From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Sun Jan 25 17:57:59 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 22:57:59 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Roger's Questions about Anayticity In-Reply-To: <200901251532.01066.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <666442.79779.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <200901211741.46649.rbj@rbjones.com> <200901251532.01066.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <602ACAACD69245BE9E04F7D93E25C993@DFLVQC1J> Hi Roger, I think I can see the source of our disagreement. You say: 'If I speak in English about the analyticity of some French sentence, e.g. "...." is an analytic sentence of the French language, this claim will be synthetic (whatever the sentence in quotes), supposing the phrase "the French language" to mean something like "the language spoken in France". This is because the language spoken in France might have been quite other than it in fact is (or at least, that explains it being contingent). If you disagree with my proviso about the meaning of "The French Language" then chose some other phrase which refers to that language without connoting its semantics.' However, the name "...." either refers to an interpreted string or it does not. If it does not, it is impossible that the string is analytic. If it does, then the string is either analytic or it is not. If it is analytic, then the statement that it is analytic is necessarily true and the statement that it is not analytic is necessarily false. If it is not analytic, then the statement that it is analytic is necessarily false and the statement that it is not analytic is necessarily true. In every possibility the attribution of analyticity is either necessarily true or necessarily false. You say: '"...." is an analytic sentence of the French language.' I interpret this as a sentence which begins with a name, which is a rigid designator. If the name refers to an uninterpreted string, then it does not refer to something that can be analytic; so let's assume that it refers to an interpreted string. In this case, it is context-dependent, just like many other names. Thus, in one context I use 'John' to refer to my brother. In another context, I use 'John' to refer to a friend. Your phrase, 'of the French language,' supplies the context which determines the reference. So we now know we a talking about the sentence interpreted as a French sentence. The statement that that sentence is analytic is thus either necessarily true or necessarily false. But you go on: 'supposing the phrase "the French language" to mean something like "the language spoken in France"' Now, this seems to involve a different meaning in that a rigid designator is replaced with a non-rigid designator. Thus in place of the name "...." and a disambiguating context, we get a definite description: 'The interpretation of "...." as a sentence of the language (that happens to be) spoken in France.' Within this definite description, "...." is the name of an uninterpreted string. So the definite description refers to different interpretations in different possible worlds, depending upon which particular language is spoken by the French in those worlds. Analyticity still attaches de re to interpreted sentences (or to interpretations of sentences), but the definite descriptions (non-rigid designators) pick out different interpretations (or different interpreted sentences) in different possible worlds, and thus they pick out an analytic interpreted sentence in one world but a non-analytic interpreted sentence in another. You then say: 'the implication of supposing that the name of a language connotes its semantics is that someone who does not have a complete knowledge of a language does not know the meaning of its name either.' Nothing that I have said implies that the name of a language CONNOTES its semantics. For example, let me just call the (interpreted, actual) French language 'Peter.' Then the name 'Peter' as I use it REFERS to French with its semantics (of which I am ignorant, not being a French speaker). And the sentence: '"...." is an analytic sentence of Peter,' is either necessarily true or necessarily false (again, here, 'of Peter' provides a context which determines the reference of the quotation name, which reference is an interpreted sentence). You say: 'It may be argued that for the purposes of delineating analyticity, it is not in fact essential that semantic assent preserve meaning, or that it preserve analyticity' I do not know what Carnap's position is (I have not read him for a quarter of a century). But it seems to me that semantic ascent must refer to expressions taken with their meanings, because nothing relevant could be said about meaningless strings. I am a bit out of practice with the logic-chopping, so if you or anyone else can point out mistakes in what I have said, I will be pleased to hear about it. Best wishes, Danny From rbj at rbjones.com Tue Jan 27 10:51:26 2009 From: rbj at rbjones.com (Roger Bishop Jones) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2009 15:51:26 +0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Roger's Questions about Anayticity In-Reply-To: <602ACAACD69245BE9E04F7D93E25C993@DFLVQC1J> References: <666442.79779.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <200901251532.01066.rbj@rbjones.com> <602ACAACD69245BE9E04F7D93E25C993@DFLVQC1J> Message-ID: <200901271551.27208.rbj@rbjones.com> Danny, That was an impressive bit of "logic chopping" as you call it, but I'm afraid I remain obdurate. I believe that you are trying to refute my allegation that a true attribution of analyticity need not itself be analytic. Your rebuttal hinges upon there being no way of referring to the semantics of the relevant language which does not employ a rigid designator, making the semantics referred to fixed across all possible worlds. I don't agree that this is the case (this would require both that "The French Language" be a "rigid designator" and that the semantics of a language is an "essential attribute" of it, neither of which do I accept). In any case this would only establish that the attribution of analyticity is necessary, not that it is analytic. regards, Roger Jones From Jlsperanza at aol.com Tue Jan 27 12:08:40 2009 From: Jlsperanza at aol.com (Jlsperanza at aol.com) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2009 12:08:40 EST Subject: [hist-analytic] A Second Paradox of Analysis? Message-ID: In a message dated 1/27/2009 11:30:32 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, rbj at rbjones.com writes: In any case this would only establish that the attribution of analyticity is necessary, not that it is analytic. So perhaps what we need is a label, 'self-analytic'. Mmm. Let's see. Not much luck. But an online paper by P. Subel reads: "the language describing [this] may be entrenched, or even self-entrenched in the sense just described." I tried 'auto-analytic' (recall that 'identity' and 'tautology' do play on the repetitive elements of the expressions, identity, from 'idem', and 'tautology' from 'tautos', the same, or very own). "Auto-analytical apparatus and analytical methods - Patent 3865549 An auto-analytical machine for the analysis of liquid samples comprises, in combination, a reaction chamber, a sample reservoir for holding the sample to be ... www.freepatentsonline.com/3865549.html - Similar pages - by Wellcome, Found - 1975 - Cited by 3 - Related articles - All 2 versions." It's a bit like the autological paradox. (p) "p is not an analytic sentence" but (q) "p is not an analytic sentence" or "p is an analytic sentence" is, in a classic two-valued interpretation, thus analytic? We should recall that for the Greeks fewer things were analytic than they are for some of us! analytic, f. Gk. verb, "analuein," to unloose, undo (itself from "ana," up, back + "luein" to loose), and in this way cognate with Latin verb "solvere" to loosen, dissolve. (So Sp. and Pg. solver, It. solvere.). Not that the Latin 'u' and 'v' are identical, and thus, 'soluere' looks closer to the Greek. Now this OED cite attempts an identification of 'unloosing' with 'irresoluto', i.e. with a formation of 'solvere' plus a negative prefix, 'irre-': 1593 QUEEN ELIZABETH Boeth. III. met. ii. 46 Nature..strains with vnlousing Knot [L. irresoluto nexu] eche thing. This other OED quote provides 'unlosably' as meaning 'indissolubly': 1445 PECOCK Donet 214 More wo is to me at ei ben vnlosabli lettid..from e laboure of meditacioun. This brings me to 'irresolution' which the OED traces as "prob. from the French irr?solution (Montaigne, 16th c.), f. ir- (IR-2) + r?solution: cf. It. irresoluzione, -solutione (Florio, 1598)" and defines as "want of resolution", "the condition of not having arrived at a settled opinion on some subject." So, oddly, it seems that while many analytic philosophers appeal to 'analytic' only if they _have_ settled an opinion on some subject, the etymology says precisely otherwise! Cheers, J. L. **************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps! (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1215855013x1201028747/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=62%26bcd=De cemailfooterNO62) From danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk Tue Jan 27 15:10:18 2009 From: danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk (Danny Frederick) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2009 20:10:18 -0000 Subject: [hist-analytic] Roger's Questions about Anayticity In-Reply-To: <200901271551.27208.rbj@rbjones.com> References: <666442.79779.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <200901251532.01066.rbj@rbjones.com> <602ACAACD69245BE9E04F7D93E25C993@DFLVQC1J> <200901271551.27208.rbj@rbjones.com> Message-ID: <049D8078280244F6989FB5D27022B460@DFLVQC1J> Hi Roger, I almost agree with you. Your claim was that the attribution of analyticity to a sentence is synthetic. My objection was that the attribution of analyticity to a sentence is either necessarily true or necessarily false - provided that the sentence in which the attribution is made picks out by means of a rigid designator the sentence to which analyticity is attributed. The first question here is how the objection, which is about necessary truth (and falsehood) relates to the claim, which is about analyticity. This is not such an easy question. If we say that analyticity is truth in virtue of meaning, we meet the issue of whether meanings are 'in the head.' When Kant spoke of analytic truths, he assumed that (roughly) 'analytic' means true in virtue of meaning and (since meanings are 'in the head') 'analytic' means true a priori. Since Kripke, this has been untenable. 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' is necessarily true, and it is true in virtue of the meanings of the terms. But it is not a priori true, because the meanings of the two singular terms are not fully transparent to us; that is, we only grasp so much of the meaning of each (at least enough to use the term to talk about its reference), but not enough to know that they refer to the same thing. Thus we could say that 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' is analytic because, given what its terms mean, it is impossible that it should be false (and thus it is true in virtue of the meaning of its terms). But it is not knowable a priori. So Kant might call it 'synthetic.' Given this distinction between objective meaning ('outside the head') and subjective meaning ('inside the head'), it seems to me that the analytic-synthetic distinction is best dispensed with. Let us talk only about necessary truths (and their negations) and non-necessary truths (and their negations). As for 'a priori' and 'empirical,' we can consign those designations to the dustbin of philosophical history for Duhemian reasons. So I am kinda with Quine, except that I would insist on the distinction between necessary and contingent truths (though we can never know for sure which is which). Now to the more minor points. My 'rebuttal' did not hinge upon the claim that the only way of referring to the semantics of a language is by means of a rigid designator. We always have the option of a definite description. What my rebuttal depended on is that an unambiguous singular term (rigid or non-rigid) referring to a bit of language refers EITHER to uninterpreted symbols OR to interpreted symbols. I was complaining that you tended to switch between the two. Uninterpreted symbols can be given different interpretations (in which case they cease to be uninterpreted symbols); but uninterpreted symbols cannot be necessarily true. Interpreted symbols can be necessarily true; but if they are so, they are necessarily so. Similarly, if we mean by 'the French language' just the noises or marks that people make when using it, then what we mean is something that has no semantics. But if we mean by 'the French language' the interpreted, meaningful noises or marks that people utter or inscribe when using it, then we mean something that has a specific semantics. We can use 'the French language' either way. But we should use it consistently whichever way we choose. Then we will avoid the apparent paradox that '.' is necessarily true is itself not necessarily true. I feel sure that this issue will have been fully discussed in modal logic texts. Perhaps Steve Bayne knows where. Doesn't Kripke deal with it in his semantics for modal logic? I've not read such stuff since 1987, so I am vague. Best wishes, Danny