. S. PEIRCE Coll. Papers (1958) VIII. II. ix. 247 But if this occasion did in actuality not arise, such habit of thought as the conditional proposition might produce would be a nullity pragmatistically and practically. The first five hits in google's 9 for "William James" "anaesthetic boy" are worth a look (the remaining 4 are mirrors of (1)): 1. The principles of psychology William James - 1893 - Psychology ... we get such results as are given in the following account by Professor A. Strumpell of his wonderful anaesthetic boy, whose only sources of feeling ... books.google.com/books?id=aW19AAAAMAAJ... 2. Comptes Rendus Biologies : The origin of voluntary action. History ... William James defended the opinion that the consciousness of our movements is ... including Str?mpell's ?wonderful anaesthetic boy?, whose only sources of ... linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1631069106000424 by M Jeannerod 3. 17/9/07 1 cases such as William James?s ?anaesthetic boy?, cited by Anscombe. 8. James?s boy, we are told, could see and hear but had no bodily sensation whatsoever. ... _www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/1148/Wittg_and_Bod_self-k n.pdf_ (http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/1148/Wittg_and_Bod_self-kn.pdf) by E Harcourt 4. Action and Its Explanation - Google Books Result by David-Hillel Ruben - 2003 - The wonderful anaesthetic boy falsely believed that he opened his hand; Landry's patient falsely believed that he had executed a certain movement with a ... books.google.com/books?isbn=0198235887... 5. Could I feel a sensation to be located in someone else?s body? The ? anaesthetic boy? example of William James, quoted by Anscombe, shows that a body may be truly mine, yet I may not be able to feel pains in it. ... _www.theotodman.com/SensationsInSomeoneElsesBody.pdf_ (http://www.theotodman.com/SensationsInSomeoneElsesBody.pdf) Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Fri Feb 20 14:04:00 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 19:04:00 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Clarity Is Not Enough Message-ID: <5B87E2BA61584AD4B0573D3E5C63E194@DFLVQC1J> Hi Steve and Roger, I am catching up with emails and just came across your two. Here are just a few comments. First, I count philosophy as a part of knowledge; and knowledge needs no justification beyond itself. But, second, I think that philosophy has many applications. Science, it may reasonably be said, is applied philosophy. The two emerged together and have never been clearly distinguished; and nor should they be so. Scientific theories often begin as metaphysical speculations; and metaphysical theories are always in the background of science providing heuristic stimulus and, for many people, motivation. The impact of philosophical speculation on science has been enormous: just think of determinism, materialism, anti-spiritualism/occultism, indeterminism, positivism/operationalism, mechanism, Pythagorean geometrical mysticism (particularly prominent in Kepler and Galileo), and so on and so forth. In social and political affairs the impact of philosophical ideas has been monumental, and usually, but not always, detrimental or disastrous: Plato, Rousseau, Hegel/Marx, Adam Smith, Bentham/Mill, etc. Popper's 'open society' ideas appear to have had a significant, and beneficial, impact in Eastern Europe. On a more mundane level, philosophy can also have an impact on the way people live their lives. A metaphysical view can change the way one sees the world and one's place in it; and this can inform or guide one's whole style of life or, less substantially, prompt one to do uncharacteristic things from time to time. The course of my life changed partly as a consequence of reading Feyerabend's 'Against Method.' (In some ways it would have been better for me if I had not read that book!) Best wishes, Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Fri Feb 20 16:16:13 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 21:16:13 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: <5B87E2BA61584AD4B0573D3E5C63E194@DFLVQC1J> References: <5B87E2BA61584AD4B0573D3E5C63E194@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <200902202116.14437.rbj@rbjones.com> Danny, On Friday 20 February 2009 19:04:00 Danny Frederick wrote: > First, I count philosophy as a part of knowledge; and knowledge needs no > justification beyond itself. I'm curious to know how you square this attitude with your earlier statement that "there can be no such thing as the justification of mathematical propositions". How can we regard philosophy as part of "knowledge" (and in need of no justification) when there is no consensus (except occasional transient points of consensus) about which propositions of philosophy are true (excluding history of philosophy)? On the other hand, there is a very high degree of consensus among professional mathematicians about which propositions of mathematics are not merely true but proven (i.e. justified by the standards of professional mathematics), scepticism about mathematics being almost exclusively confined to philosophers. There is arguably something not very far off consensus, even among philosophers, that mathematics and philosophy are poles apart in matters of rigour (mathematics being of course, highly rigorous and philosophy quite the opposite). Have I misunderstood your position? Roger Jones From baynesrb at yahoo.com Fri Feb 20 17:07:31 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 14:07:31 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Anscombe's Use of 'Direct Object' and the "Trick" Message-ID: <666948.17353.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> In her "The Analysis of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature: (Collected Papers II, p. 8) Anscombe says of 'direct object' that: _It_ can name neither a piece of language, nor anything that the piece of language names or otherwise relates to...(p.8)..."ideas and impressions ...will be rightly regarded as grammatical notions. (p. 9). She is wrestling with what 'x' is in 'S thought x' and how this relates to action like 'S did x', by analogy. This is simplifying matters for clarity. Suppose we invoke the "under a description" trick. Suppose we say this: 'direct book is the direct object under the description 'what John gave Mary'. If we do this one problem we solve will be the vagueness problem, which I haven't described but which is there in the essay for all interested. Now how about 'a book' is an idea under the description 'What John is thinking about'. Am I serious? Yes. But I'm being deliberately vague about what I am serious about. Later I'll explain. But the larger point is that 'under a description' really is beginning to look like a tricky notion. If so does this trickiness extend to propositional attitudes? STeve Bayne Mary -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Fri Feb 20 17:27:54 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 14:27:54 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Correction: Anscombe's Use of 'Direct Object' and the "trick" Message-ID: <417251.31560.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> In my original message I said: "a book is the direct object under the description 'what John gave Mary'.? What I meant to say was 'a? book' is the direct object under the description 'what John gave Mary'. Sorry. Steve Bayne In her "The Analysis of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature: (Collected Papers II, p. 8) Anscombe says of 'direct object' that: _It_ can name neither a piece of language, nor anything that the piece of language names or otherwise relates to...(p.8)..."ideas and impressions ...will be rightly regarded as grammatical notions. (p. 9). She is wrestling with what 'x' is in 'S thought x' and how this relates to action like 'S did x', by analogy. This is simplifying matters for clarity. Suppose we invoke the "under a description" trick. Suppose we say this: 'a book is the direct object under the description 'what John gave Mary'. If we do this one problem we solve will be the vagueness problem, which I haven't described but which is there in the essay for all interested. Now how about 'a book' is an idea under the description 'What John is thinking about'. Am I serious? Yes. But I'm being deliberately vague about what I am serious about. Later I'll explain. But the larger point is that 'under a description' really is beginning to look like a tricky notion. If so does this trickiness extend to propositional attitudes? STeve Bayne Mary -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rh1 at york.ac.uk Fri Feb 20 18:52:03 2009 From: rh1 at york.ac.uk (rh1 at york.ac.uk) Date: 20 Feb 2009 23:52:03 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi JL Your description of this book caused me to get out my copy. What was it you wanted to know about the book, that you hadn't been able to see? Best, Roland From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 20 19:39:50 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 19:39:50 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Clarity Is Not Enough Message-ID: -- says who? -- says me. -- whos you -- Henry Habberley -- and you mean? -- well it's _not_ is it. -- it's not what? -- enough. -- enough what? -- Not enough _what_, enough _for_. -- for what? -- for life. -- says who? -- says me -- who's you Henry Habberley "[Granted], clarity [may] be not enough; but, perhaps, it will be time to go into this when we are within measurable distance of achieving clarity on some matter." In a message dated 2/20/2009 6:52:15 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, rh1 at york.ac.uk writes: Hi JL Your description of this book caused me to get out my copy. What was it you wanted to know about the book, that you hadn't been able to see? Best, Roland ---- Well, nothing really! And contrats on the new issue of The John Locke Newsletter -- read about it in PHILOS-L. My teacher (M. Costa) _loved_ those newsletters and made _me_ love them, too. But it's an impressive book, and I'm glad you got out your copy. From the cupboard, I assume. It's the distinguished Muirhead Library, right? Im-blooming-pressive! I would think that the editor was perhaps Welsh. Note the "Lewis" and the funny first names. And then _Prichard_ was Welsh. It's amazing how it takes two to tango! I was curious if Lewis gets to quote Austin's funny 'dealing' with the whole thing (which irritated R. B. Jones, rightly) in "A plea for excuses". I hope he does! Austin's Plea for excuses has no footnotes, but he _must_ be thinking of Prichard. ("Some say clarity is not enough..."). The list of contents is so overwhelming and I'm flabbergasted to see Quine! I mean, where does he _stand_? He is with Grice and Strawson when he needs them (for that Visiting Scholarship in Oxford) but against the playgroup when he _feels_ like! The other authors sort of escape me. Let me revise: H H Price yes, the infamous sloganner. Prof. Wykeham of Logic. Replaced, in all irony, by Ayer! C. D. Broad Cambridge man, so what does he know or _can_ know (i.e. is willing to) re: Oxford philosophy? Yes, S. R. Bayne loves him... but ... I find his pictures painted with too, er, broad (ouch) a brush. Grice amazingly cites him in "Personal Identity"! B. Blanshard This I have a recollection is a distinguished American philosopher. Surely his surname was officially first "Blanchard". I once met an American whose name was "White". I said, 'That's a clean Anglo-Saxon surname". He said, "Actually, it was originally _Blanche_ but it was changed at Ellis Island". Ah well. W. V.Quine Yes, the Harvardite. William Calvert Kneale one of the Ryleites. I.e. he was old enough to be in Ryle's group, along with Prichard, and Oscar Wood. That man (Wood) really should belong to the Austin group, but ... I forget momentarily what the maiden name of his wife was. Martha, yes. Bayne was saying Anscombe was a character (we should compile one --alla that online dictionary that has 'grice' as 'conceptual intricacy'). I think Grice (in "Reply To Richards") surprises me when he quotes, I think, Kneale on matters of 'induction' and 'probablity'. I must confess I find Kneale's writing a bit too Rylean to my taste, i.e. none of the wit of the Austinians! And just because his "Growth of Logic" (original title of his lectures -- he and Martha should _never_ have changed it onto 'development' -- sounds pretty _cheap_) is the established vademecum it is, I feel there's an aura of authority around the man that does not really appeal me (And I'm using 'really' as the word that wears the trousers!). A.C.Ewing Now he was a darling. And possibly related to my favourite English soprano, Maria. I never could digest any of Ewing's readings, though. He _does_ have a lovely surname, though. I think he was a _mystic_ and then he was Cantab. so what would _he_ know? Max Black Well, the Russian, right (for he might have been a Roosian, a French, or Turk or Prossian). I guess his first name was Maxwell really. His father had a lot of class. He is _an_ interesting one, but tends to use too general phrases. Martinich did I think discuss his round with Grice in _Dialectica_. I did read Black's commentary on Grice in _Literary History_ I think the magazine is called. It has been reprinted. He has some good points but he is too commonsensical to appeal me. He had interesting things to say about _metaphor_ but I find those thoughts too Wittgenstein-influenced to appeal me! Peter Heath Well, he is another darling. First heard of him via browsing Martin Gardner's _Annotated Alice_. He was born in Firenze, of all places, but when I tell my friends that Heath is a 'dago' they laugh! -- I think Gardner discusses his views on _Aspects of Alice_, very sensical. For Humpty Dumpty, ordinary words do not have meaning (e.g. 'slithy goves') but proper names do ("Alice", "Humpty"). Just because he settled in "the green hills of Somerset" (Weatherley tune) he should be revered. He was a mathematician too but that bit about him bores me slightly. It's amazing how much he contributed to Edwards's Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. E.Harris, ... Now, this sounds like from a short story by Tennessee Williams. (I got the list of contributors from I think amazon.) and it has the "..." at the end, so I hope I _am_ missing a good old name worth preserving. Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Fri Feb 20 20:01:14 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 17:01:14 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <19210.45448.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com> C. D.? Broad Cambridge man, so what does he know or _can_ know? (i.e. is willing to) re: Oxford philosophy? Yes, S. R.? Bayne loves him... but ... I find his pictures painted with too,er, broad? (ouch) a brush.Grice amazingly cites him in? "Personal Identity"! Maybe a more curious connection is that between Broad and John Wisdom. I was never a big Wisdom fan. I certainly didn't cut my teeth on Wisdom, but I did do some cutting, Broadly speaking. Wisdom (somewhat like Von Wright) was at one time very much under the influence of Broad. Broad and Grice have very different ideas about how to pursue philosophy. One thing I've always like about Broad is his incredible understanding of people like Kant and Leibniz, as well as his work on sense data. Remember he is really far removed generationally from Grice. But you know somethin'? I can't think of any reason to believe that Broad would have taken issue with Grice on 'meaning'! Regards STeve --- On Fri, 2/20/09, Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: From: Jlsperanza at aol.com Subject: Re: Clarity Is Not Enough To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Date: Friday, February 20, 2009, 7:39 PM -- says who? -- says me. -- whos you -- Henry Habberley -- and you mean? -- well it's _not_ is it. -- it's not what? -- enough. -- enough what? -- Not enough _what_, enough _for_. -- for what? -- for life. -- says who? -- says me -- who's you Henry Habberley "[Granted], clarity [may] be not enough; but, perhaps, it will be time to go into this when we are within measurable distance of achieving clarity on some matter." In a message dated 2/20/2009 6:52:15 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, rh1 at york.ac.uk writes: Hi JL Your description of this book caused me to get out my copy. What was it you wanted to know about the book, that you hadn't been able to see? Best, Roland ---- Well, nothing really! And contrats on the new issue of The John Locke Newsletter -- read about it in PHILOS-L. My teacher (M. Costa) _loved_ those newsletters and made _me_ love them, too. But it's an impressive book, and I'm glad you got out your copy. From the cupboard, I assume. It's the distinguished Muirhead Library, right? Im-blooming-pressive! I would think that the editor was perhaps Welsh. Note the "Lewis" and the funny first names. And then _Prichard_ was Welsh. It's amazing how it takes two to tango! I was curious if Lewis gets to quote Austin's funny 'dealing' with the whole thing (which irritated R. B. Jones, rightly) in "A plea for excuses". I hope he does! Austin's Plea for excuses has no footnotes, but he _must_ be thinking of Prichard. ("Some say clarity is not enough..."). The list of contents is so overwhelming and I'm flabbergasted to see Quine! I mean, where does he _stand_? He is with Grice and Strawson when he needs them (for that Visiting Scholarship in Oxford) but against the playgroup when he _feels_ like! The other authors sort of escape me. Let me revise: H H Price yes, the infamous sloganner. Prof. Wykeham of Logic. Replaced, in all irony, by Ayer! C. D. Broad Cambridge man, so what does he know or _can_ know (i.e. is willing to) re: Oxford philosophy? Yes, S. R. Bayne loves him... but ... I find his pictures painted with too, er, broad (ouch) a brush. Grice amazingly cites him in "Personal Identity"! B. Blanshard This I have a recollection is a distinguished American philosopher. Surely his surname was officially first "Blanchard". I once met an American whose name was "White". I said, 'That's a clean Anglo-Saxon surname". He said, "Actually, it was originally _Blanche_ but it was changed at Ellis Island". Ah well. W. V.Quine Yes, the Harvardite. William Calvert Kneale one of the Ryleites. I.e. he was old enough to be in Ryle's group, along with Prichard, and Oscar Wood. That man (Wood) really should belong to the Austin group, but ... I forget momentarily what the maiden name of his wife was. Martha, yes. Bayne was saying Anscombe was a character (we should compile one --alla that online dictionary that has 'grice' as 'conceptual intricacy'). I think Grice (in "Reply To Richards") surprises me when he quotes, I think, Kneale on matters of 'induction' and 'probablity'. I must confess I find Kneale's writing a bit too Rylean to my taste, i.e. none of the wit of the Austinians! And just because his "Growth of Logic" (original title of his lectures -- he and Martha should _never_ have changed it onto 'development' -- sounds pretty _cheap_) is the established vademecum it is, I feel there's an aura of authority around the man that does not really appeal me (And I'm using 'really' as the word that wears the trousers!). A.C.Ewing Now he was a darling. And possibly related to my favourite English soprano, Maria. I never could digest any of Ewing's readings, though. He _does_ have a lovely surname, though. I think he was a _mystic_ and then he was Cantab. so what would _he_ know? Max Black Well, the Russian, right (for he might have been a Roosian, a French, or Turk or Prossian). I guess his first name was Maxwell really. His father had a lot of class. He is _an_ interesting one, but tends to use too general phrases. Martinich did I think discuss his round with Grice in _Dialectica_. I did read Black's commentary on Grice in _Literary History_ I think the magazine is called. It has been reprinted. He has some good points but he is too commonsensical to appeal me. He had interesting things to say about _metaphor_ but I find those thoughts too Wittgenstein-influenced to appeal me! Peter Heath Well, he is another darling. First heard of him via browsing Martin Gardner's _Annotated Alice_. He was born in Firenze, of all places, but when I tell my friends that Heath is a 'dago' they laugh! -- I think Gardner discusses his views on _Aspects of Alice_, very sensical. For Humpty Dumpty, ordinary words do not have meaning (e.g. 'slithy goves') but proper names do ("Alice", "Humpty"). Just because he settled in "the green hills of Somerset" (Weatherley tune) he should be revered. He was a mathematician too but that bit about him bores me slightly. It's amazing how much he contributed to Edwards's Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. E.Harris, ... Now, this sounds like from a short story by Tennessee Williams. (I got the list of contributors from I think amazon.) and it has the "..." at the end, so I hope I _am_ missing a good old name worth preserving. Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 20 20:24:21 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 20:24:21 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Aristotle De-Coded Message-ID: I was inspired by S. R. Bayne's comments to the effect that G. E. M. Anscombe was, as he says, a 'character' (aren't we all?). Then I came across (for the nth time) the well-known definition of 'grice' by Dennett. Now I see the 2008 edition is out. This one is interesting: code, v. To render unintelligible by substituting a literal translation. Hence code, n. the product of coding. "What he says about Aristotle sounds like code to me." (See also kripkography.) But how much of analytic-philosophy has been merely 're-coded'. Don't get me wrong, I live Alan Dodds, but he _can_ get carried away. I never carry my code, though, for all I need, really, is Loeb. Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 20 21:23:21 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 21:23:21 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Boulemaic Modalities -- in Aristotle and Beyond Message-ID: Boulemaic Modalities: from Aristotle to Hintikka -- and back! I am re-reading "the book" that John Gave Mary, etc. Yes, Anscombe can throw one thing (a bone of contention) but it's _one_ who needs do the chewing. I'm amused that she uses, "John thought so" i.e. John thought x. Indeed, one tends to forget that x stands for 'whatever-it-is' under a description. We are _so-used_ to what Austin calls 'that'-clauses (that's an OED by courtesy of R. H., I'd hope) that we tend to forget that the Davidsonic consideration that 'that' in a 'that'-clause is merely an old demonstrative! 1955 J. L. AUSTIN How to do Things with Words (1962) vi. 70 "Although we have in this type of utterance a ?that? clause following a verb..we must not allude to this as ?indirect speech?." Before the correction of the errata, I had read S. R. Bayne as saying, "John thought the book" I said -- how come. Surely he must have thought _that_ the book was on the table, or something. But just _think_ the book? But then I _am_ an Austinian... --- Or, where there is a _will_, there *is* a way In a message dated 2/20/2009 8:34:48 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes in "Re: Aristotle De-Coded" I would count Kenny as one of the best Aristotle scholars. I find it astonishing that his _Aristotle's Theory of the Will_ Duckworth. 1979 has been so neglected. The nit-picking works on free-will are fine, great exercise and you learn many of the current "grips" as when Plato compared philosophy to wrestling, but Kenny on Aristotle is very worthwhile. ----- prohairesis boulesis ourexeos kai boule kai kriseos outexousiotes ----- Oh my God -- it's all so difficult! Sorry I am suffering this bad-taste Dennettian phase, but I find that the 'kenny' one does owen it! kenny, adj. Clever. owen, v. To be indebted to the entire Greek corpus for one's view. "I owened winning the argument to 1094b 12-14." I've just found a good reference to Kenny on Aristotle on the will in Inwood -- quoting from Anscombe and Kenny, Inwood (who's writing, I think, on Seneca) traces the 'traditional' view of the will to Augustine -- from which, of course, it's all a wittenstone's throw... What I did love about Aristotle's convolutions was the coinage 'boulemic' (or is it 'boulomaic') that Allwood et al use in Logic and Linguistics. I must have somewhere my correspondence with J. Fields of OUP on the matter. Speranza, We keep treasuring your postings on neologisms we should include, or fail to exclude as you put it. 'Boulemaic' is a good, pedigreed one, but as I said to you before, we have to let time _pass_ and the idiom become _common_ to merit an entry with us. Ah well, I see that the OED recognises 'boule' but the etymological entry does not seem to give any cross-reference: 1846 GROTE Hist. Greece II. I. xx. 89 The Boul?, or council of chiefs, and the Agora, or general assembly of freemen. 1905 Spectator 4 Mar. 318/2 The Boul?, which answers practically to the House of Commons. I must say I'm less enamoured as I once was to neologisms. When I first read that Logic-in-Linguistics and saw that Allwood was speaking of doxastic logic versus boulemaic logic I thought, "Now this is _my_ type of modality". hintikka, n. A measure of belief, the smallest logically discernible difference between beliefs. "He argued with me all night, but did not alter my beliefs one hintikka." -- but he did break my _will_, though! Cheers, JL --- The Prefunctional Stage of First Language Acquisition: A ... - Google Books Result by Ianthi-Maria Tsimpli, Laurence Horn - 1996 - Language Arts & Disciplines - 254 pages At the same stage, boulemaic modality in positive contexts is expressed by the element minne/unne/hunne which means something like 'I want', ... books.google.com/books?isbn=0815325614... [PDF] A semantic-pragmatic analysis oftiteEnglish imperative (boulemaic-non-deontic). Cencerning [he linguistic expressien of these notiens, [he existence of cenversational implicatures in speech acts seems te ... revistas.ucm.es/fll/11330392/articulos/EIUC9393110055A.PDF by M CARRETERO - [PDF] Verb-Types and Modality in Early Child L2 Root Infinitives is likely to convey a boulemaic meaning (i.e. 'daddy wants to leave'), ..... Most of his RIs have a future/modal interpretation (often boulemaic), ... _www.lingref.com/cpp/gasla/6/paper1049.pdf_ (http://www.lingref.com/cpp/gasla/6/paper1049.pdf) by P Pr?vost [PDF] The semantic and aspectual properties of child L2 root infinitives ... File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML modal interpretation, e.g. deontic or boulemaic, in contrast to finite declaratives which tend to receive a present or past temporal reading. ... www2.hawaii.edu/~kamil/Pr%E9vost.pdf - Similar pages by P Pr?vost The Crosslinguistic Study of Language Acquisition - Google Books Result by Dan Isaac Slobin - 1992 - Language Arts & Disciplines - 655 pages The majority of Markus' discourse negations toward the end of the second year are boulemaic. All his tokens of discourse negation were encoded by na. ... books.google.com/books?isbn=0805801057... **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 20 22:04:13 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 22:04:13 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Common Sensal and Extraordinary Language Message-ID: A little tribute to Charlie Dunbar. cavell, v. An exquisitely sensitive distinction of language, hence cavellier, adj. characterizing a writing style common among extraordinary language philosophers. Clarity is _never_ enough! Ask Broad! 1896 Violeta WELBY in Mind V. 29 "We might be allowed to coin a new derivative and speak of ?sensal? where we often now speak of ?verbal? questions." Yes, but then again we might not. 1938 C. D. BROAD Exam. McTaggart's Philos. II. VII. xxxiii. 249, "I conclude then that McTaggart's argument against the possibility of extended particulars, whether material or sensal, breaks down at the fourth step in my synopsis of it." mctaggart, n. A black hole which not only sheds no light but in which time stands still. "Some mctaggarts are rather broad." -- Dennett. otherwise, adj. Knowing the difference between two philosophers with identical interests and the same name, hence otherwisdom In a message dated 2/20/2009 8:14:35 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: >Maybe a more curious connection is that between Broad and John Wisdom. >I was never a big Wisdom fan. I certainly didn't cut my teeth on Wisdom, >but I did do some cutting, Broadly speaking. I did find his prose refreshing! Those "Other Minds" articles are gems. Otherwise, his cousin is never so bright (but then his middle name was Oulton). >Wisdom (somewhat like Von Wright) was at >one time very much under the influence of Broad. -- Well, they would see each other's face almost every morning I would hope! What a man, Wisdom -- "Some like Moore, but Wisdom's my man", I say. >Broad and Grice have very different ideas about >how to pursue philosophy. Yes, and broadly speaking, Charlie Dunbar would label Grice's a 'trivial pursuit', rather. >One thing I've always like >about Broad is his incredible understanding of people like Kant and Leibniz, >as well as his work on sense data. Remember he is really far removed generationally from Grice. >But you know somethin'? I can't think of any reason to believe that Broad would >have taken issue with Grice on 'meaning'! But then he would have been bored, Grice -- he loved people taking _issue_ with him! schiffer, n. (from Neurath, "Wie Schiffer send wir.") One who uses great ingenuity in repairing a sinking ship. "There's no griceful way of saving this theory; even the rats have abandoned ship. There's no one aboard but the schiffer." ----- But yes. And of course, Grice's citing Broad in 1941 is perhaps pretty plausible. It was an article for _Mind_ and that was led by Moore (a Cambridge one). I can't quote right now the Broad ref. in Grice (1941) but see that Grice starts on p. 330 of that 1941 volume, and who do you think had just finished writing on p. 329? None other than good ole John Wisdom, on "Other Minds". Talk of a small world. Read from an online dictionary: "sense datum was coined by Moore in 1909" -- I hate that type of loose use of 'coin' when the OED tidily notes: 1882 J. ROYCE in Mind VII. 44 What relation does the external reality bear to the sense-datum? 1890 W. JAMES Princ. Psychol. II. xx. 146 It is no wonder if some authors have gone so far as to think that the sense-data have no spatial worth at all. "Broad was Russell's pupil and his preferred term was 'sensum' (1914) not really 'sense-datum' that Russell had used (1912). And then there's "Price" ("Price had studied with Moore before he returned to Oxford -- where he taught Wilfrid Sellars". 'Taught' him only to find hisself refuted by him. Some tutees! (I say that jocularly as I know Bayne loves Sellars too much). cfr. 1923 C. D. BROAD Sci. Thought viii. 240 "Such objects as y I am going to call Sensa." -- and we are going to try and follow you. I *have* to paste the 51 entries for Broad in the OED -- de-love-lee! But isn't Bayne write about Broad understanding "Kant"!: 1933 C. D. BROAD Exam. McTaggart's Philos. I. II. vii. 144 It will be remembered that Kant, in criticising the Scholastic argument from the simplicity of the soul to its immortality, said that it might cease to exist by ? elanguescence?, as a sound dies away without ?coming to bits?. I would think Grice (1941) draws on Broad for 'mnemic' listed below. I seem to recall he also makes (Grice does) a complicated point about what kind of construction it is he is dealing with ('logical', but what type of logical construction) and I seem to remember he credits Broad for some broad (and not so broad) distinctions there. 1925 C. D. BROAD Mind & its Place viii. 377 Experiences which are owned in senses (2) or (3) may be said to be ?*mnemically owned?. Then there's 1941 Mind 50 417 The only perceptible difference between conscious and non-conscious behaviour is *mnemicness. but that mouthful can't be Grice's for his essay ends on p. 350! Cheers, JL 1 1912 categorial, a. 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place iv. 21 2 c1325 declare, v. 1965 C. D. Broad in G. Cummins Swan on B 3 1827 descriptionist 1914 C. D. Broad Perception ii. 91 The d 4 1603 disvalue, n. 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place xi. 50 5 1855 elanguescence, n. 1933 C. D. Broad Exam. McTaggart's Philo 6 1938 extrasomatic, a. 1938 C. D. Broad Exam. McTaggart's Philo 7 1819 extraspective, a. 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place vii. 3 8 geo- 1923 C. D. Broad Sci. Thought xii. 457 A 9 1750 Horatian, a. (n.) 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place xi. 49 10 1914 inferrability 1914 C. D. Broad Perception ii. 128 This 11 1923 intrapolation 1923 C. D. Broad Sci. Thought xi. 428 Li 12 1925 introspectible, a. 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place ix. 41 13 1633 irreducible, a. 1923 C. D. Broad Sci. Thought x. 368 The 14 1849 limiting, ppl. a. 1914 C. D. Broad Perception i. 7 Qualiti 15 1908 Lorentz 1923 C. D. Broad Sci. Thought iv. 135 Th 16 a1613 Mahometanism, n. 1939 C. D. Broad in Philosophy 14 132 O 17 1606 mechanist, n. and adj. 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place 43 One 18 1909 mechanistically, adv. 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place ii. 77 19 ?c1225 memory, n. 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place v. 233 20 1899 mind-brain, adj. and n. 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place 439 Th 21 1908 mnemic, adj. 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place viii. 22 1862 molar, adj.3 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place xiv. 6 23 1770 molecular, adj. (and n.) 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place xiv. 6 24 1895 multiplicatively, adv. 1914 C. D. Broad Perception iii. 180 The 25 c1598 na?f, adj. and n.2 1914 C. D. Broad Perception i. 1 We are 26 c1449 neutral, n. and adj. 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place. xiv. 27 non-, prefix 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place xi. 48 28 1914 non-object, n. and adj. 1914 C. D. Broad Perception i. 8 We must 29 1925 non-referential, adj. 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place vi. 30 30 1925 objectifiable, adj. 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place vi. 30 31 1817 occasioning, adj. 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place xii. 5 32 1704 opus magnum, n. 1952 C. D. Broad Ethics & Hist. Philos. 33 1610 parallelism, n. 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place iii. 1 34 1754 parallelist, n. (and adj.) 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place iii. 1 35 1878 perceptual, adj. 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place iv. 21 36 1659 percipient, n. and adj. 1938 C. D. Broad Exam. McTaggart's Philo 37 1856 phenomenalist, n. and adj. 1914 C. D. Broad Perception 171 The phen 38 1566 pink, n.5 and adj.2 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place iv. 14 39 1905 polyadic, adj. 1918 C. D. Broad in Mind 27 284 A consi 40 1571 positional, adj. 1923 C. D. Broad Sci. Thought xi. 408 So 41 1907 presentedness, n. philosophy of C. D. Broad) the awareness of this 42 1611 primeness, n. 1923 C. D. Broad Sci. Thought ii. 75 We 43 c1443 probability, n. 1914 C. D. Broad Perception ii. 150 The 44 quasi-, comb. form 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place iv. 21 45 1603 regularity 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place x. 457 46 1835 relationist, n. (and a.) 1923 C. D. Broad Sci. Thought iii. 89 Th 47 1863 relativist, n. (and a.) 1914 C. D. Broad Perception v. 286 It is 48 retro-, prefix 1962 C. D. Broad Lect. Psychical Res. 40 49 1923 Russellian, a. and n. 1923 C. D. Broad Sci. Thought xiii. 534 50 a1866 sensal, a. 1938 C. D. Broad Exam. McTaggart's Philo 51 c1400 sense, n. 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place iv. 19 52 1868 sensum 1923 C. D. Broad Sci. Thought viii. 240 53 1900 spatio-temporal, a. 1923 C. D. Broad Sci. Thought x. 403 Sci 54 1375 sufficient, a. (adv., n.) 1923 C. D. Broad Sci. Thought xiii. 499 55 tele- 1962 C. D. Broad Lect. on Psychical Res. 56 1798 teleological, a. 1930 C. D. Broad Five Types of Ethical T 57 a800 tie, n. 1923 C. D. Broad Sci. Thought ii. 75 Tak 58 1745 transience 1914 C. D. Broad Perception ii. 105 Leib 59 1813 translational, a. 1923 C. D. Broad Sci. Thought xi. 433 A **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 20 22:58:32 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 22:58:32 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Clarity Is Not Enough Message-ID: And now to BED!!!! PROMISE!!! Further to R. Hall's gracious offer for assistance, I found: Not enough -- Tindall 329 (7477): 1285 -- BMJ Nov 26, 2004 ... Clarity and certainty are essential to surgeons in training, at least until they discover that clarity is not enough and certainty does not exist. Le Vay D. The life of Hugh Owen Thomas. Edinburgh: Livingstone, 1956 ... www.bmj.com/cgi/content/extract/329/7477/1285 - Similar pages by AJ Tindall - 2004 --- But I'm too lazy right now to find if H. H. Price could be quoting that brilliant quote above! ---- Did find loads about H. D. Lewis. Also, this German philosopher, "Block" I think his surname, cites the section of his book on analytic philosophy (but then he _is_ German) as: "Clarity is not enough!" sic with the odious "!", which I cannot think was the tenor of an otherwise pleasant and polite H. H. Price. There is a good entry for H. D. Lewis in the Dict. of Twentieth Century philosophers", by S. Brown. Brown fails to make it evident, though, that the phrase is Price's, though. Brown writes to the effect, "While Lewis thought that clarity was not enough, he deemed it pretty crucial". I still haven't found list of contents -- but would not think Lewis has much of a say in the volume. I was also confused as to editions. It seems it's a very old book (1963) -- the amazon must be displaying a reprint. So I would not think Lewis cared to check with Austin (1956) 'Plea for excuses'. I was amused that Lewis was Jesus graduate with M.Phil, I believe. And London must be a very _big_ city to have such an eminence teaching _for years_ the 'history of religion'... The man rests in peace in Wales now. He was Gifford lecturer, born 1910, d. 1992. In any case, it was an excellent sobriquet for a volume. The subtitle reading, "Essays in criticism of linguistic philosophy" -- but if this was 1963 we cannot say it had really started... The entry did say he socialised with Price and Prichard -- and relates his religious views to his "North-Wales" upbringing. Okay so I have _just_ found list of contributors online -- in guess where: the people who know: book antiquarians! 447 pages of text including an index. essays by H. H. Price, C. D. Broad, Brand Blanshard, W. V. O. Quine, W. C. Kneale, A. C. Ewing, Max Black, Peter Heath, E. E. Harris, --- so we had left there, and then there's C. A. Campbell -- ?? W. F. R. Hardie Grice's tutor, of Corpus Christi. Famous for his book on Aristotle's moral theory. Very good friend of Grice. Taught him to play golf. C. K. Grant A mystery to me. I am familiar with his "Pragmatic Implication" -- if that's not 'linguistic philosophy' what is it? -- in _Philosophy_ (my favourite philosophy journal ever). I believe he _was_ Oxford (no other would have been interested in that type of 'implication' ) and Chapman does discuss him in her book on Grice (Palgrave, 2006). I think he settled in the North of England or North of Watford in any case. Birmingham perhaps. J. N. Findlay Okay, so Bayne likes him too and quotes him in his reminiscences of when A. P. A. was worth the try. Dennett has some good line about this too: findlay, n. An implement used in the exploration of caves. It is not known exactly what it is because it is only used in total darkness. S. N. Hampshire, Well, he thought he was a celebrity of his own by then, with his brilliant "Thought and Action" -- which I value higher than Anscombe's -- and very same year too! Sir Stuart (as he then wasn't) _can_ be critical of 'linguistic philosophy' -- which he was soaked in in the fifties. By the 60s he had seen the light! H. D. Lewis the professor of religion, that is. and A. J. Ayer. the enfant terrible. As Dennett notes, Ayer is not really Anglo-Jewish but more like an Iberian: ayer, v. (from Spanish, ayer, meaning yesterday) To oversimplify elegantly in the direction of a past generation. "Russell, in the Analysis of Mind, ayers a behaviorist account of belief." In this sense, he relates to Harvard: santayana, n. A hot exhausting wind originating in the desert areas of Spain. --- Lewis was indeed editor of the Muirhead Library and to his credit he got this prestigious bunch to stop the Austinian waves to inundate the safe barracks of academia, but he lost! Cheers, J. L. Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sat Feb 21 07:21:45 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2009 04:21:45 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] C. D. Broad, Russell, and Wittgenstein In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <151183.28616.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Probably, most every significant philosopher of the period had read Broad's _Mind and Its Place in Nature_. In my opinion it is one of the best half dozen books ever written in philosophy of mind. I recall going through the, Bergmann archives at the University of Iowa at Iowa City. Bergmann used Broad extensively. He refers to Broad as "the best second rate mind of the century." Coming from Bergmann that is high praise! Russell never liked Broad and said so. Although Broad's dissertation was done under Russell and, I think, Moore, when it was published Russell gave it a luke-warm review, saying something like: "He can do better than this." Well a few years later The Mind and Its Place in Nature came out. It's worth mentioning that the criticisms of Russell's neutral monism are very good. I think the best leveled against the theory, ever. I was particularly struck by the sophistication of the chapter "Traces and Dispositions." I was amused by a comment by Bergmann, scrawled like graffitti on a prison wall, something like: "I can go no further, such is the boredom!" And, yet, I've found this chapter very good. Russell, in fact adopts criticisms leveled against Russell in the Analysis of Mind, without acknowledgement. Let me tell you a little story, nothing much, related to me by the late Cal Rollins, a student of Wittgenstein's. Rollins was assigned Broad as advisor or some such. He went into Broad's office and mentioned his interest in Wittgenstein. Broad is said to have peered over his glasses and said: "Are you sure you want to do this? You know Wittgenstein is a very queer fellow." What I loved about the story was that I had never known Broad wore glasses. Broad, it has been reported, was one of the few never intimidated by Wittgenstein. His former lover went on to win the Nobel in Medicine. Broad was a "character." I admire his philosophical work. I admire Grice's work. They are hardly comparable, except in the excellence and high standards they set, now somewhat forgotten. Regards Steve Bayne --- On Fri, 2/20/09, Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: From: Jlsperanza at aol.com Subject: Common Sensal and Extraordinary Language To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Date: Friday, February 20, 2009, 10:04 PM A little tribute to Charlie Dunbar. cavell, v. An exquisitely sensitive distinction of language, hence cavellier, adj. characterizing a writing style common among extraordinary language philosophers. Clarity is _never_ enough! Ask Broad! 1896 Violeta WELBY in Mind V. 29 "We might be allowed to coin a new derivative and speak of ?sensal? where we often now speak of ?verbal? questions." Yes, but then again we might not. 1938 C. D. BROAD Exam. McTaggart's Philos. II. VII. xxxiii. 249, "I conclude then that McTaggart's argument against the possibility of extended particulars, whether material or sensal, breaks down at the fourth step in my synopsis of it." mctaggart, n. A black hole which not only sheds no light but in which time stands still. "Some mctaggarts are rather broad." -- Dennett. otherwise, adj. Knowing the difference between two philosophers with identical interests and the same name, hence otherwisdom In a message dated 2/20/2009 8:14:35 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: >Maybe a more curious connection is that between Broad and John Wisdom. >I was never a big Wisdom fan. I certainly didn't cut my teeth on Wisdom, >but I did do some cutting, Broadly speaking. I did find his prose refreshing! Those "Other Minds" articles are gems. Otherwise, his cousin is never so bright (but then his middle name was Oulton). >Wisdom (somewhat like Von Wright) was at >one time very much under the influence of Broad. -- Well, they would see each other's face almost every morning I would hope! What a man, Wisdom -- "Some like Moore, but Wisdom's my man", I say. >Broad and Grice have very different ideas about >how to pursue philosophy. Yes, and broadly speaking, Charlie Dunbar would label Grice's a 'trivial pursuit', rather. >One thing I've always like >about Broad is his incredible understanding of people like Kant and Leibniz, >as well as his work on sense data. Remember he is really far removed generationally from Grice. >But you know somethin'? I can't think of any reason to believe that Broad would >have taken issue with Grice on 'meaning'! But then he would have been bored, Grice -- he loved people taking _issue_ with him! schiffer, n. (from Neurath, "Wie Schiffer send wir.") One who uses great ingenuity in repairing a sinking ship. "There's no griceful way of saving this theory; even the rats have abandoned ship. There's no one aboard but the schiffer." ----- But yes. And of course, Grice's citing Broad in 1941 is perhaps pretty plausible. It was an article for _Mind_ and that was led by Moore (a Cambridge one). I can't quote right now the Broad ref. in Grice (1941) but see that Grice starts on p. 330 of that 1941 volume, and who do you think had just finished writing on p. 329? None other than good ole John Wisdom, on "Other Minds". Talk of a small world. Read from an online dictionary: "sense datum was coined by Moore in 1909" -- I hate that type of loose use of 'coin' when the OED tidily notes: 1882 J. ROYCE in Mind VII. 44 What relation does the external reality bear to the sense-datum? 1890 W. JAMES Princ. Psychol. II. xx. 146 It is no wonder if some authors have gone so far as to think that the sense-data have no spatial worth at all. "Broad was Russell's pupil and his preferred term was 'sensum' (1914) not really 'sense-datum' that Russell had used (1912). And then there's "Price" ("Price had studied with Moore before he returned to Oxford -- where he taught Wilfrid Sellars". 'Taught' him only to find hisself refuted by him. Some tutees! (I say that jocularly as I know Bayne loves Sellars too much). cfr. 1923 C. D. BROAD Sci. Thought viii. 240 "Such objects as y I am going to call Sensa." -- and we are going to try and follow you. I *have* to paste the 51 entries for Broad in the OED -- de-love-lee! But isn't Bayne write about Broad understanding "Kant"!: 1933 C. D. BROAD Exam. McTaggart's Philos. I. II. vii. 144 It will be remembered that Kant, in criticising the Scholastic argument from the simplicity of the soul to its immortality, said that it might cease to exist by ? elanguescence?, as a sound dies away without ?coming to bits?. I would think Grice (1941) draws on Broad for 'mnemic' listed below. I seem to recall he also makes (Grice does) a complicated point about what kind of construction it is he is dealing with ('logical', but what type of logical construction) and I seem to remember he credits Broad for some broad (and not so broad) distinctions there. 1925 C. D. BROAD Mind & its Place viii. 377 Experiences which are owned in senses (2) or (3) may be said to be ?*mnemically owned?. Then there's 1941 Mind 50 417 The only perceptible difference between conscious and non-conscious behaviour is *mnemicness. but that mouthful can't be Grice's for his essay ends on p. 350! Cheers, JL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sat Feb 21 08:50:00 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2009 08:50:00 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] The Use of "Irreducible" in 20th Century Analytic Philosophy Message-ID: No more posts today from me! A checklist of the 59 entries for Broad in the OED. I note one under 'irreducible' that inspires me this little dialogue ('imaginary conversation') between Julie Jack and H. P. Grice JACK: Wrong, I say! GRICE: Wrong what? (never second parts were so good) JACK: Your analysis of meaning -- wrong? GRICE: Why! JACK: It's (pronounced smugly) _reductive_. We don't *do* 'reductive' at Oxford. It impoverishes our experiences _so_. GRICE (in silence) JACK: there's some right to it, too, though GRICE (about to speak) JACK: But the wrongs outdo the rights. GRICE: Why? JACK: reductive -- reductionist. GRICE. Hey madam, Wait your second. My analysis may be reductive but it's _not_ reductionist. JACK. Big difference! GRICE. Why, there is. JACK. There is what? GRICE: _a_ big difference, to use your sobriquet. JACK: Explain! GRICE. Do you have time for a pint JACK. Not really, but if you must. Grice coaxed Jack to the pub (after a few beers) JACK. So you do say it's not reductionist? GRICE. But no, madam. How could you possibly think that I'd go the whole non-Oxonian hog? JACK: So it's ... harmlessly ... 'reductive' only. GRICE: Exactly. And pretty tidy too. JACK. Meaning?? GRICE. Well, it's not circular, like Witters's. JACK: Stop it! GRICE: it's a non-circular 'analysis' which _is_ reductive Jack raises eye-brows: GRICE: but not meant to rest on reductionist foundation. JACK: Okay, give me a kiss. Readers may browse through other words used by Broad and create their literary imaginary dialogues too. I double check with Broad, and must say his use of 'irreducible' is lukewarm. I thought he was going to say the _mind_ is! But it's just what the temporal relations _really_ are! As if I cared! " The temporal relations..are really irreducibly triadic." BROAD, 1923, Scientific Thought, p. 368 Cheers, JL categorial -- Mind & its Place, 1925 p. 21 declare 1965 Broad in G. Cummins Swan on B descriptionist 1914 Perception 91 disvalue 1925 -- Mind & its Place 50 elanguescence 1933 Exam. McTaggart's Philo extrasomatic 1938 Exam. McTaggart's Philo extraspective 1925 Mind & its Place 3 geo- 1923 Sci. Thought 457 horatian 1925 Mind & its Place xi. 49 inferrability 1914 Perception ii. 128 This intrapolation 1923 Sci. Thought xi. 428 Li introspectible 1925 Mind & its Place ix. 41 irreducible 1923 Sci. Thought x. 368 The limiting 1914 Perception i. 7 Qualiti lorentz 1923 Sci. Thought iv. 135 Th mahometanism, n. 1939 Philosophy 14 132 O mechanist 1925 Mind & its Place 43 One mechanistically 1925 Mind & its Place ii. 77 memory 1925 Mind & its Place v. 233 mind-brain 1925 Mind & its Place 439 Th mnemic 1925 Mind & its Place viii. molar 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place xiv. 6 molecular 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place xiv. 6 multiplicatively 1914 C. D. Broad Perception iii. 180 The na?f 1914 C. D. Broad Perception i. 1 We are neutral 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place. xiv. non- 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place xi. 48 non-object 1914 C. D. Broad Perception i. 8 We must non-referential 1925 C. D. Broad Mind & its Place vi. 30 objectifiable, adj. 1925 Mind & its Place vi. 30 occasioning, adj. 1925 Mind & its Place xii. 5 opus magnum, n. 1952 Ethics & Hist. Philos. parallelism, n. 1925 Mind & its Place iii. 1 parallelist 1925 Mind & its Place iii. 1 perceptual, adj. 1925 Mind & its Place iv. 21 percipient, n. and adj. 1938 Exam. McTaggart's Philo phenomenalist, n. and adj. 1914 Perception 171 The phen pink, n.5 and adj.2 1925 Mind & its Place iv. 14 polyadic, adj. 1918 Mind 27 284 A consi positional, adj. 1923 Sci. Thought xi. 408 So presentedness, n. philosophy of C. D. Broad) the awareness of this primeness, n. 1923 Sci. Thought ii. 75 We probability, n. 1914 Perception ii. 150 The quasi-, comb. form 1925 Mind & its Place iv. 21 regularity 1925 Mind & its Place x. 457 relationist, n. (and a.) 1923 Sci. Thought iii. 89 Th relativist, n. (and a.) 1914 Perception v. 286 It is retro-, prefix 1962 Lect. Psychical Res. 40 Russellian, a. and n. 1923 Sci. Thought xiii. 534 sensal, a. 1938 Exam. McTaggart's Philo sense, n. 1925 Mind & its Place iv. 19 sensum 1923 Sci. Thought viii. 240 spatio-temporal, a. 1923 Sci. Thought x. 403 Sci sufficient, a. (adv., n.) 1923 Sci. Thought xiii. 499 tele- 1962 Lect. on Psychical Res. teleological, a. 1930 Five Types of Ethical T tie, n. 1923 Sci. Thought ii. 75 Tak transience 1914 Perception ii. 105 Leib translational, a. 1923 Sci. Thought xi. 433 A **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sat Feb 21 08:24:03 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2009 08:24:03 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Analytic-Philosophy 'Seminars' That Made (20th Century) History Message-ID: Where the seeds were planted and grown, as it were. I'm not familiar as to how you would title what you do. I'm sure this below is _not_ a seminar. I think it was advertised by Grice (and Strawson) as the 'summer school' which looks very fine if you _are_ in Irvine. But I'll drop it as the contribution: 1971. Summer school -- Formal Semantics. Key note speakers [don't you hate that soubriquet? It's so derogatory to the others! And who's key is _so subjective_] Grice Strawson outcome of the seminar: seminar-paper (almost), Grice, Lectures on Logic and Reality. --- In "Reply to Richards", Grice recalls this was the most formal he would ever get. I believe Strawson credits the seminar in the preface to "Subject and predicate in logic and linguistics". --- Weeding glasses at the Seminar. Analytic Philosophy: The Seminar and the Seminal seminario, Italian: a piece of ground where seeds ar planted cfr. ginnasio --- both seminario (in the newish academic use) and ginnasio are of course Austro-German borrowings, almost) 1959 Times Lit. Suppl. 29 May 322/4 The seminar-paper tends to provide..a fence-sitting indecision. In a message dated 2/21/2009 7:22:44 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: >Let me tell you a little story ... related to me by >the late Cal Rollins, a student of Wittgenstein's. Rollins was >assigned --- That was a charming story. I too must check now with photos of Broad. The glasses bit is very _distracting_ (for his sensa I mean -- in Argentina people wearing glasses not only do not get passes but are derogatorily called "quatrocci", Italian for four-eyed. I'm glad he "to have peered over his glasses" to make the comment. Indeed, there is like something about 'other minds' that glasses block -- I'm using block in Dennett's sense: block, n. (1) (shortened from mental block) A sort of organic stoprule or safety valve that prevents people from going crazy when they consider thought experiments exploiting combinatorial explosion. "It's a good thing I had a block just then! I was getting a trifle dizzy when he started going on about storing all the possible descriptions of the universe in a book made out of tiny galaxies pretending they're electrons." n. (2) A small but obdurate obstacle preventing the smooth operation of a mechanism, a spanner in the works. Hence, mental block, an objection to functionalism obsessively maintained in the face of all manner of refutations, blandishments and appeals to common cause. ---- Anyway, these would have been _reading_ glasses then. I once bought a pair of those. Actually I bought them, I recall, at a plant 'nursery', and I bought them because I liked the little silk bag they came with. It read, 'weedin' glasses', which I thought was appropriate for the task I had set them for. My friends smarted me out. ---- Anyway, I found this about Rollins which I'd generalise to any teaching method for analytic philosophy. Personally, I would have start the P. I. backwards. What I _love_ about P. I. is that it _is_ in German. I would totally skip the English. My German is good enough, and Wittgenstein's German is not like Goethe's. What amazes me today is that philosophy students are not required to speak the lingo's! Never mind first-order lingo -- for this is really the ABC of philosophy: hempel, adj. (only in the idiom hempel-minded) Said of one who insists on recasting the problem in the first order logic. Dennett. I mean German, and French and Descartes, and, well Spanish for Unamuno if you Must -- You shouldn't -- or Greek and Latin. There's ALWAYS a good translation, for surely we are not going to trust what the student can grasp out of Gavagai. But it keeps an open mind (I'm using this phrase seeing that Clark has just distributed a note on a colloquium on Open Minds with PHILOS-L) on the fact that philosophy is written in the many tongues of men (to use the Biblical phrase and title of J. R. Firth's book). ---- And I _love_ bilingual editions like the "P. I.". Anyway, here is the Rollins related bit: "I had often thought back on his seminar on (the later) Wittgenstein as the ideal learning experience. His simple method was to take us through the Philosophical Investigations in the first half of the semester ... and then start all over again! This was one of the very few times in my life when I have been able to indulge the desire one feels after finishing any great book: Oh, if only I had the time to read that over again right now! Having been "primed" by the first run-through, you are really ready to appreciate it the second time: You know what to look for, you have many questions in mind, you are alert to many clues, etc." --- I title this a 'seminar' because it's a word sometimes abused in academia. And I'm not sure if this by Dennett has a sexual innuendo about it brodbeck, n. A female expert in a predominantly male field, especially one who can carry the extra load involved. Cheers, J. L. (male, etc.) **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Sat Feb 21 11:02:01 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2009 16:02:01 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: <200902202116.14437.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <5B87E2BA61584AD4B0573D3E5C63E194@DFLVQC1J> <200902202116.14437.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <1A3F8F2D879E4138BD617E002D4211ED@DFLVQC1J> Hi Roger, I can understand your bafflement, but the explanation is really quite simple. When Popper first came to England in 1935, he attended a meeting of the Aristotelian Society at which Bertrand Russell presented a paper on empiricism. Popper made several contributions to the discussion which were greeted with gracious laughter and applause. The audience thought he was being witty when, in fact, he was in deadly earnest. When it became clear to the audience that he was being serious, they mistakenly thought he was waging an attack on science, when he was actually trying to champion it. The problem is that Popper rejects the authoritarian, or 'justificationist,' presuppositions of the Western philosophical tradition, proposing instead a critical or fallibilist approach. But unless that 'paradigm change' is made clear, people interpret him in terms of justificationism and thus MISinterpret him as a relativist or a nihilist. (See the first thirty pages of chapter 1 of Popper's 'Realism and the Aim of Science;' also, W W Bartley's 'The Retreat to Commitment.') So, to be brief: 1. when I talk of 'knowledge' I mean fallible knowledge, i.e., stuff that may be false, but stuff that is an improvement on what we had before; 2. the growth of knowledge means replacing old theories with better ones, so it depends upon criticism; 3. consensus is thus a sign of stagnation, the death of knowledge; 4. there are plenty of disagreements in mathematics (fortunately), between formalists, intuitionists, etc., as well as over particular theorems, proofs or methods of proof, such as Gentzen's transfinite induction; 5. I agree that there is much greater rigour in mathematics than in philosophy and also that rigour has its advantages, but given that there can be no absolute proof of consistency, we never know whether or not some new paradox will turn up, necessitating an overhaul of the whole structure and leading to the rejection of propositions previously accepted as indubitable (it has happened before!); 6. of course, I think this is less likely than that contemporary philosophical wisdom will be overturned. Do you still find me puzzling? Danny From rbj at rbjones.com Sun Feb 22 10:42:16 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Sun, 22 Feb 2009 15:42:16 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: <1A3F8F2D879E4138BD617E002D4211ED@DFLVQC1J> References: <5B87E2BA61584AD4B0573D3E5C63E194@DFLVQC1J> <200902202116.14437.rbj@rbjones.com> <1A3F8F2D879E4138BD617E002D4211ED@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <200902221542.16917.rbj@rbjones.com> Danny, Thanks for the clarification of your position, which is now less puzzling to me. I shall abstain from commenting about critical- and pan-critical- rationalism for the present since this would take up more time and energy than I can spare for it right now. However, I am unable to resist responding to your observation about the status of mathematics. On Saturday 21 February 2009 16:02:01 Danny Frederick wrote: > 4. there are plenty of disagreements in mathematics (fortunately), > between formalists, intuitionists, etc., as well as over particular > theorems, proofs or methods of proof, such as Gentzen's transfinite > induction; These disagreements are disagreements belonging to the philosophy of mathematics or to the foundations of mathematics. The practice of mathematics is remarkably unscathed by such controversy. In particular, "Gentzen's transfinite induction" is I believe controversial only because he used it to prove the consistency of arithmetic. The controversy is not about whether transfinite induction is sound or about whether arithmetic is consistent, but rather about whether the use of the former to prove the latter adds anything to our confidence in that proposition. In mainstream mathematics, the full resources of ZFC are deployed without controversy, and the induction principles available in that context are very much stronger than are needed to prove the consistency of arithmetic. Progress in mathematics does not depend upon, or even make use of, criticism of established results, and I would be interested to know of any examples you have of disagreement among mathematicians about the truth of supposedly proven mathematical propositions. This is of course connected to my as yet unsatisified request for an example of a proposition of mathematics which has been accepted as refuted by some empirical observation. I do aknowledge that there is controversy about what methods of proof are acceptable. This is not the same as controversy about the truth of propositions of mathematics, and again, perhaps surprisingly, does not arise from or lead to any such controversy. Roger Jones From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Sun Feb 22 11:43:59 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Sun, 22 Feb 2009 16:43:59 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: <200902221542.16917.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <5B87E2BA61584AD4B0573D3E5C63E194@DFLVQC1J> <200902202116.14437.rbj@rbjones.com> <1A3F8F2D879E4138BD617E002D4211ED@DFLVQC1J> <200902221542.16917.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <5E38779ED856407381B3B4ECB67CFF7C@DFLVQC1J> Hi Roger, Like you I will be brief, partly because I am too out of touch with this stuff to say too much (I have not done this sort of thing since I was an undergrad), and partly because I am busy with something else. But, for what it is worth, here goes. It seems to me arbitrary to consign disagreements about methods of proof to the philosophy of mathematics. First, the people who disagree over such things are often leading mathematicians, such as Brouwer, Hilbert, Gentzen and so on. Second, even if they were all to say that they are doing philosophy when they disagree, we would have, I think, to regard that as a joke. It matters to mathematics what counts as an acceptable proof because if something has not been (acceptably) proved, then it may be false. As I mentioned in an earlier mail, Lakatos' 'Proofs and Refutations' gives examples from the history of mathematics of propositions once accepted by mathematicians as 'indubitably proven' which were later rejected as false. It seems plain that this can only be a recurring phenomenon where there is doubt about the reliability of the method used to prove a theorem. The fact that the consistency of arithmetic can be proved in a stronger theory only raises the question of the consistency of the stronger theory. The fact that no one questions the consistency (if it is a fact) is not a proof of consistency. If a new paradox turns up, some propositions currently accepted by some as indubitable may be rejected as false. Russell's discovery of the paradoxes was a criticism of established results, leading Frege to remark that 'arithmetic totters' (or something similar) and leading to progress in the form of different attempts to avoid the antinomies, some more elegant than others. On the question of an empirical refutation of a mathematical proposition, I indicated earlier that the dividing line between maths and physics has not always been clear (is it now?), so some propositions may have been regarded as belonging to mathematics until they were refuted empirically. Cheers. Danny From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sun Feb 22 11:51:23 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sun, 22 Feb 2009 08:51:23 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Methods of Proof: Re: Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: <200902221542.16917.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <749009.61993.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com> This, and Danny's earlier remarks, are interesting. Bishop raises an interesting matter of the relation of the methods of proof and confidence in the proof's validity. Although I wouldn't qualify as a "C" level logicians, I have always had an interest, particularly in the relation of set theory an logic. For example, a theorem in some systems can be derived in more ways that one. In another system the number of available proofs varies. So, in a sense, one can imagine the possibility of a metric for redundancy in methods of proof. Optimally a method of proof would have no redundancy. Another idea crossed my mind, which I never pursued (probably for good reason). If we consider propositions as points and proofs as finite sets of points, then one wonders about the possibility of using certain theorems in topology in proof theory. Here is a "wild" case, one for which I make no claims except to illustrate the general point. If we think of all the propositions in propositional calculus as contained within a bounded interval, and a proof as a sort of 'cover' in the sense of a subclass of open intervals which contains the union of the members of all propositions, then couldn't we use something like the Heine-Borel Theorem to prove that a proof covers all subclasses of propositions? A far more general question might be: Is something like Godel numbering essential for some of these metatheorems? I just thought I'd throw this out. I'm nt working in logic, but Roger raises an interesting point about the relation of proof methods and epistemic adequacy. (I'll regret bringing up this silly idea of Heine-Borel by monday). Anyway, this is a good exchange. Regards Steve Bayne --- On Sun, 2/22/09, Roger Bishop Jones wrote: From: Roger Bishop Jones Subject: Re: Clarity Is Not Enough To: "Danny Frederick" Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Sunday, February 22, 2009, 10:42 AM Danny, Thanks for the clarification of your position, which is now less puzzling to me. I shall abstain from commenting about critical- and pan-critical- rationalism for the present since this would take up more time and energy than I can spare for it right now. However, I am unable to resist responding to your observation about the status of mathematics. On Saturday 21 February 2009 16:02:01 Danny Frederick wrote: > 4. there are plenty of disagreements in mathematics (fortunately), > between formalists, intuitionists, etc., as well as over particular > theorems, proofs or methods of proof, such as Gentzen's transfinite > induction; These disagreements are disagreements belonging to the philosophy of mathematics or to the foundations of mathematics. The practice of mathematics is remarkably unscathed by such controversy. In particular, "Gentzen's transfinite induction" is I believe controversial only because he used it to prove the consistency of arithmetic. The controversy is not about whether transfinite induction is sound or about whether arithmetic is consistent, but rather about whether the use of the former to prove the latter adds anything to our confidence in that proposition. In mainstream mathematics, the full resources of ZFC are deployed without controversy, and the induction principles available in that context are very much stronger than are needed to prove the consistency of arithmetic. Progress in mathematics does not depend upon, or even make use of, criticism of established results, and I would be interested to know of any examples you have of disagreement among mathematicians about the truth of supposedly proven mathematical propositions. This is of course connected to my as yet unsatisified request for an example of a proposition of mathematics which has been accepted as refuted by some empirical observation. I do aknowledge that there is controversy about what methods of proof are acceptable. This is not the same as controversy about the truth of propositions of mathematics, and again, perhaps surprisingly, does not arise from or lead to any such controversy. Roger Jones -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Sun Feb 22 12:15:18 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Sun, 22 Feb 2009 17:15:18 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] The Fundamental Triple-Dichotomy Message-ID: <200902221715.18354.rbj@rbjones.com> I have in mind, at present, writing a short monograph entitled: The Fundamental Triple-Dichotomy an overblown name for what may first have appeared as "Hume's Fork" but whose predecessors can be traced through the entire history of Western philosophy. The monograph (as presently conceived) will hang around a presentation of Hume's fork, and a contemporary re-presentation of the "triple-dichotomy". To this will be added some lightweight historical material covering related themes in the period before Hume as far back as early Greek philosophy, and also tracing the evolution of the dichtomies since Hume. Finally I intend to add to my re-presentation of the dichotomies various refinements which will include discussing the problem of regress in semantics, the problem of defining the division with maximal precision, and the question of whether a language of sets can provide a "universal" foundation for abstract semantics. I hope to discuss the various positions which I will present in this monograph here on hist-analytic, as they develop. I am especially out-on-a-limb (or out of my depth) when attempting to write about the history of philosophy, since I am a poor scholar, so I'm hoping for lots of criticism in that area, though perhaps it may be more vigorous in relation to the central proposal. To begin this process I present here in its most concise form the epicenter of my re-presentation of the dichotomies, which are of course the Necessary/Contingent Analytic/Synthetic and a priori/a posteriori dichotomies. For the purposes of this concise presentation I will assume understood the notion of logical necessity, taking this to be a characteristic of propositions consisting in their being true in every possible world (which idea I leave unexplained for now). I next propose that a sentence, together with sufficient context to disambiguate its truth conditions, should be said to be analytic iff it expresses a necessary proposition. I further propose that the term "a priori" should be used to talk of the epistemic status of a proposition, in particular of the kind of evidence we would expect to find in the justification of a claim to knowledge of the proposition, noting the distinction between this and any usage of the term to refer to the manner in which the truth of the proposition may have been discovered (rather than established). I propose in this that we should accept a priori justification for a propositon iff it is a necessary proposition and an a posteriori justification iff the proposition is contingent. In summary I have made certain proposals about how we should use the words in question, and about what we should demand in justification of claims to knowledge the effect of which is to make the three dichotomies in question co-extensive, the first two being so of necessity and analytically. This position is described in greater detail at the following URL: http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/epistem/rbj013.htm and is supported by a mathematical model at: http://rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/epistem/rbj014.htm both written more than a decade ago. The position is of course, not novel. It is Hume's fork, and it is very close to the position in these matters of the logical positivists, held by many philsophers to have been decisively "refuted" in recent times. I invite criticism. Roger Jones From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Feb 22 19:10:26 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 22 Feb 2009 19:10:26 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Hume's Fork Message-ID: Not really comments worth commenting! but for the sake of history of analytic philosophy -- and now to see the Oscars! -- Cheers, JLS. or Furca Humii ---- Apparently it was Ayers who termed it thus: >I think this is the basis for what Ayers >termed Hume's fork philosophicalneuron.blogspot.com/2008/10/humes-fork-revisited.html This is good as I like Ayers -- very Oxon, right? That would be Michael R. Ayers. born 1935. one of the "Professors of Philosophy", plain -- i.e. not a Waynflete. Studied St. John's so I expect he had Grice as tutor. Oops. no, this is "St. John's Cantab"! Sorry about that. Fellow of Wadham, tutor of Colin McGinn (Born Newcastle -- see "Memoirs of a philosopher" and also this for McGinn's uncharitable view of a man he never _knew_: Grice). Also tutor of Child who has written on Grice for Aristotelian Society (vis a vis "Intention and uncertainty"). The wiki: >Michael Ayers's research focuses are in the history of philosophy So "Hume's Fork" to be taken seriously. While OED does not recognise "Hume's fork" -- it does use 'fork' to mean 'dilemma': 1670 HOBBES Behemoth (1840) 214 "Declining the force of true reason by verbal forks..distinctions that signify nothing." But we trust Hume's was a _real_ (to use Austin's trouser-word), almost, 'un. Congratulations on the rewrite of those two links. It will take some time for me to process them. But thanks for sharing and inviting criticism. I've copied and pasted the symbols Bishop uses and then pressed, 'plain text' and so they disappeared -- but we know what they mean. I say that because it may be good to have equivalents for those symbols in plain-text, too. Below the result of the pasting. In a message dated 2/22/2009 12:28:27 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, rbj at rbjones.com writes: >The Fundamental Triple-Dichotomy >an overblown name for what may first have appeared as "Hume's Fork" Indeed from wiki: >Hume's fork is often stated in such a way that statements are divided up into two types: >Statements about ideas - these are analytic, necessary statements that are knowable a priori. >Statements about the world - these are synthetic, contingent, and knowable a posteriori. --- no hit in the OED for the expression Hume's Fork, though, so far. but _mailto:oed3 at oup.co.uk_ (mailto:oed3 at oup.co.uk) which is about time, since the wiki article mentions: Blackburn, S. W. 'Hume's Fork.' Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. OUP 1996. --- Similar thing happened with 'implicature'. It was included in Oxford Dictionary of Linguistics but only recently made it to the OED -- which is perhaps just as well. I'm surprised the OED does not mention Yogi Berra's Fork, either. :( Bunnin N. and J. Yu 'Hume's Fork.' Blackwell's Dictionary of Western Philosophy. Blackwells, 2004. ----- special symbols forallx: A.P asserts the formua P (which may contain free occurrences of the variable x) for all value of x in A existsx: A.P asserts the formua P (which may contain free occurrences of the variable x) for some value of x in A notP the logical negation of P membera B or a:Ba is a member the set B function space A B the set whose members are the functions with domain A and co-domain B cartesian product A X B the set whose members are all the ordered pairs of which the first element is a member of A and the second a member of B A descriptive language is a 6-tuple consisting of: A set of sentences S. A set of contexts C. A set of possible worlds W. A set of proposions P. A semantic map m (SC)P. A propositional evaluation map v (PW){T,F,U}. ---- **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From rbj at rbjones.com Mon Feb 23 05:59:34 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 10:59:34 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Methods of Proof: Re: Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: <749009.61993.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <749009.61993.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <200902231059.34248.rbj@rbjones.com> On Sunday 22 February 2009 16:51:23 steve bayne wrote: > For example, a theorem in some systems > can be derived in more ways that one. In another system > the number of available proofs varies. So, in a sense, one > can imagine the possibility of a metric for redundancy in > methods of proof. Probably not actually, because in most systems you can include aribtrary irrelevancies in a proof and this results in there being infinitely many proofs of every proposition. Since these are all countable infinities (unless we admit infinitary logics) all propositions either have no proof or countably many and you don't get a metric. > Optimally a method of proof would have > no redundancy. Proof theorists do use cut-elimination to normalise proofs, which does reduce the number of distinct proofs of the same proposition. Whether this amounts to elimination of redundancy is moot. > If we consider propositions as points and proofs as > finite sets of points, then one wonders about the possibility > of using certain theorems in topology in proof theory. Proofs are normally considered as having more structure than a finite set of propositions, one expect to be told from which intermediate propositions each proposition is arrived at and by what rule. > Here is a "wild" case, one for which I make no claims except to > illustrate the general point. If we think of all the propositions > in propositional calculus as contained within a bounded > interval, and a proof as a sort of 'cover' in the sense of a > subclass of open intervals which contains the union of > the members of all propositions, then couldn't we use > something like the Heine-Borel Theorem to prove that a > proof covers all subclasses of propositions? Not clear to me which subclasses of which classes of propositions you are talking about here. I'm not myself aware of any results along these lines. > A far more > general question might be: Is something like Godel numbering > essential for some of these metatheorems? In general, to reason about language A in language B one must be able to represent the syntax of A in the ontology of B. If B is arithmetic then this is called "arithmetisation" and Godel numbers (as in the original papers) are an arithmetisation of a version of the language of Principia Mathematica. Godel would probably not have chosen arithmetic for his "metalanguage" if he had not been intent on proving the incompleteness of arithetic. Set theory is a better vehicle for metatheory, and in this case one would encode the syntax directly as sets rather than arithmetically. Roger From rbj at rbjones.com Mon Feb 23 06:40:33 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 11:40:33 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Hume's Fork In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <200902231140.33954.rbj@rbjones.com> On Monday 23 February 2009 00:10:26 Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: > Congratulations on the rewrite of those two links. It will take some time > for me to process them. But thanks for sharing and inviting criticism. Sorry to have given the impression that I had rewritten them, which hasn't happened recently. I do plan a more extensive presentation, but I intend to leave these alone, and my first desire is to see what objections are raised against them (with which I remain in substantial agreement, the only change I am inclined to in the mathematical model would be to properly adopt the course in the prose version in which analyticity is explicitly defined in terms of necessity). > I've copied and pasted the symbols Bishop uses and then pressed, 'plain > text' and so they disappeared -- but we know what they mean. I say that > because it may be good to have equivalents for those symbols in plain-text, > too. My present inclination is to make the proposed monograph symbol-free, but until I get much further I won't really know how cumbersome that would be. Rpger From baynesrb at yahoo.com Mon Feb 23 08:46:00 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 05:46:00 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Methods of Proof: Re: Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: <200902231059.34248.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <632722.91718.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> "In general, to reason about language A in language B one must be able to represent the syntax of A in the ontology of B." I agree with most all of what you have said here, but I'm not sure about the above. Some maintain no ontology involved in logic at all. Now I don't agree with this, but we have to be clear before passing on to other matters. Can you give me an example of how syntax is represented in ontology. Now a point on structure. My interest here is redundancy in a logical system. When you speak of "languages" I take it you mean canonical or formal languages, if so then I think there is a difference in how redundancy is to be regarded. For example, in making the grammar of a natural language explicit lack of redundancy has always been considered a virtue. So when you are setting up principles or parameters that will "generate" (as in "generative syntax") all on only the sentences of a given language alternatives must be evaluated and redundancy in the *application* of a rule becomes paramount. Now in logic there is a difference. Let me give an example. In some proofs of both up and down versions of Lowenheim/Skolem the occurrence of vacuous quantifiers makes no difference, so that there is nothing really wrong with '(Ex)(Ey)(Ez)Fxy', but in standard linguistic theory, where natural languages are the "object language" there is nothing wrong with this. So my point was this: if you set up an two axiomatic systems, and one involves less redundancy then that is the better one. Redundancy would be determined by how many ways a theorem can be proven; the more ways of doing it the more redundancy. The quantificacional example I've given above would if duplicated in standard linguistic theory would yield massive over generation. In logic this doesn't lead to inconsistency but my point was, in part, to raise the question whether the linguistic case and the logic case are similar. One other thing: If you take redundancy to mean repeated application of a rule, then it might be that in the sense I intend, a system like Hilbert's would be less redundant than, say, Frege's. I suppose formalization of arithmetic and the formalization of natural language may differ here. Finally, on topology. There is a connection here. Tarski wrote on it briefly and there have been others. It might be argued, and I think not without reason that topology is a branch of model theory; the connection, notwithstanding the flawed suggestion of Heine-Borel (perhaps) seems pretty clear. Anyway, I think we need to get clear on what, precisely, you take to be ontology and its relation to syntax. Steve Bayne --- On Mon, 2/23/09, Roger Bishop Jones wrote: > From: Roger Bishop Jones > Subject: Re: Methods of Proof: Re: Clarity Is Not Enough > To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com > Date: Monday, February 23, 2009, 5:59 AM > On Sunday 22 February 2009 16:51:23 steve bayne wrote: > > > For example, a theorem in some systems > > can be derived in more ways that one. In another > system > > the number of available proofs varies. So, in a sense, > one > > can imagine the possibility of a metric for redundancy > in > > methods of proof. > > Probably not actually, because in most systems you can > include aribtrary irrelevancies in a proof and this results > in there being infinitely many proofs of every proposition. > Since these are all countable infinities (unless we admit > infinitary logics) all propositions either have no proof > or countably many and you don't get a metric. > > > Optimally a method of proof would have > > no redundancy. > > Proof theorists do use cut-elimination to normalise > proofs, which does reduce the number of distinct proofs > of the same proposition. Whether this amounts to > elimination of redundancy is moot. > > > If we consider propositions as points and proofs as > > finite sets of points, then one wonders about the > possibility > > of using certain theorems in topology in proof theory. > > Proofs are normally considered as having more structure > than > a finite set of propositions, one expect to be told from > which > intermediate propositions each proposition is arrived at > and by > what rule. > > > Here is a "wild" case, one for which I make > no claims except to > > illustrate the general point. If we think of all the > propositions > > in propositional calculus as contained within a > bounded > > interval, and a proof as a sort of 'cover' in > the sense of a > > subclass of open intervals which contains the union of > > the members of all propositions, then couldn't we > use > > something like the Heine-Borel Theorem to prove that a > > proof covers all subclasses of propositions? > > Not clear to me which subclasses of which classes of > propositions you are talking about here. > I'm not myself aware of any results along these lines. > > > A far more > > general question might be: Is something like Godel > numbering > > essential for some of these metatheorems? > > In general, to reason about language A in language B one > must > be able to represent the syntax of A in the ontology of B. > If B is arithmetic then this is called > "arithmetisation" > and Godel numbers (as in the original papers) are an > arithmetisation > of a version of the language of Principia Mathematica. > Godel would probably not have chosen arithmetic for his > "metalanguage" > if he had not been intent on proving the incompleteness of > arithetic. Set theory is a better vehicle for metatheory, > and in this case one would encode the syntax directly as > sets > rather than arithmetically. > > Roger From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Feb 23 09:05:00 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 09:05:00 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Hume's Fork Message-ID: "If you see a fork in the middle of a road -- take it" Y. Berra. philosophically explained online by a French Canadian. In Reply to Bishop's post. In a message dated 2/23/2009 8:29:54 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, rbj @rbjones.com writes: >>Congratulations on the rewrite of those two links. It will take some time >>for me to process them. But thanks for sharing and inviting criticism. >Sorry to have given the impression that I had rewritten them, >which hasn't happened recently. ---- Right. I was going by the footnote, "written --. updated ..." It's always good to write 'update'. It doesn't mean rewritten; it means 'I still keep a look on these'. >I do plan a more extensive presentation, but I intend to leave >these alone, Yes. Do. >and my first desire is to see what objections >are raised against them (with which I remain in substantial >agreement, the only change I am inclined to in the mathematical >model would be to properly adopt the course in the prose version >in which analyticity is explicitly defined in terms of necessity). Good, and it _is_ good to use symbols; many indeed say that mathematics is like a big 'shorthand' -- where indeed symbols should not inhibit us at all; as you write in your notes. Also, as you say, it's set theory which as you yourself say, is not necessarily part of mathematics, but of general ontology as I'd prefer. For example, Vanderveken & Searle attempt that in "Foundations of illocutionary logic". My tutor liked that book. And he told me he talked to Searle about it. Having Searle reply, "Well, I never wrote that book; it was the French-Canadian Vanderveken". Knowing them both, and loving them both, I think Searle was hyperbolizing, typically. >My present inclination is to make the proposed monograph symbol-free, >but until I get much further I won't really know how cumbersome >that would be. Exactly. I think it's very good to use a few symbols. Notably you use (x) (Ex) And then you sometimes quantify over worlds (w) (Ew) Then you do need some assignment of universe of discourse to prove that the Fork succeeds; i.e. that the class of analytically true sentences is extensively identical to the class of necessary, a priori propositions. I tend to remember that you don't claim to treat 'a priori' there, though. I am fascinated by the 'fork' in that I think Ayers was mistaken, and mistakes others in the history of philosophy. One google hit for "Hume's fork" read, with indignation: "No, of course Hume's fork did _Not_ spawn empiricism; Empiricism goes back to Aristotle!" As Bishop has edited the Locke Essay, one indeed may think that the fork Hume borrowed from Locke but never returned. There was a reference to the Hume Fork in a Locke bibliography, online -- by an author with a German surname. So possibly Ayers (who wrote on Locke) is aware that much of this is Locke's fork. Borges wrote, "The garden of forking paths". In that story, from what I recall, a fork does not need to be 'double', i.e. two extremes. The Latin 'furka' was indeed a _rake_ and I still to see a two-extreme furca; they all seem to be sort of tridents. Your triple dichotomy I see more like a double entry thing -- but I don't know what the technical term for such kind of display is. As you note, each dichotomy (or dieresis, using Platonic terminology) rests on a different criteria. But this does not mean that the result classes could not be co-extensional, as you proceed to prove. I should check with Blackburn's entry, "Hume's Fork" in the Dictionary of Philosophy. I hope he does credit Ayers and gives the locus classicus in Ayers. Then we can see if we can criticise that. I know Bishop is into ideas, not labels -- no-one more than Bishop would disagree with Hobbes's cite -- mentioned in my previous post, that forks are merely 'verbal'. When I did the fork as an undergraduate, my tutor was a Kripkean; so for him, the fork did not apply at all. Since each criteria for each dichotomy (or dieresis) explicitly indicate that we are talking along _different_ tracks. In a document I was reading recently (Barbara Partee, Reflections on a formal semanticist as of 2005) she amusingly recalls a conversation with Kaplan. Partee was discussing modal logic ('necessary propositions vs. contingent propositions') with him, and she expressed a curiosity as to why Quine is so against them (this was 1970-1971). He said, "Well, back in the day, Quine _was_ justified; modal logic was _very_ vague; but now that it isn't it's just his lingering prejudice"). What fascinates me about the necessary/contingent (the 'justificatory' a priori/a posteriori is problematic on its own -- cfr. Danny Frederick's _anti-justificationism_ spawning from Popper) is: * The variety of native speaker intuitions on the matter. The thesis cited by Sampson in "Making Sense" still makes a lot of sense for me. Speakers do disagree as to how necessary is "Spring follows Winter". * What I call Burton-Roberts's paradox. He is, if anyone is, a neo-Strawsonian (unlike Grice, it's a rarer species). And he discusses modality in terms of the square of opposition. What we cannot deny is that a 'necessary proposition' IS a contingent one (and more). So the dichotomy _has_ to be explained formally to avoid the odious implicature, "It _is_ necessarily so" (echoing Porgy and Bess) therefore, "it is _not_ contingently so". Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From rbj at rbjones.com Mon Feb 23 10:10:32 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 15:10:32 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Methods of Proof: Re: Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: <632722.91718.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <632722.91718.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <200902231510.32768.rbj@rbjones.com> On Monday 23 February 2009 13:46:00 steve bayne wrote: > "In general, to reason about language A in language B one must > be able to represent the syntax of A in the ontology of B." > > I agree with most all of what you have said here, but I'm not > sure about the above. Some maintain no ontology involved in > logic at all. Now I don't agree with this, but we have to be > clear before passing on to other matters. Can you give me an > example of how syntax is represented in ontology. Now a point > on structure. Its convenient to assume the existence of the things you want to talk about, technically it might be possible to avoid this but it would be cumbersome. Typically we chose a metalanguage which does not assume the existence of syntactic objects, but presumes an ontology sufficient to represent them. The most common examples are arithmetic, in which the existence of the natural numbers is presumed, and set theory in which the existence of a rich variety of sets is presumed. In the former case we speak about syntax via arithmetisation, in the latter using some way of coding up syntactic objects as sets (it would also be possible to do this via arithmetisation given that we have ways of representing numbers as sets). > My interest here is redundancy in a logical system. When you > speak of "languages" I take it you mean canonical or formal > languages, if so then I think there is a difference in how > redundancy is to be regarded. For example, in making the > grammar of a natural language explicit lack of redundancy > has always been considered a virtue. So when you are setting > up principles or parameters that will "generate" (as in > "generative syntax") all on only the sentences of a given > language alternatives must be evaluated and redundancy in the > *application* of a rule becomes paramount. Now in logic there > is a difference. Let me give an example. In some proofs of > both up and down versions of Lowenheim/Skolem the occurrence > of vacuous quantifiers makes no difference, so that there is > nothing really wrong with '(Ex)(Ey)(Ez)Fxy', but in standard > linguistic theory, where natural languages are the "object > language" there is nothing wrong with this. So my point was > this: if you set up an two axiomatic systems, and one involves > less redundancy then that is the better one. Redundancy would > be determined by how many ways a theorem can be proven; the > more ways of doing it the more redundancy. The quantificacional > example I've given above would if duplicated in standard > linguistic theory would yield massive over generation. In logic > this doesn't lead to inconsistency but my point was, in part, > to raise the question whether the linguistic case and the > logic case are similar. One other thing: If you take redundancy > to mean repeated application of a rule, then it might be that in > the sense I intend, a system like Hilbert's would be less > redundant than, say, Frege's. I suppose formalization of > arithmetic and the formalization of natural language may > differ here. I can certainly see certain kinds of redundancy which it is usual to avoid if possible. The classic example in first order theories is the preference for axiomatisations of a theory in which none of the axioms can be proven from any combination of the others. Similar considerations would apply to rules. As far as syntax is concerned some redundancy is common. For example, repetition is often achieved by recursion, and this will often lead to harmlessly ambiguous parse trees, Similarly with proofs, where for example a linear conception of forward proof leaves open the order in which lemmas are proven. > Finally, on topology. > There is a connection here. Tarski wrote on it briefly and there > have been others. It might be argued, and I think not without > reason that topology is a branch of model theory; the connection, > notwithstanding the flawed suggestion of Heine-Borel (perhaps) seems > pretty clear. I'm sure there are connections. For example, one way of constructing models for positive set theory is topological. > Anyway, I think we need to get clear on what, precisely, you > take to be ontology and its relation to syntax. I hope the above helps in that. regards, Roger From baynesrb at yahoo.com Mon Feb 23 10:27:26 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 07:27:26 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Methods of Proof: Re: Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: <200902231510.32768.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <411850.68825.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com> I'm pretty sure I get what you are talking about w.r.t the metalanguage stuff. But take this fragment: "represent the syntax of A in the ontology of B." Could you give an example of syntax being represented "in the ontology"? I appreciate your comments on redundancy. Sometimes when we are searching for a criterion for opting for one system over another simplicity is a consideration. I think there is a connection between simplicity and redundancy. It's worth mentioning that redundancy in nature is very common. But if we think of metalanguages as constructed redundancy takes on a different significance. Or so it seems. Regards STeve --- On Mon, 2/23/09, Roger Bishop Jones wrote: > From: Roger Bishop Jones > Subject: Re: Methods of Proof: Re: Clarity Is Not Enough > To: baynesrb at yahoo.com > Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.com > Date: Monday, February 23, 2009, 10:10 AM > On Monday 23 February 2009 13:46:00 steve bayne wrote: > > "In general, to reason about language A in > language B one must > > be able to represent the syntax of A in the ontology > of B." > > > > I agree with most all of what you have said here, but > I'm not > > sure about the above. Some maintain no ontology > involved in > > logic at all. Now I don't agree with this, but we > have to be > > clear before passing on to other matters. Can you give > me an > > example of how syntax is represented in ontology. Now > a point > > on structure. > > Its convenient to assume the existence of the things you > want to talk about, technically it might be possible to > avoid this but it would be cumbersome. > > Typically we chose a metalanguage which does not assume > the existence of syntactic objects, but presumes an > ontology sufficient to represent them. > The most common examples are arithmetic, in which the > existence of the natural numbers is presumed, and set > theory in which the existence of a rich variety of > sets is presumed. In the former case we speak about > syntax via arithmetisation, in the latter using some > way of coding up syntactic objects as sets (it would > also be possible to do this via arithmetisation given > that we have ways of representing numbers as sets). > > > My interest here is redundancy in a logical system. > When you > > speak of "languages" I take it you mean > canonical or formal > > languages, if so then I think there is a difference in > how > > redundancy is to be regarded. For example, in making > the > > grammar of a natural language explicit lack of > redundancy > > has always been considered a virtue. So when you are > setting > > up principles or parameters that will > "generate" (as in > > "generative syntax") all on only the > sentences of a given > > language alternatives must be evaluated and redundancy > in the > > *application* of a rule becomes paramount. Now in > logic there > > is a difference. Let me give an example. In some > proofs of > > both up and down versions of Lowenheim/Skolem the > occurrence > > of vacuous quantifiers makes no difference, so that > there is > > nothing really wrong with '(Ex)(Ey)(Ez)Fxy', > but in standard > > linguistic theory, where natural languages are the > "object > > language" there is nothing wrong with this. So my > point was > > this: if you set up an two axiomatic systems, and one > involves > > less redundancy then that is the better one. > Redundancy would > > be determined by how many ways a theorem can be > proven; the > > more ways of doing it the more redundancy. The > quantificacional > > example I've given above would if duplicated in > standard > > linguistic theory would yield massive over generation. > In logic > > this doesn't lead to inconsistency but my point > was, in part, > > to raise the question whether the linguistic case and > the > > logic case are similar. One other thing: If you take > redundancy > > to mean repeated application of a rule, then it might > be that in > > the sense I intend, a system like Hilbert's would > be less > > redundant than, say, Frege's. I suppose > formalization of > > arithmetic and the formalization of natural language > may > > differ here. > > I can certainly see certain kinds of redundancy which it is > usual to avoid if possible. > The classic example in first order theories is the > preference > for axiomatisations of a theory in which none of the axioms > can be proven from any combination of the others. > Similar considerations would apply to rules. > > As far as syntax is concerned some redundancy is common. > For example, repetition is often achieved by recursion, > and this will often lead to harmlessly ambiguous parse > trees, > Similarly with proofs, where for example a linear > conception > of forward proof leaves open the order in which lemmas are > proven. > > > Finally, on topology. > > There is a connection here. Tarski wrote on it briefly > and there > > have been others. It might be argued, and I think not > without > > reason that topology is a branch of model theory; the > connection, > > notwithstanding the flawed suggestion of Heine-Borel > (perhaps) seems > > pretty clear. > > I'm sure there are connections. > For example, one way of constructing models for positive > set theory > is topological. > > > Anyway, I think we need to get clear on what, > precisely, you > > take to be ontology and its relation to syntax. > > I hope the above helps in that. > > regards, > Roger From rbj at rbjones.com Mon Feb 23 10:56:40 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 15:56:40 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Methods of Proof: Re: Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: <411850.68825.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <411850.68825.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <200902231556.40930.rbj@rbjones.com> On Monday 23 February 2009 15:27:26 steve bayne wrote: > I'm pretty sure I get what you are talking about w.r.t > the metalanguage stuff. But take this fragment: > > "represent the syntax of A in the ontology of B." > > Could you give an example of syntax being represented > "in the ontology"? Take arithmetisation. The arithmetisation of syntax consists in assigning to each syntactic entity a natural number so that talk about syntax can be translated into talk about numbers (and partially vice-versa). The ontology of arithmetic is the natural numbers. Arithmetisation provides numerical representatives for syntactic entities, and hence represents syntax in the ontology of arithmetic. It would perhaps have been clearer to talk of "the domain of discourse of B", but that is of course just the set of things which exist so far as B is concerned, i.e. "the ontology of B". (is this an odd usage of "ontology"? I have thought about foundations "ontologically" for so long that I may have become accustomed to a way of thinking and hence writing which is not common) Roger From baynesrb at yahoo.com Mon Feb 23 11:02:34 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 08:02:34 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Methods of Proof: Re: Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: <200902231556.40930.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <74848.22102.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Yes, I think talking in terms of domains of discourse is the right way to go. Now on arithmetization of syntax, one would think that the Godel numbers occur in the meta-language. Making explicit the ontology of arithmetization would, then, seem to require a yet higher order language. What we are talking about in the case of the formalization of arithmetic is wff in the object language and these seem to contain few "Godel numbers." Note that being a prime number is part of how we assign the Godel numbers and so there may an implicit "ontology" of arithmetic involved. I better shut up. I haven't done much logic in a lot of years. Regards Steve --- On Mon, 2/23/09, Roger Bishop Jones wrote: > From: Roger Bishop Jones > Subject: Re: Methods of Proof: Re: Clarity Is Not Enough > To: baynesrb at yahoo.com > Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.com > Date: Monday, February 23, 2009, 10:56 AM > On Monday 23 February 2009 15:27:26 steve bayne wrote: > > I'm pretty sure I get what you are talking about > w.r.t > > the metalanguage stuff. But take this fragment: > > > > "represent the syntax of A in the ontology of > B." > > > > Could you give an example of syntax being represented > > "in the ontology"? > > Take arithmetisation. > > The arithmetisation of syntax consists in assigning to > each syntactic entity a natural number so that talk > about syntax can be translated into talk about numbers > (and partially vice-versa). > > The ontology of arithmetic is the natural numbers. > Arithmetisation provides numerical representatives > for syntactic entities, and hence represents syntax > in the ontology of arithmetic. > > It would perhaps have been clearer to talk of > "the domain of discourse of B", but that is of > course just the set of things which exist so far > as B is concerned, i.e. "the ontology of B". > (is this an odd usage of "ontology"? > I have thought about foundations "ontologically" > for so long that I may have become accustomed to > a way of thinking and hence writing which is not common) > > Roger From rbj at rbjones.com Mon Feb 23 11:24:00 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 16:24:00 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Methods of Proof: Re: Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: <74848.22102.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <74848.22102.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <200902231624.00822.rbj@rbjones.com> On Monday 23 February 2009 16:02:34 steve bayne wrote: > Now on arithmetization of > syntax, one would think that the Godel numbers occur > in the meta-language. Yes, that's right. > Making explicit the ontology of arithmetization would, then, > seem to require a yet higher order language. I'm not clear what you mean here by "making explicit the ontology". > "In general, to reason about language A in language B one must > be able to represent the syntax of A in the ontology of B." This is what we are talking about here. There are just two languages involved, A and B. To talk about the syntax of A in the language B we have to have available in B objects which will suffice as representatives of the syntactic objects of A. B is our metalanguage and A is the object language. If B is arithmetic then we have available the natural numbers and can use Godel numbers to talk about the syntax of A. To talk about B in A we don't need any further metalanguage, If we wanted to formalise this discussion then we would need another metalangage, for a transparent and convincing formalisation set theory would probably be best. Roger From Jlsperanza at aol.com Mon Feb 23 21:12:02 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 21:12:02 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] "Ordine geometrico demonstrata" Message-ID: I'm enjoying the exchange Bishop/Bayne. I'd like to drop to the annals of analysis, Spinoza's "more geometrico" This seems to have been more influential on the Continent than on the Isles, but then S. N. Hampshire did write a Penguin book on Spinoza. I do not know as much as I'd need to know about Greek mathematics, but I wonder sometimes if geometry is more basic than arithmetics. Or why would Spinoza dub his thing 'more geometrico' rather than 'more arithmetico'? >From online source: "Baruch de Spinoza attempted to improve Descartes philosophy by mathematically axiomatize philosophical thought into a coherent system (starting definitions, axioms, postulates, theorems with their demonstrations) = more geometrico (in the geometrical manner)." I note that his fist book was on the principles of philosophy of Descartes 'MORE' geometrico demonstratae. The 'Ethica ORDINE geometrico demonstrata' is later. I always found that the way Grice 'caricatures' the 'formalists' (as he then called them) in 'Logic and Conversation' (WOW, ii) -- first page -- is right into the 'heritage of Spinoza' if you think about it (and even if you don't). >From Bishop's notes: I note that in his notes Bishop mentions the "Prolegomena" remarks by Grice (re: Strawson (1952): >"expressions which are candidates for being natural analogues to logical constants." By way of critique, as Bishop charmingly puts it: >I was rather pleased to see Grice's list, [which includes Strawson 1952 -- and hence the title "LOGIC and Conversation" for the second lecture] >for it contains many examples which I have come >across and which I have previously myself felt to be unsound. Exactly. But it would have been _anathema_ to contradict Strawson where I come from! >Pleased to see them, I suppose, because my familiarity >with the literature has been insufficient for me to have seen >these criticised before. And Grice is being charming himself. For Strawson does acknowledge "Mr. H. P. Grice" as his logic tutor "from whom I have never ceased to learn from logic since he taught me in that area" (or words to that effect). A bit like overqualifying the thing. ("just a logic tutor") but let that pass. (The memoirs by J. D. Mabbott here are a delight. The man was Scots born, Mabbott, and in his "Oxford memoirs" (published by a minor publisher of Oxford) wants to say that Strawson was by far his most brilliant student (tutors have to be careful there). He goes on to add, by way of support, "And so seems to have thought, too, his other tutor at St. John's, the 'excellent' H. P. Grice" -- or words to that effect. Or 'intelligent'. Mabbot retells in detail how Strawson came out, poor thing, with a second, rather than a first. -- But we don't have to spread _that_ news. But this notes how parochial the whole thing was for we have: 1940s. Seminars Grice/Strawson (indeed Strawson was appointed Grice's tutee -- _before_ the war, as I recall). 1952. Strawson, Introduction to logical theory. Methuen (crediting "H. P. Grice" -- where? In connection with 'informativeness' -- one brief footnote). 1966. Chomsky cites "A. P. Grice" in Aspects of the theory of syntax" with regard to the logical behaviour of 'and' (implicating: 'and then'). 1967. Logic and Conversation, by Grice. Resuming the polemic. ------ But by 1967, Grice was able to provide a 'larger' picture. Strawson comes out as an 'informalist' (later a 'neo-traditionalist'), opposing the 'doctrine' of the formalists (Quine, Russell/Whitehead) later called 'modernists' (heirs of PM). Grice's point is that both camps _share_ the view that there _is_ a divergence between, to use Bishop's wording -- citing Grice --: (a) "expressions which are candidates for being natural analogues to logical constants" and (b) "logical constants proper". Grice mentions the truth-functors but also, let's recall the universal quantifier, the existential quantifier, and the iota operator -- which are not truth-functors. Hence his label of them as '(formal) [i.e. structural] devices'. ----- Personally, other than the Grice/Strawson polemic, I don't think I recall anything as systematic in the American literature. Grice does suggest that some philosophers (before him) have noted that there may be something 'unsound' about this -- i.e. that the divergence is _seeming_ rather than real. (Also, Grice pedantically but so rightly puts it, "the thesis that there is, or there _seems_ to be a divergence between..." -- for as things develop, he would claim the divergence is a matter of implicature, i.e. _seeming_ and not truth-conditional, in a way -- cfr. his "Valediction" or retrospective epilogue which _notably_ focuses on the polemic with Strawson rather than any big more fashionable issue of implicature per se -- I found that refreshing, that he goes back to the source of inspiration of it all: Strawson and his mistake!) Now, I once tried -- and I think I did list in my PhD dissertation -- all the postulates Grice _requires_ for the 'formalist' credo. They are quite a bunch. They all sound, now having refreshed my Greek Mathematics (with Thomas, and his two-volume Loeb) that it's the _axiomatic_ treatment, the Spinoza 'ordine geometrico' that he is talking about. Gentzen was just publishing those things (right?) and Grice will have occasion to present a cruder version of the 'formalist' credo in his contribution to the festschrift for Quine ("Vacuous Name", in Words and Objections, ed. Davidson/Hintikka, 1969). In the Quine festschrift, Grice does stick with Gentzen's idea that for each operator (or device) we do need a (+) rule and a (~) rule: introduction and elimination, and proceeds to provide truth-table compatible introductions for the functors and the quantifiers. This is clearer than most of what Grice really does in "Logic and Conversation" which is merely jocular in the best sense of 'jocular'. I think it was Aloysius Martinich (the Russian-born philosopher at UTexas/Austin) who noted this: they say 'Logic and Conversation' (WOW, ii) is a _masterpiece_ of an essay, but on second thoughts, it's pretty inconclusive and there seems to be a quick change of topic. When Bishop summarises the chapter in his online notes, he goes straight to Grice's definition of his term of 'art', "implicature" (I noted that Sidonius uses 'implicatura' in his Loeb -- cited by Short/Lewis, though!). But it should be noted that the discussion of 'implicature' (a special section) _follows_ the account of the 'problem' (as Grice saw it) and the two tenets who share a 'common mistake'. I would think that Grice believed to his last day that the formal devices can indeed be _saved_ by all means. I.e. an axiomatic treatment is possibly the best thing to do cognitively. But he was ready to admit or allow that in other areas, notably, the 'ordine geometrico' (which seems to work best with 'extensional' rather than 'intensional' categories, including 'modal') seems more of a strain (if that's the word) than anything 'liberatory'. Cheers, JL Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.fr eecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID%3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Tue Feb 24 07:58:57 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2009 04:58:57 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] From Richard Grandy: What do we need to represent syntax? Message-ID: <995973.23566.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> --- On Mon, 2/23/09, Richard Grandy wrote: From: Richard Grandy Subject: What do we need to represent syntax? To: baynesrb at yahoo.com, "Roger Bishop Jones" Date: Monday, February 23, 2009, 7:34 PM What do we need to represent syntax?It may? be natural or habitual to think about ontology or domains of discourse in this context, but if we are analyzing what is required we need to think more carefully. Godel's theorem for any specific system is strictly a proof theoretic result,?? no models or domains required, thank you.? "If S is omega consistent neither G or ~G is provable in S" Godel's generalized theorem ("For any formal system S? ....") requires recursion theory or something equivalent to? give a precise definition of "formal".? Again no models or domains required. I know that Godel's theorem was probably not what Steve had in mind,? but is the crispest example, and I don't see offhand why more is needed for his purposes (e.g., measuring redundancy). To put it more directly, I am arguing that what is required for a metalanguage M to provide resources to analyze the syntax of language L is that the syntax? of M can represent the syntax of L. Richard Raised by proof-theoreticians and recursion theorists on the East Coast,? though later persuaded (during time on the sunny West Coast) that model theory has its virtues) Yes, I think talking in terms of domains of discourse is the right way to go. Now on arithmetization of syntax, one would think that the Godel numbers occur in the meta-language. Making explicit the ontology of arithmetization would, then, seem to require a yet higher order language. What we are talking about in the case of the formalization of arithmetic is wff in the object language and these seem to contain few "Godel numbers." Note that being a prime number is part of how we assign the Godel numbers and so there may an implicit "ontology" of arithmetic involved. I better shut up. I haven't done much logic in a lot of years. Regards Steve --- On Mon, 2/23/09, Roger Bishop Jones wrote: > From: Roger Bishop Jones > Subject: Re: Methods of Proof: Re: Clarity Is Not Enough > To: baynesrb at yahoo.com > Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.com > Date: Monday, February 23, 2009, 10:56 AM > On Monday 23 February 2009 15:27:26 steve bayne wrote: > > I'm pretty sure I get what you are talking about > w.r.t > > the metalanguage stuff. But take this fragment: > > > > "represent the syntax of A in the ontology of > B." > > > > Could you give an example of syntax being represented > > "in the ontology"? > > Take arithmetisation. > > The arithmetisation of syntax consists in assigning to > each syntactic entity a natural number so that talk > about syntax can be translated into talk about numbers > (and partially vice-versa). > > The ontology of arithmetic is the natural numbers. > Arithmetisation provides numerical representatives > for syntactic entities, and hence represents syntax > in the ontology of arithmetic. > > It would perhaps have been clearer to talk of > "the domain of discourse of B", but that is of > course just the set of things which exist so far > as B is concerned, i.e. "the ontology of B". > (is this an odd usage of "ontology"? > I have thought about foundations "ontologically" > for so long that I may have become accustomed to > a way of thinking and hence writing which is not common) > > Roger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rgrandy at rice.edu Tue Feb 24 15:03:03 2009 From: rgrandy at rice.edu (Richard Grandy) Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2009 14:03:03 -0600 Subject: [hist-analytic] What do we need to represent syntax? was: Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: <411850.68825.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <411850.68825.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: It may be natural or habitual to think about ontology or domains of discourse in this context, but if we are analyzing what is required we need to think more carefully. Godel's theorem for any specific system is strictly a proof theoretic result, no models or domains required, thank you. "If S is omega consistent neither G or ~G is provable in S" Godel's generalized theorem ("For any formal system S ....") requires recursion theory or something equivalent to give a precise definition of "formal". Again no models or domains required. I know that Godel's theorem was probably not what Steve had in mind, but is the crispest example, and I don't see offhand why more is needed for his purposes (e.g., measuring redundancy). To put it more directly, I am arguing that what is required for a metalanguage M to provide resources to analyze the syntax of language L is that the syntax of M can represent the syntax of L. Richard Raised by proof-theoreticians and recursion theorists on the East Coast, though later persuaded (during time on the sunny West Coast) that model theory has its virtues) >I'm pretty sure I get what you are talking about w.r.t >the metalanguage stuff. But take this fragment: > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Tue Feb 24 09:46:17 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2009 14:46:17 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] What do we need to represent syntax? In-Reply-To: <995973.23566.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <995973.23566.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <200902241446.17782.rbj@rbjones.com> On Tuesday 24 February 2009 12:58:57 Richard Grandy wrote: > What do we need to represent > syntax?It may? be natural or habitual to think about ontology or > domains of discourse in this context, but if we are analyzing what > is required we need to think more carefully. <...> > To put it more directly, I am arguing that what is required for a > metalanguage M to provide resources to analyze the syntax of language > L is that the syntax? of M can represent the syntax of L. However, what Steve was seeking was not a minimalist account, but an intelligible explanation, and this is best done by calling a spade a spade (and by talk about numbers rather than numerals). The metalanguage is for *talking about* syntax (inter alia) and semantics is of the essence, without it the metalanguage expresses nothing. Our most tangible example is Godel's use of arithmetisation in the proof of his "incompleteness" theorem. It is said that Godel arrived at the incompleteness result via the liar paradox, a semantic paradox, but carefully recast the matter as a syntactic result because of a prejudice against semantics which is still alive today in some quarters. However, even though his result is strictly proof theoretic, his description of how arithmetisation works is openly semantic in character. Here are some snippets from the second paragraph of the 1931 paper. "Of course, for metamathematical considerations it does not matter what objects are chosen as primitive signs, and we shall assign natural numbers to this use [that is, we map the primitive signs one-to-one onto some natural numbers]. Consequently, a formula will be a finite sequence of natural numbers..." "The metamathematical notions (propositions) thus become notions (propositions) about natural numbers or sequences of them; therefore they can, at least in part, be expressed by the symbols of PM itself." This is pretty semantic. My explanation was generic with respect to the metalanguage, and so instead of talking specifically of natural numbers, I talk of "the ontology of the metalanguage" or its "domain of discourse". Roger Jones From baynesrb at yahoo.com Tue Feb 24 15:10:49 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2009 12:10:49 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] What do we need to represent syntax? was: Clarity Is Not Enough In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <623998.63304.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Prof. Grandy is absolutely right to correct the impression I may have made in pursuing the Godel theorems. What I had to say was far less interesting than his following remark: "To put it more directly, I am arguing that what is required for a metalanguage M to provide resources to analyze the syntax of language L is that the syntax? of M can represent the syntax of L." I have a small question here. We all remember Russell's Introduction to the Tractatus, wherein Russell brings up the idea of levels of languages that dispense with Wittgenstein's notion of showing. Prof. Grandy accepts the basic strategy now widespread of Tarski and Carnap, and those who followed. My question is this: suppose that an analysis of syntax can only take place in M. That leaves an unanalyzed notion of syntax, that of M itself. So no matter how high up the hierarchy we go the analysis given is always given in a syntax that, by Wittgenstein's lights (circa 1922) could only be shown not "said." Now if logic is not to have an ontology does this make a difference? Suppose we say, following early Wittgenstein, that the logical form of the world is shown and that somehow this is indicated by the structure of an "ideal" language. If so, then quantification would not provide a criterion of ontological commitment since any ontological commitment on the part of M could only be shown; no existential, even over concatenated expressions being given. One other question. When we give a syntactical metalanguage what is the status of objects. In Tarski's original paper, no individual constants are present. Is this significant? In any case, thanks to Prof. Grandy for his concise and informed reply. Regards STeve --- On Tue, 2/24/09, Richard Grandy wrote: From: Richard Grandy Subject: What do we need to represent syntax? was: Clarity Is Not Enough To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com, baynesrb at yahoo.com Date: Tuesday, February 24, 2009, 3:03 PM What do we need to represent syntax? was: Clarity Is NotIt may? be natural or habitual to think about ontology or domains of discourse in this context, but if we are analyzing what is required we need to think more carefully. Godel's theorem for any specific system is strictly a proof theoretic result,?? no models or domains required, thank you.? "If S is omega consistent neither G or ~G is provable in S" Godel's generalized theorem ("For any formal system S? ....") requires recursion theory or something equivalent to? give a precise definition of "formal".? Again no models or domains required. I know that Godel's theorem was probably not what Steve had in mind,? but is the crispest example, and I don't see offhand why more is needed for his purposes (e.g., measuring redundancy). To put it more directly, I am arguing that what is required for a metalanguage M to provide resources to analyze the syntax of language L is that the syntax? of M can represent the syntax of L. Richard Raised by proof-theoreticians and recursion theorists on the East Coast,? though later persuaded (during time on the sunny West Coast) that model theory has its virtues) I'm pretty sure I get what you are talking about w.r.t the metalanguage stuff. But take this fragment: -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Tue Feb 24 17:12:44 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2009 14:12:44 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Reichenbach and Wittgenstein on Language Rules Message-ID: <851174.68648.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Recall Wittgenstein's discussion of private languages. Some of us, probably, haven't read it. Some of us are sick of it. No one can intelligently deny its historical significance, and in all likelihood its viability. For those who haven't read it take a look at Philosophical Investigations PI 258. I have thought for a long time that Wittgenstein was a close reader of Reichenbach, evidence continues to mount of the connection. Since I'm going to incorporate some of this into my book on Anscombe, and in particular a criticism of the Anscombe/ Kenny view of the private language arguement - that is, as directed against Cartesianism - I will forego providing the most interesting stuff. But I can resist one conceptual (not so much textual) juxtaposition. Ok, you've read PI. 258, etc. Now look at something Reichenbach said in _Experience and Prediction_. He says this after disussing some general uses of language, emotional ("Ouch") and communicative (we all get this I guess). Now here is what he says I think is intereting: "The first is that a communticative function begins only when there are certain rules established for the use of the terms." For Wittgenstein the idea of a private rule was ruled out. Thus "internal" meanings were ruled out. Public language prevailed because private languages required private rules, and private rules were such that following them and thinking we do can be distinguished. But, now, what Reichenbach is suggesting is that the rules of a public language make the presupposition of rules, not that (as Wittgenstein is at least very close to arguing) public rules make possible the communicative function (I make him sound more Kantian than he is for simplicity, although Kant is a "monsta"). In other words communication requires public rules in order to have language. For Reichenbach the communicative function requires rules; but Wittgenstein goes a further step from this position, saying that on public rules are possible. Only a communicative function of language is possible. But what of the emotional use. Anscombe will implicitly deny it exists in a special sense I will describe. She broaches the subject on two occasions. Wittgenstein on several. At the back of the bus, sitting quietly, is Mr. Language as a Vehicle of Thought and Mr. Language as Communication. Later we shall eaves drop on what they have to say to one another in light of Wittgenstein and Reichenbach. Apologies to those whose mail I haven't answered. Aside from a modem problem I am moving quickly through the Anscombe stuff. I hope I didn't write this posting too fast, no time to preview etc. STeve Bayne -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Tue Feb 24 17:24:50 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2009 14:24:50 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Correction, etc.: Reichenbach and Wittgenstein on Language Rules In-Reply-To: <851174.68648.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <808407.75215.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> I said: "Public language prevailed because private languages required private rules, and private rules were such that following them and ?thinking we do can be distinguished." I meant to say: "Public language prevailed because private languages required private rules, and private rules were such that following them and thinking we do can? NOT be distinguished. The communicative function cannot rest on private rules; but this is a a different claim than that there are no private languages. To get this we need to see that no private language can be based on public rules. Now those who have not looked at Wittgenstein closel do NOT think by 'private' I mean something I can keep secret. Steve Bayne --- On Tue, 2/24/09, steve bayne wrote: From: steve bayne Subject: Reichenbach and Wittgenstein on Language Rules To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Tuesday, February 24, 2009, 5:12 PM Recall Wittgenstein's discussion of private languages. Some of us, probably, haven't read it. Some of us are sick of it. No one can intelligently deny its historical significance, and in all likelihood its viability. For those who haven't read it take a look at Philosophical Investigations PI 258. I have thought for a long time that Wittgenstein was a close reader of Reichenbach, evidence continues to mount of the connection. Since I'm going to incorporate some of this into my book on Anscombe, and in particular a criticism of the Anscombe/ Kenny view of the private language arguement - that is, as directed against Cartesianism - I will forego providing the most interesting stuff. But I can resist one conceptual (not so much textual) juxtaposition. Ok, you've read PI. 258, etc. Now look at something Reichenbach said in _Experience and Prediction_. He says this after disussing some general uses of language, emotional ("Ouch") and communicative (we all get this I guess). Now here is what he says I think is intereting: "The first is that a communticative function begins only when there are certain rules established for the use of the terms." For Wittgenstein the idea of a private rule was ruled out. Thus "internal" meanings were ruled out. Public language prevailed because private languages required private rules, and private rules were such that following them and thinking we do can be distinguished. But, now, what Reichenbach is suggesting is that the rules of a public language make the presupposition of rules, not that (as Wittgenstein is at least very close to arguing) public rules make possible the communicative function (I make him sound more Kantian than he is for simplicity, although Kant is a "monsta"). In other words communication requires public rules in order to have language. For Reichenbach the communicative function requires rules; but Wittgenstein goes a further step from this position, saying that on public rules are possible. Only a communicative function of language is possible. But what of the emotional use. Anscombe will implicitly deny it exists in a special sense I will describe. She broaches the subject on two occasions. Wittgenstein on several. At the back of the bus, sitting quietly, is Mr. Language as a Vehicle of Thought and Mr. Language as Communication. Later we shall eaves drop on what they have to say to one another in light of Wittgenstein and Reichenbach. Apologies to those whose mail I haven't answered. Aside from a modem problem I am moving quickly through the Anscombe stuff. I hope I didn't write this posting too fast, no time to preview etc. STeve Bayne -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rgrandy at rice.edu Wed Feb 25 00:38:14 2009 From: rgrandy at rice.edu (Richard Grandy) Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2009 23:38:14 -0600 Subject: [hist-analytic] Fwd: What do we need to represent syntax? Message-ID: OK, can we separate two questions? 1. What is the minimal metalanguage we need to represent syntax of another language. My answer stands to that. I hope/don'tbelieve that I have a prejudice against semantics, but I do have a deep commitment to keeping track of what can (and cannot) be done syntactically. That is a mathematical question independent of one's preferences for/against syntax/semantics/pragmatics. 2. What is an intelligible/psychological/historical explanation of the above. On that I defer to Steve and you (both to explain the phrase an answer it). REG > > >On Tuesday 24 February 2009 12:58:57 Richard Grandy wrote: > >> What do we need to represent >> syntax?It may be natural or habitual to think about ontology or >> domains of discourse in this context, but if we are analyzing what >> is required we need to think more carefully. > ><...> > >> To put it more directly, I am arguing that what is required for a >> metalanguage M to provide resources to analyze the syntax of language >> L is that the syntax of M can represent the syntax of L. > >However, what Steve was seeking was not a minimalist account, >but an intelligible explanation, and this is best done by >calling a spade a spade (and by talk about numbers rather >than numerals). > >The metalanguage is for *talking about* syntax (inter alia) >and semantics is of the essence, without it the metalanguage >expresses nothing. > >Our most tangible example is Godel's use of arithmetisation in the >proof of his "incompleteness" theorem. >It is said that Godel arrived at the incompleteness result via >the liar paradox, a semantic paradox, but carefully recast the >matter as a syntactic result because of a prejudice against semantics >which is still alive today in some quarters. >However, even though his result is strictly proof theoretic, >his description of how arithmetisation works is openly semantic >in character. > >Here are some snippets from the second paragraph of the 1931 paper. > > "Of course, for metamathematical considerations it does not > matter what objects are chosen as primitive signs, and we > shall assign natural numbers to this use [that is, we map > the primitive signs one-to-one onto some natural numbers]. > Consequently, a formula will be a finite sequence of > natural numbers..." > > "The metamathematical notions (propositions) thus become > notions (propositions) about natural numbers or sequences > of them; therefore they can, at least in part, be expressed > by the symbols of PM itself." > >This is pretty semantic. > >My explanation was generic with respect to the metalanguage, >and so instead of talking specifically of natural numbers, >I talk of "the ontology of the metalanguage" or its "domain >of discourse". > >Roger Jones -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Tue Feb 24 18:13:59 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2009 18:13:59 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] The Force of Linguistic Rules Message-ID: a little tribute to O. P. Wood and the Oxford polemic on things, including Collingwood versus Richards, and more. Thanks to S. R. Bayne for sharing his quote of Reichenbach: In a message dated 2/24/2009 5:15:21 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: "The first is that a communicative function begins only when there are certain rules established for the use of the terms." Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction. written originally in English in Istanbul, 1933 -- published 1938. The OED recognises a few other good ones from that one: "conventionalism" 1938 H. REICHENBACH Exper. & Predict. ?1, Within the frame of the modern philosophy of science there is a movement bearing the name of conventionalism; it tries to show that most of the epistemological questions contain no questions of truth-character but are to be settled by arbitrary decisions. "descriptum" 1938 H. REICHENBACH Exper. & Prediction ?25. 220 Existence is a quality not of individual things but of descripta. I would think Reichenbach must be thinking of German "Das Regel" and ultimately Latin "regula": "The first is that a communicative function begins only when there are certain rules established for the use of the terms." A very clear statement of what a lot of confusion some Oxonians saw in this is Oscar Wood -- I order that old volume of P. A. S. just for my edification! Oscar P. Wood, 'The Force of Linguistic Rules' Aristotelian Society, vol. 51. ---- 'rule' was, Grice tells us, a favourite talk at the playgroup's meetings (Reply to Richards). He was particular that his views were not taken as embracing any sort of 'conventionalism' (if that's the word). "I don't think meaning has anything to do with convention" ('Meaning Revisited', words to that effect). But of course one could distinguish between 'linguistic' (in Wood's title) and _other_, and meaning proper. I enjoyed Bayne's description of 'emotional language' ("Ouch") and, as he has it, He says this after disussing some general uses of language, emotional ("Ouch") and communicative (we all get this I guess). Yes, we do. But there is a _transfer_, isn't it. Between 'emotional' and 'communicative'. I always like to recall that Grice (1948) 'Meaning' can be seen as a response the 'causal' _emotionalism_ of Stevenson (who Grice quotes in a footnote to that paper, now in Bayne's page). It _is_ admittedly hard to think of what "emotion" can be secured by the expression of "It is raining" or "the cat is on the mat". Emotion works better with things like 'ouch' and 'yuck!' But Collingwood (of Oxford) had it right when he criticised Richards (in "Idea of Language"): words to the effect: "Richards thinks he has it right: the two uses of language -- but I can _feel_ his emotions as he displays on the _scientific_ use of language -- there's emotion in science, too!" The connection via Richards to Viola Welby and through Ogden to Wittgenstein is _also_ interesting. Some of this nicely described in the online PhD dissertation by R. Dale on Ogden/Richards and Grice (under Schiffer). Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From rbj at rbjones.com Wed Feb 25 03:33:14 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2009 08:33:14 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] What do we need to represent syntax? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <200902250833.14676.rbj@rbjones.com> On Wednesday 25 February 2009 05:38:14 Richard Grandy wrote: > OK, can we separate two questions? > > 1. What is the minimal metalanguage we need to represent syntax of > another language. Depends on what you want to do with the representation. For the kind of metatheory which I engage in I would state the minimal requirement as: It must be possible to define in the metalanguage an algebraic structure isomorphic to the abstract syntax of the object language. This entails that there is an injection from the abstract syntax of the object language into the things over which one can quantify in the metalanguage. It does not entail that there is an injection from the syntax of the object language into that of the metalanguage. This may be seen in my own most recent technical work (see: http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/pp/doc/t024.pdf) which involves formalising the syntax and semantics of an infinitary set theory using as metalanguage a higher-order set theory. In this case the syntax of the metalanguage is countable, but that of the object language is inaccessible, so there is no possiblity of an injection from the object language syntax into the metalanguage syntax. > 2. What is an intelligible/psychological/historical explanation of > the above. On that I defer to Steve and you (both to explain the > phrase an answer it). Too many questions there! I was attempting only the "intelligible" and I seem to have failed so far. I may try again. Roger Jones From rgrandy at rice.edu Wed Feb 25 14:42:55 2009 From: rgrandy at rice.edu (Richard Grandy) Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2009 13:42:55 -0600 Subject: [hist-analytic] What do we need to represent syntax? In-Reply-To: <200902250833.14676.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <200902250833.14676.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: You are correct, I was thinking of too narrow and standard a range of cases. Richard >On Wednesday 25 February 2009 05:38:14 Richard Grandy wrote: >> OK, can we separate two questions? >> >> 1. What is the minimal metalanguage we need to represent syntax of >> another language. > >Depends on what you want to do with the representation. > >For the kind of metatheory which I engage in I would state the >minimal requirement as: > > It must be possible to define in the metalanguage > an algebraic structure isomorphic to the abstract syntax > of the object language. > >This entails that there is an injection from the abstract syntax >of the object language into the things over which one can >quantify in the metalanguage. > >It does not entail that there is an injection from the syntax >of the object language into that of the metalanguage. >This may be seen in my own most recent technical work >(see: http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/pp/doc/t024.pdf) >which involves formalising the syntax and semantics of >an infinitary set theory using as metalanguage >a higher-order set theory. In this case the syntax of >the metalanguage is countable, but that of the object language >is inaccessible, so there is no possiblity of an injection >from the object language syntax into the metalanguage syntax. From aune at philos.umass.edu Wed Feb 25 13:46:45 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2009 13:46:45 -0500 Subject: [hist-analytic] RBJ's Proposal and and Hume's Fork Message-ID: Hume?s Fork.? RBJ?s description of his approach to the distinction seems very unpromising to me, and I?d like to say why. RBJ proposed that a sentence appropriately disambiguated should be said to be analytic iff it expresses a necessary proposition, the latter being a proposition that is true is every possible world. I think this is unpromising for the following reasons: 1. 1) As Kripke pointed out, some propositions true in all possible worlds can be known to be true only by an inference from an empirically supported premise. The prop expressed by ?Cicero = Tully? is a familiar example. Assuming that the names here are understood as rigid designators, we may say that the relevant proposition is necessary if it is true--and therefore necessary, bercause it is true-- but it is certainly not analytic. Many necessary truths are therefor not analytic in a plausible sense of "analytic." 2. 2) Many propositions claimed to be synthetic a priori truths by epistemological rationalists are generally acknowledged to be necessary, but anyone who thinks they are really analytic would generally be taken to have serious work to do. One such proposition is expressed by ?Nothing determinately blue on some region also has some other color there.? I argue in my recent book that this should be considered analytic, but there is nothing trivial about the case I make for this claim. I am convinced that I am right, but most rationalists would not share my conviction. 3. 3) Useful conceptions of analytic truth purport to explain why analytic truths that are necessary have this further property. The statements (or ?judgment?) covered by Kant?s conception give some indication of this. If a predicate concept is contained in a subject concept in an affirmative way, anything in any world falling under the subject concept would be guaranteed to fall under the predicate concept because the latter is just one of the concepts it falls under if the subject is applicable to it. This is why the statement is true in (or at) any possible world. 4. 4) Hume?s epistemic fork was the doctrine that all truths concern either mere relations of ideas or matters of fact and existence. The former are considered analytic by empiricists: their truth can be ascertained by ?mere analysis? and does not, as Hume said, depend on anything that is anywhere existent in the universe (except the relevant ideas). Matters of fact and existence are, empiricists emphasize, synthetic truths that can be known only by observation, memory, and ?experimental? inference. A conception of analytic truth can be considered plausible only if makes clear the kind of analysis that can plausibly show that a given analytic statement is indeed true and, if necessary as well, why it has this additional property. I cannot see that the conception RBJ intends to develop has this plausibility. Bruce Aune -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Wed Feb 25 15:59:08 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2009 12:59:08 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] RBJ's Proposal and and Hume's Fork In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <540876.97287.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Is "'a' is a rigid designator" determined by fact or stipulation? Is it "analytic" if true? These are two question, not one. How can we, except by stipulation, confer rigid designation status? If it is an empirical claim that 'Cicero' is a rigid designator, then what is the evidence? If it is not an empirical claim, then how are some necessary truths supported by empirical data? Oh sure, that Cicero is Tully is not a priori; or so it seems. But the only empirical evidence I have is that in this world Cicero is Tully. We have to make some unempirical assumptions about essences, I think, in order to congratulate Kripke on discovering empirically supported necessary statements. I think we are close to being in a circle. We have rigid designation if only if we have essentialism. That is a first impression. This, of course, ties in with David Lewis' program, but we need not go there, just yet. Regards Steve --- On Wed, 2/25/09, Bruce Aune wrote: From: Bruce Aune Subject: RBJ's Proposal and and Hume's Fork To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Wednesday, February 25, 2009, 1:46 PM Hume?s Fork.?? RBJ?s description of his approach to the distinction seems very unpromising to me, and I?d like to say why.RBJ proposed that a sentence appropriately disambiguated should be said to be analytic iff it expresses a necessary proposition, the latter being a proposition that is true is every possible world.? I think this is unpromising for the following reasons:1.?? ? 1) ?As Kripke pointed out, some propositions true in all possible worlds can be known to be true only by an inference from an empirically supported premise.? The prop expressed by ?Cicero = Tully? is a familiar example.? Assuming that the names here are understood as rigid designators, we may say that the relevant proposition is necessary if it is true--and therefore necessary, bercause it is true-- but it is certainly not analytic. ?Many necessary truths are therefor not analytic in a plausible sense of "analytic."2.?? 2) ?Many propositions claimed to be synthetic a priori truths by epistemological rationalists are generally acknowledged to be necessary, but anyone who thinks they are really analytic would generally be taken to have serious work to do.? One such proposition is expressed by ?Nothing determinately blue on some region also has some other color there.?? I argue in my recent book that this should be considered analytic, but there is nothing trivial about the case I make for this claim. ?I am convinced that I am right, but most rationalists would not share my conviction.3.?? ?3) ? Useful conceptions of analytic truth purport to explain why analytic truths that are necessary have this further property.? The statements (or ?judgment?) covered by Kant?s conception give some indication of this.? If a predicate concept is contained in a subject concept in an affirmative way, anything in any world falling under the subject concept would be guaranteed to fall under the predicate concept because the latter is just one of the concepts it falls under if the subject is applicable to it.? This is why the statement is true in (or at) any possible world.4.?? 4) ?Hume?s epistemic fork was the doctrine that all truths concern either mere relations of ideas or matters of fact and existence.? The former are considered analytic by empiricists: their truth can be ascertained by ?mere analysis? and does not, as Hume said, depend on anything that is anywhere existent in the universe (except the relevant ideas).? Matters of fact and existence are, empiricists emphasize, synthetic truths that can be known only by observation, memory, and ?experimental? inference. ?A conception of analytic truth can be considered plausible only if makes clear the kind of analysis that can plausibly show that a given analytic statement is indeed true and, if necessary as well, why it has this additional property.? I cannot see that the conception RBJ intends to develop has this plausibility.Bruce Aune -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Feb 25 21:22:37 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2009 21:22:37 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Hume's Fork Message-ID: In a previous post I was misled by an online source to believe that "Hume's Fork" (the phrase) was coined by R. M. Ayers, Oxford. It seems it was coined, rather by A. G. N. Flew, Oxford -- in the 1961 book on Hume's Philosophy of Belief: A Study of his First Inquiry -- the whole chapter iii seems to be entitled "Hume's Fork" (section 54) "Hume's fork ... indisputably belongs not to psychology but to logic". If the image is of a devil-looking man with a literal fork deciding what books to burn, I don't think I like the simile. For the record: After the Second World War, A G. N. Flew achieved a first class degree in Literae Humaniores at St John's College, Oxford. While he left Oxford early (and founded analytic-philosophy at Keele) he made history with his too influential volumes, "Logic and Language". I don't think better compilations than those two were ever published. And it had to be Blackwell. OUP was too conservative by then to take a turn in the 'linguistic revolution'... Cheers, JL Ref. Cohen, E. "Hume's Fork" Southern JP, vol. 5 **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Feb 26 08:41:09 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2009 08:41:09 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Hume's Fork Message-ID: Ah for linguistic botanising... --- call it the linguistic botanical bug. Anyway, this I found would better describe Hume's _thing_, it's a bifurcated furca, as it were. One OED is amusing: "His beard was bi-furked and short" Dixon, _Windsor_, 1879, p. 5 As for triple double dichotomy of Jones -- he _has_ to be amused: Gr. dikho-, combining form of adv. in *two*, asunder, apart, as in cutting in *two*. So that should give us three bifurcations, no 'triples' or 'doubles' or _nothing_ [sic]. I wish I could explain to Bayne how we _must_ appeal to experience to _prove_ Cicero = Tully. But that's not the 'epistemic fork' but the other one. Apparently Flew is quoting from that passage where Hume goes, tempered, "Either the book shows relations of ideas, or matters of fact, or -- _burn it_." So it was a trident, rather? One blog writes, "Does that mean that Hume's books are inflammated, too? Borges quipped on this in Texas -- Austin/Texas -- he was giving a lecture on Cervantes in English! (now published), back in 1968. He is commenting on the passage where the curate and the barber are determining what books to commit to the flames. They get one by Cervantes himself, "A Collection of Verse", and they save it. But Borges wonders, "Now, if they would get a copy of the _Quixote_ and commit it to the flames, what would be _some_ myse-en-abyme, would it not?!" Oddly, I expanded on that in one of my recent _pub_lications, ISSN -- on, of all titles, "The post-modern Quixote": ISBN-10: 958338867X | ISBN-13: 9789583388675 (mine is just a contribution, not the whole hog -- but don't I manage to quote from Grice on 'autophora' and _regressus ad infinitum_ as 'deeming' something to be so?) Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Feb 26 22:00:31 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2009 22:00:31 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] A Note from Inside the Teapot Message-ID: In a message dated 2/26/2009 9:54:04 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, Jlsperanza writes: "Presupposition" (WOW): "to my friend, Sir Peter, my former tutor and colleague". --- oops. That should read "tutee". He actually uses 'pupil' which is a word my mother always uses to mean what I mean by 'student'. I narrow 'pupil' to boarders! JLS **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Feb 26 21:54:04 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2009 21:54:04 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] A Note from Inside the Teapot Message-ID: The Fork, the Knife and the Spoon In a message dated 2/25/2009 4:01:10 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: >Is "'a' is a rigid designator" determined by fact or stipulation? Well, ain't stipulations _facts_? :) (pass me the knife -- this fork don't cut). >Is it "analytic" if true? These are two question, not one. Well, apparently, as Bruce Aune notes, we need _two_ rigid designators: Tully _and_ Cicero. So we'd need _two_ stipulations. >How can we, except by stipulation, confer rigid designation status? I think a 'necessarist' would say _intuit_ alla Bergson? >If it is an empirical claim that 'Cicero' is a rigid designator, >then what is the evidence? If it is not an empirical claim, >then how are some necessary truths supported by >empirical data? Well, 'support' can be pretty _weak_. They are _not_ *unsupported* by empirical data, either, aren't they? As Brunce Aune notes in his book, it is a pity that empiricists trying to responde to the 'epistemic' (versus metaphysical) rationalists' challenge ('the necessarists', as I call them) have focused on _necessary_ rather than common-or-garden _contingencies_. (If I understood him alright!). I always felt puzzled by the implicatural aspects of the Modal Square of Opposition! nec ------- not-nec not-poss ----- poss I think this was first noted in the literature by Fogelin -- (a 'close'-Gricean, there) and Burton-Roberts (Journal of Linguistics). If it's _necessary_ it's _also_ contingent! (It it must, it may). Bayne: >Oh sure, that Cicero is Tully is not a priori; >or so it seems. B. Aune quotes a good one here: Horwich (I met him, Cheshire-born), On "Aprioricity". Must say it sounds Scotian enough. (alla Duns Scotus). Bayne: >But the only empirical evidence I have is that in >this world Cicero is Tully. Oddly, the word 'world' was unknown to _Romans_! I suppose Barcan or Kripke drew it from Leibnitz. _mundus_? (It. mondo) >We have to make some unempirical assumptions about essences, >I think, in order to congratulate Kripke on discovering >empirically supported necessary statements. Well, but then _congratulatory_ as Austin would recognise, is a value-to-fact direction of fit anyway :). >I think we are close to being in a circle. And worse, the circle is _closed_! >We >have rigid designation if only if we have essentialism. >That is a first impression. Don't you hate that tautology (i.e. analytically true), "You can only make a first impression _once_"? >This, of course, ties in with David Lewis' program, >but we need not go there, just yet. Now yes? >From wiki: ---- Lewis was born in Oberlin, Ohio, to John D. Lewis, a Professor of Government at Oberlin College, and Ruth Ewart Kellogg Lewis, a distinguished medieval historian. The formidable intellect for which he was known later in his life was already manifest during his years at Oberlin High School, when he attended college lectures in chemistry. He went on to Swarthmore College and spent a year at Oxford (1959-1960), where he was tutored by Iris Murdoch and attended lectures by Gilbert Ryle, H.P. Grice, ... Oh my god -- he _is_ everywhere! ------ Anyway, loved to read Aune's foreword to the book he shared with this list's webpage: he acknowledges his 'views on ... [x] are 'strongly indebted' --- and who would you think he mentions? The big teachers, the masters! No! His 'one-time' students! This _is_ to congratulate! To drop: I will mention Grice's acknowledgement to Strawson in "Presupposition" (WOW): "to my friend, Sir Peter, my former tutor and colleague". But there the generation gap was _minimal_, since Strawson was, er, an 'older student'. Indeed, when Horn met them both he confided, (words to the effect): "they both looked so old that one would not say that one was the teacher of th'other". Anyway, the one-time students of Aune's (it's like 'friend of Aune's' -- the logical form of that second possessive for another day) are Brian Skyrms and Roger Rosencrantz -- Granted, it's to their _writings_ not to that favourite of _linguists_ (who do record thing), 'pc' -- personal correspondence or communication. I never liked that sort of 'critical apparatus'. Some people go on to mention when the personal communication _was_! Anyway, Aune mentions some pretty good authors. Quinton, for example. Where was he coming from? I asked myself, and said, "JL, you have to focus on the playgroup -- never mind externals". "But perhaps Quinto _was_ playgroup". "Yes, but in the matter under consideration you have to focus on G. A. Paul". Going through the reference list of Aune's book I note and wonder at some wonderfully titled books. My prize has to go to one that was an early influence on me -- if only via review by Dummett in _Truth and other enigmas_: Goodman, "The structure of appearance". Poetry at her highest! I have never met a necessarist. Aune writes to the effect that some years ago, one _had_ to be an empiricist. Then came Bealer and we know the rest. They _have_ made essentialism _respectable_! In this connection, Partee (of UMass.) and her 'Reflections of a formal semanticist' (pdf online) is illuminating. She recalls conversation with Kaplan, "But then, why is it that philosophers can't stand essence". "Quine can't -- but that's a lingering prejudice. When Quine was _learning_, modal logic _was_ a mess -- it's not so any more" (or as the NYT today read: "anymore" (one word). Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Fri Feb 27 08:07:24 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2009 05:07:24 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] A Note from Inside the Teapot In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <267772.64661.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> JL, I think the topic of rigid designation can only be seriously pursued carefully and systematically. There is little likelihood of my being able to shoot from the hip and make my case persuasive. But a word on stipulation vs. fact. If your ontology is a fact ontology, then all being reduces to facts, even, say events. My point is to draw attention to the distinction between "facts" that involve decision and those that don't. This is a very controversial matter, particularly in regards to certain views on the subject of space-time. Again, can't go into the all the "facts". Aune is not only a first rate philosopher, but as good at writing as Ayer, in my opinion. ONe would hope that he would write a brief essay on how to write an essay in philosophy. I think it would be a jewel. two other points before rushing away. First, Skyrms is a fine philosopher, but Bruce has had a number of other really bright students. Second, as I move in the direction of completing the Anscombe book, I'm curious about his ties to Anscombe. If you have any cases of citations that may be of interest, let me (us) know, please. Obviously, there is some conceptual connection with respect to the role of intention in meaning etc. But it hasn't been explored in the way I think it could be. STeve --- On Thu, 2/26/09, Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: From: Jlsperanza at aol.com Subject: A Note from Inside the Teapot To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Date: Thursday, February 26, 2009, 9:54 PM The Fork, the Knife and the Spoon In a message dated 2/25/2009 4:01:10 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes: >Is "'a' is a rigid designator" determined by fact or stipulation? Well, ain't stipulations _facts_? :) (pass me the knife -- this fork don't cut). >Is it "analytic" if true? These are two question, not one. Well, apparently, as Bruce Aune notes, we need _two_ rigid designators: Tully _and_ Cicero. So we'd need _two_ stipulations. >How can we, except by stipulation, confer rigid designation status? I think a 'necessarist' would say _intuit_ alla Bergson? >If it is an empirical claim that 'Cicero' is a rigid designator, >then what is the evidence? If it is not an empirical claim, >then how are some necessary truths supported by >empirical data? Well, 'support' can be pretty _weak_. They are _not_ *unsupported* by empirical data, either, aren't they? As Brunce Aune notes in his book, it is a pity that empiricists trying to responde to the 'epistemic' (versus metaphysical) rationalists' challenge ('the necessarists', as I call them) have focused on _necessary_ rather than common-or-garden _contingencies_. (If I understood him alright!). I always felt puzzled by the implicatural aspects of the Modal Square of Opposition! nec ------- not-nec not-poss ----- poss I think this was first noted in the literature by Fogelin -- (a 'close'-Gricean, there) and Burton-Roberts (Journal of Linguistics). If it's _necessary_ it's _also_ contingent! (It it must, it may). Bayne: >Oh sure, that Cicero is Tully is not a priori; >or so it seems. B. Aune quotes a good one here: Horwich (I met him, Cheshire-born), On "Aprioricity". Must say it sounds Scotian enough. (alla Duns Scotus). Bayne: >But the only empirical evidence I have is that in >this world Cicero is Tully. Oddly, the word 'world' was unknown to _Romans_! I suppose Barcan or Kripke drew it from Leibnitz. _mundus_? (It. mondo) >We have to make some unempirical assumptions about essences, >I think, in order to congratulate Kripke on discovering >empirically supported necessary statements. Well, but then _congratulatory_ as Austin would recognise, is a value-to-fact direction of fit anyway :). >I think we are close to being in a circle. And worse, the circle is _closed_! >We >have rigid designation if only if we have essentialism. >That is a first impression. Don't you hate that tautology (i.e. analytically true), "You can only make a first impression _once_"? >This, of course, ties in with David Lewis' program, >but we need not go there, just yet. Now yes? >From wiki: ---- Lewis was born in Oberlin, Ohio, to John D. Lewis, a Professor of Government at Oberlin College, and Ruth Ewart Kellogg Lewis, a distinguished medieval historian. The formidable intellect for which he was known later in his life was already manifest during his years at Oberlin High School, when he attended college lectures in chemistry. He went on to Swarthmore College and spent a year at Oxford (1959-1960), where he was tutored by Iris Murdoch and attended lectures by Gilbert Ryle, H.P. Grice, ... Oh my god -- he _is_ everywhere! ------ Anyway, loved to read Aune's foreword to the book he shared with this list's webpage: he acknowledges his 'views on ... [x] are 'strongly indebted' --- and who would you think he mentions? The big teachers, the masters! No! His 'one-time' students! This _is_ to congratulate! To drop: I will mention Grice's acknowledgement to Strawson in "Presupposition" (WOW): "to my friend, Sir Peter, my former tutor and colleague". But there the generation gap was _minimal_, since Strawson was, er, an 'older student'. Indeed, when Horn met them both he confided, (words to the effect): "they both looked so old that one would not say that one was the teacher of th'other". Anyway, the one-time students of Aune's (it's like 'friend of Aune's' -- the logical form of that second possessive for another day) are Brian Skyrms and Roger Rosencrantz -- Granted, it's to their _writings_ not to that favourite of _linguists_ (who do record thing), 'pc' -- personal correspondence or communication. I never liked that sort of 'critical apparatus'. Some people go on to mention when the personal communication _was_! Anyway, Aune mentions some pretty good authors. Quinton, for example. Where was he coming from? I asked myself, and said, "JL, you have to focus on the playgroup -- never mind externals". "But perhaps Quinto _was_ playgroup". "Yes, but in the matter under consideration you have to focus on G. A. Paul". Going through the reference list of Aune's book I note and wonder at some wonderfully titled books. My prize has to go to one that was an early influence on me -- if only via review by Dummett in _Truth and other enigmas_: Goodman, "The structure of appearance". Poetry at her highest! I have never met a necessarist. Aune writes to the effect that some years ago, one _had_ to be an empiricist. Then came Bealer and we know the rest. They _have_ made essentialism _respectable_! In this connection, Partee (of UMass.) and her 'Reflections of a formal semanticist' (pdf online) is illuminating. She recalls conversation with Kaplan, "But then, why is it that philosophers can't stand essence". "Quine can't -- but that's a lingering prejudice. When Quine was _learning_, modal logic _was_ a mess -- it's not so any more" (or as the NYT today read: "anymore" (one word). Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Fri Feb 27 09:33:30 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2009 14:33:30 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] RBJ's Proposal and and Hume's Fork In-Reply-To: <540876.97287.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <540876.97287.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <54A229D7376C4605A712C794F0CB77A2@DFLVQC1J> Hi Steve, Here are sundry comments. <> If that were so, how could communication ever get off the ground? Surely the public rules become established through successful attempts at communication? << Is "'a' is a rigid designator" determined by fact or stipulation? Is it "analytic" if true?>> It depends what 'a' refers to. If it refers to an uninterpreted sound or inscription, it is necessarily false. If it refers to an interpreted symbol, it is either necessarily true or necessarily false, depending on whether the symbol (as interpreted) either is or is not a name which designates something. What makes the statement true or false is the meaning (sense and reference) of what is referred to by 'a.' Suppose I introduce a new name and stipulate its reference by means of a reference-fixing definite description, thus: By 'a' I mean the US president in February 2009. I am doing two things. First I am making a necessarily true (so long as I am not lying, etc.) statement about a particular language, namely, English augmented by 'a.' Second I am actually bringing into existence that particular language by my 'performative' utterance. The reference-fixing statement is thus always necessarily true or necessarily false. But by making it I stipulate which language I am talking about. <> I think it is an empirical claim. While it is true that anyone who understands it, and thus understands that 'Cicero' is a proper name, must thereby know that 'Cicero' is a rigid designator, if it designates anything, it is nevertheless an empirical question whether 'Cicero' does in fact designate anything (we could all be mistaken). The empirical evidence concerns whether Cicero exists. All this is written off the top of my head, so I am not reporting any positions taken in the literature, though what I say may coincide with some. I have not read the literature for two decades, so I cannot remember what positions were taken twenty years ago and I haven't the faintest idea what positions are taken now. I think (he said hesitatingly) that it is uncontroversial that rigid designation implies essentialism. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Fri Feb 27 09:48:43 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2009 06:48:43 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] RBJ's Proposal and and Hume's Fork In-Reply-To: <54A229D7376C4605A712C794F0CB77A2@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <224810.18105.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Danny, Sorry I can reply only very briefly to a couple of points. "If that were so, how could communication ever get off the ground? Surely the public rules become established through successful attempts at communication?" We don't form rules and then communicate, thanks to them. It is the publicity of the rules rather than public "ratification" that is at issue.? I think Reichebach "gets it. If you think not, tell me why. ? "It depends what ?a? refers to. If it refers to an uninterpreted sound or inscription..." Yes, this was part of my point. Compare Quine-quotes and Scheffler, or Reichenbach. A lot hinges on this. Again, there is no GOOD discussion of Kripke that is not careful. I can't really get involved here in a "good" discussion. Another reason for care is that the topic is full of "mine fields." Distinguishing the philosophy involved in the theory of rigid designation and the logic involved in a model theoretic treatment of alethic modality is not easy. It can't be done carelessly. Much would depend on detailed discussion of Kripke's early logic papers and the conclusions drawn w.r.t. to example "actualism" on the other. Again, way too involved for me to drop everything and reread this stuff now. It is worthwhile to be sure, although I don't think it is quite as important as some believe. Ontology is not model theory etc. Regards sTeve ? --- On Fri, 2/27/09, Danny Frederick wrote: From: Danny Frederick Subject: RE: RBJ's Proposal and and Hume's Fork To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Friday, February 27, 2009, 9:33 AM Hi Steve, ? Here are sundry comments. ? ? <> ? ? If that were so, how could communication ever get off the ground? Surely the public rules become established through successful attempts at communication? ? ? << Is "'a' is a rigid designator" determined by fact or stipulation? Is it "analytic" if true?>> ? ? It depends what ?a? refers to. If it refers to an uninterpreted sound or inscription, it is necessarily false. If it refers to an interpreted symbol, it is either necessarily true or necessarily false, depending on whether the symbol (as interpreted) either is or is not a name which designates something. What makes the statement true or false is the meaning (sense and reference) of what is referred to by ?a.? ? Suppose I introduce a new name and stipulate its reference by means of a reference-fixing definite description, thus: ? By ?a? I mean the US president in February 2009. ? I am doing two things. First I am making a necessarily true (so long as I am not lying, etc.) statement about a particular language, namely, English augmented by ?a.? Second I am actually bringing into existence that particular language by my ?performative? utterance. ? The reference-fixing statement is thus always necessarily true or necessarily false. But by making it I stipulate which language I am talking about. ? ? <> ? ? I think it is an empirical claim. While it is true that anyone who understands it, and thus understands that ?Cicero? is a proper name, must thereby know that ?Cicero? is a rigid designator, if it designates anything, it is nevertheless an empirical question whether ?Cicero? does in fact designate anything (we could all be mistaken). The empirical evidence concerns whether Cicero exists. ? All this is written off the top of my head, so I am not reporting any positions taken in the literature, though what I say may coincide with some. I have not read the literature for two decades, so I cannot remember what positions were taken twenty years ago and I haven?t the faintest idea what positions are taken now. ? I think (he said hesitatingly) that it is uncontroversial that rigid designation implies essentialism. ? Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Jlsperanza at aol.com Fri Feb 27 13:53:58 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2009 13:53:58 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Grice's Frown Message-ID: Baynes was quoting from Reichenbach: "A communicative function begins only when there are certain rules established for the use of the terms." Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction (1933, 1938 -- cited in OED) (this, after, as Bayne points out, 'disussing some general uses of language, emotional ("Ouch") and communicative (we all get this I guess)'). In Baynes's exegesis: >>>communication requires public >>>rules in order to have language. Danny Frederick comments: >>If that were so, how could communication >>ever get off the ground? >>Surely the public rules become established >>through successful attempts at communication? Baynes: >We don't form rules and then communicate, >thanks to them. It is the publicity of the rules >rather than public "ratification" that is at >issue. I think Reichebach "gets it. If >you think not, tell me why. Well, what he says is, tersely: "A communicative function begins only when there are certain rules established for the use of the terms." One should check if he uses 'public' at all! This was written in Istanbul in 1933, so we have to be charitable in the interpretation. For example, 'certain'. This, I don't know, could be an ambiguous _Germanism_. It has nothing to do with 'certain' alla Descartes of course. It means _specific_, or _clearly defined_. The 'establish' (as per 'established') is a fun one and as I noted in "The force of linguistic rules", the OED credits Reichenbach not for this quote but for the one on 'descripta' and _conventionalism_. So I would think his idea of _convention_ could prove interesting. I once wrote a paper on that. I studied Greek forms of 'convention'. It's _thesei_, i.e. the dative of _thesis_, positio. Versus, notably _phusei_, by nature. Some other texts have "nomoi", i.e. by law. Cfr. Poincare, truth by convention, etc. I notice that the word _rule_ is Romantic (well, Roman), for 'regula' (Die Regel in German -- so Reichanbach must be thinking in that). Note that he is careful to have it as they beings 'rule for the use', rather than for the _meaning_! By terms, I would think he basically means _predicates_. For surely we can think that the 'structural devices' are _given_ to us. So basically he seems to be saying that there is some, I go with Baynes here, ... and would call it _procedure_. By 'communicative function' he must be meaning, as Baynes has it, the second passenger in the bus: Language-As-Communication (Not Language-as-Expression, she is so shy!). For surely we cannot analyse _meaning_ in terms of _communication_. That is, as Grice points out ('Meaning' this list's webpage), 'not helpful' (but Stevenson 1944 commits the mistake). If _function_ is taken mathematically, I would say that for any predicate P, there is a function which gives its meaning. We can even be extensionalist here. Consider the predicate "... is one of the seven wonders of the world". So to know the _meaning_ of that, for practical purposes, is to know the extension. Now we could use the expression freely, "Now _dthat_ should be a wonder of the world to add to the list of seven". If the procedure is 'public' it means that between Addressee and Utterer, they _share_ the procedure. It does not mean that who's an addressee can become an utterer and vice versa. There may be an agreement that the established procedure runs only in one direction ("When she says 'seven wonders of the world' she means ..."). What a public procedure amounts to then is -- the 'ratification' as Baynes has it, that the Utterer is _abiding_ by it -- the 'ratification' that the Addressee is relying on it to _interpret_ the Utterer. D. Frederick: >>If that were so, how could communication >>ever get off the ground? >>Surely the public rules become established >>through successful attempts at communication? What I found useful here is S. W. Blackburn (at Pembroke then) in "Spreading the word: groundings in the philosophy of language". Not terribly deep (it covers too much grounding!) but a good account of what he calls, I think, one-off communication. I was reminded of this by the 'off' (the ground) as used by Danny Frederick. But then what _is_ a procedure (or 'rule' if you must)? How _general_ has it got to be. I once wrote an essay for Rabossi on this (for one of his seminars). I called it "Aunt Matilda", for I was having in mind Grice's example: "runt" = means, 'undersized person'. This _runt_ does figuratively. Literally it means _undersized_ 'anything' ('runt of the litter'). Grice wants to say that Aunt Matilda _understands_ 'runt' but she has no procedure whatsoever to use it _communicatively_. She will 'understand' the expression, but the procedure (or rule) at play cannot be understood behaviouristically as 'dispositions to utter 'runt' to mean 'undersized person', because she _lacks_ the disposition. So, when it comes to _figurative_ uses of 'runt', surely we do not need any procedure or rule. Basic 'implicature' will do, i.e. Matilda's knowing how to build a working-out schema for the metaphor, as it were. When it comes to the _literal_ use, the 'establishing' is pretty _arbitrary_ if that's the word. If I like anything of David Kellog Lewis's PhD "Conventions of Language" (Harvard -- under Quine) is his appeal to _arbitrary_: It is _arbitrary_ that 'runt' means RUNT. That's as far as 'non-natural' (to use Grice's wording) goes. Surely for many many many vehicles of meaning, the link is _not_ arbitrary. Now, I would think that it is in the ability on the part of an addressee to grasp the _arbitrariness_ of the linguistic sign (to echo almost literally F. de Saussure), we need a 'public' ratification. Hence Reichenbach's "Ouch". "Natural" sign, no arbitrary procedure needed. The transfer is not so much an issue of evolution but 'semantic' freedom. As Grice remarks in his 1-page theory of representation (in WOW, Retrospective Epilogue), not all representations need to be _eikonic_; that would make conversation pretty _rough_ (not subtle, or, as he'd prefeer, 'genteel'). Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sat Feb 28 08:42:15 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sat, 28 Feb 2009 08:42:15 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Grice's Shopping List Message-ID: In a message dated 2/27/2009 8:08:18 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes in "Re: A note from inside the teapot" Second, as I move in the direction of completing the Anscombe book, I'm curious about his ties to Anscombe. If you have any cases of citations that may be of interest, let me (us) know, please. Obviously, there is some conceptual connection with respect to the role of intention in meaning etc. But it hasn't been explored in the way I think it could be. ---- You have become a true Grice scholar when the anaphoric 'his' you take, ceteris paribus, to mean Grice. (No mention of him earlier in Baynes' post!) --- I don't have the first page of "Intention and Uncertainty" by Grice (Clarendon, 1971 -- a separata, or offprint, really from the Proceedings of the British Academy), but I seem to recall he refers to Anscombe's shopping list. This would be to: "Elizabeth Anscombe (1957, 56) considers a mere ?shopping list?. ... plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality by P. Jacob. Yes, a moot point -- I think Grice is introducing the topic vis a vis 'directions of fit', without possibly using that expression (which we know draws from Austin, "How to talk: some simple ways", although not used in the manner that Searle will later do. In the same passage Grice cites Kenny -- his book on intention. I mentioned that to Kenny once, and we discussed the bit. I don't think Grice himself goes on to cite Anscombe in other pieces. He was of course familiar with Anscombe's translation of Wittgenstein. In a sort of amusing passage in "Method in philosophical psychology", Grice out of the blues uses quotes to the effect, "No psychological predicates without traits of behaviour that these predicates are attempting to 'explain'" -- or words to that effect. Which would be Anscombe's translation of the Wittgenstein piece in Philosophical Investigations. I would have to revise Anscombe's Oxford years. wiki: "went on to read "Mods & Greats" (a course of study in classics, ancient history, and philosophy) at St Hugh's College of the University of Oxford, graduating with a First in 1941." So this would coincide with Grice, although Grice was older (b. 1913), Anscombe b. 1919 -- like Urmson, I would think). St. Hugh's is on St Margaret's Road Oxford OX2 6LE St. Hugh's would be closer to the Grices' real abode -- a falt on Woodstock Road, rather than St. John's proper. I would think that St. Hugh's was a female-only? I did some research on the 'greats' and I'm surprised it's listed as 'mods and greats'. The Greats is just sland for 'great go' as opposed to the 'little go'. The technical name of the programme would be "Littera Humaniores". So it would be exactly the same programme Grice completed. Grice graduated with a first in 1938. I undestand (via reading Chapman's book on Grice) that in the first two or three years of the programme they did not have any philosophy _at all_. It was 'classics' by which they meant literature, then -- Homer, who knows, tragedy, who knows, Plato I _Hope_). The ancient history was Thucydides, and Herodotos, I would think. And then philosophy, and here is where the 'mod' comes in (for "modern") in that they had a sprinkling of Locke, Hume, Kant -- plus the standard Plato and Aristotle. The readings -- mandatory -- were Ethica Nichomachea. I sometimes read their syllabus and wonder. "Having gone through those classics for years -- it's unimaginable that _I_ would show _any_ interest in same in later years -- e.g. practical syllogism --," but there you are. Another rpoint of contact: "I always hated phenomenalism and felt trapped by it. I couldn't see my way out of it but I didn't believe it." the wiki has Anscombe saying. In this, like Grice -- but while Anscombe was reading Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as an undergraduate, who knows what Grice was reading. (Certainly not the Tractatus, seriously). I would think he was concerned seriously with phenomenalism as only the philosophers of his generation could -- witness essays by Isaiah Berlin in the 1930s, actually just one. And then Ayer's _empiricism_ loose free. The fashionable thing in Oxford seems not to have been to focus too much neither on the logical nor the positivistic sides to 'logical positivism' -- by which I would mean the 'verificationist'. It was really a reconsideration of what was to be a respectable empiricist, or how to challenge the charge of phenomenalism if at all. Oddly, when I read in a rush the sentence above, I read it as "I COULD see my way out of it, but I didn't believe in it" (i.e. the way). That would have been more interesting! I would say Grice never felt too trapped by it -- he had perhaps a bigger common sense! -- but he loved the logical exercise of turning 'phenomeanlist' verbs (like 'seems a yellow packet") and noumenalist verbs ("definitely _is_ a yellow packet). As you see, that great 'doubt or denial' consideration. The mention of the yellow packet is Anscombe's: "I would spend time, in caf?s, for example, staring at objects saying to myself: "I see a packet. But what do I really see? How can I say that I see here anything more than a yellow expanse?" ----- Wiki: "After her fellowship at Cambridge ended, she was awarded a research fellowship at Somerville College, Oxford" --- this would link with the 'school' that gave us some anti-Griceans like Mrs. Julie Jack, and pro-Griceans like Anita Avramides. I've been to the school (from the outside -- it's a female-only one) and can well feel that they have a sisterhood in there! "Anscombe remained at Somerville College from 1946 to 1970." So this would be the hey-day of linguistic philosophy. I would not think she would mix with the playgroup. Grice was responsible for the playgroup from 1960 to 1967, and then he was gone to UC/Berkeley. They would have common acquaintances. Grice's pubs for example where "Flag and Lamb" (on the sunny side of St. Giles) and "Eagle and the Baby" (across the street). This was the haunt of C. S. Lewis. I read from wiki: "In 1948 Anscombe presented a paper at a meeting of Oxford's Socratic Club in which she disputed C. S. Lewis's argument that naturalism was self-refuting. His loss was so humiliating that he abandoned theological argument and turned entirely to children's literature." Anscombe disagrees. Did meet with Lewis later on, and, she states, "neither Dr. Havard (who had Lewis and me to dinner a few weeks later) nor Professor Jack Bennet remembered any such feelings on Lewis's part." And in any case, Lewis did rewrite the thing in _Miracles_ to meet Anscombe's objections. Reading from wiki: "The aim of Intention (1957) was to make plain the character of human action and will. Anscombe approaches the matter through the concept of intention, which, as she famously notes, has three modes of appearance in our language." FIRST MODE: She is X'ing intentionally --- intentional action She is X'ing with the intention of doing Y SECOND MODE or ...She is X'ing in order to Y "intention with which" or further intention in acting THIRD MODE: She intends to Y or... She has expressed the intention to do Y "expression of intention for the future" (what is expressed is what Davidson later called a pure intending)" ---- I am reminded of Grice's mention of Hart in "Prolegomena" (WOW, 1989 -- Stud ies in the Way of Words). The reference is to 'unpublished' Hart, but it deals with the abuse sometimes felt on the adverb 'intentionally' -- and which Grice links with Austin's "no aberration without modification" that Roger Bishop Jones discuss in his web-pages. --- I am also reminded of an essay that I have discussed with Baynes elsehwere, Lombard/Stine, "Grice's Intentions". This is a minutiae account of the 'intentional idiom' in Grice -- as it connects with the standard 'Meaning'. I think we have to wait for Grice 1971 ("Intention and Uncertainty") to get a clearer, more serious account of Grice on intention -- much discussed in literature of action-theory emanating from UC/Berkeley -- Bratman, etc. In Grice, in the early "Meaning", the action seems to be always the uttering of x. So he is interested in that sort of intention that underlies the uttering of something (uttering taken broadly to mean any sort of 'activity' act -- even to mention Vendler). He does say that the phrase "mean to" -- which would relate to "intention with which" -- is _natural_ and outside his present account. Oddly, Grice -- perhaps as if feeling some of the criticisms of Vendler to the progressive aspect, ungrammatical, as applied to things like 'mean' ("Tom has been meaning that the cat is on the mat for the last half an hour"), he produces his analysandum in the past: "utterer U meant that p by x" iff Naturally, the analysans then becomes also in the past, iff U intended ... Now, the natural collocation for Grice, since he is into 'interpersonal' scenarios, is to have the 'that'-clause collapsed as it were in a 'transformed' clause: U intends A to believe ... ---- which I take a transformation of U intends that A believe that ... where A is addressee. Perhaps closer to Anscombe's subtle distinctions comes from those who wanted to associate Austin's work on perlocution/illocution with Grice's 'pragmatics'. So following Austin, one would say that If _BY_ uttering x, U meant that p. that's 'meanng' proper. It's not so much _in_ uttering x. The emphasis on the 'by' led some to think that Grice was a 'consequentialist' (word apparently coined by Anscombe!) and that he is analysing 'meaning' (or 'action' or intention in terms of the mediate, rather than immediate consequences. Austin does make a point that it's the 'by' versus 'in' collocations that mark the distinction between perlocution and illocution, respectively. From wiki: "To do Y" or "because I want to do Y" would be typical answers to this sort of "why?"; though they are not the only ones, they are crucial to the constitution of the phenomenon as a typical phenomenon of human life (sections 18-21)." This I would relate more to Grice's meticulous account of 'reasons for actions' and psychological attitudes in _Aspects of Reason_. "reasons for", 'reasons why', etc. I have written extensively elsewhere and Harman and Dancy have good online reviews of Grice's book. Grice is not so much concerned with 'intentional action' itself, but with 'why' questions related to the holding of a propositional attitude. So, not so much with "Why did you do that?" but why would someone _conclude_ that? What is the reason to draw the conclusion q out of the premise p, and so forth. He is perhaps seeing the phenomenon more generally, since he spends a few pages on explaining to us why the bridge collapsed! ---- Then, yes, there is the 'shopping list' example cited by Grice in 1971. He must have found Anscombe's phrasing of the phenomenon appealing: From wiki: "If the agent fails to buy what is listed, we do not say that the list is untrue or incorrect; we say that the mistake is in the action, not the belief." This "we would not say", etc. combines with PDA -- paradigm cases arguments! Then there would be connections on "I" -- Grice's Personal Identity (Mind, 1941) and I read from wiki: "Her paper "The First Person" follows up remarks by Wittgenstein, coming to the now-notorious conclusion that the first-person pronoun, "I", does not refer to anything (not, e.g., to the speaker)." The early Grice would of couse -- but then _EVERYBODY_ would -- disagree, as he proffers an analysis of "I" in terms of 'logical construction': a series of mnemonic states. I don't totally buy that picture, and would think Grice may have come to realise the importance of spatio-temoral continuity too (he dedicated one semester or two to Wiggins on Sameness and Substance -- and he cherished Strawson too much to ignore Strawson's conception of persons and parsons). Here it's Perry who'd done the most serous work on this, in PGRICE (ed. Grandy/Warner, Oxford Clarenon: Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends) and also by previously editing Grice's "Personal Identity" in his 1976 influential collection (for University of California Press at Berkeley). Finally, Grice does use, like Anscombe, 'transubstantial', but I think Grice is being more general, and using it not just for the wine --> blood, bread ---> body, but for any eschatological cross-epitheting, as I think he calls it! I _think_ Grice uses 'shopping list' in _another_ unrelated context, when he is precisely describing what eschatology should do for us. I'm retaining that as a header, for it connects with the starting point of our discussion of the Anscombe-Grice interface. Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sat Feb 28 09:47:55 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sat, 28 Feb 2009 09:47:55 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] Grice's Shopping List Message-ID: In a message dated 2/28/2009 8:42:15 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, Jlsperanza writes: Another rpoint of contact: "I always hated phenomenalism and felt trapped by it. I couldn't see my way out of it but I didn't believe it." the wiki has Anscombe saying. ---- an addendum then, of historical interest: In "Prolegomena" Grice _also_ cites from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigation. The example, as I recall, 'a horse cannot look like a horse'. Now, I've always been interested in Grice's idea of implicature, because he does confess that it came to him via studying the language of perception. I want to think that the trigger may well have been that passage from Anscombe's Wittgenstein, then. Grice is delivering the William James in 1967, and the Philosophical Investigations go back to 1955. Strawson cites Grice in terms of 'implicature' (or 'implication') in 1952: footnote. So, the Wittgenstein example may have _triggered_ what Grice had detected in perhaps other philosophers. Grice will like to say, of course, that a horse not only can look like a horse, but ceteris paribus, _will_. So, we see different motivations. Anscombe says she fell in love with Witters as an undergraduate at St. Hugh's, reading abstract things like -- to cite wiki: "Her interest in Wittgenstein's philosophy arose from reading the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as an undergraduate: she claimed to have conceived the idea of studying with Wittgenstein as soon as she opened the book in Blackwell's and read section 5.53, "Identity of object I express by identity of sign, and not by using a sign for identity. Difference of objects I express by difference of signs." Oddly I opened other books at Blackwell -- nice sunny reading rooms in the first floor, with philosophy section too -- but found it slightly noisy to fall in love with a piece of philosophical prose there! I was amused that Anscombe didn't have German and Witters arranged for her a stay in Vienna to that end. (to have German -- will travel). Some task! I could never learn a language _by mandate_! It's ood, too, to learn that Witters constantly referred to Anscombe as "old man". Not so much from the 'queer fellow' to use the Broadism direction of fit, but that _she_ ('the old man' -- very unfair) _bore_ the sobriquet. Imagine Grice calling me "Daisy". Cheers, JL **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/prom oclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sat Feb 28 14:05:55 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sat, 28 Feb 2009 11:05:55 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] RBJ's Proposal and and Hume's Fork In-Reply-To: <54A229D7376C4605A712C794F0CB77A2@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <373707.254.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Danny, I can't enter a discussion on Kripke, but I was thinking of your post and thought I'd mention one thing that I maybe should have. Part of what concerns me in all this "rigid designator worship" is in how we arrive at worlds in Kripke. Kripke is very explicit in contrasting his view with Lewis' and he repeats his point that worlds are "stipulated" not discovered. If you look at what was said about "stipulation" around 1936 among the "positivists" and their scientifically minded critics, e.g. Reichenbach, you will find that stipulation is closely related to pragmatics, in particular definition. Stipulation requires, by my lights, decision and decision introduces mind. If you can't have "worlds" without stipulation then you can't have them without minds. But you just might be able to avoid having to go "model theoretic" in dealing with many of our problems by simply accepting minds and doing without the "worlds." To be sure they are crucial on some accounts of counterfactuals but the we are back to stipulation: "Suppose contrary to fact..." I don't really want to go into this now, but you DO raise good points and I don't want to sound dismissive. Regards steve --- On Fri, 2/27/09, Danny Frederick wrote: From: Danny Frederick Subject: RE: RBJ's Proposal and and Hume's Fork To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Date: Friday, February 27, 2009, 9:33 AM Hi Steve, ? Here are sundry comments. ? ? <> ? ? If that were so, how could communication ever get off the ground? Surely the public rules become established through successful attempts at communication? ? ? << Is "'a' is a rigid designator" determined by fact or stipulation? Is it "analytic" if true?>> ? ? It depends what ?a? refers to. If it refers to an uninterpreted sound or inscription, it is necessarily false. If it refers to an interpreted symbol, it is either necessarily true or necessarily false, depending on whether the symbol (as interpreted) either is or is not a name which designates something. What makes the statement true or false is the meaning (sense and reference) of what is referred to by ?a.? ? Suppose I introduce a new name and stipulate its reference by means of a reference-fixing definite description, thus: ? By ?a? I mean the US president in February 2009. ? I am doing two things. First I am making a necessarily true (so long as I am not lying, etc.) statement about a particular language, namely, English augmented by ?a.? Second I am actually bringing into existence that particular language by my ?performative? utterance. ? The reference-fixing statement is thus always necessarily true or necessarily false. But by making it I stipulate which language I am talking about. ? ? <> ? ? I think it is an empirical claim. While it is true that anyone who understands it, and thus understands that ?Cicero? is a proper name, must thereby know that ?Cicero? is a rigid designator, if it designates anything, it is nevertheless an empirical question whether ?Cicero? does in fact designate anything (we could all be mistaken). The empirical evidence concerns whether Cicero exists. ? All this is written off the top of my head, so I am not reporting any positions taken in the literature, though what I say may coincide with some. I have not read the literature for two decades, so I cannot remember what positions were taken twenty years ago and I haven?t the faintest idea what positions are taken now. ? I think (he said hesitatingly) that it is uncontroversial that rigid designation implies essentialism. ? Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Sat Feb 28 13:57:53 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Sat, 28 Feb 2009 10:57:53 -0800 (PST) Subject: [hist-analytic] Grice's Shopping List In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <264350.28277.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> JL, Thanks for this, I knew I could count on you! Just a couple of points. "I shall return" and make a couple of other points, but my email is backing and...Anyway. The business of the shopping list occurs in the context of distinguishes two "knowledges" (the first plural use of 'knowledge' I can recall seeing). Recall that for Anscombe (and Wittgenstein) knowledge is possible only where there is a distinction to be drawn between thinking you know and seeming to know (p. 14). Now in Section 32 part of the point is to distinguish observable knowledge and knowledge "in intention." This distinction was necessitated by the requirement that the relevant "Why?" question distinctive in its applicability to cases of intention was distinguishable from other senses, particularly where 'involuntary' entails an understanding of intention. In these cases we can't evade the "Why?" question by pleading an involuntary act. The main point has to do with the relation of mistakes or the possibility of being mistaken in relation to two kinds of knowledge, suggesting two kinds of mistakes. These two kinds are illustrated, respectively, by the detective and the shopper. Direction of fit, if it pertains, is alluded to in the relation of following the list as ordered and making up the list. We can ignore this, momentarily, although I think it is important in deciding a number of questions. I notice that the Grice essay you mention is from the British Academy. The are VERY understanding on copyright, very good, indeed! If I can get the citation, I'll put it on hist-analytic at some point in the future. I'll take a look at what else you've had to say, soon, hopefully. Regards STeve --- On Sat, 2/28/09, Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: From: Jlsperanza at aol.com Subject: Grice's Shopping List To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk Date: Saturday, February 28, 2009, 8:42 AM In a message dated 2/27/2009 8:08:18 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, baynesrb at yahoo.com writes in "Re: A note from inside the teapot" Second, as I move in the direction of completing the Anscombe book, I'm curious about his ties to Anscombe. If you have any cases of citations that may be of interest, let me (us) know, please. Obviously, there is some conceptual connection with respect to the role of intention in meaning etc. But it hasn't been explored in the way I think it could be. ---- You have become a true Grice scholar when the anaphoric 'his' you take, ceteris paribus, to mean Grice. (No mention of him earlier in Baynes' post!) --- I don't have the first page of "Intention and Uncertainty" by Grice (Clarendon, 1971 -- a separata, or offprint, really from the Proceedings of the British Academy), but I seem to recall he refers to Anscombe's shopping list. This would be to: "Elizabeth Anscombe (1957, 56) considers a mere ?shopping list?. ... plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality by P. Jacob. Yes, a moot point -- I think Grice is introducing the topic vis a vis 'directions of fit', without possibly using that expression (which we know draws from Austin, "How to talk: some simple ways", although not used in the manner that Searle will later do. In the same passage Grice cites Kenny -- his book on intention. I mentioned that to Kenny once, and we discussed the bit. I don't think Grice himself goes on to cite Anscombe in other pieces. He was of course familiar with Anscombe's translation of Wittgenstein. In a sort of amusing passage in "Method in philosophical psychology", Grice out of the blues uses quotes to the effect, "No psychological predicates without traits of behaviour that these predicates are attempting to 'explain'" -- or words to that effect. Which would be Anscombe's translation of the Wittgenstein piece in Philosophical Investigations. I would have to revise Anscombe's Oxford years. wiki: "went on to read "Mods & Greats" (a course of study in classics, ancient history, and philosophy) at St Hugh's College of the University of Oxford, graduating with a First in 1941." So this would coincide with Grice, although Grice was older (b. 1913), Anscombe b. 1919 -- like Urmson, I would think). St. Hugh's is on St Margaret's Road Oxford OX2 6LE St. Hugh's would be closer to the Grices' real abode -- a falt on Woodstock Road, rather than St. John's proper. I would think that St. Hugh's was a female-only? I did some research on the 'greats' and I'm surprised it's listed as 'mods and greats'. The Greats is just sland for 'great go' as opposed to the 'little go'. The technical name of the programme would be "Littera Humaniores". So it would be exactly the same programme Grice completed. Grice graduated with a first in 1938. I undestand (via reading Chapman's book on Grice) that in the first two or three years of the programme they did not have any philosophy _at all_. It was 'classics' by which they meant literature, then -- Homer, who knows, tragedy, who knows, Plato I _Hope_). The ancient history was Thucydides, and Herodotos, I would think. And then philosophy, and here is where the 'mod' comes in (for "modern") in that they had a sprinkling of Locke, Hume, Kant -- plus the standard Plato and Aristotle. The readings -- mandatory -- were Ethica Nichomachea. I sometimes read their syllabus and wonder. "Having gone through those classics for years -- it's unimaginable that _I_ would show _any_ interest in same in later years -- e.g. practical syllogism --," but there you are. Another rpoint of contact: "I always hated phenomenalism and felt trapped by it. I couldn't see my way out of it but I didn't believe it." the wiki has Anscombe saying. In this, like Grice -- but while Anscombe was reading Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as an undergraduate, who knows what Grice was reading. (Certainly not the Tractatus, seriously). I would think he was concerned seriously with phenomenalism as only the philosophers of his generation could -- witness essays by Isaiah Berlin in the 1930s, actually just one. And then Ayer's _empiricism_ loose free. The fashionable thing in Oxford seems not to have been to focus too much neither on the logical nor the positivistic sides to 'logical positivism' -- by which I would mean the 'verificationist'. It was really a reconsideration of what was to be a respectable empiricist, or how to challenge the charge of phenomenalism if at all. Oddly, when I read in a rush the sentence above, I read it as "I COULD see my way out of it, but I didn't believe in it" (i.e. the way). That would have been more interesting! I would say Grice never felt too trapped by it -- he had perhaps a bigger common sense! -- but he loved the logical exercise of turning 'phenomeanlist' verbs (like 'seems a yellow packet") and noumenalist verbs ("definitely _is_ a yellow packet). As you see, that great 'doubt or denial' consideration. The mention of the yellow packet is Anscombe's: "I would spend time, in caf?s, for example, staring at objects saying to myself: "I see a packet. But what do I really see? How can I say that I see here anything more than a yellow expanse?" ----- Wiki: "After her fellowship at Cambridge ended, she was awarded a research fellowship at Somerville College, Oxford" --- this would link with the 'school' that gave us some anti-Griceans like Mrs. Julie Jack, and pro-Griceans like Anita Avramides. I've been to the school (from the outside -- it's a female-only one) and can well feel that they have a sisterhood in there! "Anscombe remained at Somerville College from 1946 to 1970." So this would be the hey-day of linguistic philosophy. I would not think she would mix with the playgroup. Grice was responsible for the playgroup from 1960 to 1967, and then he was gone to UC/Berkeley. They would have common acquaintances. Grice's pubs for example where "Flag and Lamb" (on the sunny side of St. Giles) and "Eagle and the Baby" (across the street). This was the haunt of C. S. Lewis. I read from wiki: "In 1948 Anscombe presented a paper at a meeting of Oxford's Socratic Club in which she disputed C. S. Lewis's argument that naturalism was self-refuting. His loss was so humiliating that he abandoned theological argument and turned entirely to children's literature." Anscombe disagrees. Did meet with Lewis later on, and, she states, "neither Dr. Havard (who had Lewis and me to dinner a few weeks later) nor Professor Jack Bennet remembered any such feelings on Lewis's part." And in any case, Lewis did rewrite the thing in _Miracles_ to meet Anscombe's objections. Reading from wiki: "The aim of Intention (1957) was to make plain the character of human action and will. Anscombe approaches the matter through the concept of intention, which, as she famously notes, has three modes of appearance in our language." FIRST MODE: She is X'ing intentionally --- intentional action She is X'ing with the intention of doing Y SECOND MODE or ...She is X'ing in order to Y "intention with which" or further intention in acting THIRD MODE: She intends to Y or... She has expressed the intention to do Y "expression of intention for the future" (what is expressed is what Davidson later called a pure intending)" ---- I am reminded of Grice's mention of Hart in "Prolegomena" (WOW, 1989 -- Stud ies in the Way of Words). The reference is to 'unpublished' Hart, but it deals with the abuse sometimes felt on the adverb 'intentionally' -- and which Grice links with Austin's "no aberration without modification" that Roger Bishop Jones discuss in his web-pages. --- I am also reminded of an essay that I have discussed with Baynes elsehwere, Lombard/Stine, "Grice's Intentions". This is a minutiae account of the 'intentional idiom' in Grice -- as it connects with the standard 'Meaning'. I think we have to wait for Grice 1971 ("Intention and Uncertainty") to get a clearer, more serious account of Grice on intention -- much discussed in literature of action-theory emanating from UC/Berkeley -- Bratman, etc. In Grice, in the early "Meaning", the action seems to be always the uttering of x. So he is interested in that sort of intention that underlies the uttering of something (uttering taken broadly to mean any sort of 'activity' act -- even to mention Vendler). He does say that the phrase "mean to" -- which would relate to "intention with which" -- is _natural_ and outside his present account. Oddly, Grice -- perhaps as if feeling some of the criticisms of Vendler to the progressive aspect, ungrammatical, as applied to things like 'mean' ("Tom has been meaning that the cat is on the mat for the last half an hour"), he produces his analysandum in the past: "utterer U meant that p by x" iff Naturally, the analysans then becomes also in the past, iff U intended ... Now, the natural collocation for Grice, since he is into 'interpersonal' scenarios, is to have the 'that'-clause collapsed as it were in a 'transformed' clause: U intends A to believe ... ---- which I take a transformation of U intends that A believe that ... where A is addressee. Perhaps closer to Anscombe's subtle distinctions comes from those who wanted to associate Austin's work on perlocution/illocution with Grice's 'pragmatics'. So following Austin, one would say that If _BY_ uttering x, U meant that p. that's 'meanng' proper. It's not so much _in_ uttering x. The emphasis on the 'by' led some to think that Grice was a 'consequentialist' (word apparently coined by Anscombe!) and that he is analysing 'meaning' (or 'action' or intention in terms of the mediate, rather than immediate consequences. Austin does make a point that it's the 'by' versus 'in' collocations that mark the distinction between perlocution and illocution, respectively. From wiki: "To do Y" or "because I want to do Y" would be typical answers to this sort of "why?"; though they are not the only ones, they are crucial to the constitution of the phenomenon as a typical phenomenon of human life (sections 18-21)." This I would relate more to Grice's meticulous account of 'reasons for actions' and psychological attitudes in _Aspects of Reason_. "reasons for", 'reasons why', etc. I have written extensively elsewhere and Harman and Dancy have good online reviews of Grice's book. Grice is not so much concerned with 'intentional action' itself, but with 'why' questions related to the holding of a propositional attitude. So, not so much with "Why did you do that?" but why would someone _conclude_ that? What is the reason to draw the conclusion q out of the premise p, and so forth. He is perhaps seeing the phenomenon more generally, since he spends a few pages on explaining to us why the bridge collapsed! ---- Then, yes, there is the 'shopping list' example cited by Grice in 1971. He must have found Anscombe's phrasing of the phenomenon appealing: From wiki: "If the agent fails to buy what is listed, we do not say that the list is untrue or incorrect; we say that the mistake is in the action, not the belief." This "we would not say", etc. combines with PDA -- paradigm cases arguments! Then there would be connections on "I" -- Grice's Personal Identity (Mind, 1941) and I read from wiki: "Her paper "The First Person" follows up remarks by Wittgenstein, coming to the now-notorious conclusion that the first-person pronoun, "I", does not refer to anything (not, e.g., to the speaker)." The early Grice would of couse -- but then _EVERYBODY_ would -- disagree, as he proffers an analysis of "I" in terms of 'logical construction': a series of mnemonic states. I don't totally buy that picture, and would think Grice may have come to realise the importance of spatio-temoral continuity too (he dedicated one semester or two to Wiggins on Sameness and Substance -- and he cherished Strawson too much to ignore Strawson's conception of persons and parsons). Here it's Perry who'd done the most serous work on this, in PGRICE (ed. Grandy/Warner, Oxford Clarenon: Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends) and also by previously editing Grice's "Personal Identity" in his 1976 influential collection (for University of California Press at Berkeley). Finally, Grice does use, like Anscombe, 'transubstantial', but I think Grice is being more general, and using it not just for the wine --> blood, bread ---> body, but for any eschatological cross-epitheting, as I think he calls it! I _think_ Grice uses 'shopping list' in _another_ unrelated context, when he is precisely describing what eschatology should do for us. I'm retaining that as a header, for it connects with the starting point of our discussion of the Anscombe-Grice interface. Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1218822736x1201267884/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Sat Feb 28 15:52:44 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Sat, 28 Feb 2009 20:52:44 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] RBJ's Proposal and and Hume's Fork In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <200902282052.45090.rbj@rbjones.com> On Wednesday 25 February 2009 18:46:45 Bruce Aune wrote: > RBJ proposed that a sentence appropriately disambiguated should be > said to be analytic iff it expresses a necessary proposition, the > latter being a proposition that is true is every possible world. I > think this is unpromising for the following reasons: The principle issue at stake is whether or not analyticity and necessity co-extensional concepts. I don't believe that the Logical Positivists argued the case for this, it was just obvious. If you think the relationship is obvious then to suggest, as my definition does, that analyticity is the one to use for sentences, and necessity for propositions is reasonable, and my definition is then reasonable. This is not so good in a context in which most people think that they are obviously not the same. It is still a tenable position, provided that this definition is offered in the context of some argument to the effect that the identity holds when some less question begging definition is used, such as "true in virtue of meaning". It is the case that I believe my definition is consistent with the view that "analytic" means "true in virtue of meaning". This is because I believe that: true in virtue of meaning means the same as: expresses a proposition which is true in every possible world This seems to me sufficiently obvious that to find a convincing demonstration is hard. It was this which motivate me to come up with the mathematical model which I referred to earlier. In that exercise I provided a lightweight model of the semantics of descriptive languages, and then defined necessity using that model. However, when I came to define analyticity, the result was too obviously the same concept that no proof was necessary. The only relevant part of the meaning of a sentence for determination of either analyticity or necessity is the truth conditions. We know that a statement is analytic when those conditions tell us that the under all conditions the sentence is true. But for a language which talks about the world (as opposed to some abstract domain for example) then the "conditions" in question are "possible worlds" and being true under all conditions just means being true in all possible worlds. I can see, that this "obvious fact" will have to consume a much larger space than this in my monograph, for though once obvious to many, it is now obvious to few. If for a second we assume that this argument is good and that analyticity is the same as necessity, there still remains a problem in identifying the fallacy in Kripke's argument to the contrary. I am no scholar of Kripke, so my suggestion on this score must be tentative. From my recollection, Kripke, perhaps thinking it obvious, does not really offer an argument in favour of the denial. He openly assumes the existence of rigid designators, which are defined as phrases which designate the same thing in every possible world, and observed that an identity between rigid designators must be necessary. Then somehow we get the denial that these identities are analytic, and I don't recall exactly how we get this. Is this part of the definition of a rigid designator, or is it a second assumption, or just a bald uncorroborated claim, or something he offers an argument for?? If my argument above is sound, and the non-analyticity is somehow incorporated into the definition of rigid designator, then the definition is incoherent and fails to define anything. If it is a second assumption, then Kripke is making contradictory assumptions. If it is a bald assertion then Kripke's argument is incomplete. Does he offer an argument? A counter argument is that if an identity of any kind is necessary, then it is true in every possible world and this information is part of the truth conditions and hence part of the meaning of the language and the identity will also be analytic. It looks to me like Kripke is begging the question. My remaining comments therefore largely point out the obvious consquences of my position above for your points. > 1. 1) As Kripke pointed out, ... I think this is now covered. > 2. 2) Many propositions claimed to be synthetic a priori truths by > epistemological rationalists are generally acknowledged to be > necessary, but anyone who thinks they are really analytic would > generally be taken to have serious work to do. One such proposition > is expressed by ?Nothing determinately blue on some region also has > some other color there.? I argue in my recent book that this should > be considered analytic, but there is nothing trivial about the case I > make for this claim. I am convinced that I am right, but most > rationalists would not share my conviction. The "serious work" is as above, perhaps expanded somewhat. It seems to me that propositions like the one you mention are problematic because of doubt about what they mean, not because of doubt about the concepts of analyticity or necessity. I would say that the proposition you quote is false since something determinately blue on some region might also be azure there. We probably don't understand the sentence in the same way! > 3. 3) Useful conceptions of analytic truth purport to explain > why analytic truths that are necessary have this further property. > The statements (or ?judgment?) covered by Kant?s conception give some > indication of this. If a predicate concept is contained in a subject > concept in an affirmative way, anything in any world falling under > the subject concept would be guaranteed to fall under the predicate > concept because the latter is just one of the concepts it falls under > if the subject is applicable to it. This is why the statement is > true in (or at) any possible world. This is nugatory in the context of a convincing demonstration that the concepts are coextensive. > 4. 4) Hume?s epistemic fork was the doctrine that all truths > concern either mere relations of ideas or matters of fact and > existence. The former are considered analytic by empiricists: their > truth can be ascertained by ?mere analysis? and does not, as Hume > said, depend on anything that is anywhere existent in the universe > (except the relevant ideas). Matters of fact and existence are, > empiricists emphasize, synthetic truths that can be known only by > observation, memory, and ?experimental? inference. A conception of > analytic truth can be considered plausible only if makes clear the > kind of analysis that can plausibly show that a given analytic > statement is indeed true and, if necessary as well, why it has this > additional property. I cannot see that the conception RBJ intends to > develop has this plausibility. I don't think my proposal makes any difference in this area, though this is something I intend to say something about in the final section of my proposed monograph. Can you poke some holes in my arguments above, or fill in the hole in my memory of Kripke's argument? Roger Jones From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Sun Mar 1 05:57:00 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2009 10:57:00 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] RBJ's Proposal and and Hume's Fork In-Reply-To: <373707.254.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <54A229D7376C4605A712C794F0CB77A2@DFLVQC1J> <373707.254.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Hi Steve, I cannot do Kripke exegesis at the moment, either. So I speak for myself, but as someone who has been strongly influenced by Kripke. I have no sympathy for David Lewis' realism about possible worlds. Apart from the actual world, possible worlds are merely possible. Thus quantification over possible worlds is to be thought of in 'as if' terms; and if we want to speak literally we use 'necessarily' and 'possibly.' Yet I am sympathetic to Plato, Frege, Popper and others who accept an ontology of abstract objects. Thus while a possible world different to the actual world does not exist, the concept of it exists as an abstract entity, or in the way that abstract entities exist. Thus, while there are no unicorns, there is a concept of a unicorn. Thus what happens in 'stipulating' a possible world is that we stipulate which possible world (or, rather which class of them) we are talking about (in the sense of 'talking about' in which we can talk about unicorns). Such stipulation involves a decision and thus mind; but it does not create a possible world, it merely conveys our intentions about which possible world we are talking about. Similarly, in a stipulative definition, as I said before, I identify which language I am using, out of all the possible languages I could use. Did the language exist before my stipulation? If a language is an abstract entity, then it did, at least in the way in which abstract entities exist. But if by a language we mean some physical realisation of an abstract entity (inscriptions, sounds, gestures or images), then I brought the language into existence by my stipulation. Although I am sympathetic to an ontology of abstract objects, someone with a penchant for desert landscapes could use his usual devices to (attempt to) convert what I have said into a form that he finds more agreeable. Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From srbayne at earthlink.net Sun Mar 8 10:57:20 2009 From: srbayne at earthlink.net (Steven Bayne) Date: Sun, 08 Mar 2009 10:57:20 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] RBJ's Proposal and and Hume's Fork In-Reply-To: <200902282052.45090.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <200902282052.45090.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: How important is the issue of analyticity? Necessity has a richer philosophical tradition, extending backwards beyond Kant who formulated the first definition of 'analytic'. Intuitively, the issue may be thought of as involving two sorts of "necessary" truth: truth grounded in form (such as being a substitution instance of a formal truth of logic), and truth based on meanings (as an extension of merely formal truths. I suspect that meanings do not exist; I suspect there is no convincing argument that outside the realm of stipulation, which involves choice, there are no alternative possible worlds. Moreover, I believe these intuitions are part of the "hard core" of common sense. I would, simply, disagree with those who maintain that 'common sense' is as removed from immediate understanding as 'analyticity'. So we might ask: Are there purely formal truths? And mean, "Are there truths based on FORM alone?" If it makes sense to say there are, then I don't think it makes sense to say that the facts ground analytic truths. The truths of propositional calculus are not factual truths, but now we have 'fact' to contend with. On the usual accounts there is an extended sense of 'analytic' meaning something like truths grounded in meanings. But like possible worlds, meanings are suspect. What is not suspect is the notion of a representation which is at the core of the meaning of ''meaning' when we are talking about the meaning of, say, descriptive terms of a canonical or "logical language." Defining 'necessity' in terms of analytic, in a sense, violated the principle that defininiens should be at least as perspicuous and non arbitrary as the defniendum. So I'm not sure about your proposal, although I keep an open mind. As for colors, just a quick point: we can think of 'red' as either referring to a monadic property, or we can think of it as relative to the position of the observer. In the latter case 'red' refers to a triadic property. If you assume that no two things can occupy the same place, and regard this as a priori, i.e., universal and knowable independent of experience (on the basis of the properties of space and bodies in them, generally), then you will have a necessary truth that agreement on the existence of a color is contingent; that is, that from one point of view the color of x is such and such, but from another it is some other color, without contradiction. Two colors existing at the same place FROM different places would be the issue. I make no claim as to how to resolve this. So, there are no meanings, although a sentence can be meaningful; there are no formal facts, thus there are no analytic sentences in the unextended sense, and because there are no meanings in some sense there are no analytic sentences in the broad sense. This is not inconsistent with Quine; but there is one problem with the view I've espoused, at least. It is this: what is the factual basis of reference, if there is no such thing as meaning. My answer is, tentatively, this: there are meanings only where there are minds. Meanings are not entities; they are not *in* minds, but neither are they in space etc. Minds are fundamental; worlds are constructs; intentionality is fundamental; meaning is a construction. That is an oversimplification. I'm out of the loop on this one. Your suggestions are provocative and interesting; not to be dismissed so easily given the stagnation that followed a model theoretic treatment of semantics and with it the classical ontologies. Steve At 04:52 PM 2/28/2009, Roger Bishop Jones wrote: >On Wednesday 25 February 2009 18:46:45 Bruce Aune wrote: > > > RBJ proposed that a sentence appropriately disambiguated should be > > said to be analytic iff it expresses a necessary proposition, the > > latter being a proposition that is true is every possible world. I > > think this is unpromising for the following reasons: > >The principle issue at stake is whether or not analyticity and >necessity co-extensional concepts. > >I don't believe that the Logical Positivists argued the case >for this, it was just obvious. >If you think the relationship is obvious then to suggest, >as my definition does, that analyticity is the one to use >for sentences, and necessity for propositions is reasonable, >and my definition is then reasonable. > >This is not so good in a context in which most people think >that they are obviously not the same. >It is still a tenable position, provided that this definition >is offered in the context of some argument to the effect >that the identity holds when some less question begging >definition is used, such as "true in virtue of meaning". > >It is the case that I believe my definition is consistent >with the view that "analytic" means "true in virtue of meaning". >This is because I believe that: > > true in virtue of meaning > >means the same as: > > expresses a proposition which is true in every possible world > >This seems to me sufficiently obvious that to find a convincing >demonstration is hard. >It was this which motivate me to come up with the mathematical >model which I referred to earlier. >In that exercise I provided a lightweight model of the semantics >of descriptive languages, and then defined necessity using that >model. >However, when I came to define analyticity, the result was too >obviously the same concept that no proof was necessary. > >The only relevant part of the meaning of a sentence for >determination of either analyticity or necessity is the >truth conditions. >We know that a statement is analytic when those conditions >tell us that the under all conditions the sentence is true. >But for a language which talks about the world (as opposed >to some abstract domain for example) then the "conditions" >in question are "possible worlds" and being true under >all conditions just means being true in all possible worlds. > >I can see, that this "obvious fact" will have to consume >a much larger space than this in my monograph, for though >once obvious to many, it is now obvious to few. > >If for a second we assume that this argument is good >and that analyticity is the same as necessity, there >still remains a problem in identifying the fallacy in >Kripke's argument to the contrary. > >I am no scholar of Kripke, so my suggestion on this score >must be tentative. > From my recollection, Kripke, perhaps thinking it obvious, >does not really offer an argument in favour of the denial. >He openly assumes the existence of rigid designators, >which are defined as phrases which designate the same thing >in every possible world, and observed that an >identity between rigid designators must be necessary. >Then somehow we get the denial that these identities >are analytic, and I don't recall exactly how we get this. >Is this part of the definition of a rigid designator, >or is it a second assumption, or just a bald uncorroborated >claim, or something he offers an argument for?? > >If my argument above is sound, and the non-analyticity >is somehow incorporated into the definition of rigid >designator, then the definition is incoherent and fails >to define anything. >If it is a second assumption, then Kripke is making >contradictory assumptions. >If it is a bald assertion then Kripke's argument is >incomplete. > >Does he offer an argument? > >A counter argument is that if an identity of any >kind is necessary, then it is true in every possible >world and this information is part of the truth >conditions and hence part of the meaning of the >language and the identity will also be analytic. > >It looks to me like Kripke is begging the question. > >My remaining comments therefore largely point out >the obvious consquences of my position above for >your points. > > > 1. 1) As Kripke pointed out, ... > >I think this is now covered. > > > 2. 2) Many propositions claimed to be synthetic a priori truths by > > epistemological rationalists are generally acknowledged to be > > necessary, but anyone who thinks they are really analytic would > > generally be taken to have serious work to do. One such proposition > > is expressed by ???Nothing determinately blue on some region also has > > some other color there.??? I argue in my recent book that this should > > be considered analytic, but there is nothing trivial about the case I > > make for this claim. I am convinced that I am right, but most > > rationalists would not share my conviction. > >The "serious work" is as above, perhaps expanded somewhat. > >It seems to me that propositions like the one you mention >are problematic because of doubt about what they mean, >not because of doubt about the concepts of analyticity >or necessity. > >I would say that the proposition you quote is false >since something determinately blue on some region might >also be azure there. >We probably don't understand the sentence in the same way! > > > 3. 3) Useful conceptions of analytic truth purport to explain > > why analytic truths that are necessary have this further property. > > The statements (or ???judgment???) covered by Kant???s conception give some > > indication of this. If a predicate concept is contained in a subject > > concept in an affirmative way, anything in any world falling under > > the subject concept would be guaranteed to fall under the predicate > > concept because the latter is just one of the concepts it falls under > > if the subject is applicable to it. This is why the statement is > > true in (or at) any possible world. > >This is nugatory in the context of a convincing demonstration >that the concepts are coextensive. > > > 4. 4) Hume???s epistemic fork was the doctrine that all truths > > concern either mere relations of ideas or matters of fact and > > existence. The former are considered analytic by empiricists: their > > truth can be ascertained by ???mere analysis??? and does not, as Hume > > said, depend on anything that is anywhere existent in the universe > > (except the relevant ideas). Matters of fact and existence are, > > empiricists emphasize, synthetic truths that can be known only by > > observation, memory, and ???experimental??? inference. A conception of > > analytic truth can be considered plausible only if makes clear the > > kind of analysis that can plausibly show that a given analytic > > statement is indeed true and, if necessary as well, why it has this > > additional property. I cannot see that the conception RBJ intends to > > develop has this plausibility. > >I don't think my proposal makes any difference in this area, >though this is something I intend to say something about in >the final section of my proposed monograph. > >Can you poke some holes in my arguments above, or fill in >the hole in my memory of Kripke's argument? > >Roger Jones From aune1 at verizon.net Sun Mar 8 13:58:52 2009 From: aune1 at verizon.net (Bruce Aune) Date: Sun, 8 Mar 2009 13:58:52 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] RBJ's Proposal on analyticity Message-ID: <2314DFB2-36FE-4A45-BBE6-D8639C6CBAB9@verizon.net> Roger, The positivists held that analyticity and necessity are co-extensional because they were convinced that necessities could be known only by means of conceptual analysis. Rationalist and Kantian alternatives seemed unscientific and therefore unacceptable. I don?t think any informed, reasonable philosopher con responsibly contend that the coextensiveness of analyticity and necessity is ?obvious.? In view of the plethora of arguments to the contrary, I think it can be defended only by a pain-staking argument, the sort I attempted in my recent book. I am aware of no fallacies in Kripke?s arguments for the truth of a posteriori necessities (as we may call them) or even for the truth of contingent a priori truths. As for the former, Kripke never said, ?an identity between rigid designators must be necessary.? What he did say was that a statement containing rigid designators would, if true, be necessary. For him, necessity is not a relation between designators (at least generally) but a relation between things: it is a relation holding between each thing and itself. But his views on the necessity of true identities did not depend on the notion of rigid designation, and it was inadvisable for me to have mentioned this notion in my email, since it always stimulates useless discussion. The formula ?(x) (y)(x = y ? N(x = y)? is a theorem of quantified standard first-order modal logic, and its proof in no way depends on a doctrine of rigid quantification.* (You can verify this by looking at any standard text on modal logic, e.g. the one by Hughes and Cresswell.) The relevance of the modal theorem to your thesis can be illustrated by standard examples. One is this: If water = H2O, then it is necessary that water = H2O. The assertion ?water = H2O? is not (most people will agree) true by virtue of meaning, and neither is ?N(water = H2O).? The truth-value of the first can be decided only by empirical investigation, and the second can be inferred from the first by means of the modal theorem. If the previous example troubles you, here is another: ?The inventor of bifocals is Benjamin Franklin,? where ?the inventor of bifocals? is used to pick out a certain man--the man who, as it happened, invented bifocals.? ---------------------------------------------------------------- * As I see it, Kripke introduced the notion of a rigid designator to disarm the sort of counter-examples people raised when he spoke informally of the necessity of true identities. Those erroneous counter-examples invariably involve fallacies of equivocation, when a term denoting one thing in the antecedent of a conditional, denotes something else in the consequent. -------------------------------------------------------- As for contingent (non-necessary) but a priori truths that can reasonably be considered analytic, consider the ?The standard meter is one meter long.? At one time (when there was a standard meter) this could be known a priori, by a priori inference from a meaning stipulation, but it is not necessary, since the standard meter, if heated sufficiently, would become appreciably longer than one meter. Please don?t bother to argue with me about these cases, which I am presenting quickly and informally. If you continue to hold your present view, you better be ready to argue with others, though, because they are generally accepted as all sound. You say,? The only relevant part of the meaning of a sentence for determination of either analyticity or necessity is the truth conditions. We know that a statement is analytic when those conditions tell us that the under all conditions the sentence is true.? I can almost agree with this, but I think ?truth conditions for an arbitrary sentence? is far more problematic than you suppose. What are the truth-conditions for ?Bachelors are unmarried?? If it is given by the biconditional, ??Bachelors are unmarried? is true iff bachelors are unmarried,? what entitles us to say that the proposition expressed by ?Bachelors are unmarried? is ?logically necessary,? as you say? As I argue in my book, partial specifications of meaning (of the kind Carnap called ?A postulates?) are, I think, vital for showing the analytic character of many sentences. And it is by reference to such postulates and other semantical rules that we can infer the a priori necessity of many analytic truths. Not all analytic truths express necessities. As I said before, one of the classic questions of epistemology is whether there are synthetic a priori truths. To move from the vague idea of true by virtue of meaning to analytically true simply begs the question against a host of traditional arguments, which have to be considered critically and fairly. You can?t ignore them. Your counterexample to the no color-overlap principle overlooked a crucial feature of that principle. This is that a thing or region of a thing can have no more than one determinate color. If a blue object is azure, its determinate blueness is not different from its azureness: it is the same thing. There is no problem with a thing having two generic colors, or a generic color and a determinate one belonging to that color-genus. I stand by all the claims I made in my memo: I think your approach to analyticity is not promising as it stands. My ideas about the subject are developed at length in my chapters and 3, and I can only suggest that you have a look at them. That is really all I have to say at this point. Best regards, Bruce Bruce Aune Email Hotline Coordinator WMMGA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Sun Mar 8 17:15:44 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sun, 8 Mar 2009 21:15:44 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] RBJ's Proposal on analyticity In-Reply-To: <2314DFB2-36FE-4A45-BBE6-D8639C6CBAB9@verizon.net> Message-ID: <1989051032.2382181236546944382.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Prof. Aune remarks:? 'As for the former, Kripke never said, ?an identity between rigid designators must be necessary.? ' If two designators designate the same thing in all possible worlds, then the truth of the sentence asserting that they are identical entails their identity in all possible worlds. That is: ?if to be necessary is to be true in all possible worlds, then, if the identity statement is true, then it is true in all possible worlds. This would follow even if we rejected the principle of substitutivity and, therefore, Barcan's theorem. Necessity is a property of sentences, sentences such as the one I've described. His theory of rigid designation is not necessary for the claim that there are a posteriori identities. However, it is sufficient , if what I said is true; that is, that an identity statement that is true, wherein the names flanking the identity sign are rigid, is a necessary truth. As I said, before, there is a hidden strength to his theory that cannot be reached by simple substitution of modal predicates in the "principle of identity" (or "substitution"). That strength is having in his possession an an argument for the necessary diversity of diverse objects in this world! Prof. Aune remarks: "The positivists held that analyticity and necessity are co-extensional because they were convinced that necessities could be known only by means of conceptual analysis." This is true, and I think it reveals a severe weakness in the positivist position, inspired as it was by an odd theory of meaning and verifiability. Of course, if you claim that the only necessities are by way of conceptual analysis , then, most assuredly, you will conclude that all necessary truths are analytic . But this is terribly question begging. It is question begging because we have not been given a good argument that all necessary truths are known by conceptual analysis. Kant's claims was simple and accurate: if you cannot arrive at all necessary truths by conceptual analysis, then if there are necessary truths besides these, they will be synthetic. This seems perfectly acceptable. Now a final word on Kripke's discovery of the a posteriori character of some necessities. I want everyone to notice one thing, especially: ALL of Kripke's examples can ONLY be examples where the necessary truth at issue is an IDENTITY statement. I find these, philosophically, of little interest in respect to the problem of the synthetic a priori. Why? Here's why: I believe '=' is a logical operator (or at least it is in my way of doing things). Insofar as it is a logical operator, ?truths containing it essentially are not facts in the world, although it may describe a fact abou t the world. It is a "logical truth", and as such does not correspond to a fact in the world: there are no logical facts in the world. It may be a discovery about the world that in it one finds that since 'a = b' that there is only one thing where we thought there were two; but it is not a fact about the world that '=' is a descriptive relation between object(s). This is one reason people stumble over the question of how TWO things can be identical. THEY aren't! There is no such fact. I offer a challenge. My challenge is this: supply me with a necessary truth that does not contain a logical operator. By the way, you can define this thing out in set theory using membership and entailment. But this only raises further questions, such as what IS a logical operator? If I am right about Quine, that is a PRAGMATIC decision. Recall the paradox of analysis. This wouldn't be an issue if "facts" of identity were relational facts. If I were to be shown a necessary truth free from the trappings of the mumbo jumbo on identity then I might "covert." I know nothing in science that rules out synthetic a priori truths; but, then, in science we have no distinctions that depend on the distinctions between sentences, judgments, propositions etc. So much the worse for science. STeve Bayne ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruce Aune" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Sunday, March 8, 2009 1:58:52 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: RBJ's Proposal on analyticity Roger, The positivists held that analyticity and necessity are co-extensional because they were convinced that necessities could be known only by means of conceptual analysis.? Rationalist and Kantian alternatives seemed unscientific and therefore unacceptable. ?I don?t think any informed, reasonable philosopher con responsibly contend that the coextensiveness of analyticity and necessity is ?obvious.?? In view of the plethora of arguments to the contrary, I think it can be defended only by a pain-staking argument, the sort I attempted in my recent book. ?I am aware of no fallacies in Kripke?s arguments for the truth of a posteriori necessities (as we may call them) or even for the truth of contingent a priori truths.? As for the former, Kripke never said, ?an identity between rigid designators must be necessary.? What he did say was that a statement containing rigid designators would, if true, be necessary.? For him, necessity is not a relation between designators (at least generally) but a relation between things: it is a relation holding between each thing and itself.? But his views on the necessity of true identities? did not depend on the notion of rigid designation,? and it was inadvisable for me to have mentioned this notion in my email, since it always stimulates useless discussion. ?? The formula ?(x)(y)(x = y? ? ?N(x = y)? is a theorem of quantified standard first-order modal logic, and its proof in no way depends on a doctrine of rigid quantification.*? (You can verify this by looking at any standard text on modal logic, e.g. the one by Hughes and Cresswell.) The relevance of the modal theorem to your thesis can be illustrated by standard examples.? One is this:? If water = H2O, then it is necessary that water = H2O.? The assertion ?water = H2O? is not (most people will agree) true by virtue of meaning, and neither is ?N(water = H2O).? The truth-value of the first can be decided only by empirical investigation, and the second can be inferred from the first by means of the modal theorem. ?If the previous example troubles you, here is another: ?The inventor of bifocals is Benjamin Franklin,? where ?the inventor of bifocals? is used to pick out a certain man--the man who, as it happened, invented bifocals.? ---------------------------------------------------------------- * As I see it, Kripke introduced the notion of a rigid designator to disarm the sort of counter-examples people raised when he spoke informally of the necessity of true identities.? Those erroneous counter-examples invariably involve fallacies of equivocation, when a term denoting one thing in the antecedent of a conditional, denotes something else in the consequent. -------------------------------------------------------- ??As for contingent (non-necessary) but a priori truths that can reasonably be considered analytic, consider the ?The standard meter is one meter long.?? At one time (when there was a standard meter) this could be known a priori, by a priori inference from a meaning stipulation, but it is not necessary, since the standard meter, if heated sufficiently, would become appreciably longer than one meter. Please don?t bother to argue with me about these cases, which I am presenting quickly and informally. ?If you continue to hold your present view, you better be ready to argue with others, though, because they are generally accepted as all sound. ?You say,? The only relevant part of the meaning of a sentence for determination of either analyticity or necessity is the truth conditions.? We know that a statement is analytic when those conditions tell us that the under all conditions the sentence is true.?? I can almost agree with this, but I think ?truth conditions for an arbitrary sentence? is far more problematic than you suppose.? What are the truth-conditions for ?Bachelors are unmarried??? If it is given by the biconditional, ??Bachelors are unmarried? is true iff bachelors are unmarried,? what entitles us to say that the proposition expressed by ?Bachelors are unmarried? is ?logically necessary,? as you say? As I argue in my book, partial specifications of meaning (of the kind Carnap called ?A postulates?) are, I think, vital for showing the analytic character of many sentences.? And it is by reference to such postulates and other semantical rules that we can infer the a priori necessity of many analytic truths.? Not all analytic truths express necessities. ?As I said before, one of the classic questions of epistemology is whether there are synthetic a priori truths.? To move from the vague idea of true by virtue of meaning to analytically true simply begs the question against a host of traditional arguments, which have to be considered critically and fairly.? You can?t ignore them. Your counterexample to the no color-overlap principle overlooked a crucial feature of that principle.? This is that a thing or region of a thing can have no more than one? determinate color .? If a blue object is azure, its determinate blueness is not different from its azureness: it is the same thing. ?There is no problem with a thing having two generic colors, or a generic color and a determinate one belonging to that color-genus. I stand by all the claims I made in my memo: I think your approach to analyticity is not promising as it stands.? My ideas about the subject are developed at length in my chapters and 3, and I can only suggest that you have a look at them.? That is really all I have to say at this point. Best regards, Bruce Bruce Aune Email Hotline Coordinator WMMGA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Wed Mar 11 12:46:50 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2009 16:46:50 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Hume's Fork In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <200903111646.51049.rbj@rbjones.com> A while back J.L. Speranza questioned whether "the fork" really was Hume's. On Monday 23 February 2009 14:05:00 Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: >I am fascinated by the 'fork' in that I think Ayers was mistaken, and >mistakes others in the history of philosophy. One google hit for "Hume's > fork" read, with indignation: > >"No, of course Hume's fork did _Not_ spawn empiricism; Empiricism goes back >to Aristotle!" >As Bishop has edited the Locke Essay, one indeed may think that the fork >Hume borrowed from Locke but never returned. There was a reference to the > Hume Fork in a Locke bibliography, online -- by an author with a German > surname. So possibly Ayers (who wrote on Locke) is aware that much of this > is Locke's fork. I don't know whether Flew intended to attribute the fork to Hume or not, he could just have been writing about Hume and thought a name for this central feature of his philosophy would be a good idea whether or not it originated with Hume. Anyway, since I propose to make "Hume's Fork" into a fulcrum around which the historical part of my monograph will turn, I thought it might be a good idea to say why I think Hume's account of the dichotomies is important enough to be given prime place (in my historical narrative). The short version of this explanations is that: 1. I think Hume was the first to get it right. 2. It seems to be more important in Hume's philosophy than it is anywhere else I know of. Hume's philosophy seems to me to hang around the dichotomy. Especially if you accept Hume's view of what was most important in his philosophy when he came up with the "Enquiry". (though the fork is not a central thesis, it is a starting point rather than a conclusion) By contrast, for example, Locke is an empiricist and the analytic side for him is trivial, so the fork not so important. The reference back to Aristotle may be closer to the mark, and we find Aristotle in pole position in Hume's account, where the analytic side is: "every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain" which is Aristotelian terminology. However, in Aristotle, the notion of "intuitively certain" is the point at which his essentialism operates (we intuit the essential properties of things), whereas Hume has already edged towards a conventionalist position by describing the subject matter as "Relations of Ideas", making the dichotomy semantic in character rather than metaphysical. The characterisation of the dichotomy in terms of its subject matter may remind us of Plato's distinction between that true knowledge which we may have of Platonic forms, and the unreliable opinions which we may have of the shadowy sensible world. But again the Platonic view is metaphysical, for Plato thinks the world of Platonic forms is the true reality, not just a place to play with ideas. Most ideas, when you look closely, can be traced back a very long way, and this is true of the dichotomies, but it is nevertheless sometimes helpful to distinguish the evolution of ideas from that of "precursors". One relevant place where this happens is in Kolakowski's "Positivist Philosophy" in which he choses Hume as the first true positivist (despite Comte having coined the term). Possibly the single most important feature of this conception of positivism is its anti-essentialism, and this is manifest in Hume's sensational call for the burning of metaphysical texts. Before Hume we see pre-cursors of the (fundamental triple) dichotomy, after Hume we see controversy about and refinement of it. The slightly longer story that I hope to develop in the monograph involves making the "triple-dichotomy" a resolution of three long standing historical dialectics: 1. That between scepticism and dogmatism 2. That between rationalism and empiricism 3. That between essentialism and nominalism All of which can be traced back close to the beginnings of philosophy. The first two are resolved by Hume in the synthesis embodied in the triple-dichotomy. The dialectic between sceptics who claim that nothing can be known, and dogmatists who know all, is synthesised by Hume into the distinction between those things which can and those which cannot be known with certainty. The dialectic between rationalists who believe that all knowledge comes from reason (or trivialise that obtainable through the senses) and empiricists who believe that all knowledge comes through the senses (or trivialise that obtainable by reason) is synthesised by Hume into a second aspect of the same dichotomy, the division between those things which can be known by deductive reason, and those things of which the senses alone provide evidence, however inconclusive. In these two Hume finds a middle ground marked by a line which I believe to be fundamental and objective, and the subsequent history may be seen as transformed by Hume into a dialectic between those who dislike the narrow scope which he allows for reason and seek to dismantle his synthesis, (Kant, Kripke) and those who defend and refine his position (Frege, Carnap). In the last dialectic, Hume does not find a moderating synthesis. His fork takes him straight to the dismissal of metaphysics, the anti-essentialist view that all necessity lies in language (in relations between ideas). There is here no middle ground. So, in this longer story, the history of the dichotomy falls into two phases, before and after Hume. Before Hume we have a dialectic leading to Hume's synthesis. After Hume that synthesis is dominant and is a mainstay of posivism, the dialectic being between those who re-affirm and refine his position and those who challenge it. Is this a plausible story or a fantasy? Roger Jones From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Wed Mar 11 16:50:33 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2009 20:50:33 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] RBJ's Proposal on analyticity In-Reply-To: <1989051032.2382181236546944382.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <2314DFB2-36FE-4A45-BBE6-D8639C6CBAB9@verizon.net> <1989051032.2382181236546944382.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: Hi Steve, I am not sure I understood your message, but here are a few comments anyway. << If two designators designate the same thing in all possible worlds, then the truth of the sentence asserting that they are identical entails their identity in all possible worlds >> We need to distinguish necessary and contingent existents. Thus '2 + 2 = 4' is true in all possible worlds because the two rigid designators flanking the identity-sign designate the same necessary existent. But 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' is false in all those worlds in which Hesperus (and thus Phosphorus) does not exist. << ALL of Kripke's examples [of a posteriori necessities] can ONLY be examples where the necessary truth at issue is an IDENTITY statement>> Some examples have to do with the material from which a thing is made. Could this table not have been made of wood yet still have been this table? The notion of the table's identity plays an essential part here; but the a posteriori necessity is that this table is made of wood, which is not an identity statement. < From baynesrb at yahoo.com Thu Mar 12 07:47:28 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2009 11:47:28 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Volition and "Deviant" Causal Chains Message-ID: <835494.84534.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> I'm looking at an essay by Berent Enc. It's called: "Causal Theories of Intentional Behavior and Wayward Causal Chains. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3814/is_200401/ai_n9383861/pg_8 Here's why I looked it up. I'm skeptical of some criticisms Anscombe lodges against Chisholm (Human Life, Action and Ethics pp. 77-87). The distinction that Chisholm (1966) was discussing was made to center, more or less, around transeunt vs. immanent causation. Since I read Gunderson, years ago, on mind/body asymmetries (Minn. Studies V?) I've been trying to add to the usual list. The other day, I entertained the idea that we might want to know if there are deviant causal chains in the case of immanent causation. The point that Chisholm might raise is that in this case there are no chains. I do not agree. There may be a sense of immanent causation that is not "direct." But, hardly, anyone maintains immanent causation, why should I? Isn't it a ridiculous idea; which all sophomores who have refuted Descartes, just to name one, have also at once refuted, and repudiated ? Still, there are senior philosophers who are, I think, in the majority. Here's the *possible* asymmetry: looked at from the *outer perspective* all immanent causation has results which are in some sense "deviant," whereas from the standpoint of the agent, the *inner perspective*, there is no "deviance." But if "deviance" is _only_ from an intention, then in the physical world there is no deviance. One is tempted, IF one accepts this, to say: the mind is introduced into the world as the source of deviant chains! Here I assume a variety of Cartesianism without apology. I just thought I'd bring the above URL to the attention of the few of you in action theory. I haven't completed it myself. My only reservation is getting "hung up" on the theory of "explanation." Also, there are some serious assumption's Enc makes about the efficacy of reasons that is controversial, at the very least. Posting on Carnap et al. soon. Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Thu Mar 12 09:57:03 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2009 06:57:03 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Disregard Message-ID: <95738.82422.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com> I accidentally sent out two messages. One a reply to Danny which I hadn't reread or replied to and secondly one on deviant causal chains. BOTH were sent unintentionally. The deviant causal chains was composed a couple of years ago, I believe, and was placed in the bin because I needed the references. So I won't be replying to any comments on this: it's junk. Secondly, the remarks to Danny were hurried and unclear, although I do want to mention that denying that statements of composition are identity statement is probably wrong but not really "worth the candle." They are close enough: 'a = c + d' etc. Very busy. Things are moving too fast for me at present for intelligent discussion. More later. Regards STeve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Sun Mar 15 11:36:55 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2009 15:36:55 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine, Aune, Jones: on defining analyticity Message-ID: <200903151536.55271.rbj@rbjones.com> This is a preliminary to a response to Aune's recent critique of my proposed definition of analyticty. Aune observes that my arguments are too short, (faint condemnation indeed) and contrasts them with the lengthy discussion in Chapter 3 of his Empiricist Theory of Knowledge. It is my purpose here to point out how different our enterprises are, and to attribute at least part of the difference in size to a difference in topic. In his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" Quine notes a difference between 'definitions' of analyticity as follows: "By saying what statements are analytic for L_0 we explain 'analytic-for-L_0' but not 'analytic' or 'analytic for'. We do not begin to explain the idiom 'S is analytic for L' with variable 'S' and 'L' even if we restrict the range of 'L' to the realm of artificial languages". There is a huge difference in the size of these two kinds of 'definition', particularly for natural languages. What Quine is also aware of, is that given a general definition of analyticity in terms of meaning or semantics, specific definitions are not necessary or desirable. One needs for specific languages, in order to establish the analyticity of particular sentences, sufficient information about the semantics of the language in question, but no further information about the concept of analyticity. To reason generally about analyticity a definition of the concept of analyticity is required, not a definition which purports to determine the extension of that concept in relation to some particular language, Since the former is likely to be short, and the latter likely to be long, it is to be expected that arguments in the first case may be concise, but general arguments in the second case will be difficult. My own reasoning is confined to generic definitions of analyticity. I advocate that there be no other 'definitions' of analyticity, but that definitions of the semantics of languages are often desirable (and are normal for formal logical systems). Particular facts about analyticity are readily derivable from such definitions (once accepted). Roger Jones From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Mar 15 13:31:03 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2009 13:31:03 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Hume's Fork Message-ID: In a message dated 3/11/2009 1:13:20 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, rbj at rbjones.com writes: A while back J.L. Speranza questioned whether "the fork" really was Hume's. --- Right. He was possible 'smooth'. Not hirsute, too. And it seems instruments used in philosophy are meant to 'cut'. "Hume's Knife" would be nicer, perhaps, or his "Spoon". Quine famously said that Occam (Actually Ockham, a town in Surrey!) used his 'razor' to cut Plato's beards. Now 'razor' is difficult to trace to the Classical Languages. Ditto for 'fork'. I proposed bifurca, which is really a bi-fork. This also in view of R. Bishop Jones's consideration of the triple dichotomy and how it can become a bi-fork. R. Jones writes: >I don't know whether [A. G. N.] Flew the creator of analytic philosophy in the Midlands, incidentally, when he settled in Keele. [in ch. iii, "Hume's Fork" of his book on Hume] >intended to attribute the fork to Hume >or not, he could just have been writing about Hume and thought a >name for this central feature of his philosophy would be a good >idea whether or not it originated with Hume. Right. I wouldn't think it originated with Hume. And I haven't checked for 'figurative' uses of 'bifurca' (the Latin term) to see if it has been used in general for dichotomies. Plato was very much into 'dichotomies', since he thought 'division' has to be indeed 'in two' (otherwise, trivision, tetravision, etc.). A relic of this is found in Porphyrii Arbor. Jones: >Anyway, since I propose to make "Hume's Fork" into a fulcrum >around which the historical part of my monograph will >turn, I thought it might be a good idea to say why I think >Hume's account of the dichotomies is important enough to >be given prime place (in my historical narrative). Good. >The short version of this explanations is that: >1. I think Hume was the first to get it right. >2. It seems to be more important in Hume's > philosophy than it is anywhere else I know of. > Hume's philosophy seems to me to hang around the dichotomy. > Especially if you accept Hume's view of what was most > important in his philosophy when he came up with the "Enquiry". > (though the fork is not a central thesis, it is a starting > point rather than a conclusion) Good. Ditto for the is-ought question, so-called. Indeed, to make it part of the conclusion would be pretty _otiose_ and would deprive a J. R. Searle of his manual, "How to derive an ought from an is in five easy steps". >By contrast, for example, Locke is an empiricist and the >analytic side for him is trivial, so the fork not so important. Right. But _trust_ R. Hall, or others, who have dwelt with the Master of All-Time English Philosphy Will Disagree! I have studied Locke's philosophy at some detail, and find that it is historically much more important than Hume -- in Oxford! -- There's Digby, of St. John's, I think, who tried to generalise Locke's theses. And of course he was firmly established in the Christ Church establishment of Oxford. So his 'empiricism' should be prepared to deal with the development of 'mathematical' sciences. True that, as they say, Oxford _science_ does not exist (even if you look at it). You have to travel to Cantab. county, Cambridge to start getting a _gleam_ of it. Since I'm basically interested in the development of philosophy _in Oxford_ I wouldn't know! But surely a pro-Oxonian could make a big thesis out of Locke on 'trifle'. I quote from R. B. Jones's own pages: _www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/classics/locke/_ (http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/classics/locke/) I refer to ch. VIII of Bk. IV -- of Knowledge, entitled, "Of trifling propositions". Some excerpts: "Some propositions bring no increase to our knowledge." --- Yes, you'd say that "He is an occulist -- i.e. an eye doctor" brings one increase to our knowledge, or the child's rather. "[T]here are universal propositions, which, though they be certainly true, yet they add no light to our understanding". "[T]hough in such kind of propositions this great and magnified maxim, boasted to be the foundation of demonstration [Aristotle's principle of non-contradiction, that is. a = a -- see below for R. B. Jones on Aristotle] may be and often is made use of to confirm them, yet all it proves amounts to no more than this, That the same word may with great certainty be affirmed of itself, without any doubt of the truth of any such proposition; and let me add, also, without any real knowledge." "It is but like a monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other: and had he but words, might no doubt have said, "Oyster in right hand is subject, and oyster in left hand is predicate"." "Popositions in which a part of any complex idea is predicated of the whole. Another sort of trifling propositions is, when a part of the complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole; a part of the definition of the word defined. Such are all propositions wherein the genus is predicated of the species, or more comprehensive of less comprehensive terms. For what information, what knowledge, carries this proposition in it, viz. "Lead is a metal" [Carnap's good old meaning postulate!] to a man who knows the complex idea the name lead stands for? All the simple ideas that go to the complex one signified by the term metal, being nothing but what he before comprehended and signified by the name lead." "Indeed, to a man that knows the signification of 'metal', and not of 'lead,' it is a shorter way to explain the signification of 'lead,' by saying it is a metal, which at once expresses several of its simple ideas, than to enumerate them one by one, telling him it is a body very heavy, fusible, and malleable." "As part of the definition of the term defined. Alike trifling it is to predicate any other part of the definition of the term defined, or to affirm any one of the simple ideas of a complex one of the name of the whole complex idea; as, "All gold is fusible." --- [or 'glass is breakable' -- and Carnap's problem with counterfactuals!] "For fusibility being one of the simple ideas that goes to the making up the complex one the sound gold stands for, what can it be but playing with sounds, to affirm that of the name gold, which is comprehended in its received signification? It would be thought little better than ridiculous to affirm gravely, as a truth of moment, that gold is yellow; and I see not how it is any jot more material to say it is fusible, unless that quality be left out of the complex idea, of which the sound gold is the mark in ordinary speech. What instruction can it carry with it, to tell one that which he hath been told already, or he is supposed to know before?" "For I am supposed to know the signification of the word another uses to me, or else he is to tell me. And if I know that 'gold' stands for this complex idea of body, yellow, heavy, fusible, malleable, it will not much instruct me to put it solemnly afterwards in a proposition, and gravely say, all gold is fusible. Such propositions can only serve to show the disingenuity of one who will go from the definition of his own terms, by reminding him sometimes of it; but carry no knowledge with them, but of the signification of words, however certain they be. "Instance, man and palfrey. "Every man is an animal, or living body," is as certain a proposition as can be; but no more conducing to the knowledge of things than to say, a palfrey is an ambling horse, or a neighing, ambling animal, both being only about the signification of words, and make me know but this- That body, sense, and motion, or power of sensation and moving, are three of those ideas that I always comprehend and signify by 'man': and where they are not to be found together, the name man belongs not to that thing: and so of the other- That body, sense, and a certain way of going, with a certain kind of voice, are some of those ideas which I always comprehend and signify by the word palfrey; and when they are not to be found together, the name palfrey belongs not to that thing. It is just the same, and to the same purpose, when any term standing for any one or more of the simple ideas, that altogether make up that complex idea which is called man, is affirmed of the term man:- v.g. suppose a Roman signified by 'homo' all these distinct ideas united in one subject, corporietas, sensibilitas, potentia se movendi rationalitas, risibilitas; he might, no doubt, with great certainty, universally affirm one, more, or all of these together of the word homo, but did no more than say that 'homo', in his country, comprehended in its signification all these ideas. Much like a romance knight, who by the word palfrey signified these ideas:- body of a certain figure, four-legged, with sense, motion, ambling, neighing, white, used to have a woman on his back- might with the same certainty universally affirm also any or all of these of the word palfrey: but did thereby teach no more, but that the word palfrey, in his or romance language, stood for all these, and was not to be applied to anything where any of these was wanting. But he that shall tell me, that in whatever thing sense, motion, reason, and laughter, were united, that thing had actually a notion of God, or would be cast into a sleep by opium, made indeed an instructive proposition: because neither having the notion of God, nor being cast into sleep by opium, being contained in the idea signified by the word man, we are by such propositions taught something more than barely what the word man stands for: and therefore the knowledge contained in it is more than verbal. "Therefore he trifles with words who makes such a proposition, which, when it is made, contains no more than one of the terms does, and which a man was supposed to know before: v.g. a triangle hath three sides, or saffron is yellow. "And this is no further tolerable than where a man goes to explain his terms to one who is supposed or declares himself not to understand him; and then it teaches only the signification of that word, and the use of that sign." "[T]hose trifling propositions which have a certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, but not instructive." ----- Next, Locke makes a distinction which may do, regarding a 'necessary consequence' that follows from a complex idea but is "_not_ contained_ in it" (my emphasis. JLS). In Hume's fork this would still be 'analytic', I would assume: "And, secondly, we can know the truth, and so may be certain in propositions, which affirm something of another, which is A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE of its precise complex idea, but *NOT CONTAINED* IN IT: as that" the external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the opposite internal angles. "Which relation of the outward angle to either of the opposite internal angles, making no part of the complex idea signified by the name triangle, this is a real truth, and conveys with it instructive real knowledge." "One may make demonstrations and undoubted propositions in words, and yet thereby advance not one jot in the knowledge of the truth of things: v.g. he that having learnt these following words, with their ordinary mutual relative acceptations annexed to them: v.g. substance, man, animal, form, soul, vegetative, sensitive, rational, may make several undoubted propositions about the soul, without knowing at all what the soul really is: and of this sort, a man may find an infinite number of propositions, reasonings, and conclusions, in books of metaphysics, school-divinity, and some sort of natural philosophy: and, after all, know as little of God, spirits, or bodies, as he did before he set out." "[N]o more increases in his own knowledge than he does his riches, who, taking a bag of counters, calls one in a certain place a pound, another in another place a shilling, and a third in a third place a penny; and so proceeding, may undoubtedly reckon right, and cast up a great sum, according to his counters so placed, and standing for more or less as he pleases, without being one jot the richer, or without even knowing how much a pound, shilling, or penny is, but only that one is contained in the other twenty times, and contains the other twelve: which a man may also do in the signification of words, by making them, in respect of one another, more or less, or equally comprehensive." "Should any one say that parsimony is frugality, that gratitude is justice, that this or that action is or is not temperate: however specious these and the like propositions may at first sight seem, yet when we come to press them, and examine nicely what they contain, we shall find that it all amounts to nothing but the signification of those terms." "All propositions wherein a part of the complex idea which any term stands for is predicated of that term, are only verbal: v.g. to say that gold is a metal, or heavy. And thus all propositions wherein more comprehensive words, called genera, are affirmed of subordinate or less comprehensive, called species, or individuals, are barely verbal." When by these two rules we have examined the propositions that make up the discourses we ordinarily meet with, both in and out of books, we shall perhaps find that a greater part of them than is usually suspected are purely about the signification of words, and contain nothing in them but the use and application of these signs." ------------ end of Lockean interlude. --- Jones: >The reference back to Aristotle may be closer to the mark, and >we find Aristotle in pole position in Hume's account, >where the analytic side is: > "every affirmation which is either intuitively > or demonstratively certain" >which is Aristotelian terminology. >However, in Aristotle, the notion of "intuitively certain" >is the point at which his essentialism operates (we intuit >the essential properties of things), whereas Hume has >already edged towards a conventionalist position by describing >the subject matter as "Relations of Ideas", making the >dichotomy semantic in character rather than metaphysical. I see. Or 'epistemic'. I'm never sure if by 'certain', the Greeks are using a metaphysical or an epistemic claim. By defining 'episteme' as 'justified true 'doxa'' or belief, they may be making both. It's interesting that Aristotle narrows it down to 'affirmation' (kataphasis). For surely some 'negations' (apophasis) look intuitively or demonstraitvely certainly _false_: 'no man is an island' (Donne). It's true that also Aristotle's scheme needs a presupposition of what a 'proof' is, his own syllogistic, and the idea of 'analysis' itself. As I recall, his use of 'analutika' refers to 'arkhai' or pinciples _of_ demonstration. Jones: >The characterisation of the dichotomy in terms of its >subject matter may remind us of Plato's distinction >between that true knowledge which we may have of Platonic >forms, and the unreliable opinions which we may have >of the shadowy sensible world. But again the Platonic >view is metaphysical, for Plato thinks the world of >Platonic forms is the true reality, not just a place >to play with ideas. True. No, I don't think Plato's topos ouranos (that 'celestial place') is the place to look for analyticity -- A few Greeks followed his rambling seriously though. I. M. Thomas, in his two-volume edition of Greek Mathematics (for the Loeb Classical Library) discusses the seriousness by which mathematicians of his day would follow Platonic maxims as to how to understand certain 'limits' of 'ideal' concepts (e.g. 'circle' for example). Colin McLarty has studied the philosophy of mathematics that springs from Platonism, as not necessarily _that_ naive. Jones: >Most ideas, when you look closely, can be traced back a >very long way, and this is true of the dichotomies, but >it is nevertheless sometimes helpful to distinguish the >evolution of ideas from that of "precursors". Right. "Ideengeschichte", the Germans call it. Indeed, Isaiah Berlin was professor in Oxford, of, if you believe this, "The History of Ideas". Boringly, he never considered 'Analyticity' but "Freedom" and such! --. >One relevant place where this happens is in Kolakowski's >"Positivist Philosophy" in which he choses Hume as the >first true positivist (despite Comte having coined the >term). I see. Comte, I think, also coined 'sociology', which should be enough of a barbarism! Only joking. >Possibly the single most important feature of >this conception of positivism is its anti-essentialism, >and this is manifest in Hume's sensational >call for the burning of metaphysical texts. >Before Hume we see pre-cursors of the (fundamental >triple) dichotomy, after Hume we see controversy about >and refinement of it. Very good point made and taken. >The slightly longer story that I hope to develop in the >monograph involves making the "triple-dichotomy" a >resolution of three long standing historical dialectics: >1. That between scepticism and dogmatism >2. That between rationalism and empiricism >3. That between essentialism and nominalism >All of which can be traced back close to the beginnings >of philosophy. Very good. >The first two are resolved by Hume in the synthesis >embodied in the triple-dichotomy. >The dialectic between sceptics who claim that nothing >can be known, and dogmatists who know all, is synthesised >by Hume into the distinction between those things which >can and those which cannot be known with certainty. Very good. I found Sextus Empiricus, "Against the dogmatics" (Loeb Classical Library) very useful here. And it is true that Kant (originally spelt, "Cant", a Scots surname) indeed was awaken from his 'Dogmatic Slumber" by non other than Mr. Home (originally spelling of "Hume"). Jones: >The dialectic between rationalists who believe that >all knowledge comes from reason (or trivialise that >obtainable through the senses) and empiricists who >believe that all knowledge comes through the senses >(or trivialise that obtainable by reason) is synthesised >by Hume into a second aspect of the same dichotomy, >the division between those things which can be known >by deductive reason, and those things of which the >senses alone provide evidence, however inconclusive. Excellent. And if you think of it, with Kant, we seem like his attempt to extend the realm of 'deductive' reason to the practical sphere. But I'm never convinced. If he thought that practical reason was 'pure', why not call it so, too? ---- Jones: >In these two Hume finds a middle ground marked by >a line which I believe to be fundamental and objective, >and the subsequent history may be seen as transformed >by Hume into a dialectic between those who dislike >the narrow scope which he allows for reason >and seek to dismantle his synthesis, (Kant, Kripke) >and those who defend and refine his position (Frege, Carnap). Very good. >In the last dialectic, Hume does not find a moderating >synthesis. His fork takes him straight to the dismissal >of metaphysics, the anti-essentialist view that all >necessity lies in language (in relations between ideas). >There is here no middle ground. >So, in this longer story, the history of the dichotomy >falls into two phases, before and after Hume. >Before Hume we have a dialectic leading to Hume's >synthesis. >After Hume that synthesis is dominant and is a mainstay >of posivism, the dialectic being between those >who re-affirm and refine his position >and those who challenge it. >Is this a plausible story or a fantasy? Nay. It's very plausible. And I applaud it. I always love the time lines, 'before and after ...'. And Hume and his cutlery (fork, spoon, knife) seems an excellent one. It would be good how explicit one can make the connection to Hume all over, but that's not impossible. Whitehead says that all metaphysics is 'but footnotes to Plato', so we could say, analogously, that all philosophically table manners (or the use of the fork) are footnotes to Hume. Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1220439616x1201372437/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From rbj at rbjones.com Sun Mar 15 15:47:20 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2009 19:47:20 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] RBJ's Proposal on analyticity In-Reply-To: <2314DFB2-36FE-4A45-BBE6-D8639C6CBAB9@verizon.net> References: <2314DFB2-36FE-4A45-BBE6-D8639C6CBAB9@verizon.net> Message-ID: <200903151947.21053.rbj@rbjones.com> Bruce, I appreciate that you will not want to be chasing hares, and I suspect that a blow by blow response to your last would risk a great deal of hare chasing. My feeling is that you have offered me neither constructive advice nor effective criticism, many of your remarks not appearing to me relevant to my position. I propose therefore to first very briefly summarise my position and to give an indication of what it would take to budge me, and then to make some specific responses, while trying to avoid hare's. My position consists in offering two definitions and a further proposal. A definition of necessity in terms of possible worlds, a definition of analyticity in terms of necessity, and a proposal for what should be counted as justification for propositions in the two categories. The definition of analyticity was followed by a short argument to the effect that it is consistent with the usual modern definition "true in virtue of meaning". A primary merit of these definitions is that they transparently entail the identification of the three dichotomies, in one case analytically and necessarily, and in the other as a matter of pragmatic choice. The definitions therefore show clearly that a philosopher who disagrees with the stance of the logical positivists must be disagreeing with them explicitly or covertly on the meanings of the terms involved, and cannot be held to be refuting views held by them. This applies of course, most conspicuously, to the philosophy of Kripke. Given that I have offered proposals rather than claims, an appropriate response is not a refutation or a casting of doubt, but considerations suggesting that the proposal is ill-advised. Given that I regard it as a merit that the consequences of the proposal are to marginalise important parts of the philosophy of Kripke, pointing out Kripke's contrary conclusions will not in my mind count against the proposal. It is my belief that there is in the region in question only one division of propositions which is of fundamental importance, and that the three dichotomies are different ways of talking about the same thing (in the hands of some philosophers). To persuade me to change my proposal, it would be necessary to persuade me that there is more than one important division in propositions in this region. This could not be done by citing Kripke's conclusions, for these flow from rather than lead to or justify an alternative conception (of analyticity), and that alternative conception marks a division in propositions which is much less important (in my opinion) than that found in the single division which my proposal hangs around. On Sunday 08 March 2009 17:58:52 Bruce Aune wrote: >I don?t think any >informed, reasonable philosopher con responsibly contend that the >coextensiveness of analyticity and necessity is ?obvious.? This is an argument ad hominem. >In view of >the plethora of arguments to the contrary, I think it can be defended >only by a pain-staking argument, the sort I attempted in my recent book. I point out to you, first that I did not rest on a claim of obviousness. Though we are entitled to say something is obvious when we believe it to be so, this will not progress matters in discussion with someone who thinks otherwise. I offered arguments which you have passed over in silence. On your own part, there are crucial places in which you have claimed to be obvious denials that certain necessary truths are analytic. In a conversation with someone who holds (as I do) that these two term have, or should be given, the same meaning, this is not an intelligible step. These claims about what is obvious on your part have been accompanied by no shred of argument. > I am aware of no fallacies in Kripke?s arguments for the truth of a >posteriori necessities (as we may call them) or even for the truth of >contingent a priori truths. You will find no discussion of these matter in the message to which you are responding. I was discussing the possibility that there might be propositions which are necessary but not analytic. In relation to these, it is so transparent from my conceptions of these words (and that of other prominent philosophers) that there can be none, and it follows trivially either that: 1. Kripke is using one or other of these terms differently to myself. or 2. Kripke has made an error in his reasoning. I am inclined to think that it is the former, but that in either case I am equally averse to Kripke's stance. I am in fact no better inclined to Kripke's view on the a priori, but it is more plain there that his usage is widely at variance with my preferred usage, so we disagree more conspicuously on usage. However, I believe that Kripke's usage is also at variance with that of the philosophers which he imagines himself to be refuting (e.g. the Logical Positivists) and that any supposed refutation of Logical Positivism flowing from his discussions of the a priori arises by equivocation (or misunderding). >As for the former, Kripke never said, ?an >identity between rigid designators must be necessary.? What he did say >was that a statement containing rigid designators would, if true, be >necessary. Well actually that's what I meant, and omission of "true" is surely acceptable in this context? However, since you raise it, don't the designators have to be "strongly rigid"? >The formula ?(x)(y)(x = y ? N(x = y)? is >a theorem of quantified standard first-order >modal logic, and its proof in no way depends on a doctrine of rigid >quantification.* (You can verify this by looking at any standard text >on modal logic, e.g. the one by Hughes and Cresswell.) The relevance >of the modal theorem to your thesis can be illustrated by standard >examples. Not unless you first establish that the modal logic is a good model for the modal aspects of the language under consideration. You would surely not offer me material implication as a model for "implies" in ordinary language? >One is this: If water = H2O, then it is necessary that >water = H2O. The assertion ?water = H2O? is not (most people will >agree) true by virtue of meaning, and neither is ?N(water = H2O).? The >truth-value of the first can be decided only by empirical >investigation, and the second can be inferred from the first by means >of the modal theorem. If the previous example troubles you, here is >another: ?The inventor of bifocals is Benjamin Franklin,? where ?the >inventor of bifocals? is used to pick out a certain man--the man who, >as it happened, invented bifocals.? My difficulties here are: 1. I am not sure whether it is true that water = H2O 2. Ditto necessary 3. I have no inclination to accept the application of modal logic which you propose (in default of further justification). However, these hares are not worth chasing. > You say,? The only relevant part of the meaning of a sentence for >determination of either analyticity or necessity is the truth >conditions. We know that a statement is analytic when those >conditions tell us that the under all conditions the sentence is >true.? I can almost agree with this, good, ... >but I think ?truth conditions >for an arbitrary sentence? is far more problematic than you suppose. You seem here to be saying that there may be a difficulty in defining or discovering the truth conditions, which I accept. How does this affect my point? Both concepts are subject to the same difficulties (as they would be if they meant the same, but I have argued that they mean the same even by the standard definitions and you have not answered my argument). > Not all analytic truths express necessities. I haven't seen any proposed counterexamples along these lines, but clearly if the two words have the same meaning as I proposed, then this is false. > As I said before, one of the classic questions of epistemology is >whether there are synthetic a priori truths. To move from the vague >idea of true by virtue of meaning to analytically true simply begs the >question against a host of traditional arguments, which have to be >considered critically and fairly. I am flummoxed here! "Analytic" is most often defined as "true in virtue of meaning", how can moving from the one to the other be called an evasion? >Your counterexample to the no color-overlap principle overlooked a >crucial feature of that principle. This is that a thing or region of >a thing can have no more than one determinate color. This is news to me. I think you must be using the term "determinate" in a manner with which I am not acquainted. As I said, we do not have the same understanding of the sentence in question. >If a blue object >is azure, its determinate blueness is not different from its >azureness: it is the same thing. >There is no problem with a thing >having two generic colors, or a generic color and a determinate one >belonging to that color-genus. You have invented a terminology of your own here, (or at the least, one with which I am not acquainted) which does not help. To progress we would need an example of which we had a common understanding. But how can any example suffice for someone who has proposed that analyticity and necessity should mean the same thing? How could I possibly agree with a supposed counterexample without first deciding to adopt some other usage? >I stand by all the claims I made in my memo: I think your approach to >analyticity is not promising as it stands. My ideas about the subject >are developed at length in my chapters and 3, and I can only suggest >that you have a look at them. But I don't see any discussion of the pros and cons of different definitions of analyticity and necessity, so what is there in your Chapter 3 which would persuade me to abandon my proposal and follow your scheme? We should be debating the merits of various different ways of definining the dichotomies rather than pretending to be debating matters of fact in the context of estalbished usage. Roger Jones From Jlsperanza at aol.com Sun Mar 15 16:10:15 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2009 16:10:15 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Hume's Fork Message-ID: I'm working on contributions by Hume to the English Language, or such. I found this which may nicely relate to R. B. Jones's point in his monograph (in progress*): ---- Jones: >So, in this longer story, the history of the dichotomy >falls into two phases, before and after Hume. [...] >Is this a plausible story or a fantasy? It is mighty plausible (as they say in the Bill-Hillies), and a guarded thing to say, as testimonied by The Guardian itself: "Most unbelievers in our society are Humeans; and one can be a Humean in this sense without ever having heard of Hume. The Guardian, 2 Mar 1960. 7/2 cited by the OED under "Humean". --- and the good point about your story is that you do allow for people be _against_ Hume, too, without, to quote The Guardian, ever having heard of of Hume'. I wonder if the same can be said of Christ?! (*: I use the phrase as a Joyceism -- he kept referring to Finnegans Wake as his Work in Progress. People got so concerned about it, that a book was published before the work was progressed at all. The title read: Our Exagmination Round His Factification for Incamination of Work in Progress. (!)) Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1220439616x1201372437/aol ?redir=http:%2F%2Fwww.freecreditreport.com%2Fpm%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fsc%3D668072%26hmpgID %3D62%26bcd%3DfebemailfooterNO62) From baynesrb at yahoo.com Tue Mar 17 07:30:59 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2009 04:30:59 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Analytic and A Priori Message-ID: <832486.2858.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com> I want to comment on a couple of issues raised by Aune and Roger on analyticity. I'm going to have to work up to this a bit, exploring areas I haven't looked at much lately. So I thought I'd begin by just mentioning things I'm thinking about and,not, conclusions I've reached. My point of origin will be Kant. Aside from the ambiguity of some of his remarks, he has integrated the concepts 'analytic' and 'a priori' etc. more completely into a philosophy world view. Later discussions, such as Quine's do not have the scope of Kant's perspective. There are many reasons for this. Among them is the role of canonical languages in the positivist methodology initiated, largely, by Russell; but, second, there is the influence of axiomatic ways of thinking in the foundations of mathematics and the result that Godel and Tarski had on how to view its limitations. What I want to explore is the use of metalanguages in the treatment of analyticity and what they bring to our understanding, if any, of ideas of necessity. A word on Kant. Recall that Kant held that 'a posteriori' describes "modes of knowledge," and NOT sentences or propositions. In particular, it describes knowledge dependent on experience. But there is a peculiar side to thinking of 'a posteriori' as 'not a priori'. Recall that the criteria for something's being a priori is universality and necessity. Notice that necessity is included here and so if we identifiy analyticity and necessity then from a Kantian perspective one criterion of being a priori is being analytic; the thesis that all analytic sentences are a priori is threatened with becoming a pointless tautology. Not quite a circle but close. I want to look into this a bit. Also, we need to look at domains of discourse when thinking of analyticity. Existence is a strange thing, otherwise there would be no philosophers. If existence is contingent, what does this mean, exactly? How does existence enter into analyticity, if at all? A contingently analytic would be as puzzling to Kant as analytic a posteriori. I think we need to look at this. Now there will be a driving force to many of my comments. That driving force is the idea of a semantical metalanguage. Take the following formula: 'p' is true (in L) iff p We say that this is a statement of the metalanguage in which the ''p'' is a sentence of the object language being "talked about." Notice that ALL the terms of the sentence above are in the metalanguage, even ''p''. Let me just state baldly one thing I have to think about: metalanguages are heirarchical. There is no "connection" in ONE sense between them. I'm thinking about how co-reference of expressions in a sentence compares to reference. In other words, language entry rules (Sellars?) on the one hand and rules of "coindexation" on the other. Intentionality will be wrapped up in rules of designation; but if we never "escape" the language (metalanguage) then how do we "get to" the world? This will figure in our concepts of existence. When Tarski wrote his famous paper on truth, I can't recall rules of designation. This was not a trivial oversight. I will look at this; ruminate on analyticity viewed a certain way and the return to Kant. One other thing. In Quine and others we begin with tautologies, ala the Tractatus; we suppose these are paradigms of analytical sentence. But why should we accept this. Hintikka once raised the issue of analytical entailments and inferences; here is where our discourse cannot be purged of talk of domains and quantifiers etc. I'll look at these. Roger's proposal of linking analyticity and necessity will be difficult to sustain, but it will be welcom if we can retain necessity; eliminate analyticity and begin to talk about concepts rather than meaning. We need to divorce meaning and conceptual analysis. The weight of orthodoxy is against "us." But orthodoxy exists to be challenged as Roger notes. Aune's remarks are cogent and informed; they to, particularly, with respect to synthetic a priori must be addressed. This is my ultimate destination. Regards Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Tue Mar 17 20:59:43 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2009 17:59:43 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine, Aune, Jones: on defining analyticity In-Reply-To: <200903151536.55271.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <200903151536.55271.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <880063.20764.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Roger, In his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" Quine notes a difference between 'definitions' of analyticity as follows: "By saying what statements are analytic for L_0 we explain 'analytic-for-L_0' but not 'analytic' or 'analytic for'. We do not begin to explain the idiom 'S is analytic for L' with variable 'S' and 'L' even if we restrict the range of 'L' to the realm of artificial languages". There is a huge difference in the size of these two kinds of 'definition', particularly for natural languages. All the action is 'analytic-for L_0'. The reasons one might give vary; some depending on what approach you take to philosophical problems more generally. 'Analytic' as a semantical notion, like 'true', is understandably restricted to a particular language. If you don't do this, you invite paradoxes etc, and probably abandoned that way of doing philosophy where the objective is to construct languages based on what, in fact, turn out to be one's philosophical positions. Not just "languages" but a language that captures all "analytic" sentences in the way that isn't much different from capturing all and only sentences that are 'grammatical' in a single generative theory of syntax. There are parallels. This requires that L_0 be strong enough to do the job. One big problem is knowing what all you want to include. What is one's objective? Some say it is this: to construct a language which will include all sentences that can be derived from the "rules of language," that is, syntactical and semantical rules. For example, if you feel that the language (Let me use L', L'', etc. for the hierarchy, that the language cannot have the property of extensionality, then you construct a language which does not include it, but does include some feature that allows for sentences expressing intentionality, say, or less controversially 'intensions'. The crux of the philosophical matter is *whether* all necessary truths are analytic. Are some synthetic. I think so. This intuition, right or wrong, was what was at the root of my remarks on what I'll call the "autonomy" of the metalanguage. Ask yourself the following question, and then give a reason for your answer. Here's the question: 'p v ~p' analytic? Typically, people like Quine begin with the assumption that it is because they begin with the idea that analytic truths include tautologies and then they build outward, trying to capture all other "necessary" truths. If you can obviate having to admit that all necessary truths are analytic, then you can argue that some are not analytic. Recall that necessity is one criterion of being a priori; once you introduce non analytic necessities you are close to accepting synthetic a priori sentences. But, again, a priori pertains to knowledge; necessity (and universality) are criteria, not definiens. Still if you are a Kantian this makes things far more interesting than trying to do philosophy only by talking about some language powerful enough to accommodate all you want to include as analytic (and damn the rest). Up to this point, we don't appear to disagree. But I'm not sure of all you intend by some of your comments. I seen Aune has sent something in. I'll post it tomorrow and reply shortly. Regards Steve ________________________________ From: Roger Bishop Jones To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Sunday, March 15, 2009 11:36:55 AM Subject: Quine, Aune, Jones: on defining analyticity This is a preliminary to a response to Aune's recent critique of my proposed definition of analyticty. Aune observes that my arguments are too short, (faint condemnation indeed) and contrasts them with the lengthy discussion in Chapter 3 of his Empiricist Theory of Knowledge. It is my purpose here to point out how different our enterprises are, and to attribute at least part of the difference in size to a difference in topic. In his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" Quine notes a difference between 'definitions' of analyticity as follows: "By saying what statements are analytic for L_0 we explain 'analytic-for-L_0' but not 'analytic' or 'analytic for'. We do not begin to explain the idiom 'S is analytic for L' with variable 'S' and 'L' even if we restrict the range of 'L' to the realm of artificial languages". There is a huge difference in the size of these two kinds of 'definition', particularly for natural languages. What Quine is also aware of, is that given a general definition of analyticity in terms of meaning or semantics, specific definitions are not necessary or desirable. One needs for specific languages, in order to establish the analyticity of particular sentences, sufficient information about the semantics of the language in question, but no further information about the concept of analyticity. To reason generally about analyticity a definition of the concept of analyticity is required, not a definition which purports to determine the extension of that concept in relation to some particular language, Since the former is likely to be short, and the latter likely to be long, it is to be expected that arguments in the first case may be concise, but general arguments in the second case will be difficult. My own reasoning is confined to generic definitions of analyticity. I advocate that there be no other 'definitions' of analyticity, but that definitions of the semantics of languages are often desirable (and are normal for formal logical systems). Particular facts about analyticity are readily derivable from such definitions (once accepted). Roger Jones -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Wed Mar 18 07:12:36 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2009 04:12:36 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori Message-ID: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Here are some remarks on Steve's latest. He said, "When Tarski wrote his famous paper on truth, I can't recall rules of designation." To deal with sentences containing quantifiers, Tarski introduced satisfaction as a basic semantical relation. Avoiding certain technicalities, we can say that a sequence satisfies a formula 'Fxy' just in case Fab. Tarski also used assignment functions without calling them rules of designation. By means of such assignments, an object (e.g. a person) may be assigned to a proper name. If we set aside the kinds of sentences Kripke used to show that some sentences true by virtue of meaning are contingent (e.g. "The standard meter is a meter long") and some sentences not true by virtue of meaning are necessary if they are true (e.g. "The inventor of bifocals = Benjamin Franklin") we can reasonably say, I believe, that all sentences true by virtue of meaning are necessary and vice-versa (or, if you like, they "express" necessary propositions). But as I said several times in response to Roger, a useful notion of analyticity should provide an a priori means of deciding on the truth-value of sentences, and this is something a mere appeal to necessity cannot do. Is "Bachelors are unmarried" or "Later than is an asymmetrical relation" is a necessary truth (or does it express one)? Is either statement analytic? How can we tell? Steve has several times expressed an interest in, if not a possible fondness for, supposed synthetic a priori truths. From my point of view, the epistemolgoical problem with such alleged truths is that I have no idea how we could possibly know they are true if they are true. Epistemological rationalist have offed many suggestions for this over the years, but none seems cogent to me. Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From baynesrb at yahoo.com Wed Mar 18 12:13:41 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2009 09:13:41 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] AUNE: Analytic and A Priori Message-ID: <264142.66964.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Avoiding certain technicalities, we can say that a sequence satisfies a formula 'Fxy' just in case Fab. Yes, you are quite right about this, but it doesn't directly address the point: there is no "commuting" between languages in the hierarchy, nor (in Tarski) are there "language exit" rules. Tarksi is quite explicit on this, making clear in no uncertain terms that his system includes only four constants: negation, disjunction, quantification, and the universal quantifier. ("The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages" in _Logic, Semantics, and Metamathematics_. Hackett, 1956. p. 168. Now, of course, you can actually "do" the sequences in some metalanguage, that is, make the correlations; but when you do you include something like 'a sequence ' and, so, introduce constants that don't occur in Tarski. So we must at some point give "rules" for correlating 'a' and some object, class, etc. The devil is in "certain technicalities," but this is where we want to go. "Kripke used to show that some sentences true by virtue of meaning are contingent (e.g. "The standard meter is a meter long")..." Kripke uses "meaning" very seldom in connection with this problem. He speaks of definitions, in particular stipulative ones. So when you use "meaning" I have to be apprised of your theory of meaning and how this relates to Kripke's reply to Wittgenstein. Read one way, Kripke's criticisms seem to assume Wittgenstein is sort of foolish. Kripke is a far better logician than Wittgenstein was, but he was not foolish. I don't mean to suggest Kripke has a low opinion of Wittgenstein, either. Indeed he credits the latter with too much in my opinion in his book on the private language argument, which I think is a masterpiece! In addition the meaning of 'contingent' must be explored. Before moving on let me give an example of my concern over the use of 'meaning'. Take the definite description 'the man in the corner drinking a martini'. I don't think there is any better example of where we must take heed of Wittgenstein injunction to ask for use not meaning. The meaning of this expression on my view is invariant; but it may be used referentially or attributively (following Donnellan). The same can be said of 'the length of a stick one meter long'. On synthetic a priori, I'm undecided, but I'm inclined to believe there are non-analytic a priori truths. Here I am motivated by Kant in particular, whose views I think are very advanced and better than many of his most articulate critics, such as Reichenbach. I haven't gotten to your criticisms in ETK which very possibly could lead me in the direction of empiricism, a direction with which I am most comfortable. Best wishes Steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Wed Mar 18 15:21:55 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2009 19:21:55 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Hi Bruce, Just a few points. You picked a bad example to illustrate a proposition which is necessary if true, viz., 'The inventor of bifocals = Benjamin Franklin.' That is actually a contingent truth (if it is true) because 'the inventor of bifocals' is not a rigid designator. 'Cicero = Tully' would have been better. Some people have seen Kripke's arguments as supporting a 'Millian' view of the meaning of names, that is, that the meaning of a name is the object it refers to, or, at least, that if two names refer to the same object, they have the same meaning. If so, then a true a posteriori identity statement would be true in virtue of the meanings of its terms. It would thus be both a posteriori and true-in-virtue-of-meaning. This would divorce analyticity from a priority; in fact it would divorce it from analysis, if we maintained the connection between analyticity and truth in virtue of meaning. Perhaps a better way of proceeding would be to distinguish analyticity from truth in virtue of meaning. Why isn't 'I think' a synthetic a priori truth? And thus also 'I am.' Both are contingent and thus not true in virtue of meaning; and I don't think anyone has held them to be analytic. But both can be known a priori if anything can. Are any of the axioms of logic more self-evident to anyone than the proposition expressed by 'I think'? I would be surprised if anyone thought so. Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Wed Mar 18 15:58:06 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2009 15:58:06 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: References: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Danny, I supplied the example without the commentary it deserves. I didn't want to mention rigid designators because doing so creates useless arguments which are old hat by now. (They were debated ad nauseam in the 70's.) If we take "the inventor of bifocals" to pick out a certain man, whom we assert to be Benjamin Franklin, then there is no world in which that man is not Franklin. Of course, if we use the definite description to refer to whatever satisfies that description in a possible world, then we are in effect referring to different men in different worlds and falsely identifying those men with Franklin. But I wasn't using the description in this referent- shifting way. It is, however, a contingent fact that the man we pick out with the definite description is Benjamin Franklin. We can't expect to know the identity of that man a priori. I was identifying analytically true with truth by virtue of meaning just because others were using "analytically true" that way. My considered views are worked out at length in my chapters 2 and 3 of my book on hist-analytic. I wouldn't day that "I think" or "I exist" are things I know a priori. I know the first only by virtue of thinking, something I have to attend to; and I know the second only because I have experience of myself as a temporal object. But thanks for the comments just the same. Bruce On Mar 18, 2009, at 3:21 PM, Danny Frederick wrote: > Hi Bruce, > > Just a few points. > > You picked a bad example to illustrate a proposition which is > necessary if true, viz., ?The inventor of bifocals = Benjamin > Franklin.? That is actually a contingent truth (if it is true) > because ?the inventor of bifocals? is not a rigid designator. > ?Cicero = Tully? would have been better. > > Some people have seen Kripke?s arguments as supporting a ?Millian? > view of the meaning of names, that is, that the meaning of a name is > the object it refers to, or, at least, that if two names refer to > the same object, they have the same meaning. If so, then a true a > posteriori identity statement would be true in virtue of the > meanings of its terms. It would thus be both a posteriori and true- > in-virtue-of-meaning. This would divorce analyticity from a > priority; in fact it would divorce it from analysis, if we > maintained the connection between analyticity and truth in virtue of > meaning. Perhaps a better way of proceeding would be to distinguish > analyticity from truth in virtue of meaning. > > Why isn?t ?I think? a synthetic a priori truth? And thus also ?I > am.? Both are contingent and thus not true in virtue of meaning; and > I don?t think anyone has held them to be analytic. But both can be > known a priori if anything can. Are any of the axioms of logic more > self-evident to anyone than the proposition expressed by ?I think?? > I would be surprised if anyone thought so. > > Cheers. > > Danny > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Wed Mar 18 16:06:56 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2009 20:06:56 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <200903182006.56267.rbj@rbjones.com> Bruce mentions again a point which I have already answered so I will give another answer. On Wednesday 18 March 2009 11:12:36 Bruce Aune wrote > But as I said several times in response > to Roger, a useful notion of analyticity should provide an a priori means > of deciding on the truth-value of sentences, and this is something a mere > appeal to necessity cannot do. I have responded to this, and I don't recall an answer. My response was that in this respect my proposal is no better nor worse than the more usual definition, (true in virtue of meaning) and this claim is supported by an argument which I presented to the effect that my definition in terms of necessity is consistent with the definition as "true in virtue of meaning" (to which also I recall no response). However, I might as well stop pulling my punches and tell you what I really feel, which is that your requirement can and should be rejected. It is clear that to establish "truth" of a sentence must be in general no more difficult than establishing "analyticity", since every analytic sentence is true. It is also clear that even when the semantics of a language as a whole is as clear as it possibly could be, for example the semantics of first order arithmetic (which is as clear as any language of similar expressive power, and clearer than most) this does not mean that there is any reliable way of deciding whether sentences in the language are true. The sentences of arithmetic vary enormously in their difficulty from "1+0=1" to Fermat's last theorem (which took hundreds of years to prove), and Goldbach's conjecture (which remains unproven), and of course there are many conjectures of which the truth remains unknown (consistency of NF) or which are known to be neither provable nor refutable in ZFC. Mathematicians have precise criteria for when a concept is well-defined, this is essential to the rigour of mathematical proofs, for faulty definitions lead to contradictions. But there is absolutely no connection between whether a concept is well defined, and whether or not we are able to determine its truth in all cases or any case. I was very pleased to see you willing to countenance the possibility that analyticity and necessity are coextensive. Of course, a primary merit of my proposed definition is that it makes this a trivial result. However I think it worth giving an alternative description of why this definition defeats Kripke that makes it seem perhaps a little less like begging the question. Both analyticity and necessity are semantic notions. Necessity will be a semantic notion for anyone who accepts that: 1. necessity is a property of propositions 2. propositions are the meanings of sentences since necessity is then an operator on meanings. By defining analyticity in terms of necessity, I ensure that the "meaning" relative to which analyticity is measured is the same as the meaning relative to which necessity is judged. In fact the operator in question is exactly the same in both cases, the operator which is true iff the truth conditions of the proposition show that the proposition is true under all conditions (in all possible worlds). Kripke obtains different results because he judges analyticity against a notion of "meaning" which is less complete than that against which he judges necessity. He does this by introducing rigid designators which designate the same thing in every possible world but which do not mean the thing they designate. This is effectively a hypothesis that the meaning of the language provides an incomplete account of its truth conditions. Roger Jones From rbj at rbjones.com Wed Mar 18 15:28:35 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2009 19:28:35 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine, Aune, Jones: on defining analyticity In-Reply-To: <880063.20764.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <200903151536.55271.rbj@rbjones.com> <880063.20764.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <200903181928.36250.rbj@rbjones.com> On Wednesday 18 March 2009 00:59:43 steve bayne wrote: >All the action is 'analytic-for L_0'. The reasons >one might give vary; some depending on what approach >you take to philosophical problems more generally. >'Analytic' as a semantical notion, like 'true', is >understandably restricted to a particular language. Surely that's not the case. Is Kant's definition of "analytic" specific to some language? Is Frege's? Is Ayer's? We know Carnap, at least in his syntactic phase advocated defining "Analyticity-in-L", but I consider that to have been a grave mistake which has lead to many problems (and invited "Two Dogmas"). In the passage you cite Quine is complaining that by defining analytic in L_0 for various languages: > We do not begin to explain > > the idiom 'S is analytic for L' with variable > > 'S' and 'L' even if we restrict the range of 'L' > > to the realm of artificial languages". And he evidently (and in this I agree with him) is calling for the general notion to be explained. (though he finds it easier to criticism his own generic accounts of language specific definitions) This is what the phrase: "true in virtue of meaning" does, and it is also what I do in my mathematical model. It is also what I do in the definition which I proposed to use in my monograph. >If you don't do this, you invite paradoxes etc, and >probably abandoned that way of doing philosophy where >the objective is to construct languages based on what, >in fact, turn out to be one's philosophical positions. >Not just "languages" but a language that captures >all "analytic" sentences in the way that isn't much >different from capturing all and only sentences that >are 'grammatical' in a single generative theory of >syntax. There are parallels. A general account of analyticity of the kind which Quine speaks of does not presume that all analytic sentences are expressible in a single language. The definition of analyticity is much much less problematic than the definition of the semantics of a language.can be, which is why a clear distinction should be drawn between defining the concept of analyticity and defining the semantics of a language, and why a specific definition of analyticity for some language is nugatory. >Up to this point, we don't appear to disagree. If the "we" you speak of is you and I, I am startled to see you write this. The two principle points you have discussed so far are: 1. Whether analyticity should be defined generically or separately for each language. 2 Whether analyticity is or is not the same as necessity. To which my answers are "generically" and "yes", and if I have understood you correctly yours are "separately" and "no". I hope I have misunderstood you. Roger From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Wed Mar 18 16:11:36 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2009 20:11:36 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: References: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Hi Bruce, I don't see why it is an objection to something being knowledge a priori that I know it only by virtue of thinking. Isn't the definition of the a priori something like what I can know purely by thinking (without reference to experience)? Has anyone ever said that he can attain a priori knowledge without thinking? Even if someone has said that, it seems to me an odd thing to say: he would not be a representative advocate of a priori knowledge. And once we have the truth of 'I think,' we can infer the truth of 'I exist.' Thus the latter is also knowable a priori, since it is known purely by deductive inference from something else knowable a priori. Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Wed Mar 18 16:50:54 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2009 20:50:54 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: References: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <8499A2021CE04E789AA06456EB066EF4@DFLVQC1J> Hi Bruce, Yes, the question here is whether my knowledge that I think is based upon experience. But I am sure that Descartes and Kant (and perhaps the rest of the a priori crew) would deny that it is based upon experience: it is, rather, pure thinking in that it does not depend on either inner or outer sense. Cheers. Danny From aune at philos.umass.edu Wed Mar 18 17:10:59 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2009 17:10:59 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: References: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: I think you misunderstood my point about knowing that "I think" is true. I did not mean I know this sentence is true by thinking, as I know "2 + 2 = 4" by thinking. I meant that I know "I think" is true only because I am aware of some episode of thinking that I do-- because, to put it differently, I have experience of myself thinking. This is what makes the knowledge a posteriori. Of course, if you want to classify this knowledge as a priori, you may certainly do so; but that will be one place where our conceptions of a posteriori and a priori diverge. Best, Bruce From baynesrb at yahoo.com Wed Mar 18 17:14:44 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2009 14:14:44 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: References: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <474275.53786.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> I think I would agree with Bruce on this. As long as thinking is experienced, as it must be for the Cogito to go through, the knowledge of the fact that we think is not a priori. We shouldn't forget that by 'a priori' we mean according to Kant something that is universal; but knowledge of my own existence is neither universal, nor for that matter necessary. We could abandon Kant and come up with our own definitions; but, then, we wander about in the wilderness to my way of thinking. Regards Steve ________________________________ From: Bruce Aune To: Danny Frederick Cc: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Wednesday, March 18, 2009 5:10:59 PM Subject: Re: Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori I think you misunderstood my point about knowing that "I think" is true. I did not mean I know this sentence is true by thinking, as I know "2 + 2 = 4" by thinking. I meant that I know "I think" is true only because I am aware of some episode of thinking that I do--because, to put it differently, I have experience of myself thinking. This is what makes the knowledge a posteriori. Of course, if you want to classify this knowledge as a priori, you may certainly do so; but that will be one place where our conceptions of a posteriori and a priori diverge. Best, Bruce -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Wed Mar 18 18:24:43 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2009 22:24:43 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Hume's Fork In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <200903182224.43997.rbj@rbjones.com> On Sunday 15 March 2009 17:31:03 Jlsperanza at aol.com wrote: >--- Right. He was possible 'smooth'. Not hirsute, too. And it seems >instruments used in philosophy are meant to 'cut'. "Hume's Knife" would be > nicer, perhaps, or his "Spoon". Quine famously said that Occam (Actually > Ockham, a town in Surrey!) used his 'razor' to cut Plato's beards. Now > 'razor' is difficult to trace to the Classical Languages. Ditto for > 'fork'. I proposed bifurca, which is really a bi-fork. This also in view > of R. Bishop Jones's >consideration of the triple dichotomy and how it can become a bi-fork. I think the cutlery analogy, though homely, is not the best. If we think of a fork in the road, then we think of two alternatives, and we are straight away in a dilemma contemplating a dichotomy. The cutlery is too complicated. >>[Jones] >>The short version of this explanations is that: >>1. I think Hume was the first to get it right. >>2. It seems to be more important in Hume's >> philosophy than it is anywhere else I know of. >> Hume's philosophy seems to me to hang around the dichotomy. >> Especially if you accept Hume's view of what was most >> important in his philosophy when he came up with the "Enquiry". >> (though the fork is not a central thesis, it is a starting >> point rather than a conclusion) > >[Speranza] >Good. Ditto for the is-ought question, so-called. Indeed, to make it part > of the conclusion would be pretty _otiose_ and would deprive a J. R. Searle > of his manual, "How to derive an ought from an is in five easy steps". That fork is for a future monograph, if I can ever get through this one. >>[Jones] >>By contrast, for example, Locke is an empiricist and the >>analytic side for him is trivial, so the fork not so important. > >[Speranza] >Right. But _trust_ R. Hall, or others, who have dwelt with the Master of >All-Time English Philosphy Will Disagree! I have studied Locke's philosophy > at some detail, and find that it is historically much more important than > Hume -- in Oxford! -- There's Digby, of St. John's, I think, who tried to > generalise Locke's theses. I didn't intend to say that Locke's philosophy was less important, just his fork (if we allow him one). Wasn't Locke a contemporary of Newton, swept up in the revolutionary fervour that ensued. Then Hume fell dead from the press. >[Speranza] >Since I'm basically interested in the development of philosophy _in Oxford_ >I wouldn't know! But surely a pro-Oxonian could make a big thesis out of > Locke on 'trifle'. I quote from R. B. Jones's own pages:... Well, I think there may be _something_ in it for me. I was thinking of starting right at the begining, and arguing that our competence to judge elementary entailments is coeval with descriptive language itself, and Locke's observations about trifles might possibly be cited as supporting that idea. Paragraph 8 of Chapter VIII suggests to me that Locke was more influential on Kant than he was on Hume, and makes Kant's position even less original than I had previously suspected. Here, Locke first, and Kant after him, seem handicapped by too great a familiarity with the Aristotelian syllogism, with which Hume does not appear to have been burdened. The effect is that Locke's trivial propositions and Kant's analytic are more narrowly conceived than Hume's "Relations between ideas" (which include mathematics and geometry), and they both end up with propositions which are synthetic(/non-trivial) but necessary. >>[Jones] >>In the last dialectic, Hume does not find a moderating >>synthesis. His fork takes him straight to the dismissal >>of metaphysics, the anti-essentialist view that all >>necessity lies in language (in relations between ideas). >>There is here no middle ground. >>So, in this longer story, the history of the dichotomy >>falls into two phases, before and after Hume. >>Before Hume we have a dialectic leading to Hume's >>synthesis. >>After Hume that synthesis is dominant and is a mainstay >>of posivism, the dialectic being between those >>who re-affirm and refine his position >>and those who challenge it. I'm not so sure about this take on the "after Hume" bit now. Though classical scepticism largely dissappears from view after Hume, who becomes epistemologies bete noir, it is arguable that the empiricist/rationalist conflict flows on unabated and without Hume being granted any special status in this, and I am increasingly impressed by the significance of the essentialist/nominalist thing, especially if you take a liberal view of what falls under that heading. Roger Jones From Jlsperanza at aol.com Wed Mar 18 17:40:42 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2009 17:40:42 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] Descartes' "Cogito": An Analytic Historic Perspective Message-ID: In a message dated 3/18/2009 5:08:02 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk writes: But I am sure that Descartes and Kant (and perhaps the rest of the a priori crew) would deny that it is based upon experience: ---- I tried to read Cartesius, Renatus, in the original vernacular (la langue francaise) and the Latinate. Both ... leave a lot for Malebranche to be desired! In French it's "je pense; donc, j'exist" where 'donc' sounds _very_ interjectional_ to me! In Latin it's "cogito ergo sum" which sounds better. But is the logical form, for him, as we assume it _should_ be: cogito ____________ . . . sum ? Don't think so. Logic was never so developed then. I think he merely meant, "si je pense, j'exist". "si cogito, sum" "Ergo" is _a_ trick of a word. I would never have my students learn it! It's _otiose_! . I find that anything that can be expressed with . . can also be expressed without. Grice's epoch-making example: "He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave." Note the profussion of graphics: 'comma', semi-colon. It's _ungrammatical_ otherwise. So it's not a sentence in Chomskyan sense. It's two. (1) He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave. (2) He is an Englishman. (3) He is, therefore, brave. And they are conjoined: (2) & (3) iff (1) But that's not what it's meant. What is meant can never be put euphonically which is a bad sign for any Austinian worthy of her name: (4) The fact that he is brave follows from the fact that he is an Englishman. But what _facts_ are we talking about? Surely the 'cogito' for Descartes cannot be a _fact_. "un fait accompli". The Latin 'factum' would also be otiose. But eliminating 'factive' references: (5) Jack's bravery follows from his Englishry [sic] is some otiose. --- I use Jack because Grice expands on this as being an utterance by _Jill_ on she having to report on Jack's brain swelling for that literally bloody pail of water. "Jack felt down and broke his crown" -- I always found that rhyme so obscene. But then so was my nurse! As I write this I'm hoping that Natasha Richardson's courage will follow from her Englishry too. It's interesting to model Kant's 'transcendental' ego, so-called, in terms of the ego of the cogito. "Ich denke" indeed. What's slightly problematic is that it's a mere doxastic: 'think', 'denken'. Now, "I _know_; thefore I am" sounds like a veritable truism to me. Never mind a priori. But I would think that Cartesius and Zant (I prefer this spelling -- as it's "Cant" pronounced in Germany before he changed it to Mr. "K") would have allowed for the total cancellation of the cogito: alla: (6) Cogito ergo sum; but then perhaps it's not even a fact that I cogito. It could be all the result of a malignant demon. In Descartes, it has to do with the odd metaphysics of res cogitans. When in problem with some cancellation, invent a new category of entity, call it 'res cogitans', and add that something is true in that realm by _decree_. With Kant, the 'ego' becomes so otiose, transcendental or not, that my teacher never understood it! "Skip it," she said -- "Stick to the things he writes the ego _understands_". Another trick, 'understand'. Why are these continentals so into not accepting 'knowledge' for what it claims to be? Hintikka had it possibly right when he tried to put Austin's odd notions to some good use, and said, "It's the performative, stupid" (Verifiable by their use, alla Lemmon). J. L. Speranza Refs. Grice, 'Descartes on clear and distinct ideas', WOW. Part II: Semantics and Metaphysics. Hintikka. The Cogito Chisholm. The first person Anscombe. The first person **************Great Deals on Dell 15" Laptops - Starting at $479 (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1220433363x1201394532/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fad.doub leclick.net%2Fclk%3B212935224%3B34245239%3Bb) From mvp1 at igc.org Thu Mar 19 03:22:16 2009 From: mvp1 at igc.org (Mark Pavlick) Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2009 03:22:16 -0400 (EDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] recent history of analytic philo Message-ID: <20210557.1237447336293.JavaMail.root@mswamui-swiss.atl.sa.earthlink.net> List members: Has anyone had a chance to look at Hans-Johann Glock's What is Analytic Philosophy?: http://www.amazon.com/What-Analytic-Philosophy-Hans-Johann-Glock/dp/0521694264/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1237447182&sr=1-1 Thanks in advance for any thoughts. - Mark Pavlick From baynesrb at yahoo.com Thu Mar 19 07:34:38 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2009 04:34:38 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine, Aune, Jones: on defining analyticity In-Reply-To: <200903181928.36250.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <200903151536.55271.rbj@rbjones.com> <880063.20764.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <200903181928.36250.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <221252.26743.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> On Wednesday 18 March 2009 00:59:43 steve bayne wrote: >>All the action is 'analytic-for L_0'. The reasons >>one might give vary; some depending on what approach >>you take to philosophical problems more generally. >>'Analytic' as a semantical notion, like 'true', is >>understandably restricted to a particular language. >Surely that's not the case. I meant, here, 'analytic' in 'analytic-for L_0' or where we speak of sentences as analytic. Sure for Kant this is not the case, but mainly because for Kant judgments are analytic, not sentences in any underived sense. So as long as you are speaking of sentences then to describe a sentence as analytic is a meta-linguistic statement. Frege's accepts thoughts or propositions and, so, here there is no idea of 'analytic' as a meta-linguistic predicate. This sort of thing begins with people like Hilbert and Lowenheim, which you probably know already. In order to assess your theory of analyticity, we need to know what "objects" can be said to be analytic on your account. On Quine, you are incorrect, in my opinion. Quine is not calling for a general notion to be explained; he is denying the existence of any general notion. I doubt that the idea of such a general notion would make sense to him. Same with 'true'. Now if you take analyticity as truth based on meaning, then you have 'meaning' to contend with; you need to establish what meaning is and, especially, if you are asserting a connection between meanings etc. Keep in mind that 'meanings', even, if you accept translation are creatures or language; so if you want to arrive at, say, a Kantian idea of analyticity you need to link meanings and concepts. Fregean functions are sometimes thought to serve this purpose; then there is the notion of meanings as captured in "worlds"; that is, senses, intensions etc. become expressed in terms of extensions over worlds (essentially Carnap, Montague). As for your last points: I believe necessity is generic; that there are different ideas of necessity. Part of the issue historically is that before DeCartes the importance of necessary truths is not to guarantee certainty, at least in any obvious sense; it is to enable truths, such as Anselm's argument and the difference between sophistry and philosophy, although this latter has an epistemical "spin"; it is not in any case Cartesian doubt that is involved. The issue of analyticity has a couple of extremes that need to be avoided. Spelling this out is a long story I just can't enter into; but here are a couple of thoughts. One, among several, complications related to analyticity is related to mathematical foundations. This is not an epistemological area of investigations. Validity theory is not designed to solve the problem of skepticism in mathematics. Recall my question about whether truths of logic, even of the Boolean sort, are analytic? Quine and others take this as given. I don't. At the level of functional logic we find ourselves in deeper waters - confusion over problems of infinite cardinals, for example. But what is very puzzling is the role of domain size in axiomatic treatments of foundations. whether a truth in functional logic (first order) is a tautology or simply false depends on the size of the universe. The old Axiom of Infinity was indicative of this problem. If the size of a domain is contingent then it is arguable that no truth of logic is analytic in a certain sense. Now a lot of people will take exception to this but I've never had a satisfactory answer. By the way, I can't find your remark on Kripke on the underdermination of truth. He has some completeness theorems and others have them. (they come cheaper by the dozen) but I found this an interesting point. Regards STeve ________________________________ From: Roger Bishop Jones To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Wednesday, March 18, 2009 3:28:35 PM Subject: Re: Quine, Aune, Jones: on defining analyticity On Wednesday 18 March 2009 00:59:43 steve bayne wrote: >All the action is 'analytic-for L_0'. The reasons >one might give vary; some depending on what approach >you take to philosophical problems more generally. >'Analytic' as a semantical notion, like 'true', is >understandably restricted to a particular language. Surely that's not the case. Is Kant's definition of "analytic" specific to some language? Is Frege's? Is Ayer's? We know Carnap, at least in his syntactic phase advocated defining "Analyticity-in-L", but I consider that to have been a grave mistake which has lead to many problems (and invited "Two Dogmas"). In the passage you cite Quine is complaining that by defining analytic in L_0 for various languages: > We do not begin to explain > > the idiom 'S is analytic for L' with variable > > 'S' and 'L' even if we restrict the range of 'L' > > to the realm of artificial languages". And he evidently (and in this I agree with him) is calling for the general notion to be explained. (though he finds it easier to criticism his own generic accounts of language specific definitions) This is what the phrase: "true in virtue of meaning" does, and it is also what I do in my mathematical model. It is also what I do in the definition which I proposed to use in my monograph. >If you don't do this, you invite paradoxes etc, and >probably abandoned that way of doing philosophy where >the objective is to construct languages based on what, >in fact, turn out to be one's philosophical positions. >Not just "languages" but a language that captures >all "analytic" sentences in the way that isn't much >different from capturing all and only sentences that >are 'grammatical' in a single generative theory of >syntax. There are parallels. A general account of analyticity of the kind which Quine speaks of does not presume that all analytic sentences are expressible in a single language. The definition of analyticity is much much less problematic than the definition of the semantics of a language.can be, which is why a clear distinction should be drawn between defining the concept of analyticity and defining the semantics of a language, and why a specific definition of analyticity for some language is nugatory. >Up to this point, we don't appear to disagree. If the "we" you speak of is you and I, I am startled to see you write this. The two principle points you have discussed so far are: 1. Whether analyticity should be defined generically or separately for each language. 2 Whether analyticity is or is not the same as necessity. To which my answers are "generically" and "yes", and if I have understood you correctly yours are "separately" and "no". I hope I have misunderstood you. Roger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From birkenbertsch at googlemail.com Thu Mar 19 08:48:05 2009 From: birkenbertsch at googlemail.com (Hanno Birken-Bertsch) Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2009 13:48:05 +0100 Subject: [hist-analytic] recent history of analytic philo In-Reply-To: <20210557.1237447336293.JavaMail.root@mswamui-swiss.atl.sa.earthlink.net> References: <20210557.1237447336293.JavaMail.root@mswamui-swiss.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: <91b31e590903190548k13a14c52h1f18a912cf4b45b7@mail.gmail.com> There is a review of Glock's book by Steven D. Hales, Bloomsburg University easily accessible at: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=14386 From Jlsperanza at aol.com Thu Mar 19 09:17:52 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2009 09:17:52 EDT Subject: [hist-analytic] recent history of analytic philo Message-ID: In a message dated 3/19/2009 7:07:30 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, mvp1 at igc.org writes: http://www.amazon.com/What-Analytic-Philosophy-Hans-Johann-Glock/dp/0521694264 /ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1237447182&sr=1-1 ---- Thanks for the link. Nice colourful cover -- alla Andy Warhol. I could recognise: 1 2 3 Frege ? Quine 4 5 6 ? Witters Russell Davidson? ---- Anyway, the CUP link possibly has the credits for backcover. I browsed the sections, and enjoyed particularly the title of one: "Fog over channel: continent cut off!" ---- I noticed that "Paul H. Grice" [sic] is cited twice only: pp. 14, 54. The author seems to have taken with some degree of seriousness the different 'meta-philosophical' approaches to the topic. Not just a history, but a metaphilosophy as it were. One section for example goes, "Is analytic philosophy conservative?" I would think so, but then Grice self-labels "dissident" reactionary or some such on the second page of his "Life and Opinions" -- so one has to be careful with generalisations. The actual phrase is "irreverent, conservative, dissenting". But: (a) irreverent -- is a trademark of his genius. You have it or you don't. It's the conviviality and the idea that philosophy has to be fun. "Laughter with philosophy is not laughter at philosophy" (b) conservative -- this he applies to his brand of 'rationalism' at a time when Empiricism was starting, to use that hateful expression, to rear its beautiful head --. Grice has described it as a 'bete noire' and now he is fighting with Kant. Recall that his "Logic and Conversation" goes, "I am enough of a rationalist to..." -- That's 1967. Today, the dissenting thing to say is "I am enough of an empiricist"! (c) dissenting -- This is the label he valued most. In fact, (a) and (b) are expanded only in a footnote. Grice's footnotes can be fun. The odd thing about this is that it's Herbert to blame. Glock cites this man as Grice, Paul H. but it was in fact, as the (c) for _WOW_ goes: Grice, Herbert Paul Herbert was Grice's father -- and Grice was the eldest son. It was traditional to christen the eldest boy after the fater (Grice's brother is Derek -- and that was it). He would never use either "Herbert" or "Paul" was the custom was in England: it's always H. P. Grice. In America they started to have him, "H. Paul Grice", which sounds odd. Finally, he got so tired (or came to love it) that he dropped the H. altogether. But it was Herbert Grice Sr that made a dissident of little Paul: "the tendency towards dissent may have [...] derived from ... my father. (a fine musician and a gentle person -- they enjoyed the trios with Grice Sr. violin, Derek cello and Grice Jr. piano -- they played Bach -- Derek became a professional cellist in Hampshire -- and Grice Jr. mesmerised the graduation-party at Clifton with his recital of Ravel). "I witnessed almost daily the spectacle of his nonconformism coming under attack from ... a resident aunt who was a Catholic convert." ---- -- Apparently the book is well documented. As a German author that I think he is, I was amused that when corresponding with the German philosopher Andreas Kemmerling -- _the_ German Grice -- I found that he was actually teaching "Analytische Philosopie". It amused me that the Germans being so reverential that they have 'analytic' in the title of the course they give! So much for fog over the channel. --- There are good sections on Germanophilia, or Germanophony, rather -- and historiophobia. I cannot say I know more than Oxford philosophy -- there is a section on Anglican-Austrian axis or some sort, which must refer to Weismann. Oxford is an animal in itself, or as I prefer, an island totally surrounded by land. The main phases of analytic philosophy in Oxford cannot be properly discussed in a book that aims at discussing Wittgenstein and Quine, too. E.g. what was the connection between analytic philosophy of the Grice generation and the realist school of Cook Wilson. Grice cites _Statement and Inference_, e.g. Or, how much scorn was poured on Sir Freddie with his new Gollancz volume, Language Truth, and Logic? Yes, 'analytic philosophy' but too much of a good thing to be properly digested in Oxford. Is the Austin vs. Ryle polemic more of a social thing than anything else? I think so. Austin would not allow in his playgroup anyone his senior. The public and the private in Oxford philosophy: how much is just unwritten (agrapha dogmata). How much was displayed at meetings of the Oxford Society. How much was the movement a real movement? How much was it the establishment outside Oxford. What percentage of 'truly Oxford philosphers' did publish in the 'establishment' journals like Aristotelian Society, or worse, Journal of Philosphy and Philosophical Review. How much of Oxford analysis was published in the conservative Philosophy of the Royal Society of Philosophy? Another thing to consider is the _teaching_ of analytic philosphy, while it was cooked. What kind of examination committees were implemented? Who decided issues of policy regarding curriculum? At this level, it does seem analytic philosophy was pretty influential, but I still cannot think that it would _make_ *me* (say, a Parmenidian) into one! Cheers, J. L. Speranza **************Great Deals on Dell 15" Laptops - Starting at $479 (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1220029050x1201385914/aol?redir=http:%2F%2Fad.doub leclick.net%2Fclk%3B212974460%3B34272906%3Bh) From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Thu Mar 19 11:43:11 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2009 15:43:11 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: References: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <37BB403BDEC34EBD8A9EAACC21D8CA72@DFLVQC1J> Hi Bruce and Steve, I think I understood your point. My point was that what is relevant to the a priori/a posteriori distinction is whether our knowledge of the truth of a proposition depends upon experience; and that for the rationalists and Kant, pure thinking was not an experience because, for them, 'experience' referred to sense-experiences, which thinking is not. There are differences here between the rationalists and Kant because, for the latter, any thinking which occurs in time belongs to inner sense and is thus empirical. But the rationalists, I think, were quite happy with the notion of non-empirical thinking about instances of thinking. Thus on the rationalist view 'I think' would be a priori even though contingent; and construed transcendentally, it is a priori also on Kant's view (though Kant seems to want to regard it as analytic - that, at least, is how he labels the 'synthetic unity of apperception'). I need to produce some quotations to defend what I am saying here. That would be a bit of a job. I have made a scrappy start of it, but what I have turned up so far is by no means clear-cut. For Descartes, a priori truths, which he calls 'innate,' are laid down in our minds and can be discovered by us if we direct our attention to them, or conduct our thinking properly: 'The mathematical truths which you call eternal have been laid down by God___There is no single one that we cannot understand if our mind turns to consider it. They are all INBORN IN OUR MINDS' (Letter to Mersenne, 15 April 1630, in 'Philosophical Letters,' translated by Anthony Kenny, p.11). Thus, a priori knowledge is discoverable by (temporal) thinking which is independent of sense-impressions. So far you would not object (I presume). But since for Descartes, 'I think' is the (or one of the) foundations of all a priori knowledge, it SEEMS it should be a priori too. The following, from Kant's First Critique, seems to translate my reading of (some of) the rationalists into Kant's own terms: 'The RATIONAL [non-empirical] doctrine of the soul___professes to be a science built upon a single proposition 'I THINK' ___The reader must not object that this proposition, which expresses the perception of the self, contains an inner experience, and that the rational doctrine of the soul founded upon it is never pure and is therefore to that extent based upon an empirical principle. For this inner perception is nothing more than a mere apperception 'I THINK,' by which even transcendental concepts are made possible___The least object of perception (for example, even pleasure or displeasure), if added to the universal representation of self-consciousness, would at once transform rational psychology into empirical psychology' (A342-343, Kemp Smith translation). Leibniz seems to want it both ways, with 'I exist' being both innate (Leibniz's word for a priori) and based on experience: 'the proposition I EXIST is evident in the highest degree___[but] it is a proposition of fact, founded on immediate experience___But if you take axioms, in a more general manner, to be immediate or non-provable truths, then the proposition I AM can be called an axiom___it may never have occurred to a man to form this proposition explicitly, even though it is innate in him' ('New Essays,' 411, Remnant and Bennett translation). My conclusion is that the situation is unclear, so it is no wonder we disagree. Cheers, Danny From srbayne at earthlink.net Thu Mar 19 13:22:55 2009 From: srbayne at earthlink.net (Steven Bayne) Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2009 13:22:55 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: <37BB403BDEC34EBD8A9EAACC21D8CA72@DFLVQC1J> References: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <37BB403BDEC34EBD8A9EAACC21D8CA72@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: I have to give brief answer here. There is much to be said. But a brief answer on Kant is this: since a thought occurs in time it belongs to intuition and intuition belongs to the sensibility not the understanding. The thought results from a synthesis that may not arise from the empirical imagination but, rather, an a priori synthesis.Still a thought belongs to the sensibility, not the understanding, even though the categories of synthesis constitute the understanding. So a thought understood as something we have in time belongs to the sensibility, as an a priori intuition, that is, a "pure" intuition. One finds in the Second Critique references that sound very much like a priori experiences; surely, this is not like the thought "I am." The importance of the a priori forms of the sensibility for synthetic a priori is in how the object of synthesis is given that relates two concepts in a judgment. But this will get us into deeper waters, largely, irrelevant to analyticity etc. Here's what I suggest. You suggested a connection with the Cogito in relation to synthetic a priori. I think the burden is on you to make your case. So with this in mind give your argument and subject it to the usual go about. This way we won't have to guess what your argument is and we won't have to do homework to figure it out. You might be on to something. I for one am sympathetic to the synthetic a priori. Regards Steve At 11:43 AM 3/19/2009, Danny Frederick wrote: >Hi Bruce and Steve, > >I think I understood your point. My point was that what is relevant to the a >priori/a posteriori distinction is whether our knowledge of the truth of a >proposition depends upon experience; and that for the rationalists and Kant, >pure thinking was not an experience because, for them, 'experience' referred >to sense-experiences, which thinking is not. There are differences here >between the rationalists and Kant because, for the latter, any thinking >which occurs in time belongs to inner sense and is thus empirical. But the >rationalists, I think, were quite happy with the notion of non-empirical >thinking about instances of thinking. Thus on the rationalist view 'I think' >would be a priori even though contingent; and construed transcendentally, it >is a priori also on Kant's view (though Kant seems to want to regard it as >analytic - that, at least, is how he labels the 'synthetic unity of >apperception'). > >I need to produce some quotations to defend what I am saying here. That >would be a bit of a job. I have made a scrappy start of it, but what I have >turned up so far is by no means clear-cut. > >For Descartes, a priori truths, which he calls 'innate,' are laid down in >our minds and can be discovered by us if we direct our attention to them, or >conduct our thinking properly: > >'The mathematical truths which you call eternal have been laid down by >God___There is no single one that we cannot understand if our mind turns to >consider it. They are all INBORN IN OUR MINDS' (Letter to Mersenne, 15 April >1630, in 'Philosophical Letters,' translated by Anthony Kenny, p.11). > >Thus, a priori knowledge is discoverable by (temporal) thinking which is >independent of sense-impressions. So far you would not object (I presume). >But since for Descartes, 'I think' is the (or one of the) foundations of all >a priori knowledge, it SEEMS it should be a priori too. > > >The following, from Kant's First Critique, seems to translate my reading of >(some of) the rationalists into Kant's own terms: > >'The RATIONAL [non-empirical] doctrine of the soul___professes to be a >science built upon a single proposition 'I THINK' ___The reader must not >object that this proposition, which expresses the perception of the self, >contains an inner experience, and that the rational doctrine of the soul >founded upon it is never pure and is therefore to that extent based upon an >empirical principle. For this inner perception is nothing more than a mere >apperception 'I THINK,' by which even transcendental concepts are made >possible___The least object of perception (for example, even pleasure or >displeasure), if added to the universal representation of >self-consciousness, would at once transform rational psychology into >empirical psychology' (A342-343, Kemp Smith translation). > >Leibniz seems to want it both ways, with 'I exist' being both innate >(Leibniz's word for a priori) and based on experience: > >'the proposition I EXIST is evident in the highest degree___[but] it is a >proposition of fact, founded on immediate experience___But if you take >axioms, in a more general manner, to be immediate or non-provable truths, >then the proposition I AM can be called an axiom___it may never have >occurred to a man to form this proposition explicitly, even though it is >innate in him' ('New Essays,' 411, Remnant and Bennett translation). > >My conclusion is that the situation is unclear, so it is no wonder we >disagree. > >Cheers, > >Danny From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Thu Mar 19 15:18:43 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2009 19:18:43 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: References: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <37BB403BDEC34EBD8A9EAACC21D8CA72@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: Hi Steve, When I said that 'I think' expresses a contingent a priori truth, I was operating with the following concept of the a priori. A proposition is a priori if and only if it can be known independently of any particular experience. Experience comprises sensory impressions, most which have an outer and an inner aspect, but some of which (like pains) have only an inner aspect. Thinking is not a sensory experience. Therefore what I can know from mere reflection about my thinking is a priori knowledge. Similarly, willing is not a sensory experience, so if I can know what I will independently of sensory experience (which I think I can), then that knowledge of my willing is a priori. Why was I working with that concept of the a priori? Because, mistakenly or otherwise, I thought that was the conception of the a priori that the rationalist philosophers operated with. I am no longer sure that they did so. Do I now propose that conception of the a priori as my own? No, I don't, because I think talk of sense-impressions is nonsense. What I might propose instead, though, is a restatement of that account in terms of 'basic statements,' that is, singular statements about what is happening in a particular region of space-time. A priori knowledge would then be what we can know (in a suitably fallibilist sense of 'know') independently of the truth or falsity of any basic statements. On that conception, 'I think' would not come out as a priori if 'I' is interpreted as referring to a spatio-temporal particular, since it would then be itself a basic statement. But if 'I' is taken to refer to the speaker/thinker and we leave it an open question whether he is really a spatio-temporal particular (he might be merely a temporal one), then 'I think' ceases to be a basic statement; and as it is knowable independently of the truth or falsity of any basic statement, then it comes out as a priori (contingent a priori). How's that? Danny From baynesrb at yahoo.com Thu Mar 19 17:05:01 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2009 14:05:01 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Hist-Analytic New: Amaral, E. V. Huntington, Mach, Russell, Eddington Message-ID: <988597.35629.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Here are some recent additions to the Hist-Analytic database. I would single out Pedro Amaral. His introduction to the Notre Dame Lectures by Sellars is very much worth a careful look. The letter from Russell is an important one on sense-data. The importance of Mach's work needs no explanation. The piece by Eddington is, in my opinion, of absolutely fundamental significance not only historically but for anyone presently interested in mind and intentionality. The Huntington paper is included because I like Huntington's work and there is a growing demand for it. The Sellars book is available from SPACE AND GEOMETRY (1901: Monist) by Ernst Mach On Physiological, as Distinguished from Geometrical Space http://www.hist-analytic.org/MachSpace.pdf On the Psychological and Natural Development of Geometry http://www.hist-analytic.org/MachSpace2.pdf Space and Geometry from the Point of View of Physical Inquiry http://www.hist-analytic.org/MachSpace3.pdf "Independent Postulates for the "Informal" Part of Principia Mathematica" by E. V. Huntington (Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 1934) http://www.hist-analytic.org/Huntington1934.pdf Pedro Amaral's Introduction to Sellars' Notre Dame Lectures http://www.hist-analytic.org/AmaralSellars.pdf Letter to the Editor of Journal of Philosophy: Bertrand Russell (1915) http://www.hist-analytic.org/Russell19152.pdf "On the Importance of Logical Form?" Bertrand Russell (1938) http://www.hist-analytic.org/RussellForm.pdf (1938) Eddington's 'Two Tables' (1938) - Sir Arthur Eddington http://www.hist-analytic.org/EddingtonNature.pdf Steven R. Bayne www.hist-analytic.org -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Fri Mar 20 04:34:10 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2009 08:34:10 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <200903200834.11210.rbj@rbjones.com> Here is a third response to Bruce Aune's comment on my proposed definition of analyticity: On Wednesday 18 March 2009 11:12:36 Bruce Aune wrote: > But as I said several times in response > to Roger, a useful notion of analyticity should provide an a priori means > of deciding on the truth-value of sentences, and this is something a mere > appeal to necessity cannot do. My first two responses were: 1. I have argued that my definition is consistent with the definition "true in virtue of meaning", and that my definition is in this respect no better or worse than its principle alternative. 2. The requirement that a definition should yield a decision procedure should be rejected. However, by way of a more constructive response here is an account of how one could produce formal proofs of specific claims about analyticity of sentences. I have not previously offered this because the role of the definition of analyticity in this is rather trifiling, all the action is in reasoning about the semantics. Before such specific proofs can be attempted one must have a definition of the semantics of the relevant language, and this must provide enough information about the truth conditions to establish the desired result. (this is in contrast to general reasoning about analyticity, which can be done without any specific definition of truth conditions) It suffices to have an abstract semantics, and for this purpose set theory (or something of similar expressive power) is the best metalanguage to use. The techniques for defining an abstract semantics involve something like arithmetisation, except that sets rather than numbers are used to represent syntax, and are also used to represent the domain of discourse, viz: "possible worlds". Any method of definition which is acceptable in set theory is acceptable, for formulating the semantics. I can and will offer examples at a later date. The main difficulty in formalising the semantics lies in deciding what the semantics of the language is, and in pathologies in natural languages which makes it doubtful that there can be a coherent semantics which meets all that one might expect of it. This is related to the existence of the semantic paradoxes, which suggest that no semantics for a natural language can be consistent with usual presumptions about sound inference in these languages. These difficulties to not apply to formal languages, for which it is normal to produce something equivalent to such a definition of semantics (in the course of establishing the consistency of the deductive system). One may then conduct proofs that some sentence is or is not analytic in the context of the two definitions, i.e. the definition of analyticity and the definition of the semantics of the language in question. Informal proofs can be conducted in the normal manner of mathematicians reasoning informally in an axiomatic set theory. Of course, conjectures about what is or is not analytic, even in a context in which the semantics has been formally defined, may be arbitrarily hard to obtain, or may not exist even if the sentence is analytic, since set theory as a deductive system is incomplete. At some point I may come up with a fully worked example. This is as close as one can get to an "a priori" method of deciding the truth value of claims about analyticity. Does it satisfy your request, or might it if the details were spelt out a bit more? Roger Jones From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Fri Mar 20 08:09:44 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2009 12:09:44 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: <20C998DF-64DF-414F-A063-AC9A5E98DE6C@philos.umass.edu> References: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <37BB403BDEC34EBD8A9EAACC21D8CA72@DFLVQC1J> <20C998DF-64DF-414F-A063-AC9A5E98DE6C@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: <1574D8C91AC0403A9E807AC410560695@DFLVQC1J> Hi Bruce, Apologies for my brevity last time! It seems to me logically possible that solipsism is true; and it seems to me logically possible that idealism is true (e.g., that the world consists of Leibnizian monads or Berkeleyan souls to whom the world APPEARS as extended in space). Thus it seems to me logically possible that I have no spatial location. This is not a possibility that I take very seriously, but it is a possibility nevertheless. Thus, while in everyday affairs I take 'I' to refer to a spatio-temporal particular, when doing philosophy I admit the possibility that 'I' refers to something temporal but non-spatial. But while admitting that possibility, I may still deem it true that I think, and thus I deem 'I think' knowable a priori (in the sense of being knowable independently of any knowledge of the truth of any proposition about spatio-temporal particulars). Since, on this view, 'I think' is a priori knowledge, and since it seems plainly contingent (since I might not have existed at all), then it is an example of a contingent a priori proposition. When I said I thought talk of sense-impressions was nonsense, I was rejecting two things. First, I was rejecting the idea that there are any sensory experiences which are not infused by theory, any bare sense data free of an interpretative scheme. I did not mean to deny that we have sensory experiences. Second, I was rejecting the idea that sensory experiences can be used to test theories and thus that they can be used to demarcate empirical statements. What we test theories against are 'basic statements,' that is, inter-subjectively testable singular statements about finite regions of space-time. Thus, our demarcation of the empirical from the a priori should refer to basic statements. Given this, the logical possibility of solipsism and of idealism leads directly to the existence of contingent a priori truths. Best wishes, Danny From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Fri Mar 20 10:50:30 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2009 14:50:30 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: <1AD2EDD6-B7D4-49EC-AF8F-3425D36AD73A@philos.umass.edu> References: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <37BB403BDEC34EBD8A9EAACC21D8CA72@DFLVQC1J> <20C998DF-64DF-414F-A063-AC9A5E98DE6C@philos.umass.edu> <1574D8C91AC0403A9E807AC410560695@DFLVQC1J> <1AD2EDD6-B7D4-49EC-AF8F-3425D36AD73A@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: Hi Bruce, You ask me: if you are asserting only that it is possible (in the sense you call 'logical') that 'I' refers to something temporal but non-spatial, shouldn't you conclude that it is just possible (and perhaps not true) that 'I think' (uttered by you) is a synthetic a priori truth? I am not quite sure what lies behind your question. It seems to be a concern with logical (or metaphysical) possibility as opposed to epistemic possibility. So let me re-state my position by making explicit use of that distinction. Is it logically possible that I am non-spatial? We don't know. It SEEMS so, in that philosophers (such as Leibniz and Berkeley) have envisaged possible worlds in which I am non-spatial. But we know from Kripke that if I am in fact a thing that has developed from a particular egg and sperm, then I am necessarily such a thing. And the 'necessarily' here is metaphysical or logical. For the sake of argument, let us suppose (what we do normally suppose) that I am a human being (rather than a disembodied spirit that appears to be a human being). Then I am necessarily embodied. Even so, it still SEEMS POSSIBLE to me that I am not embodied. Thus I am logically-necessarily embodied but epistemically-possibly not embodied. (Compare: Hesperus is necessarily Phosphorus, but for years people thought they were different, so it was epistemically possible that Hesperus was not identical to Phosphorus.) So, whether I realise it or not, 'I' (when I use it) refers to a spatio-temporal particular. Even granting all that, I can know that I think merely by thinking and attending to my thinking. Thus I can know a priori that I think, that is, I can know it independently of the truth or falsity of any inter-subjectively testable basic statement. When I add to this that my existence, and thus my thinking, is contingent, it follows that I can know a priori a contingent truth. All this follows even though we accept that I am necessarily a particular physical thing. If we accept that the proposition I express when I utter 'I think' is contingent, then it is contingent a priori. This is because its truth can be known by me independently of my knowledge of the truth or falsity of any statement which I know to be about a spatio-temporal particular. For I may doubt that 'I think' is about a spatio-temporal particular if I have been reading Berkeley or Leibniz or others. Is that clearer? Danny From aune at philos.umass.edu Fri Mar 20 10:30:59 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2009 10:30:59 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: <1574D8C91AC0403A9E807AC410560695@DFLVQC1J> References: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <37BB403BDEC34EBD8A9EAACC21D8CA72@DFLVQC1J> <20C998DF-64DF-414F-A063-AC9A5E98DE6C@philos.umass.edu> <1574D8C91AC0403A9E807AC410560695@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <1AD2EDD6-B7D4-49EC-AF8F-3425D36AD73A@philos.umass.edu> Well, Danny, if you are asserting only that it is possible (in the sense you call "logical") that "I" refers to something temporal but nonspatial, shouldn't you conclude that it is just possible (and perhaps not true) that "I think" (uttered by you) is a synthetic a priori truth? Bruce From aune at philos.umass.edu Fri Mar 20 12:53:43 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2009 12:53:43 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: References: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <37BB403BDEC34EBD8A9EAACC21D8CA72@DFLVQC1J> <20C998DF-64DF-414F-A063-AC9A5E98DE6C@philos.umass.edu> <1574D8C91AC0403A9E807AC410560695@DFLVQC1J> <1AD2EDD6-B7D4-49EC-AF8F-3425D36AD73A@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: If am afraid that I misunderstood your thinking before. But I would still deny that if you know you are thinking because you are aware of your thinking, your knowledge that you think is a priori in a sense that I would accept. BY the way, are you are aware of my criticism of Kripke's argument for the necessity of origins and composition? See my ETK pp. 63f. Bruce On Mar 20, 2009, at 10:50 AM, Danny Frederick wrote: > Hi Bruce, > > You ask me: if you are asserting only that it is possible (in the > sense you > call 'logical') that 'I' refers to something temporal but non-spatial, > shouldn't you conclude that it is just possible (and perhaps not > true) that > 'I think' (uttered by you) is a synthetic a priori truth? > > I am not quite sure what lies behind your question. It seems to be a > concern > with logical (or metaphysical) possibility as opposed to epistemic > possibility. So let me re-state my position by making explicit use > of that > distinction. > > Is it logically possible that I am non-spatial? We don't know. It > SEEMS so, > in that philosophers (such as Leibniz and Berkeley) have envisaged > possible > worlds in which I am non-spatial. But we know from Kripke that if I > am in > fact a thing that has developed from a particular egg and sperm, > then I am > necessarily such a thing. And the 'necessarily' here is metaphysical > or > logical. > > For the sake of argument, let us suppose (what we do normally > suppose) that > I am a human being (rather than a disembodied spirit that appears to > be a > human being). Then I am necessarily embodied. Even so, it still SEEMS > POSSIBLE to me that I am not embodied. Thus I am logically-necessarily > embodied but epistemically-possibly not embodied. (Compare: Hesperus > is > necessarily Phosphorus, but for years people thought they were > different, so > it was epistemically possible that Hesperus was not identical to > Phosphorus.) So, whether I realise it or not, 'I' (when I use it) > refers to > a spatio-temporal particular. > > Even granting all that, I can know that I think merely by thinking and > attending to my thinking. Thus I can know a priori that I think, > that is, I > can know it independently of the truth or falsity of any inter- > subjectively > testable basic statement. When I add to this that my existence, and > thus my > thinking, is contingent, it follows that I can know a priori a > contingent > truth. All this follows even though we accept that I am necessarily a > particular physical thing. > > If we accept that the proposition I express when I utter 'I think' is > contingent, then it is contingent a priori. This is because its > truth can be > known by me independently of my knowledge of the truth or falsity of > any > statement which I know to be about a spatio-temporal particular. For > I may > doubt that 'I think' is about a spatio-temporal particular if I have > been > reading Berkeley or Leibniz or others. > > Is that clearer? > > Danny From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Fri Mar 20 15:34:50 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2009 19:34:50 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: References: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <37BB403BDEC34EBD8A9EAACC21D8CA72@DFLVQC1J> <20C998DF-64DF-414F-A063-AC9A5E98DE6C@philos.umass.edu> <1574D8C91AC0403A9E807AC410560695@DFLVQC1J> <1AD2EDD6-B7D4-49EC-AF8F-3425D36AD73A@philos.umass.edu> Message-ID: Hi Bruce, In case you had not guessed, my demarcation of empirical knowledge, on which my demarcation of a priori knowledge is based, comes from Karl Popper. He wanted to demarcate empirical science from everything else and offered falsifiability, explained in terms of inter-subjective testability. This excludes from science all autobiographical mentalese statements, since they are not inter-subjectively testable. As Popper would put it, such statements do not belong to objective knowledge; at best, they are mere subjective knowledge. It is worth noticing that this does not exclude ALL subjective reports of experience from science. A psychologist or neuroscientist may well correlate behaviour, bodily changes or brain states with psychological states by means of subjects' reports of what they are experiencing under experimentally produced circumstances. But such subject reports are essentially inter-subjective in that the subject does duty for humankind in general: if a repeat of the experiment with a different subject gave a different subject report, this would debar the subject reports from science. So there can be a science of psychological states; but it will recognise only those psychological states that are generally reported by subjects in similar situations (any idiosyncratic reports will be dismissed, or at least put on one side for the time being, even though their truth may not be impugned). So the big question here is should epistemology concern itself with objective knowledge or subjective knowledge? We could say both. But if so, I think we should acknowledge that the primary concern should be objective knowledge, for that is the knowledge we are taught, which is discussed, challenged, tested, etc. Merely subjective knowledge does exist; but it is merely the personal property of those who have it. It is trivial from a social or human point of view, no matter how important it may be to the individual who possesses it. Thus, while you are plainly at liberty to define empirical knowledge in terms of individual experiences, I think this relegates your study to merely subjective knowledge, which I do not regard as being very important. Like Popper, I think that Knowledge (with a capital 'K') is social. At this point, you are entitled to retort that, if that is so, then I should also acknowledge that the category of the contingent a priori is unimportant, since 'I think' and 'I am,' insofar as they are knowable a priori, are mere items of subjective knowledge. I concede that point - unless there are other items of contingent a priori knowledge that are not merely subjective. Now I recall that Gareth Evans discussed contingent a priori propositions of a sort different to the ones I have been discussing, but I cannot for the moment remember what his examples were (they might, for all I now know, have been instances of subjective knowledge). I just read your criticism of Kripke's argument for the necessity of origins. I agree with you that you defeat the arguments you present, but I do not think this is sufficient to defeat the underlying intuition. In other words, there may be better arguments for the same conclusion. This more or less tallies with your own conclusion. I can say no more at the moment, since I would have to re-learn some modal logic, and re-read Kripke's relevant papers, before I could say anything more informative. (For information, I left academe in 1987 but over the last couple of years I have been re-learning some of what I used to know as well as learning some new stuff.) Best wishes, Danny From rbj at rbjones.com Fri Mar 20 17:12:59 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2009 21:12:59 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine, Aune, Jones: on defining analyticity In-Reply-To: <221252.26743.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <200903151536.55271.rbj@rbjones.com> <200903181928.36250.rbj@rbjones.com> <221252.26743.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <200903202113.00233.rbj@rbjones.com> On Thursday 19 March 2009 11:34:38 steve bayne wrote: ... >In order to assess your theory of analyticity, >we need to know what "objects" can be said to >be analytic on your account. I didn't really put forward a "theory", I put forward a definition, which was intended to be read as a proposal for usage, not a description or explication of previous usage (though it is arguably consistent with much prior usage). >On Quine, you are incorrect, in my opinion. >Quine is not calling for a general notion to >be explained; he is denying the existence of >any general notion. I doubt that the idea >of such a general notion would make sense to >him. Same with 'true'. The two are not incompatible. He says that before we can understand rules for specific languages we "must" understand the general notion. He is calling for the general notion to be explained, and denying that it can be. Prior to Carnap, so far as I am aware, no-one discussed anything but the general notion (though not explicitly talking in terms of variable L). I believe it to be a mistake ever to consider language specific definitions of analyticity. >Now if you take analyticity as truth based >on meaning, then you have 'meaning' to >contend with; you need to establish what >meaning is and, especially, if you are >asserting a connection between meanings etc. >Keep in mind that 'meanings', even, if you >accept translation are creatures or language; >so if you want to arrive at, say, a Kantian >idea of analyticity you need to link meanings >and concepts. Fregean functions are >sometimes thought to serve this purpose; then >there is the notion of meanings as captured >in "worlds"; that is, senses, intensions >etc. become expressed in terms of extensions >over worlds (essentially Carnap, Montague). I do of course accept that when analyticity is defined explicitly in terms of meanings, or when that it done indirectly as in my proposed definition, then to apply the notion to specific languages you need to have some information about the semantics of the languages in question. I would not look back to Frege for help in dealing with semantics these days, though no doubt his work has contributed in important ways to modern methods in this area. So far as Kant is concerned, my proposal is intentionally divergent from Kant. My monograph is to make a feature of Hume's fork, which Kant was inspired to reject. >One, among several, complications related to >analyticity is related to mathematical foundations. >This is not an epistemological area of investigations. >Validity theory is not designed to solve the >problem of skepticism in mathematics. Recall my >question about whether truths of logic, even >of the Boolean sort, are analytic? Quine and >others take this as given. I don't. Well they don't use the terminology, but one can see in mathematical practice that mathematicians take great pains to ensure that mathematics is analytic. (i.e. they would not accept a proof of some result as of any value if they were not satisfied that the deductive system was sound) >At the level >of functional logic we find ourselves in >deeper waters - confusion over problems of >infinite cardinals, for example. But what is >very puzzling is the role of domain size in >axiomatic treatments of foundations. whether >a truth in functional logic (first order) is >a tautology or simply false depends on the >size of the universe. I'm afraid I don't understand your point here. >The old Axiom of Infinity >was indicative of this problem. If the size of >a domain is contingent then it is arguable that >no truth of logic is analytic in a certain sense. All theorems of sound deductive systems are analytic in the sense in which Carnap and I use the term, and in the sense "true in virtue of meaning". >Now a lot of people will take exception to this >but I've never had a satisfactory answer. If I understood the question I would have a shot at giving you satisfaction. >By the way, I can't find your remark on Kripke >on the underdermination of truth. Doesn't ring any bells for me, are you sure it was my remark? Roger From Baynesr at comcast.net Fri Mar 20 20:44:16 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2009 00:44:16 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <1253165677.6249791237596256074.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Philosophical "radical" Danny Frederick says plainly: "I think' expresses a contingent a priori truth,.. " Remember that historically, and here I mean Kant, all a priori truths are necessary. If you give this up as well as the universality criterion, then you have to face the question Kant faced, fearlessly: What is your criterion for saying that any sentence is a priori? What is my procedure for deciding that this truth is a priori and this one is not, especially if you reject the idea that all a priori truths are analytic. I think this is of crucial concern. Sure you can define a priori as knowledge absolutely independent of experience, discounting those pure a priori forms of intuition (in Kant's case), but without some way of telling them apart from other sentences the distinction is a mere formality. To borrow from Chisholm (Perceiving, as I recall), it is one thing to define "rotten"; it is another to know when what you have in your hand *is* rotten. One other thing on this: Hintikka has an interesting take on the Cogito. I think I can put it online with little sweat. I'll check. Anyway, what is a priori may boil down, in fact, to something like what he had in mind. I'd have to check, but no time now. Now I think I agree with Bruce, if I understand him correctly, at least in this sense: The Cogito requires that I know I'm thinking; knowing the truth of WHAT I am thinking may be knowledge of an a priori truth. But knowing THAT I am thinking requires awareness. Here is a complication in the approach I've taken. I've connected thinking to time as the a priori form of sensibility, not to mention the unity of apperception etc. (think "schematism" and all that comes with it). My reliance on time may evoke some skepticism, but I think the real source of that skepticism is something Geach noticed back around 1957 or so. He realized that assigning time to physical events is very different from doing it in the case of mental actions (like thinking). Now on "sense impressions," I don't think they are nonsense, really. When one's labors begin to achieve productive results such nonsense may be inevitable. Broad's logical description of our experience of space, assuming Relativity is a very productive effort - one assuming something like what you probably mean by "sense impressions." The term needs spelling out, even by those who reject it, a spelling out that must consider "sensa," "sense-data," "impressions," "empirical intuitions," "qualia," etc. Each carries in many cases its own bundle of theories. Rejecting "sense impressions" as nonsense doesn't come free, anymore than one's scientific realism when properly argued for. Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Danny Frederick" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2009 3:18:43 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: RE: Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori Hi Steve, When I said that 'I think' expresses a contingent a priori truth, I was operating with the following concept of the a priori. A proposition is a priori if and only if it can be known independently of any particular experience. Experience comprises sensory impressions, most which have an outer and an inner aspect, but some of which (like pains) have only an inner aspect. Thinking is not a sensory experience. Therefore what I can know from mere reflection about my thinking is a priori knowledge. Similarly, willing is not a sensory experience, so if I can know what I will independently of sensory experience (which I think I can), then that knowledge of my willing is a priori. Why was I working with that concept of the a priori? Because, mistakenly or otherwise, I thought that was the conception of the a priori that the rationalist philosophers operated with. I am no longer sure that they did so. Do I now propose that conception of the a priori as my own? No, I don't, because I think talk of sense-impressions is nonsense. What I might propose instead, though, is a restatement of that account in terms of 'basic statements,' that is, singular statements about what is happening in a particular region of space-time. A priori knowledge would then be what we can know (in a suitably fallibilist sense of 'know') independently of the truth or falsity of any basic statements. On that conception, 'I think' would not come out as a priori if 'I' is interpreted as referring to a spatio-temporal particular, since it would then be itself a basic statement. But if 'I' is taken to refer to the speaker/thinker and we leave it an open question whether he is really a spatio-temporal particular (he might be merely a temporal one), then 'I think' ceases to be a basic statement; and as it is knowable independently of the truth or falsity of any basic statement, then it comes out as a priori (contingent a priori). How's that? Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Sat Mar 21 10:34:40 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2009 14:34:40 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: <1253165677.6249791237596256074.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <1253165677.6249791237596256074.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: Hi Steve, Thanks for putting the word 'radical' in quotation marks. I think I have already answered some of your objections in my last reply to Bruce, here: http://rbjones.com/pipermail/hist-analytic_rbjones.com/2009q1/000213.html That is: I defined a priori knowledge as what can be known independently of the truth or falsity of inter-subjectively testable singular existential statements. But I offered no procedure for deciding whether or not a proposition was knowable a priori. There is not even a decision procedure for all the analytic truths of first-order predicate logic, so we should not expect decisions procedures elsewhere. The fact that there is no general decision procedure for truth or falsity does not make that distinction 'a mere formality.' Yes, I recall Hintikka's paper on the cogito. I read it as an undergraduate. In fact, I think it was that which led me to identify 'I think' as a contingent a priori truth (whether or not Hintikka does the same I cannot remember). Obviously, knowing THAT I am thinking involves awareness, but it does not involve sensory awareness, just as knowing THAT I am willing something involves awareness but not sensory awareness. Kant confuses the whole issue, it seems to me, because of his doctrine that time is the form of inner sense, which seems to make all temporal awareness sensory. I can't remember what Geach said, but I probably read it (in fact, I might even have it on my shelf somewhere). I agree that we have sensory experience. But I deny that the basic statements against which empirical theories are tested are reports of sensory experiences. Rather they are the reports of inter-subjectively observable events; reports which are accepted or rejected on the basis of sensory experiences, but which are in no way justified or entailed by sensory experiences. Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Baynesr at comcast.net Sat Mar 21 13:42:20 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2009 17:42:20 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine, Aune, Jones: on defining analyticity In-Reply-To: <1309963617.6363711237657313518.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <845977681.6363781237657340427.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Roger, On analyticity, post Kant, prior to Carnap, the idea is kicked around in terms of validity, in particular proof theory. I know of no definition of 'analytic' which is not language specific, post Tarski. Can you cite one? If this is your view, and you may be right, I think what we need is something to justify this, beginning with what you take 'analytic' to mean. Indeed, my reason for having some sympathy for what I take to be your program is that neither truth nor validity captures analyticity. There is this business about "essence" that will not go away, unless we make the Quinean (Carnapian) "semantic ascent." >I do of course accept that when analyticity >is defined explicitly in terms of meanings, >or when that it done indirectly as in my >proposed definition, then to apply the notion >to specific languages you need to have some >information about the semantics of the >languages in question. Yes. However, meaning is language specific, like 'analytic' in my opinion. A set of morphemes may have one meaning in one language and another in another language. >So far as Kant is concerned, my proposal is >intentionally divergent from Kant. >My monograph is to make a feature of >Hume's fork, which Kant was inspired to reject. Since I'm, more or less, a Kantian, it is essential to any comment on my part that you flesh this out or be more specific. >Well they don't use the terminology, but one >can see in mathematical practice that >mathematicians take great pains to ensure >that mathematics is analytic. There are mathematicians of great talent who affirm the Kantian position, e.g. Poincare. >I'm afraid I don't understand your point here. The example I've seen most often is: (Ex)(Ey)(z)[f(x) & f(y) -> f(z)]. In a universe where the domain is 2 or less, it is logical truth. But in a universe of 3 individuals it is not. >All theorems of sound deductive systems >are analytic in the sense in which Carnap >and I use the term, and in the sense >"true in virtue of meaning". Well, I'm still not sure, since Carnap offers several definitions of 'analytic'. Do you have one in mind in particular? Which? >>By the way, I can't find your remark on Kripke >>on the underdermination of truth. >Doesn't ring any bells for me, are you sure >it was my remark? I'm sure it was you. Let me look for it. It was very good, as I recall. Let me look. Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Roger Bishop Jones" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Friday, March 20, 2009 5:12:59 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: Quine, Aune, Jones: on defining analyticity On Thursday 19 March 2009 11:34:38 steve bayne wrote: ... >In order to assess your theory of analyticity, >we need to know what "objects" can be said to >be analytic on your account. I didn't really put forward a "theory", I put forward a definition, which was intended to be read as a proposal for usage, not a description or explication of previous usage (though it is arguably consistent with much prior usage). >On Quine, you are incorrect, in my opinion. >Quine is not calling for a general notion to >be explained; he is denying the existence of >any general notion. I doubt that the idea >of such a general notion would make sense to >him. Same with 'true'. The two are not incompatible. He says that before we can understand rules for specific languages we "must" understand the general notion. He is calling for the general notion to be explained, and denying that it can be. Prior to Carnap, so far as I am aware, no-one discussed anything but the general notion (though not explicitly talking in terms of variable L). I believe it to be a mistake ever to consider language specific definitions of analyticity. >Now if you take analyticity as truth based >on meaning, then you have 'meaning' to >contend with; you need to establish what >meaning is and, especially, if you are >asserting a connection between meanings etc. >Keep in mind that 'meanings', even, if you >accept translation are creatures or language; >so if you want to arrive at, say, a Kantian >idea of analyticity you need to link meanings >and concepts. Fregean functions are >sometimes thought to serve this purpose; then >there is the notion of meanings as captured >in "worlds"; that is, senses, intensions >etc. become expressed in terms of extensions >over worlds (essentially Carnap, Montague). I do of course accept that when analyticity is defined explicitly in terms of meanings, or when that it done indirectly as in my proposed definition, then to apply the notion to specific languages you need to have some information about the semantics of the languages in question. I would not look back to Frege for help in dealing with semantics these days, though no doubt his work has contributed in important ways to modern methods in this area. So far as Kant is concerned, my proposal is intentionally divergent from Kant. My monograph is to make a feature of Hume's fork, which Kant was inspired to reject. >One, among several, complications related to >analyticity is related to mathematical foundations. >This is not an epistemological area of investigations. >Validity theory is not designed to solve the >problem of skepticism in mathematics. Recall my >question about whether truths of logic, even >of the Boolean sort, are analytic? Quine and >others take this as given. I don't. Well they don't use the terminology, but one can see in mathematical practice that mathematicians take great pains to ensure that mathematics is analytic. (i.e. they would not accept a proof of some result as of any value if they were not satisfied that the deductive system was sound) >At the level >of functional logic we find ourselves in >deeper waters - confusion over problems of >infinite cardinals, for example. But what is >very puzzling is the role of domain size in >axiomatic treatments of foundations. whether >a truth in functional logic (first order) is >a tautology or simply false depends on the >size of the universe. I'm afraid I don't understand your point here. >The old Axiom of Infinity >was indicative of this problem. If the size of >a domain is contingent then it is arguable that >no truth of logic is analytic in a certain sense. All theorems of sound deductive systems are analytic in the sense in which Carnap and I use the term, and in the sense "true in virtue of meaning". >Now a lot of people will take exception to this >but I've never had a satisfactory answer. If I understood the question I would have a shot at giving you satisfaction. >By the way, I can't find your remark on Kripke >on the underdermination of truth. Doesn't ring any bells for me, are you sure it was my remark? Roger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From srbayne at earthlink.net Sat Mar 21 20:12:53 2009 From: srbayne at earthlink.net (Steven Bayne) Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2009 20:12:53 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: References: <1253165677.6249791237596256074.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: "That is: I defined a priori knowledge as what can be known independently of the truth or falsity of inter-subjectively testable singular existential statements." Now we have "inter-subjectively testable singular existential" to worry about; this will require a lot of unpacking. "Obviously, knowing THAT I am thinking involves awareness, but it does not involve sensory awareness, just as knowing THAT I am willing something involves awareness but not sensory awareness. Kant confuses the whole issue,..." Well, awareness entails intuition and intuition puts it in the Sensibility not the Understanding. So it doesn't matter. In addition, since your rejected as absurd the idea of sense impressions, I must query you on what "sensory awareness" is; such as what are its objects; what is 'sensory' in relation to experience; whether sensation figures in your idea of perception etc. So we have a way to go before abandoning the "pleasant poetry" of Kant. Also, introducing "theory" and all that brings in does not clarify as well as one would like, precisely what you mean in respect to a priori. So, maybe, a little more explanation is in the offing. Best wishes Steve At 10:34 AM 3/21/2009, Danny Frederick wrote: >Hi Steve, > >Thanks for putting the word 'radical' in quotation marks. > >I think I have already answered some of your objections in my last >reply to Bruce, here: > >http://rbjones.com/pipermail/hist-analytic_rbjones.com/2009q1/000213.html > >That is: I defined a priori knowledge as what can be known >independently of the truth or falsity of inter-subjectively testable >singular existential statements. > >But I offered no procedure for deciding whether or not a proposition >was knowable a priori. There is not even a decision procedure for >all the analytic truths of first-order predicate logic, so we should >not expect decisions procedures elsewhere. The fact that there is no >general decision procedure for truth or falsity does not make that >distinction 'a mere formality.' > >Yes, I recall Hintikka's paper on the cogito. I read it as an >undergraduate. In fact, I think it was that which led me to identify >'I think' as a contingent a priori truth (whether or not Hintikka >does the same I cannot remember). > >Obviously, knowing THAT I am thinking involves awareness, but it >does not involve sensory awareness, just as knowing THAT I am >willing something involves awareness but not sensory awareness. Kant >confuses the whole issue, it seems to me, because of his doctrine >that time is the form of inner sense, which seems to make all >temporal awareness sensory. I can't remember what Geach said, but I >probably read it (in fact, I might even have it on my shelf somewhere). > >I agree that we have sensory experience. But I deny that the basic >statements against which empirical theories are tested are reports >of sensory experiences. Rather they are the reports of >inter-subjectively observable events; reports which are accepted or >rejected on the basis of sensory experiences, but which are in no >way justified or entailed by sensory experiences. > >Cheers. > >Danny From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Sun Mar 22 07:41:18 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2009 11:41:18 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: References: <1253165677.6249791237596256074.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <1415342723F0448AA379C7A4E2CFC634@DFLVQC1J> Hi Steve, An inter-subjectively testable singular existential is a statement of the form (Ex)(Fx & Gx & Ix) where 'F' and 'G' are observable predicates, and 'I' specifies a particular region of space-time (and is true of x if and only if x is in that region). 'Observable' is to be taken in an everyday sense and is related to what people can generally agree upon; thus it is largely pragmatic. All of this comes from Popper's 'Logic of Scientific Discovery,' particularly Chapter V. No attempt is made to relate 'observable' to features of sensory experiences (which are not observable in the required sense, being private). When you say that awareness entails intuition and intuition puts it in the Sensibility not the Understanding, you are merely reaffirming the Kantian proposition that I am denying. I can put the point this way: I am rehabilitating the notion of intellectual intuition - but only as a fallible intuition. This seems to me unavoidable. How else are we to know logical axioms or rules of inference? Surely not by sensory intuition. (And not by convention, as Quine showed.) I do not know what the objects of sensory experiences are. And nor does anyone else. We ordinarily take them to be physical objects in space and time; but we may be deluded. I cannot offer a definition of 'sensory.' But I can explain that it covers our senses of sight, touch, smell, etc. I need not put a limit on it: there may be sensory experiences that do not belong in the usual categories. Who knows? Whether sensation figures in perception seems to me terminological. I would want to distinguish sensations like pain from perceptions (which have intentional content). As I have explained before, I can know that I think, and I can know it independently of knowing the truth or falsity of any inter-subjectively testable singular existential. Hence I can know it a priori. Similarly, I can know that I am trying to do something (or 'willing') , and I can know it independently of knowing the truth or falsity of any inter-subjectively testable singular existential. Hence I can know it a priori. These two examples of a priori knowledge are contingent. But neither figures in what we normally regard as knowledge, which is mostly the universal theories of the sciences or the particular but publicly observable facts of geography or history. (The facts of history are, of course, no longer observable; but they once were and lots of the evidence for them still is.) Thus contingent a priori knowledge is peripheral, but its existence is not to be denied. Cheers. Danny From rbj at rbjones.com Mon Mar 23 06:12:58 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2009 10:12:58 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: References: <1253165677.6249791237596256074.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <200903231012.58648.rbj@rbjones.com> I'm jumping in here to a thread I have not been watching so I apologise if the question I am asking has already been answered. On Saturday 21 March 2009 14:34:40 Danny Frederick wrote: >That is: I defined a priori knowledge as what can be known independently of >the truth or falsity of inter-subjectively testable singular existential >statements. I understand that the notion of "inter-subjectively testable" is Poppers, and that he uses it for demarcation of empirical science. Is the identification of this demarcation with the a posteriori/a priori distinction also Poppers, or is that your own? It seems to me that something is lost in this identification, and that there are two lines of demarcation here each of which deserves a name. We have experiences which are not inter-subjectively testable (otherwise Popper might not have introduced the term) and that knowledge or supposed knowledge derived from such experiences is not in the usual sense "a priori". Do you agree that there is such a kind of experience and that this has often (if not usually) been excluded from the admissible basis for a priori knowledge, and if so can you say anything about why you wish to admit such experience as a basis for a priori knowledge? Roger Jones From Baynesr at comcast.net Mon Mar 23 10:03:59 2009 From: Baynesr at comcast.net (Baynesr at comcast.net) Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2009 14:03:59 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: <1415342723F0448AA379C7A4E2CFC634@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <417124460.31621237817039010.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> I'll withhold judgment on "inter-subjectively testable singular existential" because I don't? know what you want to do with it. Ok, you've given us a definition (but of what?). Now to? what use are you putting it? "you are merely reaffirming the Kantian proposition that I am denying." Yes, Kant invented the terms "synthetic a priori"; I think his position suffers ?from ambiguity, but I see no actual argument, so far, that your position is? better than Kant's. Not sure, precisely in what your alterntive consists. Similarly? when you remark that "I am? rehabilitating the notion of intellectual intuition - but? only as a fallible intuition. This seems to me unavoidable," ?I don't see where? you, actually, do this. Indeed, I'm not sure of what you are "rehabilitating." For? example, I have no idea what you mean by an "intellectual intuition." First, we? need to get clear on 'intuition'. What is your theory of intuition and how does it ?relate, for example, to "inter-subjectively testable singular existentials"? Or,? are they different. Is there a connection, etc.? "Whether sensation figures in perception seems to me terminological" Without a sensation of red, I'm not so sure I can perceive a red ball. You? need to explain this a bit. ?Maybe, an alternative theory of perception to? the "usual," which relies on sensation. You go on: "Similarly, I can know that I am trying to do something (or 'willing') , and I? can know it independently of knowing the truth or falsity of any inter-subjectively? testable singular existential. Hence I can know it a priori." I don't quite see this. That is, I am not convinced that I can know I'm trying without ?relying on some experience. How, on your view, DO I know that I am trying to put? my coat on or open a window? Knowledge that my action is intentional may not? be observational, as Anscombe alleges, but I don't think she would say it is? knowledge a priori, like the truths of elementary arithmetic. You must be working? not only with a different sense of 'intuition' but a different sense of 'a priori'. So what? is your theory of being a priori and how does this related to intuitions, and, again,? how does this related to 'synthetic a priori', particularly in connection with self knowledge? My impression is that you conceive of their being this "entity" (a trying) and there is this relation to this entity (compare Quine's "sakes") of a priori knowing. More needs to be said about what trying amounts to being. Arguably I know a priori that anything red has a shape, but this is not to say that I know *that* shape independently of experience. If I say "I married Miss. Joan" and this may carry the entailment of some intention, but can I say "When I tried to? Mary Miss Jones the lights went out, but I wasn't aware that this was what I was trying to do although I knew, a priori, what I was trying to do." The operant expression ?is 'aware'. You seem to be suggesting? a priori awareness; this, of course, would be? a problem. Some clarification? is needed. Remember, a priori indicates? knowledge that is universal. No so sure knowledge of *my* trying to marry Miss Jones is universal. This is another reason for believing that in addition to this other non-Kantian machinery you'll have to modify 'a priori'. By the way, Schopenhaur has a take on a priori that is unique; perhaps the discussion will evolve in that direction. I think you have a big job on your hands. Anyway, while awaiting clarification I'll? hold on to? a Kantian view. Also, I'm not, exactly, clear on the direction you are taking. ?We seem to? be going in five directions at once. could you clarify matters a little more? Regards STeve ----- Original Message ----- From: "Danny Frederick" To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Sunday, March 22, 2009 7:41:18 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: RE: Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori Hi Steve, An inter-subjectively testable singular existential is a statement of the form (Ex)(Fx & Gx & Ix) where 'F' and 'G' are observable predicates, and 'I' specifies a particular region of space-time (and is true of x if and only if x is in that region). 'Observable' is to be taken in an everyday sense and is related to what people can generally agree upon; thus it is largely pragmatic. All of this comes from Popper's 'Logic of Scientific Discovery,' particularly Chapter V. No attempt is made to relate 'observable' to features of sensory experiences (which are not observable in the required sense, being private). When you say that awareness entails intuition and intuition puts it in the Sensibility not the Understanding, you are merely reaffirming the Kantian proposition that I am denying. I can put the point this way: I am rehabilitating the notion of intellectual intuition - but only as a fallible intuition. This seems to me unavoidable. How else are we to know logical axioms or rules of inference? Surely not by sensory intuition. (And not by convention, as Quine showed.) I do not know what the objects of sensory experiences are. And nor does anyone else. We ordinarily take them to be physical objects in space and time; but we may be deluded. I cannot offer a definition of 'sensory.' But I can explain that it covers our senses of sight, touch, smell, etc. I need not put a limit on it: there may be sensory experiences that do not belong in the usual categories. Who knows? Whether sensation figures in perception seems to me terminological. I would want to distinguish sensations like pain from perceptions (which have intentional content). As I have explained before, I can know that I think, and I can know it independently of knowing the truth or falsity of any inter-subjectively testable singular existential. Hence I can know it a priori. Similarly, I can know that I am trying to do something (or 'willing') , and I can know it independently of knowing the truth or falsity of any inter-subjectively testable singular existential. Hence I can know it a priori. These two examples of a priori knowledge are contingent. But neither figures in what we normally regard as knowledge, which is mostly the universal theories of the sciences or the particular but publicly observable facts of geography or history. (The facts of history are, of course, no longer observable; but they once were and lots of the evidence for them still is.) Thus contingent a priori knowledge is peripheral, but its existence is not to be denied. Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Mon Mar 23 11:33:55 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2009 15:33:55 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: <417124460.31621237817039010.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <1415342723F0448AA379C7A4E2CFC634@DFLVQC1J> <417124460.31621237817039010.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <2A5681ED93AA4FDF85DF96B822B0D3E9@DFLVQC1J> Hi Roger and Steve, First, Roger. The use of Popper's demarcation criterion for empirical knowledge to define a notion of a priori knowledge is due to me. But I accept your point that the way I have done this will not do as it stands. So let me amplify a little. Objective knowledge is inter-subjectively testable. It is empirical if it is testable against public observation statements. It is a priori if it is testable in some other way, such as algorithms or derivations. Of course, we need something in addition to algorithms and derivations, namely, intuitive evidence of necessity. The latter can vary widely between people; but so can observation reports of an event which they have just witnessed. In each case we need there to be some statements (empirical or a priori) on which most people can agree easily. Well-conducted and repeatable experiments in science usually do this for empirical basic statements; and there are many mathematical and logical 'basic statements' on which general agreement is easily reached, such as '1 + 1 = 2' and 'if (p & q), then q.' Subjective knowledge is not inter-subjectively testable. It is therefore not a part of objective knowledge, not a part of shared human experience, and is usually of interest only to the people who possess it (and perhaps some of the people closest to them). But if we want to bother ourselves with solipsistic epistemology, we can draw an a priori/empirical distinction for it. In this case, I would distinguish statements prompted by sensory experiences and statements prompted by reflection. And I would say that a piece of solipsistic knowledge is empirical if it is testable against statements prompted by sensory experience; but it is a priori if it is known without being tested against statements prompted by sensory experiences. Since my awareness of my thinking is not a sensory experience, 'I think' is a piece of subjective knowledge which is a priori. And it is contingent. As I have said before, I think I am following the traditional rationalist philosophers in what I say about subjective knowledge; but I admit that it is not a clear-cut matter because they do not seem explicitly to have addressed the questions I am considering. But I am out of touch with the history of philosophy, so if anyone knows better, I will be pleased to hear. There is an important point I made a few messages back (in response to Bruce) that will bear repeating. It is not the case that ALL subjective reports of experience are debarred from science or from objective knowledge in general. A psychologist or neuroscientist may well correlate behaviour, bodily changes or brain states with psychological states by means of subjects' reports of what they are experiencing under experimentally produced circumstances. But such subject reports are essentially inter-subjective in that the subject does duty for humankind in general: if a repeat of the experiment with a different subject gave a different subject report, this would debar the subject reports from science. So there can be a science of psychological states; but it will recognise only those psychological states that are generally reported by subjects in similar situations (any idiosyncratic reports will be dismissed, or at least put on one side for the time being, even though their truth may not be impugned). Thus we can have an objective science of psychology; but any experiential reports included in it will be ones that any similar subject in a similar situation would have made, that is, they will be inter-subjectively testable. Now Steve. I hope that what I have said above answers some of your questions. Here follow some answers to the others. Although he officially rejects the notion of intellectual intuition, Kant himself relies upon it. First, his account of analyticity needs it: how do we know whether one concept is contained in another? We must be able to see it somehow. But not by any sensory from of seeing; otherwise the analytic would be empirical. Second, his transcendental deductions, which yield synthetic a priori conclusions, require a form of intellectual intuition that enables us to see, non-empirically, either the truth of synthetic propositions which are premises of the arguments or, if the arguments have no synthetic premises, the validity of non-analytic inferences. So, although I said I was rehabilitating intellectual intuition after Kant's attack upon it, I am really just exposing that Kant's attack was a sham. If I perceive a red ball as a red ball, then the content of the intentional object of my perception includes redness. Whether or not we say that my perception includes a sensation of redness is terminological. I think I would prefer not to say it, partly because it suggests that there is some incorrigible component in the perception, and partly because 'sensation' seems a better word for pains, feelings of discomfort, etc. Ordinarily (i.e., excluding cases of self-deception and unconscious action), if I am trying to do something, I know that I am trying to do it; and I know it automatically. I do not know it from sensory experiences, though they usually accompany my trying. I just have a way of knowing what I am willing, similar to my way of knowing what I am thinking. In each case, it is non-sensory and immediate, thus a priori. Although I have been convinced of this for more than a quarter of a century, I was heartened when I found a similar view expressed recently by a contemporary philosopher (see Lucy O'Brien's 'On Knowing One's Own Actions' in 'Agency and Self-Awareness' ed. Roessler and Eilan). A trying is an action if it eventuates in a bodily movement (see Hornsby, 'Actions'). Thus a trying is an event, and events are entities. And ordinarily I know when one of my tryings happens. And I know it immediately because I do it. The content of the trying reveals the aspects of the action under which it is intentional; but the action will have innumerable other aspects, many of which may surprise me. An obvious consequence of what I am saying is that a priori knowledge need not be universal or necessary. Kant was mistaken there (as with so much else). But it should be noticed that while 'I think' only ever expresses subjective knowledge, the proposition that each subject can know a priori the proposition expressed by 'I think,' is a candidate for objective knowledge and is a universal proposition. It will be admitted to objective knowledge if, through argument, examples, clarifications and psychological experiments (if relevant), we get to a position where we can reach agreement on it. This indeed is how philosophy proceeds. It is how maths and logic proceed too. But it is not an infallible procedure: something accepted today may be rejected tomorrow, just as in science (Newton in, then Newton out), and in maths (axiom of parallels in, then axiom of parallels out), and in logic ('every property defines a set' in, then 'every property defines a set' out). I have never read Schopenhauer. I know Brian O'Shaughnessy was very influenced by him and has written about our immediate knowledge of our will. But O'Shaughnessy regards our awareness of our willing or trying as sensory, which seems plain false to me (see his paper in the 'Agency and Self-Awareness' book cited above). Cheers. Danny -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aune at philos.umass.edu Mon Mar 23 16:32:52 2009 From: aune at philos.umass.edu (Bruce Aune) Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2009 16:32:52 -0400 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori In-Reply-To: <200903182006.56267.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <695366.9461.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <200903182006.56267.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <869F7A51-8068-41D0-B606-97356C5B4734@philos.umass.edu> This is my last attempt to deal with Roger?s proposals regarding analyticity. I told Roger before that I saw little profit in continuing our discussion, but I now think that a few further remarks might possibly be worthwhile. I will number my remarks so that distinct points can be considered separately. 1. I continue to believe that Roger?s use of the expression ?analytic? is idiosyncratic and misleading, but I think he is entitled to use it as he wants to, so long as he makes his meaning clear to others. They may, or they may not (as I believe), find his usage useful. 2. The standard philosophical use of the expression comes from Kant, who used it in raising a philosophical problem that has no connection that I can see with Roger?s concerns. This philosophical problem persists, at least in a qualified way, and that is my principal reason for thinking that Roger?s use is less than useful. 3. Kant explicitly applied the expression to universal affirmative judgments, leaving its application to other judgments essentially open. (This is one standard criticism with his procedure.) As Kant understood them (following the logicians of his day), universal affirmative judgments (or UAJs) contain two terms, a subject term and a predicate term. Such judgments are true when their predicate term applies to whatever falls under their subject term. Kant's definition of an analytic judgment is built upon this semantical rule and shows us why analytic judgments are bound to be true. A UAJ is true, he said, when its predicate term is contained in the concept of its subject; it is contained in such a way that if the subject term applies to anything x, its predicate is guaranteed to apply to it as well. If A&B is the subject term of a judgment J and B is its predicate term, we can see that a thing x is truly described by A&B, x is truly described by B as well. There is no philosophical problem in seeing why such judgments are true, both universally (for every object x, as we should say today) and necessarily (there are no possible exceptions). 4. UAJs that are not analytic are, Kant stipulated, synthetic: this is just what a synthetic UAJ is suppose to be. Although we can see a priori that analytic UAJs are true, the universal and necessary truth of synthetic judgments is highly problematic. There is no discernible connection between subject and predicate that guarantees their truth; this must be accomplished by some ?third thing,? something additional to semantic inclusion. The question ?How could judgments of this second kind possibly be known to be true a priori?" is the fundamental topic of Kant?s famous Critique of Pure Reason. 5. In the new logic introduced by Frege, Kant?s UAJs were transformed into universally quantified hypotheticals, the subject and predicate terms of Kant?s judgments becoming predicates attached to common bound variables. Although it is easy to see that anything falling under the predicate ?an F that is a G? must equally fall under the predicate ?a G,? so that ?For all x, if x is an F that is a G then x is a G? is clearly universally and necessarily true, it is not easy to see how hypotheticals of other type are equally true universally and necessarily. 6. Kant was convinced that representative examples of arithmetical, geometrical, and metaphysical judgments (or assertions) are true yet synthetic. He tried to show in his first Critique that, in spite of being synthetic, such judgments are necessarily true. Few philosophers today think Kant efforts in his first Critique were successful; in the last 20 years of my professorial career I devoted more than 15 courses exclusively to Kant?s critique, and I am convinced that his efforts were uniformly unsuccessful. The epistemological rationalists of the past twenty years?Chisholm, BonJour, and others?have written books and articles trying to show that their favorite examples of synthetic a priori statements are actually true, but they have plenty of contemporary critics, and the contemporary philosophical tide a pretty clearly turning against them. 7. The principal significance of the preceding paragraphs for my ongoing dispute with Roger is that the original notion of analyticity, Kant?s, was intimately connected with a way of ascertaining the truth of a special class of judgments, or statements. Kant?s conception of analyticity is now generally conceded to be inadequate because it applies, at best, to a narrow class of statements, UAJs of subject-predicate form or, expanded in a natural way, to a narrow class of universally quantified conditionals. Frege?s conception, which Frege explicitly advanced (in his ?Foundations of Arithmetic?) as a means of accommodating the new logic that he had a large part in inventing, is also closely tied to a way of showing the truth of analytic statements: S is analytically true iff is reducible to a truth of logic by a replacement of synonyms for synonyms. In my book I argue that Frege?s conception is still unacceptably narrow, but my own conception, which is a modification of Carnap?s, retains the truth- certifying property. 8. In a couple of his recent notes, Roger claims that the requirement that an adequate specification of analyticity should possess this last property ?can and should be rejected.? 9. He says, first, that ?It is clear that to establish "truth" of a sentence must be in general no more difficult than establishing "analyticity", since every analytic sentence [according to his specification] is true.? This remark does hold for Roger?s unusual and anomalous notion of analyticity, but it does not hold for traditional approaches to analyticity, which purport to make it clear just how analytic statements are to be identified and why they deserve to be considered true. Roger bypasses this concern entirely. 10. Roger also says, ?It is also clear that even when the semantics of a language as a whole is as clear as it possibly could be, for example the semantics of first order arithmetic (which is as clear as any language of similar expressive power, and clearer than most) this does not mean that there is any reliable way of deciding whether sentences in the language are true.? But the truth of mathematical truths has always been considered philosophical problematic. Mathematicians prove them (when they can) by deducing them from various axioms, but how do we know that standard axioms are, in fact, true? To ask this question is not cast doubt on their truth; it is to ask what it rests on, what its basis is. G?del thought we can apprehend basic mathematical truths by some kind of direct intuition, which he considered analogous to vision; others, such as Carnap, who considered them analytic, thought they were reducible to logical truths. (When logicists claimed they were true because analytic, they were not even suggesting that they are true for the simple reason that they are necessary.) 11. The current issue in philosophy about analyticity is partly directed to the task of finding an acceptable criterion for analytic truth, one satisfied by all and only uncontroversial examples, that shows how such truths ?are possible? and can be known by human beings without requiring them to possess some supposed faculty of a priori intuition, of the sort rationalists suppose; and it is partly directed to the question of whether the objects of human understanding, as Hume described them, can in fact be divided into two discrete classes, one concerned with matters of fact and existence, and one concerned with matters that can be decided without reference to anything irreducibly empirical, except possibly for ideas we happen to have or what meaning we give to various words. I can?t see that Roger?s conception of analytic truth applies to either of these matters. It seems to bypass them entirely. For that reason alone, I doubt that most philosophers will find it useful. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Mon Mar 23 18:00:41 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2009 22:00:41 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine, Aune, Jones: on defining analyticity In-Reply-To: <845977681.6363781237657340427.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> References: <845977681.6363781237657340427.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <200903232200.42437.rbj@rbjones.com> I'm afraid there is some repetition in the following response to Steve. Hope it isn't too tedious. On Saturday 21 March 2009 17:42:20 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: >On analyticity, post Kant, prior to >Carnap, the idea is kicked around >in terms of validity, in particular >proof theory. I know of no definition >of 'analytic' which is not language >specific, post Tarski. Can you cite >one? Depends what you count as "post Tarski". Taking this as after his paper on the definition of truth we have, Ayer, Carnap, Quine, Kripke. All of whom took analytic to mean "True in Virtue of Meaning". Admittedly, Quine didn't think the definition worked but all the others seemed to find it useful. Of course it depends what you mean by "language specific". (and I see now from comments below that at least some of the time you are using this in a sense distinct from that which I have been employing) What I meant by that was a definition of analyticity for some specific language. In another sense even the generic definitions of analyticity are language specific, in the sense that a sentence can only be said to be analytic in some particular language, given the semantics for that language. If you spell out the generic definitions, then analyticity will be a relation between sentences and languages, or between sentences and the truth conditions of the relevant language, or else a property of a pair consisting of a sentence and a language. But then you need some context too. >If this is >your view, and you may be right, I think >what we need is something to justify this, >beginning with what you take 'analytic' >to mean. Indeed, my reason for having >some sympathy for what I take to be >your program is that neither truth >nor validity captures analyticity. >There is this business about "essence" >that will not go away, unless we make >the Quinean (Carnapian) "semantic >ascent." Well you have my proposed definition, in terms of necessity. By saying "expresses a necessary proposition" the semantics of the language is made central, since the semantics tells us what proposition is expressed by each sentence. (a proposition is the meaning of a sentence, in some given context) However, "true in virtue of meaning" would do almost as well if that is any easier for you to understand. These definitions are "generic" in the sense that they define analyticity for a broad range of languages, but they do define it in terms of the semantics of the language, so the concept of analyticity thus defined is not a property of sentences, it is a property of sentences in some given language (ordered pairs perhaps), or a parameterised property of languages. The important part is that the definition of analyticity and the definition of the semantics are separated out, whereas in language specific definitions of analyticity, the definition of analyticity is in effect a (partial) definition of the semantics of the language. >>I do of course accept that when analyticity >>is defined explicitly in terms of meanings, >>or when that it done indirectly as in my >>proposed definition, then to apply the notion >>to specific languages you need to have some >>information about the semantics of the >>languages in question. > >Yes. However, meaning is language specific, >like 'analytic' in my opinion. A set of >morphemes may have one meaning in one language >and another in another language. Yes I don't deny that. I advocate a single generic definition of analyticity in terms of semantics (or truth conditions) and my definition in terms of necessity is such a definition since necessity is semantic (a property of propositions), together with definitions of semantics which are specific to each language. >>So far as Kant is concerned, my proposal is >>intentionally divergent from Kant. >>My monograph is to make a feature of >>Hume's fork, which Kant was inspired to reject. > >Since I'm, more or less, a Kantian, it is >essential to any comment on my part that you >flesh this out or be more specific. Isn't identifying analyticity and necessity specific enough to set me apart from Kant? (counting the whole of mathematics as analytic) I don't know much about Kant's philosophy but my understanding was that he was aroused from his dogmatic slumbers by Hume's fork and he differed from Hume in regarding mathematics as synthetic. (though Hume didn't have the words) The important thing is that Hume trashed metaphysics and Kant revived it. >>Well they don't use the terminology, but one >>can see in mathematical practice that >>mathematicians take great pains to ensure >>that mathematics is analytic. > >There are mathematicians of great talent >who affirm the Kantian position, e.g. >Poincare. I am talking about contemporary mathematicians. Poincare was active at the time of flux in the foundations of mathematics, and therefore pre-dates the standard practice to which I was alluding. For that matter there may well still be Kantian's about, and I think there are very large numbers of mathematicians who don't have a clue what the word "analytic" means. But you would have to look very hard to find mathematicians who do not think that all their results are proven by sound deductive methods, and that suffices to ensure that the results are analytic (by "my" definition) even if they don't know it. >>I'm afraid I don't understand your point here. > >The example I've seen most often is: > >(Ex)(Ey)(z)[f(x) & f(y) -> f(z)]. > >In a universe where the domain is 2 or >less, it is logical truth. But in a >universe of 3 individuals it is not. The example isn't quite right, (you need to insist on x and y being distinct) but in any case you can't constrain the domain and still talk about it being a logical truth. You can say "true in every interpretation whose domain is no larger than 2 elements", but "logical truth" in this context would normally be taken to mean "first order valid" (supposing your formula to be in first order logic) which means true in every interpretation (whatever the size of the domain). However, I still don't understand the point you are trying to make. If your problem is with my claim to analyticity of mathematics, then you have to get the semantics straight. If we take mathematics to be done in set theory, then the relevant language is first order set theory and the semantics must include stiplulation of the intended interpretation, i.e. the cumulative heirarchy or some sufficiently large initial segment of it) In that case "true in virtue of meaning" means "true in the cumulative heirarchy" which all the theorems of set theory most probably are. If mathematicians did not believe that then they would abandon set theory (or find some other theory/interpretation combination such that they theorems are true in the interpretation(s)). Mathematicians really do believe that their theorems are true, and since the domain of discourse is abstract, truth and analyticity will coincide (existence of abstract objects is not contingent). >>All theorems of sound deductive systems >>are analytic in the sense in which Carnap >>and I use the term, and in the sense >>"true in virtue of meaning". > >Well, I'm still not sure, since Carnap >offers several definitions of 'analytic'. >Do you have one in mind in particular? >Which? Although Carnap had several different approaches to "defining analtyicity" for specific languages, (which wass really his way of defining the semantics of a language, but not later - see below) he did nevertheless always have an overall generic concept of analyticity and I am not aware of any significant change to this (though doubtless he put it in more than one way). The best place to find this is in the Schilpp volume (see below). I looked back at my very concise notes on Carnap's philosophy http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/history/rcp000.htm and found some interesting stuff. In the section on semantics, paragraph headed "semantics and modality". When Carnap came to considering modal logic, he decided to define logical necessity in terms of logical truth (which for him was the same as analyticity). This is the opposite of my proposed definition of analyticity, so in effect he is agreeing with me that the two concepts are interdefinable, but chosing to do it the other way round. ("a proposition is logically necessary iff a sentence expressing it is logically true") This is in the biographical part of the Carnap Schilpp volume. Elsewhere in that volume there is a paper by Bohnert on "Carnaps Theory of Definition and Analyticity" in which there is some discussion of the distinction raised by Quine between definitions of analyticity for specific languages, and the of "the general relative term 'analytic'" for variable S and L. Bohnert thinks this latter will be something like a family resemblance concept for which no definition will be feasible. In Carnap's response however, which is very short and approving, he contradicts this particular point, saying: "it is possible to give general exact definitions both for A-truth (analyticity) and for truth provided that other suitable concepts occurring in these general definitions are introduced by recipe definitions" (here "general" is my "generic" and "recipe" is my "specific") Carnap refers to an earlier response in which he gives he then position on semantics and which contains general definitions for truth and analyticity (pp900-905) I'm please to say that in this (possibly his last account of his position on these methods) he is doing broadly what I have been suggesting is desirable. i.e. that there should be no language specific definition of analyticity, only a general one, which defines analyticity for an arbitrary language in terms of the semantics of that language (not in terms of a definition of analyticity for that language). The definition of semantics is in this proposal given as rules of designation, not as a language specific definition of truth or analyticity. Hope this is not just adding to the confusion! Roger Jones From baynesrb at yahoo.com Tue Mar 24 07:44:47 2009 From: baynesrb at yahoo.com (steve bayne) Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2009 04:44:47 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [hist-analytic] Quine, Aune, Jones: on defining analyticity In-Reply-To: <200903232200.42437.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <845977681.6363781237657340427.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> <200903232200.42437.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <268575.64325.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> I'm going to reply "out of order." Hopefully, this will become self-explanatory. In carnap's conception of analyticity in the Schilpp volume his views had changed considerably; just as they had changed from the Introduction to Semantics to Logical Syntax of Language. Carnap, as I said, offered a number of accounts of analyticity. This last one doesn't possess the generality I think you need to affect agreement. So when you speak of unspecified languages this must be taken witha grain of salt. First, even though you have an attempt at a general definition, it is still a definition of analyticity in terms of language. There is relativity to an unspecified language but language nonetheless; so the notion of necessity remains semantic. Secondly, while the language at issue may be unspecified the fact is that unlike his earlier attempts at codifying a definition, such as in Foundations of Mathematics, this one is straightforwardly model theoretic. So what you have is a trade off: involving analyticity in *some* language, but your "admissible" models are quite specific. He tries to dodge this a bit in his remarks on designation, but they are still a dodge. There remains specificity as long as the lexicon belongs to the language rules. Further, in earlier accounts "semantical rules" don't enter. Now you may codify a general definition of "semantical rule" but whenever you use a language then you are stuck with some one list of rules. The philosopher outside Carnaps orbit will maintain that three things are involved here. The first thing is language specific analyticity; then there is analyticity for *some* language; but, then, there is analyticity that is "free" of language, entirely. This I'll call the "ontological" view, where necessity reflects on the world rather than "today's" admissible model or the latest "mumbo logic" in the journals. The happy fact, from my point of view is that what ALL of Carnap's definitions of 'analyticity' presuppose is the analyticity of logical truths (truths derivable from null set of premises). Now I ask: What makes THESE truths analytic? Validity in all admissible models? This does not seem like what you are after. I suspect that in any of Carnap's definitions of 'analytic' you will find that the tie to a particular language, even when we speak of 'some' language, is the concept of truth. The machinery in the Schillp volume in my opinion is cumbersome, unintuitive, and philosophically dubious IF you think of analytic truths as independent of language in the usual and "acceptable" sense. On '(Ex)(Ey)(z)[f(x) & f(y) -> f(z)]' my point is that logical truth is relative to the cardinality of the domain. Logical truth in first order logic is relative to the cardinality of the domain of the language. You are right that it is not perfect; quantification over the predicate would be necessary. This is one of those things we could get hung up on. I think it is important but it raises issues that may get us off track. Not sure. Let me say something related, not the same, but more interesting philosophically. Once you assign values to the individual constants in any interpretation then a sentence like '~(a = b)' becomes "analytic," or necessary. That is if 'a' and 'b' are logically proper names etc. But here analyticity has nothing to do with Carnap's "admissible" models, but with any model! But more important, perhaps, and probably more productive for discussion is when you say: "so the concept of analyticity thus defined is not a property of sentences, it is a property of sentences in some given language" I don't see the difference, yet, clearly. The operant difference seems to be that analyticity is a property of "sentences in some given language." But how can it be a property of a sentence in some language and not be a property of sentences? I'm a bit mystified. Further, what is a sentence that is not a sentence of a language? I think the key thing in all this is 'true'. Correspondence is to 'true' as necessity is to 'analytic'. Finally, you seem to accept meanings (to get Carnap's extended sense of analyticity etc), but Quine's objections here stand, I think. Ontological relativity is what results when you deny analyticity in the way Quine has done it. Carnap wants to resist this, partly because his attachment to science is deeper than Quine's, philosophically. But that is a long story. My position is that there are necessities that do not depend on models. The idea in philosophy ought to be: "Let's get one good "model" of the world; the model is not the guide; the world is the guide to the model and that model is not a matter of choice. True this is almost Thomistic, but so what? STeve ________________________________ From: Roger Bishop Jones To: hist-analytic at simplelists.com Sent: Monday, March 23, 2009 6:00:41 PM Subject: Re: Quine, Aune, Jones: on defining analyticity I'm afraid there is some repetition in the following response to Steve. Hope it isn't too tedious. On Saturday 21 March 2009 17:42:20 Baynesr at comcast.net wrote: >On analyticity, post Kant, prior to >Carnap, the idea is kicked around >in terms of validity, in particular >proof theory. I know of no definition >of 'analytic' which is not language >specific, post Tarski. Can you cite >one? Depends what you count as "post Tarski". Taking this as after his paper on the definition of truth we have, Ayer, Carnap, Quine, Kripke. All of whom took analytic to mean "True in Virtue of Meaning". Admittedly, Quine didn't think the definition worked but all the others seemed to find it useful. Of course it depends what you mean by "language specific". (and I see now from comments below that at least some of the time you are using this in a sense distinct from that which I have been employing) What I meant by that was a definition of analyticity for some specific language. In another sense even the generic definitions of analyticity are language specific, in the sense that a sentence can only be said to be analytic in some particular language, given the semantics for that language. If you spell out the generic definitions, then analyticity will be a relation between sentences and languages, or between sentences and the truth conditions of the relevant language, or else a property of a pair consisting of a sentence and a language. But then you need some context too. >If this is >your view, and you may be right, I think >what we need is something to justify this, >beginning with what you take 'analytic' >to mean. Indeed, my reason for having >some sympathy for what I take to be >your program is that neither truth >nor validity captures analyticity. >There is this business about "essence" >that will not go away, unless we make >the Quinean (Carnapian) "semantic >ascent." Well you have my proposed definition, in terms of necessity. By saying "expresses a necessary proposition" the semantics of the language is made central, since the semantics tells us what proposition is expressed by each sentence. (a proposition is the meaning of a sentence, in some given context) However, "true in virtue of meaning" would do almost as well if that is any easier for you to understand. These definitions are "generic" in the sense that they define analyticity for a broad range of languages, but they do define it in terms of the semantics of the language, so the concept of analyticity thus defined is not a property of sentences, it is a property of sentences in some given language (ordered pairs perhaps), or a parameterised property of languages. The important part is that the definition of analyticity and the definition of the semantics are separated out, whereas in language specific definitions of analyticity, the definition of analyticity is in effect a (partial) definition of the semantics of the language. >>I do of course accept that when analyticity >>is defined explicitly in terms of meanings, >>or when that it done indirectly as in my >>proposed definition, then to apply the notion >>to specific languages you need to have some >>information about the semantics of the >>languages in question. > >Yes. However, meaning is language specific, >like 'analytic' in my opinion. A set of >morphemes may have one meaning in one language >and another in another language. Yes I don't deny that. I advocate a single generic definition of analyticity in terms of semantics (or truth conditions) and my definition in terms of necessity is such a definition since necessity is semantic (a property of propositions), together with definitions of semantics which are specific to each language. >>So far as Kant is concerned, my proposal is >>intentionally divergent from Kant. >>My monograph is to make a feature of >>Hume's fork, which Kant was inspired to reject. > >Since I'm, more or less, a Kantian, it is >essential to any comment on my part that you >flesh this out or be more specific. Isn't identifying analyticity and necessity specific enough to set me apart from Kant? (counting the whole of mathematics as analytic) I don't know much about Kant's philosophy but my understanding was that he was aroused from his dogmatic slumbers by Hume's fork and he differed from Hume in regarding mathematics as synthetic. (though Hume didn't have the words) The important thing is that Hume trashed metaphysics and Kant revived it. >>Well they don't use the terminology, but one >>can see in mathematical practice that >>mathematicians take great pains to ensure >>that mathematics is analytic. > >There are mathematicians of great talent >who affirm the Kantian position, e.g. >Poincare. I am talking about contemporary mathematicians. Poincare was active at the time of flux in the foundations of mathematics, and therefore pre-dates the standard practice to which I was alluding. For that matter there may well still be Kantian's about, and I think there are very large numbers of mathematicians who don't have a clue what the word "analytic" means. But you would have to look very hard to find mathematicians who do not think that all their results are proven by sound deductive methods, and that suffices to ensure that the results are analytic (by "my" definition) even if they don't know it. >>I'm afraid I don't understand your point here. > >The example I've seen most often is: > >(Ex)(Ey)(z)[f(x) & f(y) -> f(z)]. > >In a universe where the domain is 2 or >less, it is logical truth. But in a >universe of 3 individuals it is not. The example isn't quite right, (you need to insist on x and y being distinct) but in any case you can't constrain the domain and still talk about it being a logical truth. You can say "true in every interpretation whose domain is no larger than 2 elements", but "logical truth" in this context would normally be taken to mean "first order valid" (supposing your formula to be in first order logic) which means true in every interpretation (whatever the size of the domain). However, I still don't understand the point you are trying to make. If your problem is with my claim to analyticity of mathematics, then you have to get the semantics straight. If we take mathematics to be done in set theory, then the relevant language is first order set theory and the semantics must include stiplulation of the intended interpretation, i.e. the cumulative heirarchy or some sufficiently large initial segment of it) In that case "true in virtue of meaning" means "true in the cumulative heirarchy" which all the theorems of set theory most probably are. If mathematicians did not believe that then they would abandon set theory (or find some other theory/interpretation combination such that they theorems are true in the interpretation(s)). Mathematicians really do believe that their theorems are true, and since the domain of discourse is abstract, truth and analyticity will coincide (existence of abstract objects is not contingent). >>All theorems of sound deductive systems >>are analytic in the sense in which Carnap >>and I use the term, and in the sense >>"true in virtue of meaning". > >Well, I'm still not sure, since Carnap >offers several definitions of 'analytic'. >Do you have one in mind in particular? >Which? Although Carnap had several different approaches to "defining analtyicity" for specific languages, (which wass really his way of defining the semantics of a language, but not later - see below) he did nevertheless always have an overall generic concept of analyticity and I am not aware of any significant change to this (though doubtless he put it in more than one way). The best place to find this is in the Schilpp volume (see below). I looked back at my very concise notes on Carnap's philosophy http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/history/rcp000.htm and found some interesting stuff. In the section on semantics, paragraph headed "semantics and modality". When Carnap came to considering modal logic, he decided to define logical necessity in terms of logical truth (which for him was the same as analyticity). This is the opposite of my proposed definition of analyticity, so in effect he is agreeing with me that the two concepts are interdefinable, but chosing to do it the other way round. ("a proposition is logically necessary iff a sentence expressing it is logically true") This is in the biographical part of the Carnap Schilpp volume. Elsewhere in that volume there is a paper by Bohnert on "Carnaps Theory of Definition and Analyticity" in which there is some discussion of the distinction raised by Quine between definitions of analyticity for specific languages, and the of "the general relative term 'analytic'" for variable S and L. Bohnert thinks this latter will be something like a family resemblance concept for which no definition will be feasible. In Carnap's response however, which is very short and approving, he contradicts this particular point, saying: "it is possible to give general exact definitions both for A-truth (analyticity) and for truth provided that other suitable concepts occurring in these general definitions are introduced by recipe definitions" (here "general" is my "generic" and "recipe" is my "specific") Carnap refers to an earlier response in which he gives he then position on semantics and which contains general definitions for truth and analyticity (pp900-905) I'm please to say that in this (possibly his last account of his position on these methods) he is doing broadly what I have been suggesting is desirable. i.e. that there should be no language specific definition of analyticity, only a general one, which defines analyticity for an arbitrary language in terms of the semantics of that language (not in terms of a definition of analyticity for that language). The definition of semantics is in this proposal given as rules of designation, not as a language specific definition of truth or analyticity. Hope this is not just adding to the confusion! Roger Jones -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rbj at rbjones.com Fri Mar 27 09:55:37 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2009 13:55:37 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Frederick's conception of the A Priori In-Reply-To: <2A5681ED93AA4FDF85DF96B822B0D3E9@DFLVQC1J> References: <1415342723F0448AA379C7A4E2CFC634@DFLVQC1J> <417124460.31621237817039010.JavaMail.root@sz0010a.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net> <2A5681ED93AA4FDF85DF96B822B0D3E9@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <20090